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**TITLE:**

Improving Jointness at Marine Corps University: Meeting the Spirit of the Skelton Panel

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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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
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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Title:** Improving Jointness at Marine Corps University: Meeting the Spirit of the Skelton Panel

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**Thesis:** Legislation and military policy inhibit Joint Professional Military Education institutions' ability to acculturate Jointness fully, but Marine Corps University has a spectrum of options with which it can increase the inculcation of Jointness for its students.

**Discussion:** The 1989 report from the House Armed Services Committee Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress, also known as the Skelton Panel, provided the Department of Defense with the blueprints for a comprehensive Joint Professional Military Education system designed to achieve Jointness across the force in order to meet the requirements of the *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for Joint Professional Military Education, which is governed by the *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provides supervision, but much of the education process is administered by the military services. The primary purpose of Joint Professional Military Education is to acculturate military officers with Jointness, an elusive term that this study will seek to define. Intermediate-Level Education provides officers the first formal opportunity to inculcate Jointness in an educational environment. Each military service provides Intermediate-Level Education through organic resident and distance education institutions. This study analyzes the Marine Corps' ability to inculcate Jointness through the resident and distance Intermediate-Level Education institutions within Marine Corps University. Most criticism for Joint Professional Military Education addresses management of Joint officers and Joint duty assignments. This study does not address manpower management issues. Instead, it seeks to identify steps that can be taken within Marine Corps University to address shortfalls for inculcating Jointness.

**Conclusion:** Policy and legislation have diluted the Skelton Panel's vision of Joint Professional Military Education and Jointness. While the Marine Corps is meeting Department of Defense policy, it should exploit opportunities to implement a spectrum of changes organic to Marine Corps University in order to increase its ability to acculturate Jointness in Marine Corps officers.

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## **PREFACE**

I am convinced that life-long education is critical to the military profession, and I believe that the Marine Corps attempts to provide its officers with professional education opportunities. However, I also believe that the Marine Corps can improve the professional military education that it provides. I have experienced resident education at the career and intermediate levels, and I have found myself wanting more out of the experiences. Consequently, I have attempted to provide recommended solutions for enhancing PME at both the career and intermediate levels. I hope that my perspective and insights contribute to improving PME within the Marine Corps. I am truly humbled by this experience and the amazing individuals who serve in the United States' military.

This study represents a journey, and many people guided me along the way. I owe a debt of gratitude to my friends and family for their love and support. I would like to thank my fellow officers who provided me with their insight and encouragement. These officers are too many to thank individually, but they represent the heart and soul of our Joint Force. I would also like to thank my mentor, Dr. Bradford Wineman, for his patience and motivation. Countless staff members of Marine Corps Command and Staff College, the Command and Staff College Distance Education Program, College of Naval Command and Staff, Command and General Staff College, and Air Command and Staff College provided me with the critical information and insights needed to complete this project. The Deputy J7 Staff was also a valuable source of information and guidance.

## INTRODUCTION

Samuel P. Huntington introduces his book, *The Soldier and the State*, by describing the characteristics that define a professional. With this basis, he asserts that military officers are professionals due to the nature of their service.<sup>1</sup> Huntington writes that expertise is the first pillar of a profession, which requires “prolonged education and experience” and the educational institutions needed to impart “professional knowledge and skill.”<sup>2</sup> Continuous training and education of military professionals has been a hallmark of successful armed forces, and nations that desire formidable military power invest in training their military personnel, particularly those in the officer corps.

Professional Military Education (PME) is not a new concept, and the current military educational construct in the United States traces its roots to the Prussian *Kriegsakademie* and the French *École d’Application d’État Major*.<sup>3</sup> Despite suspicions and reservations of a standing army, George Washington and John Adams prioritized and championed military training and education because they understood the need to have professionally trained officers.<sup>4</sup> Modern PME continues to evolve from its basic origins in order to meet immediate demands and projected future requirements. However, implementation of an educational vision for the future officer requirements does not always yield the desired results.

The United States decided to focus on developing Joint military capabilities in order to maximize efficacy and efficiency nearly 30 years ago. Political and military leadership rallied to develop a Joint military construct, and the education system needed to achieve this Joint vision. Congress codified its commitment to a Joint military enterprise by passing into law the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, known simply as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA). Civilian and military leadership use the GNA as the foundation

upon which the current Joint force system rests. The success of this system depends on the quality of the personnel, which is why GNA identified Joint Officer Personnel Policy as one of the many areas designated for improvement.<sup>5</sup> Title IV of GNA specifically addresses Joint Officer Personnel Policy, including management, promotion, assignments, and education.<sup>6</sup>

In order to formalize Joint officer education, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) appointed Congressman Ike Skelton as Chairman for the Professional Military Education Panel (Skelton Panel) one year after Goldwater-Nichols became law.<sup>7</sup> The Skelton Panel deliberated for nearly two years about the best course for Joint military education. Readers of the Skelton Panel Report cannot miss the pervasiveness of the word “Jointness” throughout the document. Jointness literally means, “the quality or state of being common to two or more persons,” but neither Congress nor the military provide an official definition for the term.<sup>8</sup> “Jointness” appears 25 times throughout the document when describing the competence and mentality of the ideal military officer understanding and serving within the new Joint military construct.

Officers imbued with Jointness, as described by the Skelton Panel, provide harmony to the complex operational and strategic levels of war in which the services must synchronize their efforts. Congress published the Skelton Panel Report in 1989, and as the 26<sup>th</sup> anniversary approaches this April, the progress and efficacy of Joint education deserves reflection. Joint PME (JPME) receives constant assessment and updates from civilian oversight, military supervision, institutional introspection, and student critique. Each of these groups seeks to improve the education process in order to provide officers with the skills necessary to protect the country’s security.

The United States has achieved much success in pursuit of the Joint education goal, but JPME has become more committed to the process than the product, the product being a military officer of any Branch trained and educated in true Jointness. The current JPME system allows the majority of officers to receive credit for initial Joint education through a distance learning option despite the original intent that students receive JPME at resident institutions. The current execution of JPME through distance does not achieve the level of Jointness envisioned by crafters of the system. Non-resident JPME cannot compare to resident JPME as it fails to achieve Jointness due to a lack of diversity in the student body and faculty, restricts Joint concepts to a purely academic level, and prohibits the acculturation needed to create a Joint-minded officer.

Furthermore, resident institutions are not fully leveraging all available options to maximize the results of JPME. Students are best served when inculcated into a state of Jointness by JPME, and resident JPME meets the proverbial letter of the law, but not the spirit. The current Marine Corps PME system meets the basic educational requirements of creating Joint-minded officers, but it does not truly inculcate Jointness as articulated in the Skelton Panel Report - the blueprint of the JPME system, though there is greater potential to do so. Legislation and military policy inhibit JPME institutions' ability to acculturate Jointness fully, but Marine Corps University has a spectrum of options with which it can increase the inculcation of Jointness for its students.

