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TITLE: Promoting Innovation in the U.S. Navy through Operational Design

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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: Promoting Innovation in the U.S. Navy through Operational Design

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Thesis: To ensure the U.S. Navy is ready to meet the challenges on the horizon three institutional processes must be reformed to promote innovation: Officer Fitness Reports (FITREP) must identify and reward traits that foster innovation, information sharing in Officer Professional Military Education (PME) must be emphasized, and lessons learned must be formally incorporated into the military's operational planning process.

Discussion: As the Department of Defense deals with financial constraints, the U.S. Navy must develop better solutions for meeting the increasing demand for maritime forces. Senior Navy Leaders have called for innovation, but they have not established a framework within the organization that cultivates innovation. This work defines and analyzes the complexity of innovation and recommends actions to improve the culture of innovation within the U.S. Navy. I propose the use of Operational Design in cultivating innovation and the modification of three institutional processes to enable a culture of innovation to flourish. I recommend the Officer Fitness Report include an evaluation block to assess the qualities which engender innovation. Additionally, this study identifies and I encourage those qualities which include Professional Military Education and Information Sharing. Finally, I recommend a change to the Joint Operations Planning process to include a review of Lessons Learned in order to ensure the innovations that are demonstrated in exercises and operations are recorded and shared for further development.

Conclusion: In order to promote innovation, the U.S. Navy must foster continuous learning and engage in collaboration while ensuring it is incorporating the lessons it has already learned. The U.S. Navy can do this by modifying the officer FITREP to ensure the act of and the potential for innovation is recognized. The U.S. Navy can also foster an environment that encourages innovation by emphasizing PME and collaborations through publishing and networking. Finally, the U.S. Navy can ensure that innovations are well documented during operations and exercise, and incorporate them into the planning process through a review of lessons learned as one of the operational design elements.

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THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Preface

The U.S. Navy is coping with an increased demand for operations and a decreasing budget. This environment has leadership calling for innovation in how the U.S. Navy operates. Though the actualization of innovation is a challenging endeavor, enabling the establishment of conditions that spark innovation in an organization is not. Modifications in institutional processes within the Navy to incorporate Operational Design could be made to foster innovation within the organization.

I have benefitted from the guidance of a variety of professionals at Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Command and Staff College including my Faculty Advisors, Lieutenant Colonel Winston Gould, United States Air Force, and Dr. James Joyner in the preparation of this paper. The Leadership Communications Skills Center (LCSC), Dr. Linda Di Desidero, Ms. Andrea Hamlen, and Mrs. Stase Wells also were invaluable in their proof reading and writing assistance. Additionally, I would like to thank and acknowledge my mentor during this research, Dr. Jonathan Phillips for guiding and assisting me during this research project.

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A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is the United States Navy's outline of priorities and direction for the next decade. This strategy highlights the ever increasing demand for U.S. maritime forces and the challenges these forces face with budgetary constraints coupled with the increased sophistication and diversity of potential adversaries. To address these concerns, the strategy dictates the U.S. Navy will, "remain committed to the development of people; will validate new operational concepts; and will employ innovative capabilities that sustain warfighting advantages, particularly in the contested environment."¹ The strategy expands on the importance of innovation to the U.S. Navy stating, "continuous innovation informs how we fight, and it drives how we invest."² The Naval strategy is not the only advocate for innovation within the maritime service, as senior U.S. Navy leaders also repeatedly call for innovation in their guidance to the fleet. Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden, Commander Naval Surface Forces, commented in *Proceedings* on the future of the U.S. Navy stating, "we have to change the way we currently operate. We must display the courage necessary to move forward, to question established concepts and methods, to take risks, and to learn from our mistakes."³ Admiral Rowden is among many Navy leaders who appeal for innovation when discussing how Naval Officers should develop new ideas about the ways wars will be fought in the future and how they might be won.

What Admiral Rowden does not explain is how he will ensure the U.S. Navy will foster the innovation for which he is calling. He challenges the Navy to innovate, but does not establish a framework that encourages innovation. The U.S. Navy is like any organization in that innovative approaches are required to balance operational demand with fiscal restraints to ensure future success.⁴ The difficulty is not to identify, as Vice Admiral Rowden does, that the U.S. Navy needs to innovate. The challenge is in cultivating the individuals who innovate and

encouraging a culture within the organization that allows for the risk or uncertainty that is inherent in innovation. The US Navy must modify its institutional processes to aid innovation and Navy leaders should advocate for process reforms that encourage innovation instead of merely reaffirming the obvious that innovation is required. To ensure the U.S. Navy is ready to meet the challenges on the horizon three institutional processes must be reformed to promote innovation: Officer Fitness Reports (FITREP) must identify and reward traits that foster innovation, information sharing in Officer Professional Military Education (PME) must be emphasized, and lessons learned must be formally incorporated into the military's operational planning process.

Defining Innovation

Stephen Rosen defines military innovation as “a major innovation is defined as a change in one of the primary combat arms of a service in the way it fights or alternatively, as the creation of a new combat arm.”⁵ This definition distinguishes technological innovation from operational innovation, and it is the latter on which this paper focuses. New technologies, civilian intervention, key advocates, and external circumstances fuel military innovation; however, for military innovation to occur, senior military leaders must form a strategy for innovations that allows for their existence within the organization even while uncertain of their ultimate outcome.⁶ Stephen Rosen expands on this notion, stating “a strategy that would prepare military innovations ... has to focus on the management of uncertainty, rather than on the construction of new capabilities tailored to predictions of what future wars would look like.”⁷ This concept means a culture of innovation is one that accepts the risk of failure and focuses on institutional frameworks that allow for and promotes independent thought.

Innovation in the U.S. Navy

The U.S. Navy has, in its history, examples of making organizational allowances for innovators. The interwar period of 1919-1942 witnessed the rise of technological innovations in naval aviation. A series of institutional changes took place including the development of the Bureau of Aeronautics, the incorporation of aviation in the annual fleet exercises, Naval War College war games, and the allowance of command billets for aviators to ensure their upward mobility.⁸ The Navy leaders in 1918 did not realize the battleship navy strategy of World War I would not be a winning strategy in the future war.⁹ The innovation took place, not because of a single technological leap or great mind who foresaw the details of a future war, but rather it occurred because the U.S. Navy, while maintaining post WWI battleship doctrine, allowed for innovation to occur through their acceptance of innovative thinkers, the emphasis on information sharing through publications and learning institutions, and the adoption of rigorous exercises which tested theory and fed the lessons learned back through the system.¹⁰ This culture that allowed for the existence of innovation did not forecast that Pearl Harbor would be attacked and Naval Aviation would be the key to victory against Japan; rather, it produced discourse on the use of aircraft carriers and at the same time the use of the dirigible. This culture of innovation promoted independent thinking through a focus on professional competence, information sharing, and testing. Ultimately the aircraft carrier doctrine was revealed as successful and dirigible use was ended. That the U.S. Navy allowed a discourse on both is proof that there existed a culture of innovation.

The approach used by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps to enable innovation during the interwar years is the same that should be used today. Navy leaders advocate innovation, but they must first ensure they have embedded enablers for innovation within the organization.

Innovation as a trait in officers must be recognized with concrete methods to ensure these officers are not only retained, but also allowed to advance. Professional development must be emphasized with a clear demand signal placed on information sharing methods such as publishing articles in military journals. Additionally, the innovations that are developed and documented must be incorporated into exercises and operations through the exploitation of the lessons learned system, which is already in place but not yet formally a component of the operational planning process.

Innovation versus Good Ideas

Why does the U.S. Navy of today have difficulty incorporating the types of innovation that win future wars? The U.S. military is sometimes criticized as not have won a war since World War II. This criticism of the military is often buttressed with the statement that the organization refuses to learn the lessons from the past and is always developing a force to fight the last war. A possible underlying answer to the lack of innovation is that senior military leaders or the military as a whole do not truly want innovation as innovation can be inherently threatening. The emphasis on innovation may only be a call for more technological innovation or incorporation of new technologies in military operations. The military and the officers who drive the decision making are often risk averse, and innovation is wrought with risk; it shocks the system. It must be underscored that true innovators are met with a thousand reasons why their ideas are wrong. Thus, an organization that innovates is one that is willing to accept the risk of proceeding against the advice of the majority and one that is willing to put effort into problems that are not even yet defined.

To succeed as a military officer individuals must manage risk and often risk avoidance is the best strategy. Risk avoidance and innovation simply do not mesh. A career that tends to reward the avoidance of risk then would also discourage innovation. So the question again arises, why do senior military officers continue to ask for innovation when what they actually desire are “good ideas” or those which are marketable and without risk? Good ideas can certainly be successful in winning a war, but they are not innovations. Good ideas are often extracted from history, are backed by doctrine, and are marketable in a way that it is easy for senior leadership to jump on board. Good ideas are those that will immediately be met with agreement and responses such as, “Why didn’t I think of that?” Innovations, on the other hand, can be so contrary to the system that the parties in power will fight them at every turn. Innovation requires promotion or campaigning and often outside parties to force implementation.

