

Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on

Army Social Science Research

15 April 1971

Introduction

The Department of the Army has supported for many years a modest program of social science research. The program has never been a large one, but it has attracted attention and criticism out of proportion to its size. Our ad hoc committee has been charged with reviewing the nature and the magnitude of this program, and with making recommendations about future directions that Army-supported social research might take. We have examined the problem by reviewing the work that has been supported in the past, by listening to representatives of different agencies of the Department of the Army describe their needs for social science research, and by reviewing our own knowledge of developments in the fields of social sciences that might be relevant to Army needs. We have also broadened the scope of our inquiry to make a brief examination of work supported by the Department of Defense in general, and by becoming acquainted with the nature of research and studies conducted by the Department of State. We have been fortunate in having a representative of the Department of State on our ad hoc study group during our deliberations.

Our study has taken into account the criticism of military sponsorship of social science research that has been levied by some members of the Congress and by some academicians. We also have taken into account a growing disinclination of some members of the research community to the social sciences to accept funds to work on military problems. At the same time we have noted the increasing complexity of social issues and organizational problems within the army and of roles assigned to the

Department of the Army that require a greater knowledge of people in different cultures and of the ways in which their societies operate, and that also require the American soldier to acquire skills and techniques well beyond the normal military role on a battlefield. These opposite trends result in a dilemma.

Our conclusions and recommendations are based on a firm belief that social scientists and their work have direct and immediate usefulness to the Army in the pursuit of its mission. As a social organization as well as a military service, the Army must have an understanding of group dynamics, of principles of social influence, especially by peer groups, of principles relating to modification of behavior, of factors influencing morale, productivity, and satisfaction with work, and of the effects of cultural background on beliefs and behaviors. It should be able to anticipate the social and psychological, as well as the military and material effects of its actions. The need for knowledge of this sort is essential to the Army for its own program of organizing and training our own citizens for military service. It is equally important for the planning of operations involving other nations, whether as allies or opponents. And it is critical to any operations where our officers and men are in daily association with persons of other nations or of different social, economic, or cultural backgrounds.

The prior program of social science research in the Army has been relevant to these needs of the Army, and in some cases has been applicable simultaneously to the interests of other agencies, especially the Department of State. Nevertheless, our Committee believes that the program has been too small, that its orientation has been somewhat too specialized, and that those who have contributed to the program have represented too

small a proportion of the variety of investigators doing important and relevant work in the social sciences. The Army has attempted to "play it safe" by concentrating on work that satisfies the felt needs of one of its own operating or staff units. Nevertheless, this has not kept Army research out of difficulty, or protected it from criticism from within Congress and in the academic community. It should accept the risk of undertaking research that has major policy implications, while not ignoring "service" jobs. The only long-term security for research in the military establishment, as elsewhere, lies in the excellence of the work done and the respect accorded outstanding scholars. There is no reason why the Army should not have one of the most respected research programs in the country.

Our specific recommendations for a research program to serve the needs of the Army and simultaneously attract outstanding scholars are set forth in the following pages. Briefly summarized they are:

1. That foreign area research (including research in support of "psyops," military-civil affairs, and military-civic action) is of relevance to a wider slice of the national security community than just the Army and that therefore efforts be made to persuade other government agencies to cooperate in the collection of much of the information about foreign societies required by the Army for preparation of military manuals and training programs. The Army should, however, be primarily responsible for the collection of social and psychological information about foreign military establishments.

2. That greater emphasis be placed on social research that will help the Army to function more smoothly as an institution, with greater satisfaction to its personnel, and with constructive relationships to civilian sectors of society. Specifically, we suggest research on interpersonal relations within the Army, including aspects of the "youth culture," drug abuse, and race relations, to ways of making the Army's interaction with civilian communities more rewarding to both parties, to improving the quality of Army life for personnel of all ranks, to developing to the fullest extent possible the potentialities of each individual in the Army, and to the organizational, administrative, and ethical problems encountered by the Army.
3. That recognition be given within the social research program to one of the Army's most difficult assignments: namely, that of conducting military operations at the lowest possible level of violence. We suggest that inquiries be conducted on techniques of carrying out military missions that avoid or minimize the use of deadly force.
4. That attention should also be given to the technique of conflict avoidance, to ways of avoiding misinterpretations of our military actions by potentially hostile countries, and to methods of furthering arms limitation and control.
5. That a retrieval/^{system}for social science concepts and data applicable to our society's problems be developed (perhaps utilizing the Army's Cultural Information Analysis Center (CINFAC) but that the Army should not have primary responsibility.

for its development. The Army should explore with other government agencies the possibility of establishing a much more comprehensive retrieval system for the social sciences that would be responsive to the needs of all government departments and possible to some non-governmental needs as well. We have advanced some suggestions as to how such a system might operate.

6. That the Army restructure its mechanism for and management of its social science research program, placing greater emphasis on the development of an "in-house" research capability and attracting highly talented social science researchers to work on problems related to the Army mission, as described above. Again, we have advanced some suggestions as to how the Army research facilities might be organized.
7. That the Army establish a small Advisory Committee on Social Science Research, to assist it in keeping in touch with current developments in social science research throughout the country.

II Current Program of U.S. Army Social Science Research*

A. Description

Social science research in support of the U.S. Army's operational mission is currently grouped into three major categories as follows:

* The Army supports substantial psychological research for its managerial functions of selection, placement, and training. This report does not include a review of this part of the Army's program.

- (1) Research on problems of U.S. Military interactions with people in different cultures.

This research addresses problems that tend to reduce the effectiveness of operational interaction between U.S. military and foreign peoples, including military counterparts, "foreign nationals" employed by the United States Government and local citizens.

- (2) Research in support of psychological operations, Military-Civil Affairs, and Military Civic Action.

Typical problems addressed include (a) determination of the best systems for carrying out total psychological operations programs, (b) communication difficulties resulting from cultural differences, (c) the need for criterion measures to evaluate the effectiveness of specific civic action projects and (d) determination of military-civil affairs functions in insurgent environments.

