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14. ABSTRACT Since 2005 Norway has been the lead nation for the NATO Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the Faryab province. The Norwegian forces have had the responsibility for the security in the province, located in the northwestern part of Afghanistan. Norway has contributed with a large amount of resources in Afghanistan, political, economical, and military. When such resources are victim for risk, wear or even consumed, a rationale expectation will be that what is achieved justifies the effort. Through the Norwegian model of running the PRT, it has been important for Norway to divide the military and civilian effort. Neither the Norwegian defence or the Norwegian model conducting foreign aid are designed to support a concentrated national mission, with Norway as the lead nation, with one area of responsibility. Both the military and the foreign aid are built so that they can contribute on different levels in a NATO lead operation. In the future Norwegian decision makers should consider carefully if Norway again should take on such responsibility in a conflict. Is Norway up to the task, willing to contribute with the resources needed, and take the responsibility needed.					
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TITLE:

The Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team Faryab Province.

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Executive Summary

Title: The Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team Faryab province.

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Thesis: By not having an overall strategy, or clear political and military guidance from the beginning of the mission in Afghanistan, the Norwegian PRT in Faryab was not able to master the resources at hand in achieving more true out the period from 2005 until the termination in September 2012. On the tactical level the forces have done the job, and reached almost all goals set by the different PRT contingents, although most of the plans developed only had a horizon of six months.

Discussion: Since 2005 Norway has been the lead nation for the NATO Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the Faryab province. The Norwegian forces have had the responsibility for the security in this province, located in the northwestern part of Afghanistan. Norway has contributed with a large amount of resources in Afghanistan, political, economical, and military. When such resources are victim for risk, wear or even are consumed, a rational expectation will be that what is achieved justifies the effort. Through the Norwegian model of running the PRT; it has been important for Norway to divide the military and the civilian effort. The thought of PRT has never been popular in Norway. Neither the Norwegian defense or the Norwegian model for conducting foreign aid are designed to support a concentrated national mission, which Norway as the lead nation with one area of responsibility. Both the military and the foreign aid are built so that they can contribute in different places in a NATO operation on the tactical level. The way the day-to-day missions are done, vary according to the lead nations political guidance and goals. It is in the mission of lead nation a great responsibility and also opportunities, to lead a PRT is in many ways a political task.

Conclusion: It is not only the separation between the development work and military effort that was the problem in the Norwegian PRT. It is rather the lack of Norwegian political coordination that weakens the effort. It is clearly that the commanders of the PRT have not had an easy job trying to read the political side, and simultaneously solve their mission. In the future Norwegian decision makers should consider carefully if Norway again shall take responsibility for an area in a conflict. Is Norway up to the task, willing to contribute with the resources needed, and take the responsibility needed.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES OR THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER U.S OR NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY.

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“Even though Norway of political reasons are not allowed to do COIN operations, the core of COIN clear, hold and build seems like a appropriate way of thinking”. Norwegian PRT commander.

Introduction

Since 2005, Norway has been the lead nation for of the NATO Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the Faryab province. The Norwegian forces have had the responsibility for the security in this province, located in the northwestern part of Afghanistan. In the period since 2005 Norwegian soldiers have been engaged in an increasing number of attacks and skirmishes. In 2009 the number was around 100, and in 2010 this number had increased to around 200. The PRT has been part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and was a joint military- civilian unit. The mission statement as written in several of the PRT reports was in line with the general ISAF mission statement:

In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan [GIROA], ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, [...], and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population (PRT Mission statement as stated in PRT reports)

Background.

After the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, USA and a coalition of nations implemented in the beginning of October the same year “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan (OEF-A), Norway contributed in pursuant with the Atlantic Charter Article 5 from new year 2001-2002 with soldiers and material in Afghanistan, such as Special Forces, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel, logistics and fighter jets. (Atlantic Committee, 2014).

UNs UNSCR 1510 gave in October 2003 NATO the mandate to cover the hole of Afghanistan. This lead to an expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), as at the time only had the responsibility for the security in and around Kabul. On the NATO meeting in Istanbul in June 2004 it was decided to establish four new Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) inside the area of Regional Command North (RC Nord), including PRT Meymaneh, and Norway acquired command in September 2005. The government Stoltenberg II decided that the Norwegian contributions to the US lead Operation Enduring freedom (OEF) should be terminated and that future Norwegian contributions to the operation in Afghanistan should be through the ISAF command. (Regjeringen.no, 2014a).

