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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**VARIATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE FUTURES IN THE CONFLICT WITH
BOKO HARAM**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTERS OF MILITARY STUDIES

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: VARIATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE FUTURES IN THE CONFLICT WITH BOKO HARAM

Author: Major Raymond A. Forbes, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The current counterinsurgency operations being conducted by the Government of Nigeria, supported by United States Forces, will not have a significant effect on the capability or capacity of the Boko Haram insurgency.

Discussion: Boko Haram's emergence in northern Nigeria represents a significant security challenge. Its cooperative associations with other regional terrorist organizations expand this challenge beyond its current environment and into the region. Furthermore, Boko Haram's increasing capacity and capability could allow this regional threat to blossom from simply a local and operational challenge into a significant strategic problem for the United States and its allies. Currently, the United States' diplomatic, military, and economic relationships with Nigeria demand a response to this threat. In seeking to address these security concerns, the US employed assistance across the elements of national power to the Nigerian government, attempting to reinforce its counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. However, these efforts are likely insufficient to have any real effect on the insurgency and its violence.

This paper begins with a deconstruction of the insurgency's current operating environment; primarily focusing on the conflict's political situation, military elements, social issues, economic factors, U.S. strategy, Boko Haram strategy, and the Nigerian strategy. Then, it identifies critical factors affecting the conflict, and using a variation of alternative futures analysis, it attempts to determine the likelihood of an end to the conflict through the current combined US and Nigerian counterinsurgency actions.

Conclusion: Ultimately, through this analysis of the conflict environment, the strategies of the parties to the conflict, and the alternative futures analytical model, this paper assesses that the current combined counterinsurgency operations of the Governments of Nigeria and the United States will not have a significant effect on the capability or capacity of the Boko Haram insurgency.

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Preface

In the current conflict environment, the United States finds itself continually battling insurgent forces while simultaneously dealing with conventional threats. This hybrid world conflict taxes the United States in more than just the application of military force. The US's expenditure of blood, treasure, economic, informational, and political capital must be more efficient and effective than ever. Unfortunately, it appears that efficiency and effectiveness in applying a lasting solution to the conflict may be sacrificed in economy of force actions around the world in order to satisfy the United States' short and medium term interests. This may be what the US is doing in its conflict with Nigeria's Boko Haram.

This paper begins with an overview of the insurgency's current conflict environment, using a historical review of the insurgency, the country of Nigeria, and the operating environment. In the contemporary operating environment, the paper focuses on the Nigerian and Boko Haram political situations, their associated military elements and capabilities, Nigerian social issues, Nigerian and Boko Haram economic factors, U.S. strategy, Boko Haram strategy, and Nigerian strategy. Then, using a variation of alternative futures analysis allowing for more critical factors interaction, the paper predicts possible near and medium term outcomes to the conflict. Ultimately, the paper attempts to assess the chances of the combined COIN strategy having a significant effect on the capacity and capability of Boko Haram.

The sources for this project were extensive. Therefore, the paper used books, periodical articles, journal articles, and current local and foreign open source reporting within the last five years. Currently, all of the paper's sources are online, and there should be no issues reacquiring any of the materials. Furthermore, the source for the analytical model is on the CIA's website, and the variation used is explained and included in the appendices.

I would like to thank the Marines of my Command and Staff College Conference Group for their help in proofreading this work. I would also like to thank several of my academic advisors and military faculty for their help and support in this project. LtCol Michael “Booger” Russ, Dr. Edward Erickson, Dr. Bradford Wineman, Dr. Craig Swanson, and Dr. Jonathan Philipps were all instrumental in this undertaking. All of their advice, mentorship, and proofing were invaluable and much appreciated. Without their help, I am sure this project would not have come to completion.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Robin, for all her love and understanding. The days she left me, alone, locked in the study, reading endlessly, writing poorly, while consistently supporting the unknowable outcome was the greatest gift she could have bestowed. Her patience and support never wavered. They were certainly some of the greatest contributions to the completion of this project, and I will forever be grateful.

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Introduction

Boko Haram's emergence in northern Nigeria represents a significant security challenge. Its cooperative associations with other regional terrorist organizations expand this former local challenge beyond its current environment and into the region. Furthermore, Boko Haram's increasing capacity and capability could allow this regional threat to blossom from a local and operational challenge into a significant strategic problem for the United States and its allies. Currently, the United States' diplomatic, military, and economic relationships with Nigeria demand a response. In seeking to address these security concerns, the US employs assistance across the elements of national power to the Nigerian government,¹ attempting to reinforce the Nigerians' counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. However, these efforts are insufficient to have any real effect on the insurgency and its violence.

This paper attempts to answer the question, "to what extent will the current combined United States and Nigeria COIN strategy and operations end the Boko Haram insurgency?" This question demands an answer because of the United States' economic, diplomatic, and military relationship with the Nigerians, and the Boko Haram insurgency threatens the stability of that relationship, the security in Western Africa, and American interests in the region.

This paper begins with a deconstruction of the current conflict environment, primarily focusing on the political situation, military elements, social issues, and economic factors. It then breaks down the strategies of the parties to the conflict, and it determines the critical factors influencing the conflict. Using these critical factors, the paper employs a variation of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Structured Analytic Technique (SAT)² in order to determine whether or not the combined US and Nigeria actions will have any effect on the continuing insurgency. Unless conditions on the ground or coalition plans change significantly, the current combined US

and Nigeria counterinsurgency operations will not have a significant effect on the capability or capacity of the Boko Haram insurgency.

Overview of the Conflict Environment

History of Nigeria

During the 19th century, the British gained significant influence of the African areas that would later become Nigeria. After World War II, Nigeria gained levels of self-governance and autonomy through several constitutional iterations, ultimately gaining independence in 1960. After gaining its independence, the Nigerian military governed the country until the houses of government adopted a new constitution in 1999. This passage marked the first time power peacefully passed from the military to civilian control in the country's history.

Since 1999, the government implemented, and continues to implement, policies aimed at diversifying and transforming the nation's economy from a simple petroleum based economy to one that can compete on the global scale. However, significant corruption and mismanagement caused the current and former governments to waste vast economic resources. Furthermore, rampant poverty and ancient ethnic and religious feuds stoked significant ethnic and religious unrest across the nation. Despite these internal and external conflicts, Nigeria recently occupied a non-permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, and its recent period of relative peace has lasted longer than any other time in its history.³

History of Boko Haram

During the 19th century, British colonialists and their western influences caused a rift among the Islamic people of northern Nigeria. One side of the rift aligned with the British colonization effort, effectively becoming the British's administrators in the region. The other

side primarily comprised the Muslims living in poverty, who opposed all Western influence in the region. This opposition to western influence helped to stoke the rise of regional Islamic fundamentalism.

“Boko Haram” means “western education is forbidden,” and the group is also known as “Jama'atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da'awati wal-Jihad,” or “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad.”⁴ Mohammed Yusuf founded Boko Haram as a response to public outcry against local and national governmental corruption, which he effectively linked to western influence in the minds of the local populace.⁵ An alternative theory of Boko Haram’s founding stated that the group began in 1995 as Sahaba, and the organization’s movement toward fundamentalism began when 800 of its members, including Mohammed Yusuf, died at the hands of the government’s security forces.⁶

Shortly after its founding, Boko Haram created a settlement on the border of Niger and Nigeria, called “Afghanistan.” Local police and officials called for the removal of the “Afghanistan” settlement, and after escalating tensions, Boko Haram attacked the police and officials. In response to this escalation of violence, Nigerian forces attacked and destroyed the “Afghanistan” settlement, killing several Boko Haram members. Prior to 2009, this was one of Boko Haram's few successful attacks, but since then it significantly increased its capability, capacity, and operational tempo.⁷

Political

Nigeria employs a western system of constitutional government based on the United States system. Nigeria’s government is a Federal Republic made up of 36 states and a Capital Territory. The Federal system exists at the state and national level, and it is administered

through the President and Governors. Legislatures exist at both the state and national level as well. The national legislature is a bicameral system, with a House and Senate, known as the National Assembly. All executive and legislative personnel are elected for four years under the current constitution, and the Nigerian constitution mandates term limits of two terms. The judiciary resolves conflicts between the executive and legislative branches, and it adjudicates legal questions among the systems of courts.⁸

