


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30 JUNE 1985

A BRIEF HISTORY OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET EXPANSION TOWARD THE SOUTH



Combat Capabilities Analysis Group
United States Central Command
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 33608

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5 May 2022
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USCENTCOM SSO
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
FOREWORD

This study is a product of the Combat Capabilities Analysis Group (CCCA) and is in response to a USCINCCENT request for a historical study of Russian/Soviet expansion toward the USCENTCOM AOR.

The study includes a brief review of Russian (Soviet) expansion to the south since 1700 and reaches the following conclusions:

- The Russians (Soviets) tend to fight on one front or theater of operations at a time. (This includes a synopsis of Russian/Soviet Wars, 1700 - Present).
- The Russians (Soviets) tend to expand toward areas offering the least resistance.

Also included is a brief analysis of future Soviet objectives along their southern borders based upon historical precedents and an examination of some actions available to the US that may impede or halt Soviet expansion to the south.


WILLIAM E. HOGAN
Colonel, USAF
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

One of the most striking features of Russian history is its prodigious territorial growth over the last five or six centuries (see maps pages x and xi). In the 1400's, the Grand Principality of Moscovy covered an area to about 300 miles east and 400 miles north of present-day Moscow. It lay at the center of a vast, open plain, nowhere above 1500 feet in elevation. While no natural boundaries protected it, none hindered it, and it expanded gradually and unevenly over six centuries to its present-day size, the largest territory in the world under one central government. What makes the USSR an "empire" today, is the aggrandizement and unification of many, varying cultures and peoples.

When viewed over the course of several centuries, the historical pattern of Russian expansion is coherent. It is characterized by a probing in many directions while generally moving in the direction of least resistance. The main directions of this movement have been eastward and southward (See maps following page). Over the last two centuries, only China in the east and Great Britain to the south have been able to retard, though not halt, Russian expansion.

The imperatives of this expansion have stemmed from certain basic motivations: security - to reach defensible frontiers; economic - to acquire more and better land, raw materials, markets, and ice-free seaports; political - to collect the Russian people under a single nation; ideological - e.g., Slavdom, Russian Orthodoxy, or Communism; and simple opportunism. By trial and error, Russian leaders have formulated historic Russian aims and characteristic methods of expansion which are suitable to Russian interests and expressive of the aspirations of the Russian peoples.

Eighteenth Century

Prior to 1700 Russian expansion was generally at the expense of principalities and khanates.* Continuous Russian expansion around its periphery actually began during the reign of Peter the Great. In 1721, Peter concluded a two decades-long war with Sweden, then cast his attention southward and eastward. In 1723, he annexed, from Persia, the littoral of the Caspian Sea - from south of Astrakhan through Rasht, all the way around the Caspian to north of present-day Bandar Shah (Southeast corner of the Caspian Sea). By 1735, this territory was restored to Persia. To the end of his life, he planned and launched military expeditions to the extremities of the Eurasian Plain - the frontiers of China and India.

*A khanate refers to a state or area ruled by a Khan and was a vestige of the Mongol Empire.

Nineteenth Century

In the early 1800's, Russia's strategy was to gain control over the northeast coast of the Black Sea and eventually to control the Turkish Straits. To the southeast, the strategy was to gain concessions from Persia, allowing Russia to outflank the Ottoman Empire, and to establish a defensible line-of-communication (LOC) connected to the Indian Ocean. To accomplish this strategy, it was necessary to invade and conquer Transcaucasia between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. This was done in two stages (1804-1813 and 1826-1828) resulting in control over and annexation of what was then Transcaucasian Persia. During this period, the ancient Christian peoples of Georgia and Armenia looked to Russia for protection against Moslem Persia and Turkey. In 1795, the capital of Georgia (Tiflis, now Tbilisi) was sacked by the Persians. On the urgent appeal of Georgia's last king, Russia's Czar Alexander I annexed Georgia in 1801 and garrisoned a military force there to protect his acquisition and to provide a springboard for longer-ranged ambitions. By this move, Russia secured part of the Azerbaijan Province of Persia (now part of the Soviet Union) and acquired navigation rights in the southern Caspian Sea.

From 1804 to 1813, the Russian military strategy was decidedly riverine and estuarine: Russian forces were projected southward along waterway LOC's which included the Volga River and the coastal axis of the Western Caspian Sea. Eventually, by a legal act (The Treaty of Gulistan in 1813), Persian Azerbaijan became Russian territory. In 1828, having used this region as a forward operating area, Russia acquired Yerevan Province and Persian Armenia by the Treaty of Turkmanchai.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, Russian strategists and expansionists mostly were concerned with extending strategic lines of communications. With respect to Persia and the Persian Gulf, the eventual aim was to build a railroad from Yerevan to Bushehr through Tabriz, Tehran, and Esfahan and to build a second rail line from Merv (Mary) to Bandar-e Abbas through Meshed (Mashhad) and Kerman. The overall goal was to connect the Russian rail network with the two ports on the Persian Gulf. This plan was never carried out because of the offsetting influence of Great Britain. Today, only a principal hard-surfaced road follows the original line of communication in the Western part of Iran from Tehran to Shiraz to Bushehr. In the East, a single dirt/gravel road traverses the Dasht-e-Lut desert between Mashhad and Kerman, enroute to Bandar-e Abbas.

By 1870, British expansion northwestward from India threatened to confront Russian southeastern expansion into Central Asia. The English feared Russian expansion into Persia and India, while the Russians feared English expansion into Central Asia. Afghanistan sat at the juncture of this conflict of interests. Russia's strategy to control the area was to extend the critical artery--the railroad--from Krasnovodsk (on the Caspian Sea) eastward through Samarkand to the Chinese border. The British strategy was based on acquiring the Northwest Frontier as a buffer area and had to extend the railroad

from ... India and Karachi with lines reaching Quetta and Peshawar in what is now Pakistan. In 1885, the opposing British and Russian strategies reached a flashpoint when Russia completed a southward extension of the main rail line to the Afghanistan border crossingpoint at Kushka. This put Russia within a few days march of the ancient city of Herat, a key location in northwest Afghanistan on the land LOC between Persia and India. This threat to British interests caused considerable alarm in Great Britain and a major war was narrowly averted only because both nations felt that there was more to lose than could be gained economically and politically through open warfare.

Twentieth Century

In 1905, Russian interest was directed away from its southern border by the disastrous Russian military defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria and by internal Russian upheavals. Consequently, Russia settled her Central Asian differences with Great Britain by signing the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement. The Agreement sought to obviate any cause for misunderstanding in Persian affairs, with Russia acknowledging British interests in Afghanistan and Southern Persia while Russia's interests in Northern Persia were recognized.

The Anglo-Russian Agreement resulted in Russian suzerainty over the northern third of Persia (as far south as Yazd). By 1907 the internal politics of Persia were in disarray and there was little stability in the regime of the Shah, Mohammed Ali. Even though Russia sent a military force to Tehran in 1909 to support his regime, it fell, with power passing uncertainly into the hands of social and religious extremists who were hostile towards Russia (a situation not unlike that found in present-day Iran).

During World War I, Russian objectives along its southern border included their long sought goal of free navigation through the Turkish Straits and annexation of northern Persia. During this period, bands of pro-German Persians created havoc in the central and southern parts of Iran while in western Persia, Turkish insurgents were active. In response, Russian military forces occupied Northern Persia as far south as Hamadan and Kermanshah. This period represented Russia's deepest incursion into Persia and, had it not been for the Revolution, a separate peace with Germany, and the Civil War (1917-1921), Russian hegemony might now reach as far south as the Strait of Hormuz.

World War II

The most recent Russian (Soviet) effort to invade Persia (Iran) came during World War II, under conditions similar to those that prevailed in 1907-1915. In 1941, the British and Soviet allies again united to partition Iran with the aims of ousting the seemingly Pro-Nazi Iranian Government, denying Iranian oil to Germany, and providing a major defensible LOC through Iran for the allied resupply of the Soviet Union. To this end, the Soviet General Staff wrote an extensive detailed strategic background plan for the military invasion of northern Iran launched from Transcaucasia.* Because of the June 1941 German

*An English translation of the entire plan with a 1981 update is available in the USCENTCOM Combat Capabilities Analysis Group.

invasion of the USSR, the Soviets considered it imperative to secure the allied supply line through Iran from the Iranian ports of Abadan and Bushehr and to overthrow the increasingly pro-German government of Shah Riza Khan. In an agreement with the Russians, the British planned to enter Iran from Iraq and seize Khuzestan and its oil fields. On August 25, 1941, Soviet forces entered Northwest Iran and, early in September, linked-up with British forces near Tehran. This action was taken within ten days following an allied request that Iran free herself of German influence -- a request which Iran had ignored. Shortly after link-up, the premiership of Iran changed hands, with the Pro-German Shah, Reza Khan, abdicating in favor of his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi.


Because of Churchill's distrust of the Soviet Union, the USSR had been enjoined, during the 1943 Tehran Conference, to withdraw all her military forces from Iran within six months following the defeat of Germany. In the autumn of 1945, Soviet troops were withdrawn from Tehran but remained in Northern Iran. Pressure exerted by the US and Great Britain, in addition to the adverse publicity this problem created in the new United Nations, caused the USSR to withdraw from Iran in 1946. Indications are that Moscow had thought to use this incursion to expand Soviet control into Iran, to seek outright Iranian oil concessions, to establish pro-Soviet separatist regimes in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and to encourage leftist groups throughout Iran. When Soviet troops withdrew in 1946 in response to Western pressures, the puppet regimes they had helped to install within Iran promptly collapsed.

Post-World War II


Between the end of World War II and December, 1979, the Soviet Union relied on varying degrees of subversion, political pressure, military sales and foreign aid to influence the countries along its southern border. In December 1979, the "Great Game" originally played between Great Britain and the Russian Empire, entered a new "active" phase when the Soviets invaded and occupied Afghanistan. While the actual movement of forces into Afghanistan proved relatively easy, the resistance by the Mujahedin has proven to be a significant obstacle to control of the country.

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Periods of expansion 1261–Present



SOVIET EXPANSION TOWARD THE SOUTH 1261-1985



Modern Relevancy

Although history seldom (some say never) repeats itself, there are expansionist themes with similar circumstances that continue to reappear in Russian (Soviet) history. Therefore, when examining Russian (Soviet) foreign policy, it is possible to predict probable broad Soviet strategic objectives derived from historical precedents along the Soviet Union's southern border regions. This region has been divided into geographical areas for ease of analysis: the Turkish Straits, the Turkish-Soviet border, the Iranian-Soviet border area, and the Afghani-Pakistani border area. A summary of Soviet aspirations toward each area follows.

Turkish Straits

Within the next few years the Soviets probably will call for a meeting among the signatories of the 1936 Montreux Convention which governs passage through the Turkish Straits to renegotiate articles of that convention. A new Soviet aircraft carrier, the 75,000 ton KREMLIN, is currently under construction in the Black Sea.⁹ Since the Montreux Convention does not specifically address aircraft carriers or ships above 45,000 tons, the Soviets may wish to implement a new agreement or an interpretation to allow them legally to pass larger ships through the Straits rather than disregard the Convention. Another less likely possibility is for the Soviets to abrogate the convention placing the Turks in a difficult position of having to administer the Strait without a formal agreement.

Soviet-Turkish Border

Although the Soviets agreed to recognize the current border with Turkey in the 1921 Soviet-Turkish Friendship Treaty, they continued to apply pressure after World War II to have Turkey return the strategic area around Kars to Soviet sovereignty (strategic since it controls land LOC's into the Soviet Union from Turkey and would provide a buffer for the major Soviet city of Leninakan). The Soviets offered to recognize the Turkish claim to that area if Turkey would withdraw from The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is, therefore, possible the Soviets would still be interested in acquiring this area to reestablish the old imperial boundary which includes the city of Kars. Because of the Turkish link to NATO, the Soviets would favor, perhaps even "support" politically, confrontations between Turkey and Greece, and other NATO members, in the hopes of weakening the NATO alliance or perhaps causing the withdrawal of Turkey, thereby increasing the effectiveness of Soviet pressure to regain the Kars area.

Iran

The Soviets would like to see the central Iranian government become weaker, allowing further Soviet exploitation. Though this would make the border area less stable, it could present opportunities for increased Soviet presence and influence in the area. If fracturing of Iran occurs, a number of options could be opened to the Soviets. These include:

Supporting separatist movements among Northwestern Iranian ethnic groups to include Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Kurds; supporting leftist elements in the power struggle in Tehran; and/or supporting secessionists in Tabriz who would request Soviet assistance (this could be an excuse for Soviet troops to move into Azerbaijan).

In the meantime, the Soviets will likely seek to avoid raising US fears of a Soviet takeover of Iran. They probably realize that any threat to Iran could result in an increase of US military strength in the area and could serve as a catalyst for further US military build-ups and for additional forces being devoted to US Central Command (USCENTCOM). Additionally, a substantial Soviet threat to Iran could unify further the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council and possibly result in USCENTCOM carte blanche access rights to ports and airfields in the Persian Gulf area.

It is interesting to note that during the last 300 years, Russia (Soviet Union) has invaded or occupied Persia (Iran) six times: 1722-1735, 1804-1813, 1826-1828, 1907-1918, 1920-1921, 1941-1946. On each occasion, control was acquired over territory and local resources; however, on the three occasions in this century, this control was only temporary. From Moscow's perspective, the consequence of Soviet withdrawals after each of these last three incursions is a continuing "gap" in the imperial southern perimeter.

Afghanistan-Pakistan

Although the Soviets do not seem to be making progress against the Mujahadin in Afghanistan, history has shown the Russians to be patient when dealing with such resistance. Examples are: the 21 years it took them to put down resistance in the Caucasus (1838-1859) and the Basmachi problem along the Afghanistan frontier which involved major fighting between 1920 and 1930. The Soviets probably will continue the current level of hostilities in Afghanistan, using a combination of tactics or methods eventually to resolve the issue. These tactics or methods include: indoctrination; extermination of as many Mujahedin as possible while maintaining security of key facilities and lines of communication; and destroying the logistics bases and support of the Mujahedin. The Soviets have sent several thousand young Afghans to the USSR for indoctrination and training in an effort to establish an indigenous, pro-Soviet elite. The Soviets are using indiscriminate attacks against villages in order to destroy popular support for the Mujahedin and to drive out the Mujahedin supporters. Additionally, the war has the potential for expanding since the Soviets see Pakistan as a safe haven, supply base and training center for the Mujahedin. Numerous air strikes against Mujahedin camps in Pakistan have been carried out by Afghan/Soviet aircraft over the last five years. The Soviets may seek to increase these air attacks and perhaps eventually to launch small unit ground force attacks across the border into Pakistan ostensibly to reduce Mujahedin effectiveness. An ominous sign is the

increase in Soviet news media reporting denouncing aid being provided from Pakistan. Such news releases could be a method of preparing the Soviet public for an increase in pressure on Pakistan, perhaps to presage a ground force incursion into Pakistan.

As of this writing the Soviets still have neither consolidated their occupation of Afghanistan nor has the regime installed by the Soviets become legitimate in the eyes of the Afghan population. Based on historical precedents and the long-range tactics being employed, the Soviets eventually will be successful in establishing "full" control over Afghanistan much as they did in Southern Moslem ethnic areas of the Soviet Union or in Mongolia.

The direct Soviet intervention in and occupation of Afghanistan and the current anti-U.S. policies espoused by Iran raises an important question: As the inheritor of the British position in South Asia and the Middle East will the US be as effective a counter to the Russian/Soviet expansionist policies?

What the US Can Do To Impede or Halt Soviet Expansion in the South

This study traces the development and expansion of Moscow from a small Principality to the capital of the largest country on earth, occupying a major portion of two continents. The growth of Russia (and the Soviet Union) was generally characterized by periods of rapid expansion, followed by intervals of consolidation and even some loss of territory. The following paragraphs explore the Russian expansion and attempt to identify actions and alternatives open to the US to block further Soviet territorial acquisitions.

When reviewing Russian (Soviet) expansionism it becomes apparent that there are a number of reasons that have caused them either to stop their expansion or to return territory occupied by their forces. These reasons include: alliances between countries on the Russian (Soviet) border and another powerful nation; the withdrawal of Russian (Soviet) forces in order to leave control of the country or area to a pro-Soviet socialist government; the sharing of a common border with a nation strong enough to impede or halt Russian (Soviet) expansionism; Russian (Soviet) internal upheavals such as the Bolshevik Revolution; and events resulting in a Russian (Soviet) policy assessment that they are over-extended.

Alliances Between Countries on the Russian (Soviet) Border And Another Powerful Nation.

One of the best historical examples of a successful formal alliance against the Russian Empire was that formed during the Crimean War between Turkey, France and Britain. The opening military move of the war was the July 1853 Russian invasion of Moldavia and Wallachia (modern day Romania). This subsequently resulted in Britain and France demanding Russian withdrawal from those areas. When Russia refused, the British and French concluded an alliance with the Ottoman Empire in March 1854 and declared war against Russia.

