

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 24-04-2015		2. REPORT TYPE Master of Military Studies Research Paper		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) September 2014 - April 2015	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE A Precursor for a new German Crises Response Concept: Protecting German Lives and Promoting our National Interests by Helping Foreign Partners				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A	
6. AUTHOR(S) Muenzner, Maik, Oberstleutnant i.G., German Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A	
				5e. TASK NUMBER N/A	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) N/A	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A					
14. ABSTRACT Germany holds responsibilities to protect German lives, to promote its national interests, and to help foreign partners. Against the background of current internal transformations in the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) and the challenging security situations around Europe, the established German crisis response concept needs to be critically assessed. This paper, as a precursor for a new German crisis response concept, provides military recommendations to senior leadership for overcoming current shortfalls. Moreover, this precursor of a concept maintains and increases mission essential attributes for crisis response, proposes forward deployment, and organizational changes within the Bundeswehr to provide politics a suitable military instrument of power.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Germany; Crisis Response; SPMAGTF; Forward Deployed Forces					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE	UU	56	Marine Corps University/Command
Unclass	Unclass	Unclass			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

United States Marine Corps  
Command and Staff College  
Marine Corps University  
2076 South Street  
Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**TITLE:**

**A Precursor for a new German Crises Response Concept: Protecting  
German Lives and Promoting our National Interests by Helping Foreign  
Partners**

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Date: 24 APRIL 2015

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## **Preface**

On February 5, 2015, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg again placed emphasis on the political demand for the military to "ensure that we have the right forces, in the right place, at the right time."<sup>1</sup> While this remains the premise for all military forces involved in crisis response, the accordingly announced action-plan – adding a "Spearhead Force" to the organization, establishing six command-and-control units in Europe, and emphasizing an asset-sharing program and networking – seems to be too traditional, too reactive, and will fail. Multinational organizations cannot create the political will and military tempo to counter foreign crises. Moreover, in reality, these multinational organizations depend on their most capable member states. For good reasons, crisis response is foremost a national task. Therefore, Germany, as the arguably predominant European nation, holds responsibilities to protect German lives, to promote its national interests, and to help foreign partners.

As a German officer, I feel committed – in the context of current internal transformation as well as the crises around Europe – to call for a new German concept for crises response. With this paper, as a precursor for such a crisis response concept, I will make military recommendations to senior leadership for overcoming current shortfalls, while increasing mission essential attributes in order to provide politics a suitable military instrument of power.

## **1. The “Bundeswehr – a Continuing Transformation Process from a Bipolar-Defense- Force to a Force on World Wide Missions**

The German armed forces have transitioned four times since the German reunification in 1990. First, the two (formerly opposing) German armed forces merged. Second, the new Bundeswehr (Bw) – as the only remaining German armed forces – decreased in several steps from approximately 500,000 service members in 1990 to a number of 178,000 in 2014.<sup>2</sup> This decrease has resulted in various organizational transformations. Third, an all-voluntary force replaced the former conscript system in 2011. Finally, after 35 years (1955 – 1990) of a constitutionally limited self-defense mission, the Bw became a force on worldwide missions, starting in 1992. These transformations, often concurrent, demonstrate the Bw’s rapid development during the past 25 years. Furthermore, this information provides the context for the Bw’s specific circumstances and frames the understanding for its imperfect setup for crises response operations (CRO). With regard to the recent background and current circumstances, the Bw needs to figure out a suitable CRO concept that reflects the challenges of distance and climate in the Middle East and Africa to organize, train, and equip its crisis response forces; this will help to prepare the Bw for potential threats against Germany and its citizens abroad.

### **1.1. The Bundeswehr’s “Young Tenets”**

The Bw transformed to an armed force with international responsibility within various security system frameworks (e.g. United Nations-UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization-NATO, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe-OSCE, European Union-EU). By constitutional law, Germany deploys the Bw exclusively in legitimate international missions. All conducted NATO, EU, and UN-missions provide evidence for this judicial restraint. Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are the exception to this general tenet.<sup>3</sup>

Nevertheless, due to Germany's history – including two lost world wars, ten years without an armed force, and 35 years as a purely self-defense force – the next tenet is the restrained use of the military instrument of power. The German government – backed by a mainly pacifistic population – deploys the Bw in ultima ratio. This is true for all kinds of missions including CRO.<sup>4</sup> The historical context explains also the next tenet within Germany's young experience in international missions: the strict division between internal and external responsibilities.

