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
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
**TITLE: "URGENCY HAS BEEN THE ORDER OF THE DAY"¹:
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT TO ENABLE OPERATION CHROMITE**

**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES**

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Executive Summary

Title: “Urgency Has Been the Order of the Day”²: Personnel Management to Enable Operation CHROMITE

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Thesis: Decisions and actions by commanders and G1 personnel directly led to the unusually rapid activation and deployment of the X Corps, which was the keystone in the successful execution of Operation CHROMITE (MacArthur's Inchon landing).

Discussion: In September 1950, following only one month of planning, US General Douglas MacArthur's staff built a ready and combat capable corps size force, including a planning staff, command and control element, and combat ready units to successfully execute an amphibious assault at Inchon. Operation CHROMITE was a controversial and unexpected undertaking. Few leaders had confidence in achieving victory at the treacherous landing site. To make matters worse, U.S. military forces, already limited by rapid drawdown, were quickly being overrun by attacking North Korean forces. Where ground forces were barely available to defend the Pusan perimeter, few saw the possibility of building a combat ready corps of Army and Marine Corps forces capable of achieving amphibious success. The planning and execution of Operation CHROMITE was rapid and focused on extremely precise execution at Inchon. Personnel management was key to the eventual success of the operation. Methods used to build the X Corps included reactivation of units, reconstruction of understrength forces, and establishment of a host nation augmentation system. MacArthur's G1 developed options, manned the force of the X Corps, and developed personnel readiness during one intense month of planning.

Conclusion: Flexibility and adaptability were the method for breakout victory in Korea in September 1950. MacArthur turned impending defeat into stunning victory by challenging expectations, maintaining confidence in his staff, and pressing for urgency in every aspect of planning and execution. While many outside of the Far East Command believed it impossible to form a successful force, MacArthur's G1 enabled success in only one month. G1 planners established, activated, manned, and moved the X Corps, a complex unit including nearly 70,000 U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps personnel and coalition partners. The result was a successful landing, breakout from the Pusan perimeter and recapture of the capital city of Seoul.

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How did General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's staff and commanders build a ready, successful combined joint task force of more than two divisions in one month's time in order to execute an amphibious landing at Inchon? A plan that seemed almost impossible required manpower that was not currently on hand or even envisioned - an entirely new and as yet unimagined combat force. MacArthur pressed for an audacious operation that demanded precision timing by a powerful joint force. Within 30 days his staff developed a unit structure, filled units to full strength, and provided a multinational joint amphibious assault force. That force, known as X Corps, successfully attacked the enemy's rear area to secure the capital city of Seoul. This essay examines the methods by which X Corps was constructed and fielded, from staff to fighting force, a previously non-existent corps size unit that successfully executed an extraordinary vision. The extremely short planning timeline created an urgency that contributed to success by alleviating excessive debate or discussion – the operation would go as MacArthur directed and the only option was forward motion in planning and execution. Decisions and actions by commanders and G1 personnel directly led to the unusually rapid activation and deployment of the X Corps, which was the keystone in the successful execution of Operation Chromite (MacArthur's Inchon landing).

War on the Korean Peninsula

In the predawn hours of June 25, 1950, following years of tension on the Korean Peninsula, the Army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) achieved complete strategic surprise, assaulting south across the 38th Parallel in a coordinated attack to invade the Republic of Korea (ROK). The DPRK intended to conquer South Korea and unify the north and south as one nation under the communist regime.³ The abrupt attack shocked South Korea and destroyed frontline troops. Though enthusiastic, ROK military forces were not equipped or

trained to hold off the intensity of the assault launched by the DPRK Army. Most units disintegrated or retreated in short order.⁴ Within days the capital city of Seoul fell to the DPRK. The United Nations (UN) Security Council reacted immediately, adopting a resolution that labeled the North Korean attack a “breach of peace” and called for a cease-fire and withdrawal. The DPRK ignored the resolution and continued its attack south down the Peninsula.⁵

U.S. military assistance in Korea, since troop withdrawal in 1949, consisted only of the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (K MAG). K MAG members were American officers and enlisted men, paired with Korean counterparts, both commanders and staff officers, down to the battalion level. Primary duties consisted of advising on execution of daily duties and assisting in training of ROK units. K MAG staffing was minimal and at the time of the DPRK Army assault, consisted of only a small cadre of less than 500 personnel on the peninsula, able to offer little support to the crumbling ROK Army.⁶

On July 7, the UN Security Council passed a resolution establishing a unified command under the United States, and President Harry S. Truman designated General Douglas MacArthur as the Commanding General of the United Nations Command (UNC).⁷ In assuming this role MacArthur simultaneously commanded the UNC and the U.S. Far East Command (FECOM), and also became the supreme commander for the Allied Powers.⁸ MacArthur immediately requested reinforcements through the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, DC but was denied as quickly. His keen awareness of the enemy’s resolve was noted in his request, saying the US faced “an aggressive and well-trained professional army operating under excellent top level guidance and [that] demonstrated superior command of strategic and tactical principles.”⁹ MacArthur committed available air, ground, and naval forces to the combined United Nations

force supporting ROK forces in the defense but continuously pressed the need for a far greater military presence.¹⁰

By 1 August 1950, U.S. and ROK forces were hemmed into the constricted and ever-tightening perimeter around the port of Pusan, facing near certain defeat and withdrawal. Still confident in the U.S. and ROK militaries, MacArthur already had in mind a bold plan to defeat the DPRK. He proposed a daring amphibious assault and turning movement behind enemy lines to recover control of Seoul and South Korea from the DPRK Army. The X Corps War Diary concisely outlines the initial yet thorough plan:

The plan boldly called for the committing of the GHQ [General Headquarters] Reserve and the 1st Marine Division in an amphibious operation to seize the Inchon-Seoul area and cut the main line of enemy communication and supply to his armies in the south. In conjunction with this seaborne envelopment, Eighth Army was to launch a major offensive from the south, and driving in a northwesterly direction along the axis Taegu-Taejon-Suwon, to affect a juncture with the amphibious forces at Seoul.... The objective of Plan 100 B was the destruction of the North Korean Army south of the line Inchon-Seoul-Utchin.¹¹

