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ABSTRACT (MAXIMUM 200 WORDS) The Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902, in reaction to U.S. occupation of the Philippine Islands, could have been predicted and prevented had the U.S. government been sensitive to the desires of the local population. When occupying a foreign country there should be a clear expectation that the local population will resist, a conventional fight will transpire, and, if the local force is inferior to the occupying military force, then an insurgency will occur. Once an insurgency commences some of the population will side with the local insurgent group and its goals and a long hard fight will emerge if there is any chance of winning. The lessons from this war apply in the 21 st century: The U.S. must have a clear understanding of the environment before deciding on the level of involvement in foreign matters, and the outcomes will rarely match the desired end state.			
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
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Executive Summary

Title: Prelude to the Philippine Insurrection: The United States Enters the Philippines- Lessons for the 21st Century

Author: Major Jason Timario Martin, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The insurrection of the Filipinos, 1899-1902, in reaction to U.S. occupation of the Philippine Islands, could have been predicted and prevented had the U.S. government been sensitive to the desires of the local population.

Discussion: This research paper recounts the events leading to the Philippine Insurrection. The events of the Spanish-American War mark the beginning of the American involvement in the Philippines. The aftermath led the United States government to decide that occupying the Philippines was more important than leaving the territory in the hands of the native population, while also preventing other powers from entering the islands. The wishes of the Filipino independence movement and population were not taken into account. The U.S. military force was initially viewed as liberators, but after occupying Manila that view quickly changed as the newly arrived U.S. presence seemed simply to replace the Spanish occupiers they had defeated. Once again, the Filipinos were faced with another colonial occupying force; hence, the Filipino fight for independence continued.

In 1896, Emilio Aguinaldo led a rebellion against Spain, who had ruled the islands for over 300 years. The U.S. declared war against Spain in 1898 and part of their strategy was to defeat the Spanish fleet that was stationed in Manila Bay, Philippines. The Spanish fleet was defeated on May 1, 1898. The U.S. Navy was successful in the naval campaign but the Spanish garrison in the capital of Manila was still in tact. Shortly thereafter, an Army expedition was sent to the Philippines. Working with the Filipinos, that expedition captured Manila on August 13, 1898, but left the Filipinos outside of the city. The Philippine reaction to the occupation resulted in a conventional fight with the U.S. Army from February 4, 1899 to September 1899. Not successful, the Filipinos began a guerrilla campaign in December 1899. The Philippine Insurrection officially ended on July 4, 1902. In 1907 the indigenous Philippine government controlled internal affairs and in the 1916 Jones Act the U.S. promised Philippine independence when “ready.” In 1934 a ten-year transition to Philippines independence was promised, but WWII delayed the transfer. The Filipinos eventually gained full independence in 1946.

When occupying a foreign nation there should be a clear expectation that the local population will resist, a conventional fight will transpire, and if the local force is inferior to the occupying military force then an insurgency will occur. Once an insurgency commences some of the population will side with the local insurgent group and its goals, and a long hard fight will emerge if there is any chance of winning.

Conclusion: It has to be understood that whenever an outside power occupies a foreign land, the problems are massive, varied, and complex. It is not as simple as seizing territory, establishing some form of government, and expecting the native people to fall in line with the new authority. The people of the land have a say, they will react, and it usually is not in accordance with what the occupying force thought would occur.

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Preface

The Philippine Insurrection is a topic I have had interest in, but lacked the time and motivation to do any thorough research on the subject until this academic year at Command and Staff College. I am a second generation Filipino-American and desire to know more about the history of the Philippines, especially its relationship with the United States. Culturally, this is important to me, but professionally there are also significant lessons to be learned and applied to future operational policy decisions and implementation of them in the 21st century.

The Spanish-American War marked the beginning of the storied relationship between the United States and the Philippines, one founded on mutually beneficial interests that quickly turned into mistrust and conflict. The Philippine Insurrection could have been predicted had the U.S. government properly analyzed the situation. The military counterinsurgency eventually resulted in a superficial victory for the United States, but the focus of this research is not on the counterinsurgency. Rather, it is on how the decisions of the United States government led to conflict in the Philippines and determine some lessons learned that apply in the 21st century.

My research was gathered from sources in the Gray Research Center, MCB Quantico, VA. Dr. Donald Bittner generously provided an overwhelming amount of mentorship, of which I am eternally grateful. He recommended a majority of my sources, of which came from the annex of his Indian Wars elective course. I would also like to acknowledge the mentorship offered by Dr. Eric Shibuya, LTC Joseph Janczyk, USA, Dr. Matt Flynn, and Dr. Jonathan Phillips. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge my family as the inspiration in this project, and thank them for their never-ending patience and support.

Prologue: The Philippines, 1898

The Philippines is an archipelagic nation in Southeast Asia consisting of 7,107 islands.¹ It had been inhabited for over 30,000 years, originally populated by waves of migrants from Indonesia. The islands were claimed by Spanish explorers in 1521, led by Ferdinand Magellan, with the first permanent settlement established in Cebu in 1565. In 1571, the islands were renamed in honor of King Philip II of Spain, simply called the Philippines, and the capital was moved to Manila on Luzon Island.²

Officially, the colonial administration, headed by a governor general responsible to the viceroy of Mexico, was the governing power of the Philippines. However, the Catholic parish priest was often the only visible symbol of Spanish authority in rural areas, and the Catholic Church in the Philippines controlled education and many large estates.³ Catholic friars became wealthy and powerful by exploiting the rural population and influencing local governance in their favor. The Filipino populations steadily grew unhappy with Spanish oppression, unfair conditions, and lack of representation in the government.

In the 1880s, a peaceful nationalistic movement developed that was strongly influenced by the writings of Jose B. Rizal (1861-1896).⁴ He spurred Filipino demands for reform that later became demands for independence; similar demands for independence occurred in Cuba, another Spanish colony. These two movements coupled to strain the declining Spanish empire economically and stretched it militarily. After the Spanish executed Rizal in 1896, Emilio Aguinaldo led the revolution against Spain, and shortly thereafter against the United States in 1899. Americans were aware of Spanish atrocities in Cuba which greatly influenced American intervention there in 1898, but nothing was known about the Philippines aside from intelligence that the Spanish fleet was in Manila Bay and that the islands were a part of the Spanish Empire.

Introduction

The Spanish-American War marked the beginning of the storied relationship between the United States and the Philippines. The relationship was initially founded on mutually beneficial interests, but within a few short months mistrust developed between the two. The Filipino mistrust stemmed from U.S. military actions that did not coincide with what was assumed to occur in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. Unclear guidance from U.S. leadership on the other side of the world resulted in U.S. military forces repeatedly reacting to immediate crises. The U.S. government did not properly analyze the situation prior to the conflict, nor did it formulate a strategy that coincided with historical U.S. national interests and foreign relation policies. The military counterinsurgency eventually resulted in the U.S. superficially declaring victory in 1902, but not before thousands of lives were lost. It is important to understand how the civilian leadership decisions affected how this war transpired and was eventually fought. The Philippine Insurrection, in reaction to U.S. occupation of the Philippine Islands, could have been predicted and prevented had the U.S. government been sensitive to the desires of the local population. The lessons from this campaign continue to apply well into the 21st century.

Spanish-American War Takes the U.S. to the Philippines

The Philippine Insurrection is what transpired following the Spanish-American War of 1898. Secretary of State John Hay famously described the Spanish-American War as the “splendid little war.”⁵ The U.S. was at war with Spain because the Americans allegedly wanted to free the Cubans from the yoke of Spanish oppression. The Navy Department devised a war plan that, once hostilities commenced with Spain, called for the U.S. Asiatic Fleet to head to Manila to destroy the Spanish warships based there. This plan was developed under the

guidance of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt.⁶ Commodore George Dewey was in charge of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet and carried out the plan to perfection. At first light on May 1, 1898, Dewey gave the order to commence the attack on the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. “You may fire when you are ready, Gridley,” was his command to Captain Charles V. Gridley, captain of the USS *Olympia*, and over the next seven hours the more modern U.S. fleet sank all but one of the Spanish ships.⁷ The naval attack resulted in a quick victory at sea, but the Spanish still had possession of the Philippine Islands.