Intermediate-Level Education (ILE) focuses on the Theater Level of War and Operational Art.<sup>9</sup> Service members operating in a Joint environment must understand Operational Art and be competent at the Theater level.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, leadership must assess the efficacy of ILE to prepare military leaders to succeed in the Joint environment. As America's crisis response force, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) must be prepared to be the first on the scene regardless of

the mission. Unconventional warfare, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) operations have become primary tasks and are predicted to dominate the USMC mission sets in the future.<sup>11</sup> Operations in support of these types of missions involve, and will expand the need for, Joint operations. Accordingly, the USMC must ensure that it provides the best Joint education possible to its leaders via its organic ILE at Marine Corps University (MCU).

JPME is a complex topic that requires significant understanding. Accordingly, a substantial portion of this study seeks to properly frame the problem. The rest of the study represents course of action development to identify options to improve JPME Phase I at MCU. This study focuses on MCU because 89 percent of all Marine officers are educated through this institution. MCU faces many challenges that are largely outside of its span of control, such as the number of students and faculty from the other services and the specific goals of other ILE institutions. Solving these external challenges deserves attention, but this study limits its scope to the solutions most immediately available to MCU – solutions within its immediate span of control. The reader is encouraged to keep this limited scope in mind when assessing the content of this study.

## **ORIGINS AND POLICY**

The United States experienced several wartime and peacetime failures in the decades following World War II. These failures inspired civilian and military leadership's determination to improve the nation's security apparatus, namely through the GNA.<sup>12</sup> One of the primary goals of the GNA was to enable the different services to coordinate and collaborate cohesively on the battlefield in order to achieve unity of effort and overwhelming superiority.<sup>13</sup> The overall purpose of the GNA was to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department of

Defense (DoD), and Joint Officer Personnel Policy was one of the many areas designated for improvement.<sup>14</sup> Title IV of the GNA addresses Joint Officer Policy including management, promotion, assignments, and education.<sup>15</sup> Under this legislation, National Defense University (NDU) remained the center of Joint education, but GNA directed that all service specific PME institutions expand their curricula to include “Joint matters... [and preparation] for Joint duty assignments.”<sup>16</sup> Expanding Joint education beyond NDU was a critical step towards achieving the Joint force envisioned by the GNA, and Congress astutely chose to establish rules and standards for JPME in order to ensure unity of effort and consistency between all PME institutions.

The HASC appointed Skelton Panel began its mission to define the future of JPME on 13 November 1987 and published its report on 21 April 1989.<sup>17</sup> The Skelton Panel’s purpose was to “review...plans for implementing the Joint Professional Military Education requirements of the [GNA] with a view toward assuring that this education provides the proper linkage between the Service competent officer and the competent Joint officer.”<sup>18</sup> The panel report delineates the structure and format of JPME in order to meet the intent of the GNA. The report is the genesis of the current JPME Phase I and II system with emphasis on service PME, student/faculty ratios, and student/faculty quality.

Congress, via the Skelton Panel Report, provided guidance about JPME, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are the responsible authority for planning, execution, and supervision of the education process. The JCS codifies this responsibility in the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), which provides the “policies, procedures, objectives, and responsibilities for officer [PME] and [JPME].”<sup>19</sup> The OPMEP establishes Joint Learning Areas and Objectives for all JPME institutions to ensure JPME curriculum is consistent across the

different schools.<sup>20</sup> The OPMEP outlines how the JCS will accomplish its statutory responsibility for JPME through the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), which “serves three purposes: oversight, assessment, and improvement.”<sup>21</sup>

PAJE uses a peer review process to provide accreditation including a review at least every six years to reaffirm accreditation.<sup>22</sup> PAJE teams assess JPME Phase I using common educational standards and Joint learning areas in order to ensure consistency across all educational institutions. The OPMEP outlines seven common educational standards that apply across the spectrum of Joint education. The Joint learning areas differ depending on the level of education and the type of institution. The OPMEP provides six Joint learning areas for service ILE, which provides JPME Phase I. Tables A-1 and A-2 of Appendix A list the educational standards and service ILE Joint learning areas.

The current JPME system has evolved over the course of this nation’s history. The system has European influence from Prussian *Kriegsakademie* and the French *École d’Application d’État Major*, but it also developed a unique American identity as the nation’s leaders adapted the military to meet the United States ascendance into a global power. The national military construct changed significantly due to the GNA and the preceding military failures, and JPME adapted to meet the new requirements. While Goldwater-Nichols provided the infrastructure to enable the Joint construct, the Skelton Panel defined what it meant to be a professional officer within this Joint force. The Skelton Panel Report established the blueprint and yardstick by which the JCS and services would construct and measure the future JPME system. Today, the OPMEP provides the regulating policy that drives the planning and execution of JPME across the DoD. The nation’s military leaders pass through this system for a singular purpose – to achieve Jointness.

## JOINTNESS

The terms “Jointness” and “Joint culture” are pervasive throughout the Skelton Panel Report, the OPMEP, and studies regarding Joint education. The two terms have the same meanings essentially, and this paper primarily uses the term Jointness for simplicity. Jointness connotes different concepts to different individuals depending on their experience of and exposure to other services. Unfortunately, neither the Skelton Panel Report nor the OPMEP explicitly defines Jointness. The Joint Chiefs of Staff published *Joint Vision 2020* in 2000 and, therein, described a desire for leaders who “understand each [Service’s] capabilities and constraints” in order to “overcome the barriers of organizational culture and differing priorities” and “appreciate the full range of Service capabilities available to them.”<sup>23</sup> General Peter Pace described “the integration of diverse Service cultures and approaches” as the method for enabling Jointness in his 2005 *Vision for Joint Officer Development* when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).<sup>24</sup>

Contributors to professional journals such as *Armed Forces Journal*, *Joint Force Quarterly*, and *Parameters* provide their own definitions. One writer asserts that Jointness “is an attitude that strives for a unified approach by the Services to meet the ends of more effectiveness, economy, and efficiency.”<sup>25</sup> An Army colonel writes, “Jointness is *understanding* broadly what your fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines bring to the battle and *trusting* them to do it right and well – and their feeling the same about you.... the essence of Jointness is understanding and trust.”[emphasis in original]<sup>26</sup> A former CJCS addresses Jointness by describing the attributes required of a leader in the Joint force. He writes, “These leaders must be well-grounded in the capabilities and doctrines of their respective Services. They must also be well-

versed in Joint operations, melding the right mix of Service capabilities to fit the environment in which they will operate.”<sup>27</sup>

JPME students have also wrestled with defining Jointness. An Army War College (AWC) student proclaims, “Jointness is the ability for DoD to do the right thing with the right assets at the right time in the right place seamlessly and without regard to historic norms or Service bias.”<sup>28</sup> Another AWC student asserts that, “the appropriate level of Jointness is that which fosters cooperation among the Services while providing a range of options to the warfighter, permits the selection of the best available option, regardless of Service origin, to produce the desired result in the most efficient manner.”<sup>29</sup> The ideas expressed by these individuals clearly illustrate the common threads between military leaders, scholars, and students’ concepts of Jointness.

