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*United States Marine Corps
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Marine Corps University
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**Any Time, Any Place: The Creation and Evolution of the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team
(FAST) 1986-2015**

**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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AUTHOR:
Gary L. Cobb
Major, United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University

AY 14-15

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Donald F. Bittner, Ph. D.
Professor of History (Emeritus)

Approved: Donald F. Bittner

Date: 18 March 2015

Oral Defense Committee Member: J. W. Gordon

Approved: [Signature]

Date: 18 March 2015

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Executive Summary

Title: Any Time, Any Place: The Creation and Evolution of the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) 1986-2015

Author: Major Gary L. Cobb, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The history of the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) program, as well as current operational capability and contemporary challenges during employment, must be understood in order to grasp their continued operational relevance alongside contemporary crisis and rapid response forces.

Discussion: Marine Corps Security Forces (MCSF) have undergone four major re-organizations since the pivotal decision by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman to completely overhaul the Navy's physical security and antiterrorism programs in 1986. These major organizational changes include:

1. 1986: Secretary of the Navy directs total re-organization of Naval Security Forces; FAST is created.
2. 1992: Disestablishment of Marine Corps Security Force Battalion, Pacific
3. 1997: Second FAST Company established under MCSF Battalion in Norfolk; FAST begins forward deployed FAST Platoons.
4. 2008: MCSF Battalion re-designated Marine Corps Security Force Regiment.

The structural changes over the decades have primarily been restricted to the company level and above, leaving the basic structure of the individual FAST platoon virtually unchanged. Alongside other rapid and crisis response forces, such as Marine Expeditionary Units and Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, FAST platoons are often viewed as a redundant capability. A more than cursory study will result in the understanding that FAST employment in conjunction with these other forces, under the proper command relationships, presents the geographical combatant commander with a broader range of response options during contingency operations. By modifying the command relationships of deployed FAST units to place these units under the operational control of the Marine Component Commander, greater synergy can be achieved with other rapid and crisis response forces such as Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces and Marine Expeditionary Units. This understanding will drive the conclusion that not only is FAST not a redundant capability, but that the FAST platoons and companies offer a truly complementary and proven capability that is currently underutilized.

Conclusion: The time is now for a comprehensive review of the Marine Corps Security Force command structure, FAST command relationships, and the guiding instructions and orders regulating the employment of FAST during expeditionary antiterrorism security operations in support of naval and national assets.

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Preface

This paper is primarily an historical account of the creation and evolution of the United States Marine Corps' Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) Program from its genesis in 1987 until 2015. The FAST program is very relevant in today's operational environment; hence, serious consideration should be directed towards modifying the current structure, command relationships, and mission parameters of the FAST platoons and companies to maximize their effectiveness and employability. I shall show the reorganization of the Marine barracks and ships' security structure of the middle to early 1980s, and track the transformational policy changes that yielded Marine Corps Security Force (MCSF) Regiment and the FAST platoons and companies as they stand today.

This paper is current as of April 2015. I have attempted to use government reports and policy documents to the greatest extent possible, but have included journal and magazine articles where appropriate. While many of the details of operations conducted by the FAST Platoons are classified, I am writing this paper utilizing unclassified sources and will not comment on any on-going operations. My conclusions and opinions concerning the current and future relevancy of the FAST Program are formed from my research, my experiences as an OCONUS FAST Company Commander, and interviews conducted with Regimental and Company leadership, both past and present.

This paper is limited to information on MCSF and FAST, although it also includes tie-ins to contemporary organizations such as the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force – Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR). I shall offer opinions on FAST's role within the Marine Corps' developing Expeditionary Force – 21 concept released in 2014. This paper does not cover the Marine Security Guard (MSG) Program or the Marine Security Augmentation Unit

(MSAU). While a FAST Platoon has very real potential to be employed alongside these organizations, this possible interoperability is outside the scope of this work.

I feel strongly that the FAST story is a unique one and deserves its place in the history of the Marine Corps. The FAST program has demonstrated undeniable merit, with an uncanny ability to adapt to changes in the operational environment. It has not only survived three major conflicts and countless smaller incursions and contingencies, but has thrived despite seemingly “redundant” antiterrorism capabilities fielded during the past three decades.

I wish to acknowledge the unwavering support of my family, specifically my wife Alicia, and the assistance of the faculty of USMC Command and Staff College and the Library of the Marine Corps in the development of this work.

Prologue: An Overall Perspective

In 1987, the Secretary of the Navy directed the reorganization of Naval Security Forces (NSF) to better address global terrorist threats to installations and vessels of the naval service. This action essentially created the Marine Corps Security Force (MCSF) battalions that eventually merged at the regimental level, and was the genesis for the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) Program. Initially limited in scope and function, the FAST platoons, and the companies were manned, trained, and equipped to focus training and operations on defensive site security in support of the Navy. FAST platoons provided security afloat and ashore during nuclear re-fueling and de-fueling operations, provided point site security for these vessels in port, and maintained the ability to deploy to enhance security at naval installations around the globe.

In the succeeding two and a half decades, Marine Corps Security Forces transformed many times, and the FAST Program adjusted to the changing nature of the terrorist threats facing the United States. Shipboard detachments were disbanded, and the reclaimed manpower applied to the creation of additional FAST platoons. Marine barracks around the globe were either disestablished or were re-designated, initially as MCSF companies, and later as dedicated FAST companies. This structural change resulted in consolidated support provided to the fleet and installation commanders. FAST platoons were deployed to these forward stationed companies, and were employed against a range of missions from nuclear re-fueling and de-fueling of vessels to embarked security teams to installation security. Initially envisioned as rapidly deployable small units with strong combat power relative to size, the structure and capabilities of the FAST platoon naturally progressed to employment in support of national assets as well as naval assets.

FAST platoons began to be seen as an ideal force to provide additional security to American diplomatic facilities during times of crisis or increased threat.

Today there are 18 designated FAST platoons that are aligned with the geographic combatant commanders (GCC). Of these 18 platoons, approximately eight to nine are operational at any given time, with the other platoons in a forming, training, or de-forming status. The operational platoons primarily deploy outside the continental United States (OCONUS) and provide rapidly deployable expeditionary antiterrorism security forces in support of naval and national assets. Formed, trained, equipped, and certified by the MCSF Regiment and three continental United States (CONUS) based FAST companies, these platoons are operationally employed by permanently based OCONUS FAST companies in support of the U.S. Fleet Commanders, Naval Component Commanders, and Geographic Combatant Commanders.