The Spanish had colonized the Philippines more than 300 years prior to war with the U.S. After being discovered by Magellan, the Philippine Islands had been ruled by that curious mixture of brutality, mild beneficence, and ineptitude ever typical of Spain’s colonial ventures.⁸ The Spanish authorities, though the Catholic clergy spread throughout the rural areas of all the islands, had repressed a majority of the Filipino population to extreme poverty. The class structure of the Philippines was majority lower-class, with a very small middle-class, and even smaller upper-class that held all the wealth and power. The upper-class Spanish administrative figures, clergy, and land owners (some being Filipino) retained the wealth for themselves.

In 1896 the Filipinos started an uprising in revolt against their colonial rulers. The eventual leader of this revolution was Emilio Aguinaldo, a 27-year-old native Filipino of mixed Tagalog and Chinese ancestry. Aguinaldo was born into a moderately well to do family and at thirteen was forced to drop out of school to run the family businesses after the death of his father. He was a land owner, but separated himself from the elites by becoming a member of Katipunan, or “Highest and Most Honorable Society of the Sons of the Country.”⁹ Much like Masonic lodges, Katipunan was a clandestine society with secret passwords, rituals, ranks, and colored hoods. Formed in 1892 by Andres Bonifacio, Teodoro Plata, and Ladislao Diwa, the goal of

Katipunan was to gain independence from Spain through armed revolution. Most of the original members were upper middle class and members of the Philippine Masonry.

Andres Bonifacio became president of Katipunan on January 1, 1896, and once the secret society was discovered by Spanish authorities he immediately executed the armed uprising.

Katipunan had four aims: to develop a strong alliance with each and every Katipunero; to unite Filipinos into one solid nation; to win Philippine independence by means of an armed conflict (or revolution); and to establish a republic after independence. Katipunan appealed to the poor and uneducated and had grown to approximately 30,000 men and women in the provinces surrounding Manila. He began the 1896 revolt by attacking military garrisons in Manila, but Bonifacio was a poor military leader and had few successes against the Spanish forces.

Aguinaldo, on the other hand, proved to be a better political and military leader than Bonifacio.¹⁰

Aguinaldo had no formal military training, but what he lacked in this he made up for in charisma, shrewdness, and eloquence. As the provincial mayor of Cavite, a province on the southern shores of Manila Bay on Luzon Island, he assumed control of the local Katipunan revolutionaries and proved himself as a talented leader.¹¹ He defeated the local Civil Guard and regular Spanish units in Cavite and drove them out of the province.¹² However, a split between Bonifacio and Aguinaldo occurred within Katipunan. The two were of different classes altogether with Bonifacio of the middle working class, and Aguinaldo of the upper-class land owners. Aguinaldo and his Katipunan faction wanted to create a new revolutionary government to supersede Katipunan. Bonifacio, as president of Katipunan, traveled to Cavite to settle the Katipunan divide and refocus all of Katipunan against the Spanish. Aguinaldo and his followers deceived Bonifacio and surprised him with a Katipunan election for presidency and revolutionary government. Their differences were resolved in March 1897 when Aguinaldo was

elected as president and Bonifacio was sidelined. The election did not immediately unite Katipunan and when fighting broke out between the two factions, Aguinaldo had Bonifacio arrested, tried, and executed on 10 May 1897.¹³ Aguinaldo thus became the undisputed leader of the independence movement after he contrived the execution of his rival.¹⁴

This respite from Spanish rule in Cavite was short lived. The infighting for leadership of the independence movement weakened the revolutionary momentum. The Spanish had continued persistent military operations to defeat the rebels, or *insurrecto*, and the Spanish retook Cavite. The Spanish had destroyed their ability to conduct conventional operations, thus forcing Aguinaldo to shift to guerrilla warfare.¹⁵ Aguinaldo and his forces evaded the Spanish pursuers and moved into the mountains north of Manila in Bulacan province.¹⁶ There, the rebel's impregnable stronghold was too difficult for the Spanish to conquer.

Aguinaldo then issued a proclamation that summarized his political goals: the expulsion of the friars and division of their property among the secular clergy, return to the original owners the lands seized by the friars, greater economic and political autonomy, freedom of the press, religious tolerance, representation in the Spanish Cortes, and an end to discriminatory laws.¹⁷ Given his particular situation, driven from his province, besieged in the mountains, and supported by ragtag guerrillas ravaged by disease and hunger, Aguinaldo did not overtly state that independence was the objective within these goals.¹⁸ He purposefully limited his stated goals to seeking social and economic reforms for his people while publicly saying the movement wanted to remain within the Spanish empire. He hoped this would ease the military pressure against his revolutionary movement and bring positive change for his people.

The Spanish found themselves too weak to continue fighting the rebellion. With Spain focused on another revolution in Cuba and potential war with the U.S., local Spanish officials

recognized no help could be expected. Pedro de Paterno, an ambitious Manila lawyer, offered to negotiate a truce; both Aguinaldo and the Spanish authorities were receptive.¹⁹ The Spanish resorted to buying Aguinaldo off. Promises of instituting all of Aguinaldo's goals, and the payment of 800,000 pesos to him, were made in return for ending the revolution and all of its key leadership leaving the country.²⁰ On December 14, 1897, Aguinaldo accepted the pact and the money, but he also had no intention of giving up the struggle.²¹

He relocated to Hong Kong on December 31, 1897, and deposited 400,000 pesos in his personal account; the corrupt Spanish officials in the Philippines pocketed the rest.²² He, and the 27 others sent into exile, continued planning for the next revolt.²³ Meanwhile, in the Philippines the Spanish had no intention of instituting the reforms specified in their oral agreement. This resulted in a resurgence of the revolution as soon as the Filipino populous realized there were no changes. The Spanish thought they were clever in exiling the primary rebel leaders, but in a sense had paid out a fortune to help their enemy finance a new rebellion.²⁴

Aguinaldo used the funds to purchase more weaponry and searched for backing for the Filipino independence effort. In Hong Kong and Singapore, Aguinaldo met with the U.S. consuls and offered to help America if the U.S. went to war against Spain.²⁵ In February 1898, a member of Aguinaldo's junta, Don Felipe Agoncillo, had a guarded discussion with Mr. Rounceville Wildman, the U.S. consul stationed in Hong Kong, about the possible lines of action to pursue should America and Spain come to blows over Spanish atrocities occurring in Cuba. Agoncillo flatly proposed an immediate and automatic alliance if-and-when the U.S. went to war against their common enemy. Agoncillo offered to purchase twenty thousand Springfield rifles from the U.S. in preparation for the combined military venture. The State Department replied that Wildman should encourage no advances on the part of Mr. Agoncillo.²⁶ The State

Department's refusal to support the Filipino insurgents seemed confusing to Wildman and Agoncillo, as the State Department was doing just that in Cuba.

In fact, the Filipinos were in a different category all together from the Cubans. The Filipinos were thousands of miles away from the U.S. and many Americans had never heard of them. Even fewer Americans knew the Spanish owned the Philippine Islands and that a revolution, similar to the one in Cuba, was in progress there. The Filipinos also had neglected to set up a propaganda bureau in the U.S. No speeches in Congress were made on their behalf reporting the misrule of the Spanish, like scores of impassioned speeches about matters in Cuba. The State Department warned Spain on numerous occasions about Cuba but never warned Madrid with regard to the Philippines. In 1898, the *North American Review* carried an article entitled "The Cuba of the Far East." This was the first U.S. public reference to the Filipino situation and Aguinaldo was unaware of the American non-interest toward their cause.²⁷

While the Philippines may have been a mystery to most Americans, they were not to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt. He knew the Spanish had a decrepit Asiatic squadron located in Manila Bay and that Spain had colonial rule over the islands. The U.S. also had an Asiatic squadron and Roosevelt knew the man to take command of it, the energetic and ambitious sixty-year-old Commodore George Dewey. The Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, did not agree with the appointment. Long was not one to instigate a war and he mistrusted Dewey and his aggressive reputation. Roosevelt called for Dewey and stated, "I want you to go. You are the man equal to the emergency if one arises. Do you know any Senators?" He in fact did, and that was enough to gain the appointment. He took command of the Asiatic Station at Nagasaki, Japan, on January 3, 1898, and ordered his fleet to assemble at Hong Kong.²⁸