Both GNA and the Skelton Panel Report serve as the source of these common threads. The term Jointness may not appear in *Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary for Military and Associated Terms*, but the Skelton Panel Report provides the necessary language. For the purposes of this paper, Jointness is the mindset achieved by an individual who possesses Service and Branch expertise with acculturation providing “deep understanding, broad knowledge, and keen appreciation of the integrated employment and support of all services’ capabilities in the pursuit of national objectives.”<sup>30</sup> Jointness is not about interoperability; it is about acculturation. Inculcating Jointness is the pinnacle achievement for military personnel in the GNA Joint construct.

## **JPME IN A PERFECT WORLD**

The Skelton Panel set high expectations for JPME, and the Services have pursued the panel's recommendations admirably. Much has changed since the panel published its report in 1989, but the Panel's concepts regarding JPME are enduring. The primacy of Service expertise is an essential element of JPME. Officers must master their Branch and Service specialties in order to be effective in a Joint environment. The primacy of each Service receives consistent support beyond the Skelton Panel's assertions. In 1997, a former Deputy Director of the Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) proclaimed, "Proficiency in one's own service capabilities is the *sine qua non* of jointness. Without it there can be not trust or understanding. Trust and understanding are derived from service competence. That is the *only* foundation of which genuine jointness can be built." [emphasis in original]<sup>31</sup> A decade later, a student wrote, "Service expertise and currency is the foundation upon which Joint acculturation must be built."<sup>32</sup> The service perspective undergirds the Joint enterprise.

JPME builds upon the service expertise and occurs across the duration of an officer's career from initial Joint familiarization to Joint operations and support and culminating with national-level concerns.<sup>33</sup> The first formal JPME is Phase I, which occurs at the intermediate level.<sup>34</sup> The Skelton Panel described the intermediate level as the place "where substantial joint professional education begins."<sup>35</sup> Service intermediate schools are responsible for teaching JPME Phase I, which is the focus of this paper. JPME Phase II occurs at senior-level education (SLE) either from the service war colleges, the National War College (NWC), Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy [formerly known as the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)], or the Joint Force Staff College (JFSC). The

third, and final, phase of JPME is CAPSTONE.<sup>36</sup> This last phase is for general and flag officers.<sup>37</sup> These three phases represent the formal part of the officer's JPME continuum.

Both the Skelton Panel and OPMEP clearly define the expectations for JPME Phase I. The service perspective of the host institution dominates this phase with focus as the service headquarters or a service component of a unified command.<sup>38</sup> The service-dominated outlook does not contradict the nature of Joint education because service mastery is essential to Joint efficacy. The panel's description of the Phase I curricula illustrates the panel's full intent. Students should learn the "capabilities and limitations, doctrine, organizational concepts, and command and control of forces of all services; joint planning processes and systems; and the role of service component commands as part of a unified command."<sup>39</sup> The Skelton Panel's vision fully incorporates the GNA concept of a Joint force and sets JPME on course to develop the officers required to staff and lead the Joint military establishment.

Congress's vision would remain just that, a vision, without full implementation by the JCS, which has the responsibility for implementing JPME throughout the DoD. The JCS sets policy for the military to comply with the Skelton Panel's recommendations through the OPMEP, which describes JPME Phase I as "joint operations from the standpoint of Service forces in a joint force supported by Service component commands."<sup>40</sup> The policy clearly maintains the idea that JPME Phase I retains the service-oriented perspective. The OPMEP also describes the curricula in terms similar to the Skelton Panel. Officers must learn how to deploy and employ Joint forces to include doctrine, planning, support and command and control of these forces at the tactical and operational levels.<sup>41</sup> The current OPMEP was updated in 2011, but its language is clearly influenced by the Skelton Panel. The persistence of the JPME vision for the

22 years spanning the Skelton Panel and the current OPMEP is a testament to the breadth and depth of the panel's analysis and recommendations.

The OPMEP serves as the how-to guide for JPME. The Skelton Panel Report and the OPMEP identify specific, but different, ratios for student and faculty diversity designed to achieve Jointness. The Skelton Panel ratios are more aggressive while the OPMEP ratios are more conservative, which is a byproduct of the challenges inherent in personnel management. The ideal student mix at a service school, according to the Skelton Panel, is for each seminar group to have at least two, but preferably three, non-host Department students.<sup>42</sup> A Marine Corps Command and Staff College (MCCSC) seminar should contain at least two soldiers and two airmen, preferably three each, using the Skelton Panel's guidance.<sup>43</sup> The OPMEP sets a less aggressive requirement of only one non-host service student per seminar. The important point is that each service should be represented in each seminar. Acculturation does not occur in homogenous groups.

Faculty diversity requirements also diverge between the Skelton Panel and the OPMEP. Skelton envisioned the host service providing no more than 70 percent of the faculty, with the other two departments providing 15 percent each.<sup>44</sup> The OPMEP lowers the bar significantly requiring five percent from each of the non-host departments.<sup>45</sup> Diverse faculty serves two purposes: expose students to senior officers from other services and provide senior officers with experience leading members of other services.

In summary, the ideal JPME environment is one in which a diverse student body is taught by a diverse faculty in operational art and the theater level of war at a resident institution. Students and faculty alike embark on an educational journey that breaks down ignorance and bias as well as enhances operational proficiency. Graduates should leave school ready to staff

and eventually lead the Joint force. They have been acculturated to the needs of a Joint force and they should view military operations through the lens of Jointness. Once officers have completed JPME, they will be prepared to serve the Joint force.

### **JPME IN REALITY**

The Skelton Panel made recommendations for the ideal JPME system, but changing attitudes and resource constraints shaped the current system into something recognizable as described by the Skelton Panel, but not the same. JPME strives to educate military officers in order to provide the ideal leadership for the nation's future security, but such an ideal has been difficult to attain due to two critical factors. First, personnel management at the service level approaches JPME as a matter of convenience rather than preparing an officer to succeed on the Joint assignment. Second, policy has reduced student and faculty mixes for JPME I, which dilutes the potency of the Skelton Panel's recommendations.