The history of the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) Program, as well as current operational capability and contemporary challenges during employment, must be understood in order to grasp their continued operational relevance alongside contemporary crisis and rapid response forces such as Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force – Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) under the developing Expeditionary Force 21 (EF 21) capstone concept. This understanding will drive the conclusion that FAST is not a redundant capability rather, the FAST platoons and companies offer a truly complementary capability to MEUs and SPMAGTFs. Additionally, while more than 50% of FAST platoons are deployed OCONUS at any given time, they are currently underutilized during contingency operations requiring a proactive rapid response force due to the outdated legacy command

relationship, command structure, and the Department of the Navy (DON) instructions that govern employment.

Restructuring Security Ashore and Afloat

In 1986, the Department of the Navy (DON) began a multi-year initiative to completely restructure the organization of Naval Security Forces (NSF). Prior to this time security for vessels and installations was primarily provided by Marine Corps Security Forces (MCSF) under the authorities established by the National Security Act of 1947 and legislated by Title 10, United States Code.¹ MCSF performed their mission utilizing a disbursed structure of detachments and garrison barracks stationed ashore at Navy installations and deployed aboard various ships. These Marine barracks and detachments operated under the direct operational control of the commanding officer of the activity or ship to which assigned, but administratively still fell under the Marine Corps chain of command. The Marines of MCSF stood validated security posts, and thus provided armed and combat-trained Marines to the naval commander. This system of distributed security operations in support of the Navy had been a staple for the Marine Corps since the 18th Century, but changes in the terrorist threat during the 1980s provided a catalyst for re-organization and enhancement of antiterrorism security in order to better deter, detect, and defend against emerging threats to naval assets.²

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) convened a CNO Executive Board (CEB), including representatives from the Marine Corps, in February 1986 to receive a brief on the status of the Navy's antiterrorism program. During this presentation, the inadequacy of current Navy security forces was identified based on the existing threat and an enhancement program was recommended. Among proposals were a planned expansion and then subdivision of the Navy's Master-at-Arms (MA) force to break out physical security specialists from law enforcement, and

make changes to the structure and organization of Marine Corps Security Forces. The CEB agreed that a more dynamic program was needed to counter the terrorist threat globally, but specifically the threats emerging in the Mediterranean Sea region.³ In April 1986, Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) John Lehman received the same antiterrorism program brief and directed that the Marine Corps would be the lead agency for antiterrorist program development within the DON. Additionally, following this brief, Secretary Lehman directed a “top-down, free-form” look at the current structure of Naval Security Forces, specifically the MCSF barracks and ships’ detachments.⁴

The briefs and discussions of early 1986 resulted in a department-wide directive by Lehman in June of that year. In a memorandum to the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), the SECNAV directed “a total reorganization of the existing DON security structure, training, and manning” in order to create within the Navy/Marine team an “effective physical security organization.” This reorganization was to focus on capitalizing on existing security skills of Marines and their ability to train Navy personnel in the relevant combat-oriented techniques required of a physical security force.⁵ This directive provided for the assignment of Marine supervisors and training cadres at naval installations, and helped facilitate the desired subdivision of the MA community. Planning for the transition began immediately, and in September 1986 the SECNAV approved the general concept for the reorganization. This general concept had four key components:

1. Marine Corps Security Forces would be replaced with trained Sailors at selected locations.
2. Marine cadres would be manned, trained, and assigned to major Navy Installations to train and supervise the developing Navy Security Forces.
3. Navy Installations and Activities would establish Auxiliary Security Forces (ASF) to augment permanent Navy Security Forces when required.

4. Establish Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams (FAST) to give fleet commanders greater flexibility to meet rapidly changing security requirements.⁶

The implementing directive for the reorganization, ALNAV 011/87, was released in January 1987, and provided increased granularity on the pending changes. The Navy's installation security departments were directed to reorganize into operations, administration, and investigation divisions to provide greater efficiency. Marine officers or staff non-commissioned officers would be assigned as the head of the operations division at more than 50 installations or activities on a permanent basis. At these 50 locations and over 30 more, Marine training cadres would be posted to improve the effectiveness of the security forces. Law enforcement activities were excluded from the Marines duties, and this would be an enduring trend throughout the history of the MCSF/FAST Program. The Auxiliary Security Force (ASF), to be formed at all Navy installations, would be created as a collateral duty from the ranks of Navy personnel assigned to the installation. This provisional security force would receive weapons and tactics training from the Marine cadre, and be employed as an augmentation force in extremis as the result of a heightened terrorist alert. A handful of Marine barracks around the world would continue to provide a ground defense security force, while the majority of barracks would be converted to MCSF companies or gradually be disestablished.⁷

ALNAV 011/87 also created two new Marine Corps battalion-level organizations: MCSF Battalion, Atlantic and MCSF Battalion, Pacific. These two battalions would administratively control the MCSF cadres, MCSF companies ashore, and the Marine detachments afloat. The battalions would man, train, equip, and certify all MCSF personnel, and perform the duties of the former Marine Detachment Sea School upon its disestablishment. Mobile training teams (MTT) would be formed to train installation security forces at locations without MCSF cadres, and the

two battalions would assist the Fleet/Force Inspector General in accessing the capabilities of the installation security departments. Most significantly, ALNAV 011/87 created two FAST companies. Each MCSF Battalion would establish a single FAST company capable of deploying as a whole or by detachments on short notice in response to increased security threats. The FAST companies would be operationally employed and controlled by the U.S. fleet commanders, and would be qualified and certified to support nuclear re-fueling/de-fueling (RF/DF) operations and the rapid reinforcement of installation security forces.⁸

Soon after the publication of ALNAV 011/87, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) released Letter of Instruction (LOI) 5530 on 13 February 1987. CMC LOI 5530 confirmed the Marine Corps' plan to implement the direction of ALNAV 011/87. While mostly focused on the mechanics of establishing the two MCSF battalions, the MCSF training cadres, and the conversion of Marine barracks to MCSF companies, the LOI also provided a detailed timeline for the reorganization.⁹ By July 1987, MCSF Battalions, Atlantic and Pacific, were activated to train MCSF personnel and a FAST company was established within each battalion. Since no service end strength was authorized for the reorganization, all changes would be uncompensated. Four Marine barracks were disestablished to provide the manning for the MCSF battalions, FAST companies, and training cadres.¹⁰