Norway has contributed with a large amount of resources in Afghanistan, political, economical, and military. When such resources are victim for rick, wear or even are consumed, a rational expectation will be that what is achieved justifies the effort. Strategy can be used to establish this connection. There may be several reasons why Norwegian governments choose to contribute to the mission in Afghanistan. One reason can be the need to please the NATO alliance most important guarantor for peace, USA. The Norwegian political scientist Janne Haaland

Matlary also argues this, “As in other small western NATO countries, also Norwegian politicians are eager to keep a good relationship towards the US” (2012, p136) The decision can be said to be anchored in what Norway wanted to achieve in Afghanistan. Which goals did Norway have, what is needed regarding military and civilian contribution, and how are they going to be used to reach this goals? On the other side it is possible that contributions to such missions can be ad hoc, with a limited or incomplete strategically consensus. What characterizes the Norwegian Afghanistan contribution can be discussed. Representatives from the Norwegian government have justified the Norwegian contribution as rational, sensible, and strategically anchored. However Norwegian political scientist Janne Haaland Mallory claims, “Norwegian use of military power in recent times, are not characterized by strategy or strategic thinking.” (P122) With such conflicting visions, it can be a reason to look at the Norwegian contribution in the Faryab province through the eyes of the PRT commanders.

Faryab province.

“Faryab is one of 34 provinces in Afghanistan. Each province is divided into districts, and Faryab has 15 districts. The capital of Faryab province is Meymaneh. Faryab province has probably around 1 million inhabitants; the number is not confirmed because no counting has been done since 1979. Faryab has a large mix of ethnicities; the Uzbeks and the Turkmen are the largest category (52%), Pashtun (14%), Tajik (25%), Hazara and Arab”. (PRT report).

In Faryab 80 percent of the population in the province is spread among more than 1000 villages. The remaining 20 percent lives in Meymaneh and other larger towns. Approximately 60 percent of the population is illiterate, while for women the percent is more than 95. Around 80 - 90 percent of the population is small-scale farmers, like the country as a whole.

“The war against the Soviet and the Soviet backed government in Kabul, became in Faryab also a form of civil war among the Uzbek and the Pashtun people”. (PRT report). From 1988 until 1996 the Uzbek warlord Rasul Pahlawan dominated the province. He was allied with general Abdul Rashid Dostum, the leading warlord in Northeast Afghanistan. Under the Taliban regime (1996 - 2001) the Pashtuns took their revenge, and now the Uzbek population was harassed. After the US and the Northern alliance made an end to the Taliban regime in 2001, Uzbek warlords again harassed Pashtun villages.

There are three main sources that make the basis for power in the Faryab province. Each of them is tied to certain resources. The traditional source for power builds upon control of water and land. Water is critical important in Faryab. “The provincial borders are drawn along the watershed of the Shirin Tagab River and some smaller watercourses”. (PRT report). During the winter, snow falls in the Hindu Kush Mountains, and when it melts in the spring, the rivers flow through the valleys of Faryab.

Control of water gives power; the same can be said about pasture. Keeping livestock is an important income for many peoples, and the right to good grassing land is a source for conflict. This conflict can also be seen between residents and nomads passing through with their livestock. These conflicts have strong ethnic dimensions in the Faryab province.

The second sources for power occurred during the war in the 1980s and were again strengthened in the 1990s. This source of power is built around powerful warlords, they acquired weapons and other resources when the Soviet backed government collapsed. The war lords also took control over the drug trafficking, which is a major source for economic power.

The third source for power builds upon positions in the new state apparatus, built with support from Western countries since 2001. On the provincial level politics are formed through negotiations between locals and representatives from the government in Kabul. The Governor is

not locally elected, but pointed by the president. In Faryab is almost totally dominated by the Junbesh party, with Uzbek leaders with a background as warlords.