The most prolific complaint about the Joint education is that the services send students to JPME when it is most convenient not when it is most necessary or beneficial. JPME Phase II student data highlights this complaint; approximately 60 percent of students attend the Phase II during or *after* their Joint duty assignment and only 20 percent have completed JPME Phase I prior to their initial Joint assignment.<sup>46</sup> JPME Phase II is beyond the scope of this analysis, but the causal effects of the personnel management process make the efficacy of JPME Phase I even more important. Without JPME Phase II, the 20 percent of officers who complete Phase I must be able to rely on their knowledge and experience from the more service-oriented JPME Phase I in order to succeed in their Joint duty assignments.

JPME Phase I is the natural foundation of JPME. Students are introduced to Joint doctrine and begin the Joint cross-pollination process with limited exposure and interaction with

their minimally represented service counterparts. By defining the appropriate Joint student and faculty ratios, the Skelton Panel recognized and addressed the concept of service diversity, which remains today. General Peter Pace, former CJCS, echoed the panel when he published his *Vision for Joint Officer Development*, in which he wrote, “Joint acculturation, now achieved through policy-mandated student and faculty mixes by military department, remains an integral aspect of JPME.”<sup>47</sup> A later CJCS, General Martin Dempsey, directed in 2012 that JPME should “enable jointness through the integration of diverse service cultures and approaches.”<sup>48</sup> Both military and civilian leadership agree that diverse student and faculty bodies are an essential element to achieving Jointness.

The Skelton Panel envisioned that officers will develop and nurture Jointness over their career, but the language in the report clearly expresses the panel’s belief that this process builds upon the foundation of intermediate education. The core element to this foundation is experience gained through the curriculum and the student and faculty diversity. The panel believed that the appropriate faculty mix existed when at least 30 percent of the military faculty is from the non-host Departments. The OPMEP policy of only 10 percent from the non-host departments is grossly under this minimum definition and represents a 67 percent reduction in overall diversity. The degradation of the faculty ratio standard combined with the OPMEP reduction in student diversity significantly inhibits achieving the acculturation goal.

The preferred student mix is three from each of the non-host departments, but the minimum required mix is two per non-host department. The OPMEP requirement for only one student from each of the non-host Departments represent a 67 percent and 50 percent degradation from Skelton’s ideal and minimum respectively. The JCS decision to lower the non-host student mix to one is very curious, especially when viewed through the stated CJCS intent, because the

Skelton Panel directly addresses this issue as a significant challenge to Jointness. The panel observed that Joint discussion, consideration, and understanding was hampered or subsumed by the host service when only one student represented the other Departments.<sup>49</sup> A single student is not only a single representative for his or her service but also a representative of only one branch within the service.<sup>50</sup> The result is that the host service students experience a branch specific perspective vice offering a service-wide perspective.

The student and faculty diversity challenges experienced in resident education certainly miss the mark in relation to the Skelton Panel's recommendations. The complete lack of any diversity requirements for distance education is a more troublesome issue.<sup>51</sup> Acculturation relies on exposure to and understanding of other groups. Non-resident students from the host service do not have the same opportunity as resident students to interact and collaborate with students from the other departments. The 2005 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provided the opportunity for services to award JPME Phase I via distance learning. Prior law required resident education for JPME, but this language was removed for JPME Phase I in the 2005 NDAA.<sup>52</sup> The current OPMEP does not require any student or faculty diversity for non-resident JPME Phase I. This lack of diversity, recognized as a critical requirement, means that non-resident student acculturation will not have the developmental conditions needed to inculcate Jointness. Based on the definition of Jointness and the assertions of civilian and military leadership, pretending that acculturation, or Jointness, is even possible via distance learning is absurd.

The non-resident solution to real-world challenges is understandable, but it may have long-lasting impacts on the officer corps. Over the last five years, the majority of officers, 73 percent, received JPME Phase I credit through distance ILE that cannot provide the exposure to officers from other services or experience working with them (see Appendix B).<sup>53</sup> ILE is the

initial acculturation process, but the vast majority of officers do not have this opportunity because non-resident education is their only option. The geographic dispersion and service isolation of non-resident ILE students further restricts the acculturation process because of the variations in the distance education frameworks.

The OPMEP recognizes three formats for conducting distance education. The first approach is via satellite seminar. Adjunct faculty teach these classes at military installations usually, and the format mirrors resident education closely.<sup>54</sup> Most military installations are service specific and usually are not adjacent to other services' installations, resulting in nearly homogenous student and faculty bodies. Distance learning, the second approach, is a learning environment in which students and faculty are separated by time or distance, and learning is accomplished via print and online material with technology-based interaction that may or may not be in real time.<sup>55</sup> Distance learning is the most fragmented and individualistic approach because students and faculty only interact minimally through online discussion boards. Blended learning is the last approach and combines resident and seminar formats.<sup>56</sup> The resident period(s) provides the exposure benefits while the seminar period(s) provides the flexibility for primary occupational requirements.

Joint acculturation is impossible through distance education regardless of the education format. The lack of representation across all services between the students and faculty inhibits true acculturation because "none of the learning objectives can be fully understood collectively as a [DoD] organization despite the false appearance of understanding through rote memorization of template procedures and processes provided at the service schools."<sup>57</sup> Furthermore, distance education can compliment but not replicate or replace resident education.<sup>58</sup> Joint curricula and theory are the same whether provided via resident or distance

education, but “[the] acculturation process is one of the most important functions of the joint education process.”<sup>59</sup> True Jointness, as intended by both the Skelton Panel and the JCS, does not develop from familiarization with Joint publications; it only develops from the persistent interaction of a diverse body of service members.

Reality often impedes achieving the ideal. The Skelton Panel recommendations provide a roadmap to the ideal. Subsequent NDAAs and the OPMEP have charted the course given the actual resources available. These challenges affect each service, and the services seek to mitigate their limitations in unique ways. Improvement is continuous, and the men and women of the DoD prove their resiliency, adaptability, and competence daily. Military personnel are the nation’s most important security asset, and their education must remain a priority.

### **JPME IN THE MARINE CORPS**

Marine Corps University (MCU) leads the Marines Corps’ PME system. MCCSC and Command and Staff College Distance Education Program (CSCDEP) serve as the resident and distance ILE institutions respectively for the Marine Corps. The mission statements of MCU and MCCSC are:

*The mission of Marine Corps University is to develop, deliver, and evaluate professional military education and training through resident and nonresident programs to prepare leaders to meet the challenges of the national security environment. Preserve, promote, and display the history and heritage of the Marine Corps. [emphasis in original]<sup>60</sup>*

*The Marine Corps Command and staff College provides graduate level education and training in order to develop critical thinkers, innovative problem solvers, and ethical leaders who will serve as commanders and staff officers in service, joint, interagency, and multinational organizations confronting complex and uncertain security environments. [emphasis in original]<sup>61</sup>*

These mission statements represent the result of the Marine Corps’ journey to improve its PME construct.

