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14. ABSTRACT As the Army continues to evolve, more tasks are developed to support new technology and or new processes in order to fight and win in a full spectrum environment. Soldiers in the Army National Guard (ARNG) have to train efficiently in order to be as interchangeable as possible with the active component (AC). Although there is a huge disparity in allocated training time between the ARNG and AC, ARNG Soldiers are expected to train to the same standard as AC Soldiers with respect to both warfighting and non-warfighting tasks. The non-warfighting tasks mentioned include those outlined as mandatory training in AR and NGR 350-1. These task include, but are not limited to, suicide prevention, human trafficking, sexual harassment, resiliency, and equal opportunity training. Given the disparity in overall training time, an even greater disparity emerges as a result of the percentages of time dedicated to warfighting and non-warfighting training. Although non-warfighting tasks are a part of a Soldier's overall readiness, the Army's culture regarding training management must change, allowing the content, frequency, and priority of these tasks to be reassessed in order for the ARNG to achieve the highest possible level of readiness.					
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A Mile Wide and an Inch Deep:
Adjusting Army National Guard Training Priorities in order to Enhance Readiness.

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Executive Summary

Title: A Mile Wide and an Inch Deep: Adjusting Army National Guard Training Priorities in order to Enhance Readiness.

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Thesis: In order for the ARNG to maintain an adequate level of combat readiness, a culture change must take place enabling non-warfighting training to become more efficient, less frequent, and assigned a lower priority than mission essential warfighting tasks.

Discussion: As the Army continues to evolve, more tasks are developed to support new technology and or new processes in order to fight and win in a full spectrum environment. Soldiers in the Army National Guard (ARNG) have to train efficiently in order to be as interchangeable as possible with the active component (AC). Although there is a huge disparity in allocated training time between the ARNG and AC, ARNG Soldiers are expected to train to the same standard as AC Soldiers with respect to both warfighting and non-warfighting tasks. The non-warfighting tasks mentioned include those outlined as mandatory training in AR and NGR 350-1. These task include, but are not limited to, suicide prevention, human trafficking, sexual harassment, resiliency, and equal opportunity training. Given the disparity in overall training time, an even greater disparity emerges a as result of the percentages of time dedicated to warfighting and non-warfighting training.

Conclusion: Although non-warfighting tasks are a part of a Soldier's overall readiness, the Army's culture regarding training management must change, allowing the content, frequency, and priority of these tasks to be reassessed in order for the ARNG to achieve the highest possible level of readiness.

Preface

As a Battalion Operations Officer, I would often find myself having to choose what training the unit would have to sacrifice in order to remain in compliance with higher headquarters. Strangely enough, the majority of the time these requirements had nothing to do with our warfighting mission. I could understand the importance of most of the mandatory training topics and how they were a part of overall readiness, but I still disagreed with their priority. I would often ask why I received the same training year after year. After all, there was not an advanced level or a goal to build upon previous lessons. After a few years, it began to seem redundant. When the ability to complete our mission was hindered by such training, it left me wondering why. Could it be better? Is an organization that was solely focused on being technically and tactically proficient becoming vulnerable to political correctness? Would my commander be more willing to accept risk in the areas of equal opportunity and suicide prevention in order to make sure everyone is proficient at their warrior tasks?

After much thought on the topic, I came to the conclusion that something could be done to benefit the warfighter. I do not intend to prove that specific areas are more important than others. However, I do intend to prove that there are ways to meet the intent without taking so much away from a unit's technical and tactical proficiency.

I would like to thank the staff from the National Guard Bureau's Training Division for their assistance in identifying the challenges specific to the Army National Guard. I also owe Mr. Randy Mock, the project lead for mandatory training reform, DA G3/5/7, a sincere thank you for taking the time out of his busy schedule to provide a plethora of invaluable guidance and historical context. Lastly, I would like to thank Dr. William Gordon for... (I'm sure as soon as I get off my can and ask I will have many things to thank him for).