Since 2005 the local government in Faryab province, with support from ISAF and Norway specially have gotten more resources. The old warlords in the Junbesh party have been under pressure, but they still have influence regarding the distribution of aid money and projects conducted in the region. They have also used this influence to block projects planned in Pashtun areas, resulting in more ethnic diversity in Faryab.

Theses:

By not having an overall strategy, or clear political and military guidance from the beginning of the mission in Afghanistan, the Norwegian PRT in Faryab was not able to master the resources at hand in achieving more true out the period from 2005 until the termination in September 2012. On the tactical level the forces have done the job, and reached almost all goals set by the different PRT continents, although most of the plans developed only had a horizon of six months.

In this paper the final reports from the PRT commanders is used as the source of information. The PRT developed their plan for the operations in Faryab, using the Military Decision Making Process.

The Norwegian PRT in Meymanhe:

Norway took over the responsibility for the PRT in Meymaneh in 2005 from the British. The deployment period for the Norwegian contingent is 6 months, with change of command in

the beginning of June, and the beginning of December. The composition and the size of forces have changed from deployment to deployment during this period. The PRT was supported by a small civilian component responsible for coordinating the civilian part of the Norwegian effort in Faryab. As said by one of the commanders, “In the Norwegian PRT it is a clear separation between the civilian and the military part”. (Norwegian PRT commander). Norwegian aid was mostly provided through the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Afghan government. This in accordance with the Norwegian comprehensive approach, strictly separating aid from military operations.

There was three distinguish changes in the PRT structure; initially the PRT was small and focused towards intelligence gathering; secondly there are the force buildup and focus on partnering with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and third the transition of responsibility back to the ANSF.

The Norwegian Strategy in Faryab:

Before 2009, Norway did not have any strategy for the PRT in Faryab, they just continued on what they inherited from the British. In 2009 Norway prepared a strategy for the Norwegian effort in the Faryab province in Afghanistan. This took place four years after Norway acquired the overall responsibility for the province. Representatives from the Foreign affairs, Defense, and Justice department developed the strategy.

“Strategy has become a fashion word, that almost are meant to cover <<[...] everything, and therefore nothing” (Disen, 2012a, p 7).

One of the main purposes with the strategy was to strengthen the cooperation between the military and civilian effort. The role for the civilian and military actors was supposed to be clearer and better coordinated and the effort of both the civilian and military side strengthened

and the effort coordinated. The civilian side was therefore pulled out from the PRT and tied closer to Afghan civilian authority and the UN (UNEMA).

The military effort was to shift towards training and support of Afghan security forces (ANSF). Simultaneously the Norwegian Police effort in Faryab was to be strengthened. Norwegian military leaders and civilian coordinators were in cooperation with the UN, ISAF and local Afghan authorities to study how military plans and effort; best could be cooperated with civilian plans.

The guidance for the military was a shift towards more partnering and mentoring of the Afghan forces. A central part of the ISAF concept was to gradually transfer the lead responsibility for the security back to the Afghan security forces, Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility (TLSR) as soon as the situation permits it. The Norwegian military part was gradually developed and was to take on the role as mentors, partnering, and support for the Afghan security forces (ANSF) in order to help and support the ANSF to be able to take responsibility for the security situation. The Norwegian contribution to NATO's training – and mentoring teams for the Afghan Army (OMLT – ISAF's Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams) was crucial, in the way of strengthening the ANSF capacities. As the Afghan capacities were strengthened, the OMLT was to shift the focus towards mentoring and liaison, and the PRT towards supporting and operating with the Afghan Army and police.

In consultation with other allies one of the main goals for Norway was to reduce the military footprint and be able to withdraw as quickly as possible in coordination with NATO. The goal was to reduce the military presence in Faryab, as the security situation got better. This reorganization of the military engagement in Faryab province was to be coordinated and consolidated with NATO and the countries in the international stabilization force. At the same time Norway wanted to strengthen the effort towards capacity building true support of Afghan

military schools. Norway also considered different possibilities to support the Afghan National Army (ANA), including economic support for education and operations.

