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
***A MODIFIED ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST GLOBAL
TERRORISM***

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR: Major Brian J. Heslin, USMC


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Executive Summary:

Title: A MODIFIED ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST GLOBAL TERRORISM

Author: Major Brian J. Heslin, USMC

Thesis: As violent extremism and terrorism continue to expand and become more of a global threat, the United Nations must be established, by its members, as the lead organization in this fight, and it must organize in a manner that can effectively defeat these forms of violence against humanity.

Discussion: With the rise in violent extremist and terrorist organizations, the world needs to charge an organization to coordinate counter terrorism and extremism efforts. The organization cannot be any one specific nation due to the global nature of the problem. Additionally, a preponderance of violent extremists and terrorist organizations preach from a foundation based on a perversion of Islam. This false tie to the Muslim faith further complicates the situation and limits the options to respond by both Muslim and non-Muslim nations. Doing so would only further play into the rhetoric and information operations campaign of these threat organizations. These reasons exemplify why a collective global effort led by the United Nations is the only way to respond to these threats.

Once the United Nations is given responsibility, by the Security Council, as the lead in this global fight it must reorganize in a manner that allows for timely and accurate responses to these types of threats. Its current structure is sufficient in addressing issues raised by Member States, but it is not appropriately organized to handle issues raised by non-state actors. Following a simple process will allow the United Nations to organize in a manner that will enable adequate responses to violent extremism and terrorism.

Conclusion: This paper will address the issues caused by violent extremist and terrorist organizations and an analysis of the current structure of the United Nations' counter terrorism capability. The paper will also outline methods for organizing the United Nations in a manner that can better address these threats. The paper will then prescribe a process that can be used to address these threats.

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Preface and Acknowledgements:

In the current fight against terrorism and violent extremism, the United States and its allies continue to lead the collective effort to defeat the threat through diplomatic, information, military, and economic means. The problem is much deeper than any one nation, or even a small collective of nations can adequately address and, therefore, requires an organization to lead a global effort against these threats to peace and global order. The United States and its allies have contributed far too many resources in this fight, and it's time for the global community to unify and share the burden that must be addressed. The recommended organization to lead this fight is the United Nations. Research that was used to support this paper includes source documents, case studies, academic publications, and other open source articles that discuss the issue. Almost all of the sources used are either current, or were published after 2001. The reason for the use of primarily recent sources is because the more historical references have been superseded by more recent examples. This subject is relevant to military and government professionals that either have or will participate in strategy development, or in the conduct of operations against violent extremism and terrorism.

Throughout the process of developing this paper, research assistance was directly received from the research team at the Gray Research Center, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA. Guidance throughout the development and refinement of the paper was received from Dr. Jonathan Phillips, Professor of Military History, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University. Indirect assistance was received during the scheduled curriculum and electives attended during Academic Year 2015 of Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University.

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All acts of terrorism – by whomever committed – are criminal, inhumane and unjustifiable, regardless of motivation. An unwavering and united effort by the international community is required if we are to succeed in preventing these heinous acts. In this respect, we recognize the United Nations’ critical role in mobilizing the international community, building capacity, and facilitating technical assistance to Member States in implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.¹

-Carol Hamilton, Senior U.S. Advisor to the United Nations

Introduction:

The use of violent extremism and terrorism by organizations to influence change without a legitimate political process poses a great threat to stability, global order, and basic human rights. To defeat this threat, the world needs an organization to lead a campaign against it. This organization must follow a problem solving process that achieves a collective understanding of the issue and orchestrates the efforts of all participants in this fight. The organization best suited for this role is the United Nations. Although the United Nations has made attempts to take action against violent extremism and terrorism, it has fallen short of accomplishing any real goals due to the excessive bureaucratic process it is plagued by and its lack of ability to employ sufficient methods to address the issues. As violent extremism and terrorism continue to expand and become more of a global threat, the United Nations must be established, by its members, as the lead organization in this fight, and it must organize in a manner that can effectively defeat these forms of violence against humanity.


The Problem:

Other than the current practices of the United Nations, its overall failure can mostly be blamed on its original organizational design. The United Nations was created at the conclusion of World War II in order to, “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”² The United Nations has effectively prevented total war on a global level between major powers by providing

a forum for those nations to come together and address issues. Sanctions are one example of a method the United Nations employs in an attempt to rein in overly aggressive nations.

Where the United Nation's design falls short is in addressing issues introduced by non-state actors, in this case violent extremist organizations such as, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other transnational violent extremists and terrorists. It is ineffective in influencing these actors because they do not engage in a diplomatic process, nor should they be invited to, but the United Nations does provide a platform that must be used to rally its Member States against these non-state actors. The option to veto Security Council Resolutions for the five permanent members of the Security Council is another component of the United Nation's design that can be viewed as either positive or negative. The veto can be viewed as positive because it keeps super powers participating in dialogue they may otherwise be uninterested in engaging in. It can be viewed as negative because it can be used to prevent the global community from exerting too much necessary influence on a super power, a partner of a super power, or against an effort made by another permanent member in the interest of politicking.³

Regardless of why the United Nations was created, it must adapt to address this emerging range of global threats that impede the progression of freedom and safety, which go directly against its Charter. The map below depicts the level at which nations are impacted by terrorism.⁴ More important than depicting which nations are affected by terrorism, the map clearly demonstrates that terrorism is a global problem. As viewed below, terrorism is a problem that clearly impacts the world community. It is a common enemy that the United Nations must more actively rally its Member States against to defeat this threat to rights and freedoms.



-Map 1

When solving any problem, a process should be used to focus effort, develop solutions, and to implement the agreed upon plan. Establishing a process to follow will help synchronize an organized community against a defined foe. A planning and implementation process that will help the United Nations counter violent extremism must include the following six steps: define the problem, organize a body to address the problem, enable that body to act decisively, target the problem and its underlying causes, act against those targets, and lastly, transition the stabilized environment back to the local government. Following this process will ensure focused effort across the global community. With a defined problem and an organized, focused, and enabled force, the remaining steps of the process will be achievable and an end will be realized in this campaign against violence and terror. Before this process is applied, the Member States must unite and give the United Nations the role as leader of the effort. This can be achieved

when Member States call on the leadership of the United Nations to support coalitions against terrorism as Egypt's, President Abdel Fattah el- Sissi, did in a recent interview on how to address the Islamic State in Libya. "Egypt's president said in a radio interview aired on Tuesday that creating a U.N.-backed coalition was the best course of action to rid Libya of Islamic extremists ... 'We will not allow them to cut off the heads of our children,' he said. Asked whether he wanted to see a U.N.-backed coalition for Libya, he said: 'I think there is no choice.'"⁵ This demonstrates a desire for unified action sanctioned by the United Nations.

To date, the lead in defeating violent extremism and terrorism, particularly when transnational, has been the United States through the employment of diplomatic, information, military, and economic means. As a result of September 11th, 2001, the United States and its closest allies were much more formally forced into this role when compared to the limited role they previously played. The United States Congress immediately recognized the threat that terrorism posed and approved the President's request for the Authorization to use Military Force against terrorism on September 14th, 2001.⁶ Unfortunately, a number of miscalculations were made by the United States in its response to the terror attacks of that day. The most significant error was the failure to work with other Member States to get the United Nations to lead a global campaign against terrorism and violent extremism.

