

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

*Form Approved*  
*OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 01-05-2015		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Master of Military Studies Research Paper		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> September 2014 - May 2015	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Temperament: Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Capabilities Pertinent to the Interests within the East and South China Seas				<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b> N/A	
				<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b> N/A	
				<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b> N/A	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Crim, Jr. Keith S. Major, USMC				<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b> N/A	
				<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b> N/A	
				<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b> N/A	
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068				<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b> N/A	
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> N/A				<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b> N/A	
				<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b> N/A	
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b> N/A					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> Chinese leadership can be linked to a specific temperament and that temperament gives characteristics that can be interpreted to understand intentions. Dr. David Keirse's Temperament Model is used as a foundation to show the change of temperaments of Chinese leaders and how they are associated with decisions regarding interests in the East and South China Seas via a modernized military. Chinese leadership is focused on being regarded as a great power nation, one that can grow and prosper like the United States. It seeks to control the East and South China Seas to provide a layered defense while also controlling the resources within the ocean floors.					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Temperament, Chinese Foreign Policy, Mao Zedong, Xi Jinping, East China Sea, South China Sea, David Keirse					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> UU	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 44	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b> Marine Corps University/Command and Staff College
<b>a. REPORT</b> Unclass	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> Unclass	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> Unclass			<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)</b> (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

United States Marine Corps  
Command and Staff College  
Marine Corps University  
2076 South Street  
Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

---

---

**TITLE:** Temperament: Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Capabilities Pertinent to the Interests within the East and South China Seas

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**AUTHOR:**

Major Keith S. Crim Jr.

AY 14-15

---

---

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr Rebecca Johnson

Approved: [Signature]

Date: 28 April 2015

Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr Tanya Joyner

Approved: [Signature]

Date: 28 April 2015

## Executive Summary

**Title:** Temperament: Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Capabilities Pertinent to the Interests within the East and South China Seas

**Author:** Major Keith S. Crim Jr., United States Marine Corps

**Thesis:** The current Chinese leader, acting on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has a rational temperament and his interests in the East and South China Seas will be enforced by a modernized military capable of projecting power beyond China's littorals.

**Discussion:** Through analysis, a person can be linked to a certain temperament and having the knowledge of a person's temperament increases the probability of assessing how that person may act when exposed or confronted with specific situations. The focus of this study will be on the assessed temperaments (Idealist, Guardian, Rational, Artisan) of two distinct Chinese leaders, Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping. It is important to note that a person's temperament today may be different tomorrow and are dependent upon multiple variables. These temperaments serve to be indicators of the means most commonly employed to achieve foreign policy objectives in the East and South China Seas via a modernized military. Understanding the current and evolutionary changes of Chinese foreign policy objectives reduces the uncertainty of Chinese current intentions. Lastly, having an understanding of the military capabilities and how China may use them to enforce its foreign policy objectives demonstrate that it is capable of projecting power beyond its littorals. Therefore, by understanding the Chinese leader's temperament, outside analysts can gain a better understanding on "why" China seeks to expand beyond its continental borders, how it will likely go about it, and what end it seeks to achieve.

A Chinese leader's temperament leads to the decisions he will make regarding foreign policy and how he will develop and use his military instrument of power to satisfy those objectives. This paper analyzes three key areas: Temperaments of Chinese leaders, Chinese foreign policy, and Chinese military modernization and ends with an assessment on how China will use its military in the East and South China Seas. The temperament of Chinese leadership has changed over the years, and this change can be linked to the form of government being used to run this nation. The rational temperament is seen today in China's analytical approach to its economic ventures which are intended to better China as a country while positioning itself as a great power internationally.

Chinese interest in the East and South China Seas is to provide security to a booming economy and immediate access to resources that it will eventually need. China attempts to justify an extended EEZ and ADZ under its interpretation of international law. Chinese military modernization is credible but will only produce limited capabilities in the near future. China realizes that in order to be regarded as a great power it has to have a modernized military to defend and deter an adversary. An advanced elite military requires training and coordination. Therefore, they may have an enhanced capability, but it will take time to be proficient before they can conduct a coordinated and projected attack beyond its littorals.

**Conclusion:** Chinese leadership can be linked to a specific temperament and that temperament gives characteristics that can be interpreted to understand intentions. China seeks to become regarded as a great power nation, one that can grow and prosper like the United States. It seeks to control the East and South China Seas to provide a layered defense while also controlling the resources within the ocean floors.

## DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

## *Tables*

	Page
Table 1. <i>Keirsey's Temperament Sorter</i> .....	3
Table 2. <i>Personality Types</i> .....	4
Table 3. <i>Temperaments Defined by Personality Test</i> .....	4

*Table of Contents*

	Page
TITLE PAGE .....	i
DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER REPORT DOCUMENTATION .....	ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	iii
DISCLAIMER .....	iv
LIST OF TABLES .....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
PREFACE .....	vii
INTRODUCTION .....	1
BACKGROUND .....	2
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY .....	6
CHINA’S INTEREST IN THE EAST AND SOUTH CHINA SEAS .....	14
CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION.....	18
CONCLUSION.....	22
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	28

## *Preface*

I chose to write on the temperaments of the Chinese leadership to gain a better perspective on Chinese intentions and capabilities. As a rapidly growing nation with our focus shifting to the Pacific, I felt obligated to learn more about the leadership, military capabilities, and the issues in the East and South China Seas. To add, I found the classes in the beginning of this semester to be very interesting, especially the one covering temperament theory by Dr. David Keirsey. With an understanding of past Chinese leaders and through analysis, I was able to determine the temperament of those leaders. Further analysis of Chinese leadership today consisting of Xi Jinping also resulted in a temperament, which lends to indicators on why and how the country will satisfy its foreign policy objectives.

I would like to thank my wife, Dawn for her patience and understanding throughout this tedious process. Without her sanity and ability to drive the household ship, this would not have been possible. I would like to apologize to my kids for my mental absence during a good portion of this academic year, while I pursued the accomplishment of this paper. For my family, I love you and could have not done this without you.

I would also like to thank my Civilian Faculty Advisor, Dr. Rebecca Johnson, for her keen attention to detail and timely constructive feedback. In addition, I would like to thank my Military Faculty Advisor, LtCol Brian Ross, who throughout the academic year provided sage counsel that kept me focused and motivated in accomplishing this quest along with the other academic requirements of Command and Staff College. Lastly, I would like to thank the faculty and staff of Marine Corps University to include the Gray Research Center for providing an environment loaded with resources that have facilitated my accomplishment of this paper.

## **Introduction**

Every human being has a temperament and by understanding a specific person's temperament, one can increase the probability in understanding his or hers intentions, which lead to their actions. The President of China has a specific temperament<sup>1</sup> and the decisions he makes on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are reflected in Chinese foreign policy. This is seen in how he employs its military within the East and South China Seas. Understanding that the communist party makes the decisions for the State, the President aka General Secretary, acts as the voice and face of the party. However, the President holds more power than one might think, and his temperament gives indications on what he or the party's actual intentions are on a given issue, like the East and South China Sea.

As the United States broadcasts its focus toward the Pacific, it is important for all American citizens to understand the reasons why. With these objectives out in the open, people need to understand the environment to include the military and political intentions of those nations that are located in the Pacific. This is especially important for competing nations that don't share the same intentions. China has an extremely fast growing economy; with such growth comes the need for expansion in order to support the requirements of its people. This expansion includes territory and natural resources. To further complicate China's growth, its military modernization and unsanctioned claims in the East and South China Seas brings concern from neighboring countries and the United States.

Chinese interests in the East and South China Seas have grown steadily as seen through the changes in government and military modernization. This research will identify the systematic changes in the temperament of Chinese leadership and why it seeks to have control over the entire East and South China Seas via a modernized military. By the end of this paper, it

will be clear that the current Chinese leader, acting on behalf of the CCP, has a rational temperament and his interests in the East and South China Sea will be enforced by a modernized military capable of projecting power beyond their littorals.

It is crucial to understand the four temperaments as defined by David Keirse prior to assessing a specific person's intentions. This paper will define these four temperaments and apply them in relation to China's past and current leadership. As a sample for this study that will show two different temperaments in Chinese leadership, Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping will be the focus of this paper. More specifically, this paper will elaborate on how these two leaders shaped Chinese foreign policy. In addition, this paper will break down the current situation causing concern throughout the region and the United States regarding sovereignty over the East and South China Seas. When evaluating a country's intention with regard to its use of military force, it is important to define its capabilities. Therefore and lastly, a look into China's capabilities with regards to defending its claims in these unsanctioned areas will show that it has limited capability to do so; however, intentions will be more benign.