Horror stories about Spanish atrocities, and a sense of identification with the Cuban independence movement, led to increasing demands for an American commitment to the Cuban cause.²⁹ On the evening of February 15, 1898 the USS *Maine* blew up in Havana harbor, killing 266 of the 350 men aboard.³⁰ The explosion was most likely caused by a malfunction internal to the ship and not by the hands of the Spanish. Regardless, it became a pretext for a U.S. war against Spain. Long and President William McKinley both had feared Roosevelt would prompt threats of war. Regardless, Long temporarily left him in charge of the Navy on the afternoon of February 25, 1898. Roosevelt seized the opportunity by redistributing ships, putting in heavy orders of ammunition, and ordering guns for auxiliary vessels not yet even authorized. Roosevelt sent a telegram to Dewey, “Order the squadron, except the *Monocacy*, to Hong Kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war with Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in the Philippine Islands. Keep *Olympia* until further orders. Roosevelt.”³¹ He also requested from congress a law to authorize recruiting men to active naval duty. Long could have revoked his orders to Dewey and all of Roosevelt’s other actions, but action had already begun and he helplessly rejected this option.³²

Meanwhile, Aguinaldo’s exile distanced him from events in the Philippines. By taking most of his military leadership with him he lost much of his influence over the resistance to Spanish rule in the archipelago. However, the resistance was much alive and the American consuls in the region wanted him as the leader of the movement against Spain within the Philippines. Aguinaldo left Hong Kong in an effort to avoid legal issues, and the possibility of losing the funds he gained from the Spanish, and traveled to Singapore. He arrived there on

April 21, 1898, the same day the U.S. and Spain broke off diplomatic relations. It was then that he was introduced to American consul E. Spencer Pratt.³³

Pratt urged at length that Aguinaldo should cooperate with Dewey and resume leadership of the insurrection in Luzon. Aguinaldo wanted to fight the Spanish, but wanted to know what the U.S. intentions were once the Spanish were defeated. Pratt was taking it upon himself, without guidance from Washington, to influence action in the Philippines. He was aware of an uprising from the local Filipinos and knew Aguinaldo was a key leader in the initial movement. With war rumors looming he wanted to make his own mark on the situation in the Far East. He made bold assumptions based on what he was hearing about how Washington was handling relations with the Cubans against Spain. He knew the U.S., once Spain was defeated, would not annex Cuba. Therefore he assumed the U.S. would do the same for the Philippines. Pratt divulged that the U.S. was already at war with Spain. Unaware, Aguinaldo asked, "What can be expected to gain from helping America?" Pratt responded with "Independence." After Aguinaldo politely asked Pratt to put this in writing, the consul responded:

You need not have any worry about America. The American Congress and President have just made a solemn declaration disclaiming any desire to possess Cuba and promising to leave the country to the Cubans after having driven away the Spaniards and pacified the country. As in Cuba, so in the Philippines. Even more so, if possible; Cuba is at our door while the Philippines are 10,000 miles away!

Aguinaldo liked the analogy and agreed to place himself and his army at the service of the Americans, provided the Philippines would be given the same formal assurances as Cuba. According to Pratt, Dewey, it seemed, was the only one who could issue such a formal statement.³⁴

Pratt sent word to Dewey in Hong Kong that Aguinaldo would help him and that he would lead the insurgents. Dewey responded, "Tell Aguinaldo [to] come soon as possible."

Pratt never showed Aguinaldo the six-word telegram but capitulated its contents. Aguinaldo noted Pratt's summation as, "...the United States would at least recognize the independence of the Philippines under the protection of the U.S. Navy. The consul added that there was no necessity for entering into formal written agreement because the word of the Commodore and the U.S. Consul were in fact equivalent to the most solemn pledge..."³⁵ The exact nature of this discussion is controversial as all record of Dewey's telegram and Aguinaldo's notes no longer exist- if these ever did. Pratt maintained all he had done was urge Aguinaldo to return to Hong Kong and meet with Dewey, whose squadron was about to deploy to the archipelago against the Spanish.³⁶ Aguinaldo felt there was an agreement judging by the enthusiasm from Pratt, and later claimed the United States "would at least recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands, under a naval protectorate."³⁷ Had an agreement truly been made? Had Pratt overstepped his bounds? Was he acting without authority, or did a cover-up occur? Regardless, whether he had been deceived or not, Aguinaldo believed that once the Spanish were defeated he and his countrymen would have been free from colonial rule for the first time in centuries. Washington felt Pratt had overstepped his authority in the situation; after Aguinaldo had left for Hong Kong the State Department notified Pratt to stop unauthorized negotiations with Philippine insurgents and dismissed him from consular service.³⁸

On April 25, 1898, the U.S. Congress declared that a state of war existed with Spain. The war resolution stated, "The people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent." There was also an amendment included by Senator Henry Teller of Colorado, stating, "The United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said islands, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its

people.”³⁹ The Filipinos were in a similar situation with the Cubans, yet, there was no mention of what the U.S. would do with the Philippines if the archipelago were seized by conquest in the war. This lack of consideration for the fate of the Filipinos leads one to assume that the U.S. did not merely aim to liberate the Filipinos from Spanish rule, but rather to takeover the role of the ruler.

Aguinaldo, on that same day, boarded a transport and made his way to Hong Kong to meet with Commodore Dewey. Upon his arrival on May 1, 1898, he was disappointed not to be greeted by Dewey but instead by Mr. Wildman. Dewey was at that time commencing his attack against the Spanish Navy in the Philippines without him. Wildman assured Aguinaldo that Dewey would send a transport to retrieve him. Aguinaldo made use of his forced delay by purchasing items for his forces. He purchased a steam launch used for interisland transport and communication, two thousand Mauser rifles, two hundred thousand rounds of ammunition, and a long list of additional supplies. These items were arranged to arrive in Cavite as soon as circumstances permitted.⁴⁰

He also had discussions with Wildman about the future of the Philippines. Wildman, like Pratt, emphasized the Teller Amendment and reassured Aguinaldo that the Philippines would receive the same treatment as Cuba. Pratt had already done the damage when he made unsanctioned assurances on behalf of the U.S. government; Wildman made the tactical decision to carry on with this ruse, and he made Washington very aware of his reasons for doing so. Privately, Wildman telegraphed Washington that Aguinaldo might turn out to be “a necessary evil... If Aguinaldo were placed in command... Admiral Dewey or General Merritt would have someone whom they could hold responsible for any excesses which might otherwise be perpetrated upon the Spaniards...”⁴¹ Aguinaldo and his colleagues had always been suspicious of

the American motives, but realized they had everything to gain and nothing to lose in these circumstances. They also comprehended that the U.S. could take over the Philippines without Aguinaldo's help. In order to counteract such a possibility they needed to be sufficiently armed, further justifying Aguinaldo's feverish purchase of arms.⁴²

On May 1, 1898, Dewey provided the Philippine revolutionaries the opportunity they needed by destroying the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. The next day the Cavite garrison surrendered to Dewey, but Spanish forces still held Manila and the rest of the Philippines. Dewey comprehended the limits of what a naval force could do when he said he could "reach no further ashore. For tenure of the land you must have the man with a rifle."⁴³ Dewey had complete control of the sea, however, without an Army he could not defeat the Spanish on the ground. Wildman had made Dewey aware of Aguinaldo's presence in Hong Kong. Dewey, being short of ground forces, had him brought back to the Philippines with the hope of Aguinaldo leading the Filipino revolutionaries against the Spanish.⁴⁴

Their first meeting was aboard Dewey's flagship, the USS *Olympia*⁴⁵ on May 19, 1898. The two men were different in so many ways. Aguinaldo was not yet 30 years old, while the admiral was twice his age. Aguinaldo was dressed in a rumpled khaki uniform complete with a captured Spanish sword, while Dewey wore his creased white dress uniform. Dewey looked the part of a distinguished gentlemanly officer with silver hair and mustache, while Aguinaldo was short in stature with a face pockmarked from smallpox scars. Their differences also extended to what each of them believed was said on that day.⁴⁶ Aguinaldo claimed Dewey promised U.S. support for Philippine independence following the defeat of their common enemy, much like the promises from Pratt and the assurances from Wildman. Dewey protested he said nothing of the

sort.⁴⁷ Aguinaldo, desperate for American support, may have read into Dewey's vague assurances more than the admiral intended.⁴⁸

Dewey did not have an army embarked so he could not face the enemy ashore. He needed Aguinaldo to fight the Spanish until American troops arrived, so Dewey gave Aguinaldo an additional 100 rifles to help with their efforts ashore. Aguinaldo agreed to carry out the mission with hopes of defeating the Spanish, establishing a legitimate government, and thus giving the Americans no reason to claim ownership of the archipelago; if Dewey was using Aguinaldo, he was also being used in return.⁴⁹ Dewey asserted before a Senate committee in 1902, "I permitted it as a good military act. The Filipinos were our friends, assisting us; they were doing our work. I believe then that they would be thankful and delighted to get rid of the Spaniards that they would accept us with open arms. I was waiting for troops to arrive, and I felt sure that the closer they [the Filipinos] invested the city the easier it would be when our troops arrived to march in."⁵⁰

Aguinaldo Rules Over Archipelago, Excluding Manila

While Dewey was waiting for the American army to arrive Aguinaldo and his Filipino revolutionaries acted. He declared himself temporary leader of the country on May 25, 1898, until a president and representative body could be officially elected. On that day he also issued a proclamation to the people declaring "The great North American nation, the cradle of genuine liberty, and therefore the friend of our people, oppressed and enslaved by the tyranny and despotism of its rulers, has come to us manifesting a protection as decisive as it is undoubted disinterested toward our inhabitants, considering us as sufficiently civilized and capable of governing for ourselves our unfortunate country..."⁵¹ The first couple of steps were taken to show the United States that the Filipinos were ready to be an independent nation.