The DPRK Army forced the hand of US military leaders in the first days of September, as it launched a powerful offensive in an attempt to push the Americans into the sea at Pusan.¹²

Deploying 98,000 troops through 13 Infantry division, an armored division, and two armored brigade, the DPRK forces inflicted nearly a thousand casualties a day on UN forces, now barely able to maintain the defensive Pusan perimeter.¹³

An Operational Plan and Vision for Victory

MacArthur knew this could not continue. To achieve swift victory, he envisioned, resourced, and executed a plan that few thought would develop beyond an idea; a plan so daring that MacArthur himself later described the mission as a “5000-to-1 gamble.”¹⁴ The port of Inchon, approximately 110 miles behind enemy lines on the west coast of the peninsula, boasted a rocky coastline, treacherous narrow waterways into the port, and an inauspicious tidal basin

allowing for barely two hours of navigable water daily.¹⁵ It was no place to expect a successful amphibious landing from even the most prepared of units. MacArthur saw an opportunity in this unexpected landing site, to create a vice with U.S. forces assaulting on the enemy from both the north and south, crushing the DPRK Army.¹⁶ In MacArthur's view, the enemy would not expect an attack from such an abysmal landing site and, as such, the port of Inchon would likely be poorly defended. After landing, U.S. forces could continue the assault against an unsuspecting enemy, secure air bases, and continue on to recapture the capital city of Seoul, trapping the DPRK and enabling the defeat and possible destruction of enemy forces across the peninsula.¹⁷ The port of Inchon itself was the first challenge; the next was the state of U.S. military forces.

Understanding the sizeable scope of work at the foot of G1 personnel officers at this time requires an understanding of the state of U.S. military forces and the state of mind of senior military leadership at the time:

In hearings before the House Armed Services Committee on unification and strategy in October 1949, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, predicted that large scale amphibious operations would never occur again. The rapid drawdown and demobilization after World War II had gutted the Armed Forces, what remained was torn by strategic controversy and inter-service rivalry.¹⁸

Weakened by defense spending cutbacks and still recovering from the devastation of World War II, U.S. forces were minimally manned and spread thinly across the globe. Seeing the defense budget slashed by one third, military leaders were forced to execute an austerity plan that included severe reductions in military manpower. This left little resource from which personnel officers might pull to build combat capable forces in case of emergent threats. U.S. force strength dropped from 12 million uniformed service members at the end of World War II, to only 1.5 million by December 1948. U.S. Army forces were reduced to a cadre used primarily for processing incoming recruits. USMC forces were spread across security, training, and

administrative posts around the world, barely half of the Corps assigned to operational forces. Combat readiness was relegated to a low priority and most new recruits were assigned to clerical or occupation duties. As war veterans left the service, the average age and education level dropped, making training and organization difficult.¹⁹ In terms of numbers, the Army maintained less than 650,000 professionals, the Navy 429,000, the USMC only 74,000, and the Air Force 400,000 men and those numbers continued to drop. The drawdowns were quick and disorganized with little foresight for action in the case of future hostility.²⁰ The result was a great loss not only in manpower, but a loss of capability and proficiency. “From every perspective postwar defense policy seemed calculated to widen the gap between military responsibilities and capabilities.”²¹ Compounding matters, troops on assignment in the Pacific region were thoroughly immersed in the peacetime occupation mission and mindset. They were simply unprepared to defeat an assaulting force.

Leading the X Corps

Against all odds and only one month later, MacArthur commanded a joint and combined, fully manned and capable force, including a headquarters staff, command and control element, and joint-combined combat capable units that would successfully execute the amphibious assault at Inchon. MacArthur knew the critical importance of Seoul, “A force occupying this area is in a position to block almost all routes of North-South or East-West movement at the waist of the Korean peninsula.”²² Kimpo, the most useful airfield in Korea, was located near Seoul and the city was the hub of all rail traffic. Additionally, the major seaport of Inchon was only 18 miles east of the city.²³ MacArthur envisioned success as an amphibious envelopment launched from outside the city of Seoul and his vision came within days of the onset of war. While not widely known, he did share his strategy with a few trusted staff and began to paint the picture of the X

Corps. By 20 July he was firm on the concept for the assault and he was quick to set his staff on planning. On 23 July he circulated his framework plans to select members of the GHQ staff. That same day he informed the Department of the Army that he had scheduled a large-scale amphibious landing for mid-September.²⁴ This combined sense of assuredness and urgency marked the remainder of the time spent planning the operation, enabling MacArthur's G1 to build the X Corps in a most unorthodox manner.²⁵ Those characteristics in planning were the very reason for success.

Not waiting on any formal approval from his superiors, MacArthur instructed his Chief of Staff, Major General Edward M. Almond, to construct a plan for a landing on the east or west coast of Korea.²⁶ Soon the landing site at Inchon was agreed upon with a full assault plan already well in hand. The amphibious operation was initiated as Operation Plan 100B and given the code-name CHROMITE. A U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) landing force would seize the urban area of Inchon and advance rapidly to seize Kimpo Airfield. The Army would "land behind the Marines and advance on their right flank to seize the commanding ground south of Seoul."²⁷ These two forces would "form the strategic anvil as Eighth Army forces advanced from the Pusan Perimeter in the role of the hammer."²⁸ With perseverance always the maxim, MacArthur and his devoted leaders regarded the amphibious assault as not an option, but a necessity, from the start.

