

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 19-03-2015		2. REPORT TYPE Master of Military Studies Research Paper		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) September 2014 - March 2015	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Optimization of Citizen Sailor Integration in the Navy's Total Force				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A	
6. AUTHOR(S) Guiterman, Bree A., Lieutenant Commander, USNR				5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A	
				5e. TASK NUMBER N/A	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) N/A	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A					
14. ABSTRACT The Navy's reliance on the Naval Reserve Force has increased significantly in the post-9/11 era specifically by pulling the reserves into the operational fold with the active components. Optimizing Integration is the key to ensure the Navy Reserves is able to provide support across the entire operational spectrum. However this process continues to face challenges in achieving the Navy's Total Force objective. In a time when financial and material resources are finite, improvements in refined roles and responsibilities, reduction in funding complexity, improved effectiveness of the cross-assigned sailor, and maximizing training opportunities within available reserve time and employer restraints will increase efficiencies in end-state integration. Active units can benefit from reading Integrate Your Reserves: A How-To Primer as a starting point on techniques to integrate reservist. If the Navy is going to maintain an effective reserve force and move beyond the "weekend warrior" construct, it must also reform and update how reservists train, receive funding and successfully balance civilian requirements. Through these changes, the country can truly have a "Total Force," prepared to meet its national security requirements.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Naval Reserves, Reserve Component Integration into Active Component, Navy Total Force, Cross-Assigned Sailor, Weekend W					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: Unclass			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 70	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Marine Corps University/Command a
a. REPORT Unclass	b. ABSTRACT Unclass	c. THIS PAGE Unclass			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

*United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*


MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES


TITLE:
Optimization of Citizen Sailor Integration in the Navy's Total Force

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:
Lieutenant Commander Bree A. Guiterman

AY 14-15

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Paul D. Gelpi, PHD
Approved: 
Date: 19 March 2015

Oral Defense Committee Member: Bradford A. Wineman, PHD
Approved: 
Date: 19 March 2015

Executive Summary

Title: Optimization of Citizen Sailor Integration in the Navy's Total Force

Author: Lieutenant Commander Bree A. Guiterman, United States Navy Reserves

Thesis: The Navy continues to make strides in fully integrating the reserves into the operational fold with the active components. However this process continues to face challenges in achieving the Navy's Total Force objective. In a time when financial and material resources are finite, improvements in refined roles and responsibilities, reduction in funding complexity, improved effectiveness of the cross-assigned sailor, and maximizing training opportunities within available reserve time and employer restraints will increase efficiencies in end-state integration.

Discussion: One of the main obstacles for reserve units is time. Reserve units can increase optimization and maximize the use of available drill weekend time efficiently, through excellent planning and clear communication between reserve and active component leadership. By clarifying roles and responsibilities, open communication between reserve units, NOSC leadership, and active components will maximize effectiveness. Multiple sources of money as well as migrating two pay systems create funding complexity when active components want to utilize reservists. This added complexity creates administrative errors that may result in pay delays and other financial headaches to the reserve sailor. A single funding source and fewer pots of money would eliminate challenges and increase pay efficiency. Nearly one third of reservists are cross-assigned. Best practices to ensure these sailors maintain an effective level of readiness is discussed in this article. The 'weekend warrior' legacy term no longer reflects the reality of today's Total Force citizen sailor; however that is not often the view of civilian employers. Creating training opportunities that account for time and civilian employer constraints are discussed in order to maximize reserve participation.

Conclusion: The Navy's reliance on the Naval Reserve Force has increased significantly in the post-9/11 era. As the nation is presented with uncertain security environments, the Navy will continue to rely on the reserve component for missions abroad and at home as part of the Total Navy Operational Force. Optimization of that integration is the key to ensure the Navy Reserves is able to provide support across the entire operational spectrum. Active units can benefit from reading *Integrate Your Reserves: A How-To Primer* as a starting point on techniques to integrate reservist. If the Navy is going to maintain an effective reserve force and move beyond the "weekend warrior" construct, it must also reform and update how reservists train, receive funding and successfully balance civilian requirements. Through these changes, the country can truly have a "Total Force," prepared to meet its national security requirements.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

Acronyms

ADSW	Active Duty Special Work
ADT	Active Duty for Training
AQD	Additional Qualifying Designator
ARI	Active Reserve Integration
AT	Annual Training
ATP	Additional Training Period
BAH	Basic Allowance for Housing
CAI	Cross Assigned In
CANTRAC	Catalog of Navy Training Courses
CAO	Cross Assigned Out
CNFJ	Commander Naval Forces Japan
CNRFC	Commander Naval Reserve Forces Command
DFAS	Defense Finance and Accounting Service
DSC	Duty Status Code
E-AT	Exceptional Annual Training
FFC	Fleet Forces Command
FTS	Full Time Support
GMT	General Military Training
IA	Individual Augmentation
IDT	Inactive Duty Training
IDTT	Inactive Duty Training with Travel
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
LPO	Leading Petty Officer
MOC	Maritime Operations Centers
MSOC	Maritime Staff Operators Course
NEC	Navy Enlisted Code
NECC	Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
NKO	Navy Knowledge Online
NOSC	Naval Operational Support Center
NRF	Naval Reserve Force
NROWS	Navy Reserve Orders Writing System
PACFLT	Pacific Fleet
PACOM	Pacific Command
PSD	Personnel Support Detachment
RUAD	Reserve Unit Assignment Document
SGLI	Standard Group Life Insurance
SR	Selected Reserve
USERRA	Uniformed Services Employment & Reemployment Rights Act of 1994
VTC	Video Tele Conference

Introduction

The United States Navy's vision for the Twenty First Century is one where a single "Total Force" can anticipate and respond to a changing and dynamic global environment. This vision specifically identifies active and reserve sailors, and civilian personnel, as the critical resource for the all-encompassing Total Force.¹ The question that decision makers within the Navy ask is what ultimately constitutes the Total Force? This may be defined as all personnel who interact with the Navy, not only the men and women in uniform, but also the multitude of civilian employees and military families. All of these elements constitute the whole of an effective Navy team; however, the Total Force is defined best as those in uniform, the active and reserve component. Consequently, the challenge the Navy faces is developing and sustaining an effective Total Force that integrates the reserve component into the active force. To overcome this challenge, a refined approach is necessary that maintains the Navy's ability to meet US national security needs, and at the same time reflects the reality of today's missions and the personnel of both its components.