## **Background**

People are born with a defined temperament, which interact with experience, culture, and personal beliefs to shape their decisions. Inherent in all people are unconditioned responses, like salivation at the smell of food.<sup>2</sup> An unconditioned response can be turned into a conditioned response by associating another stimuli with the food. By this principle, after repetitive pairing of the two stimuli (new and food), the food can be taken out of the equation and the new stimuli will provoke the same response, as did the food. Now this is referred to as a conditioned response.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, a person's temperament can be shaped by their repetitive experiences. Daily interactions with the same group will establish a culture and have shared beliefs that can be

tied into a specific temperament. Dr. David Keirsey, a psychologist best known for his creation of the Keirsey temperament sorter, defines four types of temperaments: Idealist, Guardian, Rational, and Artisan.<sup>4</sup>

**Table 1.** Keirsey Temperament Sorter:<sup>5</sup>

	use Abstract words (ideas)	use Concrete words (facts)
Do what is 'Right'	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Idealist</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- value meaning, integrity &amp; involvement</li> <li>- have diplomatic talents</li> <li>- seek harmony, self- and other-improvement</li> <li>- express themselves enthusiastically</li> <li>- need meaningful work</li> <li>- 'see the best in everyone'</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Guardian</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- value experience, security, responsibility, authority</li> <li>- have logistical talents</li> <li>- seek increased responsibility</li> <li>- express themselves earnestly, observe traditions &amp; rules</li> <li>- need stable &amp; familiar work patterns</li> <li>- 'mind the store'</li> </ul>
Do what works	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Rational</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- value knowledge, reason &amp; achievement</li> <li>- have strategic talents</li> <li>- seek roles investigating &amp; improving systems</li> <li>- express themselves calmly, follow a logical approach</li> <li>- need independence in working</li> <li>- 'think outside the box'</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Artisan</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- value potency, generosity, creativity &amp; adaptability</li> <li>- have tactical talents</li> <li>- seek variety, stimulation, adventure, skill-honing</li> <li>- express themselves excitedly, make deals, take risks</li> <li>- need freedom to act on impulse</li> <li>- 'just do it'</li> </ul>

Understanding a person's temperament enables a high probability of predicting what that person will do when exposed to certain types of situations. This becomes important as different world leaders seek to understand each other and their intentions. In most countries, the President or Prime Minister will make decisions on behalf of their country. Therefore, having gained an understanding of that person's temperament enables another country's leadership to assess his or her country's intentions. This is seen today in how China responds to foreign vessels that are operating in close proximity of the Senkaku and Spratly Island chains. A cause and effect perspective shows that when a foreign vessel enters these areas, China responds by sending one of its own ships to deter any further action/occupation.

Personality traits and characteristics are found in each person’s temperament. A quick run-down on these characteristics will give a foundation for how they are linked. Isabel Myers teamed up with her mother, Kathryn Briggs, to develop a personality test that would indicate a personality type of the person taking the test.<sup>6</sup> Known as the “Myers-Briggs Type Indicator” or MBTI identifies a person’s attitude within sixteen patterns of action.<sup>7</sup> A person’s personality type is identified by a combination of the following eight letters:

**Table 2.** Personality Types.<sup>8</sup>

E = Expressive	or	I = Reserved
S = Observant	or	N = Introspective
T = Tough-minded	or	F = Friendly
J = Scheduling	or	P = Probing

Throughout the testing process, four of these characteristics are linked together which give a person their personality type. These personality types are then defined by Keirse to fall within one of his four temperaments. These personality types are categorized into the following four temperaments:

**Table 3:** Temperaments Defined by Personality Test.<sup>9</sup>

Idealist:	Guardian:
ENFJ: Teacher	ESTJ: Supervisor
INFJ: Counselor	ISTJ: Inspector
ENFP: Champion	ESFJ: Provided
INFP: Healer	ISFJ: Protector
Rational:	Artisans:
ENTJ: Field marshal	ESTP: Promoter
INTJ: Mastermind	ISTP: Crafter
ENTP: Inventor	ESFP: Performer
INTP: Architect	ISFP: Composer

When assessing a person’s temperament, multiple variables need to be taken into consideration. In order to determine a person’s temperament, the majority of characteristics that fall within one of the temperaments will be used as the defining temperament of that individual.

In addition, it is important to note that a person's temperament may be different today than yesterday and it is through repetitive analysis over time that will eventually lead to a specific temperament for a person. Therefore, the more time one has to study a person will result in a higher probability in accurately assessing that person's temperament.

The first temperament defined by Keirsey is Guardian and a person with this temperament is considered the cornerstone of society due to their strict adherence to rules and laws. This temperament is seen in about 40 to 45 percent of the population.<sup>10</sup> Guardians according to Dr. Stephen Montgomery, author of the book *People Patterns*, states that people who fall under this temperament, focus on what they can keep an eye on and take care of.<sup>11</sup> They pride themselves on being trustworthy and dependable. They are the person who is often sought to get something done and leaves the supervisor with a sense of ease. A high number of people serving in the United States military are assessed to have a Guardian temperament. They are part of a group and pride themselves on being loyal to the institution, focused on traditions while seeking security and justice for all.<sup>12</sup>

Three former presidents of the United States are considered to have possessed a Guardian temperament: George Washington, William Howard Taft, and Harry S. Truman.<sup>13</sup>

*"To be prepared for war is one of most effectual means of preserving peace."*

*"I hope I shall always possess firmness and virtue enough to maintain what I consider the most enviable titles the character of an "Honest Man."<sup>14</sup>*

George Washington

Of the following quote, George Washington uses words like "prepare for war," which can be linked to that of a protector. He also refers to preserving peace and this can be linked to both protector and provider. His second quote highlights "firmness and virtue" along with "honest man." These phrases can be linked to all four-personality types (supervisor, inspector, provider,

and protector), which make up the Guardian Temperament.<sup>15</sup> Of these leaders, all three men achieved the highest position of authority in the United States. Their conviction to do what is right in the name of the people and for the better of the people they represent, are a characteristic of the Guardian temperament.

A leader with a Guardian temperament can be viewed in a person who seeks foreign policy objects in such a manner as to protect, provide, inspect, and supervise<sup>16</sup> the interests of the country they represent. These foreign policy objectives could also fall under the realm of providing a country with a resource it requires. A Guardian temperament can be associated with decisions that involve holding countries accountable for their actions, such as the inspection of uranium enrichment operations. Lastly, a Guardian temperament can be observed in supervisory actions, such as the employment of theater and national collection assets that supervise actions taking place in areas of interest.

Guardians are adept in recalling factual data such as names, birthdates, and ages of people they meet and interact with.<sup>17</sup> This ability thrusts them into positions where the recalling of encyclopedic information is necessary or beneficial to the organization they belong to.

The next temperament of Artisan, unlike Guardian, disregards rules in order to achieve results. The temperament of Artisan identifies a person as being fun loving, bold, and a troubleshooting leader.<sup>18</sup> The following U.S. leaders were considered to have had an Artisan temperament: Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan. The following quote by John F. Kennedy is stated in such a manner to follow the temperament of a true Artisan.

*“ We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win.”<sup>19</sup>*

John F. Kennedy

President Kennedy's quote clearly identifies the characteristics of an Artisan and highlight the importance of the U.S. to seek and complete objectives that are hard and separate from other nations and their foreign policy objectives. Here, he crafts a motivational speech that promotes the U.S. as a step above other nations. In his delivery, he performs or communicates his message with conviction and confidence that not only motivates his allies, but also concerns his rivals.

Artisans bring color to bland, light to dark and warm to cold. They bring flavor and excitement to everyday life. However, Artisans do not focus on the possible ramifications of their actions, which in-turn can have devastating second and third order effects. To balance out the temperament of an Artisan, a Rational temperament comes to mind.

The Rational temperament constitutes problem solvers with a thirst for knowledge.<sup>20</sup> This temperament not only fixes problems but also seeks to understand the root causes of the deficiency and fix the issue in its entirety. Some Rational temperament leaders in the U.S. presidencies are as follows: Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Dwight D. Eisenhower.<sup>21</sup> The following quote is from Thomas Jefferson: "Error of opinion maybe tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." Here, Thomas Jefferson seeks rational solutions to solve a problem while allowing the opinions of others to contribute input. Though a Rational temperament gets results, the decisions made by that person could cause a fissure between another person who does not pose the same rational temperament.

The Rational temperament brings to light the following personality characteristics: architect, inventor, mastermind, and Field marshal.<sup>22</sup> Chinese foreign policy objectives can be seen to possess these characteristics as the country pursues its interests in the East and South China Seas. It is seeking ways to achieve its end state by developing a plan that does not trigger

an unfavorable outcome. China is inventing technologies with regards to its military capabilities that enable it to indigenously produce platforms that are capable of projecting power beyond its littorals. Therefore, making it less dependable on other nations, being somewhat less transparent while it masterminds a plan to achieve expansion both politically and militarily. More will be covered on Chinese foreign policy in that section of this paper.

The Idealist temperament is demonstrated in an enthusiastic demeanor that is trusting and persistent in bringing out the best in people, exploiting their potential.<sup>23</sup> Idealists hold themselves to a standard and if they do not achieve a goal they will be very hard on themselves. The Idealist temperament is rare; only about 15-20% of the population is categorized with this temperament.<sup>24</sup> Two famous people in U.S. history to either have had or are considered to possess the Idealist temperament are Alexander Hamilton (champion) and Oprah Winfrey (teacher).<sup>25</sup>

With such a low percentage of the population being assessed to have this temperament, it is very difficult to associate a political leader who possesses it. However, Mao Zedong does give similarities in his actions that are consistent with the characteristics of an idealist. Without going into too much detail here, all four-personality characteristics (healer, champion, counselor, and teacher) can be found throughout Mao's tenure as he transformed a nationalist society into a Communist one, known as the Cultural Revolution.<sup>26</sup> More will also be covered on this temperament style and Mao's foreign policy objectives later in this paper.