Within six months, the ASF training standards had been established, and MCSF training cadres were stationed and validated at 89 Navy installations. Additionally, the MCSF reorganization in support of the NSF antiterrorism program was complete, and the FAST companies were fully operational. By January 1988, FAST companies were deploying elements in support of mission requirements and had completely assumed the entirety of the operational tasking in support of the Navy's nuclear RF/DF security missions. On 25 March 1988, the

Department of the Navy released SECNAV Instruction 5530.4A (SECNAVINST 5530.4A) as a follow-up to the original instruction released in 1981. This comprehensive document incorporated all of the updates and structural changes enacted during the NSF reorganization. The instruction clearly detailed roles and responsibilities for the administrative and operational support and employment of FAST. SECNAVINST 5530.4A highlighted what was termed “appropriate duties” for a FAST:

1. Augmentation of local security forces to protect ships, aircraft, and other high value assets.
2. Augmentation of base/installation security departments when the threat condition has been elevated beyond the ability of permanent and auxiliary security forces.
3. Provide security for nuclear refueling/defueling operations.
4. Activating contingency sites.
5. Performed duties requiring armed combat-trained Marines as directed by the Fleet Commanders.¹¹

FAST would not be utilized to provide security for the Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS), provide aggressor forces for security exercises, or general security and administrative duties normally performed by Navy personnel or contracted/civilian personnel. Until deployed, FAST elements would remain under the operational control of the MCSF battalions. However, once deployed, this operational control would transfer to the supported installation or vessel commander.¹²

The World Changes

Marine Corps Security Forces continued to refine standard operating procedures as the decade ended. Training of physical site security techniques improved for the Marines assigned to the FAST companies, and the companies began to develop more offensive techniques during training. At both MCSF battalions’ schools, close quarters battle (CQB) tactics, techniques, and

procedures (TTP) were incorporated as standard training for the FAST Marines. While nuclear RF/DF security missions remained the wheelhouse for the companies, FAST platoons began to see an increase in operational employments around the globe. FAST platoons were deployed in support of the 1991 Gulf War during both the *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* phases. Additionally, FAST Marines from MCSF Battalion, Pacific worked with US federal agents conducting counter-drug operations in Arizona in 1991-1992.¹³

The end of the Cold War prompted dramatic changes for the United States' tactical and strategic nuclear weapons forces. On 27 September 1991, President George H. W. Bush announced on live television a comprehensive plan for sweeping reductions in the nation's nuclear weapons program in what would become known as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) of 1991-1992. Nuclear equipped bombers stood down from ready alert levels for the first time in more than 30 years. Land-based nuclear tactical artillery and short-range missiles would be destroyed, and a large percentage of strategic intercontinental missile forces would be taken off alert. Most influential for MCSF and FAST was the decision that all nuclear weapons would be removed from Navy surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft.¹⁴

As the details of the PNI policy became clear, the CNO and CMC realized that there would be a significant decline in MCSF requirements in the near future. On 11 December 1992, CMC released an updated version of LOI 5530. This letter highlighted the impact of the presidential decision with regard to nuclear weapons and identified a projected 50 % reduction in MCSF mission requirements. As the Navy removed its nuclear weapons from surface vessels and reduced storage requirements at overseas installations, fewer MCSF companies and detachments were required to ensure security of these special weapons ashore and afloat. The CMC LOI 5530 addressed the future requirements reduction by disestablishing MCSF

companies and detachments, and more significantly, consolidating all MCSF command functions under a single MCSF battalion.¹⁵ Effective on 2 August 1993, MCSF Battalion, Pacific was disestablished, and MCSF Battalion, Atlantic was re-designated simply as MCSF Battalion. This had a significant impact for the FAST program: now just a single FAST Company existed with six platoons based in Norfolk, Virginia. It would have to satisfy all of the global antiterrorism security requirements for the entire U.S. Navy.¹⁶

Foreshadowing what would become the quintessential FAST deployment, platoons deployed to both Haiti and Somalia in 1994 in support the U.S. Department of State missions to those countries. While engaged in operations at both of these locations, FAST Company conducted rotations of platoons in and out of the contingency sites while maintaining combat power and ensuring effectiveness of the platoons employed.¹⁷ In 1995, FAST Company deployed in support of the Operation *Safe Passage*. During this operation, FAST platoons assisted the U.S. Coast Guard during the transfer of Cuban migrants from Panama to Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba for additional processing.¹⁸ These deployments defined the typical FAST deployment: on short notice, limited in scope of task, and relatively limited in duration compared to other USMC forces.

Another reorganization of MCSF began in 1997 with the release of ALMAR 168/97. At the ten year anniversary of the sweeping changes initiated by SECNAV Lehman, the Navy no longer required the MCSF training cadre permanently located aboard naval installations. The MCSF Battalion would now only continue to support the Navy installation security departments with mobile training teams deploying as required from Virginia. The installation cadres, all of the aircraft carrier shipboard detachments, and several more MCSF companies were

disestablished. Manpower was shifted from these billets and used to form a second FAST company under the MCSF Battalion in Norfolk.¹⁹

In conjunction with the changes mentioned above, 1998 would prove to be a watershed year for the FAST Program. With the formation of the second company, FAST platoons began a period of forward presence that would continue into the 21st Century. MCSF Battalion instituted what would henceforth be known as the FAST Deployment Plan (FDP). Before this change, the U.S. fleet commanders would have to request the use of a FAST platoon that would then deploy from CONUS for a specific purpose before returning to the United States. Now with the FDP, fleet commanders would receive platoons on a regular schedule for six month deployments. This allowed employment of the platoons in any manner deemed appropriate by the fleet commander within the capabilities of the platoon. FAST platoons deployed to Italy, Bahrain, and Japan in support of the 6th, 5th, and 7th U.S. Fleets, respectively. Almost simultaneously with the commencement of the FDP, FAST platoons were detailed to Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in response to the bombing of those two U.S. Embassies.²⁰

The employment of FAST platoons expanded with the permanent forward presence OCONUS under the FDP. FAST platoons became the force of choice in time of crisis at diplomatic missions around the world. Platoons supported reinforcement missions for almost every GCC. A FAST platoon provided the initial security following the terrorist attack on the *USS Cole (DDG-67)* in Aden, Yemen in 2000, and they re-opened and secured the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad in 2003 following the invasion of Iraq by Coalition Forces. Platoons protected embassies throughout the Middle East and Africa following the “Arab Spring” in 2011, and were the first to reinforce diplomatic facilities in Tripoli, Libya following the death of the U.S. Ambassador in 2012. CONUS based platoons continued to fulfill all nuclear RF/DF

requirements for the Navy, but it was becoming very clear that FAST equated as much to embassy reinforcement as it did to the traditional Navy security missions.