Introduction

*Much of the Army, from the most senior levels on down, no longer follows or cannot follow the Army's training management doctrine... because there are not enough resources, especially time.*¹ Army Training and Leader Development Panel, 2001

It's a systemic problem throughout the entire Army . . . We can probably do two or three things in a day, but if you give us twenty, we're gonna half-ass fifteen and hope you ignore the other five. Former Army Brigade Commander², 2014

The latest version of Army Regulation (AR) 350-1 was completed on 19 August 2014. The office of the Chief of Staff of the Army ordered a rapid action revision to the regulation, stating that there were simply too many mandatory training requirements.³

The Army National Guard (ARNG) trains to fight using the same organizational structure as the Active Component (AC), the Brigade Combat Team (BCT). ARNG and AC BCTs must execute the same tasks, to the same standard, in order to promote interoperability and compatibility. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) has made this painfully obvious. In a perfect world, the ARNG would train for a given task for the same duration and frequency as the AC. However, Title 32, U. S. Code, restricts the ARNG to 39 training days per fiscal year.⁴ In order for these BCTs to fight and win in a full spectrum environment, the ARNG is constantly seeking to maximize the efficiency of their training programs, allowing their BCTs to maintain the highest standards within the confines of allocated training time. Keeping interoperability and compatibility in mind, this time constraint requires the ARNG to identify, and ultimately prioritize, the tasks that require mastery in order to complete the BCT's combat mission. Army Doctrine and Training Publication (ADRP) 7-0, the Army's manual for training and leader development, acknowledges that an overwhelming number of applicable requirements precludes a unit from training to standard for all tasks. Furthermore, the manual instructs leaders to "select the few, most important supporting collective tasks to train."⁵ Contrary to doctrine, the Army

continues to add to the BCT's to do list while refusing to take no for an answer. In order for the ARNG to maintain an adequate level of combat readiness, a culture change must take place enabling non-warfighting training to become more efficient, less frequent, and assigned a lower priority than mission essential warfighting tasks.

Warfighting versus Non-warfighting Tasks

In order to discuss ARNG training priorities within the confines of the proposed argument, one must understand the distinction being made between warfighting tasks and non-warfighting tasks. When discussing warfighting tasks, one needs to think of those tasks most closely related to executing a combat mission. Warfighting tasks are both individual and collective tasks. These tasks are included in documents such as a unit's Mission Essential Task List (METL) and the Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks (SMCT). ADRP 7-0 defines a METL task as something a unit could perform based on its design, equipment, manning, and table of organization and equipment.⁶ Examples of these warfighting tasks include conducting a hasty ambush, conducting an area reconnaissance, or conducting a raid. Examples of individual tasks include qualifying with one's assigned weapon system, navigating from one point to another, or moving under indirect fire. While only three examples were given for both collective and individual tasks, one should keep in mind that there are significantly more warfighting tasks, depending on the type of unit and the Soldier's Military Occupational Skill (MOS).

When discussing non-warfighting tasks, one needs to think of individual tasks that are non-tactical in nature. These tasks are captured in table G-1, Mandatory Training, of AR 350-1 as well as National Guard Regulation (NGR 350-1). Training topics include resilience and perform enhancement, substance abuse, suicide prevention, human trafficking, Army Values, employment and reemployment rights, equal opportunity (includes anti-hazing/anti-bullying),

and sexual harassment. Additional training tasks that are defined as non-warfighting tasks, but are slightly closer to a warfighting task are information security, personnel recovery and code of conduct, antiterrorism, and law of war.

Time Allocation

As previously mentioned, Title 32, U.S. Code, restricts the ARNG to just 39 days per year to train. In order for one to understand how this effects readiness, it is necessary to discuss time allocation in further detail. ARNG training periods are broken down into two categories, drill periods and annual training. Drill periods are normally one weekend per month, consisting of a Saturday and a Sunday. In certain cases, commanders may designate a longer drill period, including a Friday, for example. While adding a training day to a normal drill weekend would be beneficial while executing certain types of training, the day gained in this scenario would have to be accounted for and subtracted somewhere else during the year. Annual training consists of 15 days of continuous training, and is usually conducted in the summer to best maximize participation during collective training events.

The requirements for ARNG Soldiers to complete warfighting and non-warfighting tasks may differ depending on a unit's posture in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. ARFORGEN is a cyclic process the Army uses to make sure units are manned, equipped, and trained on a schedule that meets the needs of a combatant commander.⁷ This cycle allocates the required resources in order to predict when a unit will be ready for combat employment. ARFORGEN places units in three categories, known as force pools, consisting of reset, train-ready, and available. During the 12 month reset and 36 month train-ready periods, there are no differences, with respect to time allocation, for completing warfighting and non-warfighting tasks. However, during the available period, units that are selected for mobilization will receive

between 15 and 40 additional training days, depending on the type of unit, in order to achieve required levels of readiness.⁸ This paper will focus on the training periods that fall within the reset and train-ready ARFORGEN categories. These periods will be referred to as steady state, meaning that the unit being discussed has not been selected for near term mobilization. While training during the available ARFORGEN period is not the topic of discussion, recommendations to shift and or prioritize non-warfighting tasks will be considered as a result of this increase in training time. Additionally, recommendations will not be made as a result of training time that is increased in a similar fashion as a result of post deployment training.