On May 27, 1898, Aguinaldo's shipment of rifles arrived along with ammunition. By the end of the month his forces began military operations by occupying Cavite and advancing toward Manila. Their goal: Not only taking Manila from the Spanish, but also taking control of the entire archipelago.⁵² The Filipinos were like an avalanche sweeping over all of Luzon, as they moved as far south in the island chain as Mindanao. They squeezed the Spaniards into the heart of Manila, surrounded the city with fourteen miles of trenches, and captured the only pumping stations supplying water to the defenders. Dewey transmitted to Washington, "They do not intend to attack the city proper until the arrival of United States troops..."⁵³

Aguinaldo, building on his military successes, began laying the foundation for a Filipino civil government. On June 12, 1898, independence was declared, and six days later local government structure was established with defined responsibilities for each town and province. June 18 was made the official day of independence, and natives of all the provinces celebrated. Aguinaldo invited Dewey to attend the ceremony at the Filipino headquarters, but Dewey did not attend or give recognition to the new government.⁵⁴ Dewey understood that the U.S. government did not recognize the insurgent Filipinos as the governing authority; therefore the Admiral could not recognize Aguinaldo and his followers as the official government, no matter what promises or assurances were made to Aguinaldo. Also, had Dewey recognized the insurgents as the official Philippine authority his support would have been viewed as an international revolutionary act. Spain had not yet been defeated and was still recognized internationally as the governing body and ruler of the Philippine islands; in this age of empires, Spain still owned them. All Dewey could do was provide support and encourage the Filipinos to fight the Spanish until U.S. troops arrived.

Aguinaldo understood the local nature of Filipino politics and that is why he and his advisors began reforms at the local level before tackling issues covering the entire archipelago. Rules were established for local elections, police, courts, and taxation. On June 23, 1898, the temporary government was abolished when Aguinaldo issued a decree establishing a new revolutionary government with an executive, legislative, and military and civil judiciary branches.⁵⁵ Dewey forwarded a copy of the document to Washington accompanied by a letter stating, "In my opinion their people are superior in intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races... Further intercourse with them has confirmed me in this opinion."⁵⁶ This letter shows where Dewey's sympathies rested, but was not enough to sway the imperialist momentum back home.

Aguinaldo needed time, persuasion, and revolutionary discipline in order to mobilize the people in support of the new government. The delay of the American troops provided the time and the proclamations provided the persuasion. The discipline was enforced by Aguinaldo's announcement on July 15, 1898, "All Filipinos must understand that they are now in the Katipunan, whether they want to be or not, and hence it is the duty of all to contribute life and property to the arduous enterprise of freeing the people, and he who disobeys must stand ready to receive the corresponding punishment. We can not free ourselves unless we move united in a single desire, and you must understand that I shall severely punish the man who causes discord and dispute."⁵⁷ Knowing U.S. troops were arriving soon, Aguinaldo needed to instill a sense of nationalism in order to keep the revolutionary discipline of the people, in case the U.S. reneged on the promise of independence.

U.S. Occupation of Manila

Commodore George Dewey defeated the Spanish squadron at Manila Bay on May 1, 1898. The Spanish American War was barely a week old and American troops were being deployed from the West Coast of the United States “to occupy the Philippines.”⁵⁸ Major General Nelson A. Miles made a request to Secretary of War Russell A. Alger on May 3, 1898, that a 5,000-man expedition be sent to the Philippines. McKinley approved the undertaking for reasons unknown at the time.⁵⁹

McKinley selected Major General Wesley Merritt to command the 5,000 man volunteer force. Seeking to understand the mission, Merritt wrote to the McKinley on May 13, 1898: “I do not yet know whether it is your desire to subdue and hold all of the Spanish territory in the islands, or merely seize and hold the capital... It seems more than probable that we will have so-called insurgents to fight as well as the Spaniards, and upon the work to be accomplished will depend the ultimate strength and composition of the force.” There was obvious confusion as to what the purpose of the expedition was.⁶⁰

It took time for McKinley and his administration to respond because they also had to determine the U.S. intentions in the region. On May 19, 1898, McKinley replied that the army of occupation had “the two-fold purpose of completing the reduction of Spanish power in the quarter and giving order and security to the islands while in the possession of the United States.”⁶¹ Historian William T. Sexton summed up Merritt’s mission as:

Go to the Philippines, cooperate with the Navy, defeat the Spanish armed forces there, establish order and the sovereignty of the United States. Advise the Filipinos that the United States aims to protect, not fight them; follow existing laws as far as possible; take over public property, the collection of taxes and customs; open the ports to commerce.⁶²

With that in mind Merritt insisted the force be enlarged to include regulars. The War Department agreed and assigned 20,000 men, to include regulars, and designated them the 8th Corps. The force assembled at San Francisco and the first contingent departed on May 25, en route capturing Guam in the Spanish-held Marianas, and arrived at Cavite on June 30. The next contingent departed on June 15, one more later in the month, and two more in July.⁶³

By the time the U.S. Army started arriving in Cavite the Filipinos had Manila besieged and all of Luzon under its control. They had already formed an American-style Philippine Republic and issued a declaration of independence. This did not deter the Americans from their orders. Don Fermin Jaudenes, the Spanish Governor General of the Philippines, negotiated with Dewey and Merritt to surrender Manila after a short mock battle. These negotiations did not include Aguinaldo or any other Filipino representative. Jaudenes recognized the futility in resisting against the Americans and sought to preserve his own reputation as well as Spain's honor.⁶⁴ His troops would only defend the outer lines of defenses and would not utilize heavy guns; in return the U.S. would employ naval gunfire into Manila and would keep Filipinos out of the city. Jaudenes feared the Filipinos would retaliate for past atrocities if they were allowed access to the Spanish.⁶⁵

On August 13, 1898, the battle played out as scripted between the Spanish and the Americans. The Filipinos, however, were not privy to the plot. Hence, they spontaneously joined in the attack against their former rulers and occupied several suburbs on the way to the capitol. At the end of the day the Americans controlled most of the city, surrounded by angry Filipinos demanding a joint occupation. On August 16, both sides were still glaring at each other when word arrived that the "splendid little war" had ended four days earlier.⁶⁶

Beginning of the Philippine Insurrection

The Spanish American war ended on August 12, 1898. The Spanish could no longer maintain their garrisons neither in San Juan or Havana, Cuba, nor in Manila due to their devastating naval losses. Spain signed a protocol which ended hostilities, granted Cuba independence, and ceded Guam and Puerto Rico to the U.S. The fate of the Philippines would be determined at a postwar peace conference in Paris beginning in October of that year. The U.S. had many options regarding the islands: grant independence, return them to Spain, acquire only a naval base, annex only Luzon, establish some form of protectorate, or annex the entire archipelago. McKinley decided on complete annexation for moral, economic, political, and military reasons and by the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898, Spain ceded the Philippines.⁶⁷ Economically, the Philippines granted the U.S. access to Asian markets in the Far East. Morally, there was a common belief that the Filipinos could not govern themselves after centuries of Spanish rule and influence in the region. Militarily, the Filipinos would not be able to fend off the predatory nations seeking to expand their empires as well. All of those reasons served as political momentum pushing McKinley to annex. Dewey may have believed the Filipinos would welcome them with open arms by supporting them in their fight with the Spanish, but when the U.S. officially annexed the Philippines the country also acquired an already existing conflict, an insurgency whose goal was independence.