The Bw is an external political instrument. Thus, the Bw has no authority in German internal affairs. This is the responsibility of police forces and secret services.<sup>5</sup> For CRO, the most critical intersection is the embassy within a foreign country. These embassies include armed personnel from the German Federal Police, the Federal Intelligence Service, and the Bw. But, the ambassador – as the representative of the Federal Foreign Office in a foreign country – holds the overall responsibility. These diplomats are employees of the German Federal Foreign Office. Diplomatic personnel are often not used to working with the Bw and see the emergence of armed forces as a symbol of their diplomatic mission failure.<sup>6</sup> Mutual understanding and trust between the different entities needs to be established and reflected in a concept for mission success in a potential CRO.

## **1.2. Germany's Area of Interest – Europe, Africa, and the Middle East**

Germany's location in the center of Europe, its economic power within the EU, and its stability over the last six decades determine its role as an international European middle power and a leading power for its continental neighbors. Nowadays, this power includes the responsibility to protect the shared European prosperity, if necessary with military means. Germany is increasingly called upon to meet this responsibility. The German military, alongside international partners, faces the challenges created by poverty, corruption, crime, illicit trafficking of personnel/

materials, institutional weakness, and terrorism – termed by the US Department of Defense as the “New Normal.”<sup>7</sup>

That said, these challenges – due to globalization and information age – reach to the rich countries in Europe, including Germany. Germany is well advised to focus on Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Evidence for the focus on these regions provides the current mission locations, displayed in Annex A. This geographic level of ambition fits Germany’s historical heritage and its current position within the international community. Furthermore, its strategic means reflect such responsibilities and limit larger ambitions at the same time.

Nonetheless, the security focus on Europe, the Middle East, and Africa remains a huge challenge. The current international crises along an arc from Mali, the Maghreb states, Sudan and South Sudan, Israel, Syria, etc., draw a clear and dangerous picture. Besides the complex and difficult dynamics in these conflicts and wars, climate challenges and extreme distances create other problems for military operations. Within the recent history of Germany’s out of area missions, only a few lessons have been identified and learned so far. A CRO concept needs to reflect the challenges of climate and distance to be viable.

### **1.3. The Bundeswehr in its Evolution as a Force on Mission**

In the following years after reunification, Bw limited its contribution to air-transport assets, medical personnel, and specific force multipliers in various missions.<sup>8</sup> The NATO-led operations in the Balkans, especially in Kosovo, became the first hallmark for the Bw.<sup>9</sup> Obviously, all the different missions were unique concerning task, size, character, etc. Nevertheless, there are two missions – namely in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Afghanistan (AFG) – that elevated the Bw’s role and character in operations.

During operation EUFOR RD CONGO in 2006, Germany took the lead of a relevant multinational contingent without United States (US) / NATO support and conducted all phases of an expeditionary mission with its own means and responsibility. In Afghanistan, the Bw conducted, for the first time, high intensity joint and combined combat and managed a wide spectrum of war effects. Recently, shifted efforts to train, advise, and assist tasks for AFG security forces matured the German soldiers and has enhanced the Bw's overall capability in security assistance missions. Overall, the Bw's experience and the soldiers' increased competence should be sustained to support future missions.

## **2. "Division Schnelle Kräfte" – Germany's Crises Response Forces**

The Bw has learned – within a short time period of 25 years – a lot of positive lessons in becoming an experienced armed force and a reliable external political instrument for Germany. That said, one specific hard lesson was the negative experience from Rwanda in 1994.<sup>10</sup> The inability to rescue German citizens in a foreign country was obviously an uncomfortable situation for the most powerful nation in Europe and resulted in the political decision for the organization of a new military division. This "Division Spezielle Operation" was basically organized in one brigade of Special Forces ("Kommando Spezialkräfte" - KSK) and two brigades of specialized forces ("Luftlandebrigaden" – airborne brigades). While the KSK was organized, equipped, and trained as a tier one special operations force, the two airborne brigades were responsible for four proposed missions: early entry operations, operations against irregular operating forces, deep operations, and NEOs.<sup>11</sup> Since 1996, these three brigades – in addition to the division's HQ and division forces – have built the core for German crises response forces.<sup>12</sup>

## **2.1. The Current Concept for Crises Response**

Both airborne brigades were similarly organized and equipped for their proposed missions. And, these formations were the only two German army brigades that have kept organic logistic battalions and medical units, also capable of airborne operations.<sup>13</sup> This structure assured quicker responsiveness – at least for the ground forces – due to decreased mission preparation time. In addition, the airborne brigades received specific systematic support for their combat readiness.