This approach is hardly novel but rather one of the broad approaches available within the fields of military and strategic theory. Clausewitz writes that strategy is the process of using force to achieve political ends. From this basic Clausewitzian definition follows certain consequences. First of all, it is not strategy itself that is to realize the political aims, but rather that strategy is to serve as the link or a bridge between the use of force and the political aims. This in turn means that strategy has to describe how the use of force is to be used in order to realize the political ends. Strategy has to understand the political ends it is to achieve but equally important, and often neglected, it has to deal with the practical aspects of how, when and where force and forces are to be used. If strategy is to do this it has to resemble an overall plan.

The main problem with the Norwegian Strategy is that it did not give the military commanders any guidance for how to operate and use the military forces. As stated by one PRT commander, “A continuation of the concept of the Norwegian PRT, is not suitable for future operations resembling the one Norway performed in Faryab the last eight years. It is not likely that the Norwegian model is suitable for other operations in post conflict areas, if the Norwegian contribution is to fit in to a multinational environment like a NATO operation” (Norwegian PRT commander). Norway had the lead responsibility alongside the host nation, in an entire province. Norway retained operational control over the armed forces and chose to deviate from central aspects of ISAF’s strategy. Furthermore, the nature of coalition warfare requires members to develop a rationale for their own forces and perhaps equally important, our allies in lead of other provinces developed their own strategies to supplement that of the coalition Any state prepared to

utilize military force to realize political aims has to be concerned with the way it employs force both for ethical reasons as well as reasons of effectiveness. More importantly, Norway has elevated alliance and coalition warfare to a prominent place in Norwegian security policy, and it is thus crucial that we debate Norwegian strategy and its development within the framework of our most recent coalition experience.

The official Faryab strategy of 2009, did not describe an overall plan that would have linked the challenges of the Ghowrmach district or the Faryab province to the actual Norwegian forces on the ground. The strategy did not provide guidance as to how Norwegian forces were to operate in order to achieve Norwegian political objectives. As further example, we readily adopted ISAF's objective of providing security in Faryab, but apart from the fact that we were to co-operate with the Afghans, there were no guidelines developed for how the Norwegian Army was to provide security in an insurgency. "It has to be allocated resources, funding's, and national long term plan so that the PRT commander has the opportunity to conduct projects along the operational line security and have a have clear guldens of what we as the lead nation wants to achieve". (Norwegian PRT commander). This was not done, so in practice the problem was left to the commander of the PRT and his staff who rotated every six months.

The Norwegian PRT.

In the beginning the focus of the Norwegian PRT was intelligence gathering, and one of the most important things for the commanders was to get to know the area of responsibility (AOR). The PRT consisted of a small command element, patrols and an administration element. In this period the PRT was very welcomed by the local population. The military capacities in the PRT

can after Norway took the responsibility be divided in to three main categories. Those categories were maneuver, staff and administration support. These three categories included the contribution from different partnering nations, such as Finland and Latvia.

The largest and most important part of the maneuver element initially was the Military Observer Teams (MOT-Teams). This was a team consisting of six personnel mounted on two vehicles. This teams main mission was to patrol designated areas of responsible in the Faryab province establish contact with different local leaders and groupings in their area, in order to gather and convey information.

From the Norwegian side it was decided that it should be a distinguished split between military and civilian activities in the Norwegian PRT. “A organization of the Norwegian contribution, with a strong distinguish between the civilian part, and the military without a credible CIMIC component have made it difficult to solve the missions given by ISAF” (Norwegian PRT commander). The military part of the PRT therefore should not do any form of activities besides trying to increase the security in the region. The cooperation and synergy between the military and civilian part of the PRT was being done through a daily meeting in an established command group, where both the military and civilian part of the PRT was represented.

In the command group meetings the civilian representatives from Norway and Finland participated, together with the commander and second in command of the PRT. The civilian parts of the PRT had the responsibility of coordinating and planning for rebuilding and development in the region, coordinated with the Afghan authorities, UNAMA and non-governmental organizations. “The civilian component reported through the Norwegian embassy in Kabul an directly to the department of foreign affairs (UD), while the military part reported

through the chain of command. No reports were given to the commander of the PRT from the civilian side, except some oral updates”. (Norwegian PRT Commander). If military capacities were needed in support of the mission, it was supposed to be decided in the command group.