- (3) Research aimed at increasing knowledge about insurgent phenomena and about government activities in combating insurgencies.

In addition, the U.S. Army operates the Cultural Information Analysis Center (CINFAC) under its social science research program. CINFAC is one of a number of quick response information centers that were established upon directive of the Department of Defense (DOD). The purpose of CINFAC is to furnish cultural information responses to government agencies and their bona fide contractors. The responses are to be based on information in a data bank rather than on research efforts. During the early years of CINFAC the Department of Defense

required that the Army allocate \$750,000 per year to its operation. In fiscal year 1970, the Department of Defense modified its policy on required funding level and encouraged a reduction in the funding level. As a result of this reduction, it was necessary to restrict CINFAC responses to DOD agencies and their bona fide contractors.

Due to recent social trends related to youth dissent and race relations problems, the U.S. Army has added a new category of social science research to its planned program beginning with fiscal year 1971. This research is entitled "The American Soldier in the '70s." This research will stress social problems within the U.S. Army rather than problems that arise from the operation of the Army in the overseas environment.

B. History

In 1961 with the increasing military and national emphasis upon cold war, limited war, and problems arising in the developing areas of the world, an expanded Army interest in social science research was expressed by the creation of the Social Science Research Branch within the Human Factors & Operations Research Division, of the Army Research Office.

In March of 1962, the Office of Chief of Research and Development sponsored a symposium on the U.S. Army's Limited War Mission and Social Science Research. The symposium participation involved high level military participants, the Secretary of the Army, and senior civilian scientists from major academic institutions. This symposium outlined many aspects of the military requirements for social science research and clearly expressed the intention of the Army to support an appropriate research program.

In April of 1963, the Institute for Defense Analyses issued a report on Behavioral Science Research Relevant to Military Psychological Operations. This report was prepared at the instigation of the Department of Defense and presented a large number of social science research objectives.

In September of 1964, the Director of Defense Research & Engineering requested the Secretaries of the three services to evaluate their research programs to determine responsiveness to the nonmaterial cold war research requirements.

In October of 1964, the Department of the Army submitted a broad long-range research plan in response to the above request.

In January of 1965, the Behavioral Sciences Subcommittee of the Defense Research Board issued its report concerning research in the Department of Defense on internal conflict and insurgencies. This document indorsed the overall research activities of the Department of the Army but called for an increased level of effort and the initiation of larger projects to support the growing requirements now referred to as counterinsurgency or stability operations.

In March of 1965, in a memorandum to the three services and to the Advanced Research Projects Agency, the DOD stated the future missions of each of these organizations in social science research. The Department of the Army was instructed to: (a) conduct an applied research program responsive to immediate military needs and (b) to provide overall coordinated applied research effort and facilitate relevant coordination with other governmental agencies. As a result, in May 1965, the Social Science Research Division was established within the Army Research Office to be responsive to the DOD. DOD

requested the Army to submit a new five-year research plan to meet the existing needs of counterinsurgency and stability operations throughout the developing areas of the world. In January of 1966, an Army Five-Year Research Plan was submitted to the Department of Defense. The plan represented those military social science needs unique to the military establishment as well as some areas which represented common interests of a number of U.S. Government agencies. The plan, as approved by the Department of Defense, represents an effort approximately three times larger per year than annual funding has been able to support.

The Army's social science research program has always placed stress on expending effort toward the solution of specific Army operational problems. Due to increased pressure in recent years for demonstrating relevancy to Army needs, increased emphasis has been given to programming only research that is responsive to Army operational needs. Even that research that is categorized as basic is aimed at solution of problems which will have operational application within the near future.

In the past the Army's social science research has been performed by the Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS) and several other organizations that have been given small contracts.

CRESS was established in 1956 at the American University, Washington, D. C. and became fully operational on 1 July 1957. It was known as the Special Operations Research Office then. It was organized to conduct nonmaterial research in support of the Army's special warfare functions. In 1971, CRESS became a division of the American Institute for Research (AIR) in Pittsburgh.

CRESS was established as a result of recommendations submitted to the Secretary of the Army in 1955 by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Army Scientific Advisory Panel (The Harlow Committee).

The findings of the Harlow Committee reflected these facts:

(1) There existed an urgent requirement to know more about the cultural background of peoples, especially those in new and emerging nations;

(2) The limited in-house research capabilities of the Army were not geared to meet this need;

(3) And, on-going social science research efforts such as those of ORO, HumRRO, and HRAF were severely disadvantaged by the high priorities placed upon technological objectives of Army research.

Plans are now being developed for the establishment of an in-house laboratory to augment the contractual efforts.

C. Determination of the Army's Research Requirements

(1) Annual dragnet

During the first half of a given fiscal year a letter is sent to Army General Staff Offices and Major Commands requesting the submission of statements of research requirements for the next fiscal year. (For the first time an additional request in FY 70 called for long-range requirements beyond the FY 71 time period.)

The research requirement statements are reviewed by the staff of the Behavioral Sciences Division and evaluated. Statements of requirements are rejected if they (a) ask for effort that is not research (b) are unrealistic (c) duplicate efforts already completed or currently programmed.

The non-rejects are reformulated and submitted to the Army Human Factors Research Advisory Committee (AHFRAC) for consideration.

(2) Formal requests for specific research support

General Staff Agencies and Major Commands submit requests for specific research efforts from time to time as the needs arise. These requests are handled in much the same manner as AHFRAC responses, and may become programmed before they are submitted to AHFRAC.

(3) Recognition of a research need by social scientists

Frequently research scientists propose to ARO research on a problem that they recognize and for which they believe solutions can be found. Also, ARO research scientists may identify Army problems that can benefit from research support.

Such research needs are then presented to AHFRAC for consideration.

D. AHFRAC Evaluation of Research Requirements

AHFRAC is made up of representatives of General Staff Agencies and Major Commands. The committee meets once yearly to consider the research requirements resulting from "Dagnet." At this meeting the committee hears a presentation by each major laboratory director on his current research program and his plans for the next year. The committee usually meets a second time during the year to review the current status of research programs and to make recommendations to the Chief of Research and Development.