As the 21st century dawned MCSF continued to evolve. A third CONUS-based FAST company would be activated and two dedicated OCONUS FAST companies would be formed from the structure of MCSF companies in Spain and Bahrain. In Japan, the MCSF Company, Pacific would function in essentially the same manner as the other two OCONUS companies, but without the name change. Each of these OCONUS companies would eventually employ two FDP platoons in support of the fleet commanders. The MCSF Company in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba would retain a ground defense force mission in support of the naval installation. Finally, in 2008, MCSF Battalion would be re-designated MCSF Regiment, and continue to provide command functions for this global organization.²¹ The current Regimental organization is contained in Appendix F.

As stated previously, FAST platoons were originally designed to provide the U.S. fleet commanders with a rapidly deployable expeditionary antiterrorism security force to be employed in the limited duration protection of naval assets. FAST mission sets and capabilities have evolved over the decades to also be ideally suited to the protection of national assets, such as embassies and consulates overseas.

Ring of Steel: FAST Capabilities

FAST platoons, and the Marines and Sailors that fill the ranks, are not an elite force within an elite force. FAST platoons are not Special Operations Forces, but they are specialists. In reality, FAST Marines are basically trained infantrymen with specialized training for a specific mission set. They are, pound for pound, the best positional *defensive force* within the Department of Defense. As the acronym implies, FAST platoons are designed to be mobile and

agile, and inherently possess, through continuous repetition, the flexibility to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world and have an immediate and positive impact upon arrival. A FAST platoon is ideally employed *prior to a dynamic event* based on indicators and warnings to deter, detect, and defend against potential terrorist attacks. When employed after an attack or event, the platoon's primary function is to *mitigate* the effects of the attack or event. This is evident by the numerous accounts of support to the U.S. Department of State since the early 1990s.

Prior to deploying, each FAST platoon conducts an extensive nine month pre-deployment training program (PTP) that culminates with a full mission profile certification exercise. Broken into four blocks of training, the PTP completely trains and evaluates individual and collective tasks required by the platoon's mission essential tasks (MET). The FAST platoon PTP includes more than six weeks of specialty schools for individuals and teams, such as helicopter rope suspension training (HRST); designated marksman (DM) course; embarkation training; high mobility multiple wheel vehicle (HMMWV) drivers course; "box" truck, fork lift, and bus drivers courses; and intelligence/combat operations center (COC) training. A platoon will conduct more than three weeks of advanced urban combat (AUC) training; this includes developing close quarters battle and riot control techniques. FAST platoons will also conduct more than four weeks of site security training mastering interior guard and post procedures, emplacement of heavy weapons, and fortification engineering.²²

Currently, FAST companies and platoons are manned, trained, equipped, and certified by MCSF Regiment to conduct rapid response expeditionary antiterrorism and security operations in order to protect vital national and naval assets. To accomplish this mission companies and platoons draw on the following core mission essential tasks (MET):

1. Deploy Tactical Forces
2. Conduct Antiterrorism Operations

3. Conduct Ground Security Operations
4. Conduct Embassy Reinforcement²³

In addition to providing security for U.S. government facilities, FAST platoons can be tasked to provide security for evacuation sites and operations, ports and airfields, conduct theater security cooperation (TSC), and provide training cadres for foreign military and naval security forces.²⁴

The crowning PTP event is the mission rehearsal exercise (MRX). During this week-long field training event, a FAST platoon will be evaluated on every aspect of their PTP. The MRX is typically centered on a scenario replicating the most challenging environment that a platoon will be expected to operate: reinforcement of a diplomatic facility in a foreign country. Since FAST platoons are geographically aligned to the GCC area of responsibility in which they will deploy, MRX scenarios match this alignment. To add realism, the gaining OCONUS FAST Company will typically participate in the MRX as the higher headquarters controlling the mission scenario. By communicating with an OCONUS company headquarters, FAST platoons exercise reporting procedures and long-range communications that the platoon will be expected to utilize once deployed overseas. Additionally, MCSF Regiment coordinates with the U.S. State Department for a representative to serve as an evaluator during each MRX. At the conclusion of the MRX, platoons are certified “mission capable” in all METs by the Commanding General, II MEF based on the recommendation of the Commanding Officer, MCSF Regiment prior to deployment. If a platoon fails to demonstrate proficiency in any area or overall, remedial training and re-certification occurs under the supervision of MCSF Regiment or the gaining OCOUNS FAST Company.²⁵

Once deployed to the geographic area of operations, the certified FAST platoon will attach to a forward-stationed FAST company for employment as rapid response contingency

forces in support of the designated GCC. The GCC exercises either operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of the OCONUS FAST company and the two attached FAST platoons. OPCON and TACON are typically delegated through the Naval Component Commander to the U.S. Fleet Commander. Each OCONUS FAST company is slightly different with regards to current command relationships. As an example, FAST Company, Europe and FAST Company, Central currently have naval task forces as the companies' immediate higher headquarters, while FAST Company, Pacific remains OPCON/TACON to the U.S. 7th Fleet Commander. Regardless of the operational command relationships, MCSF Regiment exercises Title 10 administrative control (ADCON) of all FAST units.²⁶

Contemporary Challenges

The current DON instruction governing the employment of Naval Security Forces, to include FAST, is SECNAVINST 5530.4D. This version, released in 2006, retains many of the regulations and restrictions for employment of FAST units contained in previous versions. Unfortunately, it also still applies a “one-size-fits-all” approach to informing Navy fleet, installation, and component commanders on how FAST should be utilized. Additionally, this instruction has not been updated in more than nine years that have witnessed dramatic changes in the threat environment, modifications to the traditional employment criteria, the emergence of new crisis response capabilities, and a blurring of standard command relationships (COMREL).²⁷

The Navy-pure security forces, such as the former Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadrons (MSRON) and the current Coastal Riverine Squadrons (CRS), are now performing historical FAST contingency missions in support of the fleet commanders. These missions include aircraft security teams (AST), embarked security teams (EST), and boarding parties in

support of visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) operations. FAST platoons are more likely to be employed in support of degrading security situations at national assets, such as embassies and consulates, than in their traditional Navy security role.