Innovators must be so confident in their beliefs that they are willing to put their career on the line. History is wrought with military innovators who were only successful because they had the backing of a senior military leader or patron who protected them. Lieutenant William Sims would not have revolutionized the U.S. Navy’s gunnery in the early 1900s were it not for the protection by President Theodore Roosevelt.¹¹ Major “Pete” Ellis would not have revolutionized U.S. Marine Corps Amphibious doctrine in the lead up to WWII had it not been for his protection by General John Lejeune.¹² Major General Douglas Stone would not have been successful in his efforts to reform the detention facilities during the Iraq War “Surge” without the protection by General David Petraeus.¹³ These historical examples of innovation represent the execution or application of innovative ideas. The execution or actualization of innovation, however, is not the purpose of the changes I recommend. The actualization of innovation requires individuals with resolute belief in their ideas, the protection from more senior officers,

and the support of many other contributing factors. However, if in fact military leaders want “good ideas” rather than innovation, the requirement more vital to the military than ensuring the actualization of innovation is the creation of a framework that allows for innovation to exist. This framework can be strengthened by modifying the Officer Fitness report, rewarding the Professional Military Education of officers while promoting information sharing, and improving the military’s planning process. The creation of a framework that allows for the existence of innovation will in turn produce individuals within the U.S. Navy who generate numerous “good ideas” along with cultivating innovators with the academic fortitude to be resolute in the advancement of their true innovations in war fighting.

Identifying Innovators

Military innovation is difficult as there always exists resistance by the establishment to the change innovation requires. Machiavelli’s adage that, “the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order” holds true.¹⁴ It is, therefore, not often viewed as career enhancing to be the courageous voice advocating for change. Organizations must champion innovation in order to ensure individuals feel comfortable if not compelled to voice their contrary opinions. On the need for Commanders to foster innovation in the military, the U.S. Marine Corps General James Mattis stated,

If you are always on the hunt for complacency, you will reward risk-takers, and people who thrive in uncertainty. Take the mavericks in your service, the ones that wear rumpled uniforms and look like a bag of mud but whose ideas are so offsetting that they actually upset the people in the bureaucracy. One of your primary jobs is to take the risk and protect these people, because if they are not nurtured in your service, the enemy will bring their contrary ideas to you.¹⁵

General Mattis challenged military leaders to seek out and protect innovators, but like Vice Admiral Rowden, he did not give direction on how. It is much easier to voice a need for innovators and the desire to protect them than to develop a system that actually institutionalizes the promotion and protection of innovators.

The U.S. Navy has recently incorporated an organizational change to identify and protect innovators. The establishment of a new career subspecialty for “Naval Strategy” was a recognition that the Navy needed to ensure officers who had the education and experience to drive innovation in the organization were capitalized upon and given extra consideration during statutory promotion boards.¹⁶ The Naval Strategy directs the maritime defense community to “cultivate strategic thought and intellectual capital through individual Service initiatives such as the reinvigoration of the Navy and Marine Corps Naval Board, the establishment of the Navy Strategic Enterprise to create synergy among the naval staffs and other strategically minded institutions, and the development of a cadre of strategic thinkers.”¹⁷ This focus on strategic thought and information sharing is part of what I advocate, but it does not go so far as to establish an institutional framework that rewards these actions. The failure is due to lack of recognition that the primary method the military uses to recognize talent and to reward officers with retention and promotion is through a review of the officers’ fitness reports (FITREPs) at statutory promotion boards. Members of a promotion board review the officers’ records and make evaluations or judgments based on the performance ratings and the guidance provided by the board convening order. A desire to promote innovation in the U.S. Navy will continue to fall short of actualization if the FITREP or promotion system is not modified to recognize and reward innovation.

Promoting Innovators

The U.S. Navy Commander (O-5) Promotion Board Convening Order outlines the selection standard to the next higher paygrade being the identification of “the best and fully qualified” officers. The personal and professional attributes of fully qualified officers are further defined in the convening order as including “adaptability, intelligent risk-taking, critical thinking, innovation, adherence to Navy and DoD ethical standards, physical fitness, and loyalty to the Navy core values.”¹⁸ The demand signal is therefore placed by the Secretary of the Navy in the Convening Order for critical thinking and innovation. It is, however, left to the board members to ascertain the officers who have presented these traits. The main tool for identifying officers’ performance traits, the Navy Fitness Report, does not specifically address them.

The US Navy Performance Evaluation system provides an analytical evaluation of officer performance through the numerical grading of specific performance traits (appendix A). Critical thinking and innovation are captured under blocks 33 (Professional expertise), 37 (Mission accomplishment and initiative), and 39 (Tactical performance). The guidance for assigning a 5.0 trait grade (or greatly exceeding standards) is that performance must be “far above standards, and that it is notable for its exemplary or leadership quality.”¹⁹ Delineated on the fitness report under each performance block are suggestions that provide somewhat more clarity on the numerical assessment for that trait and are outlined in appendix A. In particular, the “Professional Expertise” block lists a 5.0 grade criteria as being an individual who is a “recognized expert, sought after to solve difficult problems, exceptionally skilled, develops and executes innovative ideas, and achieves early/highly advanced qualifications.”²⁰ The “Mission Accomplishment and Initiative” block and the “Tactical Performance” block also highlight innovation with the criteria, “develops innovative ways to accomplish mission” and “innovatively employs ship(s), aircraft,

or weapons systems.”²¹ The FITREP instruction does not give specific guidance on what constitutes innovation.

It is then incumbent upon the senior rater to identify those notable actions/traits which would merit a 5.0 rating. Innovation and critical thinking, though vocalized as a priority by Navy leadership, is not well assessed in the Officer Fitness reports. The lack of clear evaluation criteria identifying and rewarding innovative and critical thinking limits the Navy’s potential to innovate. More importantly, the Navy is not highlighting the fundamentals which establish a culture of innovation on the FITREP such as Professional Military Education, information sharing, and the application of ideas.

The US Marine Corps Officer Fitness Report (appendix B) does a better job of capturing some of the aspects which nurture innovation. Block G, Intellect and Wisdom, identifies Professional Military Education (PME) as a criteria to be evaluated. Specifically, the Marine Corps Fitness Report addresses innovation by assessing a Marine on the following:

Commitment to intellectual growth in ways beneficial to the Marine Corps. Increases the breadth and depth of warfighting and leadership aptitude. Resources include resident schools; professional qualifications and certification processes; nonresident and other extension courses; civilian educational institution coursework; a personal reading program that includes (but is not limited to) selections from the Commandant’s Reading List; participation in discussion groups and military societies; and involvement in learning through new technologies.²²

The US Navy, through minor modifications in the Fitness Report, could capture many of these same concepts in order to ensure innovation is encouraged. Specifically, a new block for innovation could be added or block 33 (Professional Expertise) could be better defined to ensure traits which foster innovation are captured. Particularly, the FITREP must identify those officers who have made the effort to further their professional military education, who have demonstrated

an expertise in an area desired by the Navy, and who have engaged in public discourse on military topics through publishing or presentation. A proposal for criteria which would rate 5.0 on block 33 follows:

- Dedicated to lifelong learning (completed CNO's reading list, JPME, civilian education)
- Intellectual leader in professionally related topics (developed or furthered doctrine/tactics)
- Introduces new and creative approaches to service issues (published ideas, CRIC²³)

Evaluating the Potential to Innovate

Another aspect of the US Navy Performance Evaluation system that undermines innovation is an absence of the evaluation of an officer's potential instead only evaluating his or her current or past performance. The U.S. Navy flag officer fitness report (appendix C) addresses potential through the rating of blocks 40 (Fiscal Planning/Organizational Skills), 41 (Personal Growth), 42 (Professional Growth), 43 (Potential Leading Change), and 44 (Strategic thinking).²⁴ Some of these traits should be captured in the Officer FITREP to identify the individuals in the organization that may have the potential to be the innovative and strategic thinkers which the U.S. Navy demands. Block 40 in the Officer FITREP addresses the "next career milestone" to which the senior rater recommends the individual. Block 40 should be expanded to address not only which career milestone is recommended but also what potential the officer exhibits. For example, Block 40a could still address the standard career milestone recommendation such as Department Head or Commanding Officer. In addition, Block 40b could be added to address the officer's potential for Navy needs such as fiscal planning, strategic thinker, or operational planner. This addition would aid board members in identifying the

officers which are required to fill desired skillsets (including those which generate innovation) along with those officers disposed for their next normal career milestone.

The current evaluation system the US Navy employs is heavily weighted towards the officer's performance in his or her current job, which is a reasonable method to evaluate future potential. However, it may result in overlooking officers with great potential for more senior or different positions which use a different skillset than one valued at their current position. A Lieutenant Surface Warfare Officer assigned as the Chief Engineer Department Head aboard an aging ship may struggle to break out if he/she does not possess the mechanical knowledge and management skills to maintain the ship's material readiness. However, that same Lieutenant may possess a PhD in Economics and regularly publish articles in scholarly journals on metrics to identify fiscal waste. His economic skills are in demand by the US Navy, but his fitness reports may not reflect his potential to serve the Navy in a different or future role. The Navy must find a way to specifically identify not only the officer's performance but also his/her potential on Officer Fitness reports. This is not to say that retention or promotion should be based solely on special individual skills instead of job performance; rather, to better address the requirements being placed on statutory board members by the board convening order, more information should be given on the FITREPs. For example, if in a given year the senior Surface Warfare Leaders determine they need more senior officers with computer and networking experience, the board could give extra consideration to those Surface Warfare Officers with documented cyber backgrounds (Master's degree in Computer networking, published articles on Cyber Warfare, etc.). Providing additional information on the Fitness Report would also aid board members in identifying Officers' potential to serve in other fields during lateral transfer boards.