E. Synopsis of Funding Chronology

- (1) An estimate of the amount of funds needed for social science research is included in a five-year planning

document that is updated yearly. DDR&E guidance and an OCRD planning board subsequently adjust the projected amount of funds for the next fiscal year to be incorporated in the President's budget that is submitted to Congress.

- (2) Based on estimates of amounts Congress is likely to approve, DDR&E defers a certain proportion of the research funds in the President's budget until the amount approved by Congress is known and apportioned. OCRD also withholds contingency amounts in addition to DDR&E deferrals.
- (3) Depending on the funding levels eventually allowed by the Congress, part or all of the deferrals and contingency withholdings may be released for use during the fiscal year.

F. Magnitude of Research Effort

(1) Funding

	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71
Basic Research	\$ 550,000	\$ 614,000	\$ 710,000
Applied Research	<u>2,383,000</u>	<u>1,658,000</u>	<u>1,500,000</u>
Total	\$ 2,933,000	\$ 2,299,000	\$ 2,210,000

(2) Number of discrete research tasks

Basic	5	5	5
Applied	15	13	9

G. Recipients of Funds

	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71 (Projected)
AIR/CRESS	\$1,861,000	\$1,424,000	\$1,110,000
AIR/IRI	295,000	296,000	300,000
HumRRO (Division 7)	627,000	410,000	400,000
HRB-Singer	80,000	103,000	125,000
Rowland and Co.	70,000	66,000	75,000
In-House Laboratory	_____	_____	200,000
Total	\$2,933,000	\$2,299,000	\$2,210,000

III. Recommendations

A. Foreign Area Research

Our committee recommends that the Army make strong and continuing representations within the government to ensure that on a government-wide basis appropriate agencies assume responsibility for collection and analysis of information about foreign societies, and that this information is available to the Army for training purposes and for the preparation of necessary field manuals. Because of their political sensitivity many such foreign area efforts should be carried on by civilian agencies. Every effort should be made to have additional appropriations made directly to the Department of State, the National Science Foundation, or some other civilian agencies should be urged to assume it. The largest independent research activity of the Army concerning foreign areas would then be to prepare training manuals and course materials based on data collected by other government agencies.

The primary reasons for urging that agencies other than the Army assume primary responsibility for foreign area research are twofold: (a) the Army is only one user of such research within the U.S. Government, and rarely the primary user; (b) there is significant opposition to having some kinds of such research conducted by a military service. This opposition comes from the Congress, from civilian social scientists, and in some cases from the people and governments of the foreign countries concerned.

While the Army is an important user of information about other societies, other government departments and agencies have equal or greater requirements for it. The White House and the State Department, in setting overall U.S. foreign policy, need enormous quantities

of information about all aspects of nations in every part of the world. The U.S. Information Agency requires a constant flow of reports covering both current events and background factors in all foreign areas. The Department of Commerce and other agencies concerned with foreign economic development, and with trade policy, also require extensive knowledge of the societies concerned. Too often, this knowledge has been lacking, with the result that foreign aid funds have not been spent to best advantage. When the Army functions as a service agency to provide other departments of government with foreign area research — in addition to satisfying its own needs — this gives rise to apprehensions on the part of some spokesmen that a military service is becoming involved in questions of policy determination that are properly in the civilian sphere.

Some critics of social science research by the Department of Defense have contended that military-sponsored research on foreign cultures has led to U.S. military involvement in other countries and may be a precursor to the dispatch of American troops abroad. We do not believe that these charges are justified, and in fact would argue that more thorough research would have led to less military intervention. Nevertheless, the charges and the suspicion they represent are a political fact that must be reckoned with. One effect is the reluctance of many leading civilian social scientists to take part in research efforts that seem to them to be supportive of war efforts.

Suspicion of military-sponsored research on the part of some foreign scholars and governments is likewise well known. This suspicion not only makes it difficult for scholars working under

under Army or Defense contracts to secure cooperation abroad, but damages all U.S.-sponsored research overseas, including private non-government research.

For all these reasons, we feel that foreign area research sponsored by the Army should be limited to those things the Army can do well and are of clear relevance to its needs. If our hopes for greater effort in foreign area research by civilian agencies is realized, the proportion of the Army's research effort directed to foreign areas would be reduced. Nevertheless, the Army will inevitably retain certain requirements in this field, and arrangements should be made to satisfy these requirements. It should retain a capability to collect information in certain foreign areas and on certain specified subjects.

- a. In areas where Army units are already stationed and where no U.S. civilian agencies are able to provide the information that is necessary for the performance of an assigned military mission.
- b. On subjects with regard to which the Army is better able to conduct research than any other agency — e.g., with respect to the structure and functioning of foreign military establishments, or regarding the tactical feasibility of varying types of military operations.

B. Research Serving the Army as an Institution

There is also a vast domain of problems faced by the U.S. Army that are not peculiar to operations in foreign areas and which are highly in need of social science insights. Since social and human

problems are of growing seriousness in Army settings, continued neglect of social science research on these problems is becoming hazardous. Aside from any question of whether foreign area research should be expanded or curtailed or shifted to other agencies, the Army social science research program should be expanded to support social science research on these institutional and domestic problems. We shall not attempt to deal with all aspects of each problem, but in the sections below shall simply cite a variety of problem areas, listing within each a few of the social and human questions with which the Army should concern itself and which may be solved at least in part by social science research.

1. Interpersonal relations within the Army.

The Army faces a major transition, if not a crisis, in the structure of interpersonal relations: relations between races, relations between ranks, relations of career men to draftees. The whole area of interpersonal relations contributes crucially to the quality of Army life and to the efficiency of individuals and units. Needed studies would include projects having to do with perennial aspects of officer—non-com—enlisted men relationships and also problems not restricted to the Army setting, such as interethnic hostility, particularly between blacks and whites. Aspects of the "Youth Rebellion" and generation gap would be deserving of research with reference, for example, to the recent changes in grooming that have produced a gap between young soldiers and their age peers in civilian life, and which might contribute to a morale problem. Problems having to do with families of Army personnel, for example, the presence or absence of wife and children during relatively short

tours of duty, would be another area. Under this heading would also be included questions on how campaigns to develop loyalty to one's particular unit or to the Army in general, might promote or interfere with the Army's efficiency in carrying out its mission, or might effect the morale of the people involved.