MacArthur's blueprint was audacious but resources were scant, so how did the already beleaguered FECOM accomplish this mission? U.S. units projected to execute the mission were busy holding the tenuous defensive perimeter at Pusan with six ROK divisions in support.²⁹ The FECOM G1, already managing personnel operations across the Pacific, not the least of which was the unremitting combat replacement process, must now reevaluate the status of every outfit

in order to cast an entirely new unit. Elements of four U.S. Army divisions and one USMC division were in defense of the perimeter, enduring continuous attacks from the DPRK. Combat power dropped rapidly and leaders scrambled to constantly reorganize and refit in the face of an intrepid enemy. While one leader envisioned a strategy for victory, no unit was ready or available to launch such an assault. The answer became the X Corps, a unit built from the ground up and tailored specifically for the amphibious assault at Inchon and recapture of Seoul. MacArthur's vision for the mission and the unit was undaunted by the harsh reality of the situation at hand. X Corps would become "a rock upon which withdrawing North Korean forces can be shattered."³⁰

MacArthur's first order of business following initial consideration of the plan was not to obtain approval from any higher command, but to appoint a leader who would make the X Corps a reality. Again the order of the day was urgency over standard protocol. Appointment of such a leader demanded a man of unwavering loyalty to both the command and the mission, a man who would build the staff planning channels required to translate vision into action and do so in a very short time. MacArthur placed his Chief of Staff, Army Major General Edward M. Almond, in command of the corps not yet activated.³¹

General MacArthur elevated Almond to the command of X Corps for one simple reason: loyalty. MacArthur knew the inherent difficulties of the plan, and wanted the invasion force commanded by a man who would not shrink before the apparent impossibility of the task. Almond could keep X Corps moving in conformity with MacArthur's dictates. The supreme commander wanted a loyal subordinate who would faithfully adhere to his guidance with unquestioning exactitude.³²

This choice surprised many, considering the USMC expertise in amphibious operations. The appointment surprised even Almond himself, but his fidelity never wavered.³³ He would retain his titles and duties as Chief of Staff, FECOM and United Nations Command, and he would build X Corps from the ground up, with ultimate responsibility for carrying out the amphibious

assault at Inchon.³⁴ Though Almond was not officially assigned as the X Corps commander until 26 August, he directed the planning effort from inception through execution.³⁵

The successful development and eventual manning for the X Corps can be tied in part to Almond's first duties on assignment to Japan in May 1946 – he was assigned as the G1 in charge of personnel for MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. Though he had not worked with MacArthur previously, he quickly grew to admire him greatly and earned his place within the General's inner circle after being promoted to deputy chief of staff for FECOM. In February 1949, Almond replaced his close friend Major General Paul J. Mueller as MacArthur's chief of staff.³⁶ While MacArthur did not make his amphibious attack plan known to his chief of staff until a few days later, Almond was alongside his commander in Seoul at the very inception of the eventual assault plan. Both men saw the destruction of the capital city and the inept state of the ROK Army. They shared in the understanding that swift and bold U.S. action would be required to regain control of South Korea.³⁷

Resolutely loyal to MacArthur, Almond also possessed similar personality traits. He was feared and obeyed across FECOM, known to be a strict and meticulous leader. “He drove himself hard and he demanded the same degree of hard-driving loyalty from his subordinates.” Always serving as one of the MacArthur's most trusted and ardent subordinate leaders, Almond rose to the most demanding tasks.³⁸ It was these characteristics, coupled with his extensive knowledge of FECOM and the region that allowed him to execute an unprecedented plan from start to finish by building a uniquely organized and effective force.

Activating the X Corps

With his leader and vision in hand in the first week of August, MacArthur still had no headquarters organization for the Inchon assault force.³⁹ In the year prior to the outbreak of war,

Almond's experiences in leading the FECOM staff and units reinforced the need for driven, intelligent, and sensible staff. The following briefly details one such experience with the EUSA staff:

Soldiers with the highest aptitudes as measured by AGCT score were skimmed off at every level of the replacement process, leaving the least trainable for combat arms battalions. The situation became so intolerable that General Almond felt compelled to intervene.... he prohibited GHQ's staff sections from screening projected replacements and directed that they accept personnel without prior consideration of GCT score or civilian skill. Unfortunately this directive came too late to influence Eighth Army's training programs before the outbreak of the Korean War, and training progression in the 7th Infantry Division continued to suffer from a general lack of effective leadership at the most critical levels.⁴⁰

On 7 August the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) of FECOM G3 met to discuss the need for a headquarters organization to accomplish the Inchon assault plan. The JSPOG identified a major gap in the planning capability within current structures and recommended one two possible courses of action to fill the gap: either obtain approval and organization through Admiral Radford, Commander Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, or establish a provisional headquarters; against the advice of his G3 and Deputy Chief of Staff, MacArthur selected the latter. "MacArthur wanted the detailed CHROMITE planning accomplished under his own close and constant supervision, and not by a group less subject to his direct view than his own GHQ staff."⁴¹ A Special Planning Staff was formally organized on 15 August, exactly one month before the eventual operation. The Special Planning Staff was so named to maintain anonymity and concealment in order to work under great secrecy.

The planning staff was comprised of hand-selected officers, primarily from the existing FECOM staff. Again, MacArthur and Almond looked to men of steadfast loyalty with a dogged confidence in the mission. On 5 August, Major General Clark L. Ruffner was appointed as the chief of staff of this future corps, at the time known only as the X Force. Ruffner had only

arrived from the US two days earlier, but was known as a staff genius, gaining MacArthur's trust while serving with him in World War II. USMC Colonel Edward A. Forney was appointed as the deputy chief of staff, bringing much needed amphibious operational expertise to the team. Previously serving as the commander of an elite Pacific Fleet training unit in Japan, Forney was also well known throughout FECOM. Colonel Richard H. Harrison filled the soon to be critical role of G1 personnel chief.⁴² With no TOE, Table of Allowances, or Table of Distribution the G1 had to rely on existing tables for similar units to develop a corps structure capable of functioning as a "separate corps along the lines of a field army headquarters."⁴³ G3 operations responsibilities were assigned to Lieutenant Colonel John H. Chiles, a favored officer of both MacArthur and Almond, at the time serving as Almond's secretary of the general staff. Chiles had previously served as a commander under Almond in the 2nd Infantry Division. Colonel Aubrey D. Smith, who had commanded under MacArthur in World War II, served as the G4 logistics chief and Lieutenant Colonel William W. Quinn as the G2 intelligence chief. A few Army, Navy and Marine Corps officers rounded out this small but purposeful team.⁴⁴