While Manila fell to the Americans on August 13, 1898, Filipino organization and control continued to spread. The Filipino revolutionary congress and representatives from most provinces met north of Manila in Malolos on September 15 to draft a national constitution and establish an official government for the Philippines. On January 21, 1899, the approved constitution was disseminated, Malolos was made the new capitol, and Aguinaldo was

announced as president. This was all done when it was clear in early January that the United States was going to annex the archipelago. With an official government in place Aguinaldo and his people put their hopes in the U.S. anti-imperialist movement and the U.S. Senate, which had not ratified the peace treaty yet.⁶⁸

In late August 1898, Merritt was replaced by Major General Elwell S. Otis. On December 21, 1898, McKinley notified Otis that “the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary” and that the military government is to be “extended with all possible dispatch to the whole ceded territory.” The task of the U.S. Army was to “win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines” by proving “the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule.”⁶⁹

Otis and his men began a variety of improvements in Manila; cleaning up the unsanitary conditions left by the Spanish, vaccinating the inhabitants, repairing roads, and building schools, all in an attempt to make the city bustle again. Most Filipinos, however, had no desire to be assimilated, benevolently or otherwise.⁷⁰ Tensions mounted between the U.S. troops in the city and the Filipinos surrounding it. McKinley did not want to see war break out; as a civil war veteran he had seen enough dying to last a lifetime. He hoped that if he waited long enough, Filipino resistance would collapse. Aguinaldo hoped that if he waited long enough the U.S. Senate would refuse to ratify the Treaty of Paris.⁷¹

The U.S. Anti-Imperialist League was a who’s who of prominent Americans including Grover Cleveland, Andrew Carnegie, Samuel Gompers, William James, Jane Addams, and Mark Twain.⁷² They were not all against expansion, favoring acquisitions within the Western Hemisphere and retaining naval bases abroad. The acquisition of the Philippines represented a

clear break with past policies of not entangling in foreign affairs and preserving interest and security close to home, i.e. Monroe Doctrine. The U.S. had never acquired territory that it could not eventually admit as a state. If it acquired territory in the Far East it could not forbid other nations from meddling in America affairs, defending the colony would be difficult and costly, require a large military establishment, militarism abroad, and despotism at home.⁷³ Annexing the Philippines was thus against the idealistic image the U.S. wanted to portray to the world.

On the night of February 4, 1899, a war of conquest according to the Filipinos and an insurrection according to the Americans began.⁷⁴ Fighting now ensued between two organized forces, with one representing the government of the U.S. and the other representing the revolutionary government of the Philippine Republic under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo. The conflict was between American regulars and volunteers against the Philippine army that had seized control of the islands from Spain.⁷⁵ That army surrounded the Americans in Manila and initially adopted a conventional organization and tactics. The plan was to engage with the American forces in regular combat and hope to gain international recognition for the Philippine Republic as a result.⁷⁶

On February 6, 1899, when word came out in the U.S. that fighting had commenced, the U.S. Senate ratified the Treaty of Paris by one vote more than the two-thirds required (57-27), and Washington sent further reinforcements to the Philippines.⁷⁷ Aguinaldo's hopes of a political settlement through the sway of the Anti-Imperialist League collapsed. The fight around Manila only lasted twenty-four hours when the Americans sent the Filipinos reeling north of the city. The conventional fight lasted for the next nine months, with the Filipino army being ill equipped and lacking the expertise to wage this type of war against the U.S. Army. Forced to accept the superiority of American forces in conventional operations, Aguinaldo shifted to

guerrilla warfare, a strategy aimed at making an occupation of the Philippines too costly for the Americans.⁷⁸ This was Aguinaldo's last major strategic decision and final hope for immediate Philippine independence. American resolve, however, proved too difficult to overcome. Thirty-one months of guerrilla warfare ensued and the U.S. declared the insurgency defeated on July 4th, 1902.

U.S. Expansion to the Far East

There has been much debate in the United States and the Philippines over the underlying reasons for U.S. involvement in the archipelago following the Spanish-American War. This stems from a variety of influential factors such as imperialism, social Darwinism, the quest for Asian markets, the "Yellow Press," and U.S. domestic politics.⁷⁹ All of these may have been factors in developing President McKinley's policy, but there is no documentation linking his national policy to imperialism or any of the others. He listened intently to all of his advisors but was very secretive about what he was actually thinking regarding the situation in the Philippines. McKinley was against war, but the USS *Maine* explosion in Havana Harbor swayed that belief. It would seem that public opinion and pressures steered him in the direction of annexation of the Philippines.

A more likely argument is that U.S. involvement in the Philippines was accidental and incremental.⁸⁰ After each decision and action unfolded the U.S. found itself getting further involved in a conflict in the Philippines. Manila was just the starting location of the conflict, which then expanded to all of Luzon and finally the entire archipelago. The U.S. forces were seeking to deal with immediate crises rather than follow a premeditated course of action.⁸¹ The U.S. initially wanted to use Manila, the capitol of the Philippines, as a bargaining chip with

Spain for Cuba or for trade interests in Asia.⁸² The Teller Amendment made it clear that Cuba would not be annexed; so imperialistic and economic interests gained momentum.

McKinley's initial uncertainty and hesitation to commit the nation to a policy in the Philippines would place an enormous burden on his military subordinates.⁸³ Merritt bore the brunt of this burden as the initial overall commander of the Philippine expedition. Merritt inquired of the President "whether it is your desire to subdue and hold all of the Spanish territory in the islands, or merely to seize and hold the capitol."⁸⁴ McKinley responded by sidestepping the question of the islands fate and noted only that the defeat of the Spanish fleet and the need to secure peace with Spain "rendered it necessary...to send an army of occupation to the Philippines for the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of Spanish power... and of giving order and security to the islands while in the possession of the United States."⁸⁵ Dewey and Merritt also had instructions to avoid entangling alliances with the insurgents "that would incur our liability to maintain their cause in the future."⁸⁶

Once the Philippines were in the possession of the U.S., President McKinley had to figure out what to do with them. Most Republicans were in favor of annexation; in the age of empires, U.S. territories in the Far East would reflect the growing power of the U.S. The fact remained that the American populous and leaders alike knew very little about the Far East, let alone the Philippines. Most had never heard of the island chain or knew where it was, and did not know the Filipinos were in an insurgency against their Spanish rulers, similar to what was occurring in Cuba. McKinley literally prayed on the matter and was quoted as telling a group of Methodist missionaries, "I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way...that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos and uplift them and

civilize and Christianize them...” Most Filipinos were already Christian, but McKinley’s thinking reflected Protestant piety and American jingoism that defined the turn-of-the-century zeitgeist.⁸⁷

There ultimately were a string of reasonable misunderstandings by the U.S. government that lead McKinley to decide that annexation of the Philippines was the only rational course.⁸⁸ First was the belief that the archipelago was economically valuable due to its location in the Far East. Secondly, Washington feared setting off a war among the great powers; if the U.S. did not own the islands then other nations would claim them and restrict U.S. access to the region. And thirdly, McKinley believed the Filipinos were incapable of self-government. All of these misunderstandings reinforced U.S. popular opinion that annexation was virtuous.⁸⁹ The international race for colonies by the great powers continued and Americans feared being locked out of the Asian market. The British had a base in Hong Kong, and for the Americans, Manila was a comparable port for its military abroad; it made sense to own all of the surrounding islands as well to avoid being in an indefensible location confined to just Manila Bay. The German navy shadowing Dewey’s fleet reinforced the belief that if the U.S. did not take ownership of the Philippines, Germany or Japan would. And lastly, McKinley felt Aguinaldo was not a popular leader, especially among non-Tagalogs, and that the archipelago would collapse into chaos between competing groups if outside rule did not claim responsibility. Filipino self-governance was not entertained in Washington.⁹⁰

Lessons from U.S. Intervention in the Philippines

There are several lessons that can be drawn from this examination of the sequence of events leading to the Philippine Insurrection. Historian John M. Gates, in his article “Indians and Insurrectos: The U.S. Army’s Experience with Insurgency” in the *Journal of the U.S. Army War*

College, claims that the Army “failed to learn as much as it could or should have from its 19th-century counterinsurgency experience.”⁹¹ He made that statement in comparison to the war in Vietnam, but this claim applies to the wars of the 21st century as well. Dr. Richard Millett, Professor Emeritus of History at Southern Illinois in Edwardsville and Former Oppenheimer Chair of Modern Warfighting Strategy at the U.S. Marine Corps University, has several main themes in reference to U.S. intervention in foreign lands, as compiled by Dr. Donald Bittner, Professor Emeritus at the U.S. Marine Corps University. These themes are otherwise known as “Millett’s Laws.”⁹² Several of these laws will be used as lessons for the 21st century.