Non-warfighting Task Requirements

In order to gain an appreciation for the amount of time AR 350-1 requires ARNG Soldiers to invest in non-warfighting tasks, a thorough analysis was done for tasks in both 2009 and 2014. This analysis best illustrates the aforementioned culture regarding training management. The non-warfighting tasks that ARNG Soldiers must complete differ in frequency and duration. All tasks are performed on either an annual, semiannual, or quarterly basis. Additionally, some tasks are executed during initial entry and or subsequent professional military education courses, as well as pre and post deployment.

Prior to December of 2009, which was the previous release date of AR 350-1, non-warfighting tasks accounted for 16.5 hours of mandatory training per year. An analysis of the current AR 350-1 draft shows that non-warfighting task training totals 50 hours of training per year. The significant increase in training requirements prompted a rejection of the draft, requiring a rapid action revision.

In order for one to understand how to implement changes to the current training strategy, one must also understand how the length of non-warfighting task training times tripled in overall

length. Much like new technology, tactics, techniques, and procedures have ever-changing effects on warfighting tasks, continual improvements are being made to the programs that govern non-warfighting tasks. World class subject matter experts (SME) are responsible for the Army's research and development within non-warfighting task directorates. Given the Army's issues with sexual harassment, suicide, and other similar topics, program managers are expected to design top notch programs. Along with this mission, comes resources in the form of government contractors, enhanced research capabilities, and information campaigns, creating the need for somewhat robust staffs. In some cases these directorates become so large that they can take on a life of their own. While the products these directorates produce are usually quite good, improvements made to a program usually result in an increase in training time via frequency and or duration for the individual Soldier. While this may result in a better overall product, the lack of training time facilitates the need to have a culture that is mature enough to decide when Soldiers are "good enough." Although there is nothing wrong with exceeding the standard, the Army needs nothing more than Soldiers that understand the standard well enough to adhere to it.

Ironically, a culture that promotes too many requirements with too little time to execute them may actually be the root cause of the non-warfighting training directorates in the first place. Decision makers at the highest echelons were often hesitant, or too busy themselves, to prioritize training requirements.⁹ Subsequently, leaders had to decide whether mandatory training was going to be executed or not. When confronted with one block of time to fit a warfighting or a non-warfighting task into the training schedule, the majority of leadership at the brigade and lower level decided to allocate training time to the warfighting task. Several years of this kind of neglect, compounded by a decade of continual combat operations, is largely responsible for the

increase in the negative behaviors many non-warfighting task training programs are designed to mitigate.

"We learn all the right buzzwords, all the right slogans, and all the right multiple choice answers, but our attitudes and actions remain immovable." Dr Leonard Wong, 2014

The directorates in charge of specific non-warfighting tasks are often aligned under Centers of Excellence. The major flaw with the Center of Excellence strategy is that it allows other institutions to distance themselves from the larger picture. The result is stovepiped training directorates that become the sole voice pertaining to a non-warfighting task. The majority of these directorates have courses designed to certify Soldiers, referred to as "master trainers," to teach their respective tasks. Dr Wong argues that while it takes years of training to create true SMEs in a specific field, the Army is blindly allowing "master certifications associated with Army culture change to be obtained in as little as 2 weeks."¹⁰ Wong argues that the main goal of such a certification is to facilitate measurable progress that can be easily formulated and briefed. He goes on to argue that while increasing training requirements may increase the Army's awareness of an issue, adding more requirements to an already impossible task list will lead to "callousness, cynicism, and eventual disdain toward the topic."¹¹ In the end, this will only reinforce the culture issues the Army as with training management.

Warfighting Task Requirements

Individual warfighting tasks are generated from the Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks. These tasks are broken down by individual skill level and are specific to one's MOS. While there are far too many tasks to list, tasks that are common to all will be elaborated on for a better understanding of the overall order of magnitude. The Army has given these common tasks the title of Army Warrior Tasks (AWT). AWT consist of 20 different categories with 105 subtasks.

These tasks cover shooting, moving, communicating, combatives, escalation of force, and basic survival skills for the modern battlefield. These tasks are an annual requirement for all Soldiers.