While the main theater of operations became the Crimea, the British and French sent their fleets into the Gulf of Finland to force the Russia to divide its army to protect St. Petersburg. At the same time, the Alliance was able to send enough ships into the Black Sea to neutralize Russian naval superiority in that area and, in September 1854, to land a large allied force on the Crimean Peninsula. Also, another country, Austria, threatened Russian land LOC's and concluded an alliance with Prussia who was backing the British and French position in the war.

As the war progressed, Russia became politically isolated with little prospect of winning the war. It was forced to sign the 1856 Treaty of Paris which required it to evacuate Kars (located on the Eastern Turkish/Russian border), Moldavia, Wallachia and Southern Bessarabia. The treaty also neutralized the Black Sea, ordered all fortifications on the Black Sea and naval installations on Aland Island in the Baltic destroyed, made navigation on the Danube River free to all nations and opened the Turkish Straits to all shipping. While it is evident that this treaty was a setback for Russia, it was only temporary. After the war Russian diplomats worked at obtaining a revision of the treaty. In 1864, Russia began to support Prussian activities in organizing the German nation. When they again sided with Prussia during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, Bismark of Germany agreed to endorse a unilateral Russian renunciation of the 1856 Treaty. During an 1871 meeting in London, the Russians were able to have most of the Treaty of Paris restrictions repealed.

An interesting aspect of the Crimean War is that to temporarily halt Russian expansion, the cooperation of four of the most powerful European nations of the time (Britain, France, Austria and Prussia) was required. Even then, the effects of their efforts were short-lived since Russian diplomacy quickly nullified all of the major restrictions placed upon it by the 1856 Treaty of Paris. A Czarist proverb that reads, "Russia is always defeated, but never beaten" appears to be truer than most people realize.

Withdrawal of Forces From A Socialist Country.

Another reason for the loss of Soviet territory is the return of territory to a Socialist Government. At the end of World War II Soviet troops occupied all of Eastern Europe, large parts of northern China and other areas around the periphery of the Soviet Union. As communist governments were established or installed in these areas, Soviet forces, or at least a portion of them, were usually withdrawn. However, the Soviets have found that even the establishment of communist governments has not guaranteed cooperation. Examples of problems are numerous, with China and Czechoslovakia being the more noteworthy.

By the end of World War II, the Soviets had regained everything that Imperial Russia had lost in the Far East as a result of the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War. The Nationalist Chinese government under Chiang Kai-shek formally acknowledged Soviet gains in Manchuria in a 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty. However, the Soviet removal of industrial plants in Manchuria and their refusal to

allow the Nationalist Chinese to use Manchurian ports contributed to the decline of Nationalist Chinese power and aided the 1949 Chinese Communist takeover. Even though the Chinese Communists attained power, it wasn't until 1952 that the government obtained promises from the Soviets to withdraw from China by 1955, to transfer all military installations to the Chinese without compensation, and to recognize Chinese hegemony over Manchuria. Even with these Soviet concessions, the Sino-Soviet split was well under way by the mid-1950's. The reasons for the split were numerous and included: the continuing Soviet influence in North Korean affairs, the stripping of industrial plants from Manchuria; the continued stationing of Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia (once under Chinese control), the fact that the Russian Empire had obtained large parts of Chinese territory in the 1800's; and the ideological struggle for leadership of the Communist movement. Relations between the two countries reached a nadir in the late 1960's requiring the Soviets to station large numbers of troops along the Chinese border. In March 1969, serious fighting erupted along the Ussuri River and later at various points along the Sino-Soviet border pointing out the precarious peace maintained in that area.

The Soviets also had problems with communist governments in Eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia became a problem when it sought to establish a modified national socialism which was unacceptable to the Soviets. In August 1968, Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia, purged the reform leaders and obtained a treaty allowing the occupying forces the right of indefinite presence.

The overall lesson for the Soviets has been that the withdrawal of Soviet forces can result in a loss of control. If this is the case and the Soviets have learned from their past mistakes, the probability for a complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan becomes even more unlikely.

Border Countries Strong Enough To Prevent Soviet Expansion.

Presently, the only country bordering the USSR with the military capacity to impede or halt Soviet expansion is the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and even this capability has only existed in the last thirty years. When Russia first encountered the Chinese Empire in 1689, the Chinese were at the height of their power. By the late 1800's, the Chinese Manchu Dynasty was in decline, allowing the Russians to make inroads into traditional Chinese territory. The Russians legalized their seizures of Chinese territory by the 1858 Treaties of Aigun and Tientsin and by the 1860 Treaty of Peking. These agreements gave Russia areas to the north, northeast and east of present day Manchuria. China was unable to protect itself from Russian encroachments which continued until the Russian rivalry with Japan for control of Manchuria resulted in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War. This war ended in a Russian defeat, halting expansion into this area until World War II.

World War II provided the Soviets the opportunity to regain the concessions and territory lost in the Russo-Japanese War. However, as stated previously, the Soviets were unable to maintain control of Manchuria past 1955 due to the increasing power of the PRC and their agreement to withdraw in the hopes of reaching some sort of political accommodation with the Chinese.

First, the Turkish-US/NATO relationship is critical. The US must ensure that Turkey remains a viable member of NATO. It is imperative that this country, sharing a common border with the Soviet Union and the target of Russian expansionism for the last 300 years, be allied with an outside power or powers (i.e. NATO-US). Since there appears to be a reluctance throughout Russian history to risk a major war with other powers when the cost is more than the gain, such an alliance as NATO can serve to dissuade the Soviet Union. If any war with Turkey were perceived as involving NATO, a nuclear confrontation with the US could not be ruled out by the Soviet leadership. Not only would this make a Turkish War too costly, but it could result in the one condition Marxist-Leninist Doctrine believes is unacceptable, the destruction of the Soviet State.

Second, in lieu of an access agreement or a mutual defense treaty with Iran, the US should unilaterally support Iran in the event of a Soviet invasion. The Carter Doctrine, which named the Persian Gulf as an area of vital interest to the US, has probably sent the correct signal to the Soviet Union. The implication of the Carter Doctrine is that US forces would be sent to protect Iran from a Soviet invasion. The formation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), and later the US Central Command (USCENTCOM), highlighted this possibility and once again raised the spectre of super-power conflict and nuclear escalation.

Third, the US should continue to support the Mujahedin Freedom Fighters in Afghanistan. While the Russians (Soviets) have shown the capability to eliminate similiar enemies methodically in the past, the Mujahedin should be able to prevent the near-term consolidation of the Soviet position in Afghanistan. This delay can aid US policy by diverting Soviet interest and tying down assets that could be used against other countries, such as Iran, in the region. This takes advantage of past Russian (Soviet) historical precedents which indicate a reluctance by them to become involved in more than one area at a time.

Fourth, the US should initiate or continue efforts to redirect the animosity between Pakistan and India toward the Soviet strategic threat. While it is realized that there are deep seated cultural, religious and territorial disputes between these two South Asian countries, the US must work to change their attitudes. This problem has a direct impact upon the defensibility of the region since the Indians feel, with good reason, that modern weapons acquired by Pakistan would be used against India rather than the Soviets. By the same token, Pakistan fears (also with good reason) that Indian arms acquired from the Soviets would be used against them.

Fifth, the US should continue to support an end to the Iran-Iraq War. While it is true the war probably has served to slow the Iranian export of Islamic Fundamentalism to other Persian Gulf nations, it is also true that the war is draining the political and military strength of both countries, possibly rendering them more vulnerable to Soviet indirect measures.

Internal upheavals.

Internal upheavals and problems such as the Bolsevik Revolution, have resulted in major territorial losses for the Russians (Soviets). The largest single loss of territory resulted from the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which ended the fighting between Germany and the new Soviet government. Had this treaty remained in force, the Soviet Union would have lost major portions of the Ukraine and areas of eastern Russia. However, due to the defeat of Germany in World War I, these major territorial losses were averted.

Russian Overextension.

Between periods of expansion, the Russians (Soviets) have withdrawn from various areas when they felt they were overextended. One example was their activities vis-a-vis the Persian Empire.

During the reign of Peter the Great, the Russians were able to defeat the Persians during the 1722-1723 Russo-Persian War, resulting in the occupation of the littoral of the southern Caspian Sea coast. However, by 1735, they had decided they were overextended and withdrew their forces from Persia.

The Russians (Soviets) also occupied this general area in 1905-1917, 1920-1921 and 1941-1946. The last example involves the Soviet withdrawal from Iran in 1946. During the Tehran Conference in 1943, the Soviets had agreed to withdraw their forces from Iran, but had hesitated due to concerns for Russian security, protection of nascent socialist governments in the northwest part of the country—and the loss of options for Iranian oil exploration and production. Both the US and Britain forwarded protest notes to the Soviets, with the US stressing it could not remain indifferent to Soviet troops staying in Iran. Various other diplomatic and military signals were sent to the Soviets with the result that they withdrew their forces as previously agreed.

Another example of a Russian withdrawal is the 1883 landing of Russian troops in the Turkish Straits area. The Russians used the pretext of protecting the Straits to land approximately 10,000 troops in Turkey. The French, who were worried that the Russians would seize control of the Straits, quickly arranged a treaty between the belligerents (the Ottoman Empire and Egypt) in order to cancel the Russian excuse for its intervention. Since the Russians had to rely upon their fleet for resupply they probably felt at risk since the French fleet could have blockaded and cut off the Russian Army. One day after the treaty was signed the Russians began withdrawing their forces.

Recommended US Policies and Actions.

When reviewing Russian history it becomes obvious that a number of foreign policies and actions are available to the US that can have an effect on Soviet expansionism.

Sixth, the US should continue to expand contacts with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), the only significant power sharing a common border with the Soviet Union. Strategically, the PRC is important to the US as a means of nullifying a sizeable portion of Soviet force structure since the Russians (Soviets) have been reluctant to fight wars on two fronts. If the Soviets cannot guarantee the security of the Chinese border, they are less likely to initiate a war against NATO or move into Iran.

Finally, the US should attempt to improve relations with the Soviet Union through talks and trade agreements. However, we must realize, based upon their past history and Marxist-Leninist Doctrine, that the Soviets use times of peace and detente to build their strength and neutralize US/Western defense improvements and alter the "correlation of forces" in their favor.

Since the Soviets evidently have achieved their territorial goals in Europe by establishing European buffer states and are faced with a resurgent China, the only other areas currently open to expansion are Turkey and Iran and toward Pakistan. The US probably has not seen the last of the "Great Game" since the Soviet Empire will continue in its support for attempts to achieve its age-old territorial goals.

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SECTION I A HISTORY OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET EXPANSION TOWARD THE SOUTH

INTRODUCTION

One of the most striking features of Russian history is its prodigious territorial growth over the last five or six centuries. In the 1400's, the Grand Principality of Moscow covered an area to about 300 miles east and 400 miles north of present-day Moscow. It lay at the center of a vast, open plain, nowhere above 1500 feet in elevation. While no natural boundaries protected it, none hindered it, and it expanded gradually and unevenly over six centuries to its present-day size, the largest territory in the world under one central government. What makes the USSR an "empire" today, is the aggrandizement and unification of many, varying cultures and peoples.

When viewed over the course of several centuries, the historical pattern of Russian expansion is coherent. It is characterized by a probing in many directions while generally moving in the direction of least resistance. The main directions of this movement have been eastward and southward. During the last two centuries, only China in the east and Great Britain to the south have been able to retard, though not halt, Russian expansion.

The imperatives of Russia's expansion have stemmed from certain basic motivations: security - to reach defensible frontiers; economic - to acquire more and better land, raw materials, markets, and ice-free seaports; political - to collect the Russian people under a single nation; ideological - e.g., Slavdom, Orthodoxy, or Communism; and simple opportunism. By trial and error, Russian leaders have formulated historic Russian aims and characteristic methods of expansion which are suitable to Russian interests and expressive of the aspirations of the Russian peoples.¹

To understand more fully Russian/Soviet interests in countries along its southern borders and to gain a better understanding of the imperatives for Soviet expansion southward, a brief chronological review of major expansionist periods was conducted. The following highlights key events of these periods and the results of that review:

THE RISE OF MOSCOW, 1147-1533. (MAP 1)


Moscow was founded in 1147 as a military outpost at a key position on the main arteries of commerce and communication: the eastern European river systems. Moscow, via the Oka and Moscow Rivers, had direct access to the Volga River, the Caspian Sea, and the Caucasus and Central Asia regions. By portages, Moscow had an open avenue to the Dnieper River and the Black Sea. Moscow also lay at the juncture of the Baltic-to-Black Sea LOC and was the hub of road systems radiating from the area. This central position gave Moscow commanding control over the activities of all other principalities within its reach and accelerated its growth from an insignificant town to the capital of an empire extending over two continents.

Thirty years after its founding and again in 1238, Moscow was completely destroyed by Mongols. However, the town quickly recovered and by 1247, had become an independent principality. The first prince of Moscow, Ivan I, was initially appointed as the ruler of the surrounding principalities by the Mongol ruler of the Golden Horde for putting down a tax revolt by the surrounding principalities. As a result of Ivan's trusted position, the Mongol incursions into Eastern Europe decreased, allowing him to begin expanding Moscow's territory. Moscow's relative safety and stability was attractive to merchants as well as to Orthodox Church officials, and in 1328, the see of the Orthodox Church was moved to the city. This move significantly increased the prestige of the principality and directly connected Moscow and its rulers to the Orthodox Church. It remained the focal point for orthodox activities until the fall of the Romanov Dynasty in 1918.


Following the death of Ivan I, his sons, Simeon and Ivan II, continued their father's policies, slowly expanding the size of the principality. Ivan the II's son Dmitri, after consolidating his position, launched a successful offensive against the Kazan Khanate in 1376 and defeated the main Mongol Army in 1380. In 1382 another Mongol Army seized Moscow and burned it. However, the Mongols were unable to break Moscow's authority among the northeastern principalities. Dmitri's son Vasili I succeeded him and continued to expand Moscow's control and to improve its relations with the Mongols. Vasili II was ruthless, adopting torture and other "refined" measures to become the first, but not the last, absolute and autocratic monarch of Muscovy to use such methods. The use of these methods continued throughout the history of Russia and are a part of the Russian/Soviet heritage.²

Vasili II was succeeded by Ivan III whose reign consisted of so many "notable" events he was given the title "the Great." However, his greatest achievement was the further territorial expansion of Muscovy. Between 1463 and 1485 he absorbed seven principalities. He neutralized the then-powerful state of Lithuania to the east by marrying the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor, thus linking himself and his heirs to the Byzantine heritage. He established diplomatic relations with many countries, greatly enhancing Moscow's power and prestige. In 1505, Ivan III was succeeded by his son Vasili III who continued his father's policies and added new territories, including the Smolensk and Razan areas. Of major significance was his creation of the concept of Moscow as the Third Rome. According to that concept, with the Ottoman Turks' capture of Constantinople and the Orthodox areas of the Balkan States, the only sanctuary left for Orthodox Christianity was Moscow. As such, Moscow became the protector of Orthodoxy against Catholicism and Islam.³ This concept inadvertently paved the way for an unlikely alliance between the Catholic Lithuanians and Islamic Mongols that resulted in the Mongol invasion of Muscovy and the loss of the Kazan Khanate for the period 1506 - 1524. In addition, it provided a major reason for future Russian wars in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries against the Ottoman Empire.

MAP 1 1261-1533



MAP 1A. THE RISE OF MOSCOW 1261-1533



THE PRINCES OF MOSCOW	
Ivan I	1325-1341
Simeon	1341-1353
Ivan II	1353-1359
Dmitri	1359-1389
Vasili I	1389-1425
Vasili II	1425-1462
Ivan III	1462-1505
Vasili III	1505-1533



The Principality of Moscow by 1462



The further expansion of Moscow by 1533

RUSSIA, 1533-1598. (MAP 2)

Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible) became the Grand Duke of Moscow in 1533 and was crowned "Tsar of all the Russias" in 1547. His aim of expanding the area under Russian control was marked by spectacular success in the East.


War occupied Ivan's foreign policy during most of his reign. The wars under Ivan had two phases: the Kazan War (1545-1556), which is most applicable to this study since it led to control of the Volga basin; and the Livonian War* (1554-1583), which secured a Russian outlet to the Baltic Sea. Ivan hoped to capture the city of Kazan, a key trade center along the routes to Siberia, the lower Volga River area, the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Additionally, he was attracted by the possibility of gaining control of the rich grain-producing areas in the Volga basin and converting the people of this area to Orthodox Christianity. Ivan was able to take Kazan in 1556. Four years later (in 1560) Muscovite forces gained control of Astrakhan near the Caspian Sea coast.⁴

The capture of this key area gave Moscow a direct route to the markets of the Caucasus, Persia, and Central Asia. An important by-product of this successful war was the impact upon many Central Asian natives, who, wishing to escape the fate of Kazan, expressed willingness to become Muscovy's subjects. Submission of these peoples gave Moscow its first taste of power in that area.⁴ With the death of Ivan IV in 1584, his feeble-minded son, Fedor, with the aid of Boris F. Godunov, one of his father's advisors, assumed and continued to occupy the Russian throne for 14 years. Godunov energetically pursued Moscow's colonial expansion to the east and south and was responsible for the founding of military outposts at various locations throughout the region to include Samara, Voronezh, Tsaritsyn (later Stalingrad and Volgograd), Tiumen, Tobolsk, and Saratov. These towns served as barriers against the Mongols, as commercial centers and tribute collection points and as points of control/support for area chieftains. Godunov was Moscow's great colonizer, conqueror, and pacifier of the Volga basin and the Urals.⁶


*Livonia was the area along the Baltic Sea currently included in the Latvian and Lithuanian S.S.R.'s.