Understanding the temperaments is the easy part; more complex is the analysis in determining a person's temperament. Personality tests are rampant on the World Wide Web (WWW) and tests like the Meyer's-Briggs test is even given in Keirsey's book, *Please Understand Me II*. However, these have to be done by the individual, and not everyone is

determined to find out what his or her temperament is. So, like this study, doing research on a person and finding out as much as possible is the key. A lot of information is available on the Internet and within libraries. Intelligence agencies are another source, but are restricted to authorized individuals. So, in most cases, triangulating open source data will yield the data needed to identify characteristics consistent with one of the four temperaments.

Everyone demonstrates an affinity toward one of the temperaments -- Guardian, Rational, Idealist, and Artisan. Knowing a person's temperament will give indications on what the decisions he or she might make in a given situation. In particular, U.S. Presidents can be categorized with one of these temperaments and the same can be done with foreign country leaders of today, which provides insight into their possible actions. Temperaments obviously do not dictate a specific behavior, but they flavor how leaders approach choices as well as the types of choices they make, and so provide analytical utility. Today, China has erupted into a global economy and has established relations throughout the world. This characteristic is consistent with the temperament of a rational and is evident in its pragmatic endless pursuit to maintain power and prosperity.<sup>27</sup> China's days of isolationism have come to an end and its focus on modernization has come to the forefront. With a rational temperament, it is easy to see the Chinese as displaying pride in them selves while remaining independent and strong willed in achieving their goals.<sup>28</sup>

### **Chinese Foreign Policy**

Chinese foreign policy and the temperaments of those in charge have changed drastically over the past 100 years. This is seen in history and pending the leader's temperament; his actions will be conveyed in a manner reflecting his country's ideology. The government and its ideology saw a radical change post Chinese civil war, 1949, when communism came to rule

under Mao and the nationalists fled to Taiwan. This paper will analyze Mao and the Chinese current leader, Xi, to show the change of temperament amongst Chinese leadership.

Specifically, a look into the foreign policy characteristics of Mao (idealist) and Xi (rational) will show a change from isolationism to expansionism that is consistent with the temperaments listed above.

Mao came to power following the Chinese civil war, 1927-1950, and as a result along with his idealist temperament, he reformed the government to follow a form of communism referred to as Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought.<sup>29</sup> He quickly made radical changes within China and started by marginalizing capitalists and giving equal shares/responsibilities to the peasants. He changed China's society to a socialist society and within no time, the government had control over all agriculture and industry.<sup>30</sup> Mao provided focus and direction for his new government both internally and externally and made adjustments to each area. Mao's actions while in a seat of authority displayed an idealist temperament as he drastically changed the government to something else, something that he thought would be better. Dr. Montgomery's book, *People Patterns* supports the assessment that Mao had an Idealist temperament.

Montgomery states that a person with an idealist temperament is one who looks to the future and the possibilities that tomorrow may bring.<sup>31</sup> Mao did this in his quest to convert a nationalist society into one of communism where he felt that the Chinese people would be better off.

Internally, Mao quickly sought action to abolish capitalism while promoting socialism, which falls in line with his idealist temperament associated with improving and in this case, his country. He felt as though his opponents were either revisionist or reactionary<sup>32</sup> and they were quickly removed from positions of authority, if not killed. Mao created and set into action a radical plan to cleanse the country of those who opposed his communist vision and this plan was

known as the Great Leap Forward (GLF) campaign, 1958-1960.<sup>33</sup> It resulted in over 30 million deaths, but it turned a society that fed off individual success into a society of nationalism, with harmony among the people, and a socialistic society at its finest.

Externally, Mao and his idealist temperament found that his new successful government needed to be shared, at least its principle of communism, throughout the world. Jing Men stated that Mao used three explicit doctrines as his basic guide to foreign policy, Lingqi luzao (“to set up a separate kitchen”), Dasao ganjing wuzi qingke, (“to clean up the room before inviting guests”) and Yibiandao (“to lean to one side”).<sup>34</sup> Respectively, lingqi luza means to start from a fresh slate, establish and implement a foreign policy that brings socialism to the forefront. Through the idealist temperament lens, the bringing of socialism to the forefront means that it is better than the status quo and that in doing so, China is to benefit as it seeks self and other improvement.<sup>35</sup> Dasao ganjing wuzi qingke means to rid the Chinese government of all imperialists before attempting to make new relationships. Basically, this would mean to take out the trash before starting something new. Lastly, Yibiandao means to exploit and foster socialism with those that it is attempting to establish relations with. As an Idealist, Mao sought close relations with Joseph Stalin as he seeks to change China into a communist nation.

Mao and his idealist temperament sought opportunities with Second and Third World countries that were struggling, like Cuba in 1964.<sup>36</sup> Mao perceived non-Communist countries that were struggling as targets of opportunity and found them to be ideal to conform to communism. He more than doubled the number of countries China had diplomatic relations with throughout his tenure. For instance, in 1955, China had relations with 21 countries and within nine years, increased that number to 49.<sup>37</sup> Mao’s external foreign policy at this time targeted nation states that sat on the fence or were in a state of friction. He considered them as vulnerable

and quickly sought ways to resolve their issues and turn their government toward a form of communism. Upon Mao's death in 1976, so did the Cultural Revolution and began the transition of the idealist temperament leaders to rational ones.

As the leadership of China changes so does the temperament of the individuals who represent the Communist Party. The death of Mao and his idealist temperament enabled a stagnant country to grow and prosper. Soon after Mao's death, Deng Xiaoping rose as an influential political figure while serving as the Chairmen of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Deng is assessed to have had the first rational temperament within Chinese leadership as he developed a plan to build upon Mao's positive foreign relations. He quickly implemented two diplomatic decisions to further develop a more stable and favorable international environment.<sup>38</sup> These two decisions consisted of the signing of a Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, and a focus on continuing positive relations with the United States.<sup>39</sup> These two actions demonstrate a thought out plan to neutralize external grievances with one, the Japanese and their animosity and two, with the United States, who they felt could promote Chinese economic development.<sup>40</sup> In doing so, characteristics of the rational temperament are seen as he attempts to improve relations that benefit mutually. This was a start of what is to become Chinese foreign policy influenced by Deng, who like Mao has a strong influence on the decisions that are made within the Chinese Communist Party.

A rational temperament is to be seen throughout the remainder of Chinese leaders to present. On August 21, 1982, Xiaoping presented Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United Nations, with the main principles of Chinese foreign policy: opposing hegemony, safeguarding world peace, and reinforcing cooperation with third world countries.<sup>41</sup> Later that

same year, current Chinese Chairman, Ju Yaobang stated to the CCP during the twelfth National Congress, that China would remain committed to their “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.”<sup>42,43</sup> These principles consist of the following: “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.”<sup>44</sup> Four other concepts would quickly emerge and shape Chinese foreign policy up to 2005. These further concepts consisted of “new security strategy”, “Peaceful Rise”/“Peaceful Development”, “Period of Strategic Opportunity” and “Harmonious World”.<sup>45</sup>

General Secretary Jiang Zemin defined his rational temperament with the New Security Strategy, also known and most recognized as the New Security Concept (NSC) evolved in 1997.<sup>46</sup> This concept surfaced as a white paper and its intentions were to abandon all cold war mentalities, to procure a new method of security, and to maintain/preserve peace.<sup>47</sup> More specifically, the National Security Concept reinforces the previously stated “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” while putting an emphasis on mutually beneficial economies, and a sense of confidence building throughout the world. More so, the NSC highlights the downfall of state-to-state alliances while promoting security communities like, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), East Asian Summit, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which enables discourse with a peaceful resolve.<sup>48</sup>

Later in 2002, A Chinese White Paper displayed a rational temperament on behalf of Chinese leadership as they sought ways to achieve harmony throughout the region and a peaceful coexistence. In particular, Chinese White Paper titled, “Peaceful Development” was released to the world after much scrutiny. Its initial inception, drafted by Zheng Bijian, a Chinese Scholar, was titled, “Chinese Rise.”<sup>49</sup> This paper coincides with Chinese foreign policy concept to begin in this year and last for the next twenty years, “Period of Strategic Opportunity.” Essentially,

China is saying to the world and in particular to the United States, China wants to remain stable while pursuing interests to develop a well-off society within its borders.<sup>50</sup> The Chinese Communist Party was not in favor of the “Chinese Rise” title due to fear of provoking and antagonizing other nations. This paper was produced and disseminated to give assurances to Chinese neighbors that its intentions were not to dominate and expand into other territories. This paper also addressed Chinese foreign policy objectives and how they were to be zero-sum games.<sup>51</sup> This meant that all countries that either provided assistance or allowed Chinese actions to occur would benefit. Furthermore, the White Paper highlights the fact that China did not want to engage in a large-scale conflict of fear of disrupting its internal and international economic objectives.<sup>52</sup>

The rational temperament continues within the Chinese leadership throughout Chairman Hu Jintao’s time in office. In 2005, he gave a speech at the World Summit of the 60<sup>th</sup> General Assembly on Chinese foreign policy direction titled, “Harmonious World.” Within this concept, he specified four key points: multilateralism, security, mutual benefit, and enhanced dialogue between diverse civilizations.<sup>53</sup> However, not all Chinese agreed with this concept, but there was no venue in place to show or display noncompliance. Therefore, for those that did not concur, silence was the only option. Despite the negative reactions, the majority prevailed and Hu’s rational temperament pursued a plan of action that would be mutually beneficial. The rational temperament appears to remain consistent within the present day leaders of the Chinese Communist Party.