One of these laws is “whenever an intervention in a foreign area occurs, the problems are massive, varied, and complex.”⁹³ The Filipinos were in a revolutionary struggle against the Spanish. The Spanish were attempting to suppress the insurrection in the Philippines (and another in Cuba). The U.S. was looking to expand its territories but did not want to do it through offensive armed conflict. The Spanish struggles in Cuba, and associated atrocities, caused the U.S. to invoke Monroe Doctrine as a justification for imposing pressure on Spain. Involvement against Spain as a result of the USS *Maine* explosion drew the U.S. to the Philippines to battle the Spanish fleet located in Manila Bay to deter the possible threat against the U.S. West Coast. The U.S. saw an opportunity to expand its territories if the Spanish ground forces in the Philippines were defeated, without consideration of the uprising that was occurring by the Filipinos against their colonial rulers. In fact, Washington was surprised by Dewey’s sudden and total naval victory, hence had no policy for inheriting an insurrection.⁹⁴ Had the U.S. thoughtfully considered possible courses of action, thru action, reaction, counteraction scenarios, officials might have revealed that the most likely course of action of the Filipinos would have been an insurgency against the U.S. This would have also revealed that being a protectorate over

the Philippines might have been a better solution to this complex problem, as had happened elsewhere in the world.

Two more laws that apply are “there are no “solutions” to intervention problems, only steps to make them more manageable,” and “the solution to any problem creates new ones.”⁹⁵ These laws summarize the problems that arose when the U.S. intervened against the Spanish in Manila; the country found itself in a “wicked problem.” A problem that creates more problems is a dilemma the U.S. could have avoided. Dewey assumed the Filipinos would welcome the U.S. with open arms after liberating the Spanish. The Filipinos certainly would have welcomed the U.S. as friends and allies, but not as replacement rulers over them. The U.S. government did not acknowledge the revolutionary Filipinos as legitimate political representatives; therefore, they never considered them able to govern their own lands after the Spanish were defeated. This opened the door for an insurgency in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. Again, the option to be a protectorate, much like what was done in Cuba, would have been the wiser decision.

Another law is “it is easier to send troops into a foreign state or area (i.e., intervention), than it is to get them out.”⁹⁶ Once ground forces were deployed to the Philippines to defeat the Spanish in 1898, the U.S. military establishment did not permanently leave until 1991 when the negotiations for further U.S. use of Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base collapsed. The U.S. committed itself to annexing the Philippines for moral, economic, political, and military reasons, but it proved to be false reasoning in the end and required the deployment of U.S. service members to this far off land for nearly a century. The moral reason for annexation was that the Filipinos were incapable of self-rule; however, they had established a revolutionary government, published a declaration of independence, and ratified a constitution. They

obviously believed in democratic principles and were well on their way to implementing them throughout the archipelago. Economically, the Philippine occupation proved to be more draining on the U.S. than anticipated, and the need for the Philippines for commercial opportunities in Asia was not required. Politically, the U.S. was divided in the decision to annex the Philippines, causing many high profile individuals to lash out publicly against the new colonial aspirations. The final reason for annexation requiring military occupation was the belief that if the U.S. did not take the Philippines, then someone else will. The U.S. did not need to annex the Philippines in order to keep Germany or Japan out, all the U.S. had to do was announce itself as a protectorate over it. The U.S. would not have gone to war with the Filipinos, no other nation would have colonized, the U.S. still would have had access to the Philippines for economic trade, and could have still established bases, in a friendlier environment, with the approval of the newly formed Filipino government. As it stands, the first three years of conflict turned into nearly one hundred years of military involvement under less than ideal circumstances.

The final law drawn from “Millet’s Laws” is “a success in one country or area does not transfer (i.e. guarantee success) in another.”⁹⁷ The U.S. defeated the Spanish on two fronts, one in Cuba and the other in the Philippines. The situations were vastly different, however, by the fault of the U.S. itself. The U.S. decided early on that the people of Cuba would be allowed to govern themselves as soon as they were able, with the U.S. acting as the protectorate over them. Officially, the Spanish-American War was fought against Spain for its atrocities against Cubans alone, and the Spanish fleet in the Philippines had been attacked to eliminate it as a possible menace to the U.S. west coast, but in the aftermath imperial aspirations caused the U.S. to take ownership of the Philippines instead of establishing it as a protectorate.⁹⁸ By not being

consistent with its international relations the U.S. found itself in an unanticipated war against the Filipinos it was seeking to govern.

The last lesson for the 21st century is that the U.S. government must be honest and open about her intentions abroad. Intervention laced with secrecy and deception will only fuel hostility toward any U.S. actions. The consuls in Hong Kong and Singapore, as well as Commodore Dewey, whether through the advisement of the U.S. government or not, were not open and honest with Aguinaldo about the U.S. intentions with the Philippines. Aguinaldo initially viewed the Americans as friends, but he became rightly suspicious the U.S. might annex the islands when soldiers arrived and officials refused to recognize his government.⁹⁹ For most Filipinos, Aguinaldo's government was viewed as representing their interests and reflecting their society better than the Spanish ever had, and better than Americans could.¹⁰⁰ So when the U.S. decided to annex the Philippines, which was contrary to what had been expressed prior, Aguinaldo and his army decided to continue their fight for independence.

Lessons Re-Learned in the 21st Century

The problems of the past are relevant in the 21st century. The lessons from the events leading to the Philippine Insurrection are comparable to the lessons drawn from events leading to Operation *Enduring Freedom* and Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. The situations in Iraq and Afghanistan were certainly problems that were “massive, varied, and complex.” In the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the U.S., a global war on terrorism was announced by then President George W. Bush without a common knowledge of who the terrorists were or what they wanted. The U.S. began its fight against terrorism in Afghanistan against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda members they were protecting. This includes Osama Bin Laden, the Al Qaeda leader responsible for the 9/11 attacks. In 2003, the U.S. shifted its focus from Afghanistan to Iraq, which was also part of

the so-called “Axis of Evil.” Their Baathist party, led by Saddam Hussein, was in charge of the oppressive Sunni socialist government that caused regional instability and committed atrocities within its borders. Reports that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) fueled U.S. intervention and in March of that year they began their attack to overthrow Saddam Hussein. In both cases a clear understanding of the local people and their cultures was not known. The differences between Sunni and Shia, along with their historical grievances against one another, were a mystery to most Americans, similar to the American lack of understanding of the grievances the Filipinos had toward the Spanish. Not knowing such issues automatically makes intervention complex.

The initial defeats of the Taliban and the Baathist government were rapid, but the following unforeseen insurgencies that followed were long and hard fought. It was a massive undertaking to rebuild two collapsed governments involving extremely complex and varying social structures. The assumption that western style democracy would take hold in both countries was ambitious and unrealistic. The removal of the existing governments only led to unexpected, and unplanned for, insurgencies. Nevertheless, these insurgencies could have been anticipated had a more thorough analysis been done of the cultures. This proves Millett’s law true that when intervening in another country “the solution to any problem creates new ones.” Judging by how long it took for U.S. forces to leave Iraq, and the fact that they are still in Afghanistan proves true that “it is easier to send troops into a foreign state or area (i.e., intervention), than it is to get them out.”

U.S. and coalition forces initially fought the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq for noble and just reasons. Kill or capture Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan and remove Saddam Hussein from power, thus thwarting Iraq’s ability to threaten the region with WMDs. Once Osama Bin Laden

was killed, it was assumed by many that the U.S. would immediately begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. That did not happen for too many reasons to list here, but it can be agreed that there is never a perfect time to withdraw from any intervention and that seemed to be as good a time as any. When no WMDs were found in Iraq, the world wondered what the U.S. was doing there in the first place. Reports came out that bad intelligence led to the invasion, which leads everyone to question the honesty and openness of the U.S. government. The U.S. undertook both of these complicated problems with an unstoppable nationalistic momentum and to question the U.S. government's honesty might have seemed unpatriotic to many. For the sake of preserving the nation's honor and its standing as a world super power, the U.S. government and the leadership within it must always be forthright in its intentions. As in the Philippines, the U.S. government may not have been as honest and forthright as it could have been.

Conclusion

It has to be understood that whenever an outside power occupies a foreign land, the problems are massive, varied, and complex. It is not as simple as seizing territory, establishing some form of government, and expecting the native people to fall in line with the new authority. The indigenous people of a land have a say, they will react, and it usually is not in accordance with what the occupying force thought would occur. When occupying a foreign nation there should be a clear expectation that the local population will resist, a conventional fight will transpire, and, if the local force is inferior to the occupying military force, then an insurgency will occur. Once an insurgency commences some of the population will side with the local insurgent group and its goals, and a long hard fight will emerge if there is any chance of winning.

