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14. ABSTRACT The National Guard (NG) has evolved in its roles and responsibilities as a result of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while maintaining its role as the state militia. Despite a decade of war serving side by side, the cultural divide between the Active duty and the NG still exists. This divide hinders the United States Army's ability to become an efficient fighting total force. One of the most critical ways to an integrated force is to provide an environment for both active duty and NG members to gain a better understanding of one another and eliminate the barriers between them. The Army's Professional Military Education (PME) system should increase the NG related curriculum and opportunities for NG members to attend resident programs with active duty members. Additionally, there should be increased opportunities for active duty and NG members to train together. By improving the current PME system and increasing opportunities for active duty and NG members to interact, the change can bridge the cultural gap and achieve a true Total Force that embodies the "One Team, One Fight" concept; relationships do matter. Those informal relationships formed during resident PME and multi-component, integrated training would have a huge influence on becoming the efficient, seamless Army Total Force the United States Army is trying to become.					
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**Bridging the Cultural Gap between the Active Component and the National Guard:
A Gateway to the Effective Army Total Force**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: Bridging the Cultural Gap between the Active Component and the National Guard: A Gateway to the Effective Army Total Force

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Thesis: The Army's Professional Military Education (PME) system should increase the National Guard (NG) related curriculum and opportunities for National Guard members to attend resident programs with active duty members. Additionally, there should be increased opportunities for active duty and National Guard members to train together. By improving the current PME system and increasing opportunities for active duty and NG members to interact, the change can bridge the cultural gap and achieve a true Total Force that embodies the "One Team, One Fight" concept.

Discussion: The National Guard, which makes up the largest percentage of the Army Reserve Component in the United States Army, has evolved in its roles and responsibilities as a result of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while maintaining its role as the state militia. In 2008, when the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve's (CNGR) final report made recommendations to recognize and resource the Reserve Component (RC) as an Operational Reserve, the National Guard's role shifted from being a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Reserve. As a result, the Army issued the Total Force Policy—first implemented in the early 1970s after the Vietnam War—in order to integrate the Active Army, National Guard, and the Reserve into an effective Army Total Force.

As the debate on the effective employment of the NG increased, numerous studies reported that the cultural divide between the Active duty and the Reserve Component was one of the largest obstacles to becoming an effective Army Total Force. This divide and prejudice between the AC and the NG in the current operational environment has led to the Army's inability to retain soldiers and maintain a strong Army Total Force. Although the 2012 Total Army Force Policy lists numerous directives to "organize, man, train, and equip" both active and reserve components, the Total Force Culture does not yet exist between the AC and the NG. Regardless of how well a team is organized, manned, trained, and equipped, it cannot be effective when there is a lack of cohesiveness among its members. The cultural divide and prejudice between the AC and the NG hinders the United States Army's ability to become an efficient fighting total force. One of the most critical ways to an integrated force is to provide an environment for both active duty and NG members to gain a better understanding of one another and eliminate the barriers between them.

Conclusion: The ongoing cultural divide between the AC and the NG will ultimately have a negative effect on the Army's performance. Active duty and National Guard members will continue to operate together: relationships matter. Those informal relationships formed during resident PME and multi-component, integrated training would have a huge influence on becoming the efficient, seamless Army Total Force the United States Army is trying to become.

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THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Acknowledgement

Ever since I learned about the resident Command Staff College (CSC), I envisioned attending the program, although the chance to attend it as a Title 32 National Guard officer was very slim. However, by the grace of God and those people he put in my path, I was offered an opportunity by being accepted into the Title 10 program in the National Guard Bureau (NGB). After only being in the Title 10 program for a few months, I was selected to attend my first choice of school, the Marine Corps University resident CSC. I wanted to be around those who do not think like me so that the learning experience would be much different than being around other Army officers.

Among those that God placed in my path, the senior leadership in the District of Columbia National Guard played a critical role in this exceptional learning journey. While working for them prior to my transition to the NGB, I learned so much from Major General Errol Schwartz and Brigadier General Renwick Payne, who worked day and night tirelessly to improve the organization. They whole-heartedly supported my transition from Title 32 Active Guard Reserve (AGR) to Title 10 AGR so that I can grow as a field grade officer and gain experience at the strategic level. Gentlemen, I am forever thankful for the opportunity and the support.

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Above all, I dedicate this to my husband Tim, who stuck to his promise that he made at the beginning of the school year, “this year is all about you.” He endured many days and nights of my venting sessions despite his own stress from work. Tim, I thank you from the bottom of my

heart for your endless support and for being such a wonderful husband. I am a firm believer that you are an angel that God sent from above. Thank you so much for your phenomenal support as my best friend and a husband.

As America's longest war concludes, the nation's military is steadily pushing efforts to meet the US Congress's demands for force reduction and budget cuts. However, the unceasing threats faced at home and abroad—cyber-attacks, terrorism, and pandemic diseases—have not decreased the need for the U.S. military's involvement. The National Guard (NG) transformed itself into an indispensable force in this volatile and complex era, and the U.S. government's support for the NG only strengthened as the war in Iraq and Afghanistan progressed. While America's top leaders face a multitude of complex issues, one of the challenging discussions involves how to defend the nation by effectively employing America's invaluable National Guard.

