

Consolidating Gains in LSCO: Analyzing the Army's Role in Stability Operations

A Monograph

by

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14. ABSTRACT With the updated publication of ADP 3-0 in 2019, the Army operating concept incorporated the need to conduct Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) against near-peer threats. The doctrine now calls for simultaneous execution of offense, defense, and stability operations, but downtrace doctrine still reflects best practices from counterinsurgency operations. A case study is presented on the occupation of Japan post World War Two, analyzing the use of the Japanese government to assist in the rule of millions of people. While the occupation of Japan was conducted under unique circumstances, Army leaders can draw lessons that will be useful during the implementation of a transitional military authority during LSCO.					
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Abstract

Consolidating Gains in LSCO: Analyzing the Army's Role in Stability Operations, by MAJ Jesse C. Cain, 44 pages.

With the updated publication of ADP 3-0 in 2019, the Army operating concept incorporated the need to conduct Large Scale Operations (LSCO) against near-peer threats. This update reflected the changes in the 2018 National Defense Strategy to address increased Chinese and Russian aggression. The doctrine now calls for simultaneous execution of offense, defense, and stability operations, but downtrace doctrine still reflects best practices from counterinsurgency operations. The older doctrine emphasized the use of civilian agencies to conduct stability task at the conclusion of conflict as it transitioned to phase four operations. During counterinsurgency operations the security environment allowed these organizations to work concurrently with the US Army; during LSCO, this may not be the case. Throughout this study the lessons the US Army can learn from the occupation of Japan provide an example of a way to guide the execution of stability tasks while concurrently conducting offense and defense operations during LSCO. At the direction of General MacArthur, the strategy in Japan was to leverage the Japanese government to assist in the rule of millions of people across the country. The execution of occupation tasks was supervised by the military governance of the US Eighth Army. While the occupation of Japan was conducted under unique circumstances, Army leaders can draw lessons that will be useful during the implementation of a transitional military authority during LSCO.

Contents

Acknowledgements.....	v
Abbreviations.....	vi
Figures.....	vii
Introduction.....	1
Literature Review.....	8
Methodology.....	23
Analysis.....	26
Conclusion and Recommendations.....	42
Bibliography.....	46

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Abbreviations

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
ATP	Army Techniques Publication
CAD	Civil Affairs Division
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
COIN	Counterinsurgency
DFE	Dynamic Force Employment
FM	Field Manual
GHQ	General Headquarters
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGO	Inter-governmental Organization
LSCO	Large Scale Combat Operations
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
PWC	Postwar Programs Committee
SCAP	Supreme Commander for The Allied Powers
SSTR	Stabilization, Security, Transition, Reconstruction
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Figures

Figure 1. Functions of Military Government Units in Japan.....	12
Figure 2. Organization of Eighth Army Military Government Section.....	14

Section I: Introduction

Background of the Study

As the United States Army changes its operational framework from counterinsurgency (COIN) to conducting Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) against near-peer threats, it must simultaneously re-examine how to effectively conduct stability operations. Historically, as during World War Two, the US Army shouldered the task of conducting rebuilding operations after successful LSCO. Although the doctrinal terms have changed, the current stability tasks remain the same as those conducted during the Japanese occupation.

At the conclusion of World War Two, the United States led the occupation force in Japan to provide security, support the economy, bolster the governance, and restore essential infrastructure to the population.¹ The occupation forces consisted of combat formations for security and disarmament, and military government teams who oversaw other occupation tasks. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the Pacific (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur, directed the completion of occupation tasks to ensure that Japan complied with the terms agreed on in the instrument of surrender.²

The evolution of stability planning efforts over the last seventy-five years since World War Two has been influenced by continuous limited warfare and COIN operations. In 2005, Department of Defense Directive 3000.5 assigned the military as the lead entity for planning stability operations due to security and capabilities gaps with civilian organizations, as recently experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan.³ The update to doctrine in 2019 changes the way in which

¹ Douglas MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1966).

² Eighth Army Headquarters, *Eighth US Army in Japan, 30 August 1945 - 1 May 1946* (Tokyo: Eighth US Army Printing plant, 1946), 3.

³ Eleanore Douglas, *Infrastructure Reconstruction: Imperative in the National Interest: Final Report* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2006), 18.

LSCO will be fought as compared to previous COIN operations. Now commanders must be prepared to conduct offense, defense, and stability operations simultaneously.

This study examined the parallels in providing essential services between the anticipated LSCO environment, and the end of World War Two in Japan. To best illustrate those parallels, the analysis highlights the occupation planning that started in 1943 through the first eighteen months of the Japanese occupation. Juxtaposing these actions against current doctrine explains similarities with stability operations during LSCO and provides lessons learned from those past experiences for military planners.

Statement of the Problem

Current US Army doctrine explains that during LSCO, commanders simultaneously combine the elements of decisive action – offense, defense, and stability operations.⁴ Extensive and thorough research analyzing the implications and consequences of conducting these operations simultaneously is lacking—almost non-existent—despite the tremendous differences in COIN and LSCO that would call for such an analysis. Additionally, the current assumption in doctrine is that local or international development and humanitarian organizations are already established in theater and can fulfill the requirement to support stability operations.⁵ This is based on experiences gained from COIN operations, where support from organizations like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was readily available. During and as LSCO winds down—the timeframe when stability operations should begin—the military cannot guarantee the security posture for the presence of civilian organizations and will therefore be in the lead for stability operations. The current gap in the research is highlighted by this discrepancy

⁴ US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), paragraph 3-3.

⁵ US Department of Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07, *Stability* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, July 2019), 52.

between contemplated civilian agency support and the simultaneous execution of offense, defense, and stability operations.

The purpose of this study is to examine stability operations in LSCO in order to close the research gap regarding simultaneous execution of offense, defense, and stability operations. Specifically, a case study of Japan post World War Two demonstrates the way in which General MacArthur and Eighth Army aligned forces to conduct stability tasks and restore minimum essential services. The study also analyzes how current US Army doctrine has addressed these same requirements.

The shift in Army operational framework from COIN to LSCO requires an analysis of how armed forces should conduct operations against near peer threats. With the publication of ADP 3-0 in 2019, unified land operations changed the conduct of decisive action to require concurrent offense, defense, and stability operations to effectively defeat enemies in depth. This concurrence in operations will influence commander's future decisions of how they will achieve unity of effort in combat. The lessons learned while fighting a near-peer threat during World War Two will be lost to memory if they are not incorporated in future operations. This study seeks to provide options for operational commanders by drawing parallels between the LSCO operational framework and the conduct of forces during World War Two.

Definition of Terms

To provide a common understanding, this study provides definitions of several key concepts discussed throughout the paper. The current US Army doctrine publications provide the primary reference for definitions of operations to consolidate gains, stability operations, transitional military authority, and restore essential services. The Hague Convention provides the primary reference for occupation, and military governance.

Operations to Consolidate Gains

Army operations to consolidate gains are activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate authorities. While Army forces consolidate gains throughout an operation, consolidating gains becomes the overall focus of Army forces after large-scale combat operations have concluded.⁶

Stability Operations

“A stability operation is conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to provide a secure environment, essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”⁷ During these operations commanders are legally required to provide security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment as minimum essential stability operations tasks when controlling populated area of operations.⁸

Transitional Military Authority

A transitional military authority is a temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. Under extreme circumstances, the intervening authority has a legal and moral responsibility to install a transitional military authority on behalf of the population.⁹

Occupation

Occupation of a territory was codified during the Hague Convention of 1907. Specifically, Article 42 of Section III on Military Authority states that territory is considered

⁶ US Army, ADP 3-0, 2019, 1-35.

⁷ Ibid., 3-14.

⁸ Ibid., 3-14.

⁹ US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), paragraph 2-39.

occupied when it is placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.¹⁰

Military Government

The authority of an occupying force to rule those in the occupied was also codified during the Hague Convention of 1907. Specifically, Article 43 of Section III on Military Authority states that the authority of a legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws of force in the country.¹¹

Restore Essential Services

Efforts to restore essential services ultimately contribute to achieving a stable democracy, a sustainable economy, and the social well-being of the population. In failing or failed states or in the aftermath of armed conflict and major disasters, military forces support efforts to establish or restore the most basic civil services: the essential food, water, shelter, and medical support necessary to sustain the population until local civil services are restored.¹²

Theoretical Framework

This study uses the framework of institutionalism to define actions and capabilities that operational commanders must use to implement stability operations during operations to consolidate gains as a part of LSCO. The goal of institutionalism is to cede some of the freedom of action to achieve better outcomes than those arrived at in the state of nature.¹³ Using institutionalism to analyze the required actions taken by the occupation forces after World War

¹⁰ “Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV),” Conclusion date: October 18, 1907, *Article 42*, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp#art41.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Article 43.

