Beans and Bullets at ANZAC: The Effect of Logistical Limitations on Operations in Gallipoli
Abstract
The Gallipoli campaign was intended to remove Turkey from the war and open communications with Russia. This was not to occur as the campaign failed, partially due to the limited logistics support available. The staff of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force created a poor logistics plan for the initial landings. The staff failed to understand the nature of the Gallipoli Peninsula and the effect it would have on the operations. They underestimated the time required to complete their objectives and were underprepared for the stalemate that resulted. The lines of communication were massive and were further compounded by the lack of adequate forward staging bases to transship stores. This resulted in substantial restrictions on the availability of water and artillery ammunition. Medical problems were rampant; underassessment of casualty figures led to insufficient hospital ships available for the initial landings, overworked stretcher bearers, and swamped aid stations. The logistics limitations meant that the landings on 25th of April 1915 were doomed from the start. The June attacks to seize Krithia and Achi Baba also suffered from lack of artillery ammunition as well as severe medical issues with the troops involved. The first phase of the ANZAC breakout in August used up the ammunition reserve for the entire offensive, and still failed to break the Turkish line. The landings at Suvla were also affected by water, and attacks were cancelled due the troops being overcome by thirst with no means to resupply them. The logistics support to the Gallipoli Campaign was so limited as to significantly limit the conduct of operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 27, 2015
- Accession Number
- AD1175907
Entities
People
- James A. Layzell
Organizations
- Marine Corps University