In the Norwegian concept for the PRT it was from the Norwegian side not set aside any resources in form of money in order to be able to finance projects for development and rebuilding in the Faryab province, neither from the defense or the foreign affairs department. All Norwegian aid funds went to the central Afghanistan. From the Finnish side on the other hand it was put aside economic funds for projects in the Faryab province. This was also continued after Norway took lead of the Faryab province. This money was earmarked for projects inside the security sector, such as development and building of police stations, training and education of police officers, building of courthouses, and building of prisons.

Later into the mission, following the attack on the Norwegian camp inside the city of Meymaeh the organization and structure of the PRT started to change. First it was sent a platoon size element to conduct camp security, and it was decided that the PRT needed to relocate their camp and a new camp was built in the outskirts of the city. Secondly to the increased threat and ISAFs shifting focus towards partnering, it was naturally when the Afghan National Army stationed a company in the province for Norway to increase its organization with an infantry Task Unit (TU).

“ The increase in significant events, are almost exclusively in the Pashtun areas of Faryab province.” PRT commander.

Now no more missions were done without the ANA, and some training was also initiated. Still Intel gathering was important, but the PRT also started to do more offensive operations and

conducting operations in the more hostile areas of the province. The task unit was kept as the main maneuver and partnering unit until the last face of the Norwegian contribution in Faryab. The PRT has shifted in size and units during the years, from around 70 up to around 560 at the most. In this shifting in size and numbers, it can be stated after reading all the reports that most of the increases and decreases are very ad hoc.

The Commanders

“Norwegian aid funds are used in a way that increase the distance between the provincial government in Faryab and the civilian population, and gives the insurgents more freedom of action.” (Norwegian PRT commander)

Stated by numerous commanders through their reports back to Norway. I will here not mentioned any of the commanders by name, and it is several statements in different reports that I here show, and it clearly states the argument that the Norwegian model may not have been the easiest for the commanders.

I have now ended my mission as commander for the Norwegian and Latvian stabilization force in PRT Meymaneh. As part of ISAF, and as commander of the PRT in the Faryab province, my mission has been to support the Afghan government to effectively defeat the insurgents and maintain stability along three lines of operation: security, development and governance, all in accordance with the ISAF strategy. The ISAF strategy highlights the importance of close coordination between civilian and military effort. In this strategy the Norwegian way of spending

aid funds are controversial. The consequence of the Norwegian model can be an increase in insurgency, and a growing difference and distrust between the civilian population and the government in the Faryab province.

Within the security line of operation the focus of the military has been towards partnering operations with the Afghan security forces, where the goal has been to train, advice and assist so that the Afghan police and military forces can maintain the security in the province. In the period of partnering operations we can see improvement among the Afghan security forces in the province. Nevertheless we can see an increase in insurgent activity, especially in the use of IED's and suicide attacks which also has the tendency to hit the civilian population. According to the provincial governor, the goal for the development work in the province is to build trust between the civilian population and the government. This is something the PRT supports and sees as an important step in building the Faryab province.

Within the development line of operation, the military commander of the PRT has no resources or mandate from the Norwegian government, to contribute to increase the living conditions for the civilian population in the province. This is despite that Norway canalizes approximately 20 million dollars towards development in the province. According to the provincial governor this money is supplied to Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and they run the projects as they see it, and the provincial government is kept out regarding planning and execution of these projects.

The NGOs execute projects where they see the situation as secure, and mostly this is in areas populated by Uzbeks, because this is where the Uzbeks leadership in Northern Afghanistan have deployed the security forces. The minorities such as the Pashtun people are often left out.

Much of the insurgency takes place in the so-called “Pashtun belt” in the valleys east in the province, this area are seen as the core area for insurgency. Development is almost absent in this area, and that creates an unequal standard of living among the Uzbek and Pashtun people, and in that way the NGOs are contributing to the strong distrust the Pashtun people have towards the government of the province.

The Norwegian model for aid funds contribute to that local or provincial government has no impact on planning, prioritization, and execution of development projects. The government on the provincial level is marginalized, and loses the opportunity to establish a good and trustworthy relationship towards the population. Norwegian aid funds increase the distance between those leading the province and its people, and in that way give the insurgents more freedom of action.

Norwegian aid funds must instead be used to strengthen the relationship between the government and population in the Pashtun areas. Only by doing so we can isolate the insurgency from reaching the civilian population. The PRT commanders feel they get some understanding for their view by the embassy in Kabul, and its representative in Faryab.