The 1989 Skelton Panel Report offered significant critique for the Marine Corps PME system. The Panel described the curriculum as narrow in scope and focus, student and faculty attitudes about the school as ambivalent, and the overall education as inferior to the other services' schools.<sup>62</sup> The Marine Corps responded to the Skelton Panel Report by creating MCU and dedicating resources to improve military education.<sup>63</sup> Two decades later, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the HASC praised the Marine Corps for its curriculum review, student preparedness, seminar efficacy, and Exercise NINE INNINGS.<sup>64</sup> The recent PAJE results demonstrate that the Marine Corps is meeting or exceeding basic expectations regarding JPME.

The resident and non-resident courses received initial JPME Phase I accreditation in 1989 and 1994 respectively, and both courses have maintained accreditation without interruption.<sup>65</sup> MCCSC and CSCDEP completed the PAJE review process in September 2014. The PAJE team recommended that both schools receive JPME Phase I Reaffirmation of Accreditation from the CJCS.<sup>66</sup> MCCSC met all seven of the Common Educational Standards (CES) and five of the six Joint Learning Areas (JLA); MCCSC only partially met the Joint Planning and Execution Processes JLA.<sup>67</sup> CSCDEP met six of the seven CESs and all six JLAs; CSCDEP only partially met the Provide Institutional Resources to Support the Educational Process CES.<sup>68</sup> The CSCDEP deficiency is one of access to research material that does not directly affect Jointness, but the MCCSC discrepancy stems from a lack of emphasis on the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP).<sup>69</sup> The PAJE results illustrate the superficiality of the JPME accreditation, but they also demonstrate that MCU has continued to improve its JPME Phase I education.

MCCSC is complying with the OPMEP faculty policy of five percent of instructors from each non-host departments. The breakdown for academic year 2015 is as follows: 66.7 percent USMC, 14.3 percent USN, 9.5 percent USAF, and 9.5 percent USA.<sup>70</sup> The school is also

following the OPMEP with regard to the student mix of at least one per seminar group from the non-host departments. The five-year average number of students by service is as follows: 112 USMC, 21 USN, 20 USA, and 16 USAF.<sup>71</sup> The student and faculty numbers certainly meet the OPMEP requirements, but they still fall short of the Skelton Panel's preferred and minimal recommendations. CSCDEP is in full compliance with the OPMEP because there are no student and faculty mix requirements. The complete lack of diversity for distance education explicitly contradicts everything the Skelton Panel described as necessary for inculcating Jointness.

The JPME center of gravity is student diversity. Students spend the entire academic year in one conference group. MCCSC hosts monthly social events centered on coffee and snacks, but these 15 to 30-min events do not encourage or truly permit interaction among the student and faculty bodies. The five-week elective period offers another opportunity for diverse student interaction, but there are no formal mechanisms to ensure a diverse mix within each elective group. Many of these electives do not cover subjects that inspire Joint acculturation. The only other opportunity for diverse student and faculty interaction comes at the very end of the academic year with two exercises, TROPIC THUNDER and NINE INNINGS. The bonds built in a conference group are strong, but the extremely limited diversity experienced by only one service representative severely limits acculturation.

CSCDEP represents a different challenge entirely. The OPMEP makes no requirements for faculty or student diversity for distance education. Consequently, 80 percent of Marine Corps officers receive JPME Phase I credit without ever experiencing even the slightest exposure to actual Jointness.<sup>72</sup> CSCDEP is teaching PME and JMPE curricula, but Jointness remains impossible as long as there are no requirements for diverse student and faculty interaction. The 2005 NDAA made it possible for services to grant JPME Phase I, but the OPMEP never enacted

the appropriate standards to ensure that Jointness is possible in the distance learning environment.

What matters most is whether the USMC is meeting Service specific personnel needs for Joint assignments. The number of Joint billets that the USMC is required to staff each year fluctuates, but the five-year average is 269.<sup>73</sup> Per table B-1, an annual average of 171 USMC officers receive JPME Phase I credit through resident ILE, which means the Marine Corps falls short by 98 resident students. Distance ILE produces 681 JPME Phase I students, but this number far exceeds the Marine Corps' requirements.<sup>74</sup> As argued earlier, the distance students have not experienced Jointness in their educational setting, and their JPME Phase I qualification severely dilutes the qualification of the resident students.

Additionally, there is no need to grant JPME Phase I to non-resident students. The 2007 NDAA removed the requirement for officers to have JPME Phase I before serving in a Joint billet. JPME Phase I equivalency should be removed from distance education to preserve the integrity of JPME for two main reasons: distance education cannot produce Jointness and there is no legal requirement to fill Joint billets with JPME certified officers. The continued awarding of JPME Phase I via distance learning has become merely a method to expand promotion opportunities rather than to prepare an officer to excel in a Joint assignment through a solid understanding of Jointness.

These 681 officers will continue to attend distance ILE because of individual PME requirements within the Marine Corps. The Joint curriculum should remain, but MCU should not equate distance learning and resident education when calculating the results of PME. The OPMEP created the resident and distant double standard, but the Marine Corps does not have to lower its standards. A variety of alternatives exist to address the Jointness issue, and the Marine

Corps should pursue equally high standards for Joint education as it does for warfighting and physical fitness.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The difference between the ideal JPME and the one that exists illustrates the impact of real-world limitations and the changing focus of civilian and military leadership. Closing this gap requires system-wide changes. The spectrum of possible changes range from minor tweaks at intermediate-level institutions to DoD-wide overhaul of the JPME process. The latter option is not practical in the near term. Instead, the Marine Corps has many opportunities to improve ILE within MCU that will result in significant improvement of JPME Phase I.

Distance learning will never achieve Jointness without resolving student and faculty mixes. CSCDEP's blended learning seminar is a step in the right direction. The blended seminar will never be as effective as MCCSC because of the limited duration of face-to-face interaction, but the program provides students with an opportunity for brief exposure to a diverse student population from different services.<sup>75</sup> Expanding the program will allow a larger percentage of the 681 non-resident students to experience a small lever of Joint acculturation. However, the blended learning seminar needs to increase its non-host service representation since the current student mix does not come close to the minimal standards required for resident education per the OPMEP.