The United Nations did offer limited support in the form of resolutions against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, a call for Member States to "redouble efforts against terrorists, and it urged states to "suppress the financing of terrorism" and to aid in any anti-terrorism campaigns.⁷ However, this was a more diplomatic approach, one that was not efficient for the critical matter at hand. This is where the United Nations needs to adjust its method for dealing with terrorism and violent extremism in order to stay true to the direction of the Charter of the United Nations, Article 1, "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective

collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace...”⁸ The United Nations has the intent to protect humanity but must achieve more decisive results. The standard peacekeeping operations employed by the United Nations are far too limited in response time and authorities to address these threats. The “Enable” section of the “Process” portion of this paper will further address a rare recent successful peacekeeping operation in the Congo that employed offensive operations during peacekeeping operations.

Understandably, and within its right of self-defense, the United States was not going to wait for a drawn out diplomatic process by the United Nations to determine a response to this attack on its homeland. Unlike the United Nations, the United States has the unique ability to globally deploy rapidly and sustain military force. Therefore, it did. However, this response addressed the threat to America and coalition partners, but not the greater global issue that festered in areas not addressed in this response. By taking the fight to the enemy’s terrain, the United States and its allies effectively denied safe havens for overt terrorist networks. Doing so created greater instability in other areas of the world, such as failing Middle Eastern, failing African, and even some stable European countries where violent extremist and terror networks are growing. Terrorists and violent extremists use these areas as safe havens from which they recruit, train, and stage attacks. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, these areas of instability are a problem for not only the nations these areas are in, but they are also a problem for neighboring countries and on a grander scale any country that can be accessed from those locations. Following the September 11th attacks, had the United Nations been able to lead in combating the conditions these organizations seek and the methods they use to facilitate operations, it would have prevented much of the instability that is required to develop these safe havens.

Despite the kinetic victories of the United States and its allies in the battles against violent extremists and terrorists, this ongoing war cannot be won without a collective effort of democracies and, in particular, moderate Muslim nations. A global level whole-of-government approach similar to how the United States uses all “instruments of power” is required to tackle the issue from multiple angles.⁹ The organization best suited to synchronize and employ these efforts is the United Nations. Further failure to establish a capable unified front on a global level will result in the growth of violent extremism and terrorism, and an overall increasingly violent world in which basic human rights and international peace are forever threatened.¹⁰

Although the United Nations’ full spectrum of responses have been mostly lackluster, it has demonstrated a desire to counter international terrorism. This is evidenced in the wording of the United Nations’ Charter, as quoted above, in 26 Security Council resolutions since 2001, and in 79 General Assembly resolutions since 1978. Specifically, these resolutions calls on Member States to prevent and suppress foreign terrorist fighters, and address geographic and financial conditions that allow terrorist organizations to thrive.¹¹ Despite a large quantity of non-binding General Assembly resolutions and unsupported Security Council resolutions, they have proven to be largely ineffective when trying to coordinate a consolidated effort to address the problem as a whole rather than in separate parts. A review of the resolution titles as listed in Appendices A and B show that most of these resolutions are merely condemnations of acts of terror or extensions of previous resolutions with a few that actually call for action. Additionally, the United Nations is not empowered in a way that it can rally its Member States to combat these organizations or the conditions they require. The closest effort the United Nations has made to unify action is through the establishment of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, a proposed treaty to internationally criminalize terrorism.¹²

The most recent completed effort of the United Nations against violent extremism and terrorism is based on Security Council Resolution 2178, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts*.¹³ This resolution shows an effort to rally the global community in a fight against terrorism and violent extremism, but it falls short in a number of areas. Comparable to the prior resolutions, 2178 is a solid step forward in synchronizing efforts, but it does not criminalize the act as a treaty would. Additionally, due to the United Nation's inability to enforce compliance to its resolutions, this is a mere suggestion and request of what states should do to counter terrorism and violent extremism rather than an actual binding agreement. Also, the resolution still does not take or direct ownership of the problem or provide direct methods for addressing it.

Using the recent upswing in violent extremist actions, the United Nations has an opportunity to manifest support for a treaty of this nature and can realize the ratification of this necessary document. The treaty being proposed by the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism has been deadlocked since 1996 due to the inability for committee members to decide on the definition of terrorism.¹⁴ The main challenge to the proposed definition comes from the Arab Terrorism Convention and the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which both want the definition of terrorism to exclude armed struggle for liberation and self-determination.¹⁵ This is due to the desire of some of these nations to counter what they view invasion of their lands, which is a dispute that should be worked through the global community in the United Nations rather than with violence. Coincidentally, the nations represented in those conventions represent the areas that have the most threats of terrorism and violent extremism.

As organizations such as the Islamic State, Al Nusra Front, Boko Haram, and Al Qaeda continue to recruit, train, and conduct acts of violence and terror, the Member States of the

United Nations have been given another opportunity to establish the United Nations as the lead agent to fight this evil. Once again, they have failed, as was evident at the February 2015 White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism. The United Nations missed another opportunity in two ways. First, the United Nations did not host the summit; the United States hosted, instead. The perception this created is that the United States is once again taking the lead on another global effort to fight terrorism and violent extremism. Despite Secretary General Ban Ki-moon attending the Summit, the United Nations was clearly not directing efforts. Second, President Barack Obama provided direct and aggressive opening and closing remarks that called for a unified front to defeat violent extremism, “At the United Nations in September (2014), I called on the international community to come together and eradicate violent extremism.”¹⁶ The Secretary General also remarked in a manner that was completely in line with past half-efforts by the United Nations to counter terrorism and violent extremism.

In his comments, the Secretary General highlighted that the United Nations Counter-Terrorism strategy of 2006 “provides a framework” for countering terrorism and violent extremism. However, both continue to expand their transnational reach and lethality. That in itself proves this framework and the organization created to supervise it, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, are ineffective. The Secretary General also stated that “the UN system stands ready to work on a comprehensive multi-stakeholder plan of action to prevent violent extremism.”¹⁷ This statement highlights why the United Nations has failed to lead a global effort to address violent extremism and terrorism. It has failed because it “stands ready.” Instead, the United Nations should be driving action by rallying its Member States. Additionally, the Secretary General used the word prevent rather than defeat, or something else that would imply it will address the existing issues. Preventing new instances of terrorism and violent extremism is important and must also be addressed in a strategy, but

defeating the enemy as it exists today must be at least an equivalent effort to prevent future threats. These examples of missed opportunities and soft speeches demonstrate why the mindset and organization of the United Nations need to adapt to implement a process for success.

Although, like other permanent party members of the Security Council, the United States has shown hesitation in granting increased power to the United Nations due to concerns of the United Nations becoming powerful. Due to the globally complex nature of this problem, the fact that terrorism is a common enemy, and the amount the United States has expended on regional approaches, this is one situation in which the United States would likely look for a global lead to address the issue and both coordinate and coordinate actions against it.

The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force is a collective of thirty four international organizations. These subordinate organizations, such as the Al Qaeda/Taliban Monitoring Team and the International Monetary Fund, provide focuses effort on categories of resources terrorists and violent extremist use or exploit to support operations. The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, is specifically designed to, “enhance coordination and coherence of counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system.”¹⁸ The main issue with the task force is that it must work through multiple layers of bureaucracy, mainly the politics of the international system. Additionally, the represented Member States all have competing priorities that don’t necessarily include defeating terrorism. To enable the body tasked with defeating terrorism and violent extremism, nations must both vote to establish a definition and to enable this organization to have the authority necessary to effectively address the threat. The sort of authority necessary for this effort will not be popular with some Member States. They must look past the politics in order to get on a path that leads to the defeat of violent extremism and terrorism.