In the last two decades, the Navy has made strides to incorporate and integrate all of the non-active components into the full spectrum of operations, specifically the Naval Reserve Component (NRC). In 2004, the then Chief of Naval Reserves, Vice Admiral John G. Cotton stated that, "As a nation we can no longer afford to have separate and unequal forces. There are no longer Naval Reserve requirements there are only Navy requirements."² Although the Navy has made progress in integrating the reserve and active components, this process continues to face challenges in achieving the Total Force objective. In a time when financial and material

¹ VDML Mark E. Ferguson III, ADM Gary Roughhead, and VDML Dirk J. Debbink, *Navy's Total Force Vision for the 21st Century* (January 2010).

[http://www.navy.mil/features/NTF%20Vision%20\(Final\)\(11%20Jan%2010%201210hrs\).pdf](http://www.navy.mil/features/NTF%20Vision%20(Final)(11%20Jan%2010%201210hrs).pdf)

² Richard R. Burgess, "Navy Cracking the Glass Wall between Reserve, Active Forces," *Sea Power*, (July 2004):10.

resources are finite, improvements may increase efficiencies in end-state integration in several areas. These areas include:

1. Refined roles and responsibilities in order to maximize reserve readiness and utilization
2. Reducing funding complexity
3. Improving the effectiveness of the cross-assigned sailor
4. Maximizing training opportunities within reserve time/civilian employer restraints

By recognizing these challenges and making necessary adjustments, the Navy can maximize efficiencies, reduce complexity, and create a better state of Naval Reserve integration into the Navy's Total Force.

Background and History

As 2015 marks the centennial anniversary for the Naval Reserves, it is appropriate to recognize its beginnings and to understand how the purpose of the Naval Reserves has evolved over time. The reserve component of the Armed Forces was created based on a heritage of the American citizen's commitment to meet national security demands. This dates back to the early days of the Republic, when during his administration in 1805, President Thomas Jefferson proposed a national Naval Militia that would augment to protect national maritime interests. During the Civil War, both the Union and Confederate Navies relied heavily on militia sailors and United States Naval Academy graduates, many of whom were either inactive, or had resigned their commissions in the antebellum period, were brought back into service from 1861

through 1865. By the end of the 19th century, sixteen states had naval militias in place that built on this legacy.³

In 1915 as World War I was taking place, Congress saw a need for a maritime reserve force and established the Federal Naval Reserve. As a result of this legislation, and America's entry into the war, over 300,000 naval reservists served in World War I. Two decades later and building on this precedent, over two million naval reservists served in World War II, the largest naval mobilization to date, where 4 out of every 5 sailors was a naval reservist.⁴ The designation 'Reserve' was used as a force multiplier during both World Wars. It was a way of designating a wartime force as opposed to a regular standing force during peace time. All reserve sailors who fought during the two wars were commissioned directly into the reserves and fought alongside their active component. When these conflicts ended, these sailors returned to their civilian lives.

After World War II and emergence of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, there was a need for a standing designated Naval Reserve. The United States' strategy of containing the spread of communism created a situation where military commitments often went beyond regular Navy capabilities. This created a need for a permanent reservoir of professionally trained reserve forces, capable of supporting regular forces for all services.⁵ As was the case during both World Wars, the Reserves were a force multiplier in a time of national security crisis. As such, during the Cold War, the Naval Reserve Force existed as a force in interim, waiting to respond to a major war with the Soviet Union. The reserves were often referred to as a strategic reserve, designed to increase total capability and manning of active units in a contingency. For the four decades after the conclusion of World War II, the Navy Reserves made critical contributions to

³ "The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces." In *DoD 1215.15-H*, (The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs)2000:39.

⁴ Affairs, 2000:39.

⁵ William F. Levantrosser, *Management of the Reserve Component*, (Washington D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1967) :5.

the active force. This included 130,000 reserve sailors serving during the Korean War, one in seven sailors officer and enlisted alike were designated a reservist in Vietnam, and the mobilization of over 21,000 sailors during the Persian Gulf War.⁶

Up to this point, the purpose of the Naval Reserves was to be force multiplier to the active Navy. The standing reserves were always small in size in peace time, and the designation of USNR for new sailors during a time of surge was representative of a wartime force as opposed to USN regular forces. By the 1990s, the purpose of the Naval Reserves began to expand to much more than only a surge force. This change did not happen suddenly. The modern Naval Reserves, like their active component, went through a period of downsizing following the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. The NRF went from 130,000 reserve sailors at the close of the 1980s, to less than 90,000 by the mid-1990s.⁷ With the active component also significantly downsizing, the Navy was faced with the challenge of maintaining operational commitments with a smaller force. The solution was to use the Navy's 'Total Force' with Active Reserve Integration (ARI). The NRF was essentially an untapped resource. Naval decision makers realized that the reserve force was capable of more than sitting in the limelight in waiting and came at a fraction of the cost compared to regular forces.⁸

By the mid-1990s, the Naval Reserve Forces had begun to transition into an important element of operational forces. For the first time, the NRF were a part of initial planning and not added as a force multiplier at the end. The initial emphasis of the ARI was placed on using the NRF to augment Navy blue water capabilities, or integration amongst naval platforms that went on overseas deployments. After the events of September 11, 2001, the need for ARI suddenly

⁶Affairs, 2000:39.