¹² US Army, ADP 3-07, 2-74.

¹³ Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 209.

Two in Japan will outline lessons learned for future operations. Using institutionalism to analyze the current army doctrine will highlight the implied way in which commanders will conduct the required actions. Commanders are ethically and legally responsible to provide minimum essential services to a country in which it is conducting combat operations. These legal and ethical requirements to care for the population of an occupied country are outlined in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and as such commanders have the duty to provide these services.¹⁴ As of yet, no other study ties together the concepts of providing and restoring minimum essential services and LSCO.

Hypothesis

The study tested three hypotheses to determine a way in which essential services can be restored or provided during the execution of LSCO. First, if the US Army is expected to conduct offense, defense, and stability operations concurrently, a military government is necessary. Second, if the security environment during LSCO does not permit the employment of civilian Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) or non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), then the US Army must accomplish those humanitarian tasks that are part of traditional stability operations. Lastly, if these civilian agencies are not available to supplement the military government, then the US Army must leverage local government officials and employees.

Research Questions

There are one primary and three secondary questions that guided this study. The primary question was, what lessons can the US Army learn from the occupation of Japan to guide the concurrent execution of offense, defense, and stability operations during LSCO? The following are the secondary questions: How did General MacArthur administer the military government at the strategic level? How did Eighth Army execute the operational level of the occupation at the

¹⁴ *Department of Defense Law of War Manual* (Washington, DC: General Counsel of the Department of Defense, 2015), 799.

conclusion of conflict? How can current doctrine and lessons from World War Two, specifically from Japan post-conflict, improve a commander's ability to provide essential services?

The significant limitation of this study is that most current secondary source research on the Japanese occupation have not analyzed the effectiveness of operational planning or administration of the occupation, and instead focused on the implementation of strategic policies. Therefore, due to the timeframe being researched the primary sources such as unit histories and reports can be hard to find and analyze.

The study covers the occupation planning that started in 1943 through the first eighteen months of the Japanese occupation. Narrowing the time analyzed for the occupation allows for a focus on the requirements to restore minimum essential services to the Japanese people. The study will only cover the American conduct of the occupation of Japan. The analysis focuses primarily on the administration of occupation tasks conducted by the US Sixth and Eighth Army during the first-year post conflict. Narrowing the analysis to cover the operational level of war ensures that the focus is on how Army forces accomplished the restoration of essential services.

This study relied on two assumptions. First, that the damage inflicted upon an area of operations during LSCO will be at a scope and scale that parallels World War Two in Japan. Second, that the army will not be able to rely upon the presence of inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations during operations to consolidate gains in LSCO.

This study is organized into five sections. Section one includes the background of the study, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, definition of terms, theoretical framework, research questions, limitations, delimitations, and the assumptions of the study. Section two presents a review of the relevant literature, focusing on the occupation forces in Japan after World War Two and the requirements for stability operations in current army doctrine. Section three describes the methodology used for this research study, to include the selection of the case study, application scenarios, and procedures for analysis. Section four analyzes the case study and

current doctrine, to address the hypotheses and research questions. Section five provides a summary, discussion of the key findings, and the implications for theory and practice.

Section II: Literature Review

Introduction

General MacArthur, as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), directed his General Headquarters (GHQ) to develop the Blacklist operational plan for occupation with the use of a military government.¹⁵ Discrete use of existing Japanese political and military organizations during the occupation reduced the difficulties inherent with controlling the population.¹⁶ The literature review also outlines the LSCO updates to ADP 3-0 and ADP 3-07 published in 2019, and the current doctrinal requirements for military governance outlined in FM 3-07 from 2014. In conjunction with the doctrine, the policies and procedures used to ensure Japanese adherence to the requirements of occupation provide historical precedence to the future requirements of military governance and stability operations during LSCO.

Military Government During the Occupation of Japan

The *Reports of General MacArthur* was officially published by the Department of the Army to illuminate the monumental requirement of planning an occupation to restore the defeated Japanese nation.¹⁷ These reports offer insight on the execution of the occupation in Japan, and the preliminary work that began in 1943. The reports were then completed after the war by members of his G-2 section, headed by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby with Professor Gordon W. Prange from the University of Maryland.¹⁸ When describing the success of the occupation,

¹⁵ MacArthur, *Reports*, 69.

¹⁶ Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1992), 3.

¹⁷ MacArthur, *Reports*, iii.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, iii.

MacArthur's staff credits four main factors: the use of the existing Japanese government and the authority of their emperor; the wisdom of the Supreme Commander to solve the problems inherent in transforming a totalitarian government to a democracy; the patience and tact of occupation forces when handling a humiliated and defeated people; and the unexpected cooperation of Japanese officials and the population.¹⁹ While MacArthur's staff praised his prescience on how to treat the Japanese people, no question caused greater difficulty for American policy makers than how to treat Emperor Hirohito.²⁰

Part of the difficulties in deciding on the disposition of the Japanese Emperor was caused by the conflict of choosing between China and Japan as the regional power in Asia post World War Two. Michael Schaller, in *The American Occupation of Japan*, elaborates on the key people and organizations that were responsible for this decision.²¹ State Department area specialists like High Borton, Robert Feary, and George Blakeslee of the special research division met with their counterparts in the War Department's Civil Affairs Division (CAD) to discuss the shape of a postwar settlement.²² In 1944, however, the State Department's new Postwar Programs Committee (PWC) and the army's CAD were given greater authority to recommend an occupation plan for Japan, stipulating the nations to be involved, the programs to be followed, and the method for disposing of Japan's colonies and conquests.²³ Not only were these teams tasked with completing this monumental planning effort, but they also had to reconcile the differing schools of thought regarding the treatment of Emperor Hirohito.

¹⁹ MacArthur, *Reports*, 230.

²⁰ Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 11.

²¹ Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

²² Schaller, *American Occupation*, 6.

²³ *Ibid.*, 7.

The prominent author Howard B. Schonberger elaborated upon the differing State Department schools of thought regarding the fate of the Japanese Emperor in his work *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952*.²⁴ The Conservative School scholars advocated for the purging of Japanese military leaders and modest reforms of Japanese institutions to effectively reign in the expansionism executed during the war.²⁵ The Progressive school scholars advocated for a series of reforms to destroy the prewar ruling oligarchy and elevate the truly democratic and anti-imperialist elements. These elements existed primarily in the trade union movement, peasant associations, universities, and moderately left-wing parties within Japan.²⁶ A pivotal person to guiding the outcome of these planning efforts was Joseph Grew, the Under-Secretary of State, who firmly advocated the existing monarchy be used to unify liberal elements in Japan willing to cooperate with the objectives of the United States.²⁷

Under-Secretary of State Grew was especially interested with the most important recommendation that United Nations (UN) forces in Japan not be given distinct zones of occupation such as were planned in Germany.²⁸ In addition, the PWC report favored the use of Japanese government officials for administrative purposes, and at least temporarily retaining the Emperor.²⁹ After the successful detonation of nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, President Truman ordered his cabinet on August 10th 1945 to send a missive to Tokyo. President Truman informed Tokyo that if Emperor Hirohito signed and issued surrender orders and pledged obedience to the American occupation commander, he could remain on the throne pending the

²⁴ Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 11.

²⁸ Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 25.

²⁹ Schaller, *American Occupation*, 7.

freely expressed will of the Japanese people.³⁰ This stipulation to retain the throne helped expedite Japan's intention to surrender under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.³¹

With combat operations in the Pacific Theater over by mid-August 1945, General Douglas MacArthur prepared more than half a million American troops to remake the ancient and highly sophisticated society of some eighty million Japanese people.³² General MacArthur, as Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP), was granted the authority to establish a direct military government through the discrete use of the Emperor, and the existing Japanese government and military organizations.³³ He understood that to accomplish economy in the use of occupation troops to achieve the Potsdam declaration objectives would require the Japanese government to do the work of reforming their country.³⁴ As such, General MacArthur and his staff published Operation Blacklist that employed the 279,428 soldiers and Marines with Sixth Army, and 246,743 soldiers with Eighth Army to conduct the occupation of Japan.³⁵ In addition to combat forces, four military government companies were immediately constituted from GHQ and Civil Affairs units operating in the Philippines. When additional occupation requirements were determined, units in the United States were alerted.³⁶

The military government groups consisted of thirteen officers, one warrant officer, and twenty-six enlisted men, while a military government company consisted of twelve officers and sixty enlisted men.³⁷ These companies and groups were the front-line units of military

³⁰ Schaller, *American Occupation*, 17.