To assist the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, an additional organization, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Center, was created in 2011. The role of the Counter-Terrorism Center is, “to assist in meeting capacity-building needs of Member States, and to strengthen United Nations' counter-terrorism expertise.”¹⁹ The establishment of this Center was intended to fix the process but has proven to be redundant. It has added another layer of bureaucracy, which delays the threat response. Since the Center’s formation, the Task Force must call for a meeting with all involved parties, then make a decision, document it, and act upon it. If protecting the sensitivities of Member States is the priority of the Task Force and Center, they would be achieving their ends perfectly. Unfortunately, that is not its goal, and its focus on strict adherence to a process instead of developing solutions is allowing violent extremists and terrorists to expand and maneuver with less obstruction by the global community. A third organization is a subsidiary of the Security Council, the Counter-Terrorism Committee. This committee is separate and distinct from the two previous mentioned organizations and unlike those two organizations, it only serves as a conduit between the Security Council and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the Counter-Terrorism Center.²⁰

The combined inefficiencies of each organization begin with a lack of a clearly stated definition and an understanding of the problem. They continue due to the lack of adequate authorities and support to act. After the United Nations is authorized to take lead by its Member States, and it grasps that current methods are inadequate, conditions will be set for future success. The first step towards a solution is to begin a more forceful dialogue that results in agreed upon definitions of terrorism and violent extremism. Once a definition is agreed to and a foundation is set for the problem that must be solved, a sufficient organizational structure can be established. With the appropriate authorities, it will also be able to synchronize efforts and begin to defeat violent extremism and terrorism.

The United Nations is unable to agree on a definition of terrorism because Member States cannot agree on how to define it. In his historical fiction novel about the Irish Republican Army, British novelist, Gerald Seymour stated, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”²¹ This quote exemplifies the varied views on what terrorism is – a movement, a violent criminal act, or simply a tactic used by criminals. The issue with defining terrorism is that some Member States believe that outlawing terrorism, as it is defined in the treaty, will impede their ability to protect themselves from potentially violent oppressive governments.²² The issue with this push back is that to document the definitions of terrorism and violent extremism, a treaty must be passed, making those activities illegal in international law. There are some challenges with establishing a treaty based law, and the United Nations must decide if it will stay with a resolution, or if it should continue to push for a treaty.

There are advantages and disadvantages to both types of resolutions and a treaty. It can be approved with only nine of the Security Council member’s votes, but it can also be blocked by a veto from one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Additionally, A Security Council resolution can be binding for all Member States of the United Nations and noncompliance can be acted against by the United Nations as a breach of the binding agreement. A General Assembly resolution has greater exposure to all of the Member States of the United Nations, cannot be vetoed, and only requires a majority vote, but it is non-binding.²³ A treaty, which is a formal written agreement between sovereign states or between states and international organizations, does not require a vote. The main advantage to a treaty, which makes it the only true choice for the mechanism that defines terrorism, is that a treaty is the only document that will criminalize terrorism in international law.²⁴

These limitations of the two types of resolutions the United Nations can issue, when compared to a treaty, demonstrate that the legal nature of a treaty makes it the only tool that can

be used to solidify a definition of violent extremism and terrorism. Despite the consistent negotiation at the Convention, continued push-back from Member States has prevented a comprehensive definition. The push-back from the Member States is due to the legal and binding nature of the treaty. This will give the United Nations the ability to influence actions in those nations when in violation of the treaty. The legal authority a treaty gives the United Nations is exactly the authority it needs to address terrorism and violent extremism.²⁵ Once the foundation has been laid in the form of a binding treaty, the United Nations must follow a simple, but deliberate process that focuses effort, consolidates resources, manages tempo, and ultimately aims for a specific and collective goal.

The Process:

Define: The first step of the proposed process requires establishing a definition for terrorism and violent extremism that is founded in detailed problem framing, that is followed by an agreed upon definition by Member States, which is then solidified in the form of a legally binding treaty. Without a definition, it is impossible to establish a common understanding of the problem, to develop an effective strategy, and to create a supporting framework. Failing to accomplish this initial step, based on problem framing, will create an environment that confuses the actors on whether they should be addressing acts of terrorism, the conditions that allow it, or organizations that feel committing acts of terrorism is their only option for affecting change. Examining examples of multiple definitions from resolutions and the proposed treaty shows that effort is being made to define and criminalize terrorism. After 15 years of debating, however, it is time to make a decision. In 1996, in General Assembly Resolution 51/210, the United Nations attempted to define terrorism as:

Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance

unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.²⁶

This is a General Assembly resolution, which is non-binding. That is the reason it has not been agreed upon as the United Nations' official legally binding definition. The United Nations again tried to define terrorism in the 2004 Security Council Resolution 1566 as:

Criminal acts, including, against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.²⁷

The issue with this definition is that the international conventions mentioned are not solid enough from which to act, and there is no decisive method to penalize noncompliance. The disputed definition of terrorism currently being discussed at the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism is:

Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes: (a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or (b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or (c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act."²⁸

This definition, although the best attempt to criminalize terrorism, focuses too much on the targets of a terrorist act. The vast differences in definitions and the ongoing debates clearly exemplify the need for the United Nations, through support from its Member States, to drive the process harder, streamline its structure that focuses on the problems of terrorism, and to start moving forward.

The United Nations is not alone in dealing with complications in clearly defining the problem. Within the United States government, there are multiple definitions of terrorism within U.S. Code, the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the National Counterterrorism Center. According to United States Code, Title 22, “The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”²⁹ Title 18 of United States Code defines terrorism as:

The term ‘international terrorism’ means activities that — (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended — (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.³⁰

The Department of Defense defines terrorism in *Joint Publication 3-26 Counterterrorism* as:

“Terrorism is the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political...”³¹

The following themes are common throughout the six definitions referenced above:

1. The act is unlawful. 2. It includes violence. 3. It forcefully coerces change through fear. 4. It usually targets civilians, but can target governments if the goal is to cause fear in the population. 5. It is conducted by a person or group. 6. The person or group is conventionally inferior to the group they are trying to influence. Taking these key points and consolidating them into a precise definition produces the following: **Terrorism and violent extremism are unlawful acts of violence against civilians or governments by a conventionally inferior individual or group that intends to force change through the use of fear.** Even this suggested definition, which

includes attributes of many other definitions will be challenged. The constant challenging and disagreement on a definition, and support to counter a defined problem are reasons why it has been so challenging for the international community to define terrorism. Once the international community, through the United Nations, can agree to a definition of terrorism, progress can continue, and an organization can be established to target and address the threat.

Organize: Once the United Nations decides on a definition based on detailed problem framing, the second step, creating a new organization to address the issue, can begin. Since some structure exists within the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the Counter-Terrorism Center, the United Nations does not have to start from the beginning. The focus in this step of the process should be to create a fresh start for an organization that can energize a more focused United Nations led effort to defeat terrorism and violent extremism. In essence, this step can be achieved through a reorganization of the existing entities and a rebranding of the organization. Rebranding can be accomplished with a new name, a new mission, and most importantly a new set of Member State approved authorities, which will be discussed in step four. The new name should include violent extremism since the fights against terrorism and violent extremism are parallel. This new task force should be named the United Nations Counter Violent Extremism and Terrorism Task Force. Instead of having two organizations with overlapping responsibilities, the new task force will be a larger body capable of streamlining approvals and negotiations, maneuvering the approval process for action, and coordinating the efforts of the numerous sub-committees that contribute to the fight. The head of the task force should have predetermined, Member State approved, authorities to act independently. This will allow for a more rapid response to emergency situations. This task force should also report directly to the Secretary General and the Security Council for streamlined approvals beyond


what is predetermined. Similar to establishing a definition, this step will require backing from Member States in both support and resourcing.