The National Guard, which makes up the largest percentage of the Army Reserve Component in the United States Army, has evolved in its roles and responsibilities as a result of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while maintaining its role as the state militia. Over 770,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen have deployed overseas since the beginning of 9/11, all while simultaneously supporting domestic missions such as natural disasters, airport security, and border protection. Without any formal plans in place, and almost by default, Department of Defense (DoD) senior leaders began to use the entire Reserve Component (RC) as an Operational Reserve (OR) as the demand to support the war on terrorism increased.¹ By 2004, more than 33 percent of all U.S. military forces in Iraq consisted of National Guardsmen and Reservists.²

In 2008, when the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve's (CNGR) final report made recommendations to recognize and resource the RC as an OR, the NG's role shifted from being Strategic Reserve to Operational Reserve.³ As a result, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued *Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational Force* in October, 2008.⁴ Subsequently, the Army issued the Army Directive 2012-08—*Army Total Force*

Policy—as an effort to integrate the Active Army, NG, and the Reserve into an effective Army Total Force.⁵ According to Army Directive 2012-08, DoD’s policies “require the military departments to organize, man, train and equip their active and reserve components as an integrated operational force to provide predictable, recurring and sustainable capabilities.”⁶ Therefore, it is the Army’s policy that the Total Force “be part of Army strategy and planning to fulfill national military needs.”⁷

The Total Force concept—first implemented in the early 1970s after the Vietnam War—is not new to the Army. Several Defense Secretaries issued policy statements since then in order to adhere to the Total Force Concept as an effective means to meet national security needs. Building on this historical legislation, over eleven years of war has provided numerous lessons learned towards the need for better integration that led to the Army’s 2012 Total Force Policy.⁸

As the debates on the effective employment of the NG increased, a number of research institutions became more interested in examining matters involving the NG and the entire RC. Because some of the applicable research studies cited in this paper are not specific to the NG but to the RC, the words *National Guard* and *Reserve Component* will be used interchangeably. However, numerous studies specifically explored the challenges associated with the Total Force concept to include the cultural divide between the Active Army and the NG. The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) published studies conducted by senior Army officers, who found the cultural divide between the Active duty and the RC as one of the largest obstacles to becoming an effective Army Total Force.⁹ Furthermore, the 2008 CNGR’s final report to Congress concluded that the “historical distrust and a lack of understanding, and perceived inequities affect current active-reserve interactions and lead to breakdowns in communication, feelings of insecurity, and adversarial relationships.”¹⁰

In a continuous effort to become an efficient, effective Army Total Force, there are implications from the cultural divide between the AC and the NG in the current operational environment. Both Guardsmen and Reservists perceive the differential treatment from the active duty forces as discriminatory, leading to the Army's inability to retain soldiers and maintaining a strong Army Total Force.¹¹ For too many years, the nation's largest armed forces have struggled with the cultural challenges internally, and it is time for top senior leaders to mandate visible changes to transform the Army culture. As defined in the CNGR's report, a culture is the "characteristic attitudes and practices within an organization or society" that can have an effect on an organization's performance and capability.¹² Although the 2012 Army Total Force Policy lists numerous directives to "organize, man, train and equip" both active and reserve components in order to become an effective integrated force, the Total Force Culture does not yet exist between the AC and the NG. Regardless of how well organized, equipped, or trained a team is, it cannot be effective when there is a lack of cohesiveness among its members. The cultural divide and prejudice between the AC and the NG hinders the United States Army's ability to become an efficient fighting total force. Hence, one of the most critical ways towards a seamless operative-integrated force is to provide an environment for both active duty and NG members to gain a better understanding of one another in order to eliminate the barriers between them.¹³

To accomplish this, the Army's Professional Military Education (PME) system should increase NG-related curriculum as well as provide more opportunities for National Guard members to attend resident programs with active duty members. Additionally, there should be increased opportunities for active duty and National Guard members to train together. By improving the current PME system and increasing opportunities for active duty and NG members to interact, the cultural gap can be bridged in order to achieve a true Total Force that

embodies the “One Team, One Fight” concept. The next section provides a brief history of how the cultural divide between the AC and the NG began, and how it evolved over the years.

History of the Cultural Divide between the AC and the NG

The history of the negative tension between the AC and the NG dates back to the Vietnam War, but true animosity between the two components became evident during the Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991 when the AC tried to execute the Roundout Strategy. The Roundout Strategy—first implemented post-Vietnam War as a part of the Total Force Policy—was a concept that forced the Active forces to link with the NG or a RC unit so that Reserve forces would never be left out of any major future deployments. Instead of three active duty brigades assigned to an active duty division, some of the divisions would have only two AC brigades in addition to a Roundout National Guard brigade. On the other hand, rather than adding a NG brigade, some of the AC divisions replaced one of their battalions with Roundout RC battalions.¹⁴

In 1990, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm instigated controversies about the Roundout Strategy when three NG brigades were mobilized to round out the active duty divisions. The AC leaders criticized the NG’s inability to be combat ready because none of the brigades left the country to join their Active Army division due to the challenges with the mobilization training requirements. Although it was the first opportunity to apply the Total Force Policy concept, the tension between the National Guard and Active Army’s senior leaders only worsened due to the experiences of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Additionally, the Army National Guard brigade and its Active Army’s parent division did not deploy together to Saudi Arabia, which only added to the animosity between the two components.