The hardline approach of removing JPME Phase I from distance education could negatively affect some high quality officers whose career path prevents them from attending resident education. This challenge requires a solution involving manpower management, ILE throughput, or both. Accommodating these outliers should not be the sole reason for lowering JPME Phase I requirements for distance education. If a top performer misses resident ILE,

manpower management should ensure they attend a single-phase program or a service SLE institution to make up for the lack of JPME Phase I. Manpower Management also has the option to give officers orders to JFSC en route to a Joint assignment if necessary. Ultimately, the 2007 NDAA removed the requirement for officers to complete JPME I before filling a Joint billet. Without this requirement, there is no reason that the services need to generate, speciously, so many JPME I qualified officers via distance learning.

CSCDEP has little control and capacity to effectively address acculturation through distance learning, but MCU has several options for increasing Jointness within the resident program. Increasing the opportunity for more diverse student interaction provides an immediate impact. Currently, MCCSC students spend the entire academic year with one conference group, and single non-host service representation significantly inhibits a full understanding of the represented services. This would not be as much of a problem if the student mix followed the Skelton Panel's recommendations, but the OPMEP allows for very minimal diversity.

Ideally, MCCSC would coordinate with the other services to increase the non-host student and instructor numbers, but this recommendation has several second and third order effects. The school would need space to accommodate more conference groups and the military and civilian faculty to support them. Another option exists that is within MCU's span of control. Shuffling the conference groups for second semester will allow for broader exposure to a more diverse population of the DoD, which will increase Jointness.<sup>76</sup> This change will result in discomfort for both students and faculty, but the increased acculturation is worth this minor interruption to the status quo.

MCCSC can also expand the operational exercises to include multiple conference groups. Students complete all exercises with their conference groups for the majority of the academic

year. The final two exercises, TROPIC THUNDER and NINE INNINGS, expand student interactions beyond the confines of their normal conference groups by pairing students with those from different conference groups. Instead, the school should start this interaction expansion earlier with exercises PACIFIC CHALLENGE III and PACIFIC CHALLENGE IV. Reducing the redundant staff constructs for each conference group will allow for deeper staff billets and diverse interaction. Deeper staff billets will increase the level of detail and improve the overall planning effort because the exercises will require more student interaction. The increased exposure of a more diverse student body, beyond the limited mix available in a single conference group, is a boon for Jointness. Both PME and JPME improve with this change.

MCCSC can also coordinate with the School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) and MCWAR. The purpose of this coordination would be to incorporate SAW and MCWAR students into the MCCSC exercises. This recommendation poses significant challenges due to the different missions and schedules of these schools, but the benefit is worth the effort. The expanded population of exercise participants increases the diversity, and the SAW and MCWAR students can mentor the MCCSC students during the exercises. The whole purpose of JPME is to foster “as much interaction ‘as possible’ between officers of all services and ranks in order to develop, foster and enhance jointness – joint culture.”<sup>77</sup> The addition of MCWAR students in the planning exercises increases the number of senior officers available to fill joint task force billets, which provides more opportunities for mentoring from a diverse pool of senior officers.<sup>78</sup> This recommendation benefits all students involved, not just MCCSC students.

The final recommendation is the most aggressive and complicated. This recommendation is beyond MCU’s span of control, but not beyond its span of influence. Concluding the academic year with a collaborative and Joint planning exercise between each service’s ILE would

represent the pinnacle of Jointness. This idea is not without precedence. In 2006, the CGSC, CNCS, and ACSC conducted a Joint exercise as a proof of concept, and CGSC and ACSC conducted Joint exercises in 2007 and 2008.<sup>79</sup> The Marine Corps' absence is conspicuous and telling.

This recommendation presents significant challenges to include the administrative coordination for planning given the different academic schedules, the logistics for exchanging liaisons, and the connectivity mechanisms. These challenges are neither minor nor insurmountable and are indicative of the very same challenges that students will face when working in a Joint environment. The coordination and collaboration needed to plan this kind of exercise mirrors the level of complexity needed to plan and execute as a Joint task force. MCU should embrace this challenge because of the very real education and Joint acculturation it provides the students. Leveraging the J7 is crucial to success in this endeavor. Regardless of difficulty, achieving a truly Joint planning exercise across all ILE institutions represents a faithful commitment to the Joint force construct and provides more than lip-service to a very real and required ideal.

## **CONCLUSION**

The Marine Corps is the nation's crisis response force, and both current and future operations are and will be executed with an increasingly Joint and even combined force. As the nation's expeditionary force, the Marine Corps expects to be a central element in Joint operations. A dominant majority of Marine officers, 89 percent, receive JPME Phase I from MCU. Therefore, it is critical for USMC ILE to provide the best Joint education and acculturation possible. The nation's security depends on it.

MCCSC is meeting its JPME Phase I requirements, as prescribed by the OPMEP, given the throughput and personnel management limitations. The recent PAJE assessment identified only minimal issues. However, opportunities exist to enhance student experiences. Marines are taught very early in their training a basic but important element of military tactics: always improve your position. This simple statement carries a broader scope when applied to the concept of applying military power in support of the nation. Whether used tactically or strategically, the phrase, “always improve your position,” serves as a mantra to professionals in the military. MCCSC is doing what is required and beyond, and it should strive to improve its ability to educate its students and acculturate Jointness.

The Joint construct envisioned by GNA relies on organizational and personnel strengths to cohesively and effectively apply the nation’s military power in order to secure national security interests. People, not technology, power this effort, and education provides military officers with the tools needed to successfully staff and lead the Joint force. As Huntington points out, professionalism is a characteristic required by military officers. Professional officers should be developed through education and experience. The GNA made Jointness an integral aspect of the military profession, and Marine officers will continually operate in the Joint environment. MCU should seize and maximize the opportunities within its span of control to increase its ability to inculcate Jointness. Effective JPME Phase I is critical for officer development, and it provides a crucial foundation for the Joint force construct. The power of the military is its people, and the power of the people is their education.