To these and other interpersonal relations problems current social science research has much to offer in the form of empirically-tested principles and methods of inquiry. By way of illustrations we might consider a problem of growing concern: black-white animosities as they develop under various conditions of racial integration in military situations. Social science research on attitudinal effects of externally-imposed racial integration yields many principles regarding the conditions under which integration increases or decreases liking among individuals and groups. The present survey is no place to attempt an exhaustive propositional inventory even for this specific problem, much less for all the others that fall under this heading. We shall only mention in passing that integration seems to produce positive feelings to develop between people of different racial backgrounds to the extent that the contact is on equal status, is maintained for a long period of time, is exercised in the attainment of common goals, provides evidence of ideological similarity to the participants, and is perceived as self-determined by them, etc. Insightful use of these principles can lead to numerous applications to specific military situations.

Below, we will indicate a number of other areas without attempting to specify appropriate theoretical and methodological concepts that might be contributed by the social sciences. It should

be understood throughout that social science contributions can be made at various stages of problem-solving in these areas. For example, social theory and research can be employed in detecting and defining the problems, in discovering additional principles that bear on the situations under study, in collecting specific parametric data regarding the levels of the independent variables that enter into these situations, and in suggesting applications in terms of options available to the Army.

2. Disciplinary Problems

Current social changes are making the Army's disciplinary problems unprecedentedly difficult. There is a large area for social science research having to do with delinquency problems within the Army, the use of correctional institutions, etc. Questions here include how Army men from deprived backgrounds might be given consideration in connection with disciplinary problems; how correctional institutions could be improved; how contemporary problems such as drug abuse and various aspects of the current "youth culture" should be dealt with. Here again, the Army could furnish creative social scientists with an opportunity to conduct socially and theoretically important research more effectively than can be currently done in most other segments of society. A cooperative military establishment could allow this aspect of the Army's social research and development program to become a model for many other areas of society.

In general, analysis of the Army itself as a social institution of the 20th century is clearly a fertile area for social research. The present plan of the Army Research Office to study the American soldier in the 1970s is a step in the right direction.

3. Community Relations

The area of military-civilian relationships is another broad area that includes a wide range of problems to whose solutions social science research could contribute. For example, there are problems concerning the acceptance in a civilian community of military installations and personnel. Acceptance in turn affects the pleasantness of life for the soldiers and their families and their work efficiency. Other problems have to do with the living arrangements of personnel with and without their families present. These, too, affect both the community and the military personnel concerned. Also under this heading fall opportunities to set up groups within the installation and the community to foster good relations to the mutual benefit of all parties: relations with civilian employees on the base; opportunities for the installation and its personnel to serve the community; availability in the community of resources that would help the installation, etc. What is learned about improved civilian-military relations in this country would have some applicability (restricted by cultural differences) to foreign areas as well.

4. The Quality of Army Life

Social scientists are currently much interested in the parameters affecting the quality of life. Studies of this subject in an Army setting could be of immediate service to the Army and could have a long-range pay-off for civilian society as well. A number of attempts are now afoot to devise indicators of the quality of social and human life that can be entered (in addition to strictly economic indices) in a cost-utility formula in terms of which the

long-term effects and the desirability of alternate social actions could be estimated. (See, for example, the establishment by President Nixon on July 13, 1969 of a White House Staff on "National Goals Research.") Since the Army constitutes a microcosm with many of the same parameters as the society as a whole, an attempt should be made to evaluate military life, establish indices to measure its quality, and set up simulations or field tests for evaluating the total effects of new social policies on aspects of life other than those which they were specifically designed to effect. Since social scientists are already interested in this problem of defining the quality of life, are designing social indicators, and are concerned with bringing these considerations of personal and social well being to the attention of policy makers, the unusual research opportunity offered by the Army might attract a rather high level group of thinkers and empirical researchers.

5. New Community Service Missions for the Army

Assuming that a moderately large army will continue to be maintained even after post-Vietnam cutbacks, and that the average tour of personnel may be much longer with a much higher percentage of career soldiers in that period, it would follow that in order to achieve maximum social benefits, as well as to heighten the morale of the units and the feeling of worth of the military personnel, it would be useful to explore ways in which the Army could be of service to society while standing by as a protection in case of war or as a deterrent to the outbreak of war. Task forces could be set up to study assignments the Army might undertake in times of peace, such as service to the public schools, anti-pollution work,

service as auxiliary police and rescue units, provision of army camps for training or as recreation facilities for inner-city youths, etc. There is ample precedent for this. For example, the Corps of Engineers has traditionally performed important peacetime services.

6. Organizational and Administrative Problems

There is now an administrative science that draws upon organizational and management studies, sociology, political science, and social psychology, and which has much to offer regarding the establishment and structuring of both small and large units. This branch of social science concerns itself with specialization of functions, leadership, communication networks, etc. Army-sponsored research in this area should apply to specific issues such as those having to do with organization within small units, communication between leaders and technical specialists, use of sociometric devices for the formation of compatible squads, etc. Other applications of this sort would deal with broader issues such as democratic vs. authoritarian vs. laissez-faire modes of social control, legitimacy of leadership as it involves appointed vs. elected leaders, the utilities of separate officer corps vs. election from the ranks, social relations between officers, noncoms, and enlisted men, and so on. Social science research could indicate how alternative solutions to these organizational questions would affect unit effectiveness and unit satisfaction in terms of the morale of the individual soldiers and their regard for their units.