This trend has been slowly developing into the standard since the last reorganization of MCSF in 2008. This is especially true in the European Command (EUCOM), Africa Command (AFRICOM), and Central Command (CENTCOM) areas of responsibilities (AOR). In these AORs, the tendency is to view the FAST platoons forward deployed to Rota and Bahrain as more of strategic assets in support of the GCC than the Naval Component Commander or the fleet commander. In practice, the Navy has reverted to a “care and feeding” role, often without realizing the benefit of having the flexibility to employ the FAST in support of Navy security requirements without first asking the GCC to relax the FAST alert. In other words, the FAST platoons *have become strategic assets*, whose alert levels are managed at the combatant command or National Command Authority (NCA) levels. This helps to explain why these platoons are more likely to be employed in support of the Department of State and at the direction of the GCC, Secretary of Defense, or the President.

As previously stated, this trend has not been universal within the FAST program. Specifically, FAST platoons deployed to the Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR in support of the U.S. 7th Fleet tend to execute more historical FAST missions. These platoons remain directly employable by the fleet commander, hence are more likely to embark and deploy aboard the 7th Fleet’s command ship in support of Navy security requirements or training exercises. The justification for the difference of employment criteria is unclear, but the reason may be found more in the nature of the PACOM AOR than in a view of these forces as something less than a strategic asset. Whatever the reasoning for the disparity between the OCONUS FAST

companies employment, it remains that SECNAVINST 5530.4D does not fully articulate the contemporary differences of employment practices for FAST platoons in support of the U.S. 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets.

One justification for the “one-size-fits-all” approach is that SECNAVINST 5530.4D continues to attempt to apply the original FAST employment model circa 1987. At that time all FAST platoons were maintained CONUS, and only deployed at the request of commanders of the U.S. numbered fleets and other echelon two commands, such as naval type commands (surface, air, or submarine) and naval component commands.²⁸ This method continues to work well for CONUS-based missions, for example nuclear RF/DF or in-extremis deployment of the CONUS-based FAST Alert Contingency Platoon (ACP). However, it fails to resolve many of contemporary employment challenges facing the OCONUS FAST units. While not directed by the SECNAVINST, the ACP is typically a post-FDP FAST Platoon assigned from one of the CONUS FAST companies on a rotational basis, and is staged in the Norfolk, VA area on global alert.

FAST and SPMAGTF-CR: Comparison and Contrast

The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) has been for many decades the geographical combatant commander’s force of choice for initial crisis response operations. Employment of these forces within the CENTCOM AOR increased dramatically following the beginning of the Global War on Terror in 2001. At the beginning of this period, the U.S. maintained a continuous MEU presence in EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM AORs. A decrease in amphibious shipping today requires MEU force-sharing actions between EUCOM, AFRICOM, and CENTCOM. One of the Marine Corps’ solutions to continue to provide the GCC with a crisis response capability comes in the form of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force –

Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) which has deployed to, and operated out of, Moron Air Force Base in southern Spain since early 2013. Expeditionary Force 21 outlines plans to forward deploy and maintain similar ashore-based SPMAGTF capability in CENTCOM and PACOM. These SPMAGTFs are not designed to replace a MEU for the purposes of supporting crisis response missions, but merely to provide to the GCC additional employment options of Marine combat forces in-lieu of an available MEU. Typical SPMAGTF-CR composition includes a ground combat element (GCE) constructed around a reinforced infantry company; an aviation combat element (ACE) consisting of a composite squadron of MV-22, C-130, and possibly AV-8B aircraft; a logistics combat element (LCE); and an O-6 level command element (CE). These SPMAGTFs are, or will be, assigned OPCON to the Marine Component Commander under the respective GCC.²⁹

While conceptualized in 2008-2009, the event that prompted the initial deployment of the SPMAGTF-CR based in Spain was the deaths of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Department of State employees at the hands of terrorists in Benghazi, Libya in 2012. Hours after the attack, a FAST platoon was deployed to reinforce the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, Libya. This platoon was replaced by a Marine security force (SECFOR) within three months. When the initial contingent of the SPMAGTF-CR deployed in May 2013, this organization assumed responsibility for the reinforcement mission in Libya and bolstered the crisis response capability for AFRICOM. A cursory analysis would lead to the belief that the SPMAGTF-CR capabilities are redundant to the capabilities of FAST. In truth, the two organizations present *complementary capabilities* that can be applied separately or in conjunction to maximize strengths and minimize shortfalls of each force.

A FAST platoon's chief weakness is a reliance on external agencies or organizations for logistical support to the mission. This refers back to the earlier point about how FAST platoons were originally conceived to present strong combat power relative to size with a minimum logistics tail. As a result, a FAST platoon must typically call upon U.S. Air Force C-130s to support tactical movement to the objective area. Under normal conditions, these air assets are not co-located with the FAST platoons; rather they must be alerted and conduct movement to link-up with the platoon and its equipment. FAST platoons possess no organic explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) or joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) capability. These enablers must also be "bolted on" to the platoon upon employment or at times of increased alert levels. While these procedures are well rehearsed through recent contingency operations, the challenges of aggregating forces in a time restrained environment are at times monumental. Additionally, due to the various sources of support (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and the accompanying supporting relationships, achieving unity of command for critical decisions at employment will usually not be achieved below the GCC level. Add to these issues the fact that terminal logistics, specifically mobility from the point of debarkation to the objective of a FAST platoon, must be provided by the agency receiving the security support. In most contemporary situations of embassy reinforcement this is the Department of State country team. Advance engagement with the country team is essential for the successful coordination of the arrival of the platoon. The above challenges are some of the reasons why it is more problematic to employ a FAST platoon during a crisis as opposed to employment prior to the crisis as a preventive measure.