The culture of innovation which the U.S. Navy desires to promote is severely hampered by the absence of recognition on the Fitness Report for officers who have either demonstrated an ability to innovate or shown their potential to innovate through a history of professional military education and information sharing. A new performance block for innovation or a few modifications in the wording of block 33 along with defined criteria for the rating of 5.0 and a modification of block 40 to incorporate officer potential would aid board members in identifying the officers with potential for innovation and would foster innovation in the organization. This modification would also prompt the senior rater (often the Commanding Officer) to better develop young officers into innovators by establishing specific traits or milestones required for high ratings. Rewarding officers who among other things have read the books on the CNO's reading list or who have published articles on professionally relevant topics does not have a down side.

Continuous Learning fuels Innovation

The modification of the Navy FITREP will aid in the development of innovation. However, the underlying trait which I advocate must be emphasized on the FITREP is one which is built on a foundation of professional development or growth. The expansion of knowledge and understanding of the warfighting profession should underscore everything the U.S. Navy does; it is the bedrock of innovation. Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, in a speech to the Naval War College expressed the difficulties facing officers in the coming years and emphasized innovation stating, "It is going to take patience, understanding, and looking at other perspectives to move ahead in the job we've got to do out there. It's going to take innovation, flexibility, and above all resolve."²⁵ ADM Greenert expanded on the development of innovation while giving direction to the Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College

stating, “For those of you out there in whites in the shoulder boards I need you to meet and write and I want you to publish your ideas. You are the future. You will decide where we’re going to go.”²⁶ Admiral Jim Stavridis, a leader in Navy professional development, also highlighted the importance of information sharing while directing Surface Warfare Officers to, “dare to read and develop your understanding. Carve out the time to think and form new ideas. Dare to speak out and challenge assumptions and accepted wisdom if your view differs from them. Have the courage to write, publish, and be heard. Launch your ideas and be an integral part of the conversation.”²⁷

It is the individual, not the organization who generates innovative ideas. It is, however, the organization and the organization’s ability to expand those ideas and test them that ultimately leads to the realization of innovation. A culture of innovation, therefore, must start with the development of the individual in the organization. It is through dedicated study of the warfighting profession that individuals will have the substance from which ideas can be generated. The Navy has developed institutions such as the Surface Warfare Officer School, the Naval Postgraduate School, and Naval War College that enable officer professional development. However, the “in residence” attendance in these institutions and the importance of continued professional development is not valued sufficiently within the community. Attendance in these institutions must be viewed as a vital investment for the future of the force and considered career enhancing. A de-emphasis on professional development would be organizational anorexia. It may provide for the short term gain of filling operational billets or saving on the budget, but it would reduce the long term health and effectiveness of the force. The attendance to in residence education must be rewarded in promotion boards in order to increase the demand. The increased demand would then necessitate the U.S. Navy become more

selective in the Officers chosen for these valuable seats and likely require the institution of a competitive selection board for them.

The completion of professional military education (PME) must be given weight in promotion boards, but more importantly specific attention should be given to those officers who go beyond attendance and make efforts to make advances in their field. The Promotion Board Convening Order should specifically address due consideration given to those officers who while attending resident PME achieved distinguished graduate criteria or participated in advanced studies programs such as the Halsey Group and Mahan Scholars programs provided at the Naval War College. Additional emphasis on resident education programs such as the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School (MAWS), the Federal Executive Fellowship (FEF), and the Arthur S. Moreau program (ASM) should be specifically addressed as career enhancing opportunities. PME and a dedication to lifelong learning must be viewed by officers as a requirement to their advancement.

Collaborate to Innovate

PME must not be relegated to existence only within the halls of the War College. Officers must engage in PME throughout their career and ensure it is part of their daily routine. Ideas are generated every day by officers in wardrooms and around coffee pots, but those ideas rarely make it to paper and even more seldom get published or shared with the larger Navy community. Commanding Officers must take a greater role in ensuring innovation is supported by encouraging their officers to publish their ideas or develop them in ways which can be shared with the larger maritime defense community. Commanding Officers should start by holding

themselves to the same standard and ensuring they are publishing their insights and lessons with the fleet as a whole.

One example of information sharing which was encouraged by a Commanding Officer is the Athena Project established aboard *USS BENFOLD* (DDG 65), but now expanding across the waterfront. The Athena Project allows officers and enlisted sailors time away from their traditional duties to work on ideas to improve the Navy. These individuals must then give a short presentation with actionable steps on their idea. These presentations are observed by shipmates as well as waterfront leadership and technical experts who then latch on to good ideas for further development.²⁸ The Athena Project is an example of an initiative to improve the Navy through information sharing. In order to ensure ideas do not wither away through individual conversations, the command instituted a process of reward (time away from work to develop the ideas) for realization (presentations to the professional community).

The publishing of opinions and ideas is another extremely important method of fostering innovation. The articles published in military and academic journals during the interwar years were instrumental in developing the aircraft carrier Navy. Even if ideas are not yet fully developed or especially if they are not universally accepted, through the act of publishing, they generate dialogue and spark further idea development. Innovation requires this dialogue to progress ideas and encourage the birth of new innovations.

Every Commanding Officer should be expected to publish at least once while in command or shortly after his or her command tour. Every War College student should be expected to publish at least one research or argument paper. Speeches and seminars given by senior Navy Leadership at the Naval War College and other service schools should be recorded

and published for other officers to view. The culture of innovation depends on information sharing; therefore, information sharing must be placed as a precedence. The most successful ideas may start with an individual, but they are ultimately led to success through collaboration. With each published article, seeds of thought are planted throughout the fleet ensuring that experiences and ideas are shared within the organization and innovation is fostered.

An expansion of the material published by officers also dictates an expectation that officers are reading that material. Commanding Officers must establish a climate that not only values learning but also mandates it. Officers should be expected to read articles and books on topics deemed relevant to the community, and their completion of these readings should be assessed by senior raters. The Chief of Naval Operations has distributed a list of books recommended for reading at various levels of an officer's career, and dedication should be given to completion of these readings. Senior raters should address completion of these readings in the officers' FITREPS while ensuring the command climate encourages the activity. Additionally, Commanding Officers should not only mentor their officers in a manner in which they encourage reading, but they should also question officers who demonstrate a lack of interest in professional books and journals. Time must be allocated to ensure personal and professional academic growth is feasible to be conducted during the work week. The expectation should not be that archaic measures are taken to evaluate an officer's completion of readings; rather, the expectation is that commands are able to establishment a climate which promotes self and organizational improvement.

The academic rigor of being an officer in the Navy should be emphasized along with the leadership rigor. There exists great value in leadership and management but also in independent thought and innovation to the Navy. This academic strength can then be applied to the problems

the fleet faces. Officers in the fleet should be generating ideas which can then be tested during the multitude of existing fleet exercises and war games held each year. Students at the War College should be leveraged to tackle the difficult problems the Navy faces. War Games need not take place only in dark rooms led by Admirals. Navy leaders should incorporate the junior and midgrade officers to provide a different perspective, and if innovative ideas are generated, ensure they are captured and not brushed aside as impracticable or fanciful. Then assign those junior and mid-grade officers to observe the fleet during exercises of the tactics and strategies developed during the War Games. These officers can be the backbone of the lessons learned documentation to ensure further innovations are captured and shared. These officers should bring back the innovations they observed in the fleet to the academic setting for further development and study. Navy leaders must leverage the time officers spend in the academic setting by incorporating them into fleet exercises to observe and record and then have them incorporate their observations into the projects and papers they complete at the school house.

The interwar period following WWI provides an example of incorporating lessons from exercises to the academic setting as the results of the annual Fleet Exercise were incorporated into the following Naval War College war games. The employment of aircraft carriers to strike surface ships, other carriers, and land targets was tested during the fleet exercises and then further developed at the War College. In turn, the further refined ideas were again tested in the following exercise. Thus a cycle of idea generation, information sharing, concept testing, and then incorporation of lessons learned back to the school house for further idea generation was continued. The lynch pin in the process is information sharing. Innovative ideas must be shared in order to be incorporated into synthetic war games and academic discourse. These ideas should then be tested in exercises and operations while being documented by designated officers who

ensure the results are fed through a continuum loop back through to the academic setting for further development. A possible adverse effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in assigning the War Plans to the Combatant Commanders was the cessation of information flow that occurred at the War Colleges. The War Colleges must be reinserted into the process of developing and testing the War Plans.