Appendix A

Philippine Insurrection Timeline

Timeline:

- 1896-1898 Emilio Aguinaldo leads rebellion in the Philippines against Spanish rule.
- 15 Feb 1898 USS *Maine* blows up in Havana harbor, killing 268 of its crew.
- 11 Apr 1898 President McKinley asks Congress for declaration of war against Spain.
- 25 Apr 1898 Congress declares that a state of war exists.
- 1 May 1898 Admiral George Dewey defeats Spanish fleet located in Manila Bay.
- 3 May 1898 MajGen Nelson A. Miles recommends to Sec of War Russel A. Alger send a 5000 man force from San Francisco “to occupy the Philippines.”
- 19 May 1898 Aguinaldo and Dewey first meet aboard Dewey’s flagship, the USS Olympia.
- 25 May 1898 U.S. troops depart from San Francisco, CA, for the occupation of the Philippines. Further convoys would sail on June 15, 27, and 28.
- 12 June 1898 Filipino leaders declare their independence and established a provisional republic, with Emilio Aguinaldo as President.
- 30 June 1898 Approximately 10,000 U.S. Army troops from 8th Corps, commanded by Major General Wesley Merritt, enter Manila Bay and land at Cavite.
- 1 July 1898 Emilio Aguinaldo proclaims himself President of the Revolutionary Philippine Republic.
- 13 Aug 1898 U.S. forces occupied Manila after a short “mock” battle with the Spanish. Filipinos were left out of the surrender ceremony, and not let into the capital; they begin to take over Spanish arsenals and defenses outside the city for possible hostilities against American troops.
- 20 Dec 1898 In Treaty of Paris, Spain cedes the Philippines, as well as Guam and Puerto Rico, to the United States.
- 21 Jan 1899 Philippine revolutionaries promulgate their constitution, make Malolos their capital, and announce Aguinaldo as President.

- 4 Feb 1899 Fighting commences between Philippine forces and U.S. forces commanded by Major General Elwell Otis, in Manila. Aguinaldo issues a proclamation of war against the USA.
- 6 Feb 1899 U.S. Senate ratifies the Treaty of Paris by 1 vote, and sent reinforcements to the Philippines.
- 31 Mar 1899 Amidst conventional forces, U.S. forces capture rebel capitol of Malolos.
- Sept 1899 Philippine conventional forces disappear.
- Feb 1900 Almost all major towns under U.S. control.
- Dec 1899-July 1902 Insurgency occurs (Philippine Insurrection); policy of “benevolent assimilation” ensued, i.e. “Schoolbooks and Kraggs.”
- May 1900 Major General Arthur MacArthur succeeds Otis as U.S. commander.
- Dec 1900 Comprehensive pacification program commences, with U.S. forces aided by Philippine auxiliaries (and later the Philippine Constabulary and Philippine Scouts).
- 23 Mar 1901 U.S. forces under Brigadier General Frederick Funston capture Aguinaldo.
- July 1901 Major General Adna Chaffe succeeds MacArthur as U.S. military commander; William Howard Taft assumed power as civilian governor of the Philippines.
- July 1901 Philippine Constabulary and Philippine Scouts created.
- 28 Sept 1901 U.S. infantry company (many veterans of the Boxer Rebellion) killed (called “massacre”) at Balangiga, Samar; Brigadier General Jacob Smith (later court-martialed) issues order to make Samar a “howling wilderness.” In the midst of this occurs the erroneously legendary U.S. Marine Corps “Waller Patrol.” In southern Luzon, J. Franklin Bell’s forces, aided by Philippine auxiliaries, commence severe but effective measures to counter the insurgency; these include crop destruction and local population confined in protected zones.
- April 1902 Last of the major insurgent leaders surrender or are captured.
- 4 July 1902 President Roosevelt declares the insurrection at an end (although operations continue for years afterwards, especially against Muslim guerrillas, i.e., Moros, in the southern Philippines).
- 1907 Indigenous Philippine government controls internal affairs.
- 1916 Jones Act promises Philippine independence when “ready”.

- 1934 Tydings-McDuffie provides for 10-year transition to Philippine independence.
- 1935 Manuel Quezon elected Philippine Commonwealth President; soon, General Douglas MacArthur, U.S. Army (retired) arrives as military adviser, and later commander of Philippine forces (with the eventual rank of Field Marshal) – with Major Dwight Eisenhower a key staff officer.
- 1941-45 Japanese invasion, conquest, and occupation of The Philippines.
- 1944-45 U.S. and Allied forces land at Leyete Gulf liberating the archipelago.
- 1946 Philippine Independence.
- 1947 First U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement allowing the U.S. to operate two bases, Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base.
- 1951 The U.S. and the Philippines sign a Mutual Defense Treaty, committing both countries to come to each others aid in the event of an attack by a third party.
- 1991 U.S.-Philippine negotiations for continued use of Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base collapse; U.S. forces depart the Philippines.

Chronology compiled from *The Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection 1898-1902*, by Alejandro de Quesada, and Annex J of Indian Wars elective course supplement, Command and Staff College, U.S. Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Academic Year 2014-2015, authored by Dr. Donald F. Bittner.

Appendix B

Key Figures

Emilio Aguinaldo ¹⁰¹

March 23, 1869- Feb. 6, 1964. Born near Cavite, Luzon, Philippines. Died in Manila. Filipino leader who fought first against Spain, and later against the United States for the independence of the Philippines. In 1901, Aguinaldo was captured by General Fredrick Funston, after which he took an oath of allegiance to the U.S., was granted a pension from the U.S. government, and retired to private life. In 1935, he ran for president of the commonwealth of the Philippines and lost the election. In 1941, Aguinaldo was captured by the Japanese and was used as a propaganda tool. For his acts, he was arrested after the war and spent several months in jail, later receiving presidential amnesty. As a token vindication of his honor he was appointed as a member of the Council of State in 1950. In his later years he devoted his attention to veterans' affairs, promotion of nationalism and democracy in the Philippines, and improving relations between the Philippines and the U.S.



Illustration 1- Emilio Aguinaldo

Commodore George Dewey ¹⁰²

Dec. 26, 1837- Jan. 16, 1917. Born in Montpelier, VT. Died in Washington DC. American naval officer celebrated for his victory in Manila Bay during the Spanish-American War. Graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1858. During the Civil War he saw combat in New Orleans and participated in the capture of Fort Fisher. As chief of the Bureau of Equipment and then as president of the Board of Inspection and Survey from 1889 to 1897 Dewey played an important part in the construction of the new fleet of armored, steam-propelled steel warships. In 1897, with the backing of Theodore Roosevelt, Dewey was assigned to command the fleet's Asiatic squadron where he subsequently defeated the Spanish. In 1900 he was promoted to admiral of the Navy, and assumed presidency of the General Board of the Navy. He was influential in guiding the enlargement of the fleet. Suffered a stroke shortly before WWI removing him from active duty.



Illustration 2- George Dewey

President William McKinley¹⁰³

Born in Niles, Ohio on 29 January 1843. William McKinley was the 25th President of the United States, serving from March 4, 1897, until his assassination on September 14, 1901, after leading the nation to victory in the Spanish-American War and raising protective tariffs to promote American industry. Attended Allegheny College, and was teaching in a country school when the Civil War broke out. Enlisting as a private in the Union Army, he was mustered out at the end of the war as a brevet major of volunteers. He then studied law, and opened an office in Canton, Ohio. At 34, McKinley won a seat in Congress, serving 14 years in the House. In 1891 he was elected Governor of Ohio, serving two terms. His second term as president came to a tragic end in September 1901. He was standing in a receiving line at the Buffalo Pan-American Exposition when a deranged anarchist shot him twice. He died eight days later.




Illustration 3- William McKinley

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt¹⁰⁴

Born in New York City in 1858. Theodore Roosevelt was the 26th President of the U.S. (1901-1909), following the assassination of President William McKinley. During the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt was lieutenant colonel of the Rough Rider Regiment, which he led on a charge at the battle of San Juan. Roosevelt was elected Governor of New York in 1898. He liked to quote a favorite proverb, "Speak softly and carry a big stick..." As president, Roosevelt ensured the construction of the Panama Canal. His corollary to the Monroe Doctrine prevented the establishment of foreign bases in the Caribbean and arrogated the sole right of intervention in Latin America to the United States. He won the Nobel Peace Prize for mediating the Russo-Japanese War. He left the presidency in 1909. In 1912, while campaigning for a second bid in Milwaukee he was shot in the chest by a fanatic. Roosevelt soon recovered, but his words at that time would have been applicable at the time of his death in 1919: "No man has had a happier life than I have led; a happier life in every way."