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MAP 2 1533-1598



MAP 2A.
RUSSIA 1533-1598



THE COSSACKS, 1500-1916. (MAP 3)

A major factor in the continued Russian expansion southward and the successful drive toward Azov and the Black Sea was the fabled Cossacks or "free warriors." The Cossacks, the majority of whom were illiterate peasants who had fled southwards between the 14th and 18th centuries to escape famine, religious and economic repression, and serfdom in Lithuania and Muscovy, served as the vanguard of Russian expansionism. They were categorized into groups based on their specific areas of origin. Those groups aiding the Russian advance to the south were the Don Cossacks, the Dnieper or Ukrainian Cossacks, and the Kuban Cossacks. Although they sometimes fought against Moscow, these groups normally supported the aims of the Russian governments, and by the early 17th century, had emerged as a potential political force and were given the title: "The Great Army of the Don." They were provided annual subsidies and supplies by the Russian government, thus becoming a useful means of extending Moscovite control towards the Black Sea.⁷ The Don Cossacks took an active part in the prolonged Russian struggle with Turkey in the 1670's and 1680's and in 1696 were instrumental in the successful Russian capture of Azov.


The Muscovites also were able to use the Ukrainian Cossacks in their drive toward the Black Sea. Originally Orthodox peasants from Lithuania and Poland, they eventually established a headquarters on an island in the Dnieper River. The headquarters developed into a city (Zaporozhie), and the Ukrainian Cossacks became known as the Zaporozhie Cossacks (Zaporozhie means below the rapids).⁸ These people were instrumental in Russian expansion by maintaining pressure on Catholic Poland.


The Kuban Cossacks lived in an area east of the Black Sea and aided Russian advances toward the Caucasus. Other Cossack groups that were useful to the Russians were the Ural and Terek Cossacks who occupied the Ural and Terek River basins.

All of these Cossack groups eventually were absorbed, with the last cultural vestiges, such as the Cossack schools, being dissolved under the Soviets in the 1920's.

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MAP 3 1500-1916





EUROPEAN RUSSIA, 1689-1725. (MAP 4)

The dynamic reign of Peter I (Peter the Great) witnessed immense territorial gains toward the east, nearly constant warfare culminating in a stalemate with Turkey, and only transitory gains toward the south (Persia). Shortly after his assumption of full authority in 1695, Peter began pushing Russian forces down the Dnieper and Don Valleys toward the Black Sea. To consolidate his gains, he established several forts along the Dnieper River, including Kamenny Zaton opposite the Zaporozhie Sech, greatly increasing Russian influence with and control over the Cossacks. In the Don area, he attempted to capture the Turkish stronghold at Azov, one of the keys to Black Sea access. In July 1696, the Russians stormed and captured Azov, terminating the centuries-old Turkish monopoly of the Black Sea. Additional Russian objectives in the area were to force the Turks to relinquish control of the Kerch Peninsula, to grant the right of free navigation through the Turkish Straits, and to give Russia the exclusive right to protect all Orthodox Christians within the Ottoman Empire. However, since no other European nation supported Peter's demands, he was forced in 1700 to settle for the terms of the Treaty of Constantinople which ceded only Azov to the Russians.⁹ Peter consolidated this gain by establishing a new naval base, Taganrog, on the Sea of Azov.

Russian internal problems and a war with Sweden (The Great Northern War of 1700-1721) diverted Peter's attention from the southern areas until one of his close associates, a Ukrainian by the name of Hetman Mazepa, joined forces with the Swedes who moved an army through Poland and into the Ukraine. This forced Peter to divide his army to fight on two fronts. Following political and military moves in the south, and a Russian winter that decimated the Swedish Army, Peter was able to destroy the Swedes completely at the Ukrainian City of Poltava in 1709. As Mazepa and Charles XII, Emperor of Sweden, withdrew towards Turkey, the Russians pursued, penetrating the Ottoman Empire along the northeast coast of the Black Sea. This precipitated the Russo-Turkish War (1710-1711) which ended when the Turks surrounded the Russian Army led by Peter. To escape annihilation, the Russians agreed to give up Azov, to destroy several fortresses in the area, and to permit Charles XII safe passage back to Sweden.¹⁰

Even though the Russians suffered temporary setbacks in the area around the Black Sea, the Great Northern War ended in a net gain since the 1721 Treaty of Nystadt ended 21 years of fighting and gave Russia access to the Baltic Sea by way of the Neva River (present day Leningrad is located at the mouth of the Neva River).



While involved with warfare in Europe, Peter attempted to expand Russian influence in Asia. Between 1710 and 1721, he dispatched several expeditions into Asia in search of mineral resources and easy routes to China and India. To increase Russia's presence in Asia he also ordered the building of such towns as Orsk (1713) and Semipaliatinsk (1718). Simultaneously, he extended

Russian interests into the Caspian Sea area and in the direction of the Caucasus. That push led to a successful war against Persia (1722-1723), during which Baku and Derbent (Map 4A) were brought under Russian control. These gains had enormous economic and strategic value since they provided Russia with another base of operations against the Ottoman Empire.¹¹ However, a few years after Peter's death in 1725, Russia voluntarily returned the land south of the Kura River, and in 1735 agreed to move the boundary north to the Sulak River. These actions were taken to secure Persian aid in a new war with Turkey and to withdraw overextended Russian forces. By 1735, nearly all of Russia's gains against Persia had been restored to Persian control.

MAP 4 1689-1725



MAP 4A. RUSSIA 1689-1725




EXPANSION IN CENTRAL ASIA, 1689-1821. (MAP 5)


Between 1598 and 1689, the focus of Russian expansion in the East had been toward Siberia until the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk barred further penetration into China. This treaty changed the axis of Russian expansion away from China toward the area between the Caspian Sea and the Himalaya Mountains.

Politically, Central Asia was a power vacuum since the dissolution of the Mongol Empire in the 1500's, with the area being ruled by small khanates and city states. Economically, the area offered little attraction for the Russians since it tended to be arid, with only a few oases and limited river valleys. More importantly, the area was crossed by rich trade routes connecting Russia, Persia, India, and China. Additionally, some of the region's river valleys were fertile and even on the semiarid lands between these valleys, a pastoral economy was possible. Also, the people populating the area were warlike and often made forays into Russian territory, forcing the Russians to assign special officials and military personnel to the area to maintain frontier fortifications. These officials/personnel often undertook military campaigns without approval from St. Petersburg, resulting in a slow, but continual expansion to the south.¹² By 1762 the Russians had gained at least nominal control of the areas shown on Map 5A.

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MAP 5 1689-1762





RUSSIA, 1762-1796 (REIGN OF CATHERINE THE GREAT). (MAP 6)

The reign of Catherine the Great marked the further expansion of Russia to the west and south and firmly established it as a Black Sea power. If successful aggression is the sign of greatness, Catherine II earned her title, "the Great," since she was responsible for a major expansion of Russian territory along the southern periphery into the areas of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Catherine's conquests against the Ottoman Empire began with the Russo-Prussian Treaty of St. Petersburg (1764) which pledged mutual support if Russia were attacked by Turkey, or Prussia attacked by Austria or France. Additionally, both countries agreed to intercede in Polish affairs to protect Protestant and Orthodox dissenters, resulting in Russian troops occupying most of Poland by 1767. This occupation raised concerns by various European powers, including Turkey, regarding the extent of Russian objectives in Poland. The result of the Turkish concern over the Russian occupation was the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774. In 1770, Russia moved against the Turks annihilating the Black Sea Turkish fleet, and once again occupied Azov and several points in the Crimea.¹³

Pressure to end the war, exerted by other European powers, combined with the outbreak of the Great Peasant Disturbance in Russia, led to the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardzhi (July 1774). This treaty gave Azov, Kerch, and part of the Kuban Districts to Russia resulting in a permanent Russian foothold on the Black Sea coast. The Turks also ceded Russia full and free transit rights for Russian Orthodox pilgrims to and from Jerusalem and allowed free navigation for Russian merchant vessels on the Black Sea and through the Turkish Straits. The Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardzhi was noteworthy since it made Russia a Black Sea power and initiated a long series of wars which ultimately would contribute to the demise of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴


The next Russian expansion during this period, the Russo-Turkish War (1787-1791), was again at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Around 1780, Catherine began a campaign called the "Greek Project" to expel the Turks from Europe and to restore the Byzantine Empire under Russian control. This campaign included the signing of a secret alliance with Emperor Joseph II of Austria in May 1781, to partition the European portion of the Ottoman Empire. Turkish apprehension increased when Russia annexed the Crimea in April 1783 and later extended its protection over Georgia.¹⁵

The Russian refusal to acquiesce to Turkish demands that it evacuate the Crimea resulted in the Russo-Turkish War of 1787-1791. Initial successes by the Russians were somewhat neutralized when the Swedes declared war (1787) with the avowed aim to recover northern areas lost to the Russians during previous wars. Sweden invaded Russian Finland, causing the Russians to cancel an expedition by the Russian Baltic Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean and forcing some Russian forces in the south to be withdrawn to defend Moscow. By 1790, Russia had gained the upper hand against Sweden and the war was resolved by the 1790 Treaty of Verela.¹⁶


In spite of the problems encountered in waging war on two fronts, the Russians continued to gain against the Turks. By 1790, they had captured Izmail, the strongest fortress on the Danube, and had crossed the river in 1791. The Turks were forced to accept Russian peace terms of the Treaty of Jassy in 1792 which ceded the Kuban, Crimea, and the territory east of the Dniester River, including the port of Odessa, to Russia. This treaty did not fulfill the aims of Catherine's "Greek Project" but did strengthen the Russian hold on the Black Sea region.¹⁷

The final operation southward backed by Catherine was the "Oriental Project." This plan called for Russian occupation of the Caucasus to obtain positions from which to attack Persia to the east, to establish a direct link with India and Turkey, and to provide an avenue to attack Constantinople through Turkey. Catherine's son and successor, Paul, shelved this project and withdrew Russian troops from the Caucasus.¹⁸

MAP 6 1762-1796



MAP 6A. RUSSIA, 1762-1796



 Territory annexed by Russia
1762-1796, giving Russia an outlet
on the Black Sea

THE CAUCASUS AND TRANSCAUCASIA, 1763-1878. (MAP 7)

Due to the importance of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia areas in the Russian advance towards the south and their proximity to the USCENTCOM area of operations, these campaigns will be discussed in more detail.

As shown on Map 6A, Russia reached the Kabarda area, just north of the Caucasus, in the sixteenth century. However, the subjugation of the areas between the Black and Caspian Seas was not completed until 1878, with most of the area being conquered between 1783 and 1878. Annexation of the Caucasus was not simply a north-south movement. The more accessible coastal regions and Transcaucasia, except for the southwestern corner held by Turkey, came under Russian control long before the mountainous areas were pacified. Disunity among the native people of the region and their oppression by the Turks and Persians aided the early Russian acquisition of this central mountain region. (This has a close parallel in Afghanistan with Soviet forces occupying major LOC's and trying to extend control in the more accessible areas.)

As mentioned previously, Turkey ceded the Kabarda region to Russia in 1774. However, it was over 25 years (in 1801), before the Russians made serious inroads into the Transcaucasus. Although the Russian Emperor, Alexander I (1801-1825) was involved with the Napoleonic Wars and generally focused his interests on European affairs, he was successful in expanding the Russian boundary in the Caucasus. This process started in 1801 when, fearing a Persian invasion, Georgia voluntarily accepted Russian protection. Annexation of various small states (including Tarki and the Mekhtulinsk Khanates) in the Caucasus followed, creating a state of war between Persia and Russia from 1804-1813. The Treaty of Gulistan in 1813 ended the war and acknowledged all of Russia's gains in the region.¹⁹

In 1817, Russia's border was pushed further south and a new military line was established. The Groznaya fortress (modern Grozny) was founded in 1818, although parts of this rugged area of the Caucasus were not subdued until 1821. Further expansion occurred under the next Russian ruler, Nicholas I, whose foreign policies focused on expanding the southern boundary of the empire at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.

The Persians did make an effort to reverse the Russian expansion. In 1826, the Persian Shah Fath Ali initiated the Russo-Persian War (1826-1828) to regain territories lost to Russia in the Treaty of Gulistan. The arrival of Russian reinforcements resulted in a Persian defeat compelling them to sign the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828. By its terms, the Persians agreed to the Russian occupation of northern Azerbaijan (present day Azerbaijan and Armenian S.S.R's) to include Erevan (Yerevan) and Nakhichevan and to the establishment

of the Persian frontier along the Araks River. Except for a small Russian bridgehead across the Araks River near Nakhichevan which was returned to Persia in 1893, and minor modifications in the 1950's, the 430 mile Russian-Persian boundary west of the Caspian Sea has not changed since 1828. In addition, the Russians gained full navigation rights on the Caspian Sea. However, the treaty did not bring peace to the area due to a prolonged guerrilla war between the Russians and the various native tribes of the Caucasus who opposed Russian rule. Four campaigns were required (1838, 1840-1842, 1845, and 1859) to subdue the opposition. The 21 year campaign involved approximately 200,000 men and cost the Russians 15,000 casualties.²⁰ (This type of terrain is somewhat similar to Afghanistan and indicates the long-term tenacity and commitment of the Russians to overcome this form of resistance.)

Nicholas I came to power in 1825 and showed the same interest in the Eastern question as did Catherine the Great. Conflicts between Russia and Turkey over control of the western littoral of the Black Sea led to the Russo-Turkish War of 1828 which ended in the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople. Under the terms of the treaty, Russia annexed the mouth of the Danube River and areas in the Caucasus along the whole northeastern littoral of the Black Sea, including the ports of Anapa, Sukhumi, and Poti. Additionally, the province of Akhaltsikhi was reunited with Georgia. The treaty also reiterated Russian navigation rights in the Black Sea and through the Turkish Straits.²¹

The Russians continued to show interest in the Turkish Straits. In 1832, the Egyptian Army rebelling against the Turks, conquered Syria and began moving toward Constantinople. The Turks requested Russian military aid, and in 1833, some 10,000 Russian troops landed on the Asiatic side of the Straits. British and French diplomats, fearful of a permanent Russian presence, prevailed on Egyptian and Turkish authorities to sign an agreement which resulted in an Egyptian withdrawal from Turkey on 9 July 1833. One day later the Russian forces departed. However, the episode concluded with the 1833 Russo-Turkish Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi in which each country pledged to aid the other against aggressors. The Treaty specified that the Turks would, at Russia's request, close the Straits to foreign men-of-war.²²


In 1839, the Egyptians once again attacked Turkey, with Russia entering the war on the side of the Turks. England and France, fearful of Russia seizing the Dardenelles, called for a convention dealing with the security of the Straits. The result was the Straits Convention of 1840 which stated that as long as the Turks were at peace, no foreign warships would be admitted through the Straits. (The Soviet Union was later to become a signatory to the 1936 Montreux Convention which gave Turkey control of the Straits, limited the type of warships that could use the Straits, and allowed Turkey to refortify the Straits.)