Enabling Innovation through Lessons Learned

The process of documenting innovations exhibited during exercises and operations has already been established through the lessons learned process. The Navy Lessons Learned Information System (NLLIS), which is integrated with the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS), is the “program for collection, validation and distribution of unit or staff feedback, as well as correction of problems identified and derived from fleet operations, exercises and other miscellaneous events.”²⁹ Commanders are encouraged to submit lessons learned, observations, and recommendations into NLLIS upon completion of events. The lessons learned capture the basic questions of who, what, when, where, and how along with shortfalls, best practices, and innovations observed. Additionally, prior to operations and events Commanders are encouraged to review lessons learned in the database and to designate individuals to record observations for future submission.

A review of the military planning processes, however, reveals there is no specific requirement to review lessons learned during the planning of an operation. The resultant incorporation and further development of innovative ideas is often lost due to this oversight since there is no formal requirement to ensure lessons learned were considered in plan development. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study on Military Operations found the Department

of Defense had “invested substantial resources to develop systems that capture lessons from exercises, experiments, and operations, with the intent of using these lessons to improve efficiency. However, in the case of planning, the department (had) not developed mechanisms to ensure that they are taking advantage of this resource.”³⁰ The Navy often uses the Joint Operations Planning (JP-5) publication for its operations planning. JP-5 advocates the use of “operational art, operational design, and the joint operation planning process (JOPP) in complementary fashion as part of the overall process that produces the eventual plan.”³¹

Operational Design as a Model for Innovation

Operational design is the methodology for applying “critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems, and develop approaches to solve them.”³² It is in operational design that innovation is captured in the planning process through its use of critical and creative thinking. Design takes place throughout the planning process from initial receipt of mission through to execution and assessment. A difficulty in incorporating the operational design method is in defining it in concrete terms that can be readily understood and used by the planner. A method of incorporating operational design into planning is through the use of the elements of operational design, which include center of gravity (COG) and Lines of Operation (LOOs). It is through the elements of operational design that commanders “compare similarities of their current situations with their own experiences or history to distinguish the unique features that require innovative or adaptive solutions...through the application of operational design, commanders seek innovative, adaptive options to solve complex challenges.”³³ JP-5 highlights innovation and the use of history and critical thinking in the planning process, but it does not define a specific element of operational design which requires the review of the database already populated with examples of innovation. JP-5 should

be modified to include a new element of operational design, which is the review of JLLIS. A review of lessons learned as a component of operational design will further enhance the ability to develop innovative solutions through its observance of previously observed innovations in similar operations.

Operational design does, however, reinforce the requirement for continuous learning in the development of innovation. In distinguishing between innovation and adaptation, operational design highlights the need for comprehensive professional military education as innovation “involves taking a new approach to a familiar or known situation” and “adaptation involves taking a known solution and modifying it to a particular situation.”³⁴ Both innovation and adaptation require a thorough knowledge of the military profession from both a historical and tactical perspective.

Another aspect of Operational Design which fosters innovation is not only the requirement for continuous organizational learning, but also for collaboration or information sharing. Discourse is encouraged in Operational Design, and collaboration is leveraged to identify and solve complex or ill-defined problems.³⁵ In the traditional setting of an Operational Planning Team (OPT) using the Operational Planning Process this discourse or collaboration occurs between all the staff members of the team, each sharing his or her own perspective through the lens of unique specializations and experiences. Innovations can be generated in this environment just as they can be generated in the larger community; however, the difficulty of innovation is no less present in the OPT as it is in the military community as a whole. Group think and short-sighted plans based on risk avoidance will extinguish any efforts to innovate.

An aid in avoiding such pitfalls is the use of Red Teaming. Operational Design advocates the continuous challenge to the existing comprehension of the problem and the reflection and thorough research and dialogue required to avoid shallow thinking.³⁶ Red Teaming is a tool to ensure critical thinking is taking place as it is a “function to avoid groupthink, mirror imaging, cultural missteps, and tunnel vision in plans and operations. Red Teams help staffs avoid making poor assumptions and account for the complexity inherent in the Operational Environment.”³⁷ The use of Red Teaming in an OPT can also be modeled by the larger military organization to ensure innovation is cultivated. Military staffs can institutionalize innovation by forming small innovation cells, which serve as the hub of the innovation process. These cells will assist the organization in the generation, collection, and dissemination of ideas.

SOUTHCOM Innovation Cell

Admiral James Stavridis, while serving as the SOUTHCOM Commander, instituted many of the initiatives to promote innovation, which I advocate. Admiral Stavridis created a culture of innovation at SOUTHCOM through four command tenets:

- Innovation would be encouraged and positively recognized at all levels.
- All personnel assigned within the command were requested to dedicate approximately 15 percent of their work schedule to innovative thought.
- The Southern Command Innovation Cell would serve as a full-time, dedicated resource to promote innovation within the enterprise and to help foster unity of effort for combatant command (COCOM)-level innovative initiatives.
- Innovative initiatives would be reviewed at the commander level on a monthly basis to provide guidance and top level endorsement where appropriate.³⁸

Admiral Stavridis’ acknowledgement of the requirement to create a framework which allows for innovation within the organization was a prerequisite for eventual success he had as the

SOUTHCOM Commander in generating innovative ways to accomplish his mission. His innovation cell served as a catalyst for new ideas, but more importantly his emphasis on recognition and support for innovators along with directed efforts to further PME through dedicated time in the week for innovative thought are examples of establishing a culture of innovation that the U.S. Navy should repeat.

The U.S. Navy can establish a framework which fosters innovation as proven by Stavridis's example in SOUTHCOM. Peter Drucker, in *Management Challenges for the 21st Century* states, "Innovation is not 'flash of genius.' It is hard work. And this work should be organized as a regular part of every unit within the enterprise, and of every level of management."³⁹ Drucker's statement captures the essence of my argument, that innovation is not equal to "good ideas," though an organization which has a framework that fosters innovation is also one which will generate countless good ideas. This framework will encourage the generation of new ideas, which will be marketable and have minimal risk. This framework will also allow for innovators to be cultivated in the organization, and it is through their groundbreaking innovations that, which though wrought with risk, will ensure that the U.S. Navy is able to out-think the future adversaries. This framework for innovation has already been established in doctrine and can be implemented in the U.S. Navy through use of Operation Design and through a few modifications in institutional processes.

Conclusion

One of the tenets of operational design is that it "requires agile, versatile leaders who foster continuous organizational learning while actively engaging in iterative collaboration and dialog to enhance decision making across the echelons."⁴⁰ Operational design, then is the

construct of the improvements in organizational processes which I advocate. In order to promote innovation, the U.S. Navy must foster continuous learning and engage in collaboration while ensuring it is incorporating the lessons it has already learned. The U.S. Navy can do this by modifying the officer FITREP to ensure the act of and the potential for innovation is recognized. The U.S Navy can also foster an environment which encourages innovation by emphasizing PME and collaborations through publishing and networking. Finally, the U.S. Navy can ensure that innovations are well documented during operations and exercise and incorporate them into the planning process through a review of lessons learned as one of the operational design elements.

¹ U.S. Department of the Navy. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, March 2015), 37.

² Ibid, 33.

³ Rowden, Thomas, Peter Gumataotao, and Peter Fanta. "Distributed Lethality." (United States Naval Institute: *Proceedings*, 141 (1): January 2015), 18.

⁴ Stavridis, James. *Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and U.S. Southern Command*. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2010), 177.

⁵ Rosen, Stephen Peter. *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. (Cornell studies in security affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1991), 7.

⁶ Hunter, Nathaniel L. "Fostering Military Innovation: The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps during the Interwar Period." (Unpublished paper submitted to U.S. Marine Corps University, 08 DEC, 2014), 2.

⁷ Rosen, 259.

⁸ Hammond, James W. *The Treaty Navy: The Story of the U.S. Naval Service between the World Wars*. (Victoria, B.C.: Trafford. 2001), 51-52.

⁹ George C. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994): 83.

¹⁰ Hunter, 7.