³¹ Anne Hartwell Johnstone and William Crane Johnstone, *What Are We Doing with Japan?* (New York: American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1946), 56.

³² Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 1.

³³ MacArthur, *Reports*, 69.

³⁴ Eighth Army Headquarters, *Occupational Monograph of the Eighth United States Army in Japan, August 1945 - January 1946* (Tokyo: Eighth US Army Printing plant, 1947), 43.

³⁵ MacArthur, *Reports*, 16.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 198.

³⁷ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 - Jan 46*, 120.

governance in the field and came in frequent contact with local Japanese in order to observe conditions and compliance with General MacArthur's policies firsthand.³⁸ These teams communicated his intent that local Japanese authorities were responsible for their own condition, they must provide their own emergency relief supplies, and promote the welfare and education of the community.³⁹ The assigned military government groups and subordinate companies contained several specialists: experts in engineering, legal matters, medicine, public safety, natural resources, industry, and others.⁴⁰ See Figure 1 for the functions of these teams.




Figure 1. Functions of Military Government Units in Japan, July 1948. Douglas MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1966), 204.

Upon establishing his headquarters in Tokyo, General MacArthur decided to use an indirect method of control for the Japanese occupation and augmented the military government

³⁸ MacArthur, *Reports*, 203.

³⁹ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 139.

⁴⁰ MacArthur, *Reports*, 199 (other fields of specialty included supply, translator service, labor supervision and control, salvage operations, and transportation).

units with over a dozen special staff sections that paralleled the Japanese cabinet structure.⁴¹ The GHQ occupation staff was primarily concerned with the non-military civil affairs, and governmental aspects for planning and policy direction.⁴² These staff sections oversaw the seven regional military government teams that paralleled Japanese Governmental organization and were named after the prefecture they were assigned.⁴³ With the exception of the Tokyo, Kanazawa, and Shizouka prefectural teams which reported directly to the Eighth Army Commander, the regional and prefectural teams were attached to IX, XI, and XIV corps.⁴⁴

On the operational level the commanding generals of the Sixth and Eighth Armies were charged with the implementation of SCAP directives.⁴⁵ The Sixth and Eighth Army commanders would issue their detailed orders to accomplish these special tasks, but would not disturb Japanese demobilized security forces or Japanese public servants except under specific orders.⁴⁶ Instead of instituting military government, army commanders were to supervise the execution of policies that were issued directly to the Japanese Government.⁴⁷

To ensure Japanese compliance with General MacArthur's directives, the Eighth Army utilized their subordinate corps and military government teams to conduct transitory inspections, and provide continuous observation and surveillance.⁴⁸ Corps commanders were not permitted to delegate their responsibilities, and military government groups and companies slated for use in the field were not to be assigned other duties.⁴⁹ The Eighth Army organized its military

⁴¹ Schaller, *American Occupation*, 27.

⁴² MacArthur, *Reports*, 195.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 201.

⁴⁴ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 120.

⁴⁵ MacArthur, *Reports*, 198.

⁴⁶ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 122.

⁴⁷ MacArthur, *Reports*, 35.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 73.

⁴⁹ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 121.

government into three principal agencies: a staff section at Army Headquarters for oversight and reporting, a staff section at each of the two corps headquarters for regional governance, and military government units stationed throughout Japan within the prefectures.⁵⁰ This allowed the Eighth Army military government section to become a policy-making body that could act in a supervisory capacity to investigate and report on local social, economic, and political conditions.⁵¹

In anticipation of any emergencies that might develop upon arrival in Japan, the Sixth Army selected members of tactical units to be organized into military government staff sections at divisional and regimental levels.⁵² The *98th Division Occupation Report* highlights the problem of occupation being paradoxically both simplified, and at the same time rendered complex by the decision to operate through the existing Japanese government.⁵³ In the lead-up to the occupation of Japan, division leadership had anticipated the requirement to participate as part of a military government, and as such a team was selected from division officers.⁵⁴ These officers were augmented with a trained military government team, and the division established the G5 staff section to complete the great scope and complexity of carrying out the terms of surrender, allied policies, and liaison pertaining to the Japanese civilian society.⁵⁵

By 31 December 1945, the Sixth Army was relieved of occupation duties and all high-point soldiers had redeployed. General Eichelberger of Eighth Army assumed responsibility for the remaining 18,123 officers and 223,383 enlisted men who administered the occupation of

⁵⁰ MacArthur, *Reports*, 198.

⁵¹ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 119.

⁵² MacArthur, *Reports*, 198.

⁵³ 98th Infantry Division, *Historical Report: The Occupation of Japan: Period 15 August 1945 to 30 November 1945* (Osaka: Headquarters 98th Infantry Division, 1945), 51.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁵⁵ 98th Division, *Historical Report*, 55.

Japan.⁵⁶ Prior to relinquishing his duties of military government, the 98th Division Commander implored planners to consider the need for trained specialists to supervise civilian activities.⁵⁷ While military government team commanders were in no sense military governors, they were expected to direct the issuance and implementation of an order in grave emergencies.⁵⁸ Properly executing and adhering to these orders required the best minds in the fields of economics, education, public health and welfare, public utilities, commerce, industry, price control, rationing, and the innumerable complexities of modern civil government.⁵⁹ Specifically, Maj. Gen. A.M. Harper asked future planners to create definite military government responsibilities, as variety in application or interpretation of existing directives is a source of embarrassment to commanders in their dealings with the civilian population.⁶⁰

Military Government During LSCO

The primary revision in 2019 to the Army's operational concept of unified land operations published in ADP 3-0 *Operations* was the addition of the need to prevail in LSCO. What defines large-scale ground combat operations are the sustained combat operations that involve multiple corps and divisions.⁶¹ This scope and scale of conventional warfare has been smaller since the completion of World War Two in 1945, but it retains its inherent lethality and complexity in future conflict with near-peer threats.⁶² To deter and defeat these threats the second revision to the Army's operational concept recognizes that defeating the enemy in multiple

⁵⁶ MacArthur, *Reports*, 58.

⁵⁷ 98th Division, *Historical Report*, 69.

⁵⁸ MacArthur, *Reports*, 203.

⁵⁹ 98th Division, *Historical Report*, 69.

⁶⁰ 98th Division, *Historical Report*, 69.

⁶¹ US Army, ADP 3-0, 2019, 1-7.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 1-7.

domains can only be done by conducting offense, defense, and stability operations simultaneously.⁶³

During counterinsurgency operations divisions were operational units, but with the 2019 publication of ADP 3-0 the echelon where all elements of decisive action occur simultaneously changed from division to the corps.⁶⁴ This change highlights the adapting thought that during LSCO divisions will be considered tactical units, and in future conflict the corps will achieve simultaneity by integrating operations across multiple domains.⁶⁵ In order to achieve this end, army forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains throughout an operation as part of defeating the enemy in detail to accomplish overall political and strategic objectives.⁶⁶

During LSCO early and effective consolidation activities are a form of exploitation performed while other operations are ongoing, and are anticipated to enable the achievement of lasting favorable outcomes in the shortest time span.⁶⁷ In contrast, the previous iteration of ADP 3-0 published in 2017 focused on the consolidation of gains when the operational emphasis in an area of operations shifted from large-scale combat operations.⁶⁸ Additionally, ADRP 3-0 in 2017 stated that stability operations would be done in the consolidation area that would extend from its higher headquarters boundary to the boundary of forces in close operations.⁶⁹ With the publication of ADP 3-0 in 2019 it states that a consolidation area has all the characteristics of a close area.⁷⁰ The security requirements within the consolidation area can be at odds with

⁶³ US Army, ADP 3-0, 2019, 3-1.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 3-5.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 3-10.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 1-35.

⁶⁷ US Army, ADP 3-0, 2019, 1-35.

⁶⁸ US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), paragraph 31.

⁶⁹ US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), paragraph 4-30.