Enable: The third step of the process is to enable the task force by establishing standing authorities to act. Authorities for this task force will be critical to its success due to the requirements to act faster than it does now, use force when necessary, and to act within the borders of sovereign nations when granted permission by the Security Council. In some cases, the authorities will seem to go against the United Nations' standard of not infringing on a nation's sovereignty. This infringement can be mitigated by keeping the Security Council as the decision maker for involvement. The Security Council's decision should be based on whether or not the country in question is able to respond, or if terrorism is becoming transnational from that state. These types of authorities are necessary for two main reasons. First, violent extremists do not adhere to a nation's borders and often use some national boundaries for safe havens, they are transnational in nature. Second, much of the recruitment, information operations campaign, and resourcing transactions take place in cyberspace on commercial websites such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.³² Through Member State support, and given the authorities to track, pinpoint, seize, and halt non-kinetic extremist and terrorist activities, this new task force will be able to generate noticeable effects on the enemy.

INTERPOL provides a model that does not specifically address the issue of defeating terrorism and violent extremism, but it does provide an example of a framework from which the United Nations may be able to build its organization. In 2000, Ronald Noble was appointed as the Secretary General of INTERPOL. His immediate review resulted in many identified problems from structure to schedule and an overall lack of effectiveness. By the time he departed from the Organization in 2014, it had transitioned from an ineffective social club to an active synchronizer of national and local level police forces. It is essentially a dynamic

information manager in the fight against global crime. In its current construct, INTERPOL is still too small of an organization to deal with terrorism and violent extremism, nor is it part of the United Nations.³³ However, a similar organization that is under United Nations' control and is granted the authorities and resources necessary to fight terrorism and violent extremism would be able to synchronize worldwide efforts against these threats. When this United Nations task force is necessary, resourcing it with military forces from Member States would create a formidable capability that could adequately address the issues it is designed to defeat.

In addition to the task force, boots on the ground that are controlled by either the created task force or an established subordinate task force will be required. The authority to insert external forces into a sovereign nation must be a last resort and should always be at the request of the nation to which these forces are deployed. In some rare cases, the United Nations may have to force intervention. An existing and unique aspect of the United Nations that could be leveraged in this process is that the United Nations can deploy Member State provided forces, typically as peace keepers, in situations that warrant external intervention. In this process, cases that involved deployment of forces would involve actions against state sponsors of the crimes of terrorism and violent extremism, or if the nation is unable to address the problem independently and the problem is expanding beyond its borders. The below map displays United Nations peacekeeping operations since its establishment. The dark blue countries represent 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations, and the light blue represent 69 completed peacekeeping operations.³⁴



-Map 2

The authorities that allow the deployment of forces are specifically granted to the Security Council as specified in Article 42, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which states,

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.³⁵

Issues that any United Nations raised force will create are attaining the manpower from Member States and the necessary resources to deploy and sustain the force. By design, the United Nations relies on Member States to contribute military forces and only allocates a relatively small amount of its annual budget to address the issues a United Nations' established force may encounter. This quote from Canadian Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire in reference to his experience as the commander of the Peacekeeping mission in Rwanda during 1993-1994, speaks to the challenges faced by an ad hoc force:

The UN was a 'pull' system, not a 'push' system like I had been used to with NATO, because the UN had absolutely no pool of resources to draw on. You had to make a request for everything you needed, and then you had to wait while that request was analyzed...For instance, soldiers everywhere have to eat and drink. In a push system, food and water for the number of soldiers deployed is automatically supplied. In a pull system, you have to ask for those rations, and no common sense seems to ever apply.³⁶

Lieutenant General Dallaire clearly states that providing the required sustainment for its forces is a challenge for the United Nations due to its “push” style of support. Additionally, establishing rules of engagement and any other modification to the operation requires an extensive amount of deliberation by the Security Council.

One example of the United Nations deploying forces to intervene in a problem beyond what the sovereign nation could handle is seen in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the time, violent extremist organizations were murdering civilians at a level that required external assistance. What is unique about this situation is that it is a rare example of the United Nations taking preemptive measures to counter a threat. In this case, the United Nations peacekeeping force was working with an above average budget of 1.5 billion dollars and was also authorized to use limited force to “preserve peace and restore order,” which it did. Despite its presence and resourcing, atrocities were still occurring at alarming rates. It wasn’t until preemptive action was taken that a difference was noticed. These actions were backed by Security Council Resolution 2098 and provide a tremendous example of warranted intervention succeeding.³⁷ The lesson to be learned from this is that when preemptive action is necessary, it must be employed quickly and aggressively, and force must be authorized early.

Although the Congo is the lone example of the United Nations operating preemptively with land forces, it has proven it can respond appropriately when necessary. Other than the Congo, the most preemptive actions conducted by the United Nations were in the form of naval force blockades of Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti and Sierra Leone. The United Nations has also authorized “limited use of force” for peacekeeping forces and military observers that deployed to the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Additionally, the United Nations has authorized the use of “all necessary means” to multinational forces that were not specifically United Nations forces, but acting in line with United Nations’ objectives of

preserving peace and restoring order. These multinational operations occurred in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Eastern Zaire, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, the Congo, Liberia and Iraq. When the United Nations establishes a force to address violent extremism and terrorists, it must authorize those forces to use force as it did in the examples as listed.³⁸

1 February 2015 Mandates for peacekeeping operations and field-based political missions		Total	<u>MINUSMA</u>	<u>UNAMID</u>	<u>MINUSCA</u>	<u>MONUSCO</u>	<u>UNOCI</u>	<u>UNMISS</u>	<u>UNISFA</u>	<u>UNIFIL</u>
Location/region		7	Mali	Sudan / Darfur	CAR	DRC	Cote d'Ivoire	South Sudan	Abyei	Lebanon
# of Mandate components		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Lead entity		DKPO	DPKO/AU	DPKO	DPKO	DPKO	DPKO	DPKO	DPKO	DPKO
Original mandate decision		Res. 2100 (2013)	Res. 1769 (2007)	Res. 2149 (2014)	Res. 1925 (2010)	Res. 1528 (2004)	Res. 1996 (2011)	Res. 1990 (2011)	Res. 425 (1978)	
Latest decision		Res. 2164 (2014)	Res. 2173 (2014)	Res. 2149 (2014)	Res. 2147 (2014)	Res. 2162 (2014)	Res. 2187 (2014)	Res. 2179 (2014)	Res. 2172 (2014)	
Length of the current mandate		1 year – expires 30 June 2015	10 months – expires 30 June 2015	1 year – expires 30 April 2015	1 year – expires 31 March 2015	1 year – expires 30 June 2015	6 months – expires 30 May 2015	4.5 months – expires 28 February	1 year – expires 31 August 2015	
Chapter VII		7	Yes	Yes (partial: Res. 1769 (2007) OP15)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (partial: Res. 1990 (2011) OP3)	
Authorization of the use of force		8	Res. 2100 (2013) OP17, Res. 2164 (2014) OP12	Res. 1769 (2007) OP15 (a)	Res. 2149 (2014) OP29	Res. 2147 (2014) OP4	Res. 2162 (2014) OP20	Res. 2187 (2014) OP4	Res. 1990 (2011) OP3	Res. 1701 (2006) OP12

-Table 1

Although these are not examples of preemptive operations, as in the Congo, they do demonstrate the United Nations' willingness to be aggressive and its capability to organize forces when necessary.