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- ¹¹ Armstrong, Benjamin. "The Gritty Truth of Junior Leader Innovation" (United States Naval Institute: Proceedings, June 2012).
- ¹² Krulak, Victor H. *First to Fight*. (New York: Naval Institute Press, 2013).
- ¹³ Benard, Cheryl. *The Battle Behind the Wire*. (United States, International Security and Defense Policy Center, National Defense Research Institute, Rand Corporation, and Inc. Rand Corporation monograph series. Vol. MG-934-OSD. Santa Monica, CA.: Rand, 2011), 69.
- ¹⁴ Machiavelli, Niccolò. Prince. (Oxford, GBR: Oxford University Press, UK, 2005. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 11 March 2015), 22.
- ¹⁵ Dickerson, John. "The General Who is Fighting a Constant Battle to Keep the Military Innovating." (Slate, 2011).
- ¹⁶ Chief of Naval Operations. *Establishment of the Naval Strategy Subspecialty 230X*. NAVADMIN 011/15. January 14, 2015.
- ¹⁷ U.S. Department of the Navy. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, 31.
- ¹⁸ Secretary of the Navy. *Order Convening the FY-14 Promotion Selection Boards to Consider Officers in the Line on the Active-duty List of the Navy for Permanent Promotion to the Grade of Commander*. Office of the Secretary of the Navy, 17 Jan, 2013.
- ¹⁹ U.S. Department of the Navy. *Navy Performance Evaluation System*. Navy Bureau of Naval Personnel Instruction 1610.10C. Washington, D.C., 20 April 2011, see appendix A.
- ²⁰ Ibid, see appendix A.
- ²¹ Ibid, see appendix A.
- ²² U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters. *Performance Evaluation System*. U.S. Marine Corps Officer Instruction MCO P1610.7F Ch 2. 19 Nov 2010, see appendix B.
- ²³ Chief of Naval Operations' Rapid Innovation Cell, see www.nwdc.navy.mil or www.facebook.com/NavyCRIC.
- ²⁴ *Navy Performance Evaluation System*, see appendix C.
- ²⁵ Greenert, Jonathan. "Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert speaks at the Current Strategy forum at the Naval War College." 2014, June 17.
- ²⁶ Greenert, Jonathan, "Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert addresses U.S. Naval War College." 2013, October 25.
- ²⁷ Stavridis, James. "Read, Think, Write, and PUBLISH." (United States Naval Institute: *Proceedings*, 134 (8): August 2008), 19.
- ²⁸ "TheATHENAproject," USS BENFOLD (DDG 65).
- ²⁹ Chief of Naval Operations. Lessons Learned Collection Efforts for Military Operations. NAVADMIN 075/14. April 03, 2014.
- ³⁰ U.S. Government Accountability Office. *Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and enhance Interagency Planning: GAO-07-549*. (Washington, DC: GAO, 2007), 37.
- ³¹ U.S. Department of Defense. *Joint Operation Planning*. (Joint Publication 5-0. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 11 Aug, 2011), I-5.
- ³² U.S. Joint Staff, J-7. *Planner's Handbook for Operational Design ver 1.0*. (Suffolk, VA: Joint and Coalition Warfighting, October 7), 2011, II-11.
- ³³ *Joint Operation Planning*, xix.
- ³⁴ Santacroce, Mike. *Planning for Planners: Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP)*. (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse books, May 14, 2013), VI-8.
- ³⁵ *Joint Operation Planning*, III-3.
- ³⁶ Ibid, III-5.
- ³⁷ U.S. Department of the Army. *Red Team Handbook 6.0*. (Fort Leavenworth, KN: University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, April 2012), 6.
- ³⁸ Stavridis, James. *Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and U.S. Southern Command*. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2010), 178.
- ³⁹ Drucker, Peter F. *Management Challenges for the 21st Century*. (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), 85.
- ⁴⁰ Santacroce, VI-8.

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APPENDIX A

| FITNESS REPORT & COUNSELING RECORD (E7 - O6) | | | | | RCS BUPERS 1610-1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---|---------------|---|-------------------|--------------------------------------|--------|---|--|--------------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|--|--|--|---------------------------------------|--|-----------|--|---------|--|---------|--|
| 1. Name (Last, First MI Suffix) | | | 2. Grade/Rate | | 3. Desig | | 4. SSN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5. ACT <input type="checkbox"/> | | TAR <input type="checkbox"/> | | INACT <input type="checkbox"/> | | AT/ADSW/265 <input type="checkbox"/> | | 6. UIC | | 7. Ship/Station | | 8. Promotion Status | | 9. Date Reported | | | | | | | | | |
| Occasion for Report | | | | | | Period of Report | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10. Periodic <input type="checkbox"/> | | Detachment <input type="checkbox"/> | | Detachment of <input type="checkbox"/> | | 13. Special <input type="checkbox"/> | | 14. From: | | 15. To: | | 20. Physical Readiness | | 21. Billet Subcategory (if any) | | | | | | | | | |
| 16. Not Observed Report <input type="checkbox"/> | | 11. of Individual <input type="checkbox"/> | | 12. Reporting Senior <input type="checkbox"/> | | 17. Regular <input type="checkbox"/> | | 18. Concurrent <input type="checkbox"/> | | 19. Ops Cdr <input type="checkbox"/> | | 22. Reporting Senior (Last, FI MI) | | 23. Grade | | 24. Desig | | 25. Title | | 26. UIC | | 27. SSN | |
| 28. Command employment and command achievements. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 29. Primary/Collateral/Waiver/standing duties. (Enter primary duty abbreviation in box.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| For Mid-term Counseling Use. (When completing FITREP enter 30 and 31 from counseling worksheet sign 32.) | | | | | | | | | | | | 30. Date Counseled | | 31. Counselor | | 32. Signature of Individual Counseled | | | | | | | |
| PERFORMANCE TRAITS: 1.0 - Below standards/not progressing or UNSAT in any one standard; 2.0 - Does not yet meet all 3.0 standards; 3.0 - Meets all 3.0 standards; 4.0 - Exceeds most 3.0 standards; 5.0 - Meets overall criteria and most of the specific standards for 5.0. Standards are not all inclusive. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PERFORMANCE TRAITS | | 1.0* Below Standards | | | | 2.0 Pro- gressing | | 3.0 Meets Standards | | | | 4.0 Above Standards | | 5.0 Greatly Exceeds Standards | | | | | | | | | |
| 33. PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE: Professional knowledge, proficiency, and qualifications. NOB <input type="checkbox"/> | | - Lacks basic professional knowledge to perform effectively. - Cannot apply basic skills. - Fails to develop professionally or achieve timely qualifications. | | | | - | | - Has thorough professional knowledge. - Competently performs both routine and new tasks. - Steadily improves skills, achieves timely qualifications. | | | | - | | - Recognized expert, sought after to solve difficult problems. - Exceptionally skilled, develops and executes innovative ideas. - Achieves early/highly advanced qualifications. | | | | | | | | | |
| 34. COMMAND OR ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE/EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: Contributing to growth and development, human worth, community. NOB <input type="checkbox"/> | | - Actions counter to Navy's retention/attrition goals. - Uninvolved with mentoring or professional development of subordinates. - Actions counter to good order and discipline and negatively affect Command/Organizational climate. - Demonstrates exclusionary behavior. Fails to value differences from cultural diversity. | | | | - | | - Positive leadership supports Navy's increased retention goals. Active in decreasing attrition. - Actions adequately encourage/support subordinates' personal/professional growth. - Demonstrates appreciation for contributions of Navy personnel. Positive influence on Command and Organizational climate. - Values differences as strengths. Fosters atmosphere of acceptance/inclusion per EDEEO policy. | | | | - | | - Measurably contributes to Navy's increased retention and reduced attrition objectives. - Proactive leader/emplory mentor. Involved in subordinates' personal development leading to professional growth/sustained commitment. - Initiates support programs for military, ability, and families to achieve exceptional Command and Organizational climate. - The model of achievement. Develops unit cohesion by valuing differences as strengths. | | | | | | | | | |
| 35. MILITARY BEARING/ CHARACTER: Appearance, conduct, physical fitness, adherence to Navy Core Values. NOB <input type="checkbox"/> | | - Consistently unsatisfactory appearance. - Unsatisfactory demeanor or conduct. - Unable to meet one or more physical readiness standards. - Fails to live up to one or more Navy Core Values: HONOR, COURAGE, COMMITMENT. | | | | - | | - Excellent personal appearance. - Excellent demeanor or conduct. - Complies with physical readiness program. - Always lives up to Navy Core Values: HONOR, COURAGE, COMMITMENT. | | | | - | | - Exemplary personal appearance. - Exemplary representative of Navy. - A leader in physical readiness. - Exemplifies Navy Core Values: HONOR, COURAGE, COMMITMENT. | | | | | | | | | |
| 36. TEAMWORK: Contributions towards team building and team results. NOB <input type="checkbox"/> | | - Causes conflict, unwilling to work with others, puts self above team. - Fails to understand team goals or teamwork techniques. - Does not take direction well. | | | | - | | - Reinforces others' efforts, meets personal commitments to team. - Understands team goals, employs good teamwork techniques. - Accepts and offers team direction. | | | | - | | - Team builder, inspires cooperation and progress. - Talented mentor, focuses goals and techniques for team. - The best at accepting and offering team direction. | | | | | | | | | |
| 37. MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT AND INITIATIVE: Taking initiative, planning/prioritizing, achieving mission. NOB <input type="checkbox"/> | | - Lacks initiative. - Unable to plan or prioritize. - Does not maintain readiness. - Fails to get the job done. | | | | - | | - Takes initiative to meet goals. - Plans/prioritizes effectively. - Maintains high state of readiness. - Always gets the job done. | | | | - | | - Develops innovative ways to accomplish mission. - Plans/prioritizes with exceptional skill and foresight. - Maintains superior readiness, even with limited resources. - Gets jobs done earlier and far better than expected. | | | | | | | | | |

APPENDIX A

FITNESS REPORT & COUNSELING RECORD (E7 - O6) (cont'd)