⁷Affairs, 2000:39.

⁸ John H. Pendleton, Defense Capabilities and Management. *Active and Reserve Unit Costs: DOD Report to Congress*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, July 31, 2014.

went beyond the Navy's blue water operating requirements. The frequency of inter-component training increased in order to incorporate the RC into operations and plans for more national security contingencies. 26,000 Naval Reservists were mobilized to fight in Operation Enduring Freedom, including land locked Afghanistan through Individual Augmentations (IA).⁹ By 2004, Vice Admiral Cotton emphasized unified planning between the active and reserve components. He stated the active component would begin "taking ownership of the reserve components and become responsible for their readiness".¹⁰ A reservist no longer had to mobilize in order to provide operational support. By active units including reservists into their day to day plans, reservists were now able to support operationally through watch-standing, training, and other substantive ways. Change often comes with challenges, and there were many in the initial stages of ARI. The biggest challenge initially was culture. Active duty components had to learn what their reserves brought to the table and how they could most efficiently use them.

Today the NRF is a force that is multi-faceted with the motto "Ready Now: Anytime, Anywhere."¹¹ It prides itself on being able to support the active component across the entire spectrum of operations. The NRF consists of approximately 59,000 sailors. This number represents the Selected Reserves (SR), or those individuals who are in a drilling status attached to a supported command and are the first to respond in a moment's notice. There are another 48,000+ reserve sailors in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), who do not drill on a regular basis, but are available for recall or mobilization as national security requirements dictate.¹² Roughly one third of reserve sailors serve in commission units that are complete operational

⁹ Burgess July 2004:10.

¹⁰ Burgess July 2004:10.

¹¹ "America's Navy Reserve, *Navy Recruiting Command*, <http://www.navyreserve.com/about/mission.html> (accessed October, 29, 2014)

¹² "Status of the Navy as of December 23, 2014", Accessed December 23, 2014, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=146.

entities such as: ships, construction battalions, and aircraft squadrons. The remainder reserve sailors are assigned to augment units that provide additional resources to active components for contingencies and wartime.¹³ Augment units cover an array of fields including, but not limited to, medicine, ship and aviation repair, law, and intelligence. A decade after Vice Admiral Cotton's initiative, Total Force integration is the new standard of the Navy Reserve, but maximizing efficiencies in ARI still has many obstacles.

Clarifying Roles and Responsibilities to Maximize Training within Time Limitations

One of the main obstacles for reserve units is time. A selected reserve's (drilling reservist), per Bureau of Personnel Instruction 1001.39F, annual participation requirements constitute twelve drill weekends and two weeks of Annual Training (AT).¹⁴ A drill weekend consists of four, four hour drill periods, or sixteen working hours, for an annual total of twenty-four working days. For annual training, the minimum requirement is two weeks, which includes travel to and from the supported command location. In total, reservists have roughly thirty-eight days a year of paid drill and AT time. With this in mind and to holistically understand reserve requirements, reserve units are faced with completing General Military Training (GMT), medical, and administrative requirements, as well as parent command prioritized training in this short window of time each year. Maximizing drill time is essential in order to ensure the highest level of readiness. This is possible with a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities of the reserve component and the priorities of the active command supported. With time being one of the primary limitations, increasing optimization is vital. A question that faces reserve unit leadership is how do they ensure, and what metrics are available, that drill weekend time is being

¹³ Affairs, 2000:40.

¹⁴ Chief of Naval Personnel, "Administrative Procedures for Navy Reserve Personnel." *BUPERS INSTRUCTION 1001.39F*, (September 17, 2007).

utilized efficiency. Units can achieve this through excellent planning and clear communication by reserve component unit leadership that incorporates the supported command's priorities. When priorities are clear and understood between the two components, and those priorities are realistic within a given reserve unit's abilities and time constraints, ARI is most effective.

Then Captain, now Admiral, Robert Wray stated accurately in his 2003 *How-To Primer*, "The most critical part of successful reserve integration is the commander's choice of how to use them. Ask too much, and frustration will result. Ask too little, and you will get boredom and inefficiency."¹⁵ There is nothing more frustrating for a reservist than to arrive for annual training only to discover that the active command was not aware of their arrival. The active command then scrambles to find something for that reserve sailor to do, usually a mundane office task that leaves the sailor feeling underutilized and insignificant. At the other end of the spectrum, reserve sailors can feel overwhelmed by not having had the training for duties asked to perform. When this happens, it adds to the stereotype that reservists are not equal to the task as compared to their active peers thus hurting integration. If a reservist reports for AT and is not gainfully employed by the supported command upon arrival, the reservist must inform leadership what they can do in order to contribute. This comes from the successful prior training at the reserve level. In order to achieve this, clear communication and understood priorities between reserve components and supported commands (active components) is critical. This will enable reserve training plan prioritization to align with other administrative and medical obligations. At the end of an AT, a reserve sailor should have made a positive impact at the supported command and have learned something new.

¹⁵ CAPT Robert Wray Jr., "Integrate Your Reserves: A How-To Primer," (*Proceedings*, December 2003):60.