**APPENDIX A**

**JPME PHASE I STANDARDS**

Common Educational Standards <sup>80</sup>	
1	Develop Joint Awareness, Perspective, and Attitudes
2	Employ Predominantly Active and Highly Effective Instructional Methods
3	Assess Student Achievement
4	Assess Program Effectiveness
5	Conduct Quality Faculty Recruitment, Selection, Assignment, and Performance Assessment Program
6	Conduct Faculty Development Programs for Improving Instructional Skills and Increasing Subject Matter Mastery
7	Provide Institutional Resources to Support the Educational Process

Table A-1

Service ILE Joint Learning Areas <sup>81</sup>	
1	National Military Capabilities, Command Structure, and Strategic Guidance
2	Joint Doctrine and Concepts
3	Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War
4	Joint Planning and Execution Processes
5	Joint Command and Control
6	Joint Operational Leadership

Table A-2

**APPENDIX B**

ILE STUDENT DATA

<b>USMC ILE Graduates<sup>82</sup></b>				
<b>School</b>	<b>Resident</b>	<b>Distance Learning</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>%</b>
MCCSC	562	3213	<b>3775</b>	<b>89%</b>
CGSC	138	0	<b>138</b>	<b>3%</b>
CNCS	113	194	<b>307</b>	<b>7%</b>
ACSC	43	0	<b>43</b>	<b>1%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>856</b>	<b>3407</b>	<b>4263</b>	
<b>%</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>80%</b>		

Table B-1

<b>Marine Corps Command and Staff College<sup>83</sup></b>						
<b>Resident</b>	<b>AY2011</b>	<b>AY2012</b>	<b>AY2013</b>	<b>AY2014</b>	<b>AY2015</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
USMC Officers	101	109	123	116	113	<b>562</b>
<b>Distance Learning</b>	<b>AY2010</b>	<b>AY2011</b>	<b>AY2012</b>	<b>AY2013</b>	<b>AY2014</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
USMC Officers	587	714	709	608	595	<b>3213</b>

Table B-2

<b>Command and General Staff College<sup>84</sup></b>						
<b>Resident</b>	<b>AY2010</b>	<b>AY2011</b>	<b>AY2012</b>	<b>AY2013</b>	<b>AY2014</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
USMC Officers	25	27	29	29	28	<b>138</b>
<b>Distance Learning</b>	<b>AY2010</b>	<b>AY2011</b>	<b>AY2012</b>	<b>AY2013</b>	<b>AY2014</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
USMC Officers	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>

Table B-3

<b>College of Naval Command and Staff<sup>85</sup></b>						
<b>Resident</b>	<b>AY2010</b>	<b>AY2011</b>	<b>AY2012</b>	<b>AY2013</b>	<b>AY2014</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
USMC Officers	24	24	24	21	20	<b>113</b>
<b>Distance Learning</b>	<b>AY2010</b>	<b>AY2011</b>	<b>AY2012</b>	<b>AY2013</b>	<b>AY2014</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
USMC Officers	39	31	44	33	47	<b>194</b>

Table B-4

**APPENDIX B**

ILE STUDENT DATA

<b>Air Command and Staff College<sup>86</sup></b>						
<b>Resident</b>	<b>AY2010</b>	<b>AY2011</b>	<b>AY2012</b>	<b>AY2013</b>	<b>AY2014</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
USMC Officers	6	5	10	12	10	<b>43</b>
<b>Distance Learning</b>	<b>AY2010</b>	<b>AY2011</b>	<b>AY2012</b>	<b>AY2013</b>	<b>AY2014</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
USMC Officers	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>

Table B-5

<b>DoD ILE Graduates<sup>87</sup></b>				
<b>School</b>	<b>Resident</b>	<b>Distance Learning</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>%</b>
MCCSC	853	3593	<b>4446</b>	<b>11%</b>
CGSC	6372	4713	<b>11085</b>	<b>27%</b>
CNCS	1351	4061	<b>5412</b>	<b>13%</b>
ACSC	2489	17867	<b>20356</b>	<b>49%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>11065</b>	<b>30234</b>	<b>41299</b>	
<b>%</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>73%</b>		

Table B-6

## ACRONYMS

ACSC – Air Command and Staff College, United States Air Force

AWC – Army War College

CGSC – Command and General Staff College, United States Army

CJCS – Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CNCS – College of Naval Command and Staff, United States Navy

CSCDEP – Command and Staff College Distance Education Program, United States Marine Corps

GNA – Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

ILE – Intermediate-Level Education

JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFSC – Joint Forces Staff College

JPME – Joint Professional Military Education

MCCSC – Marine Corps Command and Staff College

MCWAR – Marine Corps War College

MCU – Marine Corps University

NDU – National Defense University

NWC – National War College

OPMEP – Officer Professional Military Education Policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01D

SAW – School of Advanced Warfighting

SLE – Senior-Level Education

Skelton Panel – Panel on Military Education of the 100<sup>th</sup> Congress, chaired by Congressman Ike Skelton

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 7-18.
- <sup>2</sup> Ibid, 8.
- <sup>3</sup> Martin Van Creveld, *The Training of Officers* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 57-61. For a detailed analysis of US and German PME, read Jörg Muth, *Command Culture* (Denton, Texas: University of North Texas Press, 2011).
- <sup>4</sup> Lee S. Duemer, "The Fusion of Military Education and the Citizen-Soldier," *American Educational History Journal* 33(2) (2006): 8-10, <https://search.proquest.com/>.
- <sup>5</sup> US Congress, House, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, HR 3622, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 131, (October 1, 1986), Title IV.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid, Title IV, Section 401-402.
- <sup>7</sup> U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 1989. Committee Print No. 4, (v).
- <sup>8</sup> Definition obtained at <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jointness>.
- <sup>9</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CJCSI 1800.01d, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)*, Washington, D.C.: JCS (2009), A-A-4, [http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs\\_directives/cdata/unlimit/1800\\_01.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/1800_01.pdf).
- <sup>10</sup> Over 80% of JDAL Billets are designated for O-4 and O-5 pay grades, 4,858 and 4,614 respectfully out of 11,730. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel*, April 2010, 111th Congress, 2nd Session, H. Committee Print 111-4, 21.
- <sup>11</sup> *Expeditionary Force 21*, United States Marine Corps, (March 4, 2014), 7-8, [http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/EF21\\_Capstone\\_Concept\\_12\\_Mar\\_2014%20\(signed\).pdf](http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/EF21_Capstone_Concept_12_Mar_2014%20(signed).pdf).
- <sup>12</sup> Robert L. Lyonnais, "Joint Professional Military Education: Time for a New Goal," Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies (First Term AY 02-03): 1, <http://dsearch.dtic.mil/>.
- <sup>13</sup> Erik W. Hansen, "Goldwater-Nichols – Failing to Go the Distance," Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College (March 15, 2008): 1, <http://dsearch.dtic.mil/>.
- <sup>14</sup> US Congress, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Title IV.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid, Title IV, Section 401-402.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid, Title IV, Section 401.
- <sup>17</sup> HASC, Report of the Panel on Military Education, (v).
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid, (v).
- <sup>19</sup> OPMEP, 1.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid, E-C-1 – E-C-3.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid, F-1.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid, F-1 – F-2.