These men worked around the clock on detailed planning for the landing at Inchon, working in secret at an old bomb shelter in a downtown Tokyo motorpool. This cell of planners would become the core of the operational headquarters of X Corps.⁴⁵ The pressure and importance of the situation at hand was captured in the X Corps War Diary:

it marked one of the most successful races against time in Army annals. The target date was 15 September, just one month away. Failure to meet that deadline meant almost a month's delay before another landing attempt could be made....a month's delay could have meant defeat for UN Forces in South Korea⁴⁶

The staff's feverish and detailed work led to the realization that Force X would be a unit of great size, leading Almond to recommend a corps designation and the moniker "X Corps."⁴⁷

MacArthur approved, and issued CINCFE Operation Plan 100-B on 12 August, specifically naming the Inchon-Seoul area as the target of an amphibious invasion force.⁴⁸

With MacArthur's eyes set on the Inchon landing, his G1 now set to finding a way to build the X Corps, a unit capable of decimating a North Korean military currently in control of nearly the entire peninsula. The X Corps would be a mission-oriented unit unlike any other, a new creation without standard alignment within existing hierarchy and reporting directly to MacArthur for mission orders:

To insure independence of action, regardless of circumstances, MacArthur arranged for X Corps to serve directly under his own Far East Command. [The] Corps not only enjoyed separate status but it was lavished with extra components, being reinforced from normal corps size to the strength of a virtual field army.⁴⁹

X Corps' lack of attachment to the standard military command channels would allow for great freedom of use by MacArthur. Without such a distinctive relationship, this unit may never have been formed or employed, certainly not in such short time, probably never launching the eventually successful assault through the port of Inchon.⁵⁰ The unique command relationship eliminated much of the lengthy and contentious decision making process that regularly occurs in division and corps size units. Moreover, such a direct relationship eliminated the potential for problematic delays stemming from risk-averse leadership outside of MacArthur's direct control. The X Corps was born for a crucial and urgent task so it was aligned directly with the man who envisaged and always maintained confidence in that mission. A pressing combat mission with the complexity of the Inchon landing would likely not have been so successful with any other structure or command relationship.

Building the Fighting Force

MacArthur's earliest vision for the landing force called for the 5th Marine Regiment (1st Marine Division) and the 2nd Infantry Division to execute an amphibious assault that would "land

behind North Korean lines in conjunction with a general offensive by Eighth Army from the south.”⁵¹ The eventual X Corps, however, would be comprised of 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division as the assault force and 3rd Infantry Division in reserve, along with varied supporting elements and the I ROK Corps under operational control.

The military build up in reaction to hostilities on the Korean peninsula was therefore chaotic. The crisis reaction to an unforeseen war meant a rapid and absolute change in U.S. defense policy. Within three years the defense budget quadrupled and the size of the military tripled. In July 1950 the Army extended all existing terms of service by 12 months and issued the first call for drafts from the selective service. The length draft process did not provide immediate support, however, with the initial induction date set for September 1950. On 6 July 1950, President Truman approved raising the authorized Army strength from 630,000 to 680,000. Changes continued over the next month as conflict progressed. Three more increases to Army troop strength were approved over the next month as follows:

U.S. Army Approved Troop Strength Authorizations

Approval Date	Authorized Manpower Strength
6 July 1950	680,000
14 July 1950	740,500
19 July 1950	834,000
10 August 1950	1,081,000

Source: Gough, Terrence J. U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War: A Research Approach. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1987

Additionally four National Guard divisions and two National Guard regimental combat teams were called to active duty with activation dates in September 1950. The Army requested that reserve personnel volunteer for active duty but this did not produce sufficient response. To make up for this shortage, an involuntary recall was enacted. 30,000 men were ordered to active duty and units in paid drill status were kept intact in the event of emergencies arising elsewhere.⁵²

These increases did not occur quickly enough to assist MacArthur with requested reinforcements and U.S leadership was still not prioritizing full effort on the Korean fight. On 21 July the “Department of the Army informed MacArthur that his request for another four division could not be considered until defense officials had determined to what level the General Reserve would be rebuilt and the relative importance of Korea to other commitments worldwide.”⁵³ This sentiment did not stop MacArthur and Almond in purposefully building the X Corps battle force already envisioned for the landing at Inchon.

At the time, within the USMC, the ongoing fight for relevance and existence contributed its own urgency to the mission. Consolidation of the US armed forces was a highly debated political topic and some military and political leaders were pushing strongly for dissolution of the USMC. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Clifton B. Cates was more than willing to prove the legitimacy of the Corps through the rapid and successful deployment of a large-scale amphibious assault force. Much like MacArthur, Cates did not wait for approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his orders to prepare the 1st Marine Division for deployment.

The stateside 1st Marine Division, like the rest of the military, was reduced to peacetime strength, less than two thirds of its combat capable strength, following World War II.⁵⁴ Moreover, since the DPRK invasion, the Division had been stripped of both personnel and equipment to field a provisional brigade for the Korean fight. On 25 July, however, USMC Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepard, Jr., Commander of Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, assured Almond that the unit could be quickly reconstituted, deployed, and prepared for the amphibious assault by mid-September. Based on this assurance, MacArthur made a formal request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a full strength Marine division to join X Corps. The request was approved. Cates then further directed that the “1st Marine Division be brought to full war

strength within three weeks. This was a task that required approximately the same number of marines as existed in the entire Fleet Marine Force.”⁵⁵

Major General Oliver P. Smith took command of the 1st Marine Division on 26 July and within two weeks he saw his outfit grow from a bare framework of 7,000 Marines to a full, war strength division of 17,162 men. Highlighting the standard of urgency, 13,703 of those Marines joined the division in the first week.⁵⁶ Both regular and reserve troops provided augmentation from units scattered about the globe. The 1st Marine Division’s initial planning group was aboard the *Mount McKinley*, docked in Tokyo harbor, when it received its preliminary briefing for Operation CHROMITE on 19 August. This left only 20 days planning time prior to scheduled deployment of attack forces on 9 September, “probably the shortest period ever allotted to a major amphibious assault.”⁵⁷ The need for Marines was so great that President Truman approved a request by Cates to activate the entire ground element of the Marine Corps Organized Reserve and attached Navy medical units.⁵⁸

Once activated, most 1st Marine Division subordinate units consolidated at Camp Pendleton, California, for rapid training, organization, and equipping prior to setting sail for Japan in the first days of September 1950.⁵⁹ Personnel and equipment were gathered from bases throughout the U.S. The first regiment of the division, 1st Marines, was re-activated on 4 August by re-designation of the 2nd Marines, 2nd Marine Division.⁶⁰ This occurred barely ten months after inactivation intended to reduce the size of the Corps following World War II. Over nine thousand Marines transferred from Camp LeJeune, North Carolina to Camp Pendleton. The 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines reconstitution paints a picture indicative of the accelerated buildup.