Once a task force is established and forces are allocated, it must be made clear how these forces will be employed and whether they will operate independently from the nation they are supporting, or in conjunction with that nation's military. The best case scenario would be a nation identifying a rising terror or violent extremist threat and requesting assistance in defeating it from the United Nations. When the problem is under control, security will be turned back to the host nation. The key here is that a nation is coming to the United Nations for assistance. The Counter Violent Extremism and Terrorism Task Force would confirm if the threat was legitimate and if so, it would have the option to deploy Member State contributed military forces just as the Security Council can in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations' Charter. Upon

arrival, the United Nations forces would partner with the requesting nation's forces and counter the threat. The United Nations must also plan for a more intrusive approach. If a nation is hosting a terrorist or violent extremist threat, willingly or unwillingly, and is either protecting the threat or will not allow external intervention, the United Nations must be ready to intervene without that nation's permission. The task force must determine if the organizations are a threat to other nations. If they are, the task force must have the authority to intervene militarily, assuming there are no other options such as diplomatic or economic methods for deterrence.

The United Nations must plan for resourcing of this force and its operational costs. Just as providing forces is a responsibility of Member States, they must also contribute financial and other support. Using funds from its existing budget, the United Nations pulls roughly 8 billion dollars from Member States to support peacekeeping operations.³⁹ Since most peacekeeping operations are in the interest of stabilizing regions and protecting citizens, a merger with counter terrorism and violent extremism operations should be an option. Additionally, any resources seized from terrorist and violent extremist organizations should be used to cover the operating costs of the task force. The use of forces will always remain a last resort. Before military force is used, all other non-military means must be exhausted or ruled out as options. Those efforts begin in the targeting phase of the process.

Target: Once definitions are established in an approved legally binding treaty, a task force is organized, and that task force is enabled, the fourth phase of the process, targeting, can begin. The move from the previous phases of the process to the fourth phase represents a significant shift from the current standard. This is the part of the process where the current leadership stops and expects individual nations or coalitions to take over. The proposed process suggests the United Nations, through a Member State resourced task force, takes the fight abroad to the enemy and against the conditions and resources the enemy needs to survive. There will be

challenges in conducting the fight in this manner. However, because the use of intrusive military force will always be a last resort, there will be many opportunities for success, particularly when combatting the resources and conditions required for the survival of terrorism and violent extremism. Other than identifying and calling for Member States to seize some resourcing methods of terrorism and violent extremism, the United Nations does not currently attempt to apprehend violent extremists or terrorists. The same applies to how INTERPOL does not apprehend criminals. Both organizations currently coordinate some efforts, but rely on Member States to take care of the majority of the issues independently. As the United Nations begins to change its current methods, it can focus its targeting in two main areas; geographic areas with conditions that allow freedom of movement, and the specific resources used by terrorist and violent extremist organizations, specifically financial resources.

The first area is geographic locations with conditions that terrorists and violent extremists most commonly use for recruiting and basing operations. These are mostly vulnerable areas of the world that have high rates of illegal activity and that lack adequate governance or law enforcement to prevent the conditions from arising. These typically have high rates of poverty and low employment, and they lack government provided services. The United Nations must support nations in their efforts to eradicate these conditions and ultimately deny terrorists and violent extremists an area in which to organize and conduct attacks. Decreasing poverty, decreasing unemployment and improving the basic services necessary to support life will result in a resiliency to the organizations that seek to exploit these conditions.

Conditions that allow terrorist and violent extremist organizations to operate include everything from failing governments, to social acceptance, and a failing economic situation. Once areas with these types of conditions are identified by terrorist and violent extremist organizations, they begin to infest them. The physical terrain that has been used by these

organizations is typically in areas far removed from stable populated areas. The austerity of these locations allows the organizations to consolidate and conduct training with relative impunity from external hindrance. This is not to say that all nations intentionally offer unimpeded access to these types of areas, but they may not be able to reach into them with the forces they have. This is where a United Nations organized force can help. One example of this is the use of territory in Syria by the Islamic State. By exploiting the conditions caused by the Syrian Civil War, the Islamic State has been able to establish itself and has effectively used this area to stage other operations. There are certainly some areas of the world, such as Syria, that are more likely to attract these types of organizations, but hiding in the plain sight of unexpected areas must be addressed too.

Many areas throughout the world that are used by cells to rally support or to stage operations are in populated city centers. An example is the Sharia law governed areas that many local law enforcement agencies will not enter, allowing violent extremists and terrorists to hide in plain sight. These zones were brought into the public eye after the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris on January 7, 2015. They were used by the terrorist to hide from authorities.⁴⁰ Addressing the threats in these types of areas will require additional coordination between the United Nations and local law enforcement. If the local law enforcement agencies cannot address the issue, the United Nations task force must be prepared to step in to prevent terrorists and violent extremists from using these types of areas as safe havens. This goes back to the required authorities for the United Nations to act, not necessarily above the laws of the local area, but without added limitations while working within the laws.

Specific conditions that the United Nations can address are high poverty levels, lack of employment, and corruption. If a nation is unable to address these issues independently, the United Nations should be prepared to assist Member States in eradicating these conditions. In

addition to providing safe havens for terrorists and violent extremists, these areas also allow for other activities to take place that are used by these organizations to resource operations. The instability in these environments allows for illicit activities such as the trafficking of drugs and weapons, sex trade, human trafficking, and other black market criminal activities that provide financial resources to terrorist and violent extremist organizations. The targeting of these activities is mandatory in an effective strategy for defeating terrorism and violent extremism.

The second group of areas to focus on are the resources these organizations require to exist, specifically financing. The use of the INTERPOL process as a model is beneficial in this aspect. It collaborates and shares information among Member States, and this is a critical element in targeting the resources of these organizations. Collaboration is critical when targeting finances because they are transnational in nature. By addressing the conditions that allow these methods of resourcing to flourish, the United Nations will achieve two goals. First, it will destroy many of the financial resources that terrorists and violent extremists need to exist. Second, it will improve individual freedoms and human rights around the globe.

In addition to targeting illegal activities and the conditions terrorists and violent extremists require to exist, the United Nations must also target legal methods that these organizations use to fund their operations. The three main categories of legal resourcing are the sale of resources, receiving donations from sympathizers, and from state sponsors that do not view the actions of the terrorist and violent extremist organizations as illegal.⁴¹ Because these methods are legal, they are difficult to track. This goes back to the need for a treaty that defines terrorism and now adds that the act and knowingly resourcing of it is illegal. The United Nations does currently target terrorism financing to a degree as authorized in Security Council Resolutions, but it must increase its efforts.

Similar to how terrorists and violent extremists hide in plain sight and behind the laws of nations, a large portion of their funding comes through these legitimate sources. Whether the funding comes from the direct sale of oil, or religious contributions through zakat, or from state sponsors, the international community must take measures to limit the use of these methods of financing to the maximum extent possible. Furthermore, the ability of terrorists and violent extremists to use difficult but legal methods, such as hawala, to transfer and launder money, make its tracking particularly difficult.⁴² To track these transfers, sources and recipients, the United Nations' task force must have access to investigate, monitor, and seize these methods of funding to prevent organizations from sustaining operations. Additionally, hawala and zakat contributions, when justified, must be scrutinized more so than they are now.