⁷⁰ US Army, ADP 3-0, 2019, 4-24.

addressing immediate humanitarian concerns. This can create a need for short-term solutions with negative impacts for longer-term objectives.⁷¹

The current field manual 3-07 and technique publication 3-07.5 focus commanders towards using international aid agencies who typically respond quickly due to their presence in or proximity to the affected area.⁷² But, it also states that military forces conduct stability operations during operations to consolidate gains during or after conflict when the security situation hinders the introduction of civilian personnel.⁷³ All operations morally and legally require forces to conduct these minimal-essential stability operations tasks to provide for the well-being of civilian populations.⁷⁴ During actions to consolidate gains, army forces are legally responsible for minimum essential stability operations tasks of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment.⁷⁵ This requirement to conduct minimum essential stability operations is in contrast to ADRP 3-0 (published in 2017), which states if organizations cannot perform these required tasks, they can request relief from those tasks.⁷⁶ The doctrine generally gives the responsibility for providing for the basic needs of the people with the host-nation government or designated civil authorities, agencies, and organizations.⁷⁷ Yet, it also mandates that during operations to consolidate gains leaders make every effort to ensure that if no civilian or host-nation agency is present, then the US forces or organizations must conduct the minimal-essential stability operations tasks.⁷⁸

⁷¹ US Army, ADP 3-07, 2019, 1-49.

⁷² Ibid., 1-53.

⁷³ Ibid., 1-39.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 2-16.

⁷⁵ US Army, ADP 3-07, 2019, 2-15.

⁷⁶ US Army, ADRP 3-0, 2017, 3-5.

⁷⁷ US Army, ADP 3-07, 2019, 2-18.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 2-18.

During LSCO, maneuver forces employ civil-military operations within their capacities until they are given significant augmentation with civil affairs capabilities to perform these tasks effectively.⁷⁹ Civil affairs units are integral in conducting the stability tasks to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.⁸⁰ In some operations, the host nation can meet most or all of the population's requirements, and as such, army forces will usually work directly with those organizations.⁸¹ In operations within a failed state, army forces may need to support the local population and work with other civilian organizations to restore capabilities.⁸² Regardless of the exact situation, civil affairs units focus on the essential tasks that address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace.⁸³ With the publication of ADP 3-07 *Stability* in 2019, the increased use of civil affairs units is necessary where US Government civilian departments and agencies may not be able to participate until the operational environment is conducive and resources are available.⁸⁴ Thus, the joint force commander may have to temporarily assume responsibility for tasks outside those normally associated with the joint stability functions.⁸⁵

Military forces may assume the powers of a sovereign governing authority under two conditions: when military forces intervene in the absence of a functioning government; or when military operations prevent a government from administering to the public sector and providing public services.⁸⁶ The doctrine considers situations where the security environment is in chaos, or

⁷⁹ US Army, ADP 3-0, 2019, 3-30.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 2-17.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 2-18.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 2-18.

⁸³ US Department of the Army, Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 41-01-001, *Civil Affairs General Concepts* (Fort Eustis, VA: Army Training Support Center, 2019), 29.

⁸⁴ US Army, ADP 3-07, 2019, 1-11.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 1-11.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 2-46.

the host nation state is in crisis as a worst-case engagement scenario.⁸⁷ Yet, during LSCO, the environment might not be permissive enough for civilian organizations to provide for the well-being of the population. Therefore, a transitional military authority can exercise the functions of civil administration as an interim solution until the host-nation resumes responsibilities for governmental and infrastructure functions.⁸⁸

When military forces have invaded and are occupying enemy territory, such as in LSCO, the intervening authority has a legal and moral responsibility to install a transitional military authority.⁸⁹ The occupying force will establish this transitional military authority pursuant to international law, including The Hague and Geneva Conventions, or pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution.⁹⁰ While there is currently no overarching concept or doctrine on how to establish a transitional military authority civil affairs forces can exercise the functions of civil administration to provide for the well-being of the populace, maintaining order, and restoring essential services.⁹¹ The authority to implement the transitional military authority resides with the President, and the Secretary of Defense directs the exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the populace.⁹² Once the transitional military authority is established the time that it exercises authority varies based upon the military operation and international law.⁹³ The degree of control exercised by the transitional military authority varies greatly, and as the conditions in

⁸⁷ US Army, ADP 3-07, 2019, 2-56.

⁸⁸ US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), paragraph 1-15.

⁸⁹ US Army, FM 3-07, 2-39.

⁹⁰ US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Stability* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2016), III-63.

⁹¹ US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), II-12.

⁹² US Joint Staff, JP 3-07, III-62.

⁹³ US Army, FM 3-07, 2-47.

the territory stabilize the degree of control can decrease.⁹⁴ The maintenance of an orderly government in the occupied territory by the transitional military authority enables commanders to achieve civil control, stability, and security.⁹⁵

Transitional military authority is administered either operationally which expands in authority as operations continue, or territorially as a separate organization under the direct command of the joint force commander.⁹⁶ Under the operational form the chain of command retains the responsibility for authority and is supported by its staff structure.⁹⁷ Concentrating authority and responsibility in the commander integrates the civil administration responsibilities under the transitional military authority with ongoing operations.⁹⁸ This advantage is tempered by the tempo of operations may not provide the commander with the time necessary to address the civil administration responsibilities, and operational headquarters are not always aligned with known political divisions.⁹⁹ Under the territorial form commanders establish a separate organization to exercise the functions of civil administration.¹⁰⁰ Territorial forms of transitional military authority are established after the operational area is stabilized to ensure improved continuity of policy and administration.¹⁰¹ This advantage is tempered by undue risk created by a possible lack of coordination and communication, cooperation, and coordination.¹⁰² Successful transitional military authority often depends on the assessments and initial identification of civil

⁹⁴ US Army, FM 3-07, 2-48.

⁹⁵ US Army, FM 3-57, 2-37.

⁹⁶ US Army, FM 3-07, 2-53.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 2-54.

⁹⁸ US Joint Staff, JP 3-07, D-3.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, D-3.

¹⁰⁰ US Army, FM 3-07, 2-57.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 2-58.

¹⁰² US Joint Staff, JP 3-07, D-6.

vulnerabilities of remaining host nation government officials.¹⁰³ Generally, if a transitional military authority is established then host nation high-ranking political officials will not be retained and military forces may be required to perform their duties.¹⁰⁴ When practical, the transitional military authority should retain subordinate officials of the local government who can discharge their duties under supervision of appropriately trained military personnel.¹⁰⁵ Thorough integration of civil affairs capabilities focuses on applying civilian sector expertise to conduct government operations through positive interaction with the civilian population.¹⁰⁶

During LSCO returning a host nation to normalcy as quickly as possible is critical to success, and understanding what normalcy looks like is key for planning appropriately.¹⁰⁷ Ultimately the responsibility for stability rests with the host nation, therefore commanders must respect the views and interpretations of what the host nation believes the solutions to stability should be.¹⁰⁸ To facilitate this understanding, the doctrine implores planners to identify host-nation personnel to inform the populace of the measures to be imposed and the justification for the action.¹⁰⁹ Partnerships with these organizations ensure smooth transitions, and civil affairs units may have already developed a trust relationship among actors on both sides.¹¹⁰ For a commander and staff to accomplish stability operations simultaneously with offense and defense, they should employ civil affairs units who have the unique combination of knowledge, understanding, and cultural awareness to achieve unity of effort.¹¹¹

¹⁰³ US Army, FM 3-57, 2-33.

¹⁰⁴ US Army, FM 3-07, 2-62.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 2-63.

¹⁰⁶ US Army, FM 3-57, 2-35.

¹⁰⁷ US Army, FM 3-07, 2-3.

¹⁰⁸ US Army, ADP 3-07, 2019, 1-15.

¹⁰⁹ US Army, GTA 41-01-001, 33.

¹¹⁰ US Army, FM 3-07, 2-5.

¹¹¹ US Army, ADP 3-07, 2019, 2-60.

Summary

This review of the literature provided a description of military governance in Japan after World War Two as well as the current doctrine regarding military government during LSCO. The presentation of the current literature presented the rationale for conducting research on military governance as part of operations to consolidate gains against near-peer threats during LSCO. The historical case outlined General MacArthur's operational plan for the occupation of Japan, and the US government's granting of authority to establish a direct military government. He in turn limited the exercise of this power using the existing Japanese government institutions. This case provides a historical precedence to the future requirements of military governance and stability operations during LSCO. Presenting the current doctrine on stability operations conducted during operations to consolidate gains highlights the updates, changes, and additions inherent in the revision of the army's operational concept. This review of doctrine showcased that no longer can the support of governmental, nongovernmental, host nation, or other civilian organizations be assumed to achieve unity of effort. As such, a military government may be required due to the non-permissive nature of LSCO.