Collective training requirements are listed in a unit's METL. For organizational levels at the BCT and higher, the Army standardizes METLs for like-typed units, regardless of component.¹² Without going into too much detail on a specific METL, one can safely assume that a unit spends more than 70 percent of its time training METL tasks.¹³

ADRP 7-0 defines effective unit training as "results from a sound analysis of the unit's mission and its ability to accomplish that mission."¹⁴ The higher commander's mission and subsequent guidance, along with the METL, aid in selecting tasks the unit will include in their training plans. ADRP 7-0 states that "a unit does not have the resources to train on every METL task; therefore, units sometimes only partially train or not train on some METL tasks."¹⁵ This is evidence that our doctrine acknowledges the fact that a unit does not have enough time to train to all applicable tasks. The issue is that the Army has created a culture that ignores its own doctrine. The fact that many tasks continue to expand only compounds the problem.

A Look at Training Prior to GWOT

An argument that is being made by the authors of the latest (draft) AR 350-1 is that the last decade plus at war has driven the training requirements to its current state.¹⁶ A counterargument can be made utilizing data from Dr Leonard Wong's pre GWOT Strategic Studies Institute article on stifled innovation. This study provides evidence that the Army's current culture regarding training management has been around long before GWOT. Dr Wong noted that out of 365 days in a given year, approximately 109 days are unavailable as training days due to weekends, holidays, and the Christmas half-day schedule. Current data is extremely close, as these dates have not changed over time. The end results is 256 days per year that are

available for training.¹⁷ Furthermore, Dr Wong reviewed all literature that could potentially generate a training requirement from the Department of the Army (DA), through Major Army Command (MACOM), Installation, Corps, Division, and Brigade levels. His research resulted in over 100 distinct training requirements.¹⁸ An analysis of the amount of time needed to conduct each task resulted in a requirement of 297 training days per year. This exceeded the available threshold by 41 days. Dr Wong argued that eliminating 50 percent of the non-warfighting tasks would still not be significant enough to alleviate the problem.

What Dr Wong did not consider was the effects specific to the ARRNG. Though Dr Wong did not consider a 50 percent non-warfighting task reduction significant, the disparity in the percentage of available time spent on non-warfighting tasks between the AC and ARNG would likely reverse such an opinion. For the AC, 50 hours of non-warfighting tasks training would account for approximately 2 percent of available training time per year. For the ARNG, 50 hours of non-warfighting tasks accounts for approximately 16 percent of available training time per year. One should be aware that the 50 hour total is not entirely realistic because conducting 50 hours of mandatory training is not possible without taking occasional breaks. Additionally, preparation time is not accounted for as these classes would have to be spread out over time.

A More Recent Assessment

In 2012, the office of the Army Inspector General (IG) conducted an inspection pertaining to company level requirements. The inspection consisted of 19 different locations consisting of 11 AC, 4 ARNG, and 4 Army Reserve headquarters. Hands on inspections were conducted at 39 different maneuver and combat service support companies. The team found that of the 16 companies that were in the ARFORGEN process, none were able to complete all

prescribed tasks with respect to their posture within the ARFORGEN cycle.¹⁹ The team identified shortfalls in all 39 companies in the areas of training management, command supply discipline, personnel, and leader development. Throughout the process, commanders stated that "there was not enough time to complete all required training tasks" citing that training tasks have steadily increased.²⁰ At most locations, commanders stated that they conducted as much training as possible, but the lack of time prevented it from being conducted to standard. Furthermore, these commanders stated that they did not control training management and training schedules were not followed.²¹

Secondary Effects

In addition to the more obvious dilemmas created by approving too many training requirements, there are several secondary effects that have developed into significant issues of their own. A training calendar absent of white space prevents junior leaders from planning their own training. This stifles innovation, preventing leaders from developing the skills necessary to thrive when conducting decentralized operations. Additionally, computer based training (CBT) is being used more often to facilitate the standardization of training and the timely reporting of completion. While seemingly positive, there are several disadvantages associated with CBT. Finally, the administrative burdens created by the increased levels of task tracking are producing an alarming rate of late receipt taskings.