Active duty sailors work with reserve sailors more often than they realize. Large Echelon 2 commands such as Fleet Forces Command (FFC) or Pacific Command (PACFLT) have large reserve units to support their watch floors. During real world events or exercises, reservists can make up nearly forty percent of the watch floors.¹⁶ Since both active and reserve sailors wear the same uniform, active sailors may not even be aware they are working alongside a reservist. Turn over cycles for reservists are two to three years where as the active component turns over cycles are shorter, anywhere from 18-24 months. As personnel within units change, it is important for both reserve and active leadership, both mid-level officer and senior enlisted levels, to build and continue to build relationships. Due to longer turn over cycles, the reserve component is able to provide continuity in some cases that further benefits the active component. This is especially important as reserve units weekend drilling schedules often do not align with supported command schedules.

Like with many civilian businesses, many supported active commands are not available on weekends. It is not unusual for a reservist to call their counterpart at a parent command during a drill weekend and reach a voicemail or even a skeleton crew. Here is where continuity and relationship networks between the reserve and active component become essential. There is already built in policy leniency for reserve unit commanding officers to modify the typical weekend training model. One example, where a commanding officer deviated from the weekend drill model is Naval Reserve Unit U.S. Pacific Command Detachment 120, which supports Pacific Command (PACOM). PACOM typically does work over weekends, which makes it difficult for the reserve component to communicate directly with active counterparts during scheduled drill weekends. Detachment 120's commanding officer solved this issue by allowing her department heads to coordinate drill periods for their departments during the work week.

¹⁶ RDML Sandra E. Adams, phone interview by author, (December 17, 2014).

This ensured unit integration through direct support to PACOM.¹⁷ Rear Admiral Sandra Adams, previous Commanding Officer of Naval Reserve U.S. Pacific Command Detachment 120, commented on her deviation of the weekend training model, “Eighty percent of our drills were done at our supported command. We were able to provide PACOM with more direct support, and as long as this method was adding value I gave latitude. I only required two weekends a year for mandatory drill; this met the minimal requirements for annual PT tests, etc.”¹⁸

Adams opined that this method proved very successful to maximizing ARI during her time in command. However, a single unit’s solution cannot be applied universally. Many reserve units are simply unable to depart from the weekend drilling model as unit members do not have the flexibility with civilian commitments to drill during the work week. Although individual commanders can use flex drilling days to support the active component when practical, the weekend drilling model offers the least intrusive model for the individual sailor for the reserve community as a whole. For the majority of units that must maintain to the traditional weekend drill model, reserve leadership communication with active component during the work week or active component representation made available during the drill weekend to communicate guidance is the solution. Although it is incumbent that both reserve and active commanding officers ensure requirements are identified and prioritized, it is up to reserve leadership to maximize time available with meaningful training. As the reserve unit only drills two days a month, or essentially six percent of the month from the active component’s perspective, valuable time is easily lost when active and reserve leadership are not on the same page.

In addition to reserve and active component communication, clarifying roles and responsibility between reserve unit commanding officers and Naval Operational Support Center

¹⁷ Adams, 2014.

¹⁸ Adams, 2014.

(NOSC) commanding officers is also vital to prevent duplication of efforts, to de-conflict training schedules, and prevent ineffectiveness. Nothing can de-rail a reserve unit's training plan faster than the unit comes in to drill expecting to conduct unit specific training, only to discover the NOSC schedule has mandatory training (e.g. family readiness conference) that conflict. The unit has to wait until the following month to complete the original training. Like with clarifying roles and responsibilities, open communication between reserve units, NOSC leadership, and active components is crucial to maximizing effectiveness.

Funding Challenges: Common Pay Systems and Different Pots of Money

As with any large Federal organization, the Department of Navy is not without faults when it comes to the subject of pay and funding. In order to identify these faults, one must understand reserve funding conditions, including pay and training. There are several categories on how a reservist can drill or conduct paid training:

- Inactive Duty Training (IDT) commonly known as weekend drill and completed over weekends with two four-hour drill periods per day. Typically a reservist performs this at an individual's assigned drill site.
- Inactive Duty Training with Travel (IDTT) is IDT authorized at a location over a hundred miles from an individual's assigned drill site or home. This type of drill requires authorized orders through the Navy Reserve Orders Writing System (NROWS).
- Annual Training (AT) is an annual requirement for selected reservists, for a period of active duty. This period is generally twelve to fourteen days in length. AT may be extended for up to twenty nine days in some circumstances, any AT period that exceed 14 days is considered Exceptional Annual Training (E-AT) and requires approval by the

Unit Commanding Officer and Commander, Naval Reserve Forces Command (CNRFC) by a waiver request. Orders are required for AT and E-AT.

- Active Duty Training (ADT) is an additional period of active duty that is allowed for schools and active component command support. ADT is usually used only after AT funds are exhausted. ADT requires orders and authorization for travel varies.
- Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) is a supplementary period of active duty sponsored by a supported command for periods longer than 30 days. Like ADT, ADSW requires orders and authorization for travel varies.¹⁹

Reservists can also be recalled to active duty through a Mobilization or Individual Augmentation (IA). When a sailor is recalled, usually referred to as a Recall or Mob, he or she is brought onto active duty for a set period of time.