7. Legal and Ethical Problems

Legal and ethical issues are commonly regarded as lying outside the scientific realm, in that they involve transcendental

principles that are not matters for empirical test. While such a position is defensible, it would probably be generally agreed that legal and ethical matters do have their empirical aspects. Social science research is able to illuminate these aspects. For example, questions are being raised regarding military law, the court martial system, and military penalties. While some of these questions involve issues that are not clearly within the social science domain, there are other issues—e.g., the relative efficacy of current procedures in achieving their intended aims—that are amenable to social scientific exploration. The violent nature of military action, which makes it a last resort, inevitably is likely to have a brutalizing effect on participants. This problem has always deserved more attention than it has received, and should be studied in order that soldiers may be trained so as to be more aware of their responsibilities and in better control of their impulses. Occasional atrocities are otherwise inevitable. With the current emphasis on moral sensibility and with the greater coverage of the battle fronts by newsmen, we have all become more than ever aware of the need for bringing social science research as well as other sources of information and control to bear upon this unpleasant but unignorable problem.

8. Morale Building

As long as there have been armies there has probably been an awareness that one of the essential ingredients of military success is morale. The Army has devoted considerable research to finding ways of improving the morale of our own troops, and to weakening the morale of enemy troops through psychological warfare techniques. During the past fifteen years there has been substantial progress

in the social and behavioral sciences in understanding the processes by which attitudes and behavior can be changed by social communication and reinforcement techniques which do not involve the use of force. By appropriate application to military situations, these developments could be used to sustain the morale and efficiency of American forces, make the American forces resistant to psychological warfare from the enemy, improve unit solidarity, enhance mutual trust among units, and confer resistance to enemy psychological warfare. Other applications of these principles could be used to weaken the enemy will to resist and to maintain aggressive action.

Research is particularly needed on the functioning of the Army under conditions of restraint and the effects this has on military morale. In every recent war and crisis the fighting forces have found themselves restrained by political considerations from the full use of force. It is not easy for soldiers to operate under such constraints; yet their effectiveness depends upon their understanding of the necessity for restraint.

9. Social and Human Development of Personnel

This research area includes problems related to encouraging the personal growth of individual members of the Army, so as to increase their ability to carry out missions assigned to them, to enhance their own feelings of personal worth, and to enable them to make greater contributions to society both during and after their military careers. It involves finding ways establishing opportunities for personal development within the Army. These opportunities might include increased availability of formal education, systematic exposure to a wide variety of cultures, techniques for identifying

previously unsuspected talents, and many others. Alternative possibilities should be systematically explored.

C. Research in Support of the Army's Peace Keeping Mission

As the Army faces crises, both at home or abroad, the discipline of its men in handling deadly weapons may often be the crucial difference between easing and acerbating the crisis. Any newspaper reader can give examples. A major mission of the armed forces of a nation like the United States is the protection of its citizens' lives, property, and institutions against destruction. Historically, the services have tended to carry out this mission by developing a sufficient capacity for violence to constitute so great a threat to the lives, property, and institutions of potential enemies as to deter that enemy from attack or, if the enemy is not deterred, to destroy his forces to the extent that he is no longer a threat to this country. Social science research is needed to assess how efficacious this counter-violence strategy is in reducing threat and the extent to which its use (or even availability) has a negative effect on the psychological strength and social institutions of the home country. Basic social science research on conflict, conciliation, coalition formation, cooperation, aggression, etc. has much to offer in evaluating the efficacy of a policy of massive or gradual deterrence and retaliation vs. alternative policies of conciliation, consensus, and disengagement. The efficacy of these alternative modes of response must be evaluated not only with regard to their intended purpose of deterrence, but also in terms of their unintended effects such as psychological or sociological erosion of the home country. Some attention has been paid to these broad

issues on the strategic level, but this work also has implications for small unit operations that fall more specifically within the army mission; in any case, it would probably have implication for limited and insurgency warfare.

Peace keeping is a responsibility of the military establishment as a whole, in conjunction with civilian foreign policy agencies, and research on the total military role in peace keeping might be carried on more appropriately at the Department of Defense level than by the Army. Nevertheless, the Army should constantly monitor the effectiveness of its own doctrine, operations, and weapons systems in helping to keep the peace, and should also search for new ways in which its capabilities could be used to avoid the outbreak of armed conflict and to minimize the level of violence should armed conflict occur. As far as the committee can determine, none of the Army's social science research effort has been devoted to these problems thus far. We believe that peace keeping deserves attention in the social science research program, and would suggest the following areas in particular.

1. Deterrence in Small Unit Operations and Limited War

There have been a number of government and privately-sponsored studies of strategic deterrence, but as far as we know the questions of deterrence, conflict avoidance, and damage limitation have not been systematically studied in connection with small unit operations and limited war. Research on conflict resolution, bargaining, negotiations, etc. from game theory and other theoretical perspectives could probably help the Army to discover new ways of achieving the missions assigned to it, while at the same time lowering substantially the level of violence.

2. Development of Less Deadly Force

Army tactics, and especially army weapons, have been designed to maximize the capacity for the destruction of enemy personnel and resources. There seems to be a growing recognition with respect to the civil police force (and to a lesser extent with regard to the Army) that more research is necessary on less deadly applications of force. Involved here would be the examination and, if judged appropriate, the development of less deadly weapons (aerosol and dart tranquilizers and soporifics, immobilizing agents, slippery water and foam, smoke and other obscuring agents, etc.). While the actual development of such agents constitutes a problem in the natural sciences, there are many social science problems that arise in connection with them. For example, in some segments of the population there seems to be a revulsion against police use of mace, although this was presumably developed as a less deadly substitute for guns. To some extent, this revulsion may be based on the feeling that when less deadly weapons are available they are disproportionately more likely to be used than are deadly weapons. Social science research could throw some light on both the truth and the belief-strength of such a possibility. Perhaps subtle psychological phenomena are involved in any such revulsion; for example, it may be that police use of deadly force is so unthinkable that the very moderateness of these other agents makes the unpleasant aspects of their use loom larger in public consciousness. Social science research is even more relevant to the development of non-fatal tactics, such as the means of crowd control, the inhibition of the use of violence by others, etc. Social science analyses could

contribute to the determination of the moral acceptability and the feasibility of these non-fatal tactics, both as regards intended effects and the unintended social and biological side effects.