Section III: Methodology

Introduction

The primary goal of this study was to research how to provide for and restore minimum essential services during stability operations while conducting operations to consolidate gains. The researcher investigated the occupation of Japan after World War Two to better understand how General MacArthur and his staff developed the process of effectively rebuilding post conflict. The study then compared this case to current US Army doctrine on stability operations with the change in operational framework from COIN to LSCO. This study compared the case study and the doctrine using a case study methodology. In addition to a description of the case study, this section provides the data collection sources and expands upon the research questions

outlined in the introduction. Five parts divide this section, the introduction, case selection, data collection, data analysis, and summary.

Case Selection

The case study involved the initial occupation of Japan and the methods and procedures used by MacArthur and his headquarters to provide minimum essential services at the conclusion of hostilities in the Pacific theater. The first eighteen months of the occupation provide a snapshot in time that relates to the current doctrine legal requirements for commanders to provide for the health and welfare of the population in controlled areas during LSCO. Researching these initial actions as the focus of the case study narrows the scope and provides examples of how army forces specifically conducted stability operations before civilian organizations were present. These army forces consisted of combat troops and formations as well as dedicated staff sections, and the assigned military government teams tasked with conducting the majority of occupation duties. The case study analyzes the actions of the staff sections and military government teams and their interaction with the remaining Japanese government to provide for the health and welfare of the population impacted by conflict.

Instrumentation

In order to guide and standardize data collection, this study used a case study methodology outlined by Leedy and Ormrod in *Practical Research: Planning and Design*. They focus the researcher on conducting a case study to understand the single case study situation in great depth within its natural setting.¹¹² One of the methods of data collection they present is using appropriate written documents to provide the information necessary to gain a depth of knowledge on the case.¹¹³ This information will then be analyzed to categorize and interpret the

¹¹² Paul D. Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, *Practical Research: Planning and Design* (New York: Pearson, 2019), 236.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 236.

data in terms of common themes, and an eventual synthesis to provide the reader with an overall portrayal of the case.¹¹⁴ Next is a discussion on the study's data collection, the research questions, and the expected findings.

Data Collection

The collection of data for this study relied on doctrinal primary and secondary sources. Primary source collection focused on the systems and processes used by MacArthur and his headquarters to incorporate staff sections and military government teams with the Japanese government. Secondary sources provided the data on the decision to leave the majority of government officials in power, to include the Emperor, in order to facilitate the transition post occupation. The doctrine review outlined the current process in which the US Army plans to conduct stability operations administration, specifically through the use of a transitional military authority.

Data Analysis

This study used one primary and three secondary questions to guide the research. The primary question was, what lessons can the US Army learn from the occupation of Japan to guide the concurrent execution of offense, defense, and stability operations during LSCO? This is the starting point for the analysis of the case study and the doctrine because it determines how army forces will conduct stability operations simultaneously with offense and defense during future LSCO conflicts.

The second question was, how did General MacArthur administer the military government at the strategic level? The case study and the doctrine provide examples of how a military government can administer stability operations. The case study enhances the understanding of how General MacArthur incorporated special staff sections within his headquarters to specifically handle the administration of occupation tasks. The doctrine review

¹¹⁴ Leedy, *Practical Research*, 236.

expounds upon the use of a transitional military authority to administer stability tasks at the conclusion of combat operations. The researcher expected to find that there is a discrepancy between current doctrine and the best practices used during the occupation of Japan.

The third question was, how did Eighth Army execute the operational level of the occupation at the conclusion of conflict? The case study examined how army units were aligned with Japanese prefectural, regional, and national government to institute occupation tasks. The doctrine outlines the establishment of a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), and states that commanders are responsible for standing up a transitional military authority. The researcher expected to find that the doctrine does not detail the explanations of how to align army forces effectively for a transitional military authority.

The final question was, how can current doctrine and lessons from Japan in World War Two improve commander's ability to provide essential services? The case study provides a litany of examples of how the military government teams oversaw the Japanese execution of the requirements to restore minimum essential services. The doctrine outlines how army forces can leverage inter-governmental, non-governmental, and other organizations to provide for the minimum essential services. The researcher expected to find that there is an over reliance in doctrine on other organizations to provide for the health and welfare of the population, and that this would be at odds with the expectation of their presence while combat operations are still ongoing during LSCO.

Summary

This section restated the purpose of this research and presented the research questions in detail. The research relied upon the case study and the doctrine review to highlight the unique challenges that army force will face while conducting stability operations during LSCO. The study used a case study methodology to compare the answers to the research questions asked of each case study. Data collection methods included doctrinal as well as primary and secondary

writing related to the occupation of Japan post World War Two. The study used focused research questions relating to the administration, organization of forces, and restoration of minimum essential services during the occupation of Japan and as outlined in current doctrine. This section presented the expected answers to the research questions with an expectation that the hypotheses are valid. The next section describes the occupation of Japan post World War Two and the current doctrine regarding stability operations during LSCO by discussing the development and analysis of the case study and doctrine review.

Section IV: Analysis

Introduction

At the completion of combat operations in World War Two, occupation soldiers encountered the devastation wreaked upon Japan during the fire and nuclear bombing of the mainland. American soldiers described Japan's major cities as "completely flat with destruction."¹¹⁵ One soldier even described the eerie sensation of thinking he was driving away from a great metropolis as "there was practically nothing left; the rubble did not even look like much," even though he was approaching Tokyo from its outlying airfield.¹¹⁶ American forces spent the first eighteen months of the occupation solving the immense humanitarian crisis facing the Japanese people.

Even though the attitude of the Japanese was generally favorable to the occupation troops, measures had to be taken to address the welfare of the population to reduce the possibility for unrest.¹¹⁷ The combination of internal political unrest, food shortages, inadequacy of shelter, and the ensuing cold weather of winter in Japan could spell difficulties which might well burst into

¹¹⁵ Schaller, *American Occupation*, 26.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹¹⁷ 98th Division, *Historical Report*, 65.

violent reaction if they were not addressed.¹¹⁸ Army commanders were expected to motivate the civil police, railway workers, communication workers, utilities operators, and public health officials to ensure a continuation of all functions under a period of great stress.¹¹⁹

To support commanders in these efforts, the SCAP headquarters activated ten special staff sections on 2 October 1945 to handle the administration of the Japanese public servants.¹²⁰ These sections corresponded in general to the technical branches of Japanese civil government with which they were associated, and operated directly under one of the SCAP Deputy Chiefs of Staff.¹²¹ Current doctrine recommends the transitional military authority retain subordinate government officials and employees to discharge their duties under the direction and supervision of appropriately trained military personnel.¹²² These trained personnel can be employed by thoroughly integrating civil affairs capabilities into the operations process to facilitate unimpeded operations and maintaining a positive relationship with the local populace.¹²³

Providing Food as a Minimum Essential Service

At the conclusion of World War Two in Japan the food shortage created the most urgent problem for SCAP GHQ and the Japanese government to solve. For multiple years before the war, Japan had not been a self-sufficient agricultural economy, and now the Japanese government cabinet was generating plans to provide collateral and shipping for the importation of rice.¹²⁴ The Japanese Ministry determined the need for imports because the minimum caloric and protein intake requirement per capita per day was on the order of 2,160 calories and seventy-six grams of

¹¹⁸ 98th Division, *Historical Report*, 65.

¹¹⁹ MacArthur, *Reports*, 11.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 76.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 76.

¹²² US Army, FM 3-07, 2-64.

¹²³ US Army, FM 3-07, 2-69.

¹²⁴ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 110.

protein.¹²⁵ In order to validate the food requirements proposed by the Japanese government, the State Department provided a disease and unrest formula that would determine how many calories per person dependent on their age or occupation to sustain a survival level.¹²⁶ Balancing these requirements against each other and accounting for short rice crops in 1945 and losses from typhoons, mainland Japan could only provide 1,375 calories and forty-one grams of protein.¹²⁷ This amounted to a request to import 4,350,000 tons of food over the course of 1946.¹²⁸ Allied experts recognized this as a necessary requirement despite the knowledge of hoarding, black market operations, and reluctance by farmers and fishermen to deliver quotas.¹²⁹

While the Japanese did receive approval from General MacArthur to import food before the impending food crisis during the coming winter of 1945, this domestic problem was expected to be solved by the Japanese government.¹³⁰ To properly distribute the message that the food problem was one of Japan's own making, SCAP GHQ implemented an information program. This program included media releases on true caloric intake needs, easily understood stories on the root causes of the shortages, and encouragement to report hidden Japanese military food dumps.¹³¹ The 98th Division also augmented this information program by seizing food stuffs from demobilized Japanese military installations and returning them to the Japanese Home Ministry for further distribution.¹³²

¹²⁵ General Headquarters Supreme Commander for The Allied Powers, *Summation No. 1: Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea: For the Months of September – October 1945* (Tokyo: General Headquarters Supreme Commander for The Allied Powers, 1945), 44.

