Supply Trains Force Protection: The Convoy Security Capability Gap and How to Fix It
Abstract
Currently, the United States Army does not have an effective or coherent concept to secure its supply lines. This can be attributed to supply convoy operations being categorized as an administrative activity and presumed to be conducted in an area of safety. This belief led to the acceptance of greater risks and inadequate doctrine, equipment, and training for the truck companies that traverse the battlefield sustaining the force. Although past conflicts highlighted the need for reform, the Army failed to indoctrinate lessons learned and was unprepared to secure its supply lines during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This forced the Army to re-learn the lessons it learned during the Vietnam War, when motor transport units created the gun truck and developed Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TTPs) to escort convoys organically. During OIF the Army again realized that this was the most feasible, suitable and effective option to secure its supply lines and began resourcing motor transport units with the resources to conduct convoy security operations through the Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) program. With operations in Iraq complete and operations in Afghanistan coming to a close, it is important that these lessons learned are codified by force developers. Using the DOTMLPF construct, this paper provides a recommendation to this end.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 28, 2015
- Accession Number
- AD1175870
Entities
People
- Tometrius Greer