The Army's negative perception of the NG was evident even prior to Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. During the testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1988, Richard Davis, Senior Associate Director of the National Security International Affairs Division of the General Accounting Office, and Major General James D. Smith, Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), both confirmed that they had plans to replace the NG Roundout brigades with other AC brigades. They agreed with a Senator's response that, "... your essential testimony here is that, in fact, that [the execution of Roundout brigades] does not take place. The Roundout brigade in the National Guard is then a fiction."¹⁵

Although the NG brigades were in place to deploy as a part of the AC, there was never a plan in place to follow through with the Roundout strategy. The Total Force Policy Report to Congress at the end of 1990 and the AC's decision not to deploy the NG Roundout brigades led to phasing out the Roundout Strategy. Instead, the Army introduced a Roundup Strategy that helped to create a "new contingency corps" to prepare for immediate deployment.¹⁶ The strategy assigned the Army Reserve brigade as a backup; the AC only deemphasized the RC's role with immediate deployment planning in the post-Cold War environment.¹⁷

Just as in previous conflicts, Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm attracted many scholars, military historians, and senior leaders to analyze the experience. In his paper *Active Army Perception of the Army National Guard Subsequent to Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm*, a NG Lieutenant Colonel, Joseph F. Thomas, surveyed Army War College students to explore the AC officers' perception of the NG.¹⁸ The findings were similar to Colonel Charles E. Heller's 1992 research, *The New Military Strategy and its Impact on the Reserve Components*, where he

concluded, “it will take a significant change in attitudes through Army Staff emphasis, formal education and personnel assignments to make any positive inroads toward integration.”¹⁹

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm experiences between the Active Army and National Guard also led to increased conversation among DoD senior leaders about the culture divide. Secretary William Cohen’s critical memorandum in the late 1990s called for the top senior military leaders to eliminate “all residual barriers, structural and cultural” in order to construct a “seamless Total Force.”²⁰ As a part of this attempt, both active Army and Army NG signed an agreement to establish two AC/NG Integrated Divisions in 1998. Senior leaders continued to make efforts towards achieving the Total Force concept creating a new multi-component force concept, with the intent to integrate the active and reserve components.

Notwithstanding these attempts, the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) transformed America’s military force. A large number of the NG mobilized to support Operations Iraqi Freedom Enduring Freedom as the operations expanded. The number and frequency of deployments by NG members overseas steadily increased, and both civilian and military leaders began recognizing the contributions that the NG made although concerns about the cultural divide continued throughout the War on Terrorism. It remained as one of the major concerns for the Army in its effort towards the Total Force concept. Retired Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell’s paper in 2005 reminded everyone that a shared culture between the AC and the RC is one of the challenges that the Army faces as it continues in its attempts to transform the force.²¹

With increasing demands and multifaceted challenges that come with the effective integration of the AC and the NG, Congress chartered the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR). This initiative led to a comprehensive study of the NG and the RC, which reviewed numerous public hearings, meetings, interviews, and analysis of thousands of documents from

various government agencies. In 2008, the CNGR provided a final report to the Chairman and the ranking members of the Congressional Committee on Armed Services after three years of research. This 370+ page report included recommendations under six different categories on necessary changes to ensure both the NG (and the RC) will be effectively employed and supported to meet the needs of U.S. national security.

The report concluded that the reliance on the NG should continue even when the demands for U.S. military forces decrease. It listed the NG's unique capabilities with responding in the homeland; the cost effectiveness that the RC brings during war and peacetime; and its proven ability to execute missions since Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm.²² The CNGR recommended that the NG be maintained as an Operational Reserve, which requires making "necessary cultural changes."²³ The vital role that the organization's culture plays in becoming an optimal military force is recognized in the CNGR's final report, but also in the RAND Corporation's 2004 report, "Looking to the Future: What does Transformation Mean for Military Manpower and Personnel Policy?"²⁴ As the DoD attempts to transform itself to meet future threats, the RAND Corporation reassessed the military's manpower and personnel policies and factors that will affect the success of the transformation. In its report, the RAND Corporation found DoD's organizational culture, as well as its service branch subcultures, to be one of the major factors that will have a major impact on DoD's efforts.²⁵

As Beth Asch and James R. Hosek—the authors of the 2004 report—stated, "[a culture is] rooted in a set of values, beliefs, rituals, symbols, and assumptions, [which] strongly influences behavior," ultimately having a major impact on the organization's overall performance and capability. Leaders play an important role in shifting the culture within an organization. In addition to the responsibilities of shaping the organization, leaders play an important role in

providing “an environment that encourages understanding, and by implementing practices and procedures that lead to the successful blending of different cultures.”²⁶