The final Russian gains in the Transcaucasia region resulted from the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. The Treaty of San Stefano, which ended the war,


awarded Russia the districts of Batumi, Kars, Ardahan, and Bayazid. Because the British and Austrians were disturbed at the rise of Russian power in the Balkans, a Congress was called to review the Treaty of San Stefano. The result, the 1878 Congress of Berlin, confirmed most Russian acquisitions under the Treaty; however, the Bayazid area was restored to Turkey, and Batumi was designated a free port under Russian control. With this settlement, the Russian border with Turkey was stabilized until the beginning of World War I in 1914.²³

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MAP 7 1763-1878



MAP 7A. THE CAUCASUS AND TRANSCAUCASIA 1763-1878



	Annexed along with Crimea and other independent areas 1783-1800		Annexed 1828 (TURKMANCHI TREATY)
	Annexed 1801		Annexed 1829 (ADRIANOPLE TREATY)
	Annexed 1813 (GULISTAN TREATY)		Other areas annexed 1800-1830
			Other areas annexed 1830-1864
			Annexed 1878 (CONGRESS OF BERLIN)

EXPANSION INTO CENTRAL ASIA AND IRAN AND REVERSALS ALONG BLACK SEA, 1822-1914.
(MAP 8)

Russian expansion in the area of the Black Sea was halted by the Crimean War (1853-1856) which was initiated by the Russian threat to occupy Moldavia and Walachia* located west of the Black Sea. Britain and France, reacting to the Russian threat, entered the war on the side of the Turks and after landing forces in the Crimea, were able to win costly victories against the Russians. France and England were successful in politically isolating Russia, forcing it to sue for peace. The 1856 Treaty of Paris neutralized the Black Sea, ordered the destruction of all fortifications along the Black Sea, and opened the Danube to free trade. Additionally, it forced Russia to evacuate Kars in eastern Turkey which it had captured during the war, as well as areas along the western littoral of the Black Sea.²⁴

Nicholas I continued his expansionist moves to the south and gained control over the Central Asian area by initially establishing nominal sovereignty over the Lesser and Middle Kazakh Hordes located east of the Caspian Sea. When the Elder Horde was subjugated (1847), the Uzbek peoples to the south of the Kazakh areas found themselves facing the Russian Empire for the first time. In the following three decades, the weak Uzbek states of Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva succumbed to Russian domination as did the Turkoman people who lived along the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea. In 1853, the city of Ak-Mechet in northwestern Kokand was seized (and renamed Perovsk). As a result of these acquisitions, more than half of Central Asia came under Russian control during Czar Nicholas's reign.²⁵

The next Russian advance in Central Asia began in 1864. The impetus for this advance was the 1859 capture of the rebel leader Shamil in the Caucasus (mentioned in the previous section) and the defeat of the Cricassians in 1864, (previously vassals of Persia living north of the Persian border along the Caspian Sea). Once again, the Russians nearly gained complete control of the Caspian Sea coastline. Chimkent fell in 1864, Tashkent in 1865, and in 1868 the entire khanate of Kokand became a Russian protectorate with a subsequent revolt in 1876 leading to Russia's outright annexation of the entire khanate.²⁶

*Moldavia and Walachia make up Eastern and Southern Romania. Additionally, the area between Odessa and the Soviet border with Romania is called the Moldavian S.S.R.

During the Russian advances, Khanate of Bukhara forces had attacked the Russians in Kokand in 1865, initiating a war which resulted in the loss of Samarkand and their capital, Bukhara, in 1868. The peace treaty concluded that same year provided for Russia's annexation of Samarkand and adjacent areas with the remainder of Bukhara becoming a Russian protectorate.²⁷

The Khanate of Khiva was the last to fall in 1873. Under the terms of the peace agreement concluded that year, Russia annexed the right bank of the Amu-Darya River. The remainder of the Khiva Khanate, like Bukhara, became a Russian protectorate. In 1869 a Russo-Persian agreement established the lower Atrek River as their common boundary east of the Caspian Sea, and by 1873, Russian forces occupied the mostly uninhabited southeastern littoral of the Caspian Sea as far south as the Atrek. All of the annexed areas mentioned above were incorporated into the Turkestan region, centered at Tashkent.²⁸

Between 1881 and 1885 Russia conquered the isolated Turkmen settlements south of the Kara-Kum Desert. These areas were in the ancient dominions of Persia and in 1884, the Persians signed the Treaty of Akhal giving Russia possession of the key city of Merv (Mary).²⁹ In 1885 the Russians defeated an Afghan force and occupied and subsequently annexed the Afghan border area around Kushka. These advances resulted in two conventions (1881 and 1893) between Russia and Persia delimiting the border from east of the Caspian Sea to the Afghan tri-point.³⁰

As the Russians moved south toward Afghanistan and India, the "Great Game" ³¹ between Russia and Great Britain began in earnest. As early as 1826, Russia had spoke openly of a coming war with England. British fears of a conflict also increased as the Russians moved southward toward Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf since the British were also attempting to expand their control into the northwest frontier area and the Persian Gulf littoral. British fears of a conflict with Russia increased. (The British remembered Paul I whose planned expedition against India in 1801 was recalled with his death.) As the Russians moved southward, British strategists felt that they could be stopped on the plains of India, near well-established British bases. In London, Lord Ellenborough, the minister responsible for the affairs of India, believed that the Russians would use Afghanistan as an avenue of advance into India. He argued that the Russians first would seek to establish influence with the ruler of Afghanistan and infiltrate the country. The British, to forestall this possible situation, marched into Afghanistan. The main planner and organizer of the expedition was William H. Macnaghten, head of the Foreign and Political Department of India. The purpose of the expedition was to replace the Afghani ruler, Dost Muhammad, with a pro-British ruler, Shah Shuja. This military expedition, called the Army of the Indus (because it started from the mouth of the Indus), took nine months (December 1838 - August 1839) to reach Kabul by way of Kandahar. The British were able to install Shah Shiya and control Kabul for approximately one year. However, in November


1841, the British did nothing to put down a revolt which eventually resulted in a general Afghan uprising and the death of Macnaghten. On 6 January 1842, the Army of the Indus began a retreat toward Jalalabad. The retreat became a disaster due to the cold and marauding Afghani's, with less than 20 out of 16,000 troops returning to India. In September, a British force called the British Army of Retribution returned to Kabul to restore British honor. However, its stay was short-lived and Dost Muhammed was allowed to return to Kabul and assume his rule.³² Even with the loss of the Army of the Indus in early 1842, the British were successful in securing the eastern part of Afghanistan by 1843. By 1848 the northeastern section of India, the Punjab, was secure, thus effectively bringing the whole area under British control.

The Russian annexation of Turkestan in the late 1800's increased the opportunities for Russian economic and political influence on the Persians and in the northwest Indian frontiers. Additionally, the Russian's were building the Trans-Caspian Railroad which began from Krasnovodsk on the Caspian Sea in 1880, reached Merv in 1886, Samarkand by 1888 and Taskent by 1905. Particularly worrisome to the British was the branch-line to Kushka on the Afghan border. This posed a direct threat to the trade route that ran through Herat and joined India and northern Iran.³³ As shown on Map 8A the British had also built rail lines to the Afghan border. To prevent direct contact and friction between the two nations, both sides agreed, in 1905, to give a mountainous section called the Wakhan Mountain Territory (Wakhan Corridor) to Afghanistan. To further delineate zones of interest in Central Asia, the Russians and British signed the 1907 Russo-English Treaty on Persia and Afghanistan. This treaty divided Persia into three spheres of influence: southern Persia to the British; northern Persia to Russia; and the central area which was identified as a neutral zone. Additionally, Russia agreed to recognize Afghanistan as being within the British area of interest.³⁴ Resolution of this problem was due primarily to Russia's losing the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, internal problems (the Russian Revolution of 1905), and the Russian desire not to precipitate a war with Britain in light of its heavy naval losses to the Japanese.


After the 1907 Agreement with the British, Russian troops moved into Iran and entered Tabriz in July 1908. By 1911, Russian forces had advanced as far south as Qazvin in the west and Mashhad in the east. The beginning of World War I would see most Russian forces withdrawn from Iran. (As a note of interest, during this period the Russians planned eventually to complete two rail lines, as shown on the map, through Iran to the Persian Gulf. The first line was to begin at Jolfa on the Russian border, through Tabriz to Tehran and then south through Esfahan to Bushehr. The second rail line was to start at Mary, go through Mashhad and then south to Kerman and Bandar Abbas.)³⁵

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MAP 8 1822-1914



MAP 8A. CENTRAL ASIA 1822-1914



1914-1921. (MAP 9)

The period from 1907 to the beginning of World War I saw virtually no major changes in the boundaries between Russia and Turkey, Afghanistan, or Persia (although Russian forces were in northwest Iran). However, World War I and its aftermath, the Bolshhevik Revolution, resulted in initial foreign intervention into Russia followed by additional Soviet involvement in Iranian affairs and the loss of some Russian territory.

Turkey entered the war on the side of Germany in October 1914 and in June 1915, advanced into the Transcaucasus area initially pushing the Russians back. In July 1915, the Russians counterattacked, defeated the Turkish forces, and secured the Russo-Turkish border. By September 1915, Russian forces had moved further into Persia to oust a pro-German splinter government in Hamadan and succeeded in occupying that city.³⁶ Little activity occurred in this area until 1916 when the Russians decided that the allied withdrawal from their failed landing at Gallipoli would allow the Turks to redeploy major forces to the Caucasus front. (The Gallipoli campaign was an Allied effort to seize the Dardenelles to split Turkey from her allies and to open the Turkish Straits to Allied shipping.) This fear prompted a Russian offensive in January 1916, which took the Turks by surprise and resulted in the capture of the Turkish fortress of Erzurum. By April, the major Turkish port of Trebizond (Trabzon) on the Black Sea had been occupied.


Further to the south, the British had moved forces to the head of the Persian Gulf (Shatt-al Arab) and succeeded in driving Turkish troops out of southeastern Iraq and the Khuzestan Region of Iran. By November 1914, the British had secured Basrah and had begun a gradual advance up the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers toward Baghdad. However, by December 1915, the British Army had become surrounded at Kut by a larger Turkish Army. Since the nearest allied forces were the Russians at Hamadan, the British requested that they attempt to aid the surrounded British force. A small Russian force did move to aid the British, but was stopped at Kermanshah by Turkish opposition.³⁷ The eventual capture of the British Army at Kut in April 1916 ended any further attempts by the Russians to penetrate further toward Iraq until the following year. Even with the loss of their army at Kut, the British retained Basrah and in March 1917, sent another army to capture Baghdad. Turkish troops withdrew from the city, forming a defensive line from just north of Baghdad to the Iranian border. By this time the right wing of the British Army reported that they were in contact with a Russian detachment near Khanaqin, Iraq which is on the main LOC from Iran.³⁸

Although the Russian armies continued to fight, by March 1917, Tsarist control in the southern area of Russia had broken down completely and Russian troops began to withdraw from Iran and Turkey with all forces being evacuated by the end of the war. A Transcaucasus Federal Republic was declared, and two months later, occupied by Turkish troops. This situation remained until the Treaty


of Brest-Litovsk was signed in March 1918, ending the war between the Germans, Turks, and the Bolshevik government. Under the terms of the treaty, Russia ceded to Turkey the districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batumi, which had been annexed in 1878. By the spring and summer of 1918, the advancing German army and its allies occupied not only the Ukraine but also the lower Don Basin, the Crimea, and most of the Caucasus, including the Baku oilfields. In a supplemental treaty to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, Germany conditionally promised to evacuate the Black Sea territory outside the Caucasus, while Russia agreed to grant independence to Georgia. However, due to the defeat of Germany in 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was declared annulled by the Soviet government and later by the Allied-German Armistice Agreement of 11 November 1918 and by the Versailles Treaty. The defeat of Germany had saved the Soviets from losing large areas along their western and southern borders; however, some of the losses in the Caucasus to Turkey, including Kars and Ardahan, were permanent.³⁹

In southern Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan had declared themselves independent states in May 1918 and had asked for German, French, and British protection, and these countries sent occupying forces into Russia (see map 9A). A small British force moved by truck to Bandar-e-Anzeli, then by boat to Baku and across the Caucasus to Batumi to prevent the Turkish and German occupation of these vital ports and oil facilities. British expeditions were also sent to Mary and Tashkent; however, as Bolshevik armies reconquered the area, the British and Turks evacuated the Transcaucasus and Central Asian regions by December 1919.⁴⁰

MAP 9 1914-1919



MAP 9A. RUSSIA DURING AND AFTER WWI 1914-1919



SOVIET INTERVENTION IN IRAN, 1920-1927. (MAP 10)

By 1920, the Bolsheviks had raised sufficient forces to re-establish control over the Transcaucasus area and continued to pursue the remnants of the White Russian Army into Iran. Bolshevik troops reentered Iranian Azerbaijan in April 1920 and landed troops at Bandar-e-Anzeli in May. By December, they had gained control of almost the entire Iranian Caspian Sea Coast. Additionally, an Iranian separatist group proclaimed the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan centered around the Iranian Province of Gilan.⁴¹

By 1921, Soviet dreams of a worldwide revolution in the industrialized states were fading, resulting in a change in Soviet tactics and policy. This change was exemplified by a series of Friendship Treaties signed with a number of bordering countries including Persia, Turkey, and Afghanistan. The treaties renounced tsarist power policy, agreed to minor frontier adjustments, and relinquished all Russian rights and claims to contested territories. In Iran's case, the Soviets also agreed to the withdrawal of all Bolshevik forces from Iranian territory. Although this withdrawal resulted in the fall of the Soviet backed Republic of Gilan, it did gain Iranian diplomatic recognition of the Soviet government and secured the border with Iran. Of interest are Articles V and VI of the Iranian-Russian Friendship Treaty of 1921, which state in part:

"Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defense."⁴²

NOTE: The treaty was accompanied by an official letter which stated that Article VI applied only to the threat posed by White Russian forces, some of whom had taken refuge in Iran following their defeat in Soviet Azerbaijan.⁴³


Article VI was used by the Soviets in 1941 as an excuse to move into Iran unilaterally to protect Soviet security and formed the legal basis for their invasion. (Though the Islamic Government of Iran renounced the 1921 Friendship Treaty in 1979, the treaty is still considered to be in effect since both sides must repudiate the treaty--which the Soviets have not done to this date.)

With the March 1921 Treaty of Kars, the Soviets relinquished their claim to the border area of Turkey between Batumi and Yerevan. (In May 1945, the Soviets pressured Turkey for the return of Kars and Ardahan and attempted to coerce them into accepting a new Soviet-Turkish agreement on control of the Straits. With the support of the United States and Britain, Turkey successfully avoided these Russian demands.)


By the mid-1920's the Soviet's growth in power and prestige led them to a series of neutrality and nonaggression pacts involving Afghanistan (1926) and Persia (1927). These pacts further secured the Soviet southern boundary.

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MAP 10 1920-1927



**MAP 10A. SOVIET AND ALLIED INTERVENTION IN IRAN 1920-1927
AND KARS REGION IN TURKEY**



-  Territory given back to Turkey by 1921 Treaty of Kars
-  Socialist Republic of Gilan 1920-1921
-  Areas occupied by Red Russian Troops 1920-1921

SOVIET AND ALLIED INTERVENTION, 1941-1947. (MAP 11).


During the 1930's, the foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union generally focused on the growing power of the Japanese in the east and the Germans in the west. In connection with this the Soviets began to feel threatened by the increasing German influence in Iran. This situation was a result of Reza Shah's attempts to counterbalance Soviet and British interests in Iran by developing closer political and trade relations with the German government. The German presence in Iran became of paramount importance following the June 1941 German attack on the Soviet Union. The only available routes for the Soviets to receive supplies from Britain, and later the US, were the northern sea route to Murmansk and the overland route through Iran. As German naval interdiction intensified in the North Atlantic, the land LOC through Iran took on added importance.

On 12 July 1941, the British and Soviets signed the Anglo-Soviet Agreement of Mutual Assistance pledging British supplies to the Soviets. In order to secure the Iranian route, the Shah was ordered to expel all Germans and asked to permit the shipment of Allied war materiel through Iran. Reza Shah refused the demand since he perceived both requests as violations of Iran's neutrality. His refusal resulted in the Soviet Union invoking Article VI of the 1921 Friendship Treaty and invading Iran. The Soviets occupied the general area outlined in the 1907 Agreement, while the British, to protect their oil concession in southwest Iran, invaded and occupied the Khuzestan region and several other areas generally south of the Zagros Mountains. Beginning in October 1941, the US, Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to protocols which stipulated the amount of aid the Soviet Union was to receive, including that which would arrive through Iran. This agreement saw the beginning of an American presence in Iran that lasted until 1979. The aid funneled through Iran represented approximately one-quarter of the total aid (a total of 19,600,000 tons) provided by the West to the Soviet Union during World War II.⁴⁴

In November 1943, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin met at Tehran to determine the future course of the war. The Tehran Declaration which evolved from this meeting pledged economic assistance to Iran after the war and stated that each power would respect Iranian independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty and would withdraw within six months following the end of the war. By May 1945, the US aid program was winding down and by the end of the year all US forces had left Iran. However, there were indications that the Soviet Union had decided to ignore the Tehran Declaration. In December 1945, the establishment of an autonomous state of Azerbaijan under the Tudeh Party (Iranian Communist Party) was announced and supported by the Soviets. Additionally, the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, located in the southwestern part of Azerbaijan, was declared and subsequently supported by the USSR. By early 1946, all British troops had left, but Soviet troops still remained in northern Iran. As a result of pressure from the UN and the British and US governments, and a promise by the Iranian government


to consider Soviet oil concessions, Soviet troops withdrew from Iran in March 1946.⁴⁵ Without Soviet support, both "independent republics" had collapsed by 1947, thus ending the last Soviet overt attempt at expanding their area of control south of the Araks River.

MAP 11 1941-1947



MAP 11A. SOVIET AND ALLIED INTERVENTION 1943-1947

5 May 2022
Decontrolled
USCENTCOM SSO
Mr. Doarin Lewis



SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. (MAP 12)

As previously mentioned, the Afghans and Soviets signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1921; however, this treaty did not hinder the Soviets from major incursions and border crossings in 1925, 1929 and 1930. During this period it appears that Soviet policy toward Afghanistan was similar to that of Imperial Russia; that is, to keep the British from controlling Afghanistan, and to use it as a buffer and as an avenue of approach to the British Colony of India.