Boko Haram rejects western culture, education, science, and government. According to Mohammed Yusuf, “belief that the earth is spherical in shape is a sharp contradiction to Islamic thought and therefore should be rejected along with Darwinism and the theory that rain comes from water evaporated by the sun.”⁹ “Ironically, Nigerian academic Hussain Zakaria told BBC News that Yusuf ‘is graduate educated and very proficient in English.’”¹⁰ Boko Haram has no “conventional political activity.”¹¹ Boko Haram rejects all forms of government that are not of the Islamic system, and the Nigerian government does not have an official dialogue with Boko Haram. Therefore, talks involving cease fires are minimal, and talks are unlikely to succeed due to Boko Haram’s core rejection of all things western.¹²

Military

Nigeria has the largest military in West Africa. However, it is only capable of basic defensive operations. The Nigerian Army’s capability and capacity are not proportional to its size and armament of 60,000 soldiers organized into twenty-five infantry battalions. A general lack of training, equipment sustainment, and cooperation with western forces degraded Nigerian military effectiveness. Furthermore, since 1999 Nigeria spent about one-quarter of its budget on security. However, significant corruption hampers these massive military expenditures, as

Nigerian officers embezzle both funds and resources. Since the peaceful handover of power in 1999, the Nigerian government also intentionally created a hollow force, attempting to ensure it was not capable of a coup.¹³

Nigeria's current military equipment set includes significant assets for its ground and air forces. For example, the Nigerian air forces currently employ or are acquiring Mi-34 helicopters, Mi-35P and Mi-24 gunships, Mi-17 utility helicopters, Agusta A109 helicopters, and Agusta A139 helicopters.¹⁴ In fact, the Nigerian Air Force is even considering buying Scorpion ISR multi-role fighters in order to conduct border security; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); COIN ops; and air defense. Furthermore, the Nigerian Army ground forces currently employ or are in the process of acquiring T-72 tanks, AMX-30 tanks, T-55 tanks, MT-LB armored personnel carriers (APC) / infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), Otokar Cobra APCs, BTR-3 APCs, BTR-70 APCs, BTR-60 APCs, Panhard M3 APCs, 8x8 MOWAG APCs, Oto Melara 105 mm howitzers, Palmaria 155mm self-propelled howitzers, and BOFORS Archer 155 mm gun-howitzers.¹⁵ These acquisitions and their replacement of current aging and antiquated equipment certainly provide the material solutions in order to field an effective combined arms force. However, the aforementioned lack of training, equipment maintenance, and cooperation with western forces helped create the Nigerian military's hollow force. However, with significant changes to doctrine, sustainment, and employment these assets could be used more effectively to counter Boko Haram.^{16 17}

Even with the significant military equipment assets that Nigeria owns, fielding these assets in a manner conducive to conducting COIN operations proved elusive. For example, Nigeria recently conducted a kinetic offensive against BH safe havens, which had limited success. However, at the conclusion of the offensive in 2010, Boko Haram actually increased its

attacks, killing more civilians and establishing a base of operations along the Cameroonian border.¹⁸ Despite Boko Haram's surge, Nigeria's military recently claimed successes in aerial bombardments and ground actions on extremist hideouts in the forests and mountain caves along the Cameroon and Chad borders.¹⁹ Nigeria's allies also conducted successful kinetic attacks in the region on Boko Haram fighters. In fact, Cameroon recently claimed it killed over 100 Boko Haram fighters during a reported border incursion.²⁰

Contrary to the conventional militaries of the region, Boko Haram uses a loose hierarchical structure.²¹ Abubakar Shekau, the group's current leader, runs the organization with a Shura council, consisting of approximately twenty members. These members direct their individual autonomous cells based on a common direction and goal. While the Shura council and Shekau both direct the actions of the cells, it should be noted that Shekau can act independently of the council.²² While Boko Haram's core members likely number in the hundreds populating dozens of cells, their popular support means their supporters number in the thousands.²³

Boko Haram's membership and supporter numbers enable substantial operational and tactical capabilities in their fight against the governments of West Africa, and these capabilities may be growing with the addition of new advanced weapons acquired from other terrorist organizations. For example, the Congressional Research Service asserts, "Boko Haram's attacks [increased] substantially in frequency, reach, and lethality, now occurring almost daily in northeast Nigeria, and periodically beyond."²⁴ They also kidnapped approximately 219 Chibok schoolgirls,²⁵ and their attacks in the hills and jungles of Cameroon killed at least four people in small arms fire (SAFIRE) incidents.²⁶ Furthermore, Boko Haram fighters stormed numerous towns in Nigeria and Cameroon, killing civilians along the way, and they seized Nigerian border

towns and other territory in order to control the local state areas for their establishment of the caliphate.²⁷ Ultimately, Boko Haram killed thousands in this conflict and its pursuit of an Islamic state.²⁸

Throughout these attacks, Boko Haram demonstrated significant tactical and operational capabilities using numerous styles and methods of operations. For example, they conducted successful tactical deception operations by dressing in Nigerian military uniforms. Using these uniforms, they conducted illegal checkpoints, killing 142 people.²⁹ They also executed effective coordinated attacks, simultaneously moving against police stations, prisons, military barracks, and government buildings, killing at least 55 people.³⁰ They conducted arson attacks against schools in Yobe state luring out and then firing on children and school officials fleeing the flames, killing forty-six and wounding four.³¹ Boko Haram also carried out vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks against churches, and then they targeted first responders with secondary devices, killing thirty-two and wounding eleven.³² Boko Haram also attacked cell towers in coordinated assaults because of its rejection of western technology and its assistance to Nigerian forces' COIN operations, killing fifteen people.³³ Finally, in one of its most spectacular attacks to date, Boko Haram executed simultaneous coordinated SAFIRE attacks against police, prisons, schools, state bureaus, churches, and residences, killing over 300 people.³⁴

In addition to its effectiveness as a tactical and operational threat, Boko Haram also executed suicide attacks outside of its local northern Nigerian areas, demonstrating an expanding tactical and operational reach.³⁵ Reporting also suggested that it may have acquired SA-7 and SA-24 surface-to-air missiles (SAM) from Libya.³⁶ This combined with its planning, execution, tactical effectiveness, and its affiliations with Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb

(AQIM) for training, personnel, and supplies³⁷ means Boko Haram could become a significant operational and strategic issue for the United States.

Economic

Since 2000, the Nigerian economy grew by about seven percent on average. It was the twenty-sixth largest economy in the world and the largest in Africa.³⁸ Despite this economic growth, the ongoing conflicts with Boko Haram, and a planned naval increase, the Nigerian government reduced defense spending by 6.5% in 2013. This represented the first decline in Nigerian defense spending since 2006, where from 2006 -2013 it grew approximately 20% per year.³⁹

Boko Haram provides for its economic requirements through numerous methods, such as robberies, donations, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom.⁴⁰ Other terrorist organizations also provide significant funding sources for Boko Haram because their mutual support helps to bring about their common ideology more quickly and in larger areas. For example, AQIM provided Boko Haram money from its supporting organizations in Saudi Arabia and Great Britain.⁴¹

In fact, one of the main factors influencing the conflict in Nigeria is economic. Boko Haram claims that western influences cause the corruption of the government and lead to the impoverishment of the populace.⁴² Members of the group easily reinforce this idea in the minds of the people by highlighting that the Nigerian government receives approximately \$50B per year in revenue from southern petroleum reserves. According to Boko Haram, the north does not reap benefits from these resources.⁴³

Social

Nigeria has more than 250 ethnic groups. The largest and most politically influential are the Hausa and Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, Ijaw, and Kanuri. These groups collectively make up about eighty-two percent of the population, and the Kanuri tribe accounts for about four percent of the total population.⁴⁴ The Kanuri tribe makes up most of Boko Haram.⁴⁵ According to open source reporting, this tribe generally occupies northeast Nigeria and the surrounding areas, and many of its members are able to pass easily through the region's open borders.