Serving together side by side for over a decade has not yet changed the organizational culture between the AC and the NG; cultural barriers still exist today. The NG still suffers from a “second-class citizen anxiety” while the AC continues to treat the NG as such.²⁷ The most recently publicized negative tensions between the AC and the NG senior leadership only seem to amplify the cultural divide, especially when the military leadership plays a “critical and important role in shaping the organization.”²⁸

Understanding the U.S. Army’s increased reliance on citizen soldiers—the Army Reserve and the National Guard—and the importance of shared organizational culture within the Army, Jack L. Howard conducted a research study while deployed to Iraq. As a Reservist with over 20 years at the time of mobilization, Howard was a commander of a unit working in the headquarters staff section that reported directly to and interacted daily with the commander. Of 505 soldiers in its subordinate units to include the headquarters, 54% of the soldiers consisted of RC soldiers.²⁹

The results of Howard’s study were similar to the results of the study of the mobilized RC soldiers during the Operation Desert Storm. The reserve units were treated differently from the active units: reserve units were split up to augment the headquarters while active duty units were given dedicated missions. Soldiers were treated differently leading to comments by soldiers such as “since we are reservists, we are getting all of the jobs that the active duty soldiers do not want to do.”³⁰ Furthermore, Howard found that RC soldiers perceived the differential treatment from the active duty leadership as discrimination.

Unlike the AC soldiers, the reserve forces largely reside in the civilian sector, living and working away from military bases. Hence, both Guardsmen and Reservists identify themselves

with the civilian society more so than the military. In the civilian world, when the employees believe that they were mistreated or discriminated, they can file complaints with various agencies, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. However, in the military, the option for the soldiers in the similar scenario is usually through their chain of command or through the Inspector General's office.³¹

Those reserve force soldiers filed a complaint with the Inspector General's Office, which is section within the U.S. Army that addresses complaints. However, the result of the complaint returned within a week without finding any wrongdoing by the commander. This outraged most of the soldiers, who then pointed to the fact that the Inspector General's Office was comprised of all active duty soldiers. They made comments such as "if this is how the active duty treats us, then I cannot wait to get out of the military . . . we were brought in to do all of the dirty work and we are saving the active duty soldiers from looking bad, All of this, and they still treat us like crap."³²

This cultural divide or the perception of discrimination from the reserve forces has serious implications yet it is abstract. However, it is likely that the individuals' perception of unfairness in treatment will influence their behaviors.³³ Furthermore, studies found that differential treatment ultimately led to an inability to retain soldiers in the RC.³⁴

Undoubtedly, changing the culture and mindset of individuals within the organization is not an easy task; however, it is achievable. For instance, General Hans von Seeckt—the Chief of the general staff, then later, commander-in-chief of the German army—transformed the German military during the Interwar period by changing the culture of the officer corps.³⁵ It will take tremendous efforts by supporters, both inside and outside the organization as well as patience, leadership that can drive the transformation, and a professional officer corps that can lead the

swiftly changing environment. Developing a professional officer corps takes time, and it should start with the pre-commissioning level in the Professional Military Education environment.

Changing the Organizational Culture Through Professional Military Education

One of the main reasons that support the cultural gap between the two components is a lack of AC leaders' knowledge of the NG. As the largest RC of the U.S. Army under DoD, NG members only have a minimum requirement to train one weekend per month and two weeks each year. Most of the NG members have a full-time employment elsewhere as do the majority of Reservists. However, the NG has dual-status mission capabilities, unlike the U.S. Army Reserve and Active Component.

When mobilized under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, the NG is part of the active Army and Air Force under the federal chain of command to the President. Under Title 10, NG members are the "primary combat reserve of the Army and the Air Force" and are expected to serve equally with the AC members in supporting federal missions such as the war on terrorism.³⁶ However, under Title 32 of the U.S. Code, the NG supports state missions under the state governor's operational control. When a NG member is performing duties under Title 32, the NG member is performing "federally-funded military training subject to Federal standards or domestic missions, both of which are under the command and control of the state Governor."³⁷ Such differences provide the NG with capabilities to perform essential defense duties for the United States: fight America's wars, protect the homeland, and build global and domestic partnerships.³⁸ As of 2015, over half of NG members have combat experience.³⁹

However, despite a decade of working with one another in combat, there is a dearth of awareness about the NG. NG leaders are more aware of the AC's duties and responsibilities, whereas a large percentage of the AC leaders are not knowledgeable about the NG. This lack of

knowledge is evident at the senior level when General Raymond T. Odierno, the Chief of Staff of the Army stated below publicly in July 2013 in one of the symposiums he attended:

You know, the difference between National Guard, Reserve, and active component is the active component can practice every single day. The Guard gets to practice 39-40 days out of the year. So if you want a football team that can do one practice a month and then have two weeks spring training, versus a force that can train every single day, there's a difference.⁴⁰

Although he later emphasized the need for the Guard, his public statement about the NG showed the lack of numerous hours of personal time that NG leaders dedicate to the Guard to support mission preparation, administrative requirements, and mission completion. NG leaders meet after normal work hours, sacrificing numerous hours away from home with the family to fulfill their roles and responsibilities as NG Soldiers and leaders.