The first major Soviet incursion occurred in 1925, when Soviet troops invaded Afghan territory to regain control of an island in the Amu-Darya River that once had been on the north side of the river, but was now on the south due to a shift in the channel. After securing the island it was annexed into the Soviet Union.⁴⁶

In 1929, the Soviets organized an army of Afghani and Soviet "citizens" to restore the overthrown ruler, Amanullah, to the throne of Afghanistan. This Army, numbering as high as 6,000 personnel, crossed into Afghanistan at Termez in April 1929, and marched toward Kabul. However, when word reached the army that Amanullah had abdicated and fled to India with his family, the rationale for the campaign evaporated, and the Afghani in the Soviet-Afghani Army deserted. The Soviets withdrew their forces with the last troops leaving in June 1929. This withdrawal probably was due to pressure from Iran and Britain and the fact that without Amanullah, there would be little chance of setting up a Bolshevik government in Afghanistan.⁴⁷

The final incursion during this period was in June 1930 when the Soviets pursued a Moslem Basmachi raiding party into Afghanistan. The Basmachi's had been resisting Soviet rule in the Khiva Region and had crossed often into Afghanistan for refuge (similar to the current situation with Afghani's crossing into Pakistan). The Soviets did withdraw their forces from Afghanistan, but an alarmed Afghan government forced the Basmachi back into the Soviet Union where the leader of the group was captured and killed, ending serious resistance along the Afghan border. Between 1930 and the end of World War II the Afghan-Soviet border was generally quiet, in large part due to internal problems within the Soviet Union and the growing realization of danger from Japan and Germany.⁴⁸

The post World War II period saw the demise of British power in Iran and India and the gradual increase of American presence in the area. Afghanistan did request aid from the US due to the perceived threat from the Soviet Union, but the Truman administration was preoccupied with more immediate problems in the region. These problems included the Soviet threat to Iran, the Israeli-Arab conflict, and the partitioning of India. The desire of the Afghans to incorporate Pushtun tribal areas along the border with newly formed Pakistan resulted in the slowdown or closure of the border from 1947 onwards, reducing Afghanistan access to western trade. Additionally, the US did not favor Afghanistan trying to gain Pakistani territory and determined that military

aid would not be appropriate since it could be used against Pakistan. The result was Afghanistan looking for aid from the Soviet Union with the first major agreement being signed in 1954 for \$3.5 million. This agreement marked the beginning of competitive aid-giving in the Soviet-US struggle for influence in that country.⁴⁹

By 1979, the Soviets had made a large economic and military investment in Afghanistan, had determined that continued support of the failing Amin regime could lead to a total loss of Soviet influence and a loss of international prestige, that a socialist government was in danger of failing, and that the Islamic Revolution in Iran could spill over to affect Moslem tribes living along the border areas of the Soviet Union. The concurrent loss of US power in the area due to the fall of the Shah, the dissolution of the Central Treaty Organization, and the US preoccupation with the Embassy Hostage Crisis offered the Soviets a setting for decisive action. In December 1979, the Soviets moved their forces into the country, killing President Amin and placing the Soviet backed Kamal government in power. It also appears that the Soviets already have annexed the Wakhan Corridor. Currently, Soviet troops occupy the major cities in Afghanistan and are attempting to destroy Mujahedin resistance and give no indications that they will soon withdraw. The Soviets presently are using a number of tactics to pacify the country, to include: re-education of young Afghans in the Soviet Union; destruction of rebel bases of support within the country and cross-border operations into Pakistan, and military actions in Afghanistan to destroy rebel forces, while securing major LOCs and urban areas.

When viewing the reasons for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, they do not differ significantly from the traditional "Russian" reasons for expansion. These reasons include the following:


- Russian/Soviet long-standing geostrategic interest in the region with a more recent interest in securing an area in proximity to the Persian Gulf oil route.
- The example and precedent set by the collapse of the Afghan communist regime to wavering Eastern European communist countries resentful of Soviet hegemony.
- The beginning of a US military buildup in the littoral areas in response to events in Iran.
- Soviet concern about the potential spillover effects of Islamic Fundamentalism on the USSR's Moslem community.
- Soviet desire to forestall the penetration of Chinese influence into the area and to continue pro-Soviet containment of China.

- The feeling by the Soviets that the US would be too occupied with the Iranian crisis to effectively deal with and block a Soviet move into Afghanistan (opportunity with low risk).

As of this writing the Soviets still have not consolidated their occupation of Afghanistan nor has the regime installed by the Soviets become legitimate in the eyes of the Afghani population. Based on historical precedents and the long-range tactics being employed, the Soviets eventually will be successful in establishing "full" control over Afghanistan much as they did in the Moslem ethnic areas of the Soviet Union.


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MAP 12. SOVIET MOVE INTO AFGHANISTAN 1979-PRESENT



MAP 12A. SOVIET MOVE INTO AFGHANISTAN

→ SOVIET INVASION ROUTES



0 100 200 KILOMETERS
0 100 200 MILES

ENDNOTES

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 28. Ibid. p. 394.
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- The term "Great Game" was originally applied to the competition of British and Russian intelligence agents in the Central Asian area between their two empires, but it came to apply more broadly to the struggle over Afghanistan, with Persia and Tibet as sideshows. Rudyard Kipling popularized the term.
31. Ibid. pp 152-158.
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SECTION II

SOVIET OBJECTIVES ALONG THEIR SOUTHERN BOUNDARY

Since Soviet territorial interests and actions to expand and secure their southern borders appear to parallel those of Imperial Russia, it is reasonable to assume that they will continue to pursue like policies and goals. It may, therefore, be possible to identify areas that probably will be of future interest to the Soviets. To determine possible future territorial objectives for the Soviet Union, a review was made of those regions adjacent to its current southern boundaries. For ease of analysis, these regions were divided into geographical areas. These areas are: the Turkish Straits, the Russo-Turkish border region, Iranian border areas, and the Afghan-Pakistan border regions.

During the period of Imperial Russia (1700-1917), expansion toward the south had three basic goals: securing guaranteed right of passage through the Turkish Straits, securing the Caucasus Region to outflank the Ottoman Empire, and expanding toward and threatening the rich British colony of India. Although national goals have been modified, somewhat Russian imperialism now is justified by Marxist-Leninist ideology, with the Soviet Union continuing Russian expansionist policies. Soviet expansionist goals to the south are derived from Imperial Russian goals and appear to be: (1) to maintain guaranteed passage through the Turkish Straits; (2) to gain hegemony over Iran to provide a buffer state on the Soviet border; (3) to obtain a favorable geopolitical position in Southwest Asia (from which potentially to threaten the world's major oil reserves located in and around the Persian Gulf); (4) to secure the border region with Afghanistan; and (5) to displace US and Chinese influence in Southwest Asia.

The following is a discussion of areas located on the southern periphery of the USSR which, based upon historical precedence and apparent Soviet goals, may become the focus of future confrontations. These areas, already mentioned above, are the Turkish Straits, the Soviet-Turkish border region, Iran, and the Afghanistan/Pakistan borders.

Turkish Straits

The Turkish Straits, composed of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles, have been a major factor in Russian/Soviet foreign affairs since the 1700's. Russian interests in the Straits began with Peter I (Peter the Great) who captured the city of Azov at the mouth of the Don River, giving Russia a port on the Black Sea. The seizure of this key city in 1696 had far reaching effects since it ended the Turkish monopoly of the Black Sea and gave impetus to Russian efforts to open trade routes through the Straits to Europe. (This period coincided with Peter's interest and fascination with the West.)

However, the Russians' loss of the Russo-Turkish War in 1711 forced them to relinquish Azov until 1770, when Russian armies reoccupied the area during the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774. The treaty ending the war, the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardzhi, was significant since its provisions granted the Russians, for the first time, free navigation of merchant ships on the Black Sea and through the Turkish Straits. This was to be the first in a long line of treaties involving the Straits.

The next important document concerning the area was the 1812 Convention of Akkerman which included a provision reconfirming the right of Russian ships to pass freely through the Straits.

In 1827, the Russians, British, and French destroyed the Turkish fleet, resulting in Turkey's repudiation of the Akkerman Convention. This war was ended by the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople which secured freedom of trade for Russia throughout the Ottoman Empire and reiterated Russian navigation rights in the Black Sea and free passage through the Straits.

Two years later, in 1831, the Turks requested military aid from the European powers to halt Egyptian forces advancing on Constantinople. Although the European powers refused to send aid, Russia responded, landing 10,000 men on the Asiatic shore of the Straits between February and April 1833. A peaceful settlement with Egypt resulted in the withdrawal of Russian forces and the signing of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi between the Turks and the Russians. This agreement confirmed the provisions of earlier treaties, with the Turks pledging to consult Russia on all matters affecting "tranquility and safety." The treaty also included a secret article stating the Turks would, at Russia's request, close the Straits to all foreign warships.

In 1841, Russia and the major European powers were signatories to another Straits Convention which declared that as long as the government of the Ottoman Empire was at peace, the Turks would admit no foreign warships into the Straits. This new Convention did not state what the situation would be if the Ottoman Empire was at war with Russia. The Russians tried but failed to reach a new understanding with the European powers concerning this question.

The next treaty affecting the Straits was the 1856 Treaty of Paris which ended the Crimean War. Part of the treaty specified that the Black Sea would be neutral waters and its ports open to merchant ships (but not warships) of all nations. However, the Russians later were allowed to renounce unilaterally the treaty in 1870. The major European powers met in London in 1871 and formally agreed to permit Russia and Turkey to refortify the Black Sea, affirmed the principle of the closure of the Straits, and gave the Turkish Sultan the authority to open the Straits in peacetime to warships of friendly powers.

In 1877, the Russians again went to war with the Turks. The 1878 Treaty of San Stefano ended the war with the provision that the Turks would keep the Straits open at all times to neutral vessels bound to or from Russian ports in the Black Sea. This treaty was reviewed by the 1878 Congress of Berlin, which reaffirmed the internationalization of the Straits.

The next episode involving the Straits was the ill-fated Gallipoli Campaign during World War I. This campaign was precipitated by a request to England from Grand Duke Nicholas of Russia for a demonstration to induce the Turks to withdraw troops from the Russo-Turkish front in the Caucasus. This request resulted in Gallipoli being chosen as the objective since its capture would split the Ottoman Empire. The campaign began in March 1915 and ended in failure in February 1916 when all British forces were withdrawn.¹

The Gallipoli Campaign had been undertaken to bolster Russia whose Army had been shaken by disastrous defeats in Prussia, Polish Russia, and the Balkans in 1914 and 1915. As an inducement for Russia to begin another offensive to reduce the military pressure against the Allies in France, a series of agreements were negotiated that outlined the definitive dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. Russia was to be rewarded with the possession of Constantinople and the Turkish Straits and major areas of eastern Turkey. However, the Bolshevik takeover in 1917 and the separate Russian-German peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 negated those agreements.

Although World War I fighting officially ended in November 1918, it was not until 1920 that the Treaty of Sevres formally ended the War between Turkey and the Allies. This treaty demilitarized the Straits, placing them under a European commission which did not include a Turkish representative. However, due to the rise of nationalism in Turkey, that part of the treaty dealing with the Straits was never enforced. By October 1922, Turkish Nationalist forces were successful in driving out occupying Greek forces to the west of Istanbul. In the same month, the Turks signed the Armistice of Mudanya with the British which delineated the border in Thrace with Greece along the Maritsa River, giving Turkey control of both sides of the Straits. In 1923, representatives of Allied and Turkish governments signed the Treaty of Lausanne which recognized the present day territory of Turkey, gave general supervisory powers to the Straits Commission under the League of Nations, and stipulated that the Straits area was to be demilitarized. Turkey was to hold the presidency of the Commission, which included the Soviet Union among its members.

In 1936, the President of Turkey, Ataturk, requested the signatory powers of the Treaty of Lausanne to permit Turkish control and remilitarization of the Straits. Representatives from the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Australia, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Britain met and signed the Montreux Convention of 1936 which is still in effect today (the U.S. is not a signatory). This treaty restored Turkish sovereignty over the Straits and gave it the responsibility for the execution of the treaty.² The primary purpose of the convention was to prevent the Black Sea from becoming an area of naval competition between England, France, Germany, and Italy and could be viewed as an early arms control agreement. The treaty stipulated that only light surface vessels, minor war vessels, and auxiliary vessels were permitted free passage through the Straits. In peacetime, the aggregate tonnage of non-Black Sea powers' shipping operations in the Black Sea could not exceed 30,000 tons, and non-Black Sea powers were denied permission to send capital ships, submarines, and aircraft carriers through the Straits.³

The Convention also granted merchant vessels freedom of navigation through the Straits and conceded to Turkey the authority to close the Straits to war vessels if the Turks were at war or under threat of war. The Soviets immediately began to pressure Turkey for a revision of the Convention more favorable to the Soviet Union.

During meetings between the Germans and Soviets in Berlin in 1940, the Germans agreed to support a Soviet desire to revise the Montreux Convention to make it more favorable to the USSR. However, this diplomatic effort did not come to fruition due to Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.⁴

During World War II, the Soviets continued to seek revisions to the Convention. At the 1945 Yalta Conference, Stalin raised the issue of amending the Montreux Convention. The following year at the Potsdam Conference, the United States agreed to a Soviet proposal for an international conference to reexamine control of the Straits and later formulated proposals which Great Britain and Turkey were willing to consider. However, the Soviets countered with additional clauses which would have left administration and the defense of the Straits solely to the Turks and the Soviet Union. These additional clauses were flatly rejected, resulting in no revisions to the original Montreux Convention document. (Soviet pressure to change the Montreux Convention and its threatening post-war policies were the catalysts that pushed Turkey into joining NATO in 1952.)⁵

Since 1936, the Soviets have continued to comply with the Straits Convention although by the letter rather than the intent. An example is the aircraft carrier KIEV. In July 1976, the KIEV, built at Nikolayev on the Black Sea, was called an aircraft carrying cruiser by the Soviets, permitting "legal" passage through the Straits. However, the Soviets may have future problems complying with the treaty since they currently are building the KREMLIN, which Jane's Weekly states will be a 75,000 ton pure carrier. This probably will be in violation of the Montreux Convention since the largest ship size mentioned in the Convention is 45,000 tons.⁶

In light of this potential legal problem, it will be interesting to see the development of Soviet policy concerning the Straits in the next 5 years since the Soviets have a number of options concerning the future of the convention and the Straits. As a signatory, they can propose amendments, demand renegotiation, or call for the cancellation of the convention. Based upon their historical perspective, they well may demand renegotiation to allow complete free passage of their warships while excluding passage of foreign warships. Or, in an effort to create instability and pressure on Turkey, the Soviets could seek to cancel the convention since they now have sufficient strength to defend the Black Sea approaches against US and NATO seapower.

Observations/Conclusions

Based upon their legalistic tendencies, the Soviets probably will want to amend the Convention to permit legal passage of their large carrier, the KREMLIN, which will be completed in the late 80's. However, depending on the political situation at the time, the Soviets also may take the opportunity to flaunt its military power by passing the carrier through the Straits to embarrass Turkey and to show disregard for the convention. Whatever the case, the United States still has time to consider options to deal with this problem.

Soviet-Turkish Border Region

Although Russia had been acquiring territory and generally advancing south toward the Caucasus Region and the Ottoman Empire since the 1600's, serious inroads into those areas really began with the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774. This war was caused by the Russian desire to resolve the "Eastern Question." This so-called Question involved the Russian search for satisfactory solutions to three interrelated problems: control of the Turkish Straits; the fate of the Christian population in the Ottoman Empire; and the territorial disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardzhi in 1774 ended the war and began the large scale acquisition of Turkish controlled areas by the Russians. The Treaty gave the Russians Azov, Kerch, and part of the Kuban and Terek districts in addition to other territorial gains, resulting in the Ottoman Empire being called the "sick man" of Europe.⁶

A new Russo-Turkish War (1787-1791) began when Russia unilaterally annexed the Crimea which had been under Turkish control. The Treaty of Iassy (1792) ended the war, with the Turks acquiescing to Russian annexation of Kuban and Crimea and pledging to stop raids against Russian possessions in the northern Caucasus.

In 1827, the destruction of the fleet of Egypt, a vassal of the Turks, resulted in the Russo-Turkish War of 1828. In 1829, the Treaty of Adrianople ended the conflict, and Turkey once again was forced to give up territory in the Caucasus and along the Black Sea littoral.

The final Russian territorial gains at Turkish expense were the result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. The Treaty of San Stefano, which ended the war, awarded Russia the Turkish districts of Batumi, Kars, Ardahan, and Bayazid. Due to the European powers' concern over the expansion of Russian power at the expense of the Turks, the 1878 Congress of Berlin was convened to review the Treaty. The Congress restored the Bayazid area to Turkey and declared Batumi to be a free port under Russian control. With this settlement the Russian border with Turkey was stabilized until the beginning of World War I.