When the military commander if the PRT gets access to funding through the NATO chain of command it comes with strict demands on how to use this money. Many people believe that now the Norwegian PRT will go out and drill wells and build roads. That is wrong. The money the commander now has access to are used to strengthen the authority of the local government. In close cooperation and planning with the local government, projects are prioritized, and projects the locals themselves see the need for can be conducted throughout all the areas of the province. This process and the different projects are described in the development plan on a provincial level. It is the Afghan provincial and local governments job to do the both the planning and

execution of this projects. The PRT commander finances the projects and the provincial government controls the projects. The PRT sets demands to where these projects are carried out, so that projects are run in all the districts of the province, and the PRT are able to provide security in the areas the projects are executed. By doing so the PRT contributes to development in the Pashtun areas, and gives the local government the opportunity to come closer to the civilian population. This gives the development projects an Afghan face, makes the government accountable, and in that way is strengthening the role of the government in Faryab province.

Within the governance line of operation the progress is slow. The provincial government in Faryab lack capacities within areas such as budgeting and planning. They do not have the resources both financially and humans to do it. It is a gap between the expectations the civilian population has, and what the government can deliver. This creates tension, and Taliban exploits it, and insurgency in the province is growing. The PRT commanders urge the Norwegian government to look at the civilian component of the PRT. Today they only function as surveillance for the Norwegian embassy in Kabul, and have limited opportunity to give guidance regarding governance and development both to the PRT commander and the Afghan provincial government.

Civil - Military Coordination.

When looking at the achievements regarding the fight against the Taliban, long-term protection of the civil population, and the development of the civilian government the achievements are low: this is because to be able to have success you need coordination between military and civilian effort.

Through the Norwegian model of running the PRT; it has been important for Norway to

divide the military and the civilian effort. This was done through the strategy mentioned earlier, developed by the Justice-, foreign affairs-, and the defense department in 2009. And as said by a PRT commander “The PRTs military component normally does not relate to non governmental organizations (NGOs)”. (Norwegian PRT commander). Civilian efforts should build schools, work to improve the water conditions, build health care facilities, improve the prison conditions, develop and build roads.

American organizations supported Norwegian military operations with aide and building of civilian infrastructure in areas the Norwegian civil part of the PRT did not want to go. The American organizations were dependent of a robust military support in order to be able to conduct the work in the rural and unsecure parts of Faryab province. Everything points in the direction that the Norwegian model gave less effect in the Afghan society: “It is politically deseeded that military forces shall not do civilian aid, and that the military part of the PRT are not to conduct in projects with the civilian part”. (Norwegian PRT commander). A model with better coordination between military and civilian effort would maybe have given better effect.

By going through the reports for the military contribution in Faryab, it shows that different military contributions have done a great job. They have loyally followed the political decisions given by the Norwegian government. They have with limited resources conducted the orders given by ISAF. Norwegian officers and soldiers have seen with their own eyes everything that worked, and the things that did not work.

The reports from the PRT commanders conclude that military (security), Norway reached almost all the goals set for the missions during the different continents, the same cannot be said regarding the other two lines of operation. “ Along the operational line of DEVELOPMENT and

GOVERNANCE the PRT has just marginally been able to fulfill the goals and expectations set by ISAF, one of the reasons is that Norway has not given the PRT the resources needed to meet the ISAF COIN strategy” (Norwegian PRT commander). Despite the challenges in military and civilian cooperation regarding the overall situation in the Faryab province, the military side of the PRT has achieved a lot in order to improve the situation in the province. The PRT has contributed in building and training Afghan security forces (Military and Police), Norway leave behind infrastructure to be used by the Afghans, and the security forces are at a better level than before the mission started. In a nation without a tradition for a central government, this may in many ways be the best we can hope for.

Governmental Limitations.

For Norway a distinguished separation between civilian and military tasks were important, and by doing so we may not have achieved full effect of both the military and the civilian part of the Norwegian effort in Faryab. Although the Norwegian strategy prepared in 2009 state the importance between civilian and military coordination, it emphasizes the importance of distinctive lines between the civilian and military effort.