Many AC leaders also do not understand or agree with the NG's political structure and its influence on some of the key decisions on Capitol Hill.⁴¹ There is an influential, close relationship between The Adjutant General (TAG) and the governor, who later can influence the Congressional delegates' key decisions. However, many senior leaders do not appreciate the unique dynamics that the NG has with the states.⁴² Moreover, the Army's senior leaders are used to an organizational structure where decisions and orders are strictly followed. As Colonel James F. Hesse stated, the senior leadership does not want to be "countermanded by the political influence wielded by the Governor" if the senior leadership's decision can possibly be detrimental to the Guard.⁴³ The conflict over the authority brought challenges to the AC and NG relationship over the years so much that active duty Army made several attempts to eliminate the NG to replace it with a federal reserve to have a full time control. There are also beliefs that the dual chain of command that the NG holds is the largest reason for the cultural divide between the active Army and the NG.⁴⁴

The lack of knowledge and capabilities of the NG can be seen not only at the senior levels but also at the lowest officer corps' levels, such as Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and the United States Military Academy.⁴⁵ Beginning a military career with minimal exposure to the characteristics and competencies of other components of the Army such as the NG may contribute towards the mindset that the NG does not play any major role in defending the nation. As Major Christopher S. Landers stated in his 2007 master's thesis, "the cultural shift is best attained in those who've experienced no other Army culture to which they can default; our newest and future leaders."⁴⁶

The CNGR agreed. One of the CNGR's recommendations to improve the culture is through teaching others more about the RC organizations. The CNGR's final report states,

JPME-related courses offered as part of all levels of service professional military education, including service academies and ROTC programs, should contain significantly more material on reserve component organizations and capabilities to increase the understanding of, and appreciation for, the skills and background of reserve component service members.⁴⁷

Although there are attempts to incorporate materials on the NG into PME curricula, very few programs offer courses solely devoted to the Guard and Reserves. The services believe their course materials are sufficient. Therefore, unless someone such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposes the study of the NG as a "Special Area of Emphasis," it is likely that the service schools will not "catalyze greater incorporation of Guard and Reserves material into PME curricula."⁴⁸

Even though increasing the exposure to NG material in PME will help narrow the cultural divide between the AC and the NG, the greatest influence on the students' learning experience is the interactions between students. Through class discussions, students can exchange information and opinions, while engaging in informal conversations outside of class, which contribute

towards an increasing knowledge of each other's components.⁴⁹ Eventually, this open communication breaks down the misconceptions and stereotypes that they may have for each other's component as well as building cohesiveness and relationships that would carry them throughout their career. Ultimately, the cross-components mutual respect and trust gained during PME would "translate into enhanced fighting power."⁵⁰

Unfortunately, the opportunities for NG leaders to attend resident PME course are very limited. There are limited seats for Guard members in AC schools, especially when there are RC equivalent schools available.⁵¹ Indeed, the budget constraints and restrictions have a major impact on the number of seats available within PME. Hence, AC leaders get priority in some schools, leaving NG leaders with limited seats. Therefore, NG students have to wait to attend class, and because some PMEs are significantly longer than others, it forces NG members to complete their PME requirements later than AC members. Certainly, when there are challenges with funding, NG members are at a serious disadvantage, especially when it comes to leader developmental schools.⁵²

Although it may be unrealistic to expect NG leaders to meet the same standards as the AC with professional development and qualification criteria, the opportunities to attend the key, resident PMEs are not proportional; it should reflect the contribution that the Guard and Reservists made throughout major conflicts. As an example, for the class year 2014-2015, there are 886 students Army majors attending the resident Intermediate-Level Education (ILE) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. Out of 886 majors, only 36 majors are NG officers, which is equivalent to four percent of the total Army majors. Fourteen out of 36 Majors are in Title 10 status – Federal Active Duty Guard – while 22 are in Title 32 status. The breakdown of Title 32 status was not available, but the 22 officers could be a combination of traditional NG officers, state level Active

Guard Reserve (AGR), or federal technicians. For the upcoming class in 2015-2016, the numbers are similar.⁵³

The number of NG officers' seats in Senior Service Colleges is not much different. In the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), only six to twelve Reservists out of over 300 students in a class attend every year. The number of Reservists includes the NG, the Army Reserve, and civilian students. The number of NG officers at the United States Army War College is a bit higher than at other resident PME's. This year, there are 24 NG officers out of 217 total Army officers and for the class of 2016, the school is projecting 24 NG officers out of 227 total Army officers to attend the program.⁵⁴ The Army War College seems to project approximately ten percent of total Army officer attendance be filled by NG officers, whereas the ILE and other Senior Service Colleges project about four to six percent.