The strength of a FAST platoon is centered on the *defensive capability* of the unit once in position. The skills and cohesion forged during a nine month pre-deployment training program enable the unit to place a proverbial 'ring of steel' around an asset. Additionally, the FAST

platoon brings an organic capability to defend against a full spectrum of threats from protests using non-lethal weapons and tactics to precision target engagement to light anti-armor/anti-vehicle threat defense. The platoon arrives with all of these capabilities intact. So while it is more difficult to insert, once at an objective the FAST platoon is capable of functioning in a less intrusive manner than other crisis and rapid response forces because of the absence of the requirement to continue the flow of follow-on resources in order to build capacity and capability.

SPMATGF-CR forces provide a GCC with a long-range and rapidly deployable force of combat trained Marines in support of a range of military operations, including embassy reinforcement. The fundamental strength of SPMAGTF-CR is the ability to place these Marines literally on top of an objective utilizing the MV-22 Osprey and then have an immediate positive impact on a situation that could still be on-going at the time of employment. The organization is designed to prevent another Benghazi-like event. However, once these Marines have been inserted there exists the very real possibility of having to continue to flow in material and equipment to establish a more permanent presence. In some diplomatic environments these follow-on actions could prove problematic for the country team to coordinate and obtain approval to conduct. Additionally, due to the vast distances from friendly bases to some of the possible objectives, these land-based SPMAGTFs cannot complete follow-on movements as well as a MEU utilizing the sea as maneuver space. The follow-on flow to increase required capability is feasible, but requires greater effort and time; hence, this would leave a lightly armed and equipped initial response element exposed to greater risk on the objective. Finally, once these crisis response forces are committed to one or two specific objectives, potential gaps are opened, and shortfalls created, for responses to another developing situation.

Conclusion: A Recommended Way Ahead

Marine Corps Security Forces have undergone four major re-organizations since the pivotal decision by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman to completely overhaul the Navy's physical security and antiterrorism programs in 1986. The structural changes over the decades have primarily been restricted to the company level and above, leaving the basic structure of the individual FAST platoon virtually unchanged as evident by Appendix D of this paper. The consistency of the platoon table of organization lends credit to the FAST model. FAST platoons have been, and will continue to be, successful upon employment because of all of the points previously discussed. However, changes to the contemporary threat, current employment tendencies, and the maturation of other Navy Security Forces lead to a significant conclusion: it is now time for another reorganization of MCSF and an update to the instructions and orders that govern FAST employment. Additionally, serious consideration must be given to the current operational and tactical command relationships of the OCONUS FAST companies to better support the geographic combatant commanders.

The pathway of MCSF from dispersed barracks, companies, and detachments into the current regimental structure has resulted in a significant gap in the Title 10 administrative chain of command. The commanding officer of MCSF Regiment exercises command authority over two battalion-level commands, MCSF Battalions at King's Bay, Georgia and Bangor, Washington, and nine independent company-level commands spread across the globe. The mantra that "the sun never sets on MCSF Regiment" certainly is true considering the disposition of its forces. Compounding the challenges, the Regiment must accomplish two very distinct missions – strategic weapons security and FAST rapid response antiterrorism security support. The addition of a battalion-level command structure, a *FAST Battalion*, to lead and coordinate the actions of the FAST companies, both CONUS and OCONUS, is warranted. Such an

organization would complement the structure at Bangor and King's Bay, and would free up the Regimental Commander and his staff to focus on applicable refinements. Key areas that could be addressed would be the training and certification program, and an increase of engagements with key agencies and headquarters with the goal of advocating on behalf of both missions without being constantly pulled into the minutiae of the day-to-day FAST company operations. An organizational chart incorporating the proposed structure modifications is contained in Appendix G.

Secondly, the Department of the Navy must update SECNAVINST 5530 with the goal of making it more applicable to contemporary organizations and employment models. The current version pre-dates the most recent reorganization of MCSF and fails to place enough weight on the importance of the current role played by other NSF, such as the Coastal Riverine Squadrons, in support of the fleet and installation commanders. This revised document must draw a distinction between CONUS-based and OCONUS-based FAST units. Such a revision must also attempt to capture and resolve many of the current challenges involved in the employment of these forces.

With the development of a FAST Battalion, the DON could return to the concept of a rapidly deployable, CONUS-based FAST organization whose purpose would be to support Navy-pure mission sets. Included in this category would be nuclear RF/DF missions, rapid augmentation of an installation's security force, Navy-centric theater security cooperation, and contingency operations exceeding the capabilities of the Navy's expeditionary security organizations. In the case of required support to Naval Installations and Activities, CONUS based FAST elements could be a *bridging force* to span the divide between the surge capabilities of the installation's security and auxiliary forces, and the deployment of additional security

forces from CONUS-based Navy Reserves. The FAST Battalion would be the coordinating unit for these support requests, and could easily maintain alert levels, certification, and sustainment training of platoons providing support. More importantly, a battalion structure would ensure consistency of training in support of Navy mission sets, and increase proficiency of the Navy-pure platoons through more tailored and specific training programs.

The OCONUS-based FAST Companies in Spain, Bahrain, and Japan should have their command relationships modified to place them OPCON to the Marine Component Commander. Such a change would dramatically improve the employment options for the GCC and eliminate virtually all unity of command issues. FAST could then fall within the GCE of a SPMAGTF or remain a stand-alone rapid response force under the Marine Component Commander. The shortfalls of FAST in the areas of logistics, movement/mobility, and enabler support could be resolved from within the SPMAGTF or the Marine Component. The GCC could more easily incorporate FAST in the range of response options for a given situation. Whether used as a proactive option based on indicators and warnings, as a complementing or reinforcing force to a SPMAGTF-CR or MEU element, or as a bridging force for follow-on security options, FAST operational planning and employment would be vastly more responsive when combined with other crisis response forces under the Marine Component. Finally, since the OCONUS FAST company headquarters are permanently assigned within the GCC AOR, there exists a greater continuity of resident understanding about AOR that would improve the collective knowledge of deploying SPMAGTFs.

Understanding the history of an organization will guide informed decisions about future capability and capacity. FAST platoons have evolved into a strategic asset that is viewed at the highest levels of our military command structure as a professional and reliable organization.