¹²⁶ Donald R. McCoy, and Benedict K. Zobrist, *Conference of Scholars on the Administration of Occupied Areas, 1943-1955* (Conference conducted at the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO, April 10-11, 1970), 32.

¹²⁷ SCAP, *Non-Military Activities Sep-Oct 45*, page 44.

¹²⁸ Johnstone, *What Are We Doing with Japan?*, 41.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹³⁰ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 152.

¹³¹ SCAP, *Non-Military Activities Sep-Oct 45*, 165.

¹³² 98th Division, *Historical Report*, 58.

Even after importation and seizure of additional rice and other food supplies, a deficit of food remained. To determine this deficit in supplies the 98th Division conducted a thorough study of the food distribution system from the farmer to the ultimate consumer.¹³³ The 98th Division determined that the most difficult problem to surmount in feeding the population was the distribution of sufficient food to prevent starvation.¹³⁴ As a result of these and other studies by military government teams in conjunction with Japanese government officials, the Link System was created.¹³⁵ The Link System authorized only certain agricultural and fishery associations to collect perishable foods, which were then distributed from urban markets to licensed retailers and resold through official rationing organizations.¹³⁶ The 98th Division, in line with the link system, instituted a supervision system over the activities of food distributing agencies in order to minimize breakdowns in the system and facilitate the flow of commodities to consumers.¹³⁷ This tremendously effective system reduced the quantity of rice and other foods that farmers could divert to the black market.¹³⁸ Reports from military government teams and the Japanese government showed that although some items were still being diverted from the Link System, the black market was having less effect on the national economic institutions.¹³⁹

At the operational level, SCAP headquarters implemented a policy to reserve all Japanese food resources for the Japanese people.¹⁴⁰ Limiting occupation forces to rely solely on foodstuffs brought from America produced a profound, completely unexpected, and highly favorable

¹³³ 98th Division, *Historical Report*, 57.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 57.

¹³⁵ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 153.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 153.

¹³⁷ 98th Division, *Historical Report*, 57.

¹³⁸ Eighth Army Headquarters, *Occupational Monograph of the Eighth United States Army in Japan, September 1946 – December 1947* (Tokyo: Eighth US Army Printing plant, 1948), 3.

¹³⁹ Eighth Army, *Monograph Sep 46 – Dec 47*, 4.

¹⁴⁰ MacArthur, *Reports*, 24.

impression on the Japanese people.¹⁴¹ MacArthur's staff emphasized that their forces needed to rely upon the Japanese government structure to prevent complete social disintegration, insure internal distribution, maintain labor, and prevent calamitous diseases or wholesale starvation.¹⁴²

In the initial response phase of stability operations, providing for the humanitarian needs of the local populace can be accomplished by either bringing resources to the population or bringing the population to centralized locations.¹⁴³ Army units are then responsible for maintaining positive control of relief supplies to prevent pilferage and ensure fair and equitable distribution.¹⁴⁴ Military rations can be provided to the civilian populace, but ideally army units provide easily mass produced food such as soups, rice, or porridges to support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs.¹⁴⁵

Army units assess the needs of the population against the capabilities of other by monitoring food markets, predicting effects of conflict on food, estimate total food needs, assessing food distribution, and providing emergency food aid as needed.¹⁴⁶ By monitoring and analyzing the food markets it can be determined if there is an issue with food security or the prices civilians pay at markets.¹⁴⁷ Units will assess destruction of crops or livestock, interdiction of distribution networks, interruption of market activity, and the security of the environment that will prohibit civilians accessing the markets.¹⁴⁸ The food distribution network is also assessed to determine if there are discrepancies in physical transport, distribution, and storage of food so that

¹⁴¹ MacArthur, *Reports*, 24.

¹⁴² MacArthur, *Reports*, 57.

¹⁴³ US Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.5, *Stability Techniques* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 4-15.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 4-16.

¹⁴⁵ US Army, ATP 3-07.5, 4-17.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, table 4-4.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 4-50.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 4-54.

units can provide end-to-end food distribution as necessary.¹⁴⁹ The key to distributing this food relies on army units providing the security and positive control of these resources until people are able to eat.¹⁵⁰

Providing Water as a Minimum Essential Service

Access to water in Japan post conflict was not a critical shortage like food and shelter. Almost all the hydro-electric plants and distribution systems were intact and the water supply, although unsafe for occupation forces, was adequate for the Japanese population.¹⁵¹ The exception to this was the heavily bombed areas of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.¹⁵² In those bombed-out cities the military government sections of SCAP GHQ ordered the repairs of water and sewage systems within the first few months of occupation, but insufficient chlorine was the root of the water safety issues.¹⁵³ The focus for occupation forces then was to try and increase the water safety for both the Japanese population and also for use in US facilities.

Chlorination of the water systems in the past was only conducted during epidemics of enteric disease, and even this dosage was inadequate to meet US standards.¹⁵⁴ During the first few months of the occupation military government teams conducted surveys of water treatment materials and determined that the current stock was inadequate.¹⁵⁵ Yet, additional surveys of Japanese industrial capability revealed that they would be able to produce the necessary chlorination, provided the raw materials were available.¹⁵⁶ In addition, these inspections of the

¹⁴⁹ US Army, ATP 3-07.5, 4-56.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 4-59.

¹⁵¹ Eighth Army, *Monograph Sep 46 – Dec 47*, 69.

¹⁵² SCAP, *Non-Military Activities Sep-Oct 45*, 145.

¹⁵³ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 155.

¹⁵⁴ SCAP, *Non-Military Activities Sep-Oct 45*, 145.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 145.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 145.

municipal water plants, specifically in the Kant Plain, led to the installation of chlorinators in those locations where they had not previously been installed.¹⁵⁷

In addition to spurring the Japanese industrial base to produce the necessary water sanitation materials, occupation forces used their requirements for clean water to supplement the requirements. Upon occupying former Japanese military and industrial locations for billeting and operations the utilities staff section of SCAP GHQ obtained access to public utility facilities.¹⁵⁸ The utilities section also coordinated with the manufacturing and industry staff section to expedite the manufacture of the water treatment materials.¹⁵⁹ To supplement the local production of these materials three hundred tons of chlorine per month were imported from the US to purify water for the armed forces using the Japanese municipal water systems.¹⁶⁰ This process of supplementing the municipal water system for occupation forces was enabled by the military government legal section revision to the administrative order that provided guidance to lower echelons on matters of procurement and utilities.¹⁶¹

Once the water treatment materials had been produced by the Japanese or procured from the US the issue of getting this chlorinated water to the spigot was the next major project. Surveys conducted by military government teams on the distributions system in Tokyo determined that eighty percent was being lost through leakage.¹⁶² Over the next year repair projects were initiated to improve these systems. By the end of the second year of the occupation the Eighth Army engineer reported that leakage in Tokyo had been reduced to forty-two percent.¹⁶³ This

¹⁵⁷ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 225.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 155.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 155.

¹⁶⁰ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 155.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 124.

¹⁶² Eighth Army, *Monograph Sep 46 – Dec 47*, 72.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 72.

improvement did not quite meet the usual losses of fifteen to twenty-five percent in the US, it did improve the Japanese water safety so that it could be used by occupation forces.¹⁶⁴

Water distribution can be accomplished either through bringing the resource to the civilian population or bringing the civilian population to the source by transporting and dispensing bottled water, or bulk water through reverse osmosis purification units.¹⁶⁵ This bulk water can be transported from the source of purification to the population using either military vehicles or converting local vehicles into makeshift water trucks by adding a tank.¹⁶⁶ When bulk water is provided progressively smaller containers to support distribution are needed, to include pails for individual families. Current doctrine emphasizes the use of other agencies to ensure proper sanitation, purification, and distribution of drinking water.¹⁶⁷ The doctrine contemplates that NGOs and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will restore water supply systems, maintain water treatment facilities, repair hand pumps, and then veterinary services and preventative medicine personnel can inspect water sources for proper sanitation and storage.¹⁶⁸ In arid climates, the army will develop regional production and distribution hubs for potable and non-potable water.¹⁶⁹

Providing Shelter as a Minimum Essential Service

The overwhelming destruction caused by conventional and nuclear bombing missions had destroyed many large urban population centers such as Yokohama and Sendai, which had been the target of the longest B-29 raid of World War Two.¹⁷⁰ The displaced citizens of

¹⁶⁴ Eighth Army, *Monograph Sep 46 – Dec 47*, 72.