The last and most challenging source of funding the United Nations has to deal with is state sponsored. Again, the agreement on a treaty that criminalizes terrorism and violent extremism will greatly contribute to this problem. Examples of recent and existing financial state sponsorship of terrorism can be seen in the Taliban's support to Al Qaeda, numerous Arab states support to the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Iran's support to Hezbollah.⁴³ This goes back to the root of the problem with defining terrorism, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Convincing these nations that their support to terrorism must be stopped is an action that can only be peacefully achieved by the international collective of the United Nations.

With the support of a treaty, the targeting of individuals engaging in terrorism would prevent interference from nations that choose to protect or sponsor actions associated with these acts. The bottom line is that the United Nations, backed by a treaty, will be able to attack the upstream conditions that will turn into problems as well as the existing threats. The last aspect of the targeting phase of the process is focused against both the organizations that engage in

terrorism and violent extremism as well as those who support it. The case against those who conduct specific acts of terrorism will be easy to prove once a treaty is enacted. Adding to the prosecution of terrorists and violent extremists is the need to also target those that facilitate the physical acts. Individuals and organizations that enable or facilitate those acts must be treated as harshly. This can all be clearly outlined in the necessary treaty that defines terrorism and violent extremism.

Act: Part 5 of the method is where action is taken directly against terrorists and violent extremist, their resources, and the conditions they are able to exploit. The term “act” implies action, or application of force. This is not the case, and the application of a military force should always be the last resort. Essential to this phase is a method of due process. The International Criminal Court, will have to determine if an individual or group is in violation of the treaty as an actor or facilitator. The Court will also have to determine if resources are being used for terrorism. Once a judgment has been made, the authority to act will be granted. Once funds are seized and terrorists, violent extremists and their associates are detained, there must be a plan for the detention of these criminals. The United Nations must influence and resource the housing options for the prisoners in situations where the nation in which they were brought to justice cannot detain them. Stating in the treaty that terrorists will be imprisoned in the nations where they are apprehended will be a strong incentive for nations to eradicate terrorism and violent extremism, as well as the conditions necessary to support it. If a state will not, or cannot, imprison a convicted terrorist, another state can offer imprisonment as its means to contribute to the global fight against terrorism.

Creation of educational opportunities and jobs will be critical to this phase. Most areas susceptible to terrorism and violent extremism lack proper educational opportunities and adequate work for the citizens. Another part of this phase will be to create a forum for

discussions to occur. Before an individual or group feels the need to become a terrorist or violent extremist, every measure should be taken to allow that individual to voice his or her concerns. Global advertisement of this type of opportunity will give individuals an alternative to the only path of terrorism they may see in front of them.

The act of seizing funds can use the existing process used by the United Nations, as authorized in Security Council Resolution 1373.⁴⁴ A required change to this example must be an increase in the resources and structure currently used to deal with this issue. Partnering more closely with Member State organizations and other international organizations, such as INTERPOL, will allow less capable organizations to access resources that would not otherwise be available to them. The current process only scratches the surface of the seizure of terrorism and violent extremism funding. To truly realize the potential of this method of action, greater resources and authorities are needed by the United Nations and for Member States when addressing the transnational nature of this type of financing.

As stated above, more aggressive methods of dealing with this problem should be a last resort, however, the global community must be prepared to employ all options to eradicate this threat. Bringing terrorists and violent extremists to justice, preventing safe havens and addressing the conditions exploited by these organizations will require operations to be conducted. Whether these forces are peacekeepers or a military force on the offensive, they should fall under the United Nations. In the interest of global security, Member States, including the United States, should not have issues supporting a United Nations led force as long as the rules of engagement and authorities support the objectives. State sponsors must also be dealt with aggressively through sanctions and negotiations. Once a state sponsor of terrorism turns its back on the global community, it will be in violation of the recommended treaty and will be engaging in illegal activity. This will be grounds for more aggressive actions against what can

then be called a Terrorist State. An information operations campaign must also be waged. The purpose of this line of effort will be to expose the true nature of the terrorists and violent extremists. It will also make individuals and groups aware of other options and acknowledge to the world that efforts are underway against this threat that infringes on the rights of all human beings.

There are two distinct United Nations military response scenarios, assuming approval from the Security Council, which could result in a form of external intervention. The first, includes any situation where a sovereign nation requested United Nations' assistance based on the lack of organic capacity or capability. A specific example would be if the Government of Nigeria requested for the United Nations to intervene in countering Boko Haram. The second, includes a scenario in which a capable nation chooses not to counter a terrorist threat inside its borders, if it was providing a safe haven for terrorists that were conducting acts outside of the host nation, or if the nation was incapable of containing a threat, but refused to ask for assistance. An example is Syria's inability to contain the Islamic State, but has not requesting external assistance while the threat is growing into a global issue. This type of scenario would require forced intervention. The key difference in the scenarios is that the individual nation either requests assistance, or it can solve the problem independently, but chooses not to do so and, therefore, the problem has become transnational or global.

Transition: The 6th and final phase of this process is transition. Transition can involve a whole range of efforts. On one hand, transition can involve rehabilitating terrorists and violent extremists and returning them to society as productive members. This will be possible once those individuals who can be rehabilitated are isolated from negative influence and are exposed to the options the free world offers. Through the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, the United Nations has been working with Member States such as Saudi Arabia in its

efforts to rehabilitate terrorists. This program offers opportunities for terrorists to “deradicalize” and reintegrate into society as productive members. The three month long program advertises a 95.2% success rate.⁴⁵

Transition will also include turning geography and infrastructure back to the nations from which terrorists took it away. A contested area must be pacified and once it is, the United Nations will be able to turn it back over to its nation. Although a full turnover of the land and resources will be conducted, continually monitoring the problem by United Nations missions will always be necessary. If conditions begin to reemerge, that will be a trigger for the United Nations to reinvest in that region.

Lastly, once this process has been executed and the overall threat is reduced to a manageable level, the increased reach and authorities of the task force should be scaled back. The framework should always remain in existence in the event terrorism and violent extremism rise again, but the manpower and resources should be redirected to address other global issues that require assistance. If a situation does rise again and the framework remains, a quick vote to resource a known solution will effectively address the problem much more efficiently than the United Nations has been able to since it identified terrorism and violent extremism as problems.

Conclusion:

The recommendations outlined above will continue to be challenged by many just as the definition of terrorism has been challenged. Some Member States will claim that the system is working the way it was designed, or this isn't the job of the United Nations, or perhaps that there isn't even a problem. Those points of view are the reason the problem exists as it does today and why there is a substantial threat of it increasing. Once a treaty is approved by Member States,

they must support the binding decision and either contribute to the fight or step aside while those that are combatting terrorism and violent extremism do so.

Furthermore, accepting that the current system is not working and following a process that begins with a clear definition of the problem is necessary to the success of the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. The failure of the United Nations to act effectively to this point exacerbates the fact that it is unprepared to adequately control and defeat this ever-growing threat. As threats rise and terror and violence are continually used by extremists to push their agenda, the United Nations, through its Member States, has a responsibility and an opportunity to take charge of this global problem and truly affect change for the betterment of the global community. The United Nations must remain focused on the overall goal which is not just to defeat the current problem but also to prevent it from happening again.