3. Military Activities as a Means of Communication

Some attention has been given by military and academic researchers to air and naval demonstrations as a means of communication, usually in conjunction with diplomatic activities. There has, however, been little research on the potentialities of Army activities to communicate, and on the advantages and risks of using Army facilities for this purpose. Large-scale Army maneuvers have traditionally been used to convey certain ideas to both friends and enemies, but the extent and clarity with which the message is received has rarely been established. Almost nothing is known about the unintended meanings conveyed by routine military operations, or about the communication aspects of small group operations. Research in this area would be rewarding.

4. Arms Control and Limitation

For many years the United States has concentrated on finding ways of limiting and controlling atomic weapons, but little effort had been devoted to the study of limitations on "conventional" arms. Research in this area would involve other disciplines besides the social sciences, but social scientists could make an essential input to it. Better understanding of the functions of military establishments in developing countries, for instance, might make it possible for the United States to convince the governments of these countries that they could achieve greater security while spending a smaller proportion of their budgets on military hardware. Similarly, work

that has been done by psychologists and sociologists on coalition formation and building mutual trust might be applied to the problem of achieving "conventional" arms limitation agreements among the major as well as minor powers. The difficulties of research in this area are admittedly great, but the potential rewards in the event of a research breakthrough are so large as to justify some effort. "Conventional" arms limitation and control is an important factor in preventing or containing small wars that could lead to major conflagrations. Furthermore, we believe that the Army is particularly suited to sponsor meaningful research in this area.

D. Accumulation, Storage, and Dissemination of Social and Behavioral Science Research Findings

Efforts should be made to develop an information system to facilitate storage, retrieval and utilization of social science concepts and data applicable to the solution of social problems that would serve the needs of all government agencies (including the Army) and possibly some non-governmental agencies as well. It is appropriate for the Army to take some initiative in the establishment of such a system (though primary responsibility for its development should eventually be located elsewhere), since through CINFAC the Army has already had extensive experience in servicing the requirements of other agencies for foreign area information.

The system should be able on a relatively short time span to answer questions of social scientists embarking on new social science research. Administrators could seek answers that apply to immediate problems. Technicians and scientists could determine the state of the art in specific sub-areas. The system would be comparable to

MEDLARS in medicine. The CINFAC system is a step in the right direction but is limited in scope and capability. Such an information system should include information from foreign area research, political science, psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics, and environmental and urban affairs. Eventually it would include research in education, law and other related topics.

Factual data for the system could be obtained from many places. There are the Human Relations Area Files for the less developed countries, the Yale political data banks, the interuniversity consortium of public opinion archives for the United States and foreign areas, private research banks on violence, the UNESCO annual data on a variety of subjects, the Library of Congress files, etc. Other input to the information system would include propositional inventories encapsulating the tested relationships among variables of social science interest.

An essential part of such an information system should be getting the results of social science research into the field where they can be used. Administrators are frequently unaware that answers to other problems are just waiting to be applied. Communication experts should develop such a system so that its output would not just benefit other researchers but also administrators and those who might not understand the specialized languages of the social sciences.

As discussed in Section IIIA (pp. 14-16) specifically with reference to/^adata bank of foreign area data, this broader social science information system would contain information of use to a wide variety of governmental and non-government agencies in meeting

vital needs of our people. Hence its development should be promoted by many departments. While such a system would be of considerable use to the Army, among other agencies, in the conduct of its assigned mission, practical considerations outlined in Section IIIA, above, militate against the Army's taking primary responsibility for developing such a system. Perhaps in Social Science Divisions of the NSF (or the social science division of NIMH) would be the appropriate agency within the present governmental organization. But as one of the operational departments needing such information, the Army should help promote such a development.

E. Social Science Research Management and Organization Within the Army

1. Current Problems

We have observed a variety of management problems associated with the current research program. There is the fragmentation of social science research through a variety of agencies and locations. A substantial amount of the work of Army social scientists is spent in monitoring a modest number of research proposals, so that the staff involved has much less time than it should have to become acquainted with the scientific developments in the disciplines and the social science needs of the users in the field. The nature of the support program involves a considerable time lag between the definition of a problem, the start of work and the completion of research. Whenever work is essential to the support of a current operation, it is difficult for the Army research program as currently organized to respond in time, except in terms of a very modest product. The Army requirements system poses a restraint on the exploitation of new knowledge that is generated in social science itself.

Closely associated with this problem is the issue that often arises when a staff effort requires the initiative by an operating element of the Army in order for the staff element to be able to respond. We found ample evidence of a large number of pressures being placed upon the social science staff to undertake studies of one sort or another. We believe that this is a healthy sign from the standpoint of the Army as a whole, since it indicates a growing awareness of the great importance of social science research in supporting the Army's mission. On the other hand, an optimal contribution of social science to achieving the mission of the Army requires much more initiative on the part of the social scientists themselves. It is characteristic of social science research that one who is not a specialist in a given area cannot recognize the problems as research topics or state them in terms enabling them to be dealt with in a scientific manner. Beyond this, there are a wide variety of new developments in social science which have direct relation to the problems of the Army, but which require additional work before the research findings have direct usefulness to the Army. This means that the social science program of the Army must have within it a capability for generating studies and analyzing the current knowledge for social science answers that are not directly requested by a staff or operating element of the Army.

We also see problems produced by the shifting of military personnel associated with research efforts. Many officers hold their positions just long enough to become aware of the way in which social science research can be useful to them. Then they are transferred. Beyond this, the Army seems to have had difficulty in finding

contractors with high quality personnel who can work directly on some of the very critical problems the Army faces. While the contractors chosen for the work currently underway have been good representatives of the kind of organization solicited, the top quarter, at least, of the social science community (including those in universities) is not being tapped when new research is being contracted. We recognize the fact that there is some reluctance on the part of many faculty members in universities to engage in research directly associated with the war in Southeast Asia. However, we are convinced that there are large numbers of top-ranking university investigators who might find it attractive to work on some of the currently neglected problems that we have specified in earlier sections of this report.