In the United States Army, there were approximately 44,400 Army NG officers in Fiscal Year 14, compared to 92,800 active duty officers.⁵⁵ The Army National Guard members made up approximately 41% of all Army personnel in Iraq at the peak of active participation in July of 2005.⁵⁶ Thus, the number of seats for NG officers in the resident PME is not proportional based on the ratio of NG officers to AC officers and the NG's contribution to the Army's mission.

As stated earlier, it would be unrealistic for the NG to expect to meet the same, exact standards or the timeline as the AC in professional development qualifications since the majority of the NG members are Reservists. Furthermore, the available time and budget constraints will not allow the resident PME's to be filled with 40 to 50 percent of its total number with the NG officers to match the NG's contribution to the war efforts. However, the key to change in PME is for the top DoD decision makers to mandate visible changes in PME, thus making a paradigm shift in the Army culture. Although budget constraints may be the determining factor in the

number of seats each component receives, increasing opportunities for the NG to attend resident PME will ultimately pay the “greatest immediate dividends.”⁵⁷ The NG will continue to be employed as an operational force, and the days when the NG was referred to as the *weekend warriors* would be long gone. There must be a shift in the current Army culture for it to become a more efficient, cohesive fighting force. Increasing opportunities for the AC to learn more about the NG through formal curricula and through close informal interactions in a noncombat environment such as resident PME will help bridge the cultural gap between the AC and NG.

For many senior leaders, both civilian and military alike, when forced to make decisions related to budget, what matters most are cost-benefit analysis and measures of success. Many times, those measures have to be translated into numbers, graphs, and charts. However, there are efforts that may not be translated quantitatively, but have qualitative value such as reducing cultural prejudice within the Army. Increasing NG related materials in PME curricula and increasing the opportunities for NG leaders to attend active duty resident PME will not only reduce cultural prejudice, but will increase the efficiency—through the informal network built among leaders—of the Army Total Force. Moreover, another opportunity that the leaders can create around the environment to reduce cultural prejudice is through integrated training and exercises.

Changing the Organizational Culture Through Integrated Training and Exercises

As U.S. military forces continue to engage in fighting against terrorist threats to the U.S. all around the world, one of the foreign policy strategies that the U.S. maintains in the 21st century is building stronger relationships through coalitions and alliances with other nations. One of the ways to accomplish this partnership is by engaging in combined, multinational military

exercises, forums, and sustaining opportunities for increased dialog and working together as well as training partner nations' security forces.

The importance of building relationships is not exclusive to the international community. Building relationships within and outside of DoD is critical to the Nation's defense as it creates a cohesive fighting force. For military leaders, the DoD has mandates that help enforce the learning environment to increase knowledge and experience through the Joint Qualification criteria. There is an increased emphasis to enforce joint requirements for military leaders so that America's military leaders become more familiar with each branch of service despite their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). The officers must be "educated, trained, and experienced in joint matters" and must meet the Joint Qualification criteria in order to be eligible for promotion to the top senior level.⁵⁸ The DoD Joint Officer Management Program instruction states that by learning about each other's services, the knowledge and the experience will "enhance the joint warfighting capability of the United States."⁵⁹

There are no formal requirements for AC and NG members to learn and work with each other in the Army. Perhaps, there is a belief that every member of the Army should be the same since all soldiers wear the same uniform that states "U.S Army." There may be an expectation that all Army soldiers know about one another, although there are some major, underlying cultural differences between the AC and NG. Regardless, as seen throughout U.S. history, NG soldiers must be ready to augment the AC when called upon to execute the NG's Title 10 responsibilities. Furthermore, as the employment of the NG shifts from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve, the expectation for the NG is to "be ready to reach quickly for wartime deployments and immediately to domestic missions."⁶⁰ The Army Total Force Policy lays out the training expectations:

As appropriate, the Army will integrate AC and RC forces and capabilities at the tactical level (division and below), consistent with the Secretary of Defense's policies for use of the Total Force. . . . This will include some predeployment collective training of tactical level organizations, including those organizations that will routinely deploy as multi-component forces (for example, sustainment brigades and other multifunctional support brigades).⁶¹

As stated in the policy, there must be increased opportunities for the Active Army and the Guard to train together to enhance combat readiness and build stronger relationships. In addition to the academic setting, Active duty and NG members must learn from each other by implementing practices and procedures that bridges the cultural gap. The cultural prejudice still exists today between the AC and NG due to the misconception about the NG by the AC.⁶² The more contact the groups have with each other, the better relationship between them. Allport's Intergroup Contact Hypothesis theory supports this phenomenon. The theory states that when four key conditions—equal group status within the situation, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and the support of the authorities, law, or custom—are met, “positive effects of intergroup contact” occur, breaking down the negative stereotypes and biases that the groups may have for each other.⁶³ Furthermore, Thomas Pettigrew reported the importance of having the available time for “cross-group friendships to develop.”⁶⁴ This was evident during the first multi-component Warrior Leader Course at Camp Cook, Louisiana.