Although Turkey had signed a secret treaty with the Germans involving Turkish entry into World War I against Russia, the Turks hesitated opening hostilities. However, the Turkish war minister collaborated with the Germans, allowing a combined fleet of German and Turkish warships to bombard Russian ports on the Black Sea. This act precipitated Russia's declaring war against Turkey, with initial Turkish advances into the Caucasus beaten back by the Russian army. In 1916, the Russians managed to capture the Black Sea port of Trebizond and the fortified Turkish city of Erzerum, resulting in the occupation of almost all of Turkish Armenia northwest of Lake Van. The possibility of Turkey permanently losing this area was precluded by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 which forced the withdrawal of Russian forces from Turkish territory.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, negotiated between the Bolsheviks and the Germans, removed Russia from active participation in the war. Since Turkey was an ally of Germany it was able to regain territory occupied by the Russian Army as well as reclaim the districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batumi which had been ceded to Russia under the Treaty of San Stefano.

In 1921, the Soviets signed the Treaty of Kars, with Turkey giving up their claim to areas designated in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk even though the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was annulled after the defeat of Germany.

(As noted in Section I the Kars area is important since it is on the main land LOC's into the Soviet Union from Turkey and would serve as a buffer to the major Soviet city of Lenninakan.)

During World War II, Soviet pressure to have Turkey return these areas increased. In the five-month period between the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, the Soviets demanded that the Turks cede Kars and Ardahan back to the USSR. The Turks, with US support, rejected these demands. In addition, the Soviets continued to press Turkey to renegotiate the Montreux Convention concerning the Straits.

In 1953, the Soviets agreed to renounce Stalin's territorial claims against Turkey, provided that the Turks agree to work out conditions acceptable to both the USSR and Turkey and that Turkey withdraw from NATO and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO). Although Turkey has withdrawn from the now defunct CENTO, it is still a member of NATO, and therefore, the Soviets claim to Kars and Ardahan remains unsettled.

Observations/Conclusions

As a minimum, USSR would like to see a return to the pre-1914 border which included the key Turkish cities of Kars and Ardahan in Soviet territory. Additionally, the Armenians, the most numerous minority in the area, probably would like to see at least a portion of the Armenian province in Turkey included as part of the Armenian homeland (now located in the USSR). The Turkish area in contention includes the region occupied by Russian troops

during World War I (generally along a line from west of the port of Trebizond on the Black Sea to Lake Van). The Patriarch and head of the Armenian church resides in Yerevan, a city inside the Soviet Union, further "justifying" such a move. In order to isolate Turkey and to weaken its position in NATO, the Soviets probably see the current Greek-Turkish problems over Cyprus and conflicting claims to islands in the Aegean Sea as beneficial to their territorial designs. A Turkish defection from NATO, based on this conflict, would offer the Soviets the best chance to isolate Turkey and eventually to regain territory along this border area.

Soviet Union - Iran

Conflict between the Russian and Persian empires began under Peter I who sought to expand Russia's interests in Asia and hopefully to out-flank the Ottoman Empire through the Caucasus. This policy of expansion resulted in the first war against Persia (1722-1723) which brought Baku, Ashabad, and Derbent under Russian control, with troops occupying the western and southern littoral of the Caspian Sea. However, in 1735 the Russians, realizing that they could not control the area effectively, signed the Treaty of Resht with Persia. Under the terms of that treaty, the Russians abandoned claims to Astrabad and Gilan and withdrew from Baku and Derbent.

During the reign of Alexander I (1801-1825), Russia again turned its attention toward Persia. The Kingdom of Georgia, fearing a Persian invasion, accepted Russian protection in 1801. The subsequent Russian move into Georgia served as an apparent catalyst for expansion, prompting the Russians to begin annexation of small states in the Caucasus considered under Persian suzerainty. By 1806, Russia had reoccupied and once again annexed Baku and Derbent on the Caspian Sea. Persia viewed these acquisitions as a threat, and from 1804 to 1813, a state of war existed between the two empires. The Treaty of Gulistan (1813) ended the conflict and recognized all of the Russian gains in the Trans-Caucasus area.

In an effort to recover territory lost under the Treaty of Gulistan, the Persians launched the Russo-Persian War of 1826-1828. The Russian Army again dominated the war, compelling Persia to sign the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828. By its terms, the Persians agreed to Russian occupation of northern Azerbaijan (the current day Azerbaijan S.S.R.) and Persian Armenia (current day Armenian S.S.R.) and to the establishment of the Russo-Persian frontier along the Aras River. One clause in the treaty gave Russia a semi-circular bridgehead of territory along the south bank of the Aras River opposite Abbasabad, near Nakhichevan, a concession the Russians held until 1893.⁷

East of the Caspian Sea, the Persian border was not affected by Russian expansion until 1869. By that time, Russian conquests of Moslem groups east of the Caspian brought them near settled Persian territory. In 1869, an agreement confirming the lower Atrek River as a common boundary was signed to

prevent the Russians from continuing their southern movement. In 1881, the boundary was extended eastward to the region just east of Ashkhabad, and in 1893, the remainder of the boundary was delimited to the tri-point with Afghanistan. Several protocols following both the 1881 and the 1893 treaties provided for minor exchanges of territory and for more exact delimitation.⁸

British concern about the gradual but steady Russian expansion toward India continued to grow during the 1800s and reached such serious proportions that there was talk of war by both powers. In an effort to forestall conflict, spheres of influence were agreed upon in 1907, with Russia responsible for northern Persia and Britain for the southern areas of Iran. Following the 1907 Agreement, Russian troops entered Tabriz in 1908, and by 1911, Russian troops occupied both Qazvin and Mashhad. However, they were withdrawn across the Russian border at the beginning of World War I (WW I).

During WW I, as Turkish troops moved into Iranian Azerbaijan, Russian troops reentered Iran. In October 1915, Russian troops moved into west central Iran to Hamadan to end the activities of a German military attache who was engaged in establishing a pro-German splinter government in Hamadan. This action prevented a pro-German government takeover and resulted in a bloodless Russian victory.⁹ In December 1915, the Russians sent a small force from Hamadan toward Kut, Iraq in an attempt to aid a British force trapped there by the Turks. However, the Russian force was stopped near Kermanshah, and by 1917, Russian troops had advanced only as far as the border of Iraq at Khanaqin.¹⁰

Although Russian troops occupied the western third of Iran, they did not remain there. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the dissolution of Czarist control resulted in the withdrawal of all Russian troops from Iran by the end of WW I.

In April 1920, Russian/Soviet troops entered Iran for the fifth time while pursuing White Russian forces into the Iranian Azerbaijan Province. This pursuit included a May 1920 landing at Bandar-e-Anzeli, with the Soviets gaining control of almost the entire littoral of the Caspian Sea by December 1920.

By 1921, the Soviets appeared to have realized there would be no worldwide socialist revolution and that a policy of "peaceful coexistence" would be more successful in achieving its aims. This new policy was characterized by a series of Friendship Treaties with countries (including Iran) on the southern edge of the Soviet Union. The Soviets agreed to withdraw all forces from Iran under the 1921 Friendship Treaty which gave the Soviets the right to enter Persia if the USSR felt it were necessary. An annex or protocol to the Treaty specified that one article, Article VI, was in reference to White Russian forces rather than forces of any outside power.¹¹ This Treaty later served as the legal basis for the 1941 Soviet occupation of Iran, with the Soviets ignoring the "White Russian" protocol.

Between World War I and World War II, the ruler of Iran, Reza Shah, attempted to maintain a balance of power between the Soviet Union and Britain by establishing closer relations with Germany. Hitler realized that this could

represent an opening to weaken British influence in Iran, and by the end of the 1930's, over 600 German experts were in Iran employed in various industrial and educational projects. Another indication of the German effort was that, during 1938-1939, 41 percent of German foreign trade was with Iran.¹² However, with the German invasion of the USSR, the perceived pro-German orientation of the Reza Shah probably dictated the early-on Soviet decision to secure Iran, since it was the safest land route for western aid to reach the Soviet Union. Reza Shah assured Soviet intervention when he proclaimed Iranian neutrality and stated he would not permit the shipment of war goods through Iran.

In July 1941, the British and Soviets signed the Anglo-Soviet Agreement of Mutual Assistance which pledged British aid to the Soviets. To secure the Iranian route, the Soviets, along with the British, invaded Iran for the sixth time, with the Soviets invoking the 1921 Friendship Treaty and occupying the general areas stipulated in the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement.

During the 1943 Tehran Conference, the Soviets agreed that all foreign forces would be out of Iran within sixty days after the end of hostilities. By December 1945, the Soviets had established the Tudeh Party in Iran and were supporting the autonomous state of Azerbaijan as well as a Kurdish Republic. These political actions indicated that they did not intend to withdraw as agreed. However, mounting political pressure from the US, Great Britain, and the UN "forced" the Soviets to withdraw from Iran. By March 1946 all Soviet troops had left Iran, and by 1947, the Soviet backed independent governments in Kurdistan and Iranian Azerbaijan had collapsed, thus ending the last Soviet military attempt to extend their influence south of the Aras River.

Observations/Conclusions

The increase in US influence after World War II and Iranian membership in CENTO effectively blocked Soviet aspirations in Iran. However, the upheaval caused by the 1979 Iranian Revolution has again provided opportunities for Soviet political/military action in Iran. The Soviets can be expected to attempt to disrupt any efforts at rapprochement between Iran and the US. A concerted disinformation campaign combined with measures to create instability in the Iranian government will be their most likely approach. Such instability may give them the opportunities to exert influence and perhaps, once again, gain some measure of control over areas of Iran.

Soviet Union - Afghanistan

The 1689 Treaty of Nechinsk between the Chinese and the Russians limited eastward expansion and redirected Russian efforts toward the nearest area offering the least resistance: the area between the Caspian Sea and Lake Balkhash. Russian penetration continued toward Afghanistan in the 1800's, arousing British fears of an Anglo-Russian War along the borders of India. To forestall this possibility, the British twice invaded Afghanistan (1839 and

1878) to ensure their control over that country. During the last invasion, the Afghan ruler requested Russian aid; however, because of the rough terrain and severe environment, the Russian commander in Central Asia was unable to send troops across the Hindu Kush to Kabul during the winter. (101 years later Soviet troops were flown over the Hindu Kush and used the Salang Tunnel to reach Kabul.)¹³

The British presence in Afghanistan temporarily stopped the uncontested Russian advance and resulted in the demarcation of the Afghanistan-Russian border along a line paralleling the Amu-Darya River until it turns north and then westward to the border tri-point with Iran and Russia at the Hari Rud River. The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, which remained in effect until after World War II, formally recognized Afghanistan as a buffer between the Russians and British. The wane of British influence in the area after World War II left a serious power vacuum somewhat offset by the increased US presence in Iran and the support of the new state of Pakistan by the Peoples Republic of China. As the "cold war" period reached maturity in the early 1950's, various alliances were formed with the purpose of containing the Soviet Union.

The US policy to contain the Soviets within their southern boundaries was exemplified by the 1955 Baghdad Pact which was composed of Britain, Turkey, and Iraq, and later by Pakistan and Iran (Afghanistan was not a member). The pact lasted until 1958 when the Iraqi government was overthrown. The remaining Baghdad Pact members formed a new defensive treaty called the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) which continued to act as a defensive barrier to the Soviets. CENTO continued until its dissolution in March 1979 when Iran, followed by Pakistan, withdrew from the agreement. The loss of US influence in Iran due to the Revolution, the dissolution of CENTO, the focusing of US foreign policy and attention on the Iranian hostage crisis, and the Iranian anti-western Islamic Fundamentalist fervor placed the US on the defensive throughout the Middle East and South Asia.

However, the Soviets were faced with an equally perplexing situation. The instability along its southern borders presented complications that could have resulted in serious internal problems. They faced the specter of growing unrest among the Islamic peoples in the area, which seemed to be on the increase after the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979. This unrest had the potential of spilling across the border into the Soviet Union since its population in these southern areas includes approximately 50 million Moslems.¹⁴ In Afghanistan it appeared that the Soviet-backed government of Amin would fall, resulting in a loss of Soviet prestige and influence. This not only would result in an unstable situation on the Soviet border, but also would be in contradiction to the Brezhnev Doctrine which proclaimed the right of the Soviet Union to intervene to preserve socialism. Additionally, this would be one of the few reversals for socialism, setting the stage for further problems in Eastern Europe. Therefore, from the Soviet view these factors not only justified, but required their move into Afghanistan.

During the latter part of 1979, when the Soviets were deciding that the situation in Afghanistan only could worsen, the decision was made to replace Amin with Karmal and to send Soviet forces to deal with the Mujahedin threat. The invasion in December, 1979 resulted in the Soviets deploying over 105,000 troops into Afghanistan.¹⁵

Since the Soviets have sizeable military forces in Afghanistan, there are a number of military and political "Afghan Options" available to them that can be examined. These include: forming a coalition government; restoring the Afghan monarchy; "permitting" Afghanistan to become neutral and nonaligned; withdrawing Soviet troops; sending in more troops; "annexing" all or part of Afghanistan; and continuing present policies. Other tactical options available to them include: beginning cross-border raids into Pakistan in an attempt to destroy Mujahedin supply centers/camps; pressuring Pakistan through political means to withhold aid; and initiating a full scale invasion of Pakistan.

Political Options

The first political option, forming a coalition government, seems highly unlikely, at least in the near term. This is due to the animosity of the Mujahedin toward the Soviets and the communist Karmal government, plus the fact that Moscow probably would not accept a coalition government unless it is dominated by communists and under some sort of control from Moscow. It would be unlikely that an agreement could be forged between communist and non-communist forces that would satisfy both sides.¹⁶

The second political option is to restore the monarchy. This option also has little possibility of success. On the surface, the option of returning the exiled King Mohammad Zahir, who ruled Afghanistan for forty years, seems to hold promise. He was, at one time, evidently well thought of by the Soviets since they gave him large amounts of aid and looked upon him as someone they could control. However, it is unlikely he could be reinstated since the Mujahedin know he opened Afghanistan to Soviet aid and view him as a weak-willed person, unable effectively to organize a government or to run the country. Additionally, the Soviets never have allowed a monarchical government to replace a communist one since this would be ideologically inconsistent with Communist doctrine. Zahir may be used as a figurehead, but probably never reestablished as a king with "real" governmental powers.¹⁷

The third political option is to let Afghanistan return to its neutral and nonaligned past. This option probably is not viable for a number of reasons. First, the Russians/Soviets do not have a history of leaving territory once occupied by Soviet troops. Exceptions to this rule only apply where political pressure pushed them out, and this is unlikely in the case of Afghanistan, or if a pro-Soviet government were in control of the country. The Soviets have spent millions of rubles and taken a large number of casualties to ensure that there will be a pro-Soviet government in power and it is doubtful they would or could accept anything else. This is ideologically consistent with the Brezhnev Doctrine which proclaims the principle that once a country becomes socialist it must remain socialist,

especially if it borders the Soviet Union. Finally, the Afghans who are currently fighting a jihad against the Soviets never would be neutral toward the USSR due to the scorched earth policy currently being employed by the Soviets against the population.¹⁸

The fourth political option is for the Soviets to annex all or part of Afghanistan. Historically the Soviets have not annexed large areas that were not part of the pre-1917 Russian Empire. For example, Outer Mongolia, invaded in 1921, has never been annexed. However, by annexing the area of Afghanistan north of the Hindu Kush Mountains, the Soviets would unite peoples such as Tadzhiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen, who were arbitrarily separated by the drawing of the northern Afghan border by Russia and Britain in 1905. Additionally, the Hindu Kush provides a much better natural barrier than the Amu-Darya River, requiring fewer forces to guard a border established along this line.¹⁹ However, by annexing northern Afghanistan and uniting the peoples of the area the Soviets may strengthen the demographic and political position of these peoples, causing problems in the future. (NOTE: Apparently the Soviets already have annexed the Wakhan Corridor directly bordering Pakistan.)²⁰

Military Options

The Soviets also have two military options available to them. The first option is for the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops. There is little historical precedence that this will happen. Soviet soldiers have remained in Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia since 1945, and these are firmly emplaced communist governments. A withdrawal from Afghanistan would be seen as a loss of prestige and could result in internal rebellions in other areas. Withdrawal also would sacrifice the political and strategic advantages of being in Afghanistan: closer proximity to the Persian Gulf and the long-term ability to bring increased political-military pressure to bear upon Pakistan and Iran, as well as on other states in Southwest Asia. The Soviets have shown every indication that they are set for a lengthy stay since many of their installations appear to be of permanent construction. Additionally, the Soviets have constructed the first bridge across the Amu Darya River and are building a railroad from the Soviet frontier to Kabul.²¹

Should the Soviets be able to increase the size and reliability of the Afghan army (which is doubtful in the near and mid-term) there could be some reduction in current force levels, but probably never a complete withdrawal.