¹⁶⁵ US Army, ATP 3-07.5, 4-18.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 4-18.

¹⁶⁷ US Army, ATP 3-07.5, 4-24.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 4-25.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 4-27.

¹⁷⁰ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 70.

Yokohama eventually began to drift back into these areas in the hundreds and sought shelter by constructing lean-tos and makeshift tin shacks.¹⁷¹ In addition, prior to oversight by military government units, faulty information had been disseminated through the Yokohama Liaison Office.¹⁷² This caused repeated dispossession of hundreds of Japanese families even though early in the occupation, many large areas were specifically set aside for civilian reconstruction.¹⁷³

This acute problem of securing shelter occupied the mass of the population.¹⁷⁴ As such the military government ordered the Japanese government to conduct a survey of the specific needs for the welfare of their people. In the Tokyo-Yokohama area alone there was a requirement of more than one million blankets and about five-hundred thousand suits of clothing and underwear.¹⁷⁵ Much like the issues discussed in regard to providing food to the Japanese population, the 98th Division determined that the problem of distribution of sufficient clothing, and building materials must be surmounted to prevent death from cold or exposure.¹⁷⁶

To alleviate the desperate need of clothing to protect the population from the coming winter and to augment the lack of housing from bomb destruction Eighth Army returned all military stores to the Japanese Home Ministry.¹⁷⁷ Thousands of summer and winter blouses, rubber boots, garrison coats, blankets, and other utility articles that could be converted from military use were given to the Japanese government for distribution to civilians.¹⁷⁸ The 98th Division assisted in this process by seizing clothing and building materials that were formerly the property of the Japanese Army and Navy and returning them to the Japanese Home Ministry for

¹⁷¹ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 68.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 68.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 125.

¹⁷⁵ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 140.

¹⁷⁶ 98th Division, *Historical Report*, 57.

¹⁷⁷ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 83.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 83.

further distribution.¹⁷⁹ Once all materials had been collected the Japanese Home Ministry submitted a plan for public welfare and the distribution of Army-Navy clothing supplies that had been seized and held for that purpose.¹⁸⁰ This plan was approved by SCAP GHQ with the requirement that the Japanese distribution system was strictly supervised by lower unit commanders to ensure accuracy of records and the number of Japanese unemployed and dependents in each area.¹⁸¹

The welfare program provided for those currently unable to provide for themselves, but for everyone else, SCAP GHQ ordered the rationing of items within the markets. Manufactured fabrics were to be purchased by wholesale dealers to exercise control over distribution of critical clothing shortages.¹⁸² These items were then sold to prefectural control companies who regulated the final distribution to retail dealers and department stores.¹⁸³ The available supply and pricing of critical clothing items such as undergarments, towels, flannel cloth, and bleached cotton were widely advertised by local newspapers and posters so the neediest could receive them.¹⁸⁴ The allocation to neighborhood associations, and the announcement of date of distribution and quantity to be issued, also applied to other rationed supplies such as essential household items.¹⁸⁵

In the case of shortages that extended beyond the availability of former Army-Navy supplies, under certain circumstances the Japanese were allowed to obtain supplies from American Stockpiles.¹⁸⁶ Salvage clothing, shoes, and other items were sold to the Japanese Government for use as relief supplies and also to incentivize the work of farmers, coal miners,

¹⁷⁹ 98th Division, *Historical Report*, 58.

¹⁸⁰ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 143.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 143.

¹⁸² SCAP, *Non-Military Activities Sep-Oct 45*, 108.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 108.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 109.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 111.

¹⁸⁶ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 95.

fishermen, or other groups whose products were needed in the national economy.¹⁸⁷ In addition to clothing, authority could be granted to transfer American construction materials such as cement or asphalt to improve the efficient completion of road maintenance within the prefecture.¹⁸⁸ Corps commanders were instructed by GHQ SCAP to deal with the representatives of the Home Ministry in transactions involving supplies such as nails, pipe, wire, plywood, tentage, construction machinery, and other construction materials.¹⁸⁹ Engineer equipment vital to rebuilding the devastated areas as specifically excluded from the list of military items originally scheduled for destruction.¹⁹⁰

Other organizations such as the UN, ICRC, and host nation have primary responsibility to provide shelter, but army units will provide secure distribution networks and conduct delivery of supplies.¹⁹¹ When other organizations cannot provide support, army units can distribute materials such as tenting, blankets, mosquito nets, tarps, and large sheets of plastic so the civilian population can build their own traditional dwellings or temporarily repair damaged buildings.¹⁹² Army units can also provide adequate shelter that requires blankets and heat by using fixed facilities such as schools or temporary structures such as tents.¹⁹³ When feasible, units can also build separate shelters for males, females, or parents with children and coordinate this effort with host nation leaders to use local labor.¹⁹⁴

Providing Medical Treatment as a Minimum Essential Service

¹⁸⁷ Eighth Army, *Monograph Sep 46 – Dec 47*, 51.

¹⁸⁸ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 95.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 84.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 84.

¹⁹¹ US Army, ATP 3-07.5, 3-65.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 4-19.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 4-63.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 4-67.

During post conflict operations and throughout the early occupation of Japan there were critical shortages of some medical supplies and services, but there was nothing to indicate that the conditions were impacted by the war.¹⁹⁵ In addition, the Japanese government imposed a near-starvation diet that had weakened their resistance to disease.¹⁹⁶ With the approaching winter, and existing shortages in clothing, shelter, and fuel, it was imperative that military government medical staff keep a close watch for the outbreak of epidemics.¹⁹⁷ Much like food and shelter, SCAP GHQ directed the inventory, reception, and distribution for civilian use of the stock of medical supplies held by the Japanese Armed Forces.¹⁹⁸ The Japanese Home Ministry performed this mission and submitted the report to occupation force commanders who verified the information and authorized the transfer of supplies.¹⁹⁹ The Mitsubishi Department Store was secured to house a medical supply depot for receiving, storing, and issuing these medical supplies for civilian relief.²⁰⁰

Throughout this period, the military government medical staff worked directly with the Eighth Army Surgeon and at the division level in their military government headquarters.²⁰¹ Since Eighth Army troops were living in close proximity to the Japanese people and were dependent upon Japanese utilities and sanitation services, the health of the population had a direct impact on the health of the force.²⁰² Therefore, the medical staff of military government maintained constant surveillance over Japanese public health and sanitation, and provide

¹⁹⁵ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 128.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 128.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 128.

¹⁹⁸ SCAP, *Non-Military Activities Sep-Oct 45*, 141.

¹⁹⁹ SCAP, *Non-Military Activities Sep-Oct 45*, 141.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 222.

²⁰¹ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 126.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 127.

recommendations to protect the health of occupation forces.²⁰³ These medical officers on the staff were directed to supervise Japanese public health services without interfering with the functioning of the agency or the civilian staffs' application of sound technical policies.²⁰⁴ At the prefectural health department the military government medical team included a public health nurse and a small group of enlisted personnel trained to work directly with and through the district health centers.²⁰⁵ The use of US Army equipment and supplies was only to be used when it became apparent that the civilian resources were inadequate or ineffective, and so the health of the Japanese people had a direct impact on the accomplishment of the occupation mission.²⁰⁶

The directives of SCAP GHQ outlined the basic policy that the Japanese public health and welfare personnel were to be self-sufficient in the use of their own equipment and supplies, while the medical personnel were to be employed in a supervisory capacity only.²⁰⁷ The military government medical personnel in this capacity conducted studies on the regulation for manufacture of vaccines, narcotics control measures, reporting cases of communicable diseases, weekly hospital bed statuses, and the oversight on distribution of Army-Navy medical and dental supplies for civilian use.²⁰⁸

The success of the health program during the occupation can be attributed to the aggressive surveillance by military government medical personnel to ensure the Japanese health organizations cooperated in disease control and immunization programs.²⁰⁹ Their planning, and ability to garner support and cooperation of the Japanese people were successful in stemming the

²⁰³ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 127.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 129.