The Louisiana NG hosted the first multi-component Warrior Leader Course at Camp Cook in Ball, Louisiana from 4-18, November 2011 where Louisiana National Guard soldiers had opportunities to train active duty, NG, and Reservist members from around the country. In an integrated environment, soldiers from each component were able to train together, and the experience helped them to understand one another better. The comments from the participants were very positive. One of the NG soldiers who participated in the event stated, “We fight together overseas, so this training provides a lot more cohesion . . . there are a lot of stereotypes

with the National Guard. We were able to show them we're all soldiers, and we fight for the same team." The response from the active duty soldier, Sergeant Christy Flores, was not much different from that of the NG soldier. She stated, "it has been an eye-opening experience looking for the same leadership traits. They (National Guard) don't slack off on the standard . . . I have learned a lot. All components work together to accomplish one objective."⁶⁵ Although the duration that AC and NG members spent together was short, there was progress made in breaking down the cultural barrier between the two components during this course.

Training together to build a partnership is not a new idea. When Lieutenant Colonel Thomas conducted his survey in 1992 among the Active Army officers to examine their attitudes towards the Army National Guard, one of the survey questions was, "What can be done to improve the one Army concept?" The response from the participants centered around "training, education, and integration/structure changes."⁶⁶ Senior officers surveyed recommended more training days for the Guard to train together and integrate training exercises with the AC.⁶⁷ Since then, the Army has made progress towards integrated, multi-component training but the efforts need to be institutionalized.

Recently, the Army implemented the Total Force Partnership Program, which uses a variant concept from the Roundout strategy. AC Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and Army NG BCTs are paired with one another to "create partnerships and to increase training opportunities at home, and boost leader development."⁶⁸ Initially, Forces Command (FORSCOM) increased participation from RC units in its Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations. In 2014, 21 out of 38 brigade-level and above formations that participated in the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) were from the NG or Army Reserves. However, in order to complement the CTC training integration, FORSCOM implemented the Total Force Partnership Program, using "a

rotational alignment methodology.” In 2014, 28 ARNG BCTs were partners with AC BCTs and seven AC maneuver battalions and company-level units trained with ARNG BCTs. Furthermore, FORSCOM restructured its headquarters to create “a multi-component leader development directorate.”⁶⁹ Due to the informal command relationships, these partnerships are based on factors such as unit type, geography, and preexisting relationships.

The Army is moving towards the right direction to enhance the Army Total Concept and an integrated training must become the Army’s cultural norm. Although there is a vast difference between the number of training days that both components have and the training schedules that both components follow, a multi-component training program is possible as seen in the Total Force Partnership Program.

As Feickert and Kapp stated, Congress should explore the potential benefit of this new program because the program can significantly enhance the readiness of the Reserve Component.⁷⁰ Opportunities to participate in programs such as the Total Force Partnership Program should be available to all types of Army units, not only to the combat arms units participating in the CTC rotations. The Guard units have large capabilities with infantry, civil affairs, military police, and water purification; these types of units are required when conducting stability and restoration operations after hostile events, and the demands of such types of mission will continue.⁷¹

The greatest threats to making these visible changes—increasing more seats for the NG to attend resident PME and opportunities for multi-component training—is funding and the difference in the AC and NG’s planning timeframes. Although the Army Total Force Policy may support these efforts, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) highlighted the need for detailed planning and funding through two reports: GAO-09-720, *Army Needs to Reevaluate Its*

*Approach to Training and Mobilizing Reserve Component Forces*⁷² and GAO-09-898, *Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an OR Force*.⁷³ As DoD leaders face budget constraints and are forced to prioritize programs, it is imperative that the decisions made by the DoD are not only a short-term fix, but for long-term benefits. Furthermore, budget decisions may be based not on the actual “cost-benefit analysis, but on sporadic, yet recurring anti-reserve cultural bias that motivated previous DoD attempts to reflexively slash the Guard and Reserves when defense budgets decline.”⁷⁴

Additionally, increasing opportunities for AC and NG units to train together may be affected by the difference in planning timeframes between the two components. The NG regularly plans its Annual Training sites two years in advance whereas few AC units have any idea what they will be doing in two years. The NG only has limited training time making multi-component planning a huge challenge. However, just as the Louisiana National Guard and FORSCOM accomplished multi-component training, progress is possible.⁷⁵

There may be concerns whether or not the NG has the capabilities to balance both domestic and foreign missions, simultaneously. When the NG is not conducting foreign and/or federal missions, it has duties and responsibilities under the state governor to respond to natural disasters and/or any state emergencies. The combat skills, equipment, training, and leadership skills gained during foreign missions enables NG soldiers to respond to state missions faster and more efficient. The vast majority of NG equipment is available to state governors for use in saving lives and property, when not supporting federal missions.