This reputation comes from strong unit identity and cohesion, a solid and time tested employment model, and nearly three decades of successes during a multitude of no-fail missions. FAST platoons do not need to be dropped on top of an objective from an MV-22. FAST platoons do not need the latest version of the Interim Fast Attack Vehicle. What is required is something that has occurred numerous times since the inception of the program – a comprehensive review of the guiding instructions, command relationships, and command structure.

Endnotes

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- ¹ U.S. Department of the Navy. *Marine Corps Security Force (MCSF) Barracks and Detachments Ashore and Afloat*. Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5530.4, August 13, 1981, para. 3.
- ² SECNAVINST 5530.4, August 13, 1981.
- ³ G. K. Hamilton, Assistant for Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy. Memorandum for Distribution, “CNO Executive Board Decision Memorandum on Navy Anti-Terrorism Program.” 6 March 1986.
- ⁴ RADM Cathal L. Flynn, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy. Memorandum for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, “SECNAV Comments on Physical Security / Antiterrorism Force Brief.” 9 April 1986.
- ⁵ John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, Department of the Navy. Memorandum to Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Physical Security.” 5 June 1986.
- ⁶ U.S. Secretary of the Navy. *Physical Security*, ALNAV 011/87, 20 January 1987.
- ⁷ ALNAV 011/87, 20 January 1987, para. A and B.
- ⁸ ALNAV 011/87, 20 January 1987, para. F.
- ⁹ Commandant of the Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Security Forces Reorganization*. Letter of Instruction 5530, 13 February 1987.
- ¹⁰ Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. “Marine Corps Security Force Battalion, Pacific Command Chronology for period 31 July 1987 to 31 December 1987.” 27 January 1988.
- ¹¹ U.S. Department of the Navy. *Naval Security Forces Ashore and Afloat*. Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5530.4A, March 25, 1988, encl. 2.
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- ¹⁴ George H. W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons.” Delivered 27 September 1991. Archives, George Bush Presidential Library. Accessed January 11, 2015.
- ¹⁵ Commandant of the Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Security Force Restructuring*. Letter of Instruction 5530, 11 December 1992.
- ¹⁶ Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. “Marine Corps Security Force Battalion, Pacific Final Command Chronology for period 1 January 1993 to 2 August 1993.” 21 July 1993.
- ¹⁷ Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. “Marine Corps Security Force Battalion Command Chronology for period 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1994.” No release date.
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- ²⁰ Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. “Marine Corps Security Force Battalion Command Chronology for period 1 January 1998 to 31 December 1998.” 28 January 1999.
- ²¹ Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. “Marine Corps Security Force Regiment Command Chronology for period 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2008.” No release date.
- ²² Colonel James Bright, Command Brief, 20 August 2014.
- ²³ Colonel James Bright, “Marine Corps Security Force Regiment Command Brief.” PowerPoint presentation. Headquarters, Marine Corps Security Force Regiment, Yorktown, Virginia, 20 August 2014.
- ²⁴ Bright, Command Brief, 20 August 2014.
- ²⁵ Bright, Command Brief, 20 August 2014.
- ²⁶ Bright, Command Brief, 20 August 2014.
- ²⁷ U.S. Department of the Navy. *Naval Security Force Employment and Operations*. Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5530.4D, October 3, 2006.

²⁸ U.S. Department of the Navy. *Naval Security Forces Ashore and Afloat*. Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5530.4A, March 25, 1988.

²⁹ Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, *Expeditionary Force 21*. EF 21. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 4 March 2014.

Appendix A

Timeline

- February 1986: The CNO Executive Board convenes to discuss the status, and proposed restructuring, of the Navy's antiterrorism program.
- April 1986: SECNAV John Lehman assigns the Marine Corps as the lead agency for antiterrorism program development, and directed a "top-down, free-form" look at the current structure of Naval Security Forces.
- June 1986: SECNAV Lehman directed "a total reorganization of the existing DON security structure, training, and manning."
- September 1986: SECNAV Lehman approves the general concept for the reorganization.
- January 1987: ALNAV 011/87 is released.
- February 1987: Commandant of the Marine Corps releases CMC Letter of Instruction 5530 confirming the USMC plan to support the reorganization.
- July 1987: Marine Corps Security Force Battalions, Atlantic and Pacific are activated per ALNAV 011/87.
- March 1988: Department of the Navy releases SECNAVINST 5530.4A; codifying the reorganization and future employment of Naval Security Forces.
- September 1991: President George H. W. Bush highlights a plan for sweeping changes to the nation's nuclear weapons program. His action would remove all nuclear weapons from Navy surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft.
- December 1992: Updated CMC Letter of Instruction released directing a reduction in Marine Corps Security Forces.
- August 1993: MCSF Battalion, Pacific is disestablished; MCSF Battalion, Atlantic is re-designated as MCSF Battalion with only one assigned FAST Company.
- May 1997: Marine Corps Security Forces re-organized. Marine training cadres no longer permanently assigned to installations, aircraft carrier detachments disestablished, and a second FAST company is formed in Norfolk, VA.
- 1998: FAST Platoons begin to implement the FAST Deployment Program (FDP).
- April 2008: MCSF Battalion re-designated Marine Corps Security Force Regiment. MCSF Company, Europe and Central re-designated FAST Company, Europe (FASTEUR) and FAST Company, Central (FASTCENT), respectively.

Appendix B

Definition of Terms

1. **Administrative Control (ADCON).** Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. [JP 1-02]
2. **Antiterrorism.** Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. [JP 1-02]
3. **Combatant Command (COCOM).** Nontransferable command authority established by Title 10, United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). [JP 1-02]
4. **Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST).** An antiterrorism team composed of armed Marines task organized and equipped to perform specified security missions in support of naval installations, ships, aircraft, or personnel. [SECNAVINST 5530.4D]
5. **Installation.** A grouping of facilities, located in the same vicinity, which support particular functions. Installations may be elements of a base. [JP 1-02]
6. **Naval Security Force.** Security forces composed of Navy Security Forces, Marine Corps Security Forces, and armed Navy civilians who provide security for naval installations, vessels, and aircraft. [SECNAVINST 5530.4D]
7. **Navy Security Forces (NSF), Ashore and Afloat.** Armed Navy personnel assigned to law enforcement and security duties involving the use of deadly force to protect Navy personnel and resources. These personnel may also be reservists assigned to Naval Reserve Force Protection/Law Enforcement and Physical Security Units (NR FP/LEPSU). [SECNAVINST 5530.4D]

8. **Operational Control (OPCON).** Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense.

Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. [JP 1-02]

9. **Physical Security.** That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, materiel, and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. [JP 1-02]

10. **Refueling/Defueling Security.** Security tailored for nuclear refueling/defueling operations. [SECNAVINST 5530.4D]

11. **Tactical Control (TACON).** Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. [JP 1-02]


Appendix C

Acronyms

AFRICOM	Africa Command
ALMAR	All Marine Message
ALNAV	All Navy Message
AOR	Area of Responsibility
BSG	Basic Security Guard
CEB	Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Executive Board
CENTCOM	Central Command
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps
COMREL	Command Relationships
CONUS	Continental United States
CQB	Close Quarters Battle
DM	Designated Marksman
DON	Department of the Navy
EF21	Expeditionary Force 21
EUCOM	European Command
FAST	Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team
FDP	FAST Deployment Program
GCC	Geographic Combatant Commander
HRST	Helicopter Rope Suspension Training
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MET	Mission Essential Task
MCSF	Marine Corps Security Forces
MOUT	Military Operations in Urban Terrain
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MPS	Maritime Prepositioning Ship
MSAU	Marine Security Augmentation Unit
MSG	Marine Security Guard
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NSF	Naval Security Forces
OCONUS	Outside the Continental United States
PTDO	Prepare To Deploy Order
PTP	Pre-deployment Training Plan
RF/DF	Refuel/Defuel
SAW	Squad Automatic Weapon
SECNAV	Secretary of the Navy
SECNAVINST	Secretary of the Navy Instruction
SMAW	Shoulder launched, multi-purpose assault weapon
SPMAGTF-CR	Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force – Crisis Response
TSC	Theater Security Cooperation
VBSS	Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure
VOCO	Verbal Order of the Commanding Officer

Appendix D

1st FAST Company Organization circa 1987




Source: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. "Marine Corps Security Force Battalion, Atlantic Command Chronology for period 1 January 1987 to 30 June 1987." 26 August 1987.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of officers and enlisted Marines.

Appendix E

FAST Platoon Organization circa 2015




Source: Captain Adam Drexler, “FAST Company, Europe Command History.” PowerPoint presentation. Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team Company, Europe, Rota Naval Station, Rota, Spain, 14 August 2014

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of officers and enlisted Marines.

Appendix F


MCSF Regiment Organization circa 2015



Source: Colonel James Bright, “Marine Corps Security Force Regiment Command Brief.” PowerPoint presentation. Headquarters, Marine Corps Security Force Regiment, Yorktown, Virginia, 20 August 2014.


Appendix G

Proposed MCSF Regiment Organization (with Creation of FAST Battalion)



Author's note: MCSF Co, Guantanamo could remain ADCON to MCSF Regiment, or potentially placed ADCON to the newly created *FAST Battalion*.


Appendix H
FAST Command Relationships circa 2015



Source: Colonel James Bright, “Marine Corps Security Force Regiment Command Brief.” PowerPoint presentation. Headquarters, Marine Corps Security Force Regiment, Yorktown, Virginia, 20 August 2014.

Appendix I

Proposed OCONUS FAST Command Relationships



Author's note: The structure depicted for *FAST Battalion* does not currently exist.

Bibliography

- Anonymous. "MCSF Update." *Marine Corps Gazette*, 82,2 (Feb 1998): pg 6.

This article reports the details of *ALMAR 24/98*. Specifically, the article describes the changes to Marine Corps Security Forces. These changes impact ships' detachments, the creation of a second Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) Company, the creation of a MCSF Cadre, and planned manpower cuts as a result of Quadrennial Defense Review.

- Anonymous. "Security Forces To Be Realigned." *Marine Corps Gazette*, 71, 3 (Mar 1987): pg 6.

This article announces the realignment of Navy and Marine Corps security forces as directed by the Secretary of the Navy. The major changes include the increase in Marine involvement in security operations at installations around the globe. It also addresses the creation of (2) MCSF Battalions and one Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team Company within each battalion. Also note here is information stating that a new SECNAVINST will be released providing information and guidance for the realignment.

- Bright, Colonel James, "Marine Corps Security Force Regiment Command Brief." PowerPoint presentation. Headquarters, Marine Corps Security Force Regiment, Yorktown, Virginia, 20 August 2014.

This is a contemporary unclassified command brief for MCSF Regiment. A copy of this presentation is in author's possession.

- Bright, Colonel James (Commanding Officer, MCSF Regiment), interview by Major Gary L. Cobb, 9 December 2014.

Notes of this interview are in the author's possession.

- Bush, George H. W. "Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons." Delivered 27 September 1991. Archives, George Bush Presidential Library. Accessed January 11, 2015. <http://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/3438>

Speech given by President George H. W. Bush on 27 September 1991 detailing the U.S. plans to unilaterally begin the reduction on tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, and plans to down-grade U.S. nuclear forces alert levels in response to the end of the Cold War. This speech conveyed future policy for DON, and directly led to a re-organization of MCSF in 1993.

- Commandant of the Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Security Forces Reorganization*. Letter of Instruction 5530, 13 February 1987. Archives and Special Collection Branch, Library of the Marine Corps.

This is the CMC Letter of Instruction which outlined the restructuring of Marine Corps Security Forces (MCSF) in support of the DON's total reorganization of the physical security / antiterrorism program. Released less than a month following the release of ALNAV 011/87, this

LOI details the initial steps in the transition of MCSF from dispersed Marine barracks and ship's detachments to the MCSF Battalion structure.

- Commandant of the Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Security Forces Reorganization*. Letter of Instruction 5530, 27 February 1987. Archives and Special Collection Branch, Library of the Marine Corps.

Follow-up to the original CMC LOI 5530. This 27 February version deals primarily with the establishment of MCSF Battalion, Pacific.

- Commandant of the Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Security Force Restructuring*. Letter of Instruction 5530, 11 December 1992. Archives and Special Collection Branch, Library of the Marine Corps.

CMC Letter of Instruction details the restricting of MCSF following the nuclear posture reductions at the conclusion of the Cold War. Specifically, this LOI eliminates MCSF Battalion, Pacific and moves all administrative functions under a single MCSF Battalion in Norfolk, Virginia.

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