The Nigerian religion and language compositions are many and varied. Muslims account for about fifty percent of the population, while Christians and animist worshipers account for forty percent and ten percent, respectively.⁴⁶ The official Nigerian language is English. However, Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Fulani, and over 500 other indigenous languages are also prevalent among the populace.⁴⁷

The Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups, generally Muslim, occupy most of Northern Nigeria, and the Yoruba and Igbo groups generally occupy Southern Nigeria. During the reigns of the Muslim kingdoms of the Borno Sultanate and the Sokoto Caliphate, religion and its effects on politics significantly influenced the local region. Even after the British conquest in 1903, there was significant friction from Muslims opposed to Western influence and education.⁴⁸

Strategies of the Parties to the Conflict

Nigerian Government Strategy

The Nigerian Government strategy's ends seek the complete destruction of Boko Haram.⁴⁹ While destruction is not defined in the documentation, their current means to accomplish this end consist of approximately a sixty-thousand man army, outfitted as described above, spending approximately one-quarter of the Nigerian defense budget.⁵⁰ They also employ

Civilian Joint Task Forces, local militia forces who often act as vigilantes possibly indiscriminately killing members of Boko Haram and their supporters.⁵¹ The ways employed consist primarily of offensive combat operations and offensive militia operations. For example, the Nigerian Government employed aerial bombardments,⁵² kinetic offensives,⁵³ ground assaults,⁵⁴ and assistance from their neighbors and allies in the killing of Boko Haram members.⁵⁵

Boko Haram Strategy

Boko Haram's strategy's ends seek the creation of an Islamic state in Nigeria's predominantly Muslim northern regions. This is Boko Haram's core, unwavering demand since its uprisings began.⁵⁶ The means at Boko Haram's disposal include hundreds of members and thousands of supporters throughout their operating region.⁵⁷ These insurgents operate in nearly autonomous geographically oriented cells that are given direction from a Shura Council answering to Abubakar Shekau.⁵⁸ Boko Haram employs significant offensive capability as its ways, including attacks on governmental organizations,⁵⁹ attacks on civilians,⁶⁰ seizure of strategic territory for the establishment of its state,⁶¹ alliances with other like-minded organizations,⁶² and attempts to make the northern regions simply ungovernable.⁶³

United States Strategy

The United States' strategic ends seek to find and free the abducted Chibok schoolgirls; conduct combined COIN operations with Nigeria, its neighbors, and allies; and to dismantle this "murderous" group.⁶⁴ The United States hopes to accomplish these ends through the following ways. First, the US deploys and employs advisors and support to the Nigerian Government, and

it expands its intelligence sharing. Next, the US continues engagement to counter Boko Haram influence while providing support to the local populations affected by Boko Haram's actions. Finally, the US employs economic sanctions against Boko Haram, specifically by attacking its funding organizations that maintain legitimate businesses throughout the world. ⁶⁵

The means the United States intends to expend in its operations are substantial. For example, the deployment of Multi-Disciplinary Teams to Nigeria seeks to push a whole of government approach to Nigerian security, while advising the Nigerians about the ongoing operations to locate and rescue the Chibok schoolgirls. These teams also expect to build the capacity and capability of the Nigerian forces in order to respond effectively to future crises, while accounting for human rights and local civilian populations. Aside from these Multi-Disciplinary Teams, the US plans on expanding intelligence sharing with the Nigerians through the deployment of ISR assets in order to find the kidnapped girls and likely to attempt to degrade the Boko Haram network as a whole. Furthermore, the US plans to designate the Boko Haram group a terrorist organization and assist in having the United Nations designate it as such. This designation allows for law enforcement assets to pursue Boko Haram, and it allows for the establishment of a seven million dollar bounty on Abubakar Shekau and the freezing of assets of the organization. Finally, the US plans on allocating significant money for enhancing Nigeria's education systems, counseling, and Nigeria's inclusion into the Security Governance Initiative.⁶⁶

Conflict's Critical Factors

Analysis of the conflict environment and the strategies of all the parties involved points to four main critical factors, which happen to be major diplomatic, social, economic, and military concerns. First, political autonomy or independence of the northern regions and the

establishment of an Islamic caliphate⁶⁷ are Boko Haram's signature demands, and they likely dominate much of the conflict. The second critical factor is Boko Haram's view that the Nigerian government is indiscriminately killing Boko Haram members, leading to their retaliatory targeting of symbols of western society like government officials, police, prison guards, journalists, clerics, and newspapers. The next factor is the Nigerian government's investment and success in the economic development and equality of the northern regions. Finally, the fourth critical factor is the spread of radical Islamism among the northern Muslims.⁶⁸ As Sharif Nashashibe says, "Dependence on faith increases under poverty, creating the potential for radicalization (sic). Those who take the long view see the current instability, while deeply worrying, as part of the process of the region's countries finding their way amid their diverse communities and ideologies."⁶⁹ While the analysis could use other elements of the diplomatic, military, economic, and social aspects of the conflict, these factors appear to represent the heart of the issues confronting the belligerents.

Analysis

Model Explanation

In order to analyze possible futures in the conflict environment, this paper employs a variation on a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) structured analytic tool, Alternative Futures analysis. For a detailed graphic explanation of the models, see Appendices A, B, and C. This analytical model is useful when analysts face complex situations influenced by many factors, specifically where single outcome assessments are not desirable.⁷⁰ This variation to the model provides a reduction in uncertainty, an increase in the number of factors taken into account, and a logical framework to examine the relationships of the factors influencing the conflict.

Ultimately, the model with the four critical factors chosen produces sixteen possible future outcomes.⁷¹

In order to determine success for the United States, Nigeria, Boko Haram, and the International Community, the model had to define success. The model defined the outcomes of the belligerents on a scale of “win,” “qualified win,” “qualified loss,” and “loss.” However, the model’s assignment of “win” or “qualified win” did not necessarily coincide with the successful attainment of the belligerent’s strategic ends. For example, qualified wins for the Nigerian Government referred to possible outcomes that either lowered its levels of violence or maintained resources, or both. "Wins" generally refer to a party to the conflict attaining the ends described in the strategies outlined above. The United States gained "qualified wins" or success ultimately through lowered violence levels and maintenance of a relationship, either economic or diplomatic, with the Nigerian government. Boko Haram gained "wins" through either independence or levels of political autonomy or "qualified wins" through situational gains that led to lowered violence levels or increased economic gains. Finally, success for the international community included an end or reduction to the violence and a path to the resolution of the conflict. In most cases, a belligerent’s realization of its strategic ends ("win") is likely impossible.

Win/Loss Analysis

The following was the win/loss analysis of the model.

Win Loss Analysis	Win	Qualified Win	Qualified Loss	Loss
United States	2	14	0	0
Nigeria	0	15	0	1
Boko Haram	5	0	8	3
International Community	0	7	0	9

In all of the scenarios the United States gained a “win” or a “qualified win,” as it was always able to maintain its relationships with the Nigerian government and its economic relationships with the government’s oil rich southern regions. Even if the country split apart, no scenario identified the fall of the Nigerian government in the short term or medium term. Furthermore, the ethnic split in the country would likely delay any future significant change of the country’s government to one that was not friendly to the US. Thus, the US never gained its strategic ends, but the status quo gives it levels of success in most cases. In the future, the maintenance of this status quo requires a Return on Investment (ROI) analysis in order to determine if the economic ROI for the US outweighs the amount of money, resources, and aid provided by the US to the government of Nigeria.

The government of Nigeria gained a qualified win in fourteen of the scenarios. Some of these qualified wins included the loss of the Northern provinces with autonomy or independence for Boko Haram. These losses in territory are still qualified wins for the government because, even with these losses, the government continues to dominate the south and the primary economic drivers of the country. In some cases, they also do not lose more years of personnel, blood, and treasure in a protracted COIN fight. However, the underlying set of created

circumstances with qualified wins will likely only allow a small period of respite. The grant of independence to Boko Haram does not mean that the Northern provinces will in any way be stable or good neighbors. In fact, the lack of industry, education, and economic resources likely means that the conflict would resume in a short time. For example, Nigeria's main loss emerged in scenario twelve. Here the government lost because, while it saved on resources in its military and economy, the gains were only temporary. The ensuing instability of a hostile state on its border called for renewed military and economic action, causing a significant spike in resources expended and sovereignty lost.

Boko Haram's successes and losses spread much more evenly. However, it was the only belligerent to gain its stated strategic ends in several of the scenarios. In the model, Boko Haram won outright in five of the futures. In the futures where Boko Haram wins, it ultimately gains either autonomy or independence. It also usually buys time for either tactical or operational pauses, which allow it to continue to increase its capacity and capability for future conflict. Most of Boko Haram's eight qualified losses resulted from not gaining governance over the Northern provinces. However, its ability to trade space and resources for operational and tactical time allowed it to retain and build capacity and capability, remaining a significant advantage. Furthermore, Boko Haram's influence over the populace usually shifted toward the Nigerian government in its qualified loss scenarios. Finally, Boko Haram lost outright in three scenarios. In these scenarios, Boko Haram did not gain its stated objective, and it took significant casualties in action against the Nigerian government or combined offensives. However, once again its ability to trade space and resources for time in order to rebuild remained a significant advantage, and likely means these losses are only temporary.