Reservists receive pay for conducting training within any of these categories. While all sailors active and reserve alike, receive pay through the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) system, to process pay for reservists when the sailor comes on and off active duty orders, however, administrative officials must migrate the individual between two systems within DFAS. This causes challenges, specifically when a sailor is on ADSW orders or recalled to active duty. Within the DFAS system, every sailor is given a Duty Status Code (DSC). Active component sailors have a DSC of 100, while reserve sailors are 200. A reserve sailor who comes onto active duty through ADSW remains a reservist, but has a DSC of 211. The DSC code refers to which system in DFAS the sailor will be paid from, either the reserve or active side. If a reserve sailor mobilizes, their DSC will have to be converted from a 200 to a 100. The concept seems simple enough, but in practice is more complex. It is junior enlisted Yeomen or

¹⁹Administrative Procedures for Navy Reserve Personnel 2007.

Personnel Specialists who have to process paperwork and deal with this infrastructure on a daily basis. Personnel Specialist Third Class Stephen Adjarho, who works in manpower at NOSC Minneapolis, MN, is one of them. “I’ve seen instances where a sailor on ADSW orders had a double deduction for SGLI (Standard Group Life Insurance), he was on active duty paying the active side SGLI, but he still had a reserve DSC and was paying on the reserve side. Something like that can be easily overlooked.”²⁰

The added complexity creates small errors that if not caught by those processing paperwork, can cause financial hardship for the sailor. Migrating between two systems creates added complexity for personnel processing the pay and in some cases this process can create a delay in pay for the Reserve sailor. PS3 Adjarho witnessed a situation in which four reserve sailors, recalled to active duty, were delayed nearly a month in pay because of the complexity in changing their DSCs from 200 to a 100. “The Full Time Support (FTS) staff at the NOSC acts as the messenger for the reserve sailors. We monitor the paperwork as it moves from stage to stage at the corresponding PSD (Personnel Support Detachment). Sometimes the paper work can get held up at a particular stage and cause delays. We have to rely on contacts we’ve made at PSD to find out why things are held up.”²¹ Daily issues that PS3 describes, could be eliminated or at least mitigated by a use of a single system amongst both components.

As mentioned earlier, there are multiple categories for reservists to conduct training, coming from different funding sources. When supported commands want to use reservists, they must identify the type of training and corresponding money source for funding. Unfortunately, the multiple sources of money create complexity when supported commands want to use

²⁰ Personnel Specialist Third Class Stephen Adjarho, NOSC Minneapolis, Manpower, interview by author, (January, 07,2015).

²¹ Adjarho, 2015.

reservists. RDML Sandra Adams, Deputy Commander of Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) expresses similar sentiment, “The multiple ‘colors’ of money make it more complicated than it needs to be to use reservists. If money were more centralized then prioritization of the funds would be easier.”²² As funding becomes tighter, funding of specific ‘colors’ is reduced but often times requirements remain the same. For example, NECC had a near forty percent decrease in ADT funds last fiscal year, but had an increase in operational requirements. The command had to be creative in using different buckets of money in order to use reservists to complete these requirements.²³

The added complexity of using multiple ‘colors’ of money can create delays in pay to the reservist. An example of this occurred when two reservists were traveling to Japan to participate in an exercise in January 2014. Both of these reservists had already completed nineteen days of AT previously during the fiscal year. Rather than a single set of orders for twelve days for the sailors to participate in the exercise, two sets of back to back orders were generated. The first set was for ten days of E-AT orders and the second set of orders was for two days of ADT orders. The sailors were authorized up to 29 days of E-AT funding to support the parent command, who wanted to use up as much of that funding as possible before using the ADT bucket of funding. The two sets of back to back orders allowed the sailors to travel to Japan and participate in the exercise as ordered. Issues arose when processing the back to back orders for pay. There was much added complexity and the second two day orders were initially over looked. The end result, the process was complicated and created several weeks’ delay in pay along with paperwork headache for the sailors.

²² Adams, 2014.

²³ Adams, 2014.

The current pay system does work, but due to the entanglement of two systems and multiple pots of money, issues arise such as pay delays or over charges for reserve sailors. The solution to issues like these is to reduce funding complexity. By having a single funding source, or even less pots or ‘colors’ of money, provided directly to the reserve units, can streamline the funding orders process and increase pay efficiency. In addition, NRF can maintain a segment of funding to support reserve unit additional requirements, such as E-AT funding. Finally, Reserve units would become responsible, similar to operational planning submission, to submit a proposed budget based on operational and training requirements. If money becomes more centralized, then prioritization of funds would be easier.

The Cross Assigned Sailor: Improving Effectiveness

One of the draws for recruiting for the Naval Reserves is that all O-4 and below sailors can live anywhere in the United States and its territories and drill locally. There are even several cases of reservists living in Europe and Japan who are able to drill at supported commands directly, but hold billets with reserve units in the states. Per Commander Naval Forces Instruction 1001.5E, “all reservists in a pay status must fill a mobilization requirement. Since demographics preclude local assignment at every activity, individuals may fill requirements by cross assignment.”²⁴ RADM Adams points out, “approximately thirty percent of selected reserves are cross-assigned and that number has been consistently one third of the NRF for the last ten years.”²⁵ As a cross-assigned sailor, individuals drill locally at the nearest NOSC with a local unit, but are cross-assigned or hold billets at a unit of a supported command outside of their local area. For instance, an E-7 may possess a skill needed by Commander Naval Forces Japan

²⁴ Commander Naval Reserve Forces, “Administrative Procedures for the Drilling Reserve and Participating Members of the Individual Ready Reserves (IRR),” (*COMNAVRESFORINST 1001.5E*, March 21, 2005).

²⁵ Adams, 2014.

(CNFJ), which drills in Minneapolis, Minnesota, but the E-7 may live in Houston, Texas. It is not realistic for that sailor to travel to Minneapolis once a month for drill. The sailor will drill at a local NOSC in Houston and still be cross-assigned to the CNFJ unit in Minneapolis. When the E-7 conducts his annual training it will be in support of CNFJ in Japan, but his monthly training will be based at a NOSC locally. In nearly every reserve unit, there are cross-assigned in and out sailors.