**APPENDIX A: UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
RELATED TO TERRORISM⁴⁶**

United Nations Security Council Resolutions Related to Terrorism	
S/RES/2195 (2014)	Urges International Action to Break Links between Terrorists, Transnational Organized Crime
S/RES/2185 (2014)	Extends Assistance Mission in Somalia for One Year under Broader Mandate
S/RES/2178 (2014)	Addressing the growing issue of foreign terrorist fighters
S/RES/2170 (2014)	Condemning Gross, Widespread Abuse of Human Rights by Extremist Groups in Iraq, Syria
S/RES/2133 (2014)	Calling upon States to Keep Ransom Payments, Political Concessions from Benefiting Terrorist
S/RES/2129 (2013)	Mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) until 31 December 2017
S/RES/1963 (2010)	Mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) until 31 December 2013
S/RES/1805 (2008)	Mandate of Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) extended until 31 December 2010
S/RES/1787 (2007)	Extension of Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) mandate
S/RES/1631 (2005)	UN cooperation with regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security
S/RES/1624 (2005)	Prohibition of incitement to commit terrorist acts
S/RES/1618 (2005)	Condemnation of terrorist attacks in Iraq
S/RES/1611 (2005)	Condemnation of terrorist attacks in London
S/RES/1566 (2004)	Creation of working group to consider measures against individuals, groups and entities other than Al-Qaida/Taliban
S/RES/1535 (2004)	Creation of Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)
S/RES/1530 (2004)	Condemnation of bomb attacks in Madrid
S/RES/1516 (2003)	Condemnation of bombings in Istanbul
S/RES/1465 (2003)	Condemnation of bomb attack in Bogota, Colombia
S/RES/1456 (2003)	Declaration by Foreign Ministers on combating terrorism
S/RES/1450 (2002)	Condemnation of terrorist attacks in Kenya
S/RES/1440 (2002)	Condemnation of hostage taking in Moscow

S/RES/1438 (2002)	Condemnation of bombings in Bali
S/RES/1377 (2001)	Ministerial declaration on global effort to combat terrorism
S/RES/1373 (2001)	Creation of Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC)
S/RES/1368 (2001)	Condemnation of 11 September attacks against United States

**APPENDIX B: UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS
RELATED TO TERRORISM⁴⁷**

United Nations General Assembly Resolutions Related to Terrorism		
A/RES/68/187	18-Dec-13	Technical assistance for implementing the intl conventions related to counter-terrorism
A/RES/68/178	18-Dec-13	Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism
A/RES/68/119	16-Dec-13	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/67/99	14-Dec-12	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/66/282	29-Jun-12	The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review
A/RES/66/178	19-Dec-11	Technical assistance for implementing the intl conventions related to counter-terrorism
A/RES/66/171	19-Dec-11	Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism
A/RES/66/105	9-Dec-11	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/66/50	2-Dec-11	Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction
A/RES/66/12	18-Nov-11	Terrorist Attacks on Internationally Protected Persons
A/RES/66/10	18-Nov-11	United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre
A/RES/65/221	21-Dec-10	Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism
A/RES/65/74	8-Dec-10	Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources
A/RES/65/62	8-Dec-10	Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction
A/RES/65/34	6-Dec-10	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/64/297	8-Sep-10	The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
A/RES/64/235	14-Jan-10	Institutionalization of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force
A/RES/64/177	24-Mar-10	Technical assistance for implementing the intl conventions related to counter-terrorism
A/RES/64/168	22-Jan-10	Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism
A/RES/64/118	15-Jan-10	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/64/38	12-Jan-10	Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction
A/RES/63/185	3-Mar-09	Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism
A/RES/63/129	15-Jan-09	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/63/60	12-Jan-09	Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction
A/RES/62/272	15-Sep-08	The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

A/RES/62/172	20-Mar-08	Technical assistance for implementing the intl conventions related to counter-terrorism
A/RES/62/159	11-Mar-08	Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism
A/RES/62/71	8-Jan-08	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/62/46	10-Jan-08	Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources
A/RES/62/33	8-Jan-08	Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction
A/RES/61/171	1-Mar-07	Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism
A/RES/61/172	1-Mar-07	Hostage-taking
A/RES/61/86	18-Dec-06	Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction
A/RES/61/40	18-Dec-06	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/60/288	20-Sep-06	The United Nations global counter-terrorism strategy
A/RES/60/158	28-Feb-06	Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism
A/RES/60/78	11-Jan-06	Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction
A/RES/60/73	11-Jan-06	Preventing the risk of radiological terrorism
A/RES/60/43	6-Jan-06	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/59/290	15-Apr-05	International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
A/RES/59/195	22-Mar-05	Human rights and terrorism
A/RES/59/191	10-Mar-05	Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism
A/RES/59/80	16-Dec-04	Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction
A/RES/59/46	16-Dec-04	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/58/187	22-Mar-04	Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism
A/RES/58/174	10-Mar-04	Human rights and terrorism
A/RES/58/81	8-Jan-04	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/58/48	8-Jan-04	Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction
A/RES/57/220	27-Feb-03	Hostage-taking
A/RES/57/219	27-Feb-03	Protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism
A/RES/57/83	9-Jan-03	Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction
A/RES/57/27	15-Jan-03	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/56/160	13-Feb-02	Human rights and terrorism
A/RES/56/88	24-Jan-02	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/56/1	18-Sep-01	Condemnation of terrorist attacks in the United States

		of America
A/RES/55/158	30-Jan-01	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/54/164	24-Feb-00	Human rights and terrorism
A/RES/54/110	2-Feb-00	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/54/109	25-Feb-00	International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
A/RES/53/108	26-Jan-99	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/52/165	19-Jan-98	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/52/133	27-Feb-98	Human rights and terrorism
A/RES/51/210	16-Jan-97	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/50/186	6-Mar-96	Human rights and terrorism
A/RES/50/53	29-Jan-96	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/49/185	6-Mar-95	Human rights and terrorism
A/RES/49/60	17-Feb-95	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/48/122	14-Feb-94	Human rights and terrorism
A/RES/46/51	9-Dec-91	Measures to eliminate international terrorism
A/RES/44/29	4-Dec-89	Measures to prevent international terrorism
A/RES/42/159	7-Dec-87	Measures to prevent international terrorism
A/RES/40/61	9-Dec-85	Measures to prevent international terrorism
A/RES/39/159	17-Dec-84	Inadmissibility of the policy of State terrorism
A/RES/38/130	19-Dec-83	Measures to prevent international terrorism
A/RES/36/109	10-Dec-81	Measures to prevent international terrorism
A/RES/34/145	17-Dec-79	Measures to prevent international terrorism
A/RES/32/147	16-Dec-77	Measures to prevent international terrorism
A/RES/31/102	15-Dec-76	Measures to prevent international terrorism
A/RES/3034	18-Dec-72	Measures to prevent international terrorism

APPENDIX C: U.S. GOVERNMENT DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND WHERE THEY OPERATE⁴⁸

Terrorist Organization	Location of Operations
Haqqani network	Afghanistan
al-Qa'ida	Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi
al-Mulathamun Brigade	Algeria
al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb	Algeria, Mali, Niger
Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI-B)	Bangladesh
Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI)	Bangladesh
National Liberation Army (ELN)	Colombia
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	Colombia
Gama'a al-Islamiyya	Egypt
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis	Egypt
Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem	Egypt
Ajnad Misr	Egypt
Revolutionary Organization 17 November	Greece
Revolutionary Struggle	Greece
Indian Mujahideen (IM) (India)	India
Jemaah Islamiya organization (JI)	Indonesia
Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)	Indonesia
Jundallah (People's Resistance Movement of Iran) (Iran)	Iran
Al-Qaeda Kurdish Battalions	Iraq
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)	Iraq
Kata'ib Hezbollah	Iraq
Abdullah Azzam Brigades	Iraq
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)	Ireland, United Kingdom
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)	Ireland, United Kingdom
Kahane Chai	Israel
Aum Shinrikyo	Japan