The second military option is to increase the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. They could gain firmer control of more of the country and perhaps seal the border with Pakistan by increasing troop strength to 300,000-500,000. However, while possessing this capability, such a move would bring increased attention to the area and could elicit a larger US military presence in the area and an increase in US aid to the Mujahedin and to Pakistan. A force increase would likely require the call-up of large numbers of reservists resulting in possible disruptions of the Soviet economy. There is always the chance that 500,000 troops would still not be enough to control Afghanistan completely, posing a situation similar to that faced by the US in Vietnam. Finally, more troops probably would result in more

casualties which could begin to effect Soviet public opinion. While this probably is not a prime concern to Soviet leaders (as it was to the United States during the Vietnam years), it still must be taken into consideration.²²

Political-Military Option

The last Soviet political/military option (and probably the most likely) is to continue present policies. The Soviets basically have maintained the same policies initiated at the invasion, indicating they feel that over a period of time, their position will become stronger. In order to suppress rebel support more effectively, the Soviets evidently are destroying villages and driving Afghans out of the country. This decreases sources of in-country aid and "safe havens" for the Mujahedin, thus increasing their logistical problems. The Soviets seem to be willing, at least for the present, to accept a stalemate. The Soviets have a series of long-term successes against Moslem peoples of Central Asia, and they can be expected to show their historical persistence in Afghanistan, anticipating a slow, gradual domination of the country.

This period could then be followed by the establishment of an autonomous area such as the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). The government and party organization and procedures of Mongolia are as direct a parallel to those of the Soviet Union as the culture and society of the MPR permits. The Soviets have directed the country for approximately 57 years, with the Mongolians generally accepting socialist methods to achieve modernity.

For the Soviets, the creation of an Afghanistan People's Republic may be the only workable solution. To do so will require a long-term investment in education, large scale improvements to the country's infrastructure, and time. However, as seen by past Russian/Soviet history and their interpretation of history, time may be on their side.

Observations/Conclusions

The Soviets probably will attempt to gain control of the population through the use of education to indoctrinate and train future Afghan elites. To accomplish this goal, several thousand Afghan young people are presently being educated in the USSR. If the Soviets can train and indoctrinate these future elites, it will be easier for them to establish, maintain, and control a socialist system in the country.²³

Another method the Soviets are using to gain control is through attrition of the Mujahedin. This includes indiscriminate bombing of villages in Mujahedin controlled areas, armed sweeps through areas controlled by the Mujahedin, and the observation and mining of key infiltration routes from the Pakistani and Iranian borders.

While it can be argued that the Afghan people would never accept communism, many of the people of Eastern Europe, Mongolia, and other areas under control of socialist governments were and are anti-communists. However, this has not prevented the communist regimes of those countries, with Soviet support, from maintaining themselves in power since World War II. The Afghans will likely suffer a similar fate.²⁴

Pakistan

With regard to Pakistan, the continued support for the Afghan Mujahedin from that country is continuing to cause problems for the Soviets. (A historical precedent is the support received by the Basmachi from Afghanistan in the 1920's and 1930's.) In an effort to pressure Pakistan to stop supporting the Mujahedin, the Soviet/Afghan Air Force has staged bombing raids against Mujahedin camps inside Pakistan. Since these efforts have not caused any perceived decrease in aid, the Soviets/Afghans may opt for more ambitious cross-border raids, perhaps to include regimental-or brigade-sized operations, to destroy Mujahedin camps, and to pressure Pakistan to cease aiding the Mujahedin. Various articles and radio broadcasts have been released by Pravda and Moscow radio naming Pakistan as "a bridgehead for aggression against Afghanistan and a base for training and instructing counterrevolutionaries."²⁵ These warnings may be preparing the Soviet public for increased military actions against Pakistan.

Another tactic to slow or curtail Mujahedin aid from Pakistan is the threat of additional aid to Pakistani separatists, such as the Baluchi's, to divert Pakistani attention away from Afghanistan and toward internal problems. Such a move could initiate large scale demonstrations against President Zia, threatening his central government.

Another option open to the Soviets is a full scale invasion of Pakistan. Such a move, if successful, could offer many geo-strategic and political possibilities to the Soviets. These include: the destruction or downfall of the only pro-Chinese government in the area; the dismemberment of the country into weak autonomous states; and the highlighting of US "impotence" in supporting pro-western nations. The net results would include an end to Mujahedin support from Pakistan and possible eventual Soviet control of a port on the Indian Ocean (Karachi), and permit the Soviets to continue efforts to outflank Iran and China. However, such an invasion of Pakistan probably would be too risky unless tacitly "approved" or supported by India. It would require the commitment of sizeable Soviet forces over long and vulnerable LOC's through Afghanistan and Pakistan while being opposed by the Pakistani Army, one of the best (if not the best) in Southwest Asia.

Observations/Conclusions

Current cross-border incursions may increase in number and size and could evolve into larger-scale ground force incursions involving brigade-sized Soviet-Afghan units against Pakistani border guards and army units. The

objective of the Soviet-Afghan forces would be to destroy Mujahedin base camps and Afghan refugee camps to force them further from the border, increasing the logistical problems of the Mujahedin. The threat of increased cross-border incursions would result in additional Pakistani requests for US aid and increase the potential for superpower confrontation in the area.

In the final analysis, history has shown that the Soviet Union, with the legacy of its imperial expansionist past, will continue to pursue opportunities to expand its control of areas near its borders. It is, therefore, the responsibility of the United States, as the primary counterbalance to Soviet aspirations, to try to prevent such moves.

END NOTES

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SECTION III

THE DIRECTION OF FUTURE SOVIET EXPANSION WILL PROBABLY BE TOWARD THE SOUTH

While researching the Russian (Soviet) history of expansion, two tendencies which probably preclude a concurrent war against Southwest Asia and NATO and increase the chance of expansion to the South emerge: first, the Russians tend to fight on one front at a time; and second, they tend to expand toward the area offering the least resistance, and therefore, less risk. The following is a brief discussion of these tendencies.

Russians Tend to Fight on One Front (or Theater of Operations) at a Time.

In viewing Russian (Soviet) history in a modern context, it would appear unlikely that the Soviets would initiate a war on two fronts or major theaters. To portray this historical reluctance, a time line depicting major wars and campaigns beginning from the Imperial Russian period (about 1700) to the present was constructed (Table 1). One side of the time line represents wars fought on the European and Far Eastern fronts while the opposite side of the line represents those wars fought along the southern boundary region.

The time line lists thirty major wars or campaigns involving significant Russian (Soviet) forces and indicates that only five wars or campaigns were fought concurrently on two fronts or major theaters. Of those five wars, the Russians initiated only two: the Russo-Turkish War of 1710-1711, in which the Russian Army was completely surrounded by the Turks and forced to surrender to avoid complete annihilation; and the Russo-Persian War of 1804-1813 which occurred during the Napoleonic Wars. The latter period was actually a slow assimilation of small khanates in the Caucasus, involving limited forces, against areas controlled by a weak Persian government. All other multi-front wars were initiated by other nations who sought to take advantage of Russian involvement on other fronts (Examples: The Russo-Finish War of 1788-1790 which was initiated by Sweden to regain areas previously lost to the Russians and was timed to take advantage of the Russian preoccupation with fighting the Turks; the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812, orchestrated by France, to weaken Russian armies facing Napoleon in Europe). At Appendix A is a synopsis of the major Russian (Soviet) wars since 1700 that are listed on the time line .

A factor other than historical precedent limiting Russian (Soviet) multi-front options is the size of their armed forces in comparison to the size of the country. While it may be argued that their military has been modernized and expanded to enable them to launch successfully a multi-front war, it still would be difficult for them to support such an undertaking. The front facing NATO probably would be given a high priority for readiness (even if in a defense-only situation) since the most serious threats to Moscow traditionally have approached from the West (The Poles, Prussians, Swedes, Napoleon and the German Armies in World Wars I and II approached from this direction). This would likely constrain the commitment of assets to other fronts (theaters). Additionally, it would not be an easy matter for the Soviets to shift significant numbers of ground forces quickly between theaters due to long distances between theaters, the size of forces (numbers and weight) to be moved, and resupply/support constraints.

Observations/Conclusions:

While the Soviets have the capability for fighting multi-theater wars, this would not appear to follow their historical pattern and, based on "historical pressures," still probably would be considered risky to do so. If this holds true then a Soviet invasion of a southern boundary country likely would not represent a preplanned move or feint designed to cause the US to deploy forces to Southwest Asia as a prelude to war in Europe.

Russians (Soviets) Tend to Expand Toward Areas Offering the Least Resistance, Least Risk.

Early Russian rulers quickly learned that expansion was far easier toward the east and north than toward the west. Prior to about 1750, Poland and Lithuania served as effective counters to Russian expansion in that direction.

It was not until the reign of Catherine the Great and the weakening of those states that Russia was able to annex sizable areas to the west, usually only after long, costly wars (see Map 6).

In comparison, Russia had few problems expanding to the east. This area was underpopulated, undeveloped and was similar to the American West prior to the 1800's. The reasons and possibilities for the expansion toward the east were basically two fold: the collapse of the Mongol Empire in the 15th century and the Russian vanguard of fur trappers who hunted, trapped or bought furs from local natives (a comparison can be made with the American Mountain Men). The Russian method of expansion, though unplanned, generally followed a set pattern. Following the initial influx of trappers, came state employees who collected tribute and taxes, followed by deportees (war prisoners; political and religious dissenters) who established camps and towns. The rapid acquisition of the northern and some eastern territories, to

include Siberia, was possible due to this forced settlement and to the extensive river system which aided transportation. Additionally, the lack of sophistication of and inter-tribal warfare among the peoples inhabiting the region allowed the Russians to conquer, divide, and rule with relative ease (once again similar to the US experience with native American Indian Tribes). This expansion was halted in the east around the Amur River basin when the Russians came into contact with the then-powerful Chinese Manchu dynasty. Unable to proceed further east, they signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, resulting in the establishment of the boundary in that region. To the northeast of the Russian-Chinese border the Russians continued to expand onto the Kamchatka Peninsula and into Alaska.

At about the same time as the Treaty of Nerchinsk was signed, the Russians pressed south against the Ottoman and Persian Empires, and into Central Asia between the Caspian Sea and Mongolia. These expansions were uncoordinated, sporadic, and dependent upon the level of resistance encountered and the political pressure exerted by other European powers to retard Russian expansionism. By 1885, the Russians had reached the general boundaries currently occupied by the Soviet Union.

When looking at Russian (Soviet) expansion it becomes clear that they are opportunists, tending to expand along the axes of least resistance. If this is valid, then the strategic direction (west, east, or south) the Soviets most likely would move in the future (they cannot expand north because of the water boundary) can be established.

The first direction to be examined is westward against NATO. (It should be noted that all major threats to Moscow since 1800 have come from Western Europe and Soviet tactics and equipment are primarily tailored to fight on terrain found in Eastern and Western Europe.) NATO presents a significant threat against any Soviet move into Western Europe. Although the level of cooperation and agreement varies between member countries of NATO, the Soviets probably view it as a formidable alliance, capable of significant resistance. Since a war against NATO could result in a protracted conventional war which the Soviets consider undesirable for political as well as military reasons, or a nuclear war which could result in the destruction of the Soviet Union, they probably would be reluctant to attempt expansion in this direction. Additionally, the LOC's necessary to support an attack against NATO from the Soviet Union to Western Europe run through the countries of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia which, in the past, have rebelled against Soviet hegemony. This is bound to cause some Soviet concern regarding Warsaw Pact ally reliability during a war with NATO. (This factor would be dependent upon the context of the conflict.) The wholehearted support of the Warsaw Pact allies would be necessary for the Soviets to effectively execute a full-scale military move against NATO.

In the east, a Soviet attack against China probably would not be decisive since it would not affect directly the military power of the US or NATO. Although its offensive capabilities appear to be limited due to a lack of mechanized units and modern aircraft, China does have a number of nuclear weapons that could be used against the Soviet Union. Additionally, it would be difficult for the Soviets to defeat the Chinese decisively if for no other reason but the physical size of the country. A Soviet invasion could lead to a protracted war with the possibility of the US supplying modern weapons to help the Chinese. In the final analysis, it probably would be too costly for the Soviets to attack China conventionally in relation to the possible strategic gain.

To the south the Soviet Union is bordered by Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan/Pakistan. Since Turkey is a member of NATO, a Soviet move to expand into Turkey could result in a wider war with the West, one which the Soviets would prefer to avoid. However, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are not members of any current alliances with major western powers; thus a move in their direction would pose less risk than a move west against NATO east against or China. Additionally, an expansion through the southern regions could be of significant long-term strategic and geopolitical value to the Soviets. Expansion southward could enable them to influence the flow of oil from the Middle East to Western Europe and Japan. It also would serve to isolate India and Southeast Asia, to place the Soviets in a position to threaten Africa, and to continue flanking movements against China. A southward thrust becomes strategically important because it offers opportunities to exert military, political and economic leverage against the oil suppliers for both Europe and Japan without directly involving either. Finally, such a move could discredit the US further as a reliable ally. The achievement of a breakthrough to the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean could place the Soviets in such a position of strategic strength that it would be increasingly difficult for the US and the Western Alliance to challenge them successfully (perhaps militarily as well as politically) in the future.

Based upon historical factors, it appears that the best axes for the Soviets to achieve significant strategic gains would be to the south. This area presents the Soviets with an opportunity for greater strategic gains with less comparable risk than any other theater of operations.

SECTION IV

WHAT THE US CAN DO TO IMPEDE OR HALT SOVIET EXPANSION TO THE SOUTH

Section 1 of this study traced the development and expansion of Moscow from a small Principality to the capital of the largest country on earth, occupying a major portion of two continents. The growth of Russia (and the Soviet Union) was generally characterized by periods of rapid expansion, followed by intervals of consolidation and even some loss of territory. This section explores the Russian expansion and attempts to identify actions and alternatives open to the US to block further Soviet territorial acquisitions.

When reviewing Russian (Soviet) expansionism it becomes apparent that there are a number of reasons that have caused them either to stop their expansion or to return territory occupied by their forces. These reasons include: alliances between countries on the Russian (Soviet) border and another powerful nation; the withdrawal of Russian (Soviet) forces in order to leave control of the country or area to a pro-Soviet socialist government; the sharing of a common border with a nation strong enough to impede or halt Russian (Soviet) expansionism; Russian (Soviet) internal upheavals such as the Bolsevik Revolution; and events resulting in a Russian (Soviet) policy assessment that they are over-extended.

Alliances Between Countries on the Russian (Soviet) Border And Another Powerful Nation.

One of the best historical examples of a successful formal alliance against the Russian Empire was that formed during the Crimean War between Turkey, France and Britain. The opening military move of the war was the July 1853 Russian invasion of Moldavia and Wallachia (modern day Romania). This subsequently resulted in Britain and France demanding Russian withdrawal from those areas. When Russia refused, the British and French concluded an alliance with the Ottoman Empire in March 1854 and declared war against Russia.

While the main theater of operations became the Crimea, the British and French sent their fleets into the Gulf of Finland to force the Russia to divide its army to protect St. Petersburg. At the same time, the Alliance was able to send enough ships into the Black Sea to neutralize Russian naval superiority in that area and, in September 1854, to land a large allied force on the Crimean Peninsula. Also, another country, Austria, threatened Russian land LOC's and concluded an alliance with Prussia who was backing the British and French position in the war.¹

As the war progressed, Russia became politically isolated with little prospect of winning the war. It was forced to sign the 1856 Treaty of Paris which required it to evacuate Kars (located on the Eastern Turkish/Russian border), Moldavia, Wallachia and Southern Bessarabia.

The treaty also neutralized the Black Sea, ordered all fortifications on the Black Sea and naval installations on Aland Island in the Baltic destroyed, made navigation on the Danube River free to all nations and opened the Turkish Straits to all shipping.² While it is evident that this treaty was a setback for Russia, it was only temporary. After the war Russian diplomats worked at obtaining a revision of the treaty. In 1864, Russia began to support Prussian activities in organizing the German nation. When they again sided with Prussia during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, Bismark of Germany agreed to endorse a unilateral Russian renunciation of the 1856 Treaty. During an 1871 meeting in London the Russians were able to have most of the Treaty of Paris restrictions repealed.³

An interesting aspect of the Crimean War is that to halt Russian expansion temporarily, the cooperation of four of the most powerful European nations of the time (Britain, France, Austria and Prussia) was required. Even then, the effects of their efforts were short-lived since Russian diplomacy quickly nullified all of the major restrictions placed upon it by the 1856 Treaty of Paris. A Czarist proverb that reads, "Russia is always defeated, but never beaten" appears to be truer than most people realize.⁴

Withdrawal of Forces From A Socialist Country.

Another reason for the loss of Soviet territory is the return of territory to a Socialist Government. At the end of World War II Soviet troops occupied all of Eastern Europe, large parts of northern China and other areas around the periphery of the Soviet Union. As communist governments were established or installed in these areas, Soviet forces, or at least a portion of them, were usually withdrawn. However, the Soviets have found that even the establishment of communist governments has not guaranteed cooperation. Examples of problems are numerous, with China and Czechoslovakia being the more noteworthy.