In about 10 days, the two-element, half-strength battalion expanded into a three-element, full-strength battalion. The two rifle companies in the battalion each numbering about 100 men were doubled in size with a third rifle platoon added.... A heavy machine gun platoon was created and third sections were added to the antitank assault and 81mm

mortar platoons.... The pressure of the unknown D-Day gave almost no time for unit shake-down and training.⁶¹

To make matters worse, the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, who became the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, had only recently returned from six-month deployment to the Mediterranean. They traveled directly to Camp Pendleton by troop train for the hurried reorganization.⁶²

The second regiment, 7th Marines, was re-activated on 17 August and sailed for Japan just two weeks later. Its reconstitution was more complex. The 6th Marines had already lost two battalions to the reactivated 1st Marines, but nevertheless assembled to form the core of the newly minted 7th. The 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, deployed at sea and dispersed across the Mediterranean, would become the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines. They joined the regiment in Japan and by the time their tour was complete “these military tourists would have traveled entirely around the world by various forms of land, water, and air transportation.”⁶³ Additional personnel for that unit, including the reconstructed third rifle company, would come from Camp Pendleton and join the Regiment in Japan.⁶⁴ To get the unit to full war strength, the 7th Marine Regiment filled nearly 50% of its personnel requirement with activated reservists, the largest proportion of any unit in the Division.⁶⁵ The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was derived from the reorganization of the Sixth Fleet Landing Force arrived at Pusan on 9 September and was then formally re-designated. Already engrossed in battle in Korea, the 5th Marine Regimental Combat Team was pulled from direct combat action on 5 September and moved to Pusan for reconsolidation with the division.⁶⁶ In defending the perimeter the Regiment was fighting at its peacetime strength of only two rifle companies per battalion. The third rifle companies arrived just days before the Regiment sailed for Inchon on 10 September. The remainder of the 1st Marine Division converged on Kobe, Japan and the scene there was unlike any previous operation. Units began arriving from the United States on 28 August and were required to be ready to sail for Inchon by

11 September. “They and their gear would have to be unloaded, the equipment stacked, inventoried and loaded again, about thirty thousand tons of it, all in less than two weeks. It was unheard of. But then so was almost everything about this landing plan.”⁶⁷

Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA), led by Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, was serving as the occupation force in Japan when the DPRK Army charged the 38th Parallel. EUSA included four divisions: the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division. As of June 30, 1950, the EUSA was only manned at 48.8% of its authorized strength, and 25.9% strength for service troops.⁶⁸ All were poorly resourced, unequipped, and severely undermanned. Each of the four divisions was short of its authorized war strength by nearly 7,000 men. “On the whole none of the four divisions was capable of laying down more than 62 percent of its normal firepower.”⁶⁹ FECOM had received no new equipment since World War II and little training was conducted to achieve combat effective units at battalion level or higher.⁷⁰ Their occupation duties in Japan left troops untrained and ill prepared for combat operations:

In occupied Japan these GIs... had found a not unpleasant life. Most Japanese were docile and cooperative and, outwardly at least, appeared to welcome their conquerors. A warm companionship between the Japanese and the GIs evolved. ...it was not uncommon for a first sergeant and his family to have one or two servants.⁷¹

In July, MacArthur ordered the 24th Infantry, 25th Infantry, and 1st Cavalry Divisions of EUSA to Korea, leaving only the cannibalized 7th Infantry Division in Japan. He also received, from elsewhere across the Army, the infantry and artillery battalions necessary to bring EUSA up to battle strength.⁷² EUSA resources were quickly and seriously depleted from early battles on the Korean Peninsula. The 24th Infantry Division was defeated in battles along the Kum River early in July. Elements of the 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions were also overwhelmed and severely weakened in engagements with the DPRK Army. Even with reinforcements from Okinawa, these units were quickly overcome by the continuous onslaught.⁷³

FECOM resources were running out, creating even greater urgency in the execution of an amphibious landing to turn the tide of war.

The 2nd Infantry Division deployed from the U.S. to the Far East, originally slated to be part of the Inchon assault force. MacArthur was quickly forced to push the 2nd Infantry Division to the front lines, replacing them for the landing operation with the 7th Infantry Division, still in Japan and manned at less than half strength. Over 1600 personnel had been transferred from the 7th to augment the remainder of EUSA units deploying in support of the defense of the ROK. Combat replacements continued to drain the Division of able bodied, combat capable troops. By the end of July, the division was short more than 9,000 men, a large proportion of whom were critical specialists and noncommissioned officer weapons leaders. On 26 July, MacArthur relieved the 7th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General David G. Barr, of its occupation duties in Japan. On 4 August he further ordered Barr to bring his unit to full strength by 15 September prepare for movement to Korea.⁷⁴ All replacement troops arriving in the Far East, including those slated for other EUSA units in active combat, were channeled into GHQ reserve, eventually to fill the 7th Infantry Division in preparation for the amphibious assault, now the top priority in FECOM. Experienced non-commissioned officers were pulled from military schools in the U.S. to fill field leadership positions and assist in training within the quickly expanding Division.⁷⁵

With the primary Army assault force still severely understrength, MacArthur resorted to an expedient, unorthodox, and unprecedented measure, namely authorizing incorporation of over 8,000 Korean troops into the 7th Infantry Division. This was the inception of Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA).⁷⁶ Soon formalized through agreement between the ROK and US Armies, the KATUSA program integrated “South Korean soldiers into U.S. units,

with the ROK Army retaining responsibility for their administration, pay, and discipline.”⁷⁷