Chinese current leadership under Xi<sup>54</sup> continues to focus and enhance foreign policy objectives and his pursuit to maintain a peaceful coexistence in consistent of those who possess a rational temperament. China refers to its security environment as “complex” with regards to the

following topics: economics, nationalism, regional challenges, domestic unrest, environment, and demographics.<sup>55</sup> A quick look into the history of Xi and his rise to power along with each of the complex securities issues will show a rational temperament as he leads China seeking it to revitalize the nation through peaceful development and cooperation.<sup>56</sup>

Characteristics of the rational temperament are evident throughout Xi's early years are seen today in the decisions he makes as the President of China. Xi was raised as a Chinese student under the close-eye of his father, Xi Zhongxun.<sup>1</sup> In 1953, Xi was born in Beijing<sup>57</sup> while his father was serving as the Secretary General of the State Council and as the Head of the CPC Propaganda Department. It was in his father's footsteps, that he would learn about the communist party and strive to not only become a member, but a leader. Prior to applying for membership in the Communist Party, Xi attended and graduated from Tsinghua University in 1979 where he studied synthetic organic chemistry.<sup>58</sup> His degree of choice in chemistry supports one of the characteristics that fall within Keirse's Rational temperament. A person with a Rational temperament seeks complex things and a degree in synthetic organic chemistry fits that mold. Dr. Montgomery writes in his book, *People Patterns*, that a person with a Rational temperament is more interested in the hard to explain category and therefore, a person with this temperament likes to study complex systems whether they be mechanical, biological, or social systems.<sup>59</sup> Upon his graduation, Xi began his career within the political arena where he served as a secretary for the Secretary-General of The Central Military Commission (CMC), Geng Biao. After serving in multiple Provinces, Xi spent 17 years in Fujian Province where he worked his way up to Governor in 2000. In 2002, Xi moved to neighboring Zhejiang Province where he would quickly assume the highest position, that of Secretary, and while serving in this billet, his

---

<sup>1</sup> Xi Zhongxun served in multiple positions throughout the Communist Party of China.

rational temperament was demonstrated via his policy known as “Opening the bird cage to swap the bird.”<sup>60</sup> With this new policy, Xi sought to decrease China’s industrial dependency, which requires a tremendous amount of manual labor, resources, and creates extensive pollution from the factory production sites.<sup>61</sup> This policy would decrease these dependencies and focus on using higher technologies that reduce air pollution, and lead to a higher profit. This policy grabbed the attention of the new General-Secretary of the Communist People’s China (CPC), Hu Jintao due to complimenting his “Scientific Development Concept.”<sup>62</sup> As seen throughout his life, Xi’s actions are coupled with planning and these actions have had and will have a lasting effect on China’s future.

Xi’s rational temperament proved to serve him well as he transitioned through the political ranks of the Chinese Communist Party. Xi’s thirst for seeking out problems and developing courses of action to resolve them would catapult him into higher positions within the communist party. As previously stated, his birdcage concept proved valuable and was adopted by the neighboring Guangdong Province. From his rationalist views, brought to fruition by extensive research, promoted change by highlighting the negatives associated with high labor industry. With these deficiencies out in the open, Xi led initiatives to reduce high labor costs. This change catapulted China into achieving economic development for all of China.<sup>63</sup> The Central Committee of the CPC recognized the potential of Xi, and due to his outstanding political work was promoted to be the 8<sup>th</sup> member of the Central Politburo and top candidate to succeed Hu.<sup>64</sup> Xi would later become Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and thereby make him the number-two person in the nation and the army.<sup>65</sup> After achieving success under Hu and within the Communist Party, Xi was selected to be the next General Secretary of the People’s Republic of China in 2012.

Since his time as the senior member of the Communist Party, Xi has invoked his rational temperament with respect to planning the development of a modernized military while giving focus and direction for China's booming economy. It appears as China grows, so will its need to expand and by adopting a rational approach, China will seek agreements as it pursues its economic interests throughout the world. Furthermore and while it grows, it must invest in modernization, especially with its military in order to deter aggressors and to project power to areas of interests. The Chinese economy has achieved tremendous results with a GDP of 8% and has decided to reduce that growth to 7.5% between 2011-2015.<sup>66</sup> China's concern for the 21<sup>st</sup> century is its dependency on this growth that relies on investments and exports. While it seeks new opportunities, it must maintain the ones it has by keeping ahead of hungry competitors. The Chinese pragmatism and analysis of their economic status reveal a rational temperament in its leaders that will enable it to succeed in meeting its economic goals.<sup>67</sup>

As Xi exercises his rational temperament with regards to the decisions being made by the communist party, another semi-critical transition is occurring within China. Nationalism brought China out of imperialism, but its economic ventures have introduced capitalism which conflicts with communism. Communism is being challenged today within China and the CCP is realizing this as it pursues its quest to be considered a great power. The struggle between economic growth and individual wealth is tainting young entrepreneurs throughout the country. Nationalists could potentially restrict the decision-making process of the CCP,<sup>68</sup> which could have an adverse affect on economic growth. A rational temperament is present here as China institutes a plan to promote capitalism while maintaining a national mindset. China walks a fine line in this approach due the propensity of greed to occur if not governed properly.

As an economy grows so do the rational temperament of its leaders and the needs of people to achieve a higher personal status. Entrepreneurs are able to take advantage of open trade and as a result, they are able to afford a better than average living. Wealth can permeate greed, which in turn can lead to unrest in the most structured societies. The Chinese people and government are in fear of corruption and its ability to be responsive to nip it in the bud before it comes to fruition. This is where deliberate planning by Chinese leadership will be crucial in maintaining accountability while being transparent in order to ensure controlled capitalism doesn't get out of hand.<sup>69</sup> Chinese leadership must identify triggers that might cause unrests and resolve them before they become another Jasmine Revolution.<sup>2</sup> The rational temperament is seen here, as Chinese leadership understands the potential for unrest to occur and how it will need to be somewhat transparent while seeking ways to best mitigate.

Decisions being made by Chinese leadership are seen as consistent with that of a rational temperament as these leaders develop plans to address China's environmental concerns. China's leaders understand that it has contributed significantly to global warming and its industrialization has been the root cause. In particular, China is concerned that environmental degradation can lead to undermining governmental legitimacy, threaten economic opportunity, health, stability and China's overall image.<sup>70</sup> China's pollution problems, caused by coal burning and automobile exhaust fumes have increased drastically since opening its borders to free trade.<sup>71</sup> Environmentally, China is now experiencing large sand storms within its coastal cities due to the expanding size of the Gobi Desert in West China.<sup>72</sup> A rational temperament can be derived from

---

<sup>2</sup> Jasmine Revolution: January 2011, a commoner set himself afire in front of a Tunisia government building after the government failed to resolve corruption issues regarding his fruit stand, where he was trying to make an honest living. As a result, a mass uprising ensued and the government killed dozens of protestors in what was perceived as excessive force. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1753072/Jasmine-Revolution>

the deliberate planning and actions of Chinese leaders as they tackle the issues leading to an increase in air pollution. In 2008, Chinese leader, Hu set into action a plan to reduced air pollution by limiting automobile traffic during the Olympic games in Beijing. More recently, Xi committed to reducing pollution CO2 emissions by 2030 and to transfer to non-fossil fuels by 20%.<sup>73</sup>

In order to address population concerns, Chinese leadership displays a rational temperament by relaxing the laws that govern the number of births allowed by its people. China faces a dual threat of an aging population and a lowering in birth rate. These demographics raise concern for China, as its economic status and expedient growth are dependent upon a young labor force. A pragmatic solution is being exercised, which follows under a rational temperament, to increase spending toward social and health care services.<sup>74</sup> In addition, China is relaxing its one birth law and allowing more families to have multiple kids legally.<sup>75</sup> However, based on its economic growth, China will need to do more in order to stabilize the economy.

Lastly, Xi attempts to rationalize his decisions regarding territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. However, Chinese interests are raising concern to the United States and disputing countries within the area.<sup>76</sup> The East China Sea is home to the Senkaku Island chain and is under dispute with Japan. The South China Sea is home to the Spratly Islands and is disputed with China, Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Brunei, and Indonesia. As China continues to grow so will its need for resources. In addition, and in order to provide a layered defense, these island claims will legitimately extended their sovereign right and enable a military presence to better defend the Chinese continental boundaries. The rational temperament being used by Xi is seen in his analytical approach to one using its military to make a statement and two, its manipulation of international law to justify its rights to these island chains.

Chinese foreign policy has changed considerably over the past fifty years that change can be linked to the temperaments of the leaders that held the position of General Secretary or President. Prior to Mao, China was led under a Nationalist government and the temperament of the leaders at this time was that of a Guardian, a protector of the nation and its interest-country before self. During Mao's tenure, he led the transformation of China to a Communist state and with his Idealist temperament he felt that he was making his country a greater and more powerful nation. Post Mao, another change has occurred and it has been somewhat gradual as each leader added a more rational approach to their decision making process. Chinese leaders of today possess a rational temperament and use this to their advantage in seeking and achieving foreign policy objectives without provoking hostilities in order to support their fast growing economy.