RCS BUFFERS 1610-1

| 1. Name (Last, First MI Suffix) | | 2. Grade/Rate | | 3. Desig | | 4. SSN | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|---|--------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| PERFORMANCE TRAITS | 1.0* Below Standards | 2.0 Pro- gressing | 3.0 Meets Standards | 4.0 Above Standards | 5.0 Greatly Exceeds Standards | | | | | | |
| 38. LEADERSHIP: Organizing, motivating and developing others to accomplish goals. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Neglects growth/development or welfare of subordinates. - Fails to organize, create problems for subordinates. - Does not set or achieve goals relevant to command mission and vision. - Lacks ability to cope with or tolerate stress. - Inadequate communicator. - Tolerates hazards or unsafe practices. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - - - - - - | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Effectively stimulates growth/development in subordinates. - Organizes successfully implementing process improvements and efficiencies. - Sets/achieves useful, realistic goals that support command mission. - Performs well in stressful situations. - Clear, timely communicator. - Ensures safety of personnel and equipment. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - - - - - - | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inspiring motivator and initiator, subordinates reach highest level of growth and development. - Superb organizer, great foresight, develops process improvements and efficiencies. - Leadership achievements dramatically further command mission and vision. - Perseveres through the toughest challenges and inspires others. - Exceptional communicator. - Makes subordinate safety-conscious, maintains top safety record. - Constantly improves the personal and professional lives of others. | NCB <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 39. TACTICAL PERFORMANCE: (Warfare qualified officers only) Basic and tactical employment of weapons systems. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Has difficulty attaining qualifications expected for rank and experience. - Has difficulty in ship(s), aircraft or weapons systems employment. - Below others in knowledge and employment. - Warfare skills in specialty are below standards compared to others of same rank and experience. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - - - - | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Attains qualifications as required and expected. - Capably employs ship(s), aircraft, or weapons systems. Equal to others in warfare knowledge and employment. - Warfare skills in specialty equal to others of same rank and experience. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - - - - | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fully qualified at appropriate level for rank and experience. - Innovatively employs ship(s), aircraft, or weapons systems. Well above others in warfare knowledge and employment. - Warfare skills in specialty exceed others of same rank and experience. | NOB <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 40. I recommend screening this individual for next career milestone(s) as follows: (maximum of two) Recommendations may be for competitive schools or duty assignments such as: LCPO, DEPT CPO, SEA, CMC, CWO, LDO, Dept Head, XO, OIC, CO, Major Command, War College, PG School. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 41. COMMENTS ON PERFORMANCE. * All 1.0 marks, three 2.0 marks, and 2.0 marks in Block 34 must be specifically substantiated in comments. Comments must be verifiable. Form must be 10 or 12 pitch (10 to 12 point) only. Use upper and lower case. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Promotion Recommendation | | NOB | Significant Problems | Progressing | Promotable | Must Promote | Early Promote | 44. Reporting Senior Address | | | |
| 42. INDIVIDUAL | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 43. SUMMARY | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | | | | | | | | | |
| 45. Signature of Reporting Senior | | | | Date: | | 46. Signature of individual evaluated. * I have seen this report, been apprised of my performance, and understand my right to make a statement. I intend to submit a statement <input type="checkbox"/> do not intend to submit a statement <input type="checkbox"/> | | | | | |
| Member Trait Average: | | Summary Group Average: | | Date: | | | | | | | |
| 47. Typed name, grade, command, UIC, and signature of Regular Reporting Senior on Concurrent Report | | | | | | | | Date: | | | |

APPENDIX B

| | | | | | |
|---|--------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|---|-------------------------------|
| USMC FITNESS REPORT (1610) NAVMC 10836 (Rev. 7-11) (EF) PREVIOUS EDITIONS WILL NOT BE USED FOUO - Privacy sensitive when filled in. | | COMMANDANT'S GUIDANCE | | DO NOT STAPLE THIS FORM | |
| The completed fitness report is the most important information component in manpower management. It is the primary means of evaluating a Marine's performance and is the Commandant's primary tool for the selection of personnel for promotion, augmentation, resident schooling, command, and duty assignments. Therefore, the completion of this report is one of an officer's most critical responsibilities. Inherent in this duty is the commitment of each Reporting Senior and Reviewing Officer to ensure the integrity of the system by giving close attention to accurate marking and timely reporting. Every officer serves a role in the scrupulous maintenance of this evaluation system, ultimately important to both the individual and the Marine Corps. Inflationary markings only serve to dilute the actual value of each report. Reviewing Officers will not concur with inflated reports. | | | | | |
| A. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION | | | | | |
| 1. Marine Reported On: | | | | | |
| a. Last Name | b. First Name | c. MI | d. SSN | e. Grade | f. DOR |
| | | | | | |
| 2. Organization: | | | | | |
| a. MCC | b. RUC | c. Unit Description | | | |
| | | | | | |
| 3. Occasion and Period Covered: | | | | | |
| a. OCC | b. From | To | c. Type | 4. Duty Assignment (descriptive title): | |
| | | | | | |
| 5. Special Case: | | | | | |
| a. Adverse | b. Not Observed | c. Extended | 6. Marine Subject Of: | | 7. Recommended For Promotion: |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | a. Commendatory Material | b. Derogatory Material | c. Disciplinary Action |
| | | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7. Recommended For Promotion: | | | | | |
| a. Yes | | | | | |
| b. No | | | | | |
| c. N/A | | | | | |
| 8. Special Information: | | | | | |
| a. QUAL | d. HT(in.) | g. Reserve Component | 9. Duty Preference: | | |
| b. PFT | e. WT | h. Status | a. Code | b. Descriptive Title | |
| c. CFT | f. Body Fat | i. Future Use | 1st | | |
| | | | 2nd | | |
| | | | 3rd | | |
| 10. Reporting Senior: | | | | | |
| a. Last Name | b. Init | c. Service | d. SSN | e. Grade | f. Duty Assignment |
| | | | | | |
| 11. Reviewing Officer: | | | | | |
| a. Last Name | b. Init | c. Service | d. SSN | e. Grade | f. Duty Assignment |
| | | | | | |
| B. BILLET DESCRIPTION | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| C. BILLET ACCOMPLISHMENTS | | | | | |
| | | | | | |

APPENDIX B

| | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|--|---------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Marine Reported On: | | | | 2. Occasion and Period Covered: | | | |
| a. Last Name | | b. First Name | | c. MI | d. SSN | a. OCC | b. From To |
| D. MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT | | | | | | | |
| 1. PERFORMANCE. Results achieved during the reporting period. How well those duties inherent to a Marine's billet, plus all additional duties, formally and informally assigned, were carried out. Reflects a Marine's aptitude, competence, and commitment to the unit's success above personal reward. Indicators are time and resource management, task prioritization, and tenacity to achieve positive ends consistently. | | | | | | | |
| ADV | Meets requirements of billet and additional duties. Aptitude, commitment, and competence meet expectations. Results maintain status quo. | Consistently produces quality results while measurably improving unit performance. Habitually makes effective use of time and resources; improves billet procedures and products. Positive impact extends beyond billet expectations. | Results far surpass expectations. Recognizes and exploits new resources; creates opportunities. Emulated; sought after as an expert with influence beyond unit. Impact significant; innovative approaches to problems produce significant gains in quality and efficiency. | | | | N/O |
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. PROFICIENCY. Demonstrates technical knowledge and practical skill in the execution of the Marine's overall duties. Combines training, education and experience. Translates skills into actions which contribute to accomplishing tasks and missions. Imparts knowledge to others. Grade dependent. | | | | | | | |
| ADV | Competent. Possesses the requisite range of skills and knowledge commensurate with grade and experience. Understands and articulates basic functions related to mission accomplishment. | Demonstrates mastery of all required skills. Expertise, education and experience consistently enhance mission accomplishment. Innovative troubleshooter and problem solver. Effectively imparts skills to subordinates. | True expert in field. Knowledge and skills impact far beyond those of peers. Translates broad-based education and experience into forward thinking, innovative actions. Makes immeasurable impact on mission accomplishment. Peerless teacher, selflessly imparts expertise to subordinates, peers, and seniors. | | | | N/O |
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| JUSTIFICATION: | | | | | | | |
| E. INDIVIDUAL CHARACTER | | | | | | | |
| 1. COURAGE. Moral or physical strength to overcome danger, fear, difficulty or anxiety. Personal acceptance of responsibility and accountability, placing conscience over competing interests regardless of consequences. Conscious, overriding decision to risk bodily harm or death to accomplish the mission or save others. The will to persevere despite uncertainty. | | | | | | | |
| ADV | Demonstrates inner strength and acceptance of responsibility commensurate with scope of duties and experience. Willing to face moral or physical challenges in pursuit of mission accomplishment. | Guided by conscience in all actions. Proven ability to overcome danger, fear, difficulty or anxiety. Exhibits bravery in the face of adversity and uncertainty. Not deterred by morally difficult situations or hazardous responsibilities. | Uncommon bravery and capacity to overcome obstacles and inspire others in the face of moral dilemma or life-threatening danger. Demonstrated under the most adverse conditions. Selfless. Always places conscience over competing interests regardless of physical or personal consequences. | | | | N/O |
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. EFFECTIVENESS UNDER STRESS. Thinking, functioning and leading effectively under conditions of physical and/or mental pressure. Maintaining composure appropriate for the situation, while displaying steady purpose of action, enabling one to inspire others while continuing to lead under adverse conditions. Physical and emotional strength, resilience and endurance are elements. | | | | | | | |
| ADV | Exhibits discipline and stability under pressure. Judgment and effective problem-solving skills are evident. | Consistently demonstrates maturity, mental agility and willpower during periods of adversity. Provides order to chaos through the application of intuition, problem-solving skills, and leadership. Composure reassures others. | Demonstrates seldom-matched presence of mind under the most demanding circumstances. Stabilizes any situation through the resolute and timely application of direction, focus and personal presence. | | | | N/O |
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. INITIATIVE. Action in the absence of specific direction. Seeing what needs to be done and acting without prompting. The instinct to begin a task and follow through energetically on one's own accord. Being creative, proactive and decisive. Transforming opportunity into action. | | | | | | | |
| ADV | Demonstrates willingness to take action in the absence of specific direction. Acts commensurate with grade, training and experience. | Self-motivated and action-oriented. Foresight and energy consistently transform opportunity into action. Develops and pursues creative, innovative solutions. Acts without prompting. Self-starter. | Highly motivated and proactive. Displays exceptional awareness of surroundings and environment. Uncanny ability to anticipate mission requirements and quickly formulate original, far-reaching solutions. Always takes decisive, effective action. | | | | N/O |
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| JUSTIFICATION: | | | | | | | |
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APPENDIX B