Many of the Army's problems are large and complex problems, and their very size and complexity make them incompatible with a yearly funding cycle. The area of interpersonal relations offers a number of examples. For such problems, an organizational mode must be found which allows for continuity of research over significant periods of time. Simultaneously there will be, as there is today, a requirement to solve short-term problems properly falling in the social science domain which have identifiable solutions. Such problems are typified by training requirements, selection devices and personal inventories of one type or another. The organizational mode then must also provide for a quick response capability to problems of this type.

There are further problems which do not carry a "research" requirement but which often have social science implications. These

tend to be operational decisions made within the Army that can be expected to have a significant impact on the soldier himself, on the population with which the Army interacts or, quite often, on both. Such decisions can profit from analysis as to potential social impact by social scientists who are experienced with respect to the Army as well as being current with the state of the art in social science.

From an organizational point of view, then, we feel that there are two major problem areas. These are the lack of in-house capability and the difficulty of interesting top level university social scientists in the Army social science research program.

2. Organizational Solutions

The present intention to develop an in-house capability is a critical element for developing an effective program and should be encouraged. Such an organization should have the responsibility to pursue and study the long-range types of problems referred to earlier, both by bringing to bear the already-available social science knowledge and by new data-collecting research. It should not have the requirement to monitor contract research except where that research is a part of its own program. Further, if it is to be effective, it must be capable of recruiting and holding creative social scientists who can remain in touch with on-going social science research and, at the same time, develop close familiarity with the Army itself. The development of such a staff demands appropriate leadership—namely a director whose scientific standing and administrative standing place him high in the social science community, and who has a zest for applied research and the talent for recognizing and

attracting (on permanent and ad hoc basis) social scientists with the appropriate skills and interests, as discussed below.

The Committee feels that not only should the present content emphasis of Army social science research be changed but that a restructured organization is necessary to support that change. The kinds of problems we feel the Army should be pursuing require a greater depth and breadth of social science competence than is presently available to the Army, granted that the Army has a personnel-ceiling problem. Nevertheless, it is probable that there are already slots for several dozen—or more—fairly high level social science specialists in various Army staff agencies in Washington and at numerous field locations, some of which could be reassigned to the in-house laboratory for administrators and for policy-oriented in-house scholars, who are given time to become expert on a problem over a period of years is valuable to an organization such as the Army in helping it to use the results of expensive research projects. Such scholars have been developed by military establishments in Great Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and probably elsewhere. The concept works. A race relations expert with long-term experience in Army settings, for instance, would know about all relevant race relations research going on throughout the country, and would be able to apply this to Army problems. If he needed data gathered on a large scale he could have this done through the Army's facilities, or he could have it contracted out. He should be so familiar both with his field of specialization and with the Army that he often could recommend an application without doing any field research at all. When large-scale projects become necessary, he could follow them through from the very beginning to the final applications.

The in-house laboratory should be organized to assure that the Army obtains the maximum benefit from past and current social science research in the conduct of its mission. Hence within the limits of its resources, the lab should be prepared to take on problems in any of the subject-matter areas discussed in the previous sections as well as to work at all stages of the research process. These stages include: (a) early recognition of social problems affecting the Army; (b) conduct research to discover and evaluate possible solutions; (c) interpret the results of this research in terms of options available within military settings; (d) develop programs for the utilization of the obtained results; and (e) monitor the employment and effectiveness of these programs. This concept of the in-house laboratory assures that it would be responsible for both research and development.

Work at most of these stages would be the direct responsibility of the permanent staff of the in-house lab, supplemented by consultants including outside social scientists and operational Army personnel. For some of the stages new procedures should be adopted. For example, in carrying out the first stage of early recognition of problems, it might be wise to develop^a a questionnaire that could be administered annually and anonymously to a sample of Army personnel to identify developing social and personal problems and possible solutions to them. Such an annual social audit might also involve a structured questionnaire that would be completed by a sample of unit commanders at all levels and military situations. The later, developmental stages (c, d, and e) of utilizing and monitoring the programs require that the permanent in-house social scientists have continued contact with field settings.

The permanent staff of the laboratory would be less appropriate for actually carrying out certain of the stages, especially stage (b), the conduct of specific research projects. Such specific projects call for specialists who would seldom be available among the permanent staff who would be few in number compared to the very wide-range of social problems reviewed in the previous sections; also, their primary responsibilities in problem recognition and in developing programs of application and monitoring them would leave the permanent staff with little time to focus on specific research projects.

Rather than contract these specific projects out to university or nonacademic organizations, we recommend that individual researchers be employed to work within the Army setting on temporary ad hoc appointments. Since the vast pool of social science research talent in the universities is currently being underutilized by the Army, such ad hoc assignments might often take the form of one or two summer-term appointments for an academic social scientist (perhaps with part-time work during the intervening academic year if such release time is necessary and is permitted by the university). In these cases all the research should be done within the Army facilities and not at or through the university, since the research would be primarily for the needs of the Army rather than for the teaching and basic research responsibilities of the university. Such ad hoc social science appointees should be chosen primarily for their expertise in the problem area and their creativity in social science application, rather than for their specific knowledge of military settings. While this latter would be an additional

asset, it could be developed through opportunities for field observation and working with permanent staff of the in-house laboratory.

These specific research projects might often take the form of new data-collecting empirical studies. But very frequently they should take the form of analytic research consisting of analyzing the already available social science knowledge, with an orientation toward developing solutions feasible within the options available within military settings (and the possible changes in those settings). In most cases, new empirical studies should be undertaken only after the above analytic process has been completed and its results carefully discussed with the permanent members of the laboratory and the potential users in the field.

F. Social Science Research Advisory Board

We recommend the establishment of a small Army Social Science Research Advisory Board, consisting of from seven to ten leading social scientists. Members should be recruited primarily because of their expertise on issues with which the Army should concern itself, rather than to represent their scientific discipline. Nevertheless, to insure a broad spectrum sensitivity to problems and solutions, we suggest that the Board include a political scientist, a psychologist, a sociologist, an economist, an anthropologist, and an historian. The Board should be authorized to invite other scholars to sit with it for the discussion of specialized subjects.