KATUSA troops were not organized, trained, or even necessarily experienced military service members; most were newly conscripted Korean civilians.⁷⁸ The ROK Army had been so decimated in the first days of the war that in order to fill the augmentation quotas in short time, they resorted to enlisting men of the streets of Korean cities. The recruits were sent directly to U.S. units.⁷⁹ They were not uniformed or prepared for service, but in the last week of August, 8,637 KATUSA recruits arrived at the 7th Infantry Division assembly area in Japan.⁸⁰ The recruits were assigned primarily to Infantry fighting units. Preparing them for the discipline of combat service and military life was a task of great complexity in itself. The following are accounts of the state of KATUSA recruits upon arrival in Japan:

“Their clothing on arrival ranged from business suits to shirts and shorts, or shorts only. The majority wore sandals or cloth shoes. They were civilians-stunned, confused, and exhausted. Only a few could speak English. Approximately 100 of the South Korean recruits were assigned to each rifle company and artillery battery; the buddy system was used for training and control.”⁸¹

“The Koreans we received looked as though they had been herded together to get them off the streets of Pusan. They spent their first week in Japan in quarantine, since they had to be deloused and cleaned. Then we had to equip them completely... They could not speak English and we had few interpreters.... We had a long way to go in two weeks.”⁸²

To establish combat readiness in these new KATUSA troops, EUSA established four training centers but with the constrained schedule for the Inchon landing, many new Korean troops were sent directly into combat with U.S. units, receiving no training. Knowledge of the English language was not a requisite and in fact was practically nonexistent among KATUSA soldiers. With translators in short supply, training and integrating KATUSA troops was frustrating at best. Administrative issues abounded in many unexpected areas. Standard uniforms were hard to fit to the Korean men, most more diminutive in size than average American troops. Feeding Koreans posed a significant change from the customary diet of

primarily rice. U.S. rations were higher in calories but lower in bulk and this led to nearly constant complaints of hunger on the part of the KATUSA troops. In terms of technical training, it was nearly impossible to adequately train these new recruits in the proper use of weaponry, vehicles, and equipment.⁸³

There were certainly benefits to the KATUSA program. These soldiers were found most useful in artillery and service units. Language barriers still existed, but these units were more adaptable to visual means of communication. The Korean soldiers were highly skilled at distinguishing between North and South Koreans, a skill that was particularly helpful to U.S. units during the assault at Inchon and recapture of Seoul. Perhaps most importantly, particularly during the Inchon invasion and recapture of Seoul, KATUSA troops were very valuable in handling of refugees, allowing U.S. units to focus on the combat mission.⁸⁴

Assault at Inchon

The KATUSA program had a long way to go from inception to action, and U.S. units had to be reestablished and reorganized, all with only a few weeks to get there. The mission orders for the Inchon attack were officially published on 28 August as X Corps Operations Order No. 1.⁸⁵ On 3 September, as Typhoon Jane bore down on Kobe, the first elements of the 1st Marine Division loaded U.S. Navy ships for transport to Inchon. Two days later the 5th Marine Regiment withdrew from the defensive line in Pusan and sailed for Inchon on 10 September. At the same time, the 7th Infantry division embarked for transport from Yokohama.

For the Navy's part, Joint Task Force 7 (JTF 7) was activated on 11 September, under the command of Admiral Arthur D. Struble. JTF 7, built around the 7th Fleet, maintained responsibility seven task forces: Attack Force, Blockade and Covering Force, X Corps, Control and Reconnaissance Force, First Carrier Group, Service Squadron, and ROK Naval Forces.

From initial departure through the amphibious assault, Almond and the X Corps would remain subordinate to Struble and JTF 7. Almond would assume command once ashore and JTF 7 would be disbanded.⁸⁶ On 13 September 1950, a gunfire support group of four cruisers and six destroyers steamed into the outer harbor at Inchon. Rear Admiral John M. Higgins then directed an early assault from the sea, shaping the battlefield and destroying enemy coastal defenses.⁸⁷

On 15 September, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division, as the primary assault force, landed at Green Beach, on the tiny island of Wolmi-do, opposite the Inchon harbor. With only the slightest window to land forces, they seized the island to await the second high tide and additional forces. With the second tide, additional elements of the 5th Marines landed at Red Beach, across from Wolmi-do while the 1st Marines landed at Blue Beach south of the city of Inchon.⁸⁸ U.S. Marines advanced quickly, followed closely by ROK Marine forces, securing the harbor for use as a base through which follow on forces and resupply would flow expeditiously.⁸⁹ As expected, the Inchon area was only lightly defended, offering exactly the enemy weakness that MacArthur was planning to exploit. “Two hundred miles behind the front line Inchon was weakly defended by a garrison that had never expected its enemy to attempt such a lunatic operation.”⁹⁰ Exploding through Inchon allowed nearly direct access to the capital city of Seoul and key communication lines. Within days the Marines captured Kimpo air base, completely clearing it on 18 September to allow for close air support and supply transport.⁹¹ That same day, the first elements of the 7th Infantry Division landed at Inchon with the mission of protecting the right (south) flank of X Corps forces and expanding the beachhead. In conjunction with the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Infantry Division would form the anvil on which the EUSA hammer would crush the DPRK Army.⁹² By 22 September over 53,000

personnel had been unloaded at Inchon, a remarkable feat particularly considering the scattered and slim state of the U.S. military just one month prior.⁹³

To achieve the desired breakout from Pusan, while simultaneously diverting attention from Inchon, EUSA fought intensely to create complete disorder for the DPRK Army.