Cross-assigned in (CAI) are personnel already described, those who drill locally, but still hold a billet within a different unit, such as the case with an E-7 drilling in Houston, who is attached to CNFJ in Minneapolis. These sailors appear on rosters and paperwork, but do not drill during regularly scheduled drill weekends of the parent reserve unit. Cross-assigned out (CAO) are those sailors who hold billets in a unit at another NOSC, but drill weekends with the local unit. CAO sailors are present each month, but do not support the unit they drill with for AT but rather support the command of the billet they hold. Commanders are confronted with two challenges, first how to handle remote unit members in order to ensure an effective level of readiness for those sailors who are cross-assigned in and second what to do with sailors who are cross-assigned out, who are physically present for monthly drills but are attached to another unit.

Dealing with the CAO is not as difficult as CAI. Although CAO sailors support a different unit's mission for AT, they are physically present during most regularly scheduled drills and incorporating them into one's unit is not as challenging. It is the absent sailor, who shows up on the Reserve Unit Assignment Document (RUAD) or roster, but no one in the unit can ever seem to get a hold of. The problem is that this absent sailor is out of sight out of mind and is easily overlooked. When AT comes around, that sailor appears, but does his level of training

match that of the rest of the unit? How does the commander ensure this sailor's level of readiness?

One solution is to use IDTT. IDTT is available for cross-assigned sailors to travel to drill with their parent unit at no cost to the sailor. It is generally encouraged, but not required, for cross-assigned sailors to drill with their commands once a quarter. In choosing the weekend for CAI sailors to attend, unit leadership should consider deciding on a weekend that has limited NOSC requirements (such as an advancement exam or a Chain of Command ceremony) and announce the required drill weekend several months out to CAI sailors. The goal is to ensure maximum participation of the CAI and to focus completely on unit operation training vs other administrative obligations.²⁶ Communication with CAI sailors is also essential.

One best practice is for commanders to officially designate a unit member to reach out to CAI on a monthly basis. An officer representative for those officer CAIs and a motivated Leading Petty Officer (LPO) designated to reach out to enlisted CAIs should have this responsibility. Often times enlisted members feel more comfortable communicating to other enlisted members than directly to senior officers. Also, a demanding cross assigned manager collateral duty is then created for a motivated LPO who needs a leadership bullet for annual evaluations. The commanding officer then can get monthly reports on his CAIs that include what their AT plans are and any issues they may have. If a CAI sailor cannot be reached via phone or email, commands should attempt communications via other means. Many of the younger enlisted prefer to use text messages and social media, such as Facebook, over answering

²⁶Joe Carlin, "What are your best practices for employment of cross-assigned personnel?" *Linked In Discussion Board*, August 19, 2012, <https://www.linkedin.com/groupitem?view=&gid+4092479&type> (accessed January 14, 2015).

navy email.²⁷ Keeping these sailors in the loop is the goal. Along keeping with good communication with the member, it is also imperative to be in contact with the sailor's local drilling unit leadership. Communication between both units' leadership ensures expectations are aligned.

Training Opportunities vs. Time/Civilian Employer Constraints

The idea of a 'weekend warrior' is a legacy term that no longer reflects the reality many reservists face today. In 2004, VADM Cotton said during his ARI initiative that, "The average reservist now doesn't do weekends. The average reservist now supports what I call supportive commands whenever they can."²⁸ Eleven years later VADM Cotton's words continue to ring true, as many of today's reservists go beyond the drill weekend commitment. Minimum participation requirements are 38 days per the Bureau of Naval Personnel.²⁹ In fiscal year 2013, thirty five percent of Navy RC sailors served 0-38 days annually, forty percent served 39-53 days and twenty five percent served more than 54 days.³⁰ Over sixty five percent of the NRF does more than required, and this is a metric utilized by the Navy for reserve employment. In many cases there is unmeasured time where reservists contribute to their commands by completing requirements at home on their own time, unpaid. For instance, it is not uncommon for reservists to participate in conference calls, prepare reports, or complete GMT during the middle of their civilian work week outside of drill hours, on their own time. Some commands are able to compensate sailors who conduct unit work outside normal drill weekends with Additional Training Periods (ATP) when funds are available and the work is identified ahead of time, but this is not always the case.

²⁷ Carlin, 2012.

²⁸ Burgess July 2004.

²⁹ Administrative Procedures for Navy Reserve Personnel 2007.

³⁰ Adams, 2014.

In recent years, the Navy has made large strides in creating training opportunities for reserve sailors. Outside of drill weekends, both officer and enlisted sailors alike are encouraged to seek out training opportunities through offered naval courses. They are encouraged to apply for school billets that match individual training needs which in turn can advance Reserve Naval careers and improve a units' ability to support their supported active command. Sailors can navigate the Catalog of Navy Training Courses (CANTRAC) offered by CNRFC N7 Training to find suitable training opportunities to meet their personal and unit goals.³¹ Some courses are offered multiple times a year at multiple naval installations, while others are offered electronically through Navy Knowledge Online (NKO). For example, if a particular unit has a need for a Navy Enlisted Code (NEC) and has an eager junior enlisted sailor who wants to attend 30 days of technical training to earn it, the unit will find a suitable billet in CANTRAC and then use a combination of AT and ADT to fund the orders. Problems can arise when sailor has to take time off from their civilian jobs in order to attend the training and the civilian employer is not supportive.