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- <sup>23</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2020* (Washington D.C.: JCS, 2000), 15. <http://dsearch.dtic.mil/>.
- <sup>24</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development*, (Washington, D.C.: JCS, 2005): 6. <http://dsearch.dtic.mil/>.
- <sup>25</sup> John T. Kuehn, "The Goldwater-Nichols Fix: Joint Education is the Key to True Jointness," *Armed Forces Journal* 147, no. 8 (April 2010): 32-37, <http://search.proquest.com/>.
- <sup>26</sup> Lawrence B. Wilkerson, "What Exactly is Jointness," *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly* 16, (August 1997): 66, <http://dsearch.dtic.mil/>.
- <sup>27</sup> Henry H. Shelton, "Professional Education: The Key to Transformation," *Parameters* 13, no. 3 (Autum 2001): 13, <http://search.proquest.com/>.
- <sup>28</sup> Henry T. Buckley III, "The Goldwater Nichols Act: Are We Finally There?" Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College (March 30, 2007): 1. <http://dsearch.dtic.mil/>.
- <sup>29</sup> Hansen, "Goldwater-Nichols – Failing to Go the Distance," 3.
- <sup>30</sup> HASC, Report of the Panel on Military Education, 56-58.
- <sup>31</sup> Wilkerson, "What Exactly is Jointness," 68.
- <sup>32</sup> Buckley, "The Goldwater Nichols Act: Are We Finally There?" 14.
- <sup>33</sup> HASC, Report of the Panel on Military Education, 57-58.
- <sup>34</sup> OPMEP, A-A-A-1.
- <sup>35</sup> HASC, Report of the Panel on Military Education, 102.
- <sup>36</sup> OPMEP, A-B-1.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid, A-A-A-1.
- <sup>38</sup> HASC, Report of the Panel on Military Education, 102.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid, 105.
- <sup>40</sup> OPMEP, A-A-7.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid, A-A-4.
- <sup>42</sup> HASC, Report of the Panel on Military Education, 64 and 88.
- <sup>43</sup> The Marine Corps and the Navy are both in the Department of the Navy so there is no specified requirement to have a sailor represented in the Marine Corps seminar.
- <sup>44</sup> HASC, Report of the Panel on Military Education, 67 and 88.
- <sup>45</sup> OPMEP, B-2.
- <sup>46</sup> Over 50% of JPME II students have at least one year of joint duty experience prior to starting the course. Vincent C. Bowhens, "Manage or Educate: Fulfilling the Purpose of Joint Professional Military Education," *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly* (67) (2012): 27, <https://search.ebscohost.com/>; and Center for Strategic and International Studies, Study Group on Professional Military Education, Dick Cheney (Chair), "Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress" (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1997), 39, 54.
- <sup>47</sup> CJCS, *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development*, 6.
- <sup>48</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Education White Pape*, (Washington, D.C.: JCS, 2012), 5. <http://dsearch.dtic.mil/>.
- <sup>49</sup> HASC, Report of the Panel on Military Education, 76-77.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid, 77.
- <sup>51</sup> OPMEP, B-6.
- <sup>52</sup> HASC, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Another Crossroads?*, 24.

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- <sup>53</sup> Appendix B shows the detailed results.
- <sup>54</sup> OPMEP, B-5.
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid, B-5.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid, B-5.
- <sup>57</sup> Lyonnais, “Joint Professional Military Education: Time for a New Goal,” 40.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid, 43.
- <sup>59</sup> CSIS, “Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress,” 53.
- <sup>60</sup> Marine Corps University Institutional Research, Assessment & Planning, *Marine Corps University Factbook 2015*, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2014), 3.
- <sup>61</sup> Ibid, 18.
- <sup>62</sup> HASC, Report of the Panel on Military Education, 188-191.
- <sup>63</sup> USMC Command and Staff College, *Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE): Self-Study Resident Program* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 2014): 5.
- <sup>64</sup> HASC, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Another Crossroads?*, 18, 44, 65, 77.
- <sup>65</sup> OPMEP, A-C-2.
- <sup>66</sup> PAJE Team, “C&S 2014 PAJE Outbrief – MASTER Version 1.0,” (PowerPoint Presentation, JPMED, 19 November 2014) 3.
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid, 10-24.
- <sup>68</sup> Ibid, 25-39.
- <sup>69</sup> Ibid, 22 and 32.
- <sup>70</sup> MCU *Factbook*, 20-21.
- <sup>71</sup> Ibid, 18.
- <sup>72</sup> See Table B-1 for specific data.
- <sup>73</sup> FY 2011-FY2015 requirements are 309, 279, 244, 228, and 289 respectively. The FY2015 final billet list is still pending approval. Interview with Joint Officer Matters Officer, Manpower Management Officer Assignments (MMOA-6), Manpower Personnel Management, March 2, 2015 and March 27, 2015.
- <sup>74</sup> Refer to Table B-1.
- <sup>75</sup> Jaymes E. Roedl, “Blended Learning: The Ideal Strategy for Professional Military Education – USMC Command and Staff College,” (master’s thesis, Marine Corps University, 2014), 16.
- <sup>76</sup> PAJE Team, “C&S 2014 PAJE Outbrief,” 11.
- <sup>77</sup> Lyonnais, “Joint Professional Military Education: Time for a New Goal,” 44.
- <sup>78</sup> Bert L. Frandsen, “Improving JPME through Interschool Collaboration,” *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly* (51) (2008): 162. <https://search.ebscohost.com/>.
- <sup>79</sup> Ibid, 161.
- <sup>80</sup> OPMEP, E-1 – E-2.
- <sup>81</sup> Ibid, E-C-1 – E-C-3.
- <sup>82</sup> This data is aggregated from different sources, which is explained in the subsequent tables B-2 through B-5.
- <sup>83</sup> The MCU registrar could not provide me with AY 2010 resident numbers. This table assumes that AY2015 will not experience significant attrition. Slight attrition is statistically insignificant to this analysis. MCU, *Factbook*, 18.
- <sup>84</sup> CGSC resident student data sent via email from the Chief of the United States Student Division at CGSC. Distance Learning student data sent via email from the Operations Officer of Satellite Campuses and Blended Learning, CGSC.

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<sup>85</sup> CNCS resident student data sent via email from the Assistant Registrar, US Naval War College. Distance Learning student data sent via email from the Supervisory Distance Programs Coordinator, College of Distance Education, US Naval War College.

<sup>86</sup> Data collected via official Marine Corps message traffic announcing student selection to ILE institutions for AY2010-AY2014. Director, Manpower Management Division, *Academic Year (AY) 10 Intermediate Level School (ILS) Selections Board Results*, MARADMIN 014/10, January 08, 2010,

<http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/112196/academic-year-2010-ay10-intermediate-level-school-ils-selection-board-results.aspx>; Director, Manpower Management Division, *Academic Year (AY) 11-12 Intermediate Level School (ILS) Selections Board Results*, MARADMIN 738/10, December 28, 2010,

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<sup>87</sup> Data is the 5-year aggregate of the above data. The expanded ACSC numbers are available at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/cf/cfa/digests/>.

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