*They're not telling me, here, you have ten crews. Train them. They're not allowing me to devise the methods and the ways to get there. They're giving me the egg and telling me how to suck it.*²² Company Commander, 2002

The increase in both warfighting and non-warfighting tasks leave little flexibility in the training schedule, resulting in less discretionary time for company level leadership. While the centralization of military training has several distinct advantages, an inadvertent result of this

process is the removal of commanders, especially at the company level, from a training management process that is an integral part of their development. This is also problematic at the noncommissioned officer level due to the removal of flexibility, and ultimately ownership, in a unit's training program. Additionally, this lack of ownership puts leaders at a disadvantage during the assessment portion of training due to less internalization, thus familiarity with the training program.

This paradigm leads to a culture that is comfortable with top down, centralized leadership. This is problematic because the Army strives to develop decentralized leaders that are responsive to mission type orders. For obvious reasons, units spend much more time in garrison than they do in the field. This leaves the majority of training time spent in a reactionary mode, stifling initiative. Reliance on computers and personal handled devices are prompting subordinates to postpone decision making until all involved parties are in agreement and the approving authority has given their blessing. Dr Wong argues that, due to simple human nature, a unit is incapable of a conceptual shift from centralized operations in garrison to decentralized operations in the field.²³ His research concluded that junior leaders "will not suddenly be able or willing to make the judgments required of them in training or in combat."²⁴

The trend of reporting, in great detail, on a rapidly increasing number of tasks further stifles innovation and detracts from readiness. The aforementioned reliance on computers and personal handled devices, coupled with a leader's natural aspiration to avoid uncertainty, have created a nearly unmanageable level of top down information requirements. These administrative requirements take time from junior leaders that normally require a bit longer to reflect on a training program in order to accurately make adjustments and report accordingly. Subsequently, it is only natural for a leader to investigate discrepancies or shortfalls with regards

to information received that carry a negative connotations. This phenomenon lessens readiness by allowing senior leaders, most often at the battalion level, to get decisively engaged in company level business. Research conducted at the Army War College suggested that "an entire cohort of junior officers is inadvertently being produced where company command experience consists mainly of responding to directions and disruptions from higher headquarters."²⁵ While some may argue that research conducted over a decade ago would decrease the validity of an argument, the fact that the Army has increased training requirements and further micromanaged, as well as increased, subsequent administrative requirements has only exacerbated the problem. While company commanders should be comfortable operating in an unstructured, ambiguous environments, the Army is allowing a system built on micromanagement, stifled innovation, and a mountain of administrative baggage to prevail.

*What I have noticed over 10 years of observation is that most service members try to get through CBT as quickly as possible, not necessarily retaining any value in the training. There are so many courses that most members just want to take the tests to be in compliance.*²⁶
Company Commander, 2002

Mandatory training conducted as CBT may have an opposite effect to that intended. CBT is now required for several non-warfighting tasks. The most beneficial trait of computer-based learning to the trainee is the convenience and flexibility it provides. For the AC, it makes things a bit easier because Soldiers can complete the training during any downtime throughout a given training cycle. Soldiers are free to learn whenever they want from any location where a computer is available. However, given the relatively low allocation of training time, the ARNG has to be as efficient as possible, eliminating any downtime during a given drill period. Additionally, ARNG Soldiers complete CBT on the Army's time, not their own, making computer availability an issue. CBT also gives incredible resolution to commanders, allowing

individual Soldiers to be tracked with the click of a mouse. This system may be used to protect leaders in the event of Soldier misconduct. If a Soldier does not follow the rules, the level of record keeping allows commanders to show that the Soldier is aware of the policy. While this may have some benefits, many Soldiers have observed several negative repercussions. Additionally, there is less interaction with other trainees, preventing learning from others asking questions, limiting CBT's effectiveness. Lastly, it is a missed opportunity not to give junior leaders a chance to plan, resource, and execute, their own training.

Another secondary effect of having too many requirements without the time to accomplish them is the administrative burden of late receipt taskings. While late receipt taskings are unavoidable, they should not be generated as a result of a non-warfighting task. The majority of these taskings are communicated through all Army Activities Distributions (ALARACTs). There is a significant correlation between the increase in mandatory, non-warfighting training and ALARACTs. From 2002 until 2011, the Army experienced its sharpest increase in the number of, as well as the overall time spent on, non-warfighting tasks. Over the same time period, the number of ALARACTs distributed by the DA rose from an average of 67 to 546 per year.²⁷ The time it takes an ARNG's state headquarters to review such a high number of ALARACTs significantly distracts from their ability to plan and resource training. These late receipt requirements threaten predictability, often resulting in other training events being curtailed, modified, or cancelled. This phenomenon has created an atmosphere that attributes to the aforementioned culture and thus reactive nature of the Army's junior leadership. Categories of availability, such as the popular red, amber, and green training cycles, provide AC BCTs a method to absorb the impact of late receipt taskings.²⁸ Unfortunately, ARNG units do not have

the luxury of following the red, amber, green cycle. Due to a limited amount of allocated training time, ARNG Soldiers must fully participate in all training events during a drill period.