Eighth Army had to hold its position so tightly that the enemy would become psychologically as well as physically stuck fast to his Pusan position.... The enemy would understandably be uneasy when the landing in the rear occurred, and his dilemma would be compounded when the enemy to the NKPA's front, instead of remaining beleaguered, somehow found the strength of arms and will to launch a counter-offensive.⁹⁴

Ensuing battles over the next week led to the desired convergence of the EUSA units from the south with X Corps units from the north. On 26 September 1950, MacArthur declared, "SEOUL, Capital of the Republic of Korea, is again in friendly hands, United Nations Forces, including the 17th Regiment of the ROK Army and elements of the U.S. 7th and 1st Marine Divisions, have completed the envelopment and seizure of the city."⁹⁵

Urgent Risk Acceptance for Swift Success

"MacArthur and Almond conducted all Inchon Planning behind an elaborate wall of secrecy."⁹⁶ Though complete secrecy was a matter of military operational classification, it also enabled X Corps planning to move forward at a rapid pace. Within the bounds of operational confidentiality, a driving energy, for which MacArthur and Almond were known, thrived among those kept in the know.⁹⁷ It was this very foundation of loyalty and urgency that led directly to the activation of X Corps in Korea and its successful amphibious assault at Inchon. The bureaucracy of military decision-making and approval processes, particularly at headquarters level echelons, can stymie the very progress it intends to produce. Much of this practice was scrapped in the face of the urgency required to complete this mission. In an atmosphere of implicit trust within MacArthur's X Corps planning cell, decisions were made quickly and

adhered to unflinchingly. On 12 September MacArthur and Almond sailed for Inchon aboard the *Mount McKinley*. On 13 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff received MacArthur's order for Operation CHROMITE by courier, leaving little to no time for input from senior leaders in Washington.⁹⁸ This seemingly intentional control effort highlights the influence and internal control that MacArthur built into his plan in order to ensure that Operation CHROMITE progressed according to his direction and vision.

Fighting across the Korean peninsula from June through September 1950 was the foundation for urgency; flexibility and adaptability became the method for urgent victory. Without an enterprising and daring plan, the battles surely would have continued, likely leading to the expulsion of FECOM forces from Korea and the defeat of ROK forces by the DPRK. MacArthur turned impending defeat into stunning victory by the challenging and unexpected amphibious landing through the port of Inchon. Operation CHROMITE was a controversial undertaking. Most leaders outside of MacArthur's inner circle saw it as dangerous, even impossible, but he and his staff saw it as the only way to succeed. In the words of one of MacArthur's intelligence officer, "While others thought of a way to withdraw our forces safely MacArthur planned for victory."⁹⁹ With such friction, the only route to success started with planning activities conducted within the bounds of MacArthur's own command. In time it was his bullishness and defensible arrogance that allowed X Corps to become a unit that included sister service and coalition partners. "In spite of the great odds against it and the serious doubts of many experts, the X Corps of almost 70,000 men was organized, equipped, moved to staging areas, embarked, and transported to Korea in time to make a successful amphibious assault at INCHON on D-Day, the 15th of September."¹⁰⁰

 Notes

¹ Lynn Montross and CPT Nicholas M. Canzona. *U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Korea, 1950-1953: The Inchon-Seoul Operation*. Vol. II (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters USMC, 1955), 330.

² Ibid, 330.

³ “The Korean War,” National Archives and Record Administration, *Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library*, accessed October 20, 2014, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/korean_war.html.

⁴ Curtis A. Utz, “Assault from the Sea: The Amphibious Landing at Inchon.” In *The U.S. Navy Modern War Series* (Naval Historical Center, 1994), 10-12.

⁵ Hiroshi Masuda, *MacArthur in Asia: The General and His Staff in the Philippines, Japan, and Korea*. Translated by Hiroshi Yamamoto (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 249.

⁶ Richard W. Stewart *American Military History: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2008*, Vol. II, CMH Pub 30-22-2 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2010), 230; MAJ Robert K. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War*. CMH Pub 30-3. Edited by Walter G. Hermes (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1988), 48.

⁷ Masuda, 251-252; “The Korean War,” National Archives and Record Administration, *Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library*, accessed October 20, 2014, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/korean_war.html.

⁸ Masuda, 252.

⁹ “MacArthur Victory at Inchon: Defeating the British Empire,” Don Phau and Dean Andromidas, *Executive Intelligence Review*, last updated April 10, 2013, <http://archive.larouchepac.com/node/26166>.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ “Headquarters X Corps War Diary Summary for Operation Chromite: 15 August to 30 September 1950,” 1950, Headquarters, United States X Corps. Combined Arms Research Library. U.S. Army, 2.

¹² Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War* (New York, NY: Times Books, 1987), 239.

¹³ Michael Langley, *Inchon Landing: MacArthur's Last Triumph* (New York, NY: Times Books, 1979), 17.

¹⁴ Ibid, 39.

¹⁵ Masuda, 6; “MacArthur Victory at Inchon: Defeating the British Empire,” Don Phau and Dean Andromidas, *Executive Intelligence Review*, last updated April 10, 2013, <http://archive.larouchepac.com/node/26166>.

¹⁶ “The Assault On Inchon”, *The Independent Veteran, Korean War Documentary*, accessed October 20, 2014 <http://www.koreanwaronline.com/history/inchon.htm>

¹⁷ Utz 1994, 1.

¹⁸ Edward W. Sheehan, Jr., *Operational Logistics: Lessons from the Inchon Landing* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1996), 3.

¹⁹ Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis. *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012*. Third Edition (New York, NY: Free Press, 2012), 451; James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year*. CMH Pub 20-1-1 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1992), 159.

²⁰ Blair, 6-9.

²¹ Millett, Maslowski and Feis, 452.

²² "Headquarters X Corps War Diary Summary for Operation Chromite: 15 August to 30 September 1950," 1950, Headquarters, United States X Corps. Combined Arms Research Library. U.S. Army, 5.

²³ MAJ John D. Jordan, *Operation CHROMITE: Power Projection... From the Sea* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1995), 6.

²⁴ Roy E. Appleman, "South to the Naktong, North to Yalu." In *United States Army in the Korean War*. CMH Pub 20-2-1 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1961), 490.

²⁵ In standard military operations the Division or Corps G1 is able to pull resources from an established Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE). In this case, not only was there no established TOE but MacArthur was not being allotted additional forces. To develop the X Corps the G1 would have to first develop a skeleton structure for leadership and staff, then build a new personnel requirement utilizing only minimal existing forces in FECOM. Additionally, MacArthur ordered this a joint and combined operation so his G1 was required to understand and work with all services including the ROK.

²⁶ "Headquarters X Corps War Diary Summary for Operation Chromite: 15 August to 30 September 1950," 1950, Headquarters, United States X Corps. Combined Arms Research Library. U.S. Army, 1-2.