| 1. Marine Reported On: | | | | 2. Occasion and Period Covered: | | |
|---|---|--|--|---------------------------------|--------------------------|---|
| a. Last Name | b. First Name | c. MI | d. SSN | a. OCC | b. From | To |
| | | | | | | |
| F. LEADERSHIP | | | | | | |
| 1. LEADING SUBORDINATES. The inseparable relationship between leader and led. The application of leadership principles to provide direction and motivate subordinates. Using authority, persuasion and personality to influence subordinates to accomplish assigned tasks. Sustaining motivation and morale while maximizing subordinates' performance. | | | | | | |
| ADV | Engaged; provides instructions and directs execution. Seeks to accomplish mission in ways that sustain motivation and morale. Actions contribute to unit effectiveness. | Achieves a highly effective balance between direction and delegation. Effectively tasks subordinates and clearly delineates standards expected. Enhances performance through constructive supervision. Fosters motivation and enhances morale. Builds and sustains teams that successfully meet mission requirements. Encourages initiative and candor among subordinates. | Promotes creativity and energy among subordinates by striking the ideal balance of direction and delegation. Achieves highest levels of performance from subordinates by encouraging individual initiative. Engenders willing subordination, loyalty, and trust that allow subordinates to overcome their perceived limitations. Personal leadership fosters highest levels of motivation and morale, ensuring mission accomplishment even in the most difficult circumstances. | | | N/O |
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G H |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. DEVELOPING SUBORDINATES. Commitment to train, educate, and challenge all Marines regardless of race, religion, ethnic background, or gender. Mentorship. Cultivating professional and personal development of subordinates. Developing team players and esprit de corps. Ability to combine teaching and coaching. Creating an atmosphere tolerant of mistakes in the course of learning. | | | | | | |
| ADV | Maintains an environment that allows personal and professional development. Ensures subordinates participate in all mandated development programs. | Develops and institutes innovative programs, to include PME, that emphasize personal and professional development of subordinates. Challenges subordinates to exceed their perceived potential thereby enhancing unit morale and effectiveness. Creates an environment where all Marines are confident to learn through trial and error. As a mentor, prepares subordinates for increased responsibilities and duties. | Widely recognized and emulated as a teacher, coach and leader. Any Marine would desire to serve with this Marine because they know they will grow personally and professionally. Subordinate and unit performance far surpassed expected results due to MRO's mentorship and team building talents. Attitude toward subordinate development is infectious, extending beyond the unit. | | | N/O |
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G H |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. SETTING THE EXAMPLE. The most visible facet of leadership: how well a Marine serves as a role model for all others. Personal action demonstrates the highest standards of conduct, ethical behavior, fitness, and appearance. Bearing, demeanor, and self-discipline are elements. | | | | | | |
| ADV | Maintains Marine Corps standards for appearance, weight, and uniform wear. Sustains required level of physical fitness. Adheres to the tenets of the Marine Corps core values. | Personal conduct on and off duty reflects highest Marine Corps standards of integrity, bearing and appearance. Character is exceptional. Actively seeks self-improvement in wide-ranging areas. Dedication to duty and professional example encourage others' self-improvement efforts. | Model Marine, frequently emulated. Exemplary conduct, behavior, and actions are tone-setting. An inspiration to subordinates, peers, and seniors. Remarkable dedication to improving self and others. | | | N/O |
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G H |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. ENSURING WELL-BEING OF SUBORDINATES. Genuine interest in the well-being of Marines. Efforts enhance subordinates' ability to concentrate/focus on unit mission accomplishment. Concern for family readiness is inherent. The importance placed on welfare of subordinates is based on the belief that Marines take care of their own. | | | | | | |
| ADV | Deals confidently with issues pertinent to subordinate welfare and recognizes suitable courses of action that support subordinates' well-being. Applies available resources, allowing subordinates to effectively concentrate on the mission. | Instills and/or reinforces a sense of responsibility among junior Marines for themselves and their subordinates. Actively fosters the development of and uses support systems for subordinates which improve their ability to contribute to unit mission accomplishment. Efforts to enhance subordinate welfare improve the unit's ability to accomplish its mission. | Noticeably enhances subordinates well-being, resulting in a measurable increase in unit effectiveness. Maximizes unit and base resources to provide subordinates with the best support available. Proactive approach serves to energize unit members to "take care of their own," thereby correcting potential problems before they can hinder subordinates' effectiveness. Widely recognized for techniques and policies that produce results and build morale. Builds strong family atmosphere. Puts motto <i>Mission first, Marines always</i> , into action. | | | N/O |
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G H |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5. COMMUNICATION SKILLS. The efficient transmission and receipt of thoughts and ideas that enable and enhance leadership. Equal importance given to listening, speaking, writing, and critical reading skills. Interactive, allowing one to perceive problems and situations, provide concise guidance, and express complex ideas in a form easily understood by everyone. Allows subordinates to ask questions, raise issues and concerns and venture opinions. Contributes to a leader's ability to motivate as well as counsel. | | | | | | |
| ADV | Skilled in receiving and conveying information. Communicates effectively in performance of duties. | Clearly articulates thoughts and ideas, verbally and in writing. Communication in all forms is accurate, intelligent, concise, and timely. Communicates with clarity and verve, ensuring understanding of intent or purpose. Encourages and considers the contributions of others. | Highly developed facility in verbal communication. Adept in composing written documents of the highest quality. Combines presence and verbal skills which engender confidence and achieve understanding irrespective of the setting, situation, or size of the group addressed. Displays an intuitive sense of when and how to listen. | | | N/O |
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G H |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| JUSTIFICATION: | | | | | | |

APPENDIX B

| 1. MARINE REPORTING OFFICER | | | | 2. OCCASION AND PERIOD COVERED | | |
|---|---|--|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------|---|
| a. Last Name | b. First Name | c. MI | d. SSN | a. OCC | b. From | To |
| | | | | | | |
| G. INTELLECT AND WISDOM | | | | | | |
| <p>1. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (PME). Commitment to intellectual growth in ways beneficial to the Marine Corps. Increases the breadth and depth of warfighting and leadership aptitude. Resources include resident schools; professional qualifications and certification processes; nonresident and other extension courses; civilian educational institution coursework; a personal reading program that includes (but is not limited to) selections from the Commandant's Reading List; participation in discussion groups and military societies; and involvement in learning through new technologies.</p> | | | | | | |
| ADV | Maintains currency in required military skills and related developments. Has completed or is enrolled in appropriate level of PME for grade and level of experience. Recognizes and understands new and creative approaches to service issues. Remains abreast of contemporary concepts and issues. | PME outlook extends beyond MOS and required education. Develops and follows a comprehensive personal program which includes broadened professional reading and/or academic course work; advances new concepts and ideas. | Dedicated to life-long learning. As a result of active and continuous efforts, widely recognized as an intellectual leader in professionally related topics. Makes time for study and takes advantage of all resources and programs. Introduces new and creative approaches to services issues. Engages in a broad spectrum of forums and dialogues. | | | N/O |
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G H |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <p>2. DECISION MAKING ABILITY. Viable and timely problem solution. Contributing elements are judgment and decisiveness. Decisions reflect the balance between an optimal solution and a satisfactory, workable solution that generates tempo. Decisions are made within the context of the commander's established intent and the goal of mission accomplishment. Anticipation, mental agility, intuition, and success are inherent.</p> | | | | | | |
| ADV | Makes sound decisions leading to mission accomplishment. Actively collects and evaluates information and weighs alternatives to achieve timely results. Confidently approaches problems; accepts responsibility for outcomes. | Demonstrates mental agility; effectively prioritizes and solves multiple complex problems. Analytical abilities enhanced by experience, education, and intuition. Anticipates problems and implements viable, long-term solutions. Steadfast, willing to make difficult decisions. | Widely recognized and sought after to resolve the most critical, complex problems. Seldom matched analytical and intuitive abilities; accurately foresees unexpected problems and arrives at well-timed decisions despite fog and friction. Completely confident approach to all problems. Masterfully strikes a balance between the desire for perfect knowledge and greater tempo. | | | N/O |
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G H |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <p>3. JUDGMENT. The discretionary aspect of decision making. Draws on core values, knowledge, and personal experience to make wise choices. Comprehends the consequences of contemplated courses of action.</p> | | | | | | |
| ADV | Majority of judgments are measured, circumspect, relevant and correct. | Decisions are consistent and uniformly correct, tempered by consideration of their consequences. Able to identify, isolate and assess relevant factors in the decision making process. Opinions sought by others. Subordinates personal interest in favor of impartiality. | Decisions reflect exceptional insight and wisdom beyond this Marine's experience. Counsel sought by all; often an arbiter. Consistent, superior judgment inspires the confidence of seniors. | | | N/O |
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G H |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| JUSTIFICATION: | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| H. FULFILLMENT OF EVALUATION RESPONSIBILITIES | | | | | | |
| <p>1. EVALUATIONS. The extent to which this officer serving as a reporting official conducted, or required others to conduct, accurate, uninflated, and timely evaluations.</p> | | | | | | |
| ADV | Occasionally submitted untimely or administratively incorrect evaluations. As RS, submitted one or more reports that contained inflated markings. As RO, concurred with one or more reports from subordinates that were returned by HQMC for inflated marking. | Prepared uninflated evaluations which were consistently submitted on time. Evaluations accurately described performance and character. Evaluations contained no inflated markings. No reports returned by RO or HQMC for inflated marking. No subordinates' reports returned by HQMC for inflated marking. Few, if any, reports were returned by RO or HQMC for administrative errors. Section Cs were void of superlatives. Justifications were specific, verifiable, substantive, and where possible, quantifiable and supported the markings given. | No reports submitted late. No reports returned by either RO or HQMC for administrative correction or inflated markings. No subordinates' reports returned by HQMC for administrative correction or inflated markings. Returned procedurally or administratively incorrect reports to subordinates for correction. As RO nonconcurred with all inflated reports. | | | N/O |
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G H |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| JUSTIFICATION: | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
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APPENDIX B