Research has shown that all units struggle from the issues associated with balancing their many assigned tasks.²⁹ Further analysis from Army Command Inspection Program interviews suggest that units that performed well on non-warfighting tasks did so by shifting the priority of effort away from warfighting tasks several months in advance.³⁰ This is evidence that the choices between warfighting and non-warfighting efforts are deliberate, conscious decisions. These decisions are often influenced by superior commanders, deployment timelines, and personal convictions. However, if a commander chooses to focus on warfighting tasks, automatic feedback via CBT and the plethora of other non-warfighting task reporting criteria, coupled with a zero tolerance culture pertaining to the completion of mandatory training, puts commanders in a precarious position.

*We needed to get SHARP training done and reported to higher headquarters, so we called the platoons and told them to gather the boys around the radio and we said, "Don't touch girls." That was our quarterly SHARP training.*³¹ Company Commander, 2014

The Army's unwritten rule of zero defects with regards to non-warfighting training only reinforces a culture that demands more from leaders than is realistically possible. If Soldiers are literally unable to complete an assigned tasks, then the aforementioned reporting criteria forces leaders to admit noncompliance or create a report that is intentionally, yet acceptably, inaccurate.³² Research conducted by the Strategic Studies Institute shows that leaders are more likely to falsify reports than admit noncompliance. A recent Army Profession Campaign Report revealed that over 90 percent of the 20,000 Soldiers surveyed believed that their own personal values mirrored the seven Army values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity and personal courage.³³ This suggests that Soldiers want to do the right thing, they just do not

have the time to do it. Many Soldiers surveyed stated that they felt like they had to pick the lesser of two evils when faced with reporting compliance in order to focus on seemingly more important training.³⁴ This is of particular concern when junior leaders are put into a position to choose between integrity and what they think may keep their Soldiers alive in combat, regardless of what is culturally accepted. This is a culture that is not only highly flawed, but self-induced. In order for recommend adjustments to non-warfighting training to be taken seriously, the Army's culture with respect to task assignments, realistic expectations, and reporting criteria must first change.

Recommendations

The first step to correcting this problem is to identify where the change needs to take place. As with all military change, it has to start with the leadership. A strong argument can be made that the first significant leadership position for an Army officer is company command. While there is no shortage of company commanders that notice the lack of time to complete the myriad of assigned tasks, these young leaders do not have the institutional experience to effect change. From their prospective, they are doing the best they can to complete as many tasks as possible while taking care of Soldiers. Interviews conducted by the Army War College indicate that these leaders believe that this is the way it has always been and will always be. These young leaders believe that success is accomplishing tasks that are directed from, and reported back to, superior officers. While this concept holds some truth, junior leaders are becoming less able to develop training plans and lead their units without the direct supervision from higher headquarters. Today's culture regarding training management insists that these leaders are failing their subordinates unless they are reporting a plethora of statistics to higher, indicating that they have accomplished the impossible on a daily basis. The Army War College's research

supports this theory stating that "company commanders have not experienced anything other than the current environment in the Army, they are largely unaware of any changes in the culture."³⁵ In order to change this culture, one will have to look higher up the chain of command.

The general consensus among company level leaders is that their battalion leadership, while less likely to express it openly, is just as irritated with the amount of training requirements and micromanagement as they are. They see their battalion leadership "merely passing on the requirements and directives from higher headquarters."³⁶ Although these battalion commanders are a product of the same culture previously outlined regarding company commanders, they now have enough experience to identify a culture that is based on minimizing risk and removing uncertainty. What they do not realize is that this is often done without setting reasonable limits or considering potentially negative effects. This paradigm drives the way senior leaders think. Dr Wong points out that this culture "has pervaded not just the leadership, but also the way the entire institution thinks and works." He goes on to say that "the Army has moved to the point where the current degree of structure, control, and centralization is accepted as proper and necessary."³⁷ The task now becomes convincing senior leaders that the principals they have been accustomed to for 20 plus years are actually what is wrong with training management in the Army. Assuming this needs to happen, a culture change becomes extremely difficult.