### **China's Interests in the East and South China Sea**

The rational temperament of Chinese leadership recognizes the need to have control over the East and South China Seas. These interests have been growing steadily as seen through the changes in government and military modernization. These are not new interests of China, but have arisen due to its ability to now control and maintain security of its eastern borders from a naval adversary. In addition and due to China's economic growth, these island chains enable access to natural resources. Though China may not need these resources now, China's rational temperament indicates that the need will arise soon and that it would be better for them to take control of these resources now prior to another country staking claim. A closer look into China's claim of these islands for security and access to the natural resources within, gives an understanding of why these island chains are so important.

Prior to the 21<sup>st</sup> century and during the Qing dynasty (1644-1912),<sup>77</sup> leadership attempted to address security concerns but left out what would be a vital avenue of approach, one

constituting a naval encroachment along its eastern coast. Eventually, post-Japanese and British invasion and Chinese civil war, Mao put into action plans to secure its eastern border. Chinese history throughout this period established interior strategies that consisted of expanding rings of security. These rings surrounded the state's territory and areas just outside that were of strategic value. The strategic value defined during this time frame was referred to as the Han heartland and consisted of Beijing in the north to the Guangzhou Province in the south.<sup>78</sup> This ring also extended from the Yellow, Yangtze, and Pearl Rivers east toward the Sichuan Province. As time went on, so this strategic arc expanded. The Chinese would have influence in these buffering territories and if these civilizations resisted Chinese measures, they would be conquered. The Han Heartland would eventually expand from Manchuria in the east through Mongolia to today's Xinjiang Province, and south to Tibet. However, Qing leaders failed to provide security of its territory along its eastern border via an encroaching naval adversary.<sup>79</sup>

China's failure to protect/secure its eastern territorial approach via the sea was compromised twice; once by the British in 1840 during the Opium War and then by the 1945 ending of the Japanese invasion.<sup>80</sup> Prior to these points, China chose and for the most part secured its sovereignty by having a strong, large ground army that would be numerically superior to any encroaching adversary. These two invasions would provoke China to seek ways to project power or extend its arc over the near seas and this ability would provide China with security, acting as a buffer prior to reaching its core territory, the Chinese coast. In order to achieve this buffer, China would seek to legitimize its influence over the near sea areas legally and by developing a Navy capable of influencing these near sea areas.

Under the umbrella of a rational temperament, deliberate research/planning identifies the resources within the East and South China Sea as being driving factors on why these island

chains are so important.<sup>81</sup> In particular, the South China Sea contains up to 218 billion barrels of crude reserves, according to a 2008 United States Energy Information Administration (USEIA) report. This number equates to satisfying China's crude requirements for more than sixty years.<sup>82</sup> As China works with the United States and international communities, the need for natural gas is growing. Also in the same report of 2008, the USEIA stated that the South China Sea contains up to 3.79 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and this would satisfy China's requirements for up to thirty years.<sup>83</sup> Therefore, Chinese leadership is realizing that its economic growth is going to constitute the need for more resources and that it better secure access to these resources now, before it is too late or before a more kinetic response is needed.

Resource reserves like those contained within the South China Sea are very rare and a main reason why China is seeking to have recognized control over them. Natural gas drilling and extraction is a complex process and one that requires a great deal of expertise and resources. China has procured oil rigs to drill for these resources and uses its sovereign claims to justify its actions.

Today, China seeks to legitimize its claim in the East and South China Sea by interpretation of law associated with the establishment of an Air Defense Zone (ADZ) and Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). Being that China sees the small island chains within both these seas, Spratly Islands and Senkaku Islands, China feels entitled to control the seas and the air above between its coastal region and the islands themselves and beyond. Beyond is defined as the Asian continental shelf, which is well outside of its internationally recognized borders. However, and by law, these island chains remain in dispute and the Philippines has filed a case against China to be ruled by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.<sup>84</sup> A verdict

should be released this year, 2015, but some scholars think that this will be decided prior to that verdict.

Xi's actions within the East and South China Seas are fine examples of a rationalist approach to resolving these complex issues. In particular, Xi attempts to rationalize his behavior as being under law as defined in United Nations Conventions Under Law of Seas (UNCLOS) where China is entitled to have control of the water and air spaces in, around, and above its sovereign territory. Xi's rational behavior with respect to escalation of force has also been somewhat pragmatic in nature. He supports military intervention in defending Chinese claims, but that application is delivered in such a manner to not provoke a large-scale military action. This would not be the same for a leader like Mao with his idealist temperament. If Mao were faced with the same issues as Xi pertaining to the sovereign claim of the East and South China Seas, Mao would openly seize these territories with military force, develop military installations where possible to sustain an active defense and begin resource extraction immediately. Mao's idealist actions today bring a better future for the Chinese people tomorrow. Interestingly, Chinese leadership post Mao that has a rational temperament has used military force to stake claim to these island chains. Three recorded incidents have occurred between 2001 and 2009 where the Chinese have used military force in the East and South China Seas.

The Chinese Navy has employed its forces on three separate occasions to reinforce its claims within the East and South China Seas. The first recorded incident occurred on 23 March 2001, where Peoples Liberation Army Navy ships traveling in international waters and within the Chinese EEZ claim, intercepted a U.S. Navy surveillance ship.<sup>85</sup> A second similar incident occurred nine years later on 8 March 2009, and it consisted of the same type of intercept between the same types of ships. Lastly, on 1 April 2009, a U.S. Navy P-3 Orion surveillance aircraft

was intercepted by a Peoples Liberation Army Air force plane which caused it to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island due to contact between the two.<sup>86</sup> These incidents confirm Chinese leadership's rational temperament as they conduct deliberate plan to use their military to defend claims within their self-proclaimed EEZ. While walking this fine line with respect to use of military force, the need to provide security for its claim is in large part due to the resources that resident with the East and South China Seas.

Chinese leadership exercises a rational temperament as it attempts to justify its actions in the East and South China Seas. First and foremost history has identified that China has been vulnerable from the East and the need to have a more robust defensive posture is crucial to maintaining its sovereignty. Next, China realizes that it will need the resources within the East and South China Seas to support its growing population. In order to justify these claims, China interprets international laws to be in its favor and has demonstrated the use military force on three separate reported occasions.

### **Chinese Military Instrument of Power**

Chinese leadership invokes their rational temperament in how they use their military instrument of power to enforce objectives within the East and South China Seas. The Chinese will primarily use its People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to resolve any disputes within the East and South China Seas. Therefore and for the purpose of this paper, the Chinese capabilities covering the air, and sea will be expounded upon in order to give a more relevant perspective. Also, the focus on this section is to show the military capabilities that can be used to enforce the Chinese claims in the East and South Seas. The rational temperament of Chinese leadership is brought to fruition in the deliberate planning on how they seek to modernize their military instrument of power to enforce these claims.

The Chinese are using their economic successes to develop a modern military that is able to project force throughout its established economic exclusion zone that encompasses the East and South China Seas. While serving as the Chairman Joint Chief's of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen stated that he was concerned with China's military modernization program, a closed program leaving the United States and others to wonder.<sup>87</sup> China recognizes that in order to secure its claims in the East and South China Sea, it must develop military capabilities that can counter the most sophisticated ones of the United States while satisfying foreign policy objectives via a competitive military. In order to do this, they must remain somewhat covert. Rational temperament people use their drive and tenacity to reduce dependency on others to achieve their end state.<sup>88</sup> As the basis, China has used Russian platforms as the model to indigenously produce military platforms that can effectively operate on the sea, and air capable of countering U.S. capabilities.

The Chinese military instrument of power covering the air domain falls under the People's Liberation Army Navy Air Force (PLANAF) and is able to satisfy Chinese interests throughout its economic exclusion zone. In particular, aerial refueling, fourth and fifth generation fighter aircraft, and intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft are within its inventory and have been used to enforce Chinese foreign policy objectives. Chinese aircraft are capable of projecting force by delivering bombs at designated targets, able to scramble and intercept encroaching aircraft within their airspace at all times, and they are able to collect on all activity throughout the East and South China Sea.

Recent developments in the Chinese aerial refueling mission have significantly extended the ability to facilitate effects on the environment throughout the East and South China Seas. In particular, the Chinese have produced ten H-6 tanker aircraft that are able to refuel fighter

aircraft throughout their claimed territory.<sup>89</sup> The H-6 tanker is derived from the Russian made IL-78. In order to keep up with its aerial refueling demand, the Chinese have agreed to purchase eight more IL-78 tankers from Russia giving them a total of eighteen refueling aircraft to support the air intercept and intelligence collecting capabilities of the PLAAF.<sup>90</sup> The mission of aerial refueling is quite complex; however, the extended range and time on station make it paramount to the Chinese military instrument of power. With a range of 7,300 km at ~36 thousand feet, the IL-78 can extend the range of PLAAF fighter aircraft out to Guam from the Chinese Eastern coast.<sup>91</sup> Therefore, this enables the PLAAF to have effects on vessels within the South China Sea and beyond. Chinese aircraft are used to intercept encroaching naval vessels or foreign aircraft and have the ability to refuel in the air.