It is well known that the main reason for Norway taking on the responsibility for PRT Faryab in 2005 was the obligation they felt towards NATO. And that was the political motive behind the mission of PRT Meymaneh. It can seen by reading the reports that it was given clear guidelines how the contribution in the PRT should be framed and formulated. It can be seen in the reports that it is clearly stated that it must be a clear distinguish between the civilian and military side, and that it should be no Norwegian funding of development projects true PRT Meymaneh, and finally that the PRT should have no civil military cooperation (CIMIC) element

in the organization. This is opposite of what the commanders may have wanted, as stated by a commander, “The Norwegian defense should build a CIMIC organization, this is better matched the way NATO operations are constructed around, so that Norway can increase the effect of their contribution” (Norwegian PRT commander).

PRT is and was one important part of NATO’s way of operating in Afghanistan. The thought was that the PRT should be able to use civilian and military tools in order to strengthen development and security in the different areas of responsibility, in close cooperation with local Afghan forces and government. As stated by a Norwegian commander there may have been a better model than the Norwegian. “In other PRTs in the Regional command (RC) North it was a large focus on CIMIC. Not only to be able to handle the reporting on development and governance, but first and foremost to maximize the military presence in the area”. (Norwegian PRT Commander). The lead nation in the PRT has the main responsibility for the operations. The way the day-to-day missions are done, vary according to the lead nations political guidance and goals. It is in the mission of lead nation a great responsibility and also opportunities, to lead a PRT is in many ways a political task.

In the reports it can be seen that the different commanders are struggling to be able to carry out the political mission for the PRT. It is difficult to see the long-term goal, it is first after that the United States and NATO states that there are to be tremendous drawdowns in Afghanistan that what can see as a main goal appear and are focused on over several continents in the Norwegian PRT. That goal is that we are to withdraw from the PRT following the main downsizing of NATO forces in Afghanistan.

The thought of a PRT has never been popular in Norway. Neither the Norwegian defense

nor the Norwegian model for conducting foreign aid are designed to support a concentrated national mission, with Norway as the lead nation with one area of responsibility. Both the military and the foreign aid are built so that they can contribute in different places in a NATO operation on the tactical level.

This can clearly be seen in the reports from the different PRT commanders, because the size of the force and the focus areas changes true out the several years of the Norwegian PRT. And as mentioned by several commanders, there is no common understanding of how this force really should be designed in order to be able to cope with the different missions. You can see that the commanders are reporting back that they do not have the right tools to cope with every aspect of the PRT mission. On the small scale tactical level as mentioned earlier Norway succeeds in every contact with the enemy repels.

Norwegian politicians and decision makers have always downplayed Norway's role in Faryab. The PRT is often only seen as a force subject to ISAF and NATO, and in that way is only a part of the big puzzle. The PRT is just to be a supporting part to the Afghan government, where the Afghans have the main responsibility. In this there is a lack of Norwegian political responsibility in the province as the lead nation. The Norwegian responsibility is by not taking the steps needed, reduced to a small tactical force. On the other hand it is an example of Norwegian influence on ISAF.

The civilians in the PRT reported to the Norwegian embassy in Kabul, witch again reported to the department of foreign affairs in Oslo. The Norwegian military forces reported to ISAF and Regional Command North, but also to the Norwegian joint headquarter (FOH) true its representatives in Mazar-e Sharif. FOH then reported to the Norwegian Department of Defense.

It is therefore first on political level in Oslo that the different threads are collected and compared. “It is a challenge that most of the Norwegian founding for rebuilding and development in Faryab province are locked in long term projects run by NGOs. This entails it difficult to provide founding’s to provide recourses for building of necessary infrastructure for the operational lines security and governance”. (Norwegian PRT commander). It was no combined guidance and leadership for the Norwegian PRT in Faryab.

It is primarily the diversion between development work and military operations that is the problem, and it is the lack of Norwegian political coordination that hampers the effect.

Recommendations.

If Norway in the future shall take on such responsibility as we did in the Faryab province as a lead nation, we need an overall national strategy. This will make it easier for the different PRT commanders and staffs to be able to pull in the same direction, and in ways that better fulfill the goal stated by NATO. Especially along the lines of governance and development, the PRT would have had the possibility to achieve more if we had more clear guidance, and a larger civilian component in the PRT to help the commanders along those lines of effort. Norway needs to develop a strategy so that we can tie together the ends and means, with help of clearly defined ways. This will help to reach the strategic goals even with challenges and problems that might occur during such a long mission.