Brigade commanders are also dealing with a myriad of reporting criteria. While they are not senior enough to facilitate a culture change independently, they are the highest level of leadership that may actually hear feedback from the battalion and company commanders that are charged with executing these tasks on a regular basis. For this reason, it is critical that leaders at this level have the intestinal fortitude to accept, as well as justify, noncompliance. Interviews conducted with former brigade commanders reveal that leaders at the O-6 level are fully aware

of the issue.³⁸ Based on this testimony, one would naturally assume that the culture change needs to take place at the division or instillation level. Although buy in is most certainly required from major generals, it is still not the appropriate level. Each level of Army leadership looks higher for cultural boundaries, therefore change needs to start with the Army's most senior leader, the Chief of Staff of the Army. Looking at the Army from an organizational standpoint suggests that senior leaders must get involved on an extremely personally level in order effect change.

Contrary to most large organizations, the Army has the unique ability to spread cultural change throughout its formations from the top down. This is made evident by the common practice of emulating successful Army leaders.³⁹ As Army leaders begin to buy in to the culture change, a domino effect will drive the rest of the force to reconsider their views on training management. While top down cultural changes take time to blossom, these gradual changes tend to be far less superficial.⁴⁰ Many theorists argue that once internalized, an "evangelistic fervor" develops out of the senior leader's personal interests and belief in the need for change. Once this takes place, leaders become living examples of the change in culture. This is far more effective than Soldiers going through what many call "droning lectures, stacks of dull PowerPoint slides, or mindless online training."⁴¹ Soldiers are smart enough to realize when their leaders are legitimately concerned with an issue. When a commander personally conducts a rehearsal of concept prior to a combat mission, Soldiers hang on every word because they understand the seriousness of the situation. The same brief would seem far less important if it were sent out in an email or if it were conducted by an animated character inside a computer simulation. Leaders can show their concern for changing the culture of Army training by discussing their intent during counseling sessions, spot checking training events, and reiterating priorities and

acceptable levels of non-compliance during training meetings. Research suggests that we are so used to prefabricated and or online training that we have “forgotten the vital role of leadership in culture change.”⁴²

In order for this change in culture to begin, senior leaders must be willing to change. They must be willing to let go of outdated frames of reference and face the reality of what Army training has become. They must begin to question what their subordinates are telling them was accomplished, tearing down the preconceived notions of a zero defect policy. Leaders must revisit problem framing often, allowing their decisions to be guided by common sense, current information, and honest feedback from subordinates.

Implementation

The majority of warfighting related tasks are generated at the division level and below. These requirements are generated out of necessity in order for BCT Commanders to ensure their units are capable of successfully executing tasks that facilitate the completion of their combat missions. On the contrary, the majority of requirements specific to non-warfighting tasks originate from the DA and MACOM levels.⁴³ This would lead one to believe that DA policy actions are one of the most effective and timely ways to reduce the level of non-warfighting task training.

The Strategic Studies Institute released a study arguing that "the starting point for real culture change is realizing that too much of anything dilutes the effort."⁴⁴ While there are many things that are important, establishing every issue as a top priority makes it nearly impossible to distinguish what is truly the most important. Changing the Army's culture regarding training management will allow senior leaders to prioritize training requirements. The first step in this process is to review the governing process for all non-warfighting tasks. Eliminating large

directorates devoted to specific non-warfighting tasks will minimize over training, self-justification, and other biases that would prevent an honest, internal review of the resources required to adequately train the force. Once an unbiased review is possible, the Army will be able to establish a method, through a single proponent, to prioritize non-warfighting training requirements.

The United States Marine Corps identified that they were facing similar problems regarding the efficiency, effectiveness, and prioritization of non-warfighting training. In 2014, they executed a review of all behavioral health training to include combat operational stress control, substance abuse, suicide prevention, and family advocacy training. The review produced a program that incorporated the common principals taught in all behavioral health training, significantly reducing training from over six hours to a single 90 minute block of instruction.⁴⁵ The new training program, titled Unit Marine Awareness and Prevention Training (UMAPIT), addresses the leader development and individual internalization issues assessed as significant issues in the Army's curriculum. The Marine Corps states that the training is "designed to be delivered to groups of 30 or less in an interactive manner, at the unit level, and facilitated by a leader who is familiar with the course material."⁴⁶ The Marine Corps has also prepared an additional 30 to 45 minutes of training material to address specific needs or risks identified by commanders. This is a clear indication that, while there is always more training that could be done, the Marine Corps has figured out what "good enough" looks like. This eliminates individual directorates from falling into the trap of empire building. While this training program covers topics limited to behavioral health training, the Army should take a more holistic approach to non-warfighting training, gaining efficiencies wherever possible.