| | | | | | | |
|---|---------------|---|---|-----------------------------------|---|----|
| 1. Marine Reported On: | | | | 2. Occasion and Period Covered: | | |
| a. Last Name | b. First Name | c. MI | d. SSN | a. OCC | b. From | To |
| I. DIRECTED AND ADDITIONAL COMMENTS | | | | | | |
| J. CERTIFICATION | | | | | | |
| 1. I CERTIFY that to the best of my knowledge and belief all entries made hereon are true and without prejudice or partiality and that I have provided a signed copy of this report to the Marine Reported on. | | | | _____ | <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> | |
| | | | | (Signature of Reporting Senior) | (Date in YYYYMMDD format) | |
| 2. I ACKNOWLEDGE the adverse nature of this report and | | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I have no statement to make <input type="checkbox"/> I have attached a statement | | | | _____ | <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> | |
| | | | | (Signature of Marine Reported On) | (Date in YYYYMMDD format) | |
| K. REVIEWING OFFICER COMMENTS | | | | | | |
| 1. OBSERVATION: <input type="checkbox"/> Sufficient <input type="checkbox"/> Insufficient | | | 2. EVALUATION: <input type="checkbox"/> Concur <input type="checkbox"/> Do Not Concur | | | |
| 3. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT: Provide a comparative assessment of potential by placing an "X" in the appropriate box. In marking the comparison, consider all Marines of this grade whose professional abilities are known to you personally. | | DESCRIPTION | | COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT | | |
| | | THE EMINENTLY QUALIFIED MARINE | <input type="checkbox"/> | | | |
| | | ONE OF THE FEW | <input type="checkbox"/> | | | |
| | | EXCEPTIONALLY QUALIFIED MARINES | <input type="checkbox"/> | | | |
| | | ONE OF THE MANY HIGHLY QUALIFIED | <input type="checkbox"/> | | | |
| | | PROFESSIONALS WHO FORM THE MAJORITY OF THIS GRADE | <input type="checkbox"/> | | | |
| | | A QUALIFIED MARINE | <input type="checkbox"/> | | | |
| | | UNSATISFACTORY | <input type="checkbox"/> | | | |
| 4. REVIEWING OFFICER COMMENTS: Amplify your comparative assessment mark; evaluate potential for continued professional development to include: promotion, command, assignment, resident PME, and retention; and put Reporting Senior marks and comments in perspective. | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| 5. I CERTIFY that to the best of my knowledge and belief all entries made hereon are true and without prejudice or partiality. | | | | _____ | | |
| | | | | (Signature of Reviewing Officer) | | |
| 6. I ACKNOWLEDGE the adverse nature of this report and | | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I have no statement to make <input type="checkbox"/> I have attached a statement | | | | _____ | | |
| | | | | (Signature of Marine Reported On) | | |
| L. ADDENDUM PAGE | | | | | | |
| ADDENDUM PAGE ATTACHED: <input type="checkbox"/> YES | | | | | | |

APPENDIX B

| USMC FITNESS REPORT | | | | | DO NOT STAPLE THIS FORM | | |
|--|--|---|--------|--------------------------|--|--------------------------|----|
| NAVMC 11297 (Rev. 7-11) (EF) FOUO - Privacy sensitive when filled in. | | | | | ADDENDUM PAGE | | |
| A. PURPOSE | | | | | | | |
| 1. Marine Reported On: | | | | | 2. Occasion and Period Covered: | | |
| a. Last Name | b. First Name | c. MI | d. SSN | e. Grade | a. OCC | b. From | To |
| | | | | | | | |
| 3. Purpose: | | | | | | | |
| a. Continuation of Comments Justification | b. Accelerated Promotion Justification | c. Adverse Report MRO Statement 3rd Officer Sighter | | d. Admin Review | e. Supplemental Material | f. HQMC Use | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| B. TEXT | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| C. SUBMITTED BY | | | | | | | |
| 1. a. Last Name | b. First Name | c. MI | 2. SSN | 3. Service | 4. Grade | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| _____ Signature | | | | | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> (Date in YYYYMMDD format) | | |
| D. GENERAL/SENIOR OFFICER ADVERSE REPORT SIGHTING | | | | | | | |
| 1. a. Last Name | b. First Name | c. MI | 2. SSN | 3. Service | 4. Grade | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| _____ Signature | | | | | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> (Date in YYYYMMDD format) | | |
| PAGE <input type="checkbox"/> OF <input type="checkbox"/> | | | | | | | |

APPENDIX C

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------|---|--------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| 1. Name (Last, First MI Suffix) | | 2. Grade | 3. Desig | 4. SSN | | | | |
| 5. ACT RES <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | 6. UIC | 7. Command | | | 8. Promotion Status | 9. Date Reported | | |
| Occasion for Report 10. Periodic <input type="checkbox"/> 11. Detachment Of Individual <input type="checkbox"/> 12. Detachment Of Reporting Senior <input type="checkbox"/> 13. Special <input type="checkbox"/> | | | | Period of Report 14. From: _____ 15. To: _____ | | | | |
| 16. Not Observed Report <input type="checkbox"/> | | Type of Report 17. Regular <input type="checkbox"/> 18. Concurrent <input type="checkbox"/> 19. Ops CDR <input type="checkbox"/> | | | 20. Physical Readiness | | | |
| 21. Reporting Senior (Last, FI MI) | | 22. Grade | 23. Desig | 24. Title | | 25. UIC | | |
| 26. Command Employment And Achievements | | | | | | | | |
| 27. Primary/Additional Duties Assigned | | | | | | | | |
| Flag Officer Development Counseling | | 28. Date Counseled | 29. Counselor | | 30. Signature of Individual Counseled | | | |
| PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE | | NOB | Very Low (1) | Low (2) | Avg (3) | High (4) | Very High (5) | Top Three Traits Select top three traits that create results (place a 1, 2 or 3) |
| 31. Mission Accomplishment | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| 32. Operational Professional Competence | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| 33. Vision/Strategic Thinking | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| 34. Communication Skills | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| 35. Fiscal Planning/Organizational Skills | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| 36. Geopolitical Fluency | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| 37. Military Bearing | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| 38. Leadership Judgment | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| 39. Leading Change | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |

APPENDIX C

| | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Name (Last, First MI Suffix) | | 2. Grade | 3. Desig | 4. SSN | | | |
| POTENTIAL TRAITS | | NOB | Very Low (1) | Low (2) | Avg (3) | High (4) | Very High (5) |
| 40. Fiscal Planning/Organizational Skills | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 41. Personal Growth | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 42. Professional Growth | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 43. Potential Leading Change | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 44. Strategic Thinking | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 45. Performance Trait Average | | Individual | | Reporting Senior | | | |
| 46. Future Assignments: I recommend the following assignments for this individual (three) | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| 47. Comments | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| 48. Signature Of Reporting Senior | | 49. Signature of Individual Evaluated. "I have seen this report, been apprised of my performance, and understand my right to make a statement. <input type="checkbox"/> I intend to submit a statement <input type="checkbox"/> I do not intend to submit a statement | | | | | |
| 50. Typed name, grade, command, UIC and signature of Regular Reporting Senior on Concurrent Report | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |