The Tragedy of Benghazi: The Department of State and Bureaucratic Failure
Abstract
Analysis of the 2012 terrorist attack of the Department of State's diplomatic facility in Benghazi from a bureaucratic and organizational vantage point provides both meaningful lessons and a framework to successfully institutionalize future reform efforts. As a result of extensive diplomatic engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, a commitment to expeditionary diplomacy, shifting diplomatic initiatives, and turmoil in the Middle East, diplomats continue to deploy in increasingly non-permissive environments. Unfortunately the diplomatic efforts in Libya did not benefit from a significant U.S. military presence or a host country security force capable of providing security support in the event of a crisis. More importantly, many of the causal factors that contributed to the tragedy at Benghazi were well known by the Department and previously identified as vulnerabilities in the earlier attacks of the U.S. embassies in Lebanon, Kuwait, Kenya and Tanzania. Consequently, the terrorist attack at Benghazi signifies more than simply the inherent limitations of deploying diplomats in non-permissive environments. The Benghazi tragedy represents a pattern of bureaucratic failure over the past thirty years by the Department of State to adapt and emphasize a culture of security and risk management in balancing the needs of diplomacy and security in the 21st century.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 29, 2015
- Accession Number
- AD1175897
Entities
People
- Robert F. Kelty
Organizations
- Marine Corps University