Hezbollah (Party of God)	Lebanon
Asbat an-Ansar	Lebanon
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)	Libya
Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi	Libya
Ansar al-Shari'a in Darnah	Libya
Ansar Dine	Mali
Boko Haram	Nigeria
Ansaru	Nigeria
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)	Pakistan
Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of Mohammed) (JEM)	Pakistan
Lashkar-e Tayyiba (Army of the Righteous) (LET)	Pakistan
Lashkar i Jhangvi	Pakistan
Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP)	Pakistan
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	Palestinian Territories
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)	Palestinian Territories
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)	Palestinian Territories
Islamic Jihad Group	Palestinian Territories
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine(PFLP)	Palestinian Territories
PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)	Palestinian Territories
Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades	Palestinian Territories
Army of Islam (Palestinian)	Palestinian Territories
Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)	Peru
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	Philippines
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)	Philippines
al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	Saudi Arabia
Al-Shabaab	Somalia
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) (ETA)	Spain, France
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	Sri Lanka
Al-Nusra Front	Syria

Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia	Tunisia
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front(DHKP/C)	Turkey
Kongra-Gel (formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party)(KGK)	Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)	Uzbekistan
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	Uzbekistan, Afghanistan

APPENDIX D: CURRENT UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, AS OF 1 FEBRUARY 2015⁴⁹

1 February 2015 Mandates for peacekeeping operations and field-based political missions		Total	MINUSMA	MINUSTAH	UNAMID	MINUSCA	UNMIL	MONUSCO	UNOCI	UNMIK
Location/region	16	Mali	Haiti	Sudan / Darfur	CAR	Liberia	DRC	Cote d'Ivoire	Kosovo	
# of Mandate components	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Lead entity	DKPO	DPKO	DPKO	DPKO/AU	DPKO	DPKO	DPKO	DPKO	DPKO	DPKO
Original mandate decision	Res: 2100 (2013)	Res: 1542 (2004)	Res: 1789 (2007)	Res: 2149 (2014)	Res: 1509 (2003)	Res: 1925 (2010)	Res: 1528 (2004)	Res: 1244 (1999)		
Latest decision	Res: 2164 (2014)	Res: 2180 (2014)	Res: 2173 (2014)	Res: 2149 (2014)	Res: 2190 (2014)	Res: 2147 (2014)	Res: 2162 (2014)	Res: 1244 (1999)		
Length of the current mandate	1 year - expires 30 June 2015	1 year - expires 15 October 2015	10 months - expires 30 June 2015	1 year - expires 30 April 2015	9 months - expires 30 September 2015	1 year - expires 31 March 2015	1 year - expires 30 June 2015	Open-ended		
Continued_										
1 February 2015 Mandates for peacekeeping operations and field-based political missions		Total	UNMISS	UNISEA	UNIEL	MINURSO	UNECYP	UNTSO	UNDOF	UNMOGIP
Location/region	South Sudan	Abyei	Lebanon	Western Sahara	Cyprus	Middle East	Golan Heights	India / Pakistan		
# of Mandate components	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
Lead entity	DPKO	DPKO	DPKO	DPKO	DPKO	DPKO	DPKO	DPKO		
Original mandate decision	Res: 1936 (2011)	Res: 1930 (2011)	Res: 425 (1978)	Res: 630 (1991)	Res: 186 (1964)	Res: 50 (1948)	Res: 350 (1974)	Res: 47 (1948)		
Latest decision	Res: 2187 (2014)	Res: 2179 (2014)	Res: 2172 (2014)	Res: 2152 (2014)	Res: 2168 (2014)	Res: 73 (1949)	S/RES/2192 (2014)	Res: 307 (1971)		
Length of the current mandate	6 months - expires 30 May 2015	4.5 months - expires 28 February 2015	1 year - expires 31 August 2015	1 year - expires 30 April 2015	6 months - expires 31 January 2015	Open-ended	6 months - expires 30 June 2015	Open-ended		

Notes:

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² United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*. (San Francisco, CA: 1945). p. 2. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>

³ United Nations, *Voting System and Records*. (New York, NY: Security Council), Accessed February 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/voting.shtml>

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⁵ “*Egyptian leader calls for UN coalition in Libya.*” CBS News for the Associated Press, February 17, 2015. <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/egypt-el-sissi-calls-for-un-coalition-isis-libya/>

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⁸ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*. p.3. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>

⁹ Barack Obama, U.S. President, “National Security Strategy,” Feb 2015, p. 4 http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf

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¹¹ United Nations, Security Council, Counter-Terrorism Committee. *Resolutions Relevant to the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*. (New York, NY: Security Council), Accessed March 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/res-sc.html>

¹² United Nations, *Draft Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism*, New York, NY: 2005. Accessed March 2015. p.8. <http://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup08/basicmats/unterrorism.pdf>

¹³ United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 2178*. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/547/98/PDF/N1454798.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁴ United Nations, *Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism*. (New York, NY: January 29, 2015). Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210. Accessed February 2015. <http://www.un.org/law/terrorism/>

¹⁵ *UN 101: There is no definition of Terrorism*. Human Rights Voices, 2014. Accessed February 2015. http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/EYEontheUN/un_101/facts/?p=61&zoom_highlightsub=un+101+terrorism

¹⁶ President Barak Obama, *Remarks by the President at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism*. (Washington, DC: February 19, 2015). Accessed February, 2015. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/19/remarks-president-summit-countering-violent-extremism-february-19-2015>

¹⁷ Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, *Remarks at Summit for Countering Violent Extremism*. (Washington, DC: February 19, 2015). Accessed February 2015. http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=2517#.V5F6p_nF-So

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²¹ Gerald Seymour, *Harry's Game*. (New York: Overlook Press, 1975)

²² *UN 101: There is no definition of Terrorism*. Human Rights Voices, http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/EYEontheUN/un_101/facts/?p=61&zoom_highlightsub=un+101+terrorism

²³ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*. (San Francisco, CA: 1945). p. 7. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>

²⁴ United Nations, Treaty Section *Treaty Collection, Definitions*, New York, NY. Accessed March 2015. https://treaties.un.org/pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/page1_en.xml#treaties

²⁵ United Nations, Treaty Section *Treaty Collection, Definitions*. https://treaties.un.org/pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/page1_en.xml#treaties

²⁶ United Nations, *Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism*. General Assembly Resolution 51/210. Accessed February 2015. <http://www.un.org/law/terrorism/>

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³⁰ *Title 18*, U.S. Code, Chapter 113B, Sect 2331. (2004). <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2331>

³¹ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-26, Counterterrorism*, (Washington, DC: October 24, 2014). p. vii. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_26.pdf

³² Wesley J.L. Anderson, *Disrupting Threat Finance: Using Information to Disrupt Terrorist Organizations*, Joint Special Operations University Report 08-3. (Tampa, FL: The JSOU Press. April 2008). p. 3-13.

³³ “*The Man from INTERPOL.*” 60 Minutes, Steve Kroft Interviews Ron Noble. Video, 14:02. CBS Interactive Inc. October 4, 2007.

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³⁶ Romeo Dallaire and Samantha Power, *Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (New York: Carol and Graf Publishers, 2004), p. 99-100.

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- ⁴⁴ United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1373, Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts*, S/RES 1373, (September 28, 2001). http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf
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