Chinese fixed wing aircraft are used throughout the East and South China Seas to deter encroaching forces while proving a capability credible throughout the world. Specifically, the SU-33 Flanker D is a carrier launch and recovery capable aircraft with universal ability to carry multiple types of munitions. Chinese current inventory ranges around 48-50 platforms along with another 24 land based SU-30 MKK2.<sup>92</sup> The munitions carried on these aircraft give the PLA the ability to attack naval forces and aviation assets throughout the Chinese economic exclusion zone. These munitions include anti-air, anti-radiation, and ant-ship missiles with ranges from the launched aircraft of up to 300km.<sup>93</sup> The J-10 is another indigenously produced air platform used by the PLA and current reporting indicates that it also being fitted with equipment that enables it to be launched and recovered from an aircraft carrier.<sup>94</sup> Older generation models are still being used by the PLA and this will be so until China is able to produce enough newer generation aircraft. Platforms like the J-8II Finback and SU-27 Flankers

(Russian made) provide the numbers and are still capable aircraft to satisfy requirements throughout the East and South China Seas.

China's pursuit to modernize its aircraft platform capabilities makes it a formidable opponent for any military operating the East and South China Seas. Land based aircraft like the J-8 Finback, the Q-5 Fantan A, and J-7 fighters along with the H-6D/H-6X, which fulfill bombing and reconnaissance missions, all enable and give the Chinese credibility with regards to defending their claims in the East and South China Seas. Other aircraft, like KJ-2000 (AWACS) built from the Russian made/procured A-50 Mainstay/IL-76 airframe enable collections and command and control of the air domain.<sup>95</sup> China has also ventured into the unmanned aerial vehicle domain and they currently have multiple platforms that can deliver munitions on targets or collect on enemy combatants throughout the East and South China Seas. These platforms continue to evolve and can be launched from land or by naval surface ships.<sup>96</sup>

The Chinese Navy has platforms that satisfy surface and subsurface requirements and are also capable of ranging all areas throughout its economic exclusion zone. Starting with the subsurface capabilities consisting of submarines, China has approximately 55 active platforms in service today and some researchers are assessing 60 by 2020.<sup>97</sup> These platforms consist of five types of classes (Jin, Shang, Yuan, Song, and Ming) that are indigenously produced and one class (Han) is from Russia. Of these submarines, only two of them are nuclear powered. The Jin class submarine is able to launch ballistic missiles and range targets throughout the entire economic exclusion zone. Though the total number of submarines is being assessed to increase by 2020, China is shifting its focus on quantity to quality and this number is further expected to decrease post 2020. This will leave China with fewer submarines, but with more ability to have

effects throughout its water domain. In order to complete the sea domain, the Chinese have also procured surface combatants.

Chinese surface ships have followed a somewhat similar inventory composition as to most navies, which consists of destroyers, frigates, amphibious platforms, and to include an aircraft carrier. According to a study conducted by Mr. Kostecka,<sup>98</sup> Chinese naval ships will decrease in numbers by 2020; however, the ships that will be active will be more capable of effecting the environment in multiple ways vice just having a singular purpose. Like the United States, Chinese ships will carry helicopters, which will be the indigenously produced Z-9 and Russian made Ka-28 Havoc that are capable of performing anti-ship warfare (ASW) and search and rescue (SAR).<sup>99</sup> Though limited in number (about 20), they are spread out across frigates and destroyers and they provide the Chinese with a rotary wing projected capability that can be used in concert with its fixed wing assets.

Lastly, Chinese military modernization has resulted in the procurement of an aircraft carrier used to complement the Chinese Navy and project power well beyond its littorals. The Chinese now have one Russian Kuznetsov-class carrier originally purchased from Russia and now updated with Chinese equipment. The former Varyag named aircraft carrier was commissioned in 2011 when it began its sea trials under the PLAN. This particular aircraft carrier has a ski jump takeoff system, which is consistent with minimally capable aircraft to project power;<sup>100</sup> meaning, a ski slope system is best designed for less modern aircraft where its air role is specific to defending the naval force and has limited time on station, hours of flight time. However, the Chinese are in the process of developing a carrier specific platform, the J-15, that is the indigenously produced version of the Russian made Su-27. This aircraft will be suited with the latest aviation and munitions technologies being used throughout the world today.

Limited in scope with only deck space for 18 aircraft on board, this aircraft carrier still has a way to go in order to compare to the capabilities of the United States.<sup>101</sup> However, the presence alone of an aircraft carrier can cause a tenacious adversary to think twice about their actions.

The Chinese rational temperament of its leaders is seen throughout its military modernization program. Its significant development in aerial refueling give its air interceptor type aircraft an ability to extend its range while enabling longer flight times. Its air intercept type aircraft are becoming more sophisticated with weapon systems and avionics. The Chinese naval platforms are also increasing in capabilities to include an aircraft carrier that will enable aircraft to strike targets throughout the East and South China Seas. Therefore, the rational temperament of the Chinese leadership understands that in order to defend its claims in the East and South China Seas, it has to have a credible military instrument of power, and this research proves that it does.

## **Conclusion**

Current leaders within the Chinese government are assessed to have a rational temperament and this is seen throughout its foreign policy objectives being pursued today in the East and South China Seas via a modernized military. Dr. Keirse has defined the four human temperaments as being Idealist, Guardian, Rational, and Artisan. Throughout the scope of this research, the Chinese leader, Mao displayed an idealist temperament and transitioned to leaders with a rational temperament thereafter, which is still seen in the decisions today by Xi. Under a rational temperament, it can be understood why China seeks to control the island chains in the East and South China Sea and why it is modernizing its military to have effects in those areas. Though the Chinese are modernizing its naval forces, which are capable of projecting power beyond its littorals and throughout its self-proclaimed economic exclusion and air defense zones

(EEZ/ADZ), it will remain somewhat benign. This research has identified the systematic changes in the temperaments of Chinese leaders and why they seek to have control over the entire East and South China Seas via a modernized military. In conclusion, Xi has a rational temperament and his decisions on behalf of the Chinese government identify its interests in the East and South China Seas as being for security and resources. And, in order to accomplish this, China needs a modernized military that is capable of projecting power beyond its littorals.

## Endnotes

---

<sup>1</sup> Keirsej Temperament Website - Overview of the Four Temperaments. Keirsej Temperament Website - Overview of the Four Temperaments. Accessed December 10, 2014. [http://www.keirsej.com/4temps/overview\\_temperaments.asp](http://www.keirsej.com/4temps/overview_temperaments.asp).

<sup>2</sup> Ivan Pavlov. *Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes Twenty-five Years of Objective Study of the Higher Nervous Activity (Behaviour) of Animals*. 1928. <http://digitalcommons.hsc.unt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=hmedbks>

<sup>3</sup> Saul McLeod. *Classical Conditioning*. Simply Psychology. 2008. <http://www.simplypsychology.org/classical-conditioning.html>

<sup>4</sup> Keirsej, David, and David Keirsej. *Please Understand Me II: Temperament, Character, Intelligence*. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis, 1998. Page 79.

<sup>5</sup> Keirsej Temperament Sorter. Accessed February 2015. <http://images.frompo.com/35afe263cd5e863edcd31fb4f754de67>

<sup>6</sup> Keirsej, David, and David Keirsej. *Please Understand Me II: Temperament, Character, Intelligence*. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis, 1998. Page 3.

<sup>7</sup> Keirsej, David, and David Keirsej. *Please Understand Me II: Temperament, Character, Intelligence*. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis, 1998. Pages 3-11.

<sup>8</sup> Keirsej, David, and David Keirsej. *Please Understand Me II: Temperament, Character, Intelligence*. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis, 1998. Page 12.

<sup>9</sup> Keirsej, David, and David Keirsej. *Please Understand Me II: Temperament, Character, Intelligence*. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis, 1998. Pages 11 and 12.

<sup>10</sup> Keirsej Temperament Website - Portrait of the Guardian® (SJ). Keirsej Temperament Website - Portrait of the Guardian® (SJ). Accessed December 26, 2014. [http://www.keirsej.com/4temps/guardian\\_overview.asp](http://www.keirsej.com/4temps/guardian_overview.asp).

<sup>11</sup> Stephen Montgomery. *People Patterns: A Popular Culture Introduction to Personality Types and the Four Temperaments*. 2nd ed. Del Mar, CA: Archer Publications, 2011. Kindle Page 513.

<sup>12</sup> Keirsej Temperament Website - Portrait of the Guardian® (SJ). Keirsej Temperament Website - Portrait of the Guardian® (SJ). Accessed December 26, 2014. [http://www.keirsej.com/4temps/guardian\\_overview.asp](http://www.keirsej.com/4temps/guardian_overview.asp).

<sup>13</sup> Keirsej Temperament Website - Portrait of the Guardian® (SJ). Keirsej Temperament Website - Portrait of the Guardian® (SJ). Accessed December 26, 2014.