The last party in the model was the International Community. This party to the conflict gained qualified wins seven times, and lost nine times. The qualified wins for the International Community usually resulted from the reduction in violence over the near or medium term. In some cases, the belligerents found a possible solution to the conflict, or more likely a path to a solution. However, in no case did the International Community win over the long term, as solutions and reductions in violence were likely temporary. Furthermore, the International Community gained losses in nine of the scenarios due to increased levels of violence and no solution to the Boko Haram security dilemma.

Most Likely Scenario

Future six was the most likely scenario. It saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government enacted policies to centralize government in Abuja, effectively minimizing provincial and local government in the northern provinces. It may even attempt to remove the local government officials and govern directly from Abuja in order to fully centralize control of the region. Simultaneously, the government launched significant coordinated offensive operations using both the conventional military and the Civilian Joint Task Forces. These operations likely syphon off the limited resources at the Nigerian government's disposal, which means that there will be a net loss, or at a minimum no gain, in economic aid to the Northern provinces. Meanwhile, radical Islam continued to increase throughout the region. This future manifested due to Abuja's centralization policies and practices effectively removing or minimizing provincial and local government in the northern provinces. With the implementation of these policies, the government's combined offensive ideally killed large numbers of Boko Haram members in the provinces and disrupted their supply chains. The

removal of corrupt local government combined with the decreases in economic development projects in the Northern provinces stagnated or imperiled the people's economic well-being. However, the remnants of Boko Haram used the crackdown as a recruitment tool. This combined with significant economic hardship increased radical Islamism throughout the region.

This future was a qualified loss for Boko Haram, a qualified win for the Nigerian government, a qualified win for the United States, and a qualified win for the international community. Boko Haram lost because it did not gain its stated objective, and it likely took significant casualties in the process. However, its ability to trade space and resources for time in order to rebuild remained a significant advantage over the long term. This time likely bought Boko Haram the ability to fight in the future. Furthermore, Boko Haram gained from the alienation of the populace through their worsening economic situation. This future was a qualified win for the Nigerian government because it retained control of the Northern provinces, and the actions inflicted damages on Boko Haram. However, the expenditure of resources for these gains may have been severe. Their execution of a cost benefit analysis to determine the gains value was ultimate in determining their affinity for this course of action. For the United States, this future was a qualified win as well. The United States retained its petroleum relationship with the Nigerian economy, but it may or may not have had significant effects on the region as a whole and the region's adoption of radical Islamism. Ultimately, this was a qualified win for the International Community as well, since the violence subsided for a short while, but not over the long term.

Most Dangerous Scenario

Future twelve was the most dangerous scenario. In this model, most dangerous scenario meant the one that saw a continuation of the violence, a degeneration of the regional strategic situation, or both. Future twelve saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government enacted policies to increase the independence or autonomy of the northern regions, while lowering or ceasing economic development programs in the area. Furthermore, the government held positions with the Nigerian Army and the Civilian Task Forces in preparation for their withdrawal, and they noted a decrease in the spread of radical Islamism. This future resulted from the Nigerian government granting autonomy or independence to the northern regions and Boko Haram. This independence created a safe haven for Boko Haram fighters, and it granted them time to train and build capacity and capability for their long term needs. Simultaneously, the government ceased offensive military operations and prepared for their withdrawal, effectively ceding the initiative to Boko Haram members. The Nigerian government ceasing military operations also likely only resulted in reduced violence by Boko Haram against government troops. Boko Haram retained the ability to murder, forcibly convert, or commit atrocities against any of the civilian populace in the area. Furthermore, the decrease in economic investment saved the Nigerian government resources in the short term. However, the ensuing lack of security caused an increase in Boko Haram actions to ensure they are in control of the future government. The lack of a spread of radical Islam was likely only temporary, while Boko Haram consolidated its control on the new country.

This future was a win for Boko Haram, a loss for the Nigerian government, a qualified win for the United States, and a loss for the international community. Boko Haram won because it gained all of its objectives at a very low cost. The Nigerian government lost because, while it saved on resources in its military and economy, the gains were only temporary. The ensuing

instability of a hostile state on its border likely called for future renewed military and economic action, which caused a significant spike in resources expended and sovereignty lost. The United States gained a qualified win through the maintenance of the relationships with Nigerian oil and economic partnerships. Finally, the international community lost, as there was no obvious solution to the violence or ongoing Boko Haram security dilemma.

Outliers

There were no outliers in this generation of the model. However, considering Boko Haram's acquisition of advanced weaponry from other terrorist organizations, there is an increasing likelihood of outliers if this model used different critical factors to the conflict. For example, the confirmation of the acquisition, training, and successful use of SA-7 and SA-24 advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAM) significantly increases Boko Haram's ability to influence the region and the world's strategic interests. Therefore, this situation would create outliers depending on the number, use, and movement of these weapons acquired.

Conclusion

The combined counterinsurgency operations by the United States and Nigeria will not have a significant effect on the capability or capacity of the Boko Haram insurgency. The failure of the current COIN campaign is likely due to the virtually indiscriminant kinetic attacks and approaches employed by the Nigerian government,⁷² coupled with little helpful aid from the US, other nations, or the international community. Furthermore, neither the current kinetic approach nor the token aid given to Nigeria addresses the underlying critical factors of the conflict. .

Understanding this and the fact that there is likely no solely military solution to this conflict, the US and the UN can help the Nigerian government solve this problem. However, this solution requires a long-term “whole of government” approach that employs a “whole of government” escalation of intensity, see Appendix D. Diplomatically, the US and UN need to build a coalition including Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, attempting to effectively isolate or drive Boko Haram into ground where they can be destroyed. Informationally, the coalition needs to build and distribute the capacity of information networks throughout the region. With this information network, the coalition’s cyber and information operations capabilities can reach both the populace and Boko Haram members. Militarily, the US should only advise the Nigerian forces and attempt to help build their COIN capability and capacity. The Nigerian armed forces in conjunction with the region’s forces should further provide for the security of the populace by reinforcing the local police. The US can also help by providing policing experts to help in this area. However, the US military should not be employed in this capacity. Next, the regional coalition mentioned above needs to harden the borders of the surrounding states, and attempt to drive Boko Haram into Borno province alone. There, with its back against the wall of Lake Chad, it can be destroyed or dealt with at leisure. Finally, economically, the international community and the coalition must continue to educate the people, sustain the gains in the military establishment, and help the governments bring prosperity to these lawless regions.

The employment of this type of a course of action will not be without its difficulties, though. As mentioned before, the Nigerian government intentionally hollowed out its military in order to protect itself from the threat of coups. Therefore, the course of action’s suggested build-up of the Nigerian military’s capability and capacity may represent a threat to the Nigerian regime over the long-term. However, it appears that the Nigerian government’s greatest present

threat and its greatest challenge to sovereignty is that posed by Boko Haram and militant Islamic extremists. Therefore, the increase in the military's capacity and capability is in the Nigerian government's best interest currently, and over the long-term it could be reduced to a hollow force again once the challenge posed by Boko Haram is finished.

This project generated a few other research questions and requirements for collection. First, an analyst should run this model again using the ends, ways, and means of each side's strategy and its implementation, or lack thereof, as the critical factors. Using this method, the model would generate 2^9 , or 512, possible futures. If this model took into account the acquisition of advanced weapons by Boko Haram, it would certainly generate more beneficial most dangerous scenarios for US and Nigerian planners and policy makers. Furthermore, the US ISR assets that deployed to the region should devote significant assets to determine if Boko Haram actually possesses and can use SAMs. Aside from these two immediate questions, this situation could also stand as a case study for reworking US strategy in regional threats and challenges to sovereignty, essentially developing a long-term but affordable method of dealing with these issues through internationally supported, strategic and operational envelopments.

Over the long-term, the only way the US and its allies can solve this problem is through the understanding that it is a multi-generational problem, requiring exceptionally long-term commitments and strategies. In this context, a multi-generational problem is one that takes multiple generations to fix or turn to a beneficial solution for at least one party to the conflict. At a minimum, any lasting and permanent solution to this problem is likely seventy-five years long and at least that amount away. As such, considering the US political cycle, a continuation of the status quo over the near and medium term best serves the US's largest set of interests.

Boko Haram's stronghold in northern Nigeria represents a significant security challenge, and it requires significantly more resources and actions to defeat it. Other regional terrorist organizations reinforce Boko Haram's position, and its increasing capacity and capability could allow this regional threat to become a significant strategic challenge for the US. In order to effectively deal with this problem, the US and its allies' expenditure of blood, treasure, economic, informational, and political capital must be more efficient and effective than ever. Unfortunately, it appears that the continuing economy of force actions may sacrifice the required efficiency and effectiveness, effectively preserving the status quo. This status quo, at best, grabs the US a qualified win from the jaws of defeat. Unless the US and its allies implement significant changes in strategy, the conflict will continue.

Notes

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APPENDIX A: LIST OF FUTURES DEVELOPED AND WIN/LOSS ANALYSIS

Future one saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government granted an increase in either political autonomy or independence for the northern regions, while simultaneously increasing the indiscriminate killing of Boko Haram Members. The Nigerian government also increased economic development and raised the underlying economic plight of the people. However, radical Islamism continued to spread throughout the region. This future likely resulted from the Nigerian government agreeing to grant independence to the region and employing continued economic programs, which local corrupt government officials did not administer. While these economic programs were likely temporary as the region establishes its own government, they affected the people's welfare in the short term. However, the Nigerian government's adoption of independence for the region directly affects the local Civilian Joint Task Forces, that fought on the front lines against the insurgents as militias and vigilantes. In response to the upcoming independence of the region, these forces claimed their ability to operate independently and struck out at Boko Haram members and their institutions. Ultimately, the increased local violence and lack of effective policing as the Nigerians withdraw their military contributes to the increased spread of radical Islamism.

This future is a win for Boko Haram, a qualified win for Nigeria, a qualified win for the U.S, and a loss for the international community. Boko Haram wins because it gains its ultimate goal of independence, and it buys itself time. This is a qualified win for Nigeria, as they lose the northern provinces. However, they continue to dominate the south and the primary economic drivers of the country. They also do not lose more years of blood and treasure with a protracted COIN fight. However, the underlying set of created circumstances will likely only allow a small period of respite. The United States gains a qualified win in this scenario, as well, since it

maintains economic relationships with the oil producing point of Nigeria. The US's overall economic costs for this outcome are also relatively small. For the international community though, including Nigeria and the US, this future is a loss, as it likely leads to an unsustainable set of circumstances where the ethnic and insurgent violence likely continues possibly spills over into the surrounding countries.

Future two saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government granted an increase in either political autonomy or independence for the northern regions, while simultaneously increasing the indiscriminate killing of Boko Haram Members. The Nigerian government simultaneously decreased economic aid in the region harming the underlying plight of the people. However, this could also be accounted for due to an increase in local government corruption. Finally, radical Islamism continued to spread throughout the region. This future likely resulted from the Nigerian government adopting a policy of granting independence to the region and effectively cutting its economic and resource losses. The Nigerian government's policy of independence for the region again directly affects the local Civilian Joint Task Forces, fighting the front lines. In response to the upcoming independence of the region, these forces again claimed their ability to operate independently and struck out at Boko Haram members and their institutions. Ultimately, the increased local violence, decreased economic programs, increasing poverty, and lack of effective policing as the Nigerians withdraw their military contributes to the increased spread of radical Islamism.

This future was a win for Boko Haram, a qualified win for Nigeria, a qualified win for the United States, and a loss for the international community. Boko Haram wins because it gains its ultimate goal of independence, and it buys time. This is a qualified win for Nigeria, as they loose the northern provinces. However, they continue to dominate the south and the primary

economic drivers of the country. They also do not lose more years of blood and treasure with a protracted COIN fight. The United States gains a qualified win in this scenario, as economic relationships with the oil producing point of Nigeria are maintained and the overall cost in resources to the US was relatively small. For the international community though, including Nigeria and the US, this future was a loss, as it likely leads to an unsustainable set of circumstances where the ethnic and insurgent violence will likely continue to cause violence and possibly spill over into the surrounding countries.

Future three saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government granted an increase in either political autonomy or independence for the northern regions, while simultaneously decreasing the indiscriminate killing of Boko Haram Members. The Nigerian government further increased economic development and aid programs with the newly independent north and raised the underlying economic plight of the people. However, this future also saw the increased spread of radical Islamism in the northern states. This future likely resulted from the Nigerian government agreeing to grant independence to the region and employing continued economic programs, which local corrupt government officials did not administer. While these economic programs were likely temporary as the region establishes its own government, they affected the people's welfare in the short term. However, the Nigerian government's adoption of independence and the military withdrawal causes the collapse of the Civilian Joint Task Forces, as they are no longer supported in the north with weapons and supplies. The decrease in local violence and increase in economic benefit to the people should have resulted in decreased radicalization of the populace. However, offensive COIN operations no longer restrain Boko Haram, and they embark on a campaign of enforcing strict Sharia Law and conversion of all non-Muslims.

This future was a win for Boko Haram, a qualified win for Nigeria, a qualified win for the United States, and a loss for the international community. Boko Haram wins because it gains its ultimate goal of independence, and it buys time. This is a qualified win for Nigeria, as they loose the northern provinces. However, they continue to dominate the south and the primary economic drivers of the country. The United States gains a qualified win in this scenario, as economic relationships with the oil producing point of Nigeria are maintained and the overall cost in resources to the US was relatively small. For the international community though, including Nigeria and the US, this future was a loss, as it likely again leads to an unsustainable set of circumstances. Ethnic violence in the newly independent country will likely continue as Boko Haram seeks to consolidate its control and Islamify the region. Furthermore, their secondary goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate throughout Nigeria as well as the rest of Africa continues to cause regional tensions.

Future four saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government granted an increase in either political autonomy or independence for the northern regions, while simultaneously decreasing the indiscriminate killing of Boko Haram Members. The Nigerian government further decreased or stopped economic development and aid programs with the newly independent north, effectively lowering or keeping stagnant the underlying economic plight of the people. However, this future also saw the increased spread of radical Islamism in the northern states. This future likely resulted from the Nigerian government agreeing to grant independence to the region and cutting their losses in economic development and aid programs. However, the Nigerian government's adoption of independence and the military withdrawal causes the collapse of the Civilian Joint Task Forces, as they are no longer supported in the north with weapons and supplies. The decrease in local violence, decrease in

economic benefit to the people, and Boko Haram rule now causes an increase in the spread of radical Islam throughout the region, through enforcement of strict Sharia Law and conversion of all non-Muslims.

This future was a win for Boko Haram, a qualified win for Nigeria, a qualified win for the United States, and a loss for the international community. Boko Haram wins because it gains its ultimate goal of independence, and it buys time. This is a qualified win for Nigeria, as they loose the northern provinces. However, they continue to dominate the south and the primary economic drivers of the country. The United States gains a qualified win in this scenario, as economic relationships with the oil producing point of Nigeria are maintained and the overall cost in resources to the US was relatively small. For the international community though, including Nigeria and the US, this future was a loss, as it likely again leads to an unsustainable set of circumstances. Ethnic violence in the newly independent country will likely continue as Boko Haram seeks to consolidate its control and spread radical Islamism throughout the region. Furthermore, their secondary goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate throughout Nigeria as well as the rest of Africa continues to cause regional tensions.

Future five saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government enacted policies to centralize government in Abuja, effectively minimizing provincial and local government in the northern provinces. Simultaneously, the government launched significant offensive operations with both the conventional military and the Civilian Joint Task Forces, as well as increasing significant economic aid to the northern provinces. However, they still noted an increasing spread of radical Islam. This future manifested due to Abuja's centralization policies and practices effectively removing or minimizing provincial and local government in the northern provinces. With the implementation of these policies, the

government launched significant conventional and Civilian Joint Task Force operations, ideally killing large numbers of Boko Haram members in the provinces and disrupting their supply chains. The removal of corrupt local government combined with the net increases in economic development projects in the northern provinces improves the plight of the people. However, Boko Haram used the crackdown as a recruitment tool, effectively linking it to hatred and fear against Muslims vice the terrorist organization leading to increased radical Islamism throughout the region.

This future was a loss for Boko Haram, a qualified win for the Nigerian government, a qualified win for the United States, and a loss for the international community. Boko Haram loses because it did not gain its stated objective, and it take significant casualties in the process. However, its ability to trade space and resources for time in order to rebuild remains a significant advantage. This future was a qualified win for the Nigerian government because they retain control of the northern provinces, and they inflict damages on Boko Haram itself. However, the expenditure of resources for these gains may be severe, and a suitable cost benefit analysis would need to be conducted in order to determine the gains' value. For the United States, this future was a qualified win as well. The United States retained its relationship with the oil portion of the Nigerian economy, but it may or may not have significant effects on the region as a whole and its adoption of radical Islamism. Ultimately, this was a qualified win for the International Community as well, since the violence was likely reduced for a time but did not subside for the long term.

Future six saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government enacted policies to centralize government in Abuja, effectively minimizing provincial and local government in the northern provinces. Simultaneously, the government launched significant

offensive operations with both the conventional military and the Civilian Joint Task Forces, as well as decreasing economic aid to the northern provinces. Meanwhile, radical Islam continued to increase throughout the region. This future manifested due to Abuja's centralization policies and practices effectively removing or minimizing provincial and local government in the northern provinces. With the implementation of these policies, the government launched significant conventional and Civilian Joint Task Force operations, ideally killing large numbers of Boko Haram members in the provinces and disrupting their supply chains. The removal of corrupt local government combined with the decreases in economic development projects in the northern provinces stagnates or imperils the people. However, Boko Haram used the crackdown as a recruitment tool. This combined with significant economic hardship increased radical Islamism throughout the region.

This future was a qualified loss for Boko Haram, a qualified win for the Nigerian government, a qualified win for the United States, and a loss for the international community. Boko Haram loses because it did not gain its stated objective, and it take significant casualties in the process. However, its ability to trade space and resources for time in order to rebuild remains a significant advantage. Furthermore, Boko Haram gains from the alienation of the populace through their worsening economic situation. This future was a qualified win for the Nigerian government because they retained control of the northern provinces, and they inflicted damages on Boko Haram. However, the expenditure of resources for these gains may have been severe. Their execution of a cost benefit analysis to determine the gains value was ultimate in determining their affinity for this course of action. For the United States, this future was a qualified win as well. The United States retained its petroleum relationship with the Nigerian economy, but it may or may not have had significant effects on the region as a whole and the

region's adoption of radical Islamism. Ultimately, this was a qualified win for the International Community as well, since the violence was likely reduced for a time but did not subside for the long term.

Future seven saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government enacted policies to centralize government in Abuja, effectively minimizing provincial and local government in the northern provinces. Simultaneously, the government occupied defensive positions and held fast with both the conventional military and the Civilian Joint Task Forces. Meanwhile, the government increased significant economic aid to the northern provinces. However, they still noted an increasing spread of radical Islam throughout the region. This future likely manifested due to Abuja's centralization policies and practices effectively removing or minimizing provincial and local government in the northern provinces. This centralization of government and authority coupled with the reduction in offensive operations likely gained the approval of the populace through the removal of corrupt local government and the associated net increases in economic development projects in the northern provinces. However, Boko Haram's decreased influence throughout the region resulted in increasing radicalization, as they attempted to consolidate their power and influence throughout their territories.

This future was a qualified loss for Boko Haram, a qualified win for the Nigerian government, a qualified win for the United States, and a loss for the international community. Boko Haram loses because it did not gain its stated objective. However, its ability to trade space and resources for time remained a significant advantage. Boko Haram also lost through the likely alignment of the populace with the national government due to their slightly improved situation. This future was a qualified win for the Nigerian government because they retained

control of the northern provinces. However, the expenditure of resources for these gains was not cheap. Furthermore, the vast expenditure of political capital to remove the local leadership perhaps gained only short-lived victories. For the United States, this future was a qualified win as well. The United States retained its petroleum relationship with the Nigerian economy, but it may or may not have had significant effects on the region as a whole and the region's adoption of radical Islamism. Ultimately, this was a qualified win for the International Community as well, since the violence was likely reduced for a time but did not subside for the long term.

Future eight saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government enacted policies to centralize government in Abuja, effectively minimizing provincial and local government in the northern provinces. Simultaneously, the government occupied defensive positions and held fast with both the conventional military and the Civilian Joint Task Forces. Meanwhile, the government decreased or cut off economic aid to the northern provinces, and they noted an increasing spread of radical Islam throughout the region. This future likely manifested due to Abuja's centralization policies and practices effectively removing or minimizing provincial and local government in the northern provinces. This centralization of government and authority coupled with the reduction in offensive operations could have gained the approval of the populace through the removal of corrupt local government. However, the associated drop in economic development projects in the northern provinces offset any gains made through anti-corruption operations. However, Boko Haram's ongoing influence throughout the region coupled with the economic retrograde tended to push the populace toward increasing radicalization.

This future was a qualified loss for Boko Haram, a qualified loss for the Nigerian government, a qualified win for the United States, and a loss for the international community.

Boko Haram loses because it did not gain its stated objective. However, its ability to trade space and resources for time remained a significant advantage. Boko Haram gained through the populace's likely alignment against the government over the withdrawal of economic development projects. This future was a qualified win for the Nigerian government because they retained control of the northern provinces. However, the costs to maintain any gains over the long term were significant, due to the lack of a whole of government approach. Furthermore, the vast expenditure of political capital to remove the local leadership perhaps gained only short-lived victories. For the United States, this future was a qualified win as well. The United States retained its petroleum relationship with the Nigerian economy, but it may or may not have had significant effects on the region as a whole and the region's adoption of radical Islamism. Ultimately, this was a loss for the International Community as well, since the violence was not stopped and likely increased due to the region's increasing radicalization and alignment toward Boko Haram.

Future nine saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government enacted policies to increase the independence or autonomy of the northern regions, while increasing economic development programs in the area. Furthermore, they increased the violence against the members of Boko Haram, and they noted a decrease in the spread of radical Islamism. This future resulted from the Nigerian government granting autonomy to the local governments in the northern regions, which were not aligned with Boko Haram. Simultaneously, the government launched coordinated assaults among the Nigerian Army and the Civilian Joint Task Forces across the region, ideally killing and capturing large numbers of Boko Haram operatives as well as disrupting their supply chains. Furthermore, the increase in economic investment, or the decrease in local corruption, insured the people benefitted from the

government actions. This benefit and separation from Boko Haram in the minds of the populace mitigated the spread of radical Islam.

This future was a loss for Boko Haram, a qualified win for the Nigerian government, a win for the United States, and a qualified win for the international community. Boko Haram loses because it did not gain its stated objective, and it take significant casualties in the process. However, its ability to trade space and resources for time in order to rebuild remains a significant advantage. This future was a qualified win for the Nigerian government because they retain control of the northern provinces, and they inflict damages on Boko Haram itself. However, the expenditure of resources for these gains was severe. For the United States, this future was a win as well. The United States retained its relationship with the oil portion of the Nigerian economy, and it damaged Boko Haram proper. However, these successes were short-lived depending on the Nigerian government's continued actions. Ultimately, this was a qualified win for the International Community as well, since the violence was likely reduced for a time but did not subside for the long term.

Future ten saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government enacted policies to increase the independence or autonomy of the northern regions, while decreasing economic development programs in the area. Furthermore, they increased the violence against the members of Boko Haram, and they noted a decrease in the spread of radical Islamism. This future resulted from the Nigerian government granting autonomy to the local governments in the northern regions, which were not aligned with Boko Haram. Simultaneously, the government launched coordinated assaults among the Nigerian Army and the Civilian Joint Task Forces across the region, ideally killing and capturing large numbers of Boko Haram operatives as well as disrupting their supply chains. Furthermore, the decrease in economic

investment was offset by the newly independent nation, and its people's autonomy. This separation from Boko Haram in the minds of the populace mitigated the spread of radical Islam. However, this future was likely short-lived, as a resurgence in Boko Haram through a fledgling government was highly likely.

This future was a qualified loss for Boko Haram, a qualified win for the Nigerian government, a win for the United States, and a qualified win for the international community. Boko Haram lost because it did not gain its stated objective, and it took significant casualties in the process. However, its ability to trade space and resources for time in order to rebuild remained a significant advantage. This future was a qualified win for the Nigerian government because they retained control of the Northern provinces, and they inflicted damages on Boko Haram itself. However, the expenditure of resources for these gains was severe, but they saved significantly in the economic development of the north. However, these savings led to the very short amount of time the region was stable. For the United States, this future was a win as well. The United States retained its relationship with the oil portion of the Nigerian economy, and it damaged Boko Haram proper. However, these successes were short-lived depending on the Nigerian government's continued actions after independence. Ultimately, this was a qualified win for the International Community as well, since the violence was likely reduced for a time but did not subside for the long term.

Future eleven saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government enacted policies to increase the independence or autonomy of the northern regions, while increasing economic development programs in the area. Furthermore, the government held positions with the Nigerian Army and the Civilian Task Forces, and they noted a decrease in the spread of radical Islamism. This future resulted from the Nigerian government granting

autonomy to the local governments in the northern regions, which were not aligned with Boko Haram. Simultaneously, the government ceased offensive military operations against Boko Haram with the Nigerian Army and the Civilian Task Forces. Furthermore, the increase in economic investment, or the decrease in local corruption, insured the people benefitted from the government actions. The seeming benefit from the government through economic actions led to a decrease in radical Islam spreading, for a short time.

This future was a qualified loss for Boko Haram, a qualified win for the Nigerian government, a qualified win for the United States, and a qualified win for the international community. Boko Haram lost because it did not gain its stated objective. However, its ability to trade space and resources for time in order to rebuild remained a significant advantage. This future was a qualified win for the Nigerian government because they retained control of the Northern provinces, and their economic programs helped turn the people away from Boko Haram. However, the expenditure of resources for these gains was severe, and the gains were short-lived. Boko Haram's counter and increase in operations once again destabilized the region. For the United States, this future was a win as well. The United States retained its relationship with the oil portion of the Nigerian economy, and it damaged Boko Haram proper. However, these successes were short-lived depending on the Nigerian government's continued actions after independence. Ultimately, this was a qualified win for the International Community as well, since the violence was likely reduced for a time but did not subside for the long term.

Future twelve saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government enacted policies to increase the independence or autonomy of the northern regions, while lowering or ceasing economic development programs in the area. Furthermore, the government held positions with the Nigerian Army and the Civilian Task Forces in preparation

for their withdrawal, and they noted a decrease in the spread of radical Islamism. This future resulted from the Nigerian government granting autonomy to the local governments in the northern regions, which were not aligned with Boko Haram. Simultaneously, the government ceased offensive military operations and prepared for their withdrawal. Furthermore, the decrease in economic investment saved the government resources in the short term. However, the lack of security caused an increase in the actions of Boko Haram to ensure they are in control of the future government. The lack of a spread of radical Islam was likely only temporary, while Boko Haram consolidated its control on the new country.

This future was a win for Boko Haram, a loss for the Nigerian government, a qualified win for the United States, and a loss for the international community. Boko Haram won because they gained all of their objectives at a very low cost. The Nigerian government lost because, while it saved on resources in its military and economy, the gains were only temporary. The ensuing instability of a hostile state on their border called for renewed military and economic action, causing a significant spike in resources expended and sovereignty lost. The United States gained a qualified win through the maintenance of the relationships with Nigerian oil and economic partnerships. Finally, the international community lost, as there was no obvious solution to the violence or ongoing Boko Haram security dilemma.

Future thirteen saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government enacted policies to centralize the government of the Northern provinces in Abuja, while increasing economic development programs in the area. Furthermore, the government coordinated offensive operations from the Nigerian Army with the Civilian Joint Task Forces, ultimately killing and capturing significant numbers of Boko Haram members and interdicting their supply lines. During this they noted a decrease in the spread of radical Islam. This future

resulted from the Nigerian government centralizing control of the Northern provinces in Abuja, while conducting coordinated offensive military operations in the sector. These operations likely killed or captured significant numbers of Boko Haram members. Furthermore, the increased economic investment or removal of the corrupt local government brought the people to the side of the Nigerian government. Furthermore, the combination of increased investment and security saw a slowdown in the spread of radical Islamism.

This future was a loss for Boko Haram, a qualified win for the government of Nigeria, a qualified win for the United States, and a qualified win for the international community. Boko Haram lost because it did not gain any of its stated goals, and it took losses in the combined offensive. Nigeria received a qualified win for the amount of resources it expended for a temporary quell in the violence. The United States gained a qualified win because it maintained relations with Nigerian oil, and the international community received a qualified win because violence levels decreased for a short time, until Boko Haram can reorganize and reconstitute its forces.

Future fourteen saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government enacted policies to centralize the government of the Northern provinces in Abuja, while decreasing or ceasing economic development programs in the area. Furthermore, the government coordinated offensive operations from the Nigerian Army with the Civilian Joint Task Forces, ultimately killing and capturing significant numbers of Boko Haram members and interdicting their supply lines. During this they noted a decrease in the spread of radical Islam. This future resulted from the Nigerian government centralizing control of the Northern provinces in Abuja, while conducting coordinated offensive military operations in the sector. These operations likely killed or captured significant numbers of Boko Haram members. However, the

decreased economic investment likely countered the increases in security. Furthermore, effective actions against Boko Haram and the increased security slowed the spread of radical Islamism for a short while.

This future was a qualified loss for Boko Haram, a qualified win for Nigeria, a qualified win for the United States, and a qualified win for the international community. Boko Haram lost because it didn't gain any of its stated goals, and it took significant casualties in the process. However, its ability to reconstitute in the long game was strength. Nigeria received a qualified win because it gained the upper hand over the short to medium term, where the US benefited from its continued relationship with Nigerian oil. Finally, this was a qualified win for the international community because it lowered violence levels for a short time.

Future fifteen saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government enacted policies to centralize the government of the Northern provinces in Abuja, while decreasing or ceasing economic development programs in the area. Furthermore, the Nigerian government ceased offensive operations against Boko Haram during this period, and they noted a decrease in the spread of radical Islam. This future resulted from the Nigerian government centralizing control of the Northern provinces in Abuja, while halting and consolidating their military operations. Simultaneously, increased economic investment likely countered the centralization of control, but the ongoing lack of security in the Northern provinces continued to work against the government of Nigeria. These ineffective actions at the operational and tactical level gave Boko Haram the initiative, but their indiscriminate violence caused the slowing of the spread of radical Islam.

This future was a qualified loss for Boko Haram, a qualified win for Nigeria and the United States. It was also a qualified win for the international community. Boko Haram lost

because they were not successful in gaining any of their stated goals. However, their ability to trade space and resources for time was a significant advantage. Furthermore, their follow-on freedom of action was a significant advantage. The Nigerian government won due to its retention of the Northern provinces and its gains with the populace. However, the United States won by retaining its relationship to Nigerian oil and economics. Finally, the international community won for decreasing the violence for a small amount of time.

Future sixteen saw the following interactions of the critical factors. The Nigerian government enacted policies to centralize the government of the Northern provinces in Abuja, while decreasing or ceasing economic development programs in the area. Furthermore, the Nigerian government ceased offensive operations against Boko Haram during this period, and they noted a decrease in the spread of radical Islam. This future resulted from the Nigerian government centralizing control of the Northern provinces in Abuja, while halting and consolidating their military operations. Simultaneously, the slowing or ceasing of economic development programs in the area ceded the initiative to Boko Haram. However, Boko Haram's indiscriminate violence caused the slowing of the spread of radical Islam.

This future was a qualified loss for Boko Haram, a qualified win for Nigeria and the United States. It was also a qualified win for the international community. Boko Haram lost because they were not successful in gaining any of their stated goals. However, their ability to trade space and resources for time was a significant advantage. Furthermore, their follow-on freedom of action was a significant advantage. The Nigerian government won due to its retention of the Northern provinces and its gains with the populace. However, the United States won by retaining its relationship to Nigerian oil and economics. Finally, the international community won for decreasing the violence for a small amount of time.


APPENDIX B: BOKO HARAM ALTERNATIVE FUTURES VARIATION MODEL

To what extent will the current combined United States and Nigeria counterinsurgency strategy and its operations end the Boko Haram Insurgency?

The analysis revealed 16 possible future scenarios. The scenarios covered the increasing and decreasing continuums of the chosen critical factors, or the increase or decrease in political autonomy / independence, expanded or contracted economic growth and development in northern Nigeria, expanding or contracting indiscriminate killing of Boko Haram members, and the expanding or contracting spread of radical Islamism in the northern provinces.