Secondly we need to extend the deployment time for key personnel in the PRT. On the military side this includes the PRT commander and his staff. This is important, because it takes time to be able to get to know the situation and the key Afghan personnel in the province. The expansion of the deployment time, will also decrease operations on the tactical level, because my

impression after working in and with 5 different PRT's, and supporting in preparing and training for two PRT's before deployment is that many commanders have their own agenda for what they want to achieve on the tactical level in their contingent. This is not always for the better of the overall Norwegian mission in the Faryab district. It also vary a lot between the different contingencies how the commanders choose to relate and cooperate with the Afghan security forces, and how they are able to put an Afghan face on the operations. With the short deployment time for each contingency, and the time it takes to get on top of the situation I will argue that each PRT only had four months were they operated at full capacity.

We should have given FOH the responsibility to develop the overall Norwegian plan for the PRT in coordination with the Norwegian political side, including the overall ends, means, and ways. And then each PRT could have developed their contingency plan based on the overall Norwegian plan, and ISAF. I also believe that FOH should have taken more responsibility regarding following up with each PRT, and making sure that they all pull in the same direction, and that the next continues where the previous left off.

Another thing to look at is the overall leadership of the PRT. If Norway is going to take on similar responsibility in the future, we have to better be able to tie the military and the civilian side together. Should we have a civilian overall leadership, with the military commander as an adviser regarding the use of military forces. If we have civilian overall leadership it is important that they also stay on for longer time, and not rotate out and change every six-month as we did with each contingency. By having a civilian leadership I believe we would force the political side in Norway to pay more attention towards the mission. I will argue that if we had overall civilian leadership, we would not have had those strict political guidance regarding the separation of military and civilian effort. Also I will argue that we would have had better political coordination

of the effort in Faryab.

Finally I will argue that Norway must examine how we select and train the PRT commanders. I do not say that the military have selected the wrong commanders, but based on my own experience working with five different commanders in Afghanistan, and assisting in training two PRT's before deployment, I argue that not all of them were prepared enough, and fully aware of the responsibility of the position of PRT commander. Most of the training and education before deployment is on the tactical level, both regarding planning and execution. The main selection criteria for becoming PRT commander are that they have to had command of a battalion back in Norway.

Conclusions.

It is not only the separation between the development work and military effort that is the problem in the Norwegian PRT. It is rather the lack of Norwegian political coordination that weakens the effort. It is clearly that the commanders of the PRT have not had an easy job trying to read the political side, and simultaneously solve their mission. In the future Norwegian decision makers should consider carefully if Norway again shall take responsibility for an area in a conflict. Is Norway up to the task, willing to contribute with the resources needed, and take the responsibility needed?

There was no debate within the Norwegian military organization as far as alternative strategies were concerned or in developing the military advice that was to support the political involvement. Part of this may be attributed to the reduction of military staffs involved with strategy and operations after 2003 and 2008, which in turn explains the lack of any Norwegian

doctrinal development when it came to PSO (Peace supporting operations) and COIN, but there was also a general lack of debate within the army as to what our alternatives were for the use of force in Faryab.

By examining the numerous reports written by the different contingences in the Norwegian PRT, it is clear that the training and preparations before deployment could have been done differently in order to face the some of the challenges with not having an overall Norwegian strategy or plan. Most of the education and training done in the four to six month period before deployment are on the tactical level. COIN and military civilian cooperation are barely addressed. For the future it might be a better use of time for the commander and his staff to use more time preparing together with the civilian representatives in the PRT. And also bring in civilian scholars with thorough knowledge about the situation, and how to get better effect along the operational lines of development and governance so that we can be better prepared for the mission.

For future research it would have been interesting to look at and compare the military commanders reports, with the political decision documents. Furthermore it would have been interesting to compare the Norwegian model with other countries model for running a PRT, to be able to see the difference in how the states approaches the mission. Strategically thinking around the use of military force, have an untapped potential among Norwegian politicians.

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