²⁷ Montross and Canzona, 58.

²⁸ Ibid, 58.

²⁹ "Headquarters X Corps War Diary Summary for Operation Chromite: 15 August to 30 September 1950," 1950, Headquarters, United States X Corps. Combined Arms Research Library. U.S. Army, 1.

³⁰ Carl H. Builder, Steven C. Bankes, and Richard Nordin. "The Visionary: MacArthur at Inchon." In *Command Concepts: A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control*, 73-88 (New York, NY: Rand Corporation, 1999), 86.

³¹ Montross and Canzona, 38

³² Shelby L. Stanton, *America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950* (Novata, CA: Presidio Press, 1989), 43.

³³ Appleman 1992, 490.

³⁴ "The Assault On Inchon", The Independent Veteran, *Korean War Documentary*, accessed October 20, 2014 <http://www.koreanwaronline.com/history/inchon.htm>.

³⁵ Appleman, 490.

³⁶ Stanton, 15-17.

³⁷ Ibid, 25-28.

³⁸ Ibid, 28.

³⁹ Montross and Canzona, 43.

⁴⁰ Thomas E. Hanson, *Combat Ready: The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War*. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 62.

⁴¹ James F. Schnabel, "Policy and Direction: The First Year," In. *United States Army in the Korean War*. CMH Pub 20-2-1 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1992), 154.

⁴² Though information is not available on the subject, it can be assumed that COL Harrison was also a trusted advisor to both Almond and MacArthur, as his responsibilities in building the X Corps were great and unprecedented.

⁴³ Schnabel, 158.

⁴⁴ Stanton 1989, 38-40.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 39.

⁴⁶ Headquarters X Corps War Diary Summary for Operation Chromite: 15 August to 30 September 1950," 1950, Headquarters, United States X Corps. Combined Arms Research Library. U.S. Army, 1.

⁴⁷ Stanton, 40-41.

⁴⁸ Appleman, 489-490.

⁴⁹ Stanton, 42.

⁵⁰ Ibid, ix.

⁵¹ Ibid, 32.

⁵² Terrence J. Gough, *U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War: A Research Approach*. CMH Pub 70-19 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1987), 4-5.

⁵³ Ibid, 3-7

⁵⁴ Danny J. Crawford, et al., *The 1st Marine Division and Its Regiments* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1999), 3; BGEN (Ret) Edwin H. Simmons, "Over the Seawall: US Marines at Inchon." In *U.S. Marines in the Korean War*, by U.S. Marine Corps History Division, edited by Charles R. Smith, 73-142 (Washington, DC: History Division, USMC, 2007), 83.

⁵⁵ Stanton, 35-37.

⁵⁶ Appleman 1992, 49; Simmons, 80-81; Ralph W. Donnelly, Gabrielle M. Neufeld, and Carolyn A. Tyson. *A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps, 1947-1964* (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1971).

⁵⁷ Montross, Canzona, 55.

⁵⁸ Utz, 14-16.

⁵⁹ Crawford, 9.

⁶⁰ MAJ John H. Johnstone, USMC, *A Brief History of the 1st Marines* (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters US Marine Corps, 1968), 20.

⁶¹ Simmons, 82-83.

⁶² Ibid, 81-82.

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- ⁶³ Montross and Canzona, 53.
- ⁶⁴ Simmons, 84,85.
- ⁶⁵ James S. Santelli, *A Brief History of the 7th Marines* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters US Marine Corps, 1980), 34; Montross and Canzona, 54.
- ⁶⁶ Stanton, 37.
- ⁶⁷ Walton Sheldon, *Hell or High Water: MacArthur's Landing at Inchon* (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1968), 122.
- ⁶⁸ Gough 3-4; Masuda, 252.
- ⁶⁹ Blair, 44.
- ⁷⁰ William J. Webb, *The Korean War: The Outbreak*, CMH Pub 19-6. (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2006), 6.
- ⁷¹ Blair, 49.
- ⁷² Utz, 8-18.
- ⁷³ Stanton, 30.
- ⁷⁴ Appleman, 491; Simmons, 83.
- ⁷⁵ Appleman, 492.
- ⁷⁶ Utz 1994, 8-18.
- ⁷⁷ Gough, 47.
- ⁷⁸ Stewart, 231.
- ⁷⁹ Gough, 47.
- ⁸⁰ Stanton, 53.
- ⁸¹ Appleman 1961, 492.
- ⁸² Stanton, 53.
- ⁸³ Simmons, 83-85
- ⁸⁴ Simmons, 83-85
- ⁸⁵ Headquarters X Corps War Diary Summary for Operation Chromite: 15 August to 30 September 1950," 1950, Headquarters, United States X Corps. Combined Arms Research Library. U.S. Army, 7.
- ⁸⁶ Simmons, 97-98.
- ⁸⁷ Utz 1994, 24.
- ⁸⁸ Sheldon, ix-x; Jordan, 13-14.
- ⁸⁹ Headquarters X Corps War Diary Summary for Operation Chromite: 15 August to 30 September 1950," 1950, Headquarters, United States X Corps. Combined Arms Research Library. U.S. Army, 10-11; Langley, 17.
- ⁹⁰ Langley, 17.
- ⁹¹ Utz, 2.
- ⁹² R. Schmidt, et al. *Operation CHROMITE (Inchon)* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1984), 50,51.
- ⁹³ Gough, 7.

⁹⁴ MAJ David H. Mamaux, *Operation CHROMITE: Operational Art in a Limited War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Studies, US Army Command and Staff College, 1987).

⁹⁵ Headquarters X Corps War Diary Summary for Operation Chromite: 15 August to 30 September 1950," 1950, Headquarters, United States X Corps. Combined Arms Research Library. U.S. Army, 22.

⁹⁶ Blair, 238.

⁹⁷ Appleman 1961, 490.

⁹⁸ Mamaux, 21.

⁹⁹ Langley 1979, 40.

¹⁰⁰ Headquarters X Corps War Diary Summary for Operation Chromite: 15 August to 30 September 1950," 1950, Headquarters, United States X Corps. Combined Arms Research Library. U.S. Army, 3.

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