Although the 'weekend warrior' model is not generally the case for many reserve sailors, as with the example of the junior enlisted sailor, the 'weekend warrior' reservist is still the perception of many civilian employers. Civilian employers have come a long way in recognizing and supporting their reserve sailor employees when those sailors are confronted with military commitments, but challenges still exist in this area. USERRA laws protect reservists who mobilize to active duty during a recall, but missed civilian job time for military training outside of deployments can be frowned upon. When an employee takes time off to do ADT or other forms of military training (outside of the two weeks of AT), some sailors use vacation time to

³¹ Navy Reserve Forces Command Commander N7 Training, "Training: How to Find and Apply for Opportunities," (*The Navy Reservist*, October 2014):8.

cover the missed work. Or in some cases, a stigma is created within the company that the employee lacks commitment to that company in favor of the Navy. This type of attitude has second and third order affects down the road that will affect a reserve sailor personally and in turn may affect that sailors' decision on how much time he or she is willing to commit to the navy. After all, reservists are 'part-time' employees of the Navy, and it is their civilian jobs that 'put food on the table'.

Not all civilian employers can be characterized as a whole. Some larger companies have very robust military policies that go above and beyond minimum law requirements. Boston Scientific, a medical device manufacturing and distribution company, for example, pays employees who are reservists their full employee salary for the first two weeks of military orders and then a differential (when the civilian salary is higher than the sailor's base pay) for military orders up to 12 months.³² Likewise, Conoco Philips, a large energy corporation out of Houston, provides its employees on military orders their regular salary for the first two weeks of their orders followed by a differential for up to a year.³³ Small business employers do not have additional military leave policies to support employees who have military commitments. These employers may feel a greater impact of the loss of individuals than larger Fortune 500 companies.

The Navy has recognized Sailor-Civilian Employer constraints and has made efforts in addressing it. Flexible drilling options were implemented in 2003. Flex drills are normal IDTs that are performed outside regularly scheduled drill weekend that are authorized by unit Commanding Officers. The flexibility allows reservists to complete formal schooling or work

³² U.S. Military Leave: Policy No. 4-06. December 01, 2012. https://hrconnectbsc.bsclhr.com/images_bsc/4-06_U.S._Military_Leave.pdf (accessed January 15, 2015).

³³ Conoco Philips, U.S. Military Leave Policy. July 01, 2013. http://hr.conocophillips.com/Documents/SMID_063_Military_Leave.pdf (accessed February 19, 2015).

around difficult civilian work schedules should there be a conflict between civilian job commitments and navy reserve commitments. Each fiscal year, up to forty flex IDTs may be authorized by Commanding Officers. Flex drilling helps when a civilian job or personal commitments clash with normal unit work, but it not the work around for additional naval training.

In the case of the junior enlisted sailor wanting to attend a technical 30 day school for a NEC, how does the NRF make that happen when the sailor does not have a supportive civilian employer? One option, turn a thirty day school into two two week sessions. The sailor could use AT over two fiscal years to complete the training. The Navy can create a distance learning option. In one area of training that the Navy already does this, is Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). There are multiple ways an officer can complete JPME training. Distance learning is offered through all the services war college websites. If selected, Reserve officers can attend in-residence at those war colleges. JPME is also offered in small two week modules of in-residence seminars in Newport, RI.³⁴ All of these options allow flexibility to reserve officers desiring this training, and as a result, more officers are JPME qualified. Another popular school is the Maritime Staff Operators Course (MSOC), which prepares officers and senior enlisted to serve in operational staff assignments in numbered fleets Maritime Operations Centers (MOC), or represent maritime planning efforts while serving in other combined liaison/service/joint billets.³⁵ Sailors receive an Additional Qualifying Designator (AQD) upon completing the course. This course is approximately 4-5 weeks in length and is offered over fifteen times a calendar year at the Naval War College in Newport, RI.³⁶ Unlike JPME, MSOC is only offered

³⁴ Commander 2014: 12.

³⁵ U.S. Naval War College, "Maritime Staff Operators Course (MSOC)." *U.S. Naval War Colleg. n.d.* <https://www.usnwc.edu/Academic/Maritime--Staff-Operators-Course.aspx> (accessed January 15, 2015).

³⁶ College, n.d. 2015.

in Newport and the course is not broken up. As many reserve officers will fill operational staff billets at one point in their career, it is beneficial to have this training as part of their active component support. MSOC is one of those schools that can only be attended by reserve sailors who have flexibility to take off 4-5 weeks from their civilian jobs to attend.

How can the navy make this school more accessible to reserve sailors who want to attend but do not have the civilian employer flexibility? One solution would be to break MSOC up into smaller one-two week sessions or have a traveling training team that could offer the course regionally at certain NOSCs. Both options would allow for more reserve sailors to attend the training and may even be more cost effective than sending the same sailors to Newport. Two instructors traveling to a local NOSC would cost less than 20 reservists traveling to Newport on the Navy's dime. Even a Video Tele Conference (VTC) of the course during a drill weekend would touch more Reservists. The Navy already has this technology with the use of Assist and Assist Teams that are able to provide education and tailored assistance to fleet staffs. These solutions offer options to reserve sailors who do not have civilian job flexibility to take off work in order to attend Navy training. Of course, the counter argument is that all of these training opportunities are just that, training, and are not requirements. It is possible to have a successful career in the Naval Reserves without them. Also the needs of the Navy will always trump the convenience of the sailor. In the case of JPME, Navy leadership in the late nineties decided it needed more personnel with this training. So other options for attaining JPME were created. The needs of the Navy created the solution in this case.³⁷ For MSOC or schools like it, Navy leadership will have to decide if they want more sailors to attend. If so, any of the solutions previously mentioned could be the solution in the future. For the time being, sailors have to work within their own constraints.