- 
- <sup>14</sup> Keirsey Temperament Website - Well-known Guardians® (SJs)." Keirsey Temperament Website - Well-known Guardians® (SJs). Accessed December 26, 2014. [http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/guardian\\_quotes.asp](http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/guardian_quotes.asp).
- <sup>15</sup> Keirsey, David, and David Keirsey. *Please Understand Me II: Temperament, Character, Intelligence*. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis, 1998. Pages 11 and 12.
- <sup>16</sup> Keirsey, David, and David Keirsey. *Please Understand Me II: Temperament, Character, Intelligence*. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis, 1998. Page 11.
- <sup>17</sup> Keirsey, David, and David Keirsey. *Please Understand Me II: Temperament, Character, Intelligence*. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis, 1998. Page 9.
- <sup>18</sup> Keirsey Temperament Website - Portrait of the Artisan® (SP)." Keirsey Temperament Website - Portrait of the Artisan® (SP). Accessed December 28, 2014. [http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/artisan\\_overview.asp](http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/artisan_overview.asp).
- <sup>19</sup> Keirsey Temperament Website - Portrait of the Artisan®." Keirsey Temperament Website - Portrait of the Artisan®. Accessed December 28, 2014. [http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/artisan\\_quotes.asp](http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/artisan_quotes.asp).
- <sup>20</sup> Keirsey Temperament Website - Portrait of the Rational® (NT). Keirsey Temperament Website - Portrait of the Rational® (NT). Accessed December 28, 2014. [http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/rational\\_overview.asp](http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/rational_overview.asp).
- <sup>21</sup> Keirsey Temperament Website - Portrait of the Rational® (NT)." Keirsey Temperament Website - Portrait of the Rational® (NT). Accessed December 28, 2014. [http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/famous\\_rationals.asp](http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/famous_rationals.asp).
- <sup>22</sup> Keirsey, David, and David Keirsey. *Please Understand Me II: Temperament, Character, Intelligence*. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis, 1998. Page 12.
- <sup>23</sup> Keirsey Temperament Website - Portrait of the Idealist® (NF). Keirsey Temperament Website - Portrait of the Idealist® (NF). Accessed December 28, 2014. [http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/idealist\\_overview.asp](http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/idealist_overview.asp).
- <sup>24</sup> Keirsey Temperament Website - Portrait of the Idealist® (NF). Keirsey Temperament Website - Portrait of the Idealist® (NF). Accessed December 28, 2014. [http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/idealist\\_overview.asp](http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/idealist_overview.asp).
- <sup>25</sup> The Temperaments of America." Please Understand Me. April 22, 2011. Accessed December 28, 2014. <http://blog.keirsey.com/2011/04/22/the-temperaments-of-america/>.
- <sup>26</sup> Sujian Guo. *New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007. 11.
- <sup>27</sup> Sujian Guo. *New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007. 7.
- <sup>28</sup> Keirsey Temperament Website - Portrait of the Guardian® (SJ). Keirsey Temperament Website - Portrait of the Guardian® (SJ). Accessed December 31, 2014.
- <sup>29</sup> Sujian Guo. *New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007. 9.
- <sup>30</sup> Sujian Guo. *New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007. 10.
- <sup>31</sup> Stephen Montgomery. *People Patterns: A Popular Culture Introduction to Personality Types and the Four Temperaments*. 2nd ed. Del Mar, CA: Archer Publications, 2011. Kindle Page 969.

- 
- <sup>32</sup> Sujian Guo. *New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007. 9.
- <sup>33</sup> Marc Lanteigne. *Chinese Foreign Policy an Introduction*. London: Routledge, 2009. 4.
- <sup>34</sup> Sujian Guo. *New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007. 11.
- <sup>35</sup> Keirsey Temperament Sorter. Accessed February 2015.  
<http://images.frompo.com/35afe263cd5e863edcd31fb4f754de67>
- <sup>36</sup> Sujian Guo. *New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007. 11.
- <sup>37</sup> Sujian Guo. *New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007. 11.
- <sup>38</sup> Yufan Hao. *Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization, and the next World Power*. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2009. 16.
- <sup>39</sup> Yufan Hao. *Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization, and the next World Power*. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2009. 15.
- <sup>40</sup> Yufan Hao. *Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization, and the next World Power*. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2009. 16.
- <sup>41</sup> Yufan Hao. *Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization, and the next World Power*. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2009. 17.
- <sup>42</sup> Marc Lanteigne. *Chinese Foreign Policy an Introduction*. London: Routledge, 2009. 11.
- <sup>43</sup> Yufan Hao. *Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization, and the next World Power*. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2009. 17.
- <sup>44</sup> China Balance Sheet: Chinese Foreign Policy Accessed January 17, 2015.  
[http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/080916\\_cbs\\_1\\_foreignpolicyf.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/080916_cbs_1_foreignpolicyf.pdf).
- <sup>45</sup> China Balance Sheet: Chinese Foreign Policy Accessed January 17, 2015.  
[http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/080916\\_cbs\\_1\\_foreignpolicyf.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/080916_cbs_1_foreignpolicyf.pdf).
- <sup>46</sup> Marc Lanteigne. *Chinese Foreign Policy an Introduction*. London: Routledge, 2009. 87.
- <sup>47</sup> Marc Lanteigne. *Chinese Foreign Policy an Introduction*. London: Routledge, 2009. 87.
- <sup>48</sup> Marc Lanteigne. *Chinese Foreign Policy an Introduction*. London: Routledge, 2009. 88.
- <sup>49</sup> Nau, "World Views of Aspiring Powers" Page 42.
- <sup>50</sup> China Balance Sheet: Chinese Foreign Policy Accessed January 17, 2015.  
[http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/080916\\_cbs\\_1\\_foreignpolicyf.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/080916_cbs_1_foreignpolicyf.pdf).
- <sup>51</sup> China Balance Sheet: Chinese Foreign Policy Accessed January 17, 2015.  
[http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/080916\\_cbs\\_1\\_foreignpolicyf.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/080916_cbs_1_foreignpolicyf.pdf).
- <sup>52</sup> Russell Ong. *China's Security Interests in the 21st Century*. London: Routledge, 2007. 118-119.
- <sup>53</sup> Henry R. Nau. *Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 45-46.
- <sup>54</sup> Jonathan Sharp. *China Renaissance : The Rise of Xi Jinping and the 18th Communist Party Congress*. Singapore, SGP: World Scientific Publishing Company/OTHERS, 2013. Accessed February 26, 2015. ProQuest ebrary.
- <sup>55</sup> Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2013. Pages 25 and 26. Accessed December 31, 2014.  
[http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014\\_DoD\\_China\\_Report.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf).

- 
- <sup>56</sup> Hao, Yufan. "Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization, and the Next World Peace" Page 32
- <sup>57</sup> Tomoyoshi Isogawa. *Understand Xi Jinping In 30 Minutes*. United Books Tokyo, Japan, 2012.
- <sup>58</sup> Tomoyoshi Isogawa. *Understand Xi Jinping In 30 Minutes*. United Books Tokyo, Japan, 2012. Page 281.
- <sup>59</sup> Stephen Montgomery. *People Patterns: A Popular Culture Introduction to Personality Types and the Four Temperaments*. 2nd ed. Del Mar, CA: Archer Publications, 2011. Kindle Page 969.
- <sup>60</sup> Tomoyoshi Isogawa. *Understand Xi Jinping In 30 Minutes*. United Books Tokyo, Japan, 2012. Kindle Page 445.
- <sup>61</sup> Tomoyoshi Isogawa. *Understand Xi Jinping In 30 Minutes*. United Books Tokyo, Japan, 2012. Kindle Page 446.
- <sup>62</sup> Tomoyoshi Isogawa. *Understand Xi Jinping In 30 Minutes*. United Books Tokyo, Japan, 2012. Kindle Page 445.
- <sup>63</sup> Tomoyoshi Isogawa. *Understand Xi Jinping In 30 Minutes*. United Books Tokyo, Japan, 2012. Kindle Page 445.
- <sup>64</sup> Tomoyoshi Isogawa. *Understand Xi Jinping In 30 Minutes*. United Books Tokyo, Japan, 2012. Kindle Page 497.
- <sup>65</sup> Tomoyoshi Isogawa. *Understand Xi Jinping In 30 Minutes*. United Books Tokyo, Japan, 2012. Kindle Page 609.
- <sup>66</sup> Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2013. Pages 25 and 26. Accessed December 31, 2014. [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014\\_DoD\\_China\\_Report.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf).
- <sup>67</sup> [http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/rational\\_overview.asp](http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/rational_overview.asp)
- <sup>68</sup> Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2013. Pages 26. Accessed January 18, 2015. [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014\\_DoD\\_China\\_Report.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf).
- <sup>69</sup> Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2013. Pages 26. Accessed January 18, 2015. [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014\\_DoD\\_China\\_Report.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf).
- <sup>70</sup> Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2013. Pages 26. Accessed January 18, 2015. [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014\\_DoD\\_China\\_Report.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf).
- <sup>71</sup> Marc Lanteigne. *Chinese Foreign Policy an Introduction*. London: Routledge, 2009. 45.
- <sup>72</sup> Marc Lanteigne. *Chinese Foreign Policy an Introduction*. London: Routledge, 2009. 45.
- <sup>73</sup> The U.S. and China Just Announced Important New Actions to Reduce Carbon Pollution." The White House. Accessed January 17, 2015. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/11/12/us-and-china-just-announced-important-new-actions-reduce-carbon-pollution>.
- <sup>74</sup> Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2013. Pages 26. Accessed January 18, 2015. [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014\\_DoD\\_China\\_Report.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf).
- <sup>75</sup> China's Self-Created Demographic Disaster Is Coming." The National Interest. Accessed January 18, 2015. <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-self-created-demographic-disaster-coming-11353>.
- <sup>76</sup> Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2013. Pages 26. Accessed January 18, 2015. [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014\\_DoD\\_China\\_Report.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf).
- <sup>77</sup> The Qing Dynasty." China Highlights. Accessed January 10, 2015. <http://www.chinahighlights.com/travelguide/china-history/the-qing-dynasty.htm>.