1. **XYZA:** Increased Political Autonomy / Independence, Increased Indiscriminate violence against BH members, Increased Economic development in northern provinces, Increased Spread of Radical Islamism in northern states.
Assessment of success for Nigeria, Boko Haram, US, and International Community:
2. **XYZA:** Increased Political Autonomy / Independence, Increased Indiscriminate violence against BH members, Decreased Economic development in northern provinces, Increased Spread of Radical Islamism in northern states.
Assessment of success for Nigeria, Boko Haram, US, and International Community:
3. **XYZA:** Increased Political Autonomy / Independence, Decreased Indiscriminate violence against BH members, Increased Economic development in northern provinces, Decreased Spread of Radical Islamism in northern states.
Assessment of success for Nigeria, Boko Haram, US, and International Community:
4. **X-YZA:** Increased Political Autonomy / Independence, Decreased Indiscriminate violence against BH members, Decreased Economic development in northern provinces, Decreased Spread of Radical Islamism in northern states.
Assessment of success for Nigeria, Boko Haram, US, and International Community:
5. **XYZA:** Decreased Political Autonomy / Independence, Increased Indiscriminate violence against BH members, Increased Economic development in northern provinces, Increased Spread of Radical Islamism in northern states.
Assessment of success for Nigeria, Boko Haram, US, and International Community:
6. **XYZA:** Decreased Political Autonomy / Independence, Increased Indiscriminate violence against BH members, Decreased Economic development in northern provinces, Increased Spread of Radical Islamism in northern states.
Assessment of success for Nigeria, Boko Haram, US, and International Community:
7. **X-YZA:** Decreased Political Autonomy / Independence, Decreased Indiscriminate violence against BH members, Increased Economic development in northern provinces, Increased Spread of Radical Islamism in northern states.
Assessment of success for Nigeria, Boko Haram, US, and International Community:
8. **X-YZA:** Decreased Political Autonomy / Independence, Decreased Indiscriminate violence against BH members, Increased Economic development in northern provinces, Decreased Spread of Radical Islamism in northern states.
Assessment of success for Nigeria, Boko Haram, US, and International Community:
9. **XYZA:** Increased Political Autonomy / Independence, Increased Indiscriminate violence against BH members, Increased Economic development in northern provinces, Increased Spread of Radical Islamism in northern states.
Assessment of success for Nigeria, Boko Haram, US, and International Community:
10. **XYZA:** Increased Political Autonomy / Independence, Increased Indiscriminate violence against BH members, Decreased Economic development in northern provinces, Decreased Spread of Radical Islamism in northern states.
Assessment of success for Nigeria, Boko Haram, US, and International Community:
11. **X-YZA:** Increased Political Autonomy / Independence, Decreased Indiscriminate violence against BH members, Increased Economic development in northern provinces, Decreased Spread of Radical Islamism in northern states.
Assessment of success for Nigeria, Boko Haram, US, and International Community:
12. **X-YZA:** Increased Political Autonomy / Independence, Decreased Indiscriminate violence against BH members, Decreased Economic development in northern provinces, Decreased Spread of Radical Islamism in northern states.
Assessment of success for Nigeria, Boko Haram, US, and International Community:
13. **XYZA:** Decreased Political Autonomy / Independence, Increased Indiscriminate violence against BH members, Increased Economic development in northern provinces, Decreased Spread of Radical Islamism in northern states.
Assessment of success for Nigeria, Boko Haram, US, and International Community:
14. **XYZA:** Decreased Political Autonomy / Independence, Increased Indiscriminate violence against BH members, Decreased Economic development in northern provinces, Decreased Spread of Radical Islamism in northern states.
Assessment of success for Nigeria, Boko Haram, US, and International Community:
15. **X-YZA:** Decreased Political Autonomy / Independence, Decreased Indiscriminate violence against BH members, Increased Economic development in northern provinces, Decreased Spread of Radical Islamism in northern states.
Assessment of success for Nigeria, Boko Haram, US, and International Community:
16. **X-YZA:** Decreased Political Autonomy / Independence, Decreased Indiscriminate violence against BH members, Decreased Economic development in northern provinces, Decreased Spread of Radical Islamism in northern states.
Assessment of success for Nigeria, Boko Haram, US, and International Community:

Forbes Futures Analysis Adaptation



Critical Factors:

- 6.1. (X-Axis) Political Autonomy of the northern regions, or Independence for the region, establishment of an Islamic caliphate in all of Nigeria. (START)
- 6.2. (Y-Axis) Indiscriminate killing of Boko Haram members, retaliation by targeting symbols of western society, officials, police, prison guards, journalists, clerics, and newspapers.
- 6.3. (Z-Axis) Economic development and equality of the northern regions, which may be transparent to the populace if corruption at the national and local levels is rooted out.
- 6.4. (A-Axis) Spread of radical Islamism among the Muslims of the northern regions. (Beacham publishing).
- 6.4.1. "Dependence on faith increases under poverty, creating the potential for radicalisation (sic). Those who take the long view see the current instability, while deeply worrying, as part of the process of the region's counties finding their way amid their diverse communities and ideologies." (Nashashibi, Sharif, Ideological Pendulum).

APPENDIX C: ALTERNATIVE FUTURES VARIATION MODEL SHELL

Analytic Line / Research Question (State the analytic line)?


Possible Futures

Determine how the factors are interacting and generate a possible scenario for each of the interactions possible. The below scenario assumes 6 interacting critical factors, each with its own axis.

- 1. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 2. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 3. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 4. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 5. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 6. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 7. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 8. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 9. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 10. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 11. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 12. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 13. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 14. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 15. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 16. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 17. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 18. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 19. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 20. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 21. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 22. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 23. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 24. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 25. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 26. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 27. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 28. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 29. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 30. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 31. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 32. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 33. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 34. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 35. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 36. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 37. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 38. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 39. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 40. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 41. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 42. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 43. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 44. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 45. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 46. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 47. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 48. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 49. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 50. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 51. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 52. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 53. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 54. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 55. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 56. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 57. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 58. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 59. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 60. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 61. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 62. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 63. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;
- 64. X, X1, X2, Y, Y1, Y2;


Model Explanation:

- Conduct research on the topic or analytic line under consideration.
 - From the research conducted, identify the critical factors that are interacting in the situation.
 - Example: Critical Factor: Political Situation. Possible endpoints=Centralized authority vs. Political Autonomy
 - Signposts = degrees inbetween the endpoints as the situation moves from one to the other.
 - Identify endpoints for the critical factors along all axes, and the signposts for all axes.
 - Example: Critical Factor: Political Situation. Possible endpoints=Centralized authority vs. Political Autonomy
 - Signposts = degrees inbetween the endpoints as the situation moves from one to the other.
 - If there are more than two critical factors, add axes as appropriate.
 - Each axis added increases the number of possible futures according to the following formula:
 - $2^n = \#$ of possible futures, where n is the number of axes.
 - Therefore, 3 axes (critical factors) gives $2^3 = 8$ possible futures.
- C. NOTE: for the model shown the number of futures possible is $2^{10} = 1024$ futures.
6. NOTE: The graphic only shows the axes in the viewer's plane of vision. However, they are repeated through all octants of each set of three axes.



- | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Critical Factors: | Critical Factors: | Critical Factors: |
| 1. Factor 1 | 1. Factor 4 | 1. Factor 7 |
| 1. Endpoint 1 | 1. Endpoint 1 | 1. Endpoint 1 |
| 2. Signposts | 2. Signposts | 2. Signposts |
| 3. Signposts | 3. Signposts | 3. Signposts |
| 4. Endpoint 2 | 4. Endpoint 2 | 4. Endpoint 2 |
| 2. Factor 2 | 2. Factor 5 | 2. Factor 8 |
| 1. Endpoint 1 | 1. Endpoint 1 | 1. Endpoint 1 |
| 2. Signposts | 2. Signposts | 2. Signposts |
| 3. Signposts | 3. Signposts | 3. Signposts |
| 4. Endpoint 2 | 4. Endpoint 2 | 4. Endpoint 2 |
| 3. Factor 3 | 3. Factor 6 | 3. Factor 9 |
| 1. Endpoint 1 | 1. Endpoint 1 | 1. Endpoint 1 |
| 2. Signposts | 2. Signposts | 2. Signposts |
| 3. Signposts | 3. Signposts | 3. Signposts |
| 4. Endpoint 2 | 4. Endpoint 2 | 4. Endpoint 2 |

APPENDIX D: FLEXIBLE DETERENT OPTIONS GRAPH



Flexible and Scalable COAs

COA 1: UN and US advisors and observers deploy to Nigeria with associated air cover requirements IOT assess the state of the Nigerian military, police, and government's COIN capability. During this assessment they determine the requirements for increasing and sustaining capacity and capability in the multi-generational fight ahead. Simultaneously the US employs economic assistance to the Nigerian government IOT build and maintain COIN capability in their government and military.

COA 2: UN and US provide directed air strikes and observers / trainers ISO the Nigerian government IOT sustain capacity and capability in the multi-generational fight ahead. Simultaneously the US employs economic assistance to the Nigerian government IOT build and maintain COIN capability in their government and military.

COA 3: UN and US provide direct military ground and air assistance ICW observers / trainers and air support IOT allow the government of Nigeria to regain the battlefield initiative, while simultaneously employing economic assistance to the Nigerian government IOT build and maintain COIN capacity and capability in the government and military.

COA 4: US and UN provide significant ground and air assets and take the lead for the Nigerian COIN fight IOT wrest the initiative from Boko Haram. Simultaneously, employing diplomatic, economic, and informational assistance to build and maintain capacity and capability in the Nigerian military and government to conduct COIN ops.

COA 5: Full UN and US governmental and military intervention.