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact also allows the Guard to support other states so that it reduces the stress on individual states in response operations.⁷⁶ For example, there were 10,000 Army National Guard personnel from 15 states that responded to Hurricane

Sandy in 2012, while another 40,000 from neighboring states waited in preparation for response. In addition, more than 50,000 NG troops provided support to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, while 80,000 Guard personnel were simultaneously deployed overseas. Not only do these statistics reveal that the NG has sufficient end-strength to support domestic missions, but also has the interstate support and capabilities to meet both domestic and foreign mission requirements.⁷⁷

There may not be an immediate, visible return-on-investment by increasing opportunities to instill “cross-component unity,” but the change will ultimately have a huge impact on the Army’s culture that will lead to the cohesive Army Total Force.⁷⁸ As Edgar Schein stated, “culture . . . points us to phenomena that are below the surface, that are powerful in their impact but invisible and to a considerable degree unconscious.”⁷⁹ Both DoD leaders and Congress must find means to provide this platform for AC and RC members to work and learn together as a team.

Recommendations

As the Army continues to make its efforts to enhance the Army Total Force concept, both the AC and the NG must do their part to ensure that every Army command is well prepared and ready. Leader development must be emphasized throughout the commands by educating leaders on the opportunities available and ensure that the information is communicated down to the applicable level. Instilling the values of a learning organization is key to developing agile, adaptable leaders that today’s fast-moving, ever-changing environment requires. The emphasis must come from the top leadership within each Army command. Officer Professional Development (OPD) and Non-Commissioned Officer Professional Development (NCODP) sessions must be incorporated and executed in the training plan. Unfortunately, depending on the

command, there are disparities in OPD/NCODP sessions held, which may mean that leader development priorities may or may not exist.

In the NG, there is a phenomenon that some commanders deny their full-time members attend resident PME due to limited full-time manning. A large percentage of NG officers do not attend resident PME; they may not have a clear understanding of the value that resident PME brings to an organization. There must be a shift in many of the NG leaders' perception of PME; it is more than just an educational requirement for promotion. As an OR, the NG will continue to work closely with the AC on both domestic and foreign missions; therefore, the NG must become more operational and strategic thinkers, rather than tactical ones. More than ever, the NG will need leaders that are educated, experienced, and well-connected to those other than just the NG organizations. The experience, knowledge, and relationships gained from resident PME will be invaluable to the organization's current and future missions.

Indeed, because the minimum training requirement for the NG is only one weekend per month and two weeks per year, there are huge challenges to meet all of higher headquarters' mandatory administrative and training requirements. Effective time management and task prioritization are the keys to success in the NG, which is why numerous NG leaders spend their personal time on NG related tasks such as training meetings. Due to limited training time available, leadership development can often be set aside unless the organization's culture prioritizes the importance of leadership development. Whether it is battalion or division level driven, senior leaders must find time and the resources to mentor and train upcoming and present leaders.

In addition to increasing opportunities for NG members to attend AC schools, there should also be opportunities for AC members to attend NG led courses such as those held at the

Professional Education Center at Camp Robinson, Arkansas and state owned Regional Training Institutes. Due to funding and limited training days, the likelihood of a drastic increase in number of NG members attending AC resident schools will be low. Therefore, by including AC members in NG schools will achieve the same end state: increase AC soldiers' knowledge and understanding of the NG, and foster a better working relationship between them.

The senior leaders in the NG must also conduct a comprehensive assessment of their organization's culture. New soldiers and leaders coming into the organization may have to expect to face challenges such as frequent deployments, full time job challenges, expectations from the NG leaders, especially those AC soldiers that are transitioning to the NG. When transitioning from active duty to the NG, soldiers and leaders must be well informed on the new norm of the NG as an OR, what it means, and how it will affect them. Active duty soldiers might expect to serve in the NG hoping for drastically decreased deployments, when, realistically, the units that they join might have a similar frequency of deployment as AC units.

Conclusion

One of the strengths that the United States military possesses is its ability to synergize and integrate numerous cultures to work towards one common goal. It is the military leaders' responsibility to provide the platform for the AC and the NG to learn about each other, build long-lasting relationships, and dispose of rivalries among components so that the Army can become a "seamlessly integrated Total Force."⁸⁰ As General George C. Marshall stated, "it is the fact that the better informed an Army officer is, the more he is impressed with the vital importance of the National Guard."⁸¹

The platform must start with junior officer level PME such as ROTC and USMA by adding more NG materials into their curricula. Learning must continue for the AC and NG to exchange

ideas for increasing opportunities for the NG leaders to attend resident PME. With continuous threats at home and from abroad, the U.S. cannot afford to have “separate and unequal” forces.⁸² Furthermore, in order to train as the U.S. military forces fight, integrated, multi-component training and exercises must be widely conducted among all different types of units.

The ongoing cultural divide between the AC and NG will ultimately have an effect on the Army’s performance. There may not be a quantitative way to measure the overall success of increasing opportunities for AC and NG members to break down the barrier of the cultural prejudice. However, numerous research studies in the past decade of war have shown that the NG is a reliable, competent force that will not return to being a strategic reserve anytime soon. Active duty and NG members will continue to perform the missions together: relationships do matter. Those informal relationships formed during resident PME and multi-component, integrated training will have a huge influence on becoming the efficient, seamless Army Total Force the U.S. wants and needs.

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