Once the Army has prioritized non-warfighting task training, consolidating where possible, the delivery method must advocate a shift from training for a specific situation or set of circumstances to the application of basic Army values in all situations. A recent study on changing the Army's culture regarding training management suggested that "if the Army desires real culture change, it must first isolate those vital values and beliefs it wants to promulgate and then shift resources and attention accordingly."⁴⁷ Doing this will facilitate shifting the focus from accomplishing a task to internalizing values allowing Soldiers to prevail in multiple situations. Success would be measured by what Soldiers internalized, not by superficial, prefabricated computer training.

Risks associated with adjusting non-combat related tasks Risks if we do not adjust non-combat related tasks stop the reporting frenzy.

Conclusion

While non-warfighting tasks are an iatrical part of the total Soldier package, there is simply not enough training time allocated for ARNG Soldiers to master these tasks the say way they must master warfighting tasks. In order to prioritize, and ultimately increase the effectiveness of non-warfighting training, the Army's culture towards training management must change. Changing this culture must start with the most senior Army leaders. These leaders must realize that the solution to their problems is not identifying another superficial, computer based training program. The fact that this culture has been around for decades makes this is a hard concept for many senior leaders to grasp. Leaders are so used to the facade the Army calls training management that changing this culture will be the most daunting task these leaders have faced. Leaders have to be more than simply willing to change. They have to have the intestinal fortitude to admit that they are as much of the problem as anyone else.

This change will reduce the impact of secondary effects created by CBT, affording junior leaders an opportunity to show, not tell, their subordinates how a Soldier should act. Allowing junior leaders to focus on basic Army values will alleviate the insurmountable amount of reporting requirements, get rid of computer based training, and focus on internalization through quality leadership. If done properly, the ARNG's combat readiness will be increased by, for the first time, truly being able to adhere to the doctrinal principal of "selecting the few, most important tasks to train."⁴⁸

¹ Leonard Wong, Stephen J. Gerras, "Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession." (Draft, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2015), 6.

² Lying to Ourselves, 7.

³ Randal Mock (DA G3/5/7), interviewed by Keith Bell, October 23, 2014.

⁴ *National Guard*, U.S. Code, Title 32, sec 502 (1956).

⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, ADRP 7-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, August 23, 2012), 3-2.

⁶ ADRP 7-0, 3-2.

⁷ National Guard Bureau, *Implementing the Army Force Generation Model in the Army National Guard*: White Paper. Staff Study, 2011, 3.

⁸ *Implementing the Army Force Generation Model*, 6.

⁹ Leonard Wong, "Stifled Innovation? Developing Tomorrow's Leaders Today," (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 1, 2002) 11.

¹⁰ Op-Ed: Changing the Army's Culture, 2.

¹¹ Op-Ed: Changing the Army's Culture, 3.

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- 12 ADRP 7-0, 3-2.
- 13 Stifled Innovation, 9.
- 14 ADRP 7-0, 3-1.
- 15 ADRP 7-0, 3-1.
- 16 Randal Mock interview.
- 17 Stifled Innovation, 9.
- 18 Stifled Innovation, 12.
- 19 *Implementing the Army Force Generation Model, 27.*
- 20 *Implementing the Army Force Generation Model, 27.*
- 21 *Implementing the Army Force Generation Model, 27.*
- 22 Stifled Innovation, 1.
- 23 Stifled Innovation, 13.
- 24 Stifled Innovation, 18.
- 25 Stifled Innovation, 27.
- 26 Interview with company commander, January 15, 2015.
- 27 SSI ALARACT chart - courtesy of the Strategic Studies Institute.
- 28 Stifled Innovation, 21.
- 29 Department of the Army Inspector General Report, Disciplined Leadership and Company
Administrative Requirements Inspection, 2012.
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- 31 Lying to Ourselves, 11.

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Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 20, 2012, p. 104.
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- 38 Lying to Ourselves, 7-9.
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- 41 Op-Ed: Changing the Army's Culture, 3.
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- 43 Leonard Wong, interview.
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- 45 Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Implementation of Unit Marine Awareness and
Prevention Integrated Training, October 9, 2014.
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- 48 ADRP 7-0, 3-2.

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