³⁷ Adams 2014.

All reserve units will have sailors who will have flexibility with their civilian careers and those without it. There are reserve units that are higher tempo that support operational commands that require more than the 38 day a year minimum and expect reserve unit members to be able to accommodate and there are other strategic depth units requiring only the minimum participation from their sailors. The Navy needs both types. Commands that need skills sets such as MSOC or 30 day technical schools should advertise it, to attract reservists who do have the flexibility with their civilian employers and within their personal lives to support the additional training. Those that cannot find flexibility should seek a billet in a more strategic depth unit. Over one's reserve career, an individual might be able to move between strategic and operational units depending on their ability to support.

Conclusion

The Navy's reliance on the Naval Reserve Force has increased significantly in the last two decades and more so in the post-9/11 era. Twelve years after the publishing of *Integrate Your Reserves: A How-To Primer* in Proceedings, Robert Wray's words still echo true. "The most critical part of successful reserve integration is the commander's choice of how to use them".³⁸ It is recommended that this Primer be required reading for all active and reserve leadership, as it gives an introduction to reserve matters and outlines basic integration techniques that if used, allows active units to derive advantages in manpower, flexibility, and skills, through masterful teaming with their reservists. Right now, reservists are actively supporting their active components, deploying to all areas of operation and mobilizing to meet the nation's national security requirements in Afghanistan, the Philippines and other global locations. Today the Navy Reserves prides itself on having the ability to have the right sailor at the right place at the right

³⁸ Wray, 2003.

time, touching the entire operational spectrum. As the nation is presented with uncertain security environments, it will continue to rely on the reserve component for missions abroad and at home as part of the Total Navy Operational Force. If the Navy is going to maintain an effective reserve force and move beyond the “weekend warrior” construct, it must also reform and update how reservists train, receive funding and successfully balance civilian requirements. Through these changes, the country can truly have a “Total Force,” prepared to meet its national security requirements.

Bibliography

U.S. Military Leave: Policy No. 4-06. December 01, 2012.

https://hrconnectbsc.bschr.com/images_bsc/4-06_U.S._Military_Leave.pdf (accessed January 15, 2015).

Adams, Sandra E. , interview by Author. *Rear Admiral, Deputy Commander, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command* (December 17, 2014).

Adjiarho, Stephen, interview by author. *Personnel Specialist Third Class, NOSC Minneapolis, Manpower* (January 07, 2015).

"The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces." In *DoD 1215.15-H*, by The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 1-99. 2000.

Burgess, Richard R. "Navy Cracking the Glass Wall Between Reserve, Active Forces." *Sea Power*, July 2004: 10-11.

Carlin, Joe. "What are your best practices for employment of cross-assigned personnel?" *Linked In-Discussion Board* . August 19, 2012.

https://www.linkedin.com/groupItem?view=&gid=4092479&type=member&item=148836987&commentID=5960861378439843840&report%2Esuccess=8ULbKyXO6NDvmoK7o030UNOYGZKrvdhBhypZ_w8EpQrrQI-BBjkmxwkeOWBjLE28YyDlxcyEO7_TA_giuRN#commentID_5960861378439843840 (accessed January 14, 2015).

College, U.S. Naval War. "Maritime Staff Operators Course (MSOC)." *U.S. Naval War College*. n.d. <https://www.usnwc.edu/Academics/Maritime--Staff-Operators-Course.aspx> (accessed January 15, 2015).

Command, Navy Recruiting. *America's Navy Reserve*. n.d. <http://www.navyreserve.com/> (accessed October 29, 2014).

Commander, Navy Reserve Forces Command N7 Training. "Training: How to find and apply for opportunities." *The Navy Reservist*, October 2014: 08-17.

Cotton, John G. VADM. "Citizen Sailors Now Fully Integrated into Navy Force." *Officers*, December 2006: 26-29.

Ferguson III, VDML Mark E. , ADM Gary Roughhead, and VDML Dirk J. Debbink. *Navy's Total Force Vision for the 21st Century*. January 2010. [http://www.navy.mil/features/NTF%20Vision%20\(Final\)\(11%20Jan%2010%201210hrs\).pdf](http://www.navy.mil/features/NTF%20Vision%20(Final)(11%20Jan%2010%201210hrs).pdf).

Forces, Commander Naval Reserve. "Administrative Procedures for the Drilling Reserve and Participating Members of the Individual Ready Reserves (IRR)." *COMNAVRESFORINST 1001.5E*. March 21, 2005.

Levantrosser, William F. *Management of the Reserve Components*. Washington D.C. : Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1967.

Pendleton, John H. Defense Capabilities and Management. *Active and Reserve Unit Costs: DOD Report to Congress*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, July 31, 2014.

Personnel, Chief of Naval. "Administrative Procedures for Navy Reserve Personnel." *BUPERS INSTRUCTION 1001.39F*. September 17, 2007.

—. "Administrative Procedures for the Navy Reserve Personnel." *BUPERS INSTRUCTION 1001.39F CHANGE TRANSMITTAL 1*. May 03, 2013.

Philips, Conoco. *Military Leave Policy*. July 01, 2013.
http://hr.conocophillips.com/Documents/SMID_063_Military_Leave.pdf (accessed February 18, 2015).

Status of the Navy. December 23, 2014. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id+146 (accessed December 23, 2014).

Wray, Robert Jr. CAPT. "Integrate Your Reserves: A How-To Primer." *Proceedings*, December 2003: 60-63.