By the end of World War II, the Soviets had regained everything that Imperial Russia had lost in the Far East as a result of the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War. The Nationalist Chinese government under Chiang Kai-shek formally acknowledged Soviet gains in Manchuria in a 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty. However, the Soviet removal of industrial plants in Manchuria and their refusal to allow the Nationalist Chinese to use Manchurian ports contributed to the decline of Nationalist Chinese power and aided the 1949 Chinese Communist takeover. Even though the Chinese Communists attained power, it wasn't until 1952 that the government obtained promises from the Soviets to withdraw from China by 1955, to transfer all military installations to the Chinese without compensation, and to recognize Chinese hegemony over Manchuria. Even with these Soviet concessions, the Sino-Soviet split was well under way by the mid-1950's. The reasons for the split were numerous and included: the continuing Soviet influence in North Korean affairs, the stripping of industrial plants from Manchuria; the continued stationing of Soviet

troops in Outer Mongolia (once under Chinese control), the fact that the Russian Empire had obtained large parts of Chinese territory in the 1800's; and the ideological struggle for leadership of the Communist movement. Relations between the two countries reached a nadir in the late 1960's requiring the Soviets to station large numbers of troops along the Chinese border. In March 1969, serious fighting erupted along the Ussuri River and later at various points along the Sino-Soviet border pointing out the precarious peace maintained in that area.⁵

The Soviets also had problems with communist governments in Eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia became a problem when it sought to establish a modified national socialism which was unacceptable to the Soviets. In August 1968, Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia, purged the reform leaders and obtained a treaty allowing the occupying forces the right of indefinite presence.

The overall lesson for the Soviets has been that the withdrawal of Soviet forces can result in a loss of control. If this is the case and the Soviets have learned from their past mistakes, the probability for a complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan becomes even more unlikely.

Border Countries Strong Enough To Prevent Soviet Expansion.

Presently, the only country bordering the USSR with the military capacity to impede or halt Soviet expansion is the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and even this capability has only existed in the last thirty years. When Russia first encountered the Chinese Empire in 1689, the Chinese were at the height of their power. By the late 1800's, the Chinese Manchu Dynasty was in decline, allowing the Russians to make inroads into traditional Chinese territory. The Russians legalized their seizures of Chinese territory by the 1858 Treaties of Aigun and Tientsin and by the 1860 Treaty of Peking. These agreements gave Russia areas to the north, northeast and east of present day Manchuria. China was unable to protect itself from Russian encroachments which continued until the Russian rivalry with Japan for control of Manchuria resulted in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War. This war ended in a Russian defeat, halting expansion into this area until World War II.⁶

World War II provided the Soviets the opportunity to regain the concessions and territory lost in the Russo-Japanese War. However, as stated previously, the Soviets were unable to maintain control of Manchuria past 1955 due to the increasing power of the PRC and their agreement to withdraw in the hopes of reaching some sort of political accommodation with the Chinese.

Internal upheavals.

Internal upheavals and problems such as the Bolsevik Revolution, have resulted in major territorial losses for the Russians (Soviets). The largest single loss of territory resulted from the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which ended the fighting between Germany and the new Soviet government. Had this treaty remained in force, the Soviet Union would have lost major portions of the Ukraine and areas of eastern Russia. However, due to the defeat of Germany in World War I, these major territorial losses were averted.

Russian Overextension.

Between periods of expansion, the Russians (Soviets) have withdrawn from various areas when they felt they were overextended. One example was their activities vis-a-vis the Persian Empire.

During the reign of Peter the Great, the Russians were able to defeat the Persians during the 1722-1723 Russo-Persian War, resulting in the occupation of the littoral of the southern Caspian Sea coast. However, by 1735, they had decided they were overextended and withdrew their forces from Persia.

The Russians (Soviets) also occupied this general area in 1905-1917, 1920-1921 and 1941-1946. The last example involves the Soviet withdrawal from Iran in 1946. During the Tehran Conference in 1943, the Soviets had agreed to withdraw their forces from Iran, but had hesitated due to concerns for Russian security, protection of nascent socialist governments in the northwest part of the country and the loss of options for Iranian oil exploration and production. Both the US and Britain forwarded protest notes to the Soviets, with the US stressing it could not remain indifferent to Soviet troops staying in Iran. Various other diplomatic and military signals were sent to the Soviets with the result that they withdrew their forces as previously agreed.

Another example of a Russian withdrawal is the 1883 landing of Russian troops in the Turkish Straits area. The Russians used the pretext of protecting the Straits to land approximately 10,000 troops in Turkey. The French, who were worried that the Russians would seize control of the Straits, quickly arranged a treaty between the belligerents (the Ottoman Empire and Egypt) in order to cancel the Russian excuse for its intervention. Since the Russians had to rely upon their fleet for resupply they probably felt at risk since the French fleet could have blockaded and cut off the Russian Army. One day after the treaty was signed the Russians began withdrawing their forces.⁷

Recommended US Policies and Actions.

When reviewing Russian history it becomes obvious that a number of foreign policies and actions are available to the US that can have an effect on Soviet expansionism.

First, the Turkish-US/NATO relationship is critical. The US must ensure that Turkey remains a viable member of NATO. It is imperative that this country, sharing a common border with the Soviet Union and the target of Russian expansionism for the last 300 years, be allied with an outside power or powers (i.e. NATO-US). Since there appears to be a reluctance throughout Russian history to risk a major war with other powers when the cost is more than the gain, such an alliance as NATO can serve to dissuade the Soviet Union. If any war with Turkey were perceived as involving NATO, a nuclear confrontation with the US could not be ruled out by the Soviet leadership. Not only would this make a Turkish War too costly, but it could result in the one condition Marxist-Leninist Doctrine believes is unacceptable, the destruction of the Soviet State.

Second, in lieu of an access agreement or a mutual defense treaty with Iran, the US should unilaterally support Iran in the event of a Soviet invasion. The Carter Doctrine, which named the Persian Gulf as an area of vital interest to the US, has probably sent the correct signal to the Soviet Union. The implication of the Carter Doctrine is that US forces would be sent to protect Iran from a Soviet invasion. The formation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), and later the US Central Command (USCENTCOM), highlighted this possibility and once again raised the spectre of super-power conflict and nuclear escalation.

Third, the US should continue to support the Mujahedin Freedom Fighters in Afghanistan. While the Russians (Soviets) have shown the capability to eliminate methodically similar enemies in the past, the Mujahedin should be able to prevent the near-term consolidation of the Soviet position in Afghanistan. This delay can aid US policy by diverting Soviet interest and tying down assets that could be used against other countries, such as Iran, in the region. This takes advantage of past Russian (Soviet) historical precedents which indicate a reluctance by them to become involved in more than one area at a time.

Fourth, the US should initiate or continue efforts to redirect the animosity between Pakistan and India toward the Soviet strategic threat. While it is realized that there are deep-seated cultural, religious and territorial disputes between these two South Asian countries, the US must work to change their attitudes. This problem has a direct impact upon the defensibility of the region since the Indians feel, with good reason, that modern weapons acquired by Pakistan would be used against India rather than the Soviets. By the same token, Pakistan fears (also with good reason) that Indian arms acquired from the Soviets would be used against them.

Fifth, the US should continue to support an end to the Iran-Iraq War. While it is true the war probably has served to slow the Iranian export of Islamic Fundamentalism to other Persian Gulf nations, it is also true that the war is draining the political and military strength of both countries, possibly rendering them more vulnerable to Soviet indirect measures.


Sixth, the US should continue to expand contacts with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), the only significant power sharing a common border with the Soviet Union. Strategically, the PRC is important to the US as a means of nullifying a sizeable portion of Soviet force structure since the Russians (Soviets) have been reluctant to fight wars on two fronts. If the Soviets cannot guarantee the security of the Chinese border, they are less likely to initiate a war against NATO or move into Iran.

Finally, the US should attempt to improve relations with the Soviet Union through talks and trade agreements. However, we must realize, that based upon their past history and Marxist-Leninist Doctrine, that the Soviets use times of peace and detente to build their strength and neutralize US/Western defense improvements and alter the "correlation of forces" in their favor.

Since the Soviets evidently have achieved their territorial goals in Europe by establishing European buffer states and are faced with a resurgent China, the only other areas currently open to expansion are Turkey and Iran and toward Pakistan. The US probably has not seen the last of the "Great Game" since the Soviet Empire will continue in its support for attempts to achieve its age old territorial goals.

RUSSIAN/SOVIET WARS 1700 - PRESENT

5 May 2022
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MAJOR EVENTS OF
RUSSIAN/SOVIET MOVEMENT TOWARD SOUTH

KEY EVENTS	BRIEF DESCRIPTION	SIGNIFICANCE OR RESULT
Moscow founded, 1147	Moscow founded at a strategic location on the land and river systems.	Beginning of Moscow
Russians capture Kazan, 1556	Russians under Ivan IV capture Kazan in 1556	Expanded Russian control and opened trade routes to Siberia and Volga Rivers
Russians capture Azov, 1696	Prior to capture of Azov, Russia did not have an outlet to the Black Sea.	Russians obtained an outlet on Black Sea
Treaty of Nechinsk, 1689	An agreement between Russia and China establishing a boundary between the expanding Russian Empire and the Chinese Empire.	Stopped Russian expansion south against China.
Great Northern War, 1700-1721	Russia declared war on Sweden to gain territory giving them access to Baltic Sea.	War ended by Treaty of Nystadt which gave Russia outlet on Baltic Sea.
Russo-Turkish War, 1710-1711	Precipitated by Russian Army following remnants of a Swedish Army into Ottoman territory resulting in defeat of Russian forces.	Russia agreed to evacuate Russian forces from Poland, destroy fortresses on the Black Sea and give up Azov.
Russo-Persian War, 1722-1723	Caused by Russian attempts to out-flank Ottoman Empire from east.	Russia gained control of Baku, Ashabad and Derbent on Caspian Sea.
War of the Polish Succession, 1733-1735	War to resolve who would be king of Poland.	Russia won the war and was able to place its selectee on Polish throne.
Russo-Turkish War, 1735-1739	Caused by dispute over Kuban area, Mongol raids into Russian territory, and by Russian interference in Polish affairs.	The 1739 Treaty of Belgrade ended the war giving Russia Azov and large areas near the Black Sea.
Russo-Swedish War, 1741-1743	War initiated by Swedish invasion of Finland.	1743 Treaty of Abo gave Russia some Finish territory.
Seven Years War, 1756-1763	A large number of reasons caused France, Russia, Saxony and Sweden to fight against Prussia and England.	1763 Treaty of Hubertsburg ended the war with no gains in territory.
Russo-Turkish War, 1868-1874	War was the result of the Turkish dissatisfaction with Russian occupation of Poland and the Russian belief that it was time to settle their problems over territorial claims with the Turks.	The 1874 Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardzhi ended the war. The Russians gained Kerch, part of the Kuban and Terek districts and territory between the Dnieper and Bug Rivers.
Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1879	The Russo-Turkish War was caused by the Russians occupying the Crimea.	The Turks acquiesced to Russian annexation of Kuban, Crimea and Territory between the Bug and Dniester Rivers.

KEY EVENT

BRIEF DESCRIPTION

**SIGNIFICANCE
OR RESULT**

Russo-Finish War,
1788-1790

The Russo-Finish war was caused by the Swedes invading Finland in 1788 to gain back lost territory.

The 1790 Treaty of Verla ended the fighting with a return to the status quo.

Russo-Persian War,
1801-1813

The Russian conquest of Khanates in the Trans-Caucasus area led to Persia declaring war.

The 1813 Treaty of Gulistan ended the war, with Russia gaining most of the Trans-Caucasus area.

War of the Third Coalition,
1805-1807

Russia joined a coalition made up of England and Sweden against France.

Russia was defeated in several battles resulting in the 1807 Treaty of Tilsit. Bound Russia to the continental system and divided Europe into French and Russian spheres of influence.

Russo-Turkish War,
1806-1812

Masterminded by France to keep Russian forces occupied in another theater of operations.

Resulted in the Russian Army being weakened, allowing Napoleon to defeat it.

Russo-Austrian War,
1809

Result of an agreement between France and Russia for Russia to attack Austria if it went to war against France.

1809 Treaty of Schonbrunn with Austria gave Russia a small area of Eastern Galicia and a large portion of Poland.

The War of 1812-1814

Napoleon invaded Russia because of Russian maneuvering against France. The war ended in 1814 with France being defeated and occupied by foreign troops.

Russia played a major role in shaping Europe in the 1815 Congress of Vienna.

Russo-Persian War,
1826-1828

Initiated by the Persians to regain territory lost by the 1813 Treaty of Gulistan.

The 1828 Treaty of Tsurkmanchai set the Russian Persian frontier along the Araks River, gave Russia full navigation rights on the Caspian Sea and a sizable indemnity.

Russo-Turkish War,
1818-1829

The cause of this war was the 1818 Anglo-Russian Treaty supporting an armistice between the Greeks and Turks. The Turks refused to end the war resulting in the Russian, French and English fleet sinking the Turkish fleet. The Turks declared war on Russia in April 1828.

Russia annexed the area around the Danube River, and some Turkish territory along the Black Sea. They also obtained navigation rights through the Turkish Straits.

Russo-Polish War,
1831

Uprisings by the Poles led to the deposition of Nicholas, the Polish King appointed by the Russians. Russian forces took Warsaw in September of 1831.

Poland was annexed into the Russian Empire.

Crimean War, 1854-1856

This war began with Russian demands that it be recognized as the protector of Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, the occupation of Ottoman territory and the sinking of the Turkish fleet. The British and French backed the Turks resulting in the invasion of the Crimea and the threatened invasion of Russia in the Baltic Sea area.

The Russians lost the war resulting in the loss of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia, guaranteed free navigation on the Danube and the abandonment of Russian claims as protector of Orthodox Christianity.

KEY EVENT	BRIEF DESCRIPTION	SIGNIFICANCE OR RESULT
Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878	The war was caused by a Christian uprising in Herzegovina being harshly put down by the Turks which lead to Russian intervention to help protect Christians in the Ottoman Empire.	By the 1877 Treaty of Stefano the Russians gained areas in Turkey and the Danube Delta, forced Turkey's recognition of the independence of Balkan States, and guaranteed neutral vessels access to the Turkish Straits. Russia was also recognized as the protector of Christians in the Ottoman Empire.
1878 International Congress in Berlin	Called to review the "generous" terms given the Russians in the 1877 Treaty of Stefano.	The Congress of Berlin upheld most of the Treaty with the port of Batumi being made an open port.
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905	Caused by conflicts between the Russian occupation of Manchuria and Japanese expansionist policies.	Resulted in the Russian loss of Manchuria, the southern part of Sakhalin Island and gave fishing rights off Russian Islands to the Japanese.
1907 Russo-English Treaty	Divided Iran into zones of influence.	Resulted in Iran being divided between Russia and England into two zones of influence, allowing Russian influence in Iranian affairs.
World War I, 1914-1917	Russian armies were defeated by Germany which was a contributing factor to the Russian Revolution.	Bolseviks came to power, Soviet Union loses territory to Poland, Turkey, Finland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia.
Foreign Intervention, 1918-1920	Initially, foreign troops occupied Russian ports to guard allied war materiel, later aided the White Russians.	Foreign troops occupied large parts of Russia and aided White Russian forces. All foreign troops left Russia with the defeat of the White forces.
Russo-Polish War, 1920	The Poles occupied areas in eastern Russia.	Treaty of Riga ended the fighting, giving Poland territories east of the Curzon Line and reestablished the 1772 border between Poland and Russia.
Battle of Khalkin Gol, 1939	Confrontation between expanding Japanese Empire and Soviet troops stationed in Outer Mongolia.	Soviets decisively defeated Japanese Army, resulting in redirection of Japanese interest toward China.
Russian invasion of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania	Soviets invade and occupy Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.	Soviets incorporate area (known as the Livonia) into Soviet Union.
Russo-Finnish War, 1939-1940	Caused by Soviets desire to expand into Finland to acquire buffer area.	Soviets gained Finnish territory providing a land buffer to Leningrad.

KEY EVENT

BRIEF DESCRIPTION

**SIGNIFICANCE
OR RESULT**

World War II - European,
Theater 1941-1945

Germany invaded Soviet Union to settle
conflicts over Balkans and acquire
rich areas belonging to Soviet Union.

Soviets gained large areas
in Europe to include
Carpatho-Ukraine, a portion of
East Prussia, Petsamo Region,
Karelia, eastern Poland,
Bessarabia, part of Romania.
Also extended hegemony over
Poland, East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Romania,
Hungary, Bulgaria.

World War II - Asian
Theater - 1945

Russia moved against Japanese forces
in Manchuria as specified at the
1945 Yalta Conference.

Soviets gained southern part
of Sakhalin Island. Control
of the Manchuria railroads,
Port Arthur and Soviet
hegemony over Manchuria and
Dairen be recognized. The
Soviets gave up these gains
when the Chinese communists
gained control of the country.

Afghanistan - 1979

Russia invaded Afghanistan in order
to stabilize socialist government
in power.

Currently Soviets occupy major
cities (approximately
110,000 troops) with the
prospect of a long war fought
against Mujahedin forces in
the countryside.

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