Illustration 4- Theodore Roosevelt

Major General Wesley Merritt¹⁰⁵


Jun 16, 1834- Dec 3, 1910. Born in New York City. Merritt was a Union cavalry officer and the commander of VIII Corps in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War in 1898. He graduated from West Point in 1860. At the outbreak of the Civil War Merritt was made aide-de-camp first to Gen Philip St. George Cooke, then to Gen George Stoneman. Still young, Merritt commanded the reserve cavalry during Stoneman's raid in the Chancellorsville campaign. After the Battle of Upperville Merritt received an unusual promotion from captain to brigadier general, prompted by a reorganization of the cavalry wing into a more unified force. Merritt participated in the Battle of Gettysburg and, after taking acting command of 1st Div Cav Corps, he took part in the Overland Campaign of 1864. He was promoted to Maj Gen during the Valley Campaign of 1864. From 1882-1887 he was Superintendent of West Point. He died in 1910 and is now interred there.



Illustration 5- Wesley Merritt

Appendix C


Maps of the Philippines¹⁰⁶



Map 1- The Philippines, Guam, Cuba, and Puerto Rico



Map 2- The Philippine Archipelago



Map 3- The Battle of Manila Bay

Endnotes

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- ⁵ Robert D. Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), 1.
- ⁶ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002), 103.
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- ⁸ Leon Wolff, *Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century's Turn*, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961), 16.
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- ¹⁷ Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902*, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 18. Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines*, 7.
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- ²² Wolff, *Little Brown Brother*, 32. Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines*, 8.
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- ²⁴ Wolff, *Little Brown Brother*, 32-33.
- ²⁵ Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, 103.
- ²⁶ Wolff, *Little Brown Brother*, 35.
- ²⁷ Wolff, *Little Brown Brother*, 35.
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- ³³ Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902*, 20.
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- ³⁵ Wolff, *Little Brown Brother*, 49.
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- ³⁸ Wolff, *Little Brown Brother*, 54.
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- ⁴² Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902*, 21.
- ⁴³ Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607-2012 (Third Ed.)*, (New York: Free Press, 2012), 261.
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- ⁷⁶ Gates, "Indians and Insurrections," 62.
- ⁷⁷ Quesada, *The Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection 1898-1902*, 9. Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, 106.
- ⁷⁸ Gates, "Indians and Insurrections," 62.
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- ⁹⁶ Millett, "Millett's Laws."
- ⁹⁷ Millett, "Millett's Laws."
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Gates, John M, "Indians and Insurrections: The U. S. Army's Experience with Insurgency," *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, March 1983, pp. 59-68.

Gates starts by giving three reasons as to why no doctrine of counterinsurgency emerged from the campaigns of the 19th century. 1) Indian-fighting generation looked at Indian warfare as a fleeting bother, and to develop a special system for it seemed hardly worthwhile. 2) There was a lack of attention on the Army's part to its own history of counter-guerrilla operations. 3) The Army efforts against the Mexicans, Confederates, Indians, and Filipinos took place in such different contexts, and over such a long span of time that whatever common elements might have been present were either too obvious to merit discussion by the officers involved at the time or too hidden from their view to be discerned.

Some discussion as to how the U.S. Army countered guerrillas in the 19th century. Actions became governed by General Order 100 in 1863. Benevolence to the population was initially adopted in the Philippines, and then replaced by harsh retaliation/revenge in reaction to guerrilla activities.

In the end, every officer should ask, in the moral sense, when countering insurgents, what is right, good, and proper?

Gates, John M, "Two American Wars in Asia: Successful Colonial Warfare in The Philippines and Cold War Failure in Vietnam," *War in History*, January 2001, pp. 19-46.

Gates does a comparison of the two counterinsurgencies in Asia the U.S. was involved in, Philippines and Vietnam. He references his book *Schoolbooks and Krag's: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902* extensively. He essentially says the "Civilize 'em with a Krag" approach was a success in the Philippines, and modern technology and the conscript U.S. Army in Vietnam was a failure.

Mark R. Grandstaff, "Preserving the 'Habits and Usages of War': William Tecumseh Sherman, Professional Reform, and the U.S. Army Officer Corps, 1865-1881, Revisited," *The Journal of Military History*, July 1998, pp. 521-546.

Boot, Max, *The Savage Wars of Peace, Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002.

This book is an excellent source of information for U.S. intervention and conflict with respect to small wars. It was a primary source of information regarding the Philippine Insurrection. Thorough historical account of events leading to the insurgency.

Linn, Brian M., "Joint Operations in the Days of Empire", in Donald F. Bittner, ed., *Marine Corps University Perspectives on Warfighting, Volume III: Selected Papers from the 1992 (59th) Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History*.

Linn, Brian M., "We Shall Go Heavily Armed: The Marines Small War on Samar, 1901-1902," (Paper eventually published in *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Ninth Naval History Symposium*, ed. William Roberts (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989).

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Linn, Brian M., "Guerrilla Fighter: Frederick Funston in the Philippines, 1900-1901," *Kansas History*, Spring 1987.

This article examines Funston's career between being Colonel of the Twentieth Kansas in 1899 and the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo in 1901. It brings new perspective to the U.S. Army's experience in the Philippines at that time. He may have been viewed as cruel, and possibly criminal, but especially racist, yet able to pacify the 4th District on Luzon by establishing a well organized intelligence service, rapid response to military offensives, and inclusion of key elements of the population in their own defense.

Linn, Brian McAllister, *The Philippine War 1899-1902*, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000.

This book is Linn's comprehensive work on the Philippine Insurrection. In the preface he states the various naming conventions of the war, and he settled on "The Philippine War." For the purposes of my MMS he offers all of the historical insight needed to relate U.S. entry into that war to the wars of the 21st century.

Millett, Allan R, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, *For the Common Defense, A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012, Third Edition*, New York: Free Press,

2012.

Dr. Millett offers a survey of U.S. military involvement in the training of indigenous security forces in the Philippines and the Caribbean Basin in the 20th century. Given the dramatic increase of these types of efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries, this study provides relevant insights for current military professionals facing the daunting challenges that are inherent to the training and advising of foreign police and military forces.

Millett, Richard L, *Searching for Stability: The U.S. Development of Constabulary Forces in Latin America and the Philippines*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, 2010.

This was an interesting account of the U.S. incorporating indigenous residents of the Philippines to combat local insurgents. It did not provide a thorough background of information required for this study.

Millett, Richard, "Millett's Laws" compiled and edited by Dr. Donald F. Bittner, "Summary of Themes (otherwise self-proclaimed "Millett's Laws")," Annex J of Indian Wars elective, Command and Staff College, U.S. Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Academic Year 2014-2015.

Millett's Laws were extremely useful in comparing the events leading to the Philippines Insurrection to the U.S. wars in the 21st century.

Philippines Country Handbook, U.S. Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program, DOD-2630-PHL-009-02, February 2002.

This small reference handbook is full of useful information pertinent to the prologue of this study. It is a must have for any traveler to the Philippines.

Quesada, Alejandro de, *The Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection 1898-1902*, New York: Osprey Publishing, 2007.

This is a small publication devoted to summarizing the Spanish-American War and the ensuing Philippine Insurrection. Not a lot of detail, primarily utilized as a reference to the timeline of events. More than half the book describes the uniforms and weapons of the various participants of the wars.

Ramsey, Robert D, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007.

The introductory historical account of the events leading to the Philippine Insurrection was a primary source of information for this study. The detailed account of events were pertinent to the thesis and analysis of this paper.

Silbey, David J, *A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902*, New York: Hill and Wang, 2007.

Wolff, Leon, *Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century's Turn*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961.

This book offers great insights to the events leading to the Philippine Insurrection. The most important pieces I gathered were the discussions between Aguinaldo and American diplomats in Hong Kong and Singapore. Promises were made ensuring Philippine independence, of which the U.S. government did not officially endorse. These assurances were reneged, eventually leading to the insurrection in response to American occupation of the Philippines.

Zinni, Tony and Tony Koltz, *Before The First Shots Are Fired, How America Can Win or Lose Off the Battlefield*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014.