---

<sup>78</sup> Dutton, Peter A. "China's Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas" page. 2 Accessed December 31, 2014. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9edbcea9-8425-4b96-aa14-aac1f81532c2/China-s-Maritime-Disputes-in-the-East-and-South-Ch.aspx>.

<sup>79</sup> Dutton, Peter A. "China's Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas" page. 2 Accessed December 31, 2014. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9edbcea9-8425-4b96-aa14-aac1f81532c2/China-s-Maritime-Disputes-in-the-East-and-South-Ch.aspx>.

<sup>80</sup> Dutton, Peter A. "China's Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas" page. 2 Accessed December 31, 2014. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9edbcea9-8425-4b96-aa14-aac1f81532c2/China-s-Maritime-Disputes-in-the-East-and-South-Ch.aspx>.

<sup>81</sup> Henelito A. Sevilla. 2013. "The 'Arab Spring' and South China Sea Tensions: Analyzing China's Drive to Energy Security." *Alternatives: Turkish Journal Of International Relations* 12, no. 3: 194. *Academic Search Premier*, EBSCOhost (accessed November 21, 2014).

<sup>82</sup> Henelito A. Sevilla. 2013. "The 'Arab Spring' and South China Sea Tensions: Analyzing China's Drive to Energy Security." *Alternatives: Turkish Journal Of International Relations* 12, no. 3: 194. *Academic Search Premier*, EBSCOhost (accessed November 21, 2014).

<sup>83</sup> Henelito A. Sevilla. 2013. "The 'Arab Spring' and South China Sea Tensions: Analyzing China's Drive to Energy Security." *Alternatives: Turkish Journal Of International Relations* 12, no. 3: 194. *Academic Search Premier*, EBSCOhost (accessed November 21, 2014).

<sup>84</sup> Caroline Dorminey. "China's Navy and Conflict in the South China Sea" page. 4. Accessed January 16, 2015. [http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Dorminey South China Sea-AG.pdf](http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Dorminey%20South%20China%20Sea-AG.pdf).

<sup>85</sup> Ronald O'Rourke. "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities-Background and Issues for Congress." *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, 26 August 2010: 2.

<sup>86</sup> Ronald O'Rourke. "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities-Background and Issues for Congress." *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, 26 August 2010: 2.

<sup>87</sup> Ronald O'Rourke. "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities-Background and Issues for Congress." *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, 26 August 2010: 2.

<sup>88</sup> Keirsey Temperament Website - Portrait of the Rational® (NT)." Keirsey Temperament Website - Portrait of the Rational® (NT). Accessed December 28, 2014. [http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/famous\\_rationals.asp](http://www.keirsey.com/4temps/famous_rationals.asp).

<sup>89</sup> Daniel J Kostecka. "CHINA'S AEROSPACE POWER TRAJECTORY IN THE NEAR SEAS." *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 3 (Summer2012 2012): 117. *Academic Search Premier*, EBSCOhost (accessed November 22, 2014).

<sup>90</sup> Daniel J Kostecka. "CHINA'S AEROSPACE POWER TRAJECTORY IN THE NEAR SEAS." *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 3 (Summer2012 2012): 118. *Academic Search Premier*, EBSCOhost (accessed November 22, 2014).

<sup>91</sup> Global Security.org. "Il-78M Midas Ukraine." *Global Security.org*. Accessed November 2014. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/il-78.htm>

<sup>92</sup> Phillip C. Saunders. *The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011. 161.

<sup>93</sup> Phillip C. Saunders. *The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011. 161.

- 
- <sup>94</sup> Phillip C. Saunders. *The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011. 161.
- <sup>95</sup> Phillip C. Saunders. *The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011. 161.
- <sup>96</sup> Phillip C. Saunders. *The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011. 162.
- <sup>97</sup> Phillip C. Saunders. *The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011. 149.
- <sup>98</sup> Daniel J. Kostecka. "CHINA'S AEROSPACE POWER TRAJECTORY IN THE NEAR SEAS." *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 3 (Summer 2012). *Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost* (accessed November 22, 2014).
- <sup>99</sup> Daniel J. Kostecka. "CHINA'S AEROSPACE POWER TRAJECTORY IN THE NEAR SEAS." *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 3 (Summer 2012). *Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost* (accessed November 22, 2014).
- <sup>100</sup> Daniel J. Kostecka. "CHINA'S AEROSPACE POWER TRAJECTORY IN THE NEAR SEAS." *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 3 (Summer 2012). *Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost* (accessed November 22, 2014).
- <sup>101</sup> Phillip C. Saunders. *The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011. 149.

## Bibliography

- Airforce-technology.com. "IL-78 Midas Air-to-Air Refueling / Transport Aircraft, Russia." (accessed November 20, 2014). <http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/ilyushin-il-78/>
- Dorminey, Caroline and David H. Gray. "China's Navy and Conflict in the South China Sea." *Global Security Studies, Summer 2014 Volume 5, Issue 3*.
- Dutton, Peter A. "China's Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas." *Hearing for the House Foreign Affairs Committee*, 14 January 2014.
- Erickson, Andrew. "A Work in Progress: China's Development of Carrier Strike." *Janes Navy International*, June 2014. <https://janesc.com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=+++1714784&Pubabbrev=JNI>
- Fisher, Jr., Richard D. "Building for Future Power Projection." *China's Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach*. Praeger Publishers (2008). <http://psi.praeger.com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/doc.aspx?newindex=1&q=Chinese+Aircraft+Carrier&imageField.x=-501&imageField.y=-181&c=&d=/books/gpg/C9486/C9486-0665.xml&i=0>.
- Fravel, Taylor M. "U.S. Policy Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea Since 1995." *Policy Report (2014)*:

---

<http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2014.RSIS.us.policy.scs.pdf>

Global Security.org. "Il-78M Midas Ukraine." *Global Security.org*. Accessed November 2014. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/il-78.htm>

Global Security.org. "J-31 (Jianjiji-31 Fighter aircraft 31)." *Global Security.org*. Accessed October 2014. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/j-31.htm>

Guo, Sujian. *New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007.

Hao, Yufan. *Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization, and the next World Power*. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2009.

Holmes, James R. "A Thought Neighborhood for Hegemons." *Strategic Features of the South China Sea*. Naval War College Review, Spring 2014, Vol. 67, No. 2.

Hossain, Kamrul. "The UNCLOS and the US-China Hegemonic Competition over the South China Sea." *Journal Of East Asia & International Law* 6, no. 1 (Spring 2013). *Academic Search Premier*, EBSCOhost (accessed November 20, 2014).

Isogawa, Tomoyoshi. *Understand Xi Jinping In 30 Minutes*. United Books Tokyo, Japan, 2012.

Joffe, Ellis. "The Right Size for China's Military: To What Ends?" *Right Sizing the People's Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China's Military*, Roy

Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, eds. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 559-571.

Keirse, David, and David Keirse. *Please Understand Me II: Temperament, Character, Intelligence*. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis, 1998.

Kostecka, Daniel J. "CHINA'S AEROSPACE POWER TRAJECTORY IN THE NEAR SEAS." *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 3 (Summer2012 2012). *Academic Search Premier*, EBSCOhost (accessed November 22, 2014).

Lanteigne, Marc. *Chinese Foreign Policy an Introduction*. London: Routledge, 2009.

McLeod, Saul. *Classical Conditioning*. Simply Psychology. 2008.  
<http://www.simplypsychology.org/classical-conditioning.html>

Montgomery, Stephen. *People Patterns: A Popular Culture Introduction to Personality Types and the Four Temperaments*. 2nd ed. Del Mar, CA: Archer Publications, 2011.

McGrath, Bryan and Seth Cropsey. "The Real Reason China Wants Aircraft Carriers." *Real Clear Defense*. (April 16, 2014).

---

[http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/04/16/the\\_real\\_reason\\_china\\_wants\\_aircr\\_aft\\_carriers.html](http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/04/16/the_real_reason_china_wants_aircr_aft_carriers.html)

Nau, Henry R. *Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013.

Ong, Russell. *China's Security Interests in the 21st Century*. London: Routledge, 2007.

O'Rourke, Ronald. "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities- Background and Issues for Congress." *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, 26 August 2010.

Pavlov, Ivan. *Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes Twenty-five Years of Objective Study of the Higher Nervous Activity (Behaviour) of Animals*. 1928.  
<http://digitalcommons.hsc.unt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=hmedbks>

Saunders, Phillip C. *The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011.

Sevilla, Henelito A. 2013. "The 'Arab Spring' and South China Sea Tensions: Analyzing China's Drive to Energy Security." *Alternatives: Turkish Journal Of International Relations* 12, no. 3. *Academic Search Premier*, EBSCOhost (accessed November 21, 2014).

Sharp, Jonathan. *China Renaissance : The Rise of Xi Jinping and the 18th Communist Party Congress*. Singapore, SGP: World Scientific Publishing Company/OTHERS, 2013. Accessed February 26, 2015. ProQuest ebrary.

Spires, David N. *The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles*. Progressive Management Publication, 2013. Smashwords Edition.

Thayer, Carlyle A. "ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea." *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 33, no. 2 (2013). <http://muse.jhu.edu/> (accessed November 12, 2014).

Xu, Beina. "South China Sea Tensions." Jan, 2013. Accessed Oct, 2014.  
<http://www.cfr.org/china/south-china-sea-tensions/p29790>