²⁰⁵ Eighth Army, *Monograph Sep 46 – Dec 47*, 216.

²⁰⁶ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 129.

²⁰⁷ Eighth Army, *Monograph Aug 45 – Jan 46*, 128.

²⁰⁸ SCAP, *Non-Military Activities Sep-Oct 45*, 133.

²⁰⁹ Eighth Army, *Monograph Sep 46 – Dec 47*, 163.

smallpox epidemic in the spring of 1946, typhus in the winter of 1947, and the recurring influx of cholera from repatriated citizens.²¹⁰ The US also furnished many of the materials necessary to make the Japanese self-sufficient in the production of vitally needed drugs and vaccines.²¹¹ This allowed for the localization of cholera, smallpox, typhoid, diphtheria, Japanese B encephalitis, and dysenteries outbreaks so that they did not have a substantial impact on occupation personnel.²¹² The military government medical teams stood for freedom and a new way of life for the Japanese through public health controls, vaccinations, improved hospitals, and public welfare provisions.²¹³ Under the supervision of the military government, the Japanese public health agencies had largely removed the danger of contagious disease among the population by the beginning of 1947.²¹⁴

The transitional military authority establishes a public health policy to address security, public safety, and humanitarian reasons for the health of military forces and the local populace.²¹⁵ Generally though, the transitional military authority lacks the health service support and force health protection capacity for civilians.²¹⁶ Army units concentrate on assessing vulnerabilities and capabilities to determine the necessary actions to prevent further deterioration of existing medical services.²¹⁷ The first assessment is done regarding public health hazards to include disease, malnutrition, dehydration, and industrial hazards.²¹⁸ The existing medical infrastructure,

²¹⁰ Eighth Army, *Monograph Sep 46 – Dec 47*, 215.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 164.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 2.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 208.

²¹⁴ Eighth Army, *Monograph Sep 46 – Dec 47*, 164.

²¹⁵ US Army, FM 3-07, 2-83.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2-83.

²¹⁷ US Army, ATP 3-07.5, 4-82.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 4-83.

logistics, and resources are assessed to evaluate the need for additional clinics, trained personnel, equipment, or improved management procedures.²¹⁹

In addition to providing the public health policy, when directed, units provide emergency medical support to civilians suffering from injury or illness.²²⁰ To meet the immediate medical needs of the population, coordination with the US country team, host nation ministries for health and agriculture, and international relief organizations.²²¹ In addition to providing for emergency medical services army units will also prevent epidemics such as typhoid cholera, polio, or smallpox through immediate vaccinations.²²² The transitional military authority can reinforce the public health policies by securing the local public health infrastructure to enable functioning hospitals and clinics to remain open and provide service to the civilian populace.²²³ The transitional military authority may establish temporary clinics, train local health professionals, and provide medical augmentation in medical services, administration, logistics, pay, or security operations of existing civilian medical facilities.²²⁴ Other organizations such as the UN, ICRC, and host nation have primary responsibility to provide medical supplies.²²⁵ When other organizations are unable to provide support, army units will conduct actual deliveries and distribution of the items at destination points.²²⁶

²¹⁹ US Army, ATP 3-07.5, 4-86.

²²⁰ Ibid., 4-20.

²²¹ Ibid., 4-20.

²²² Ibid., 4-89.

²²³ US Army, FM 3-07, 2-84.

²²⁴ US Army, ATP 3-07.5, 4-88.

²²⁵ Ibid., 3-65.

²²⁶ Ibid., 4-67.

Summary

This analysis provides a historical example of how army units can execute the requirement to provide minimum essential services for populations during LSCO. When too few civilian agencies exist, army units help establish the effective organization and administration of civil services.²²⁷ Unfortunately the doctrine fails to adequately address the capability of army units to complete the tasks and recommends using any personnel who have relevant experience with municipal services.²²⁸ This analysis shows that during LSCO when the security environment does not permit civilian agency support there is a need for a comprehensive approach to conduct stability operations concurrently with offense, and defense.

Section V: Conclusion and Recommendations

Introduction

With the publication of DOD Directive 3000.05 in 2005, the US Army established stabilization operations as a core tenant, and began the process of increasing cooperation with civilian agencies and personnel.²²⁹ This was done in conjunction with the publication of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 which placed the State Department as the lead for Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations.²³⁰ Both of these directives established that in every post-conflict mission, providing essential services are the prerequisite for rehabilitating the economy, and the failure to do so has negative political consequences.²³¹ The need for this level of cooperation between military and civilian agencies

²²⁷ US Army, ATP 3-07.5, 4-32.

²²⁸ Ibid., 4-32.

²²⁹ Terrence K. Kelly, *Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing Developing US Civilian Personnel Capabilities* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2008), 23.

²³⁰ Douglas, *Infrastructure Reconstruction* 18.

²³¹ William L. Nash, *In the Wake of War, Improving US Post-Conflict Capabilities: Report of an Independent Task Force* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), 28.

was highlighted during the 1970 Truman scholars conference on occupied areas where panel members stated that the US will face the need for an American military government while operating as a world power.²³² But, the debate between the Army and the State Department about transferring the operational level of military government between the organizations has been in contention since World War Two.²³³ Regardless of which organization is in charge of the operational level execution of the military government and occupation ruling large masses of land and large numbers of people cannot be done effectively without the use of the local government institutions.²³⁴ Ensuring local buy-in from the start of reconstruction efforts and having local communities provide resources stabilizes the transition to local control and strengthens the security and sustainability of these operations.²³⁵ As the army prepares for the future of stability operations and providing minimum essential services during LSCO, the method in which armed forces employ military government will be the key to success. To effectively integrate stability operations with LSCO the military must train officers in peacetime for civil affairs in wartime as opposed to simply appointing any officer as a military governor when the time comes.²³⁶

Conclusions

Throughout this study the lessons the US Army can learn from the occupation of Japan provide an example of a way to guide the execution of stability tasks while concurrently conducting offense and defense operations during LSCO. Using a military government General MacArthur and the Eighth Army were able to provide for the welfare of eighty million Japanese with just over two hundred thousand troops. This military government was able to accomplish this monumental task by empowering the Japanese civil administration officials to stabilize their

²³² McCoy, *Conference of Scholars*, 56.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 63.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 36.

²³⁵ Douglas, *Infrastructure Reconstruction*, 22.

²³⁶ McCoy, *Conference of Scholars*, 60.

own country. During future LSCO the use of a military government will be necessary to enable commanders to conduct offense, defense, and stability operations concurrently.

Describing General MacArthur's administration of military government at the strategic level and juxtaposing this against current doctrine the study exemplifies how a military government can administer future stability operations during LSCO. General MacArthur incorporated special staff sections within his headquarters to specifically handle the administration of occupation tasks. Additionally, analyzing Eighth Army's execution of the occupation at the operational level provides an example of aligning army units with Japanese prefectural, regional, and national government to institute occupation tasks. The doctrine emphasizes that leveraging host nation government officials and employees will be necessary when civilian IGOs and NGOs are not available to supplement the military government. Using these strategic and operational examples from General MacArthur and Eighth Army future commanders can employ a transitional military authority in line with doctrinal requirements to administer stability tasks during LSCO.

Finally, by analyzing current doctrine on providing essential services with how these tasks were completed in Japan during World War Two can improve a commander's ability to execute these tasks. The case study provides a litany of examples of how the military government teams oversaw the Japanese execution of the requirements to restore minimum essential services. The current doctrine outlines how army forces can leverage inter-governmental, non-governmental, and other organizations to provide for the minimum essential services. This overreliance in doctrine on other organizations to provide for the health and welfare of the population is at odds with the historical example provided. If the security environment during LSCO does not permit the employment of civilian IGOs or NGOs, then the US Army must accomplish those humanitarian tasks that are part of traditional stability operations. Therefore, it would behoove commanders to heed the historical examples provided within this study to provide essential services more effectively to the population during LSCO.

Recommendations

As the army prepares for the future of stability operations and providing minimum essential services during LSCO the method in which we employ military government will be the key to success. This can be accomplished by assigning civil affairs units to the corps and division level to ensure commanders have the necessary forces to conduct stability operations simultaneously with offense and defense. By integrating their expertise in all training and planning events the simultaneous operations conducted during LSCO can be accomplished. Conducting stability operations is a complex problem that requires effective planning and implementation. Instead of approaching the complex problem of stability in a pragmatic or fatalistic basis due to the changing nature of these operations, incorporating civil affairs units into the divisions and corps training in peacetime can pay dividends in war.

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