The Board should meet at least twice a year; smaller meetings of those Board members concerned with specific problems of current interest to the Army could be held as required. Terms of membership should be four to six years, but staggered so as to permit the addition

of one or two new members each year.

Among the functions of the Board should be the following:

1. Review of projects being carried on by ARO.
2. Suggest regarding new projects.
3. Input of information about research being carried on by the social science community.
4. Suggest personnel who might be recruited for the Army social science research program.

Terms of Reference

Ad Hoc Committee on Army Social Science Research

- I. PURPOSE - The purpose of the ad hoc committee is to evaluate the social science research program of the Behavioral Sciences Division, Army Research Office.
- II. BACKGROUND
 - A. Mission. The purpose of the Army's Social Science Research Program is to conduct research in the Behavioral and Social Sciences that is responsive to the military requirements in the developing nations and remote areas. The program is in direct support of counterinsurgency, internal defense, and the objectives of military MAAG's and Missions.
 - B. Precedent. A historic precedent for convening an ad hoc committee was established by a symposium on "The US Army's Limited War Mission and Social Science Research" in March 1962. Sponsored by the Chief of Research and Development, this symposium was attended by more than 400 key military and civilian personnel and prominent social scientists. Key roles were assumed by such individuals as GEN Arthur G. Trudeau, the late Dr. Paul Linebarger, BG Russell W. Volckman (Ret), Dr. W. Phillips Davison, Dr. Lucian W. Pye, Dr. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Dr. Klaus Knorr, Dr. Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Dr. Roger M. Russell, BG D. D. Blackburn and Dr. Carroll L. Shartle. This symposium aided in bringing about greater understanding between the academic world and the military community of the role that the social sciences could play in assisting the Army in its cold-war mission.
 - C. Conflicting Criticism of Social Science Research. Social Science Research is criticised on occasion for not attempting to solve most of the Army's operational problems. Criticism has pertained to failure to respond to research needs in support of (1) Institution building, (2) psychological operations and (3) solving the problems of Vietnam. On the other hand there are critics who express the conviction that the social sciences have nothing to offer in the solution of the Army's operational requirements.
 - D. Status of Army Social Science Research. During the period of time that has elapsed since the symposium, a social science research program has been funded at a modest annual budget in the vicinity of \$3,000,000. This level of funding has permitted support for a limited number of the Army's operational requirements. The research program has been functioning according to a DDR&E approved 5-year plan. It is planned to update and renew this 5-year plan based on guidance anticipated from the Ad Hoc Committee.

E. Present Programming Procedures. Operational requirements for research are conveyed to the Behavioral Sciences Division in two principal ways. A common method involves a request by an operating agency for research to assist in the solution to a stated operational problem. The other method involves a yearly inventory of Behavioral and Social Science research requirements. A canvass is made of General Staff agencies to determine the present status of previously stated needs and to ascertain what new needs have arisen. Responses to this canvass are reviewed by the Army Research Office and the cognizant research laboratories. Feasible and promising research efforts are programmed subject to availability of scientific talent and budgetary limitations. The Army Human Factors Advisory Committee, composed of representatives of concerned agencies and commands gives the total program a detailed and critical review. Currently more than 30 operational requirements for social science research are unfunded.

F. Emerging Areas for Research. Recently several areas of potential research in support of the Army's cold war mission have been vying for inclusion in the research program. These pertain to functions of the Army's Military Assistance Officer program, psychological operations and planned social change.

III. PROCEDURES

A. Selection of Committee Members. It is proposed to derive the list of names of committee members from a longer list of names of eminent social scientists in the nation and military experts in the operational functions where social science research is needed. The assistance of BG D. D. Blackburn, Dr. Davis Bobrow and representatives of the Air Force and Navy has already been sought in compiling the large list of names.

B. Selection of Chairman. It is proposed to invite Dean Clark of ASAP to serve as Chairman. The committee would then function under the chairman.

C. Presentations to be made to the Committee.

1. General Nature of the Program. Topics to be covered will include organization and funding.

2. Relationship of the Army's Program to the Total DOD Program.

3. Operational Research Requirements and Utilization Data (to be Presented by Representatives of the Principal Sponsors.)

4. Research Programs (to be Presented by Laboratory Directors and Other Contractor Representatives.)

5. Program of the US Army Research Unit, Korea (to be Presented by the Chief of the Unit.)

IV. RESULTS DESIRED

A. Identification of Problem Areas. It is hoped that the committee will point up areas of the Army's social science research program where reorientation would be worthwhile. Identification of conditions that mitigate against maximum effectiveness will help in improving the research program.

B. Outside Evaluation of the Army's Social Science Research Requirements. This will furnish an objective determination of the validity of stated operational requirements.

C. Evaluation of the Social Science Research Program. Quality of research effort. Extent of responsiveness of research to operational requirements.

D. Examination of Newly Emerging Operational Requirements. Consideration of the new requirements such as military assistance, psychological operations and planned social change in terms of operational needs, state of the art and promise of research payoff as compared with the currently programmed research efforts in terms of budgetary and research resources considerations.

E. Recommendations for the Social Science Research Program.

1. Areas for immediate research programming.
2. A long range research plan.
3. Funding trends.
4. How current and future programs can be made maximally effective.
5. Other recommendations as deemed to be warranted by the committee.

what will be different?

*Briefed by C^{OC} (Col. Hyman?)
relationships bet C^{OC} + O^{CRD}
Different ways to manage & impact on sys.
appropriate R+D organization (CRESS?, BESRL)
When production?*



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

CRD

11 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (R&D)

SUBJECT: Proposed Ad Hoc Group on Social Science Research

1. Forwarded herewith is a draft proposal for an ASAP study group, subject as above, on which your concurrence and/or comments are requested.
2. In the interest of time, General Betts would like to establish the proposed ad hoc group at the earliest opportunity. The attached proposal contains the considerations involved, proposed terms of reference for the group and the chairman.

Incl
as

Wayne D. Miller
WAYNE D. MILLER
Lieutenant Colonel, GS
Executive Secretary

I approve
CA 14 April

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