Despite shortfalls in personnel recruitment and materiel supply in some parts of the German armed forces, the airborne brigades were always the first to receive personnel and material. This opened opportunities for training.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, the airborne brigades maintain a much higher degree on combat readiness in comparison to conventional units.<sup>15</sup> Organization, materiel/personnel supply, and esprit de corps of the airborne brigades are different and specific. This ensures that this small and exclusive community has the capabilities and capacities to train as it fights. Overall, the results were special combat readiness and combat effectiveness within these ground forces that provided the basis for Germany's crises response force. This fits their motto: "ready for action, at any time, worldwide!"

## **2.2. Successful NEOs in Albania and Libya**

After the bad experiences from Rwanda, the political reaction to build the "Division Spezielle Operationen" and the above described efforts, Germany's crises response capabilities increased. The analysis of the two successful NEOs in Albania and Libya illustrates this increase (see Annex C for detailed information about both NEOs). Moreover, their comparison exemplifies the progress within German CRO in the recent years. While Operation Libelle in Albania in 1997 was a hastily conducted operation with forces already deployed in theatre, Operation Pegasus in Libya 2011 was conducted in accordance with the current doctrine.<sup>16</sup>

### **2.3. Current Framing Factors for the German Crises Response Forces**

The year 2014 held two major developments for the German crises response forces. On the one hand, the “Division Spezielle Operation” merged with the “Division Luftbewegliche Operation” – the German army aviation division – to the new “Division Schnelle Kräfte” (DSK; in English: Rapid Forces Division) on January 1, 2014. On the other hand, the end of the ISAF mission and the reduced force contribution for the follow on Resolute Support Mission (RSM) shifted the DSK’s focus away from AFG.<sup>17</sup>

#### **2.3.1. The post-Afghanistan era**

With the end of the ISAF mission – and the far smaller footprint of German forces in RSM – the main focus of the Bw shifted away from AFG.<sup>18</sup> As a consequence, the Bw needs to redesign its setup for the next challenges. Similar to the US, Germany will likely have to counter local instabilities, competitions for resources, and regional power struggles with small-scale contingencies.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, the US and German level of ambitions and military capabilities differ enormously.<sup>20</sup> But, both nations share the responsibility to protect their respective people. Therefore, Germany’s CRO concept can adapt doctrine and experiences from the US armed forces, in particular from the United States Marine Corps (USMC), to increase its preparedness and readiness. Moreover, the concept of forward presence needs to be proven suitable for the German crises response forces.

#### **2.3.2. The new “Rapid Force Division” – Division Schnelle Kräfte**

The creation of the DSK is another important, current development for the crisis response forces. The Bw, for the first time in its history, merged the majority of its airborne capable forces and its army aviation in one division (see Annex D).<sup>21</sup> The DSK now incorporates command and control (C2), a (rotary) air wing, logistics, and specialized/ special ground elements – similar to a Marine Air Ground Task Force

(MAGTF). Moreover, for training and exercises, the Dutch 11<sup>th</sup> Luchtmobiele Brigade (air mobile brigade) with approximately 2,100 service members is part of the DSK with an overall strength of 9,100 soldiers.<sup>22</sup>

Of great importance is also the shifted responsibility for the conduct of CROs from division level to the airborne brigade. As a consequence, the current concept (tailored to the division level) is no longer valid. This provides an opportunity to revamp the old concept and adapt it for future challenges. Experiences from the other nations can support this effort. For the purpose of this paper, the MAGTF concept of the USMC, in particular the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force Crises Response (SPMAGTF-CR), is the preferred template.

### **3. Crises Response – Necessary Mission Attributes and Capabilities**

In 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates stated, “The strategic rationale for swift-moving expeditionary forces, whether Army or Marine, airborne infantry or special operations, is self-evident given the likelihood of counterterrorism, rapid reaction, disaster response, or stability or security force assistance missions.”<sup>23</sup> Versatility and flexibility are vital characteristics of these swift-moving expeditionary forces. That said, such attributes need to be established and sustained by organization, equipment, and training. In addition, the personnel within these elite crisis response units needs cohesion, mindset, and endurance for operational success. Therefore, a suitable (future) CRO concept should include all of these attributes to maintain these special attributes/ capabilities within the DSK.

Capabilities of strategic and tactical lift, logistical and medical support/sustainability, and communications (to name some) are also vital to operate against the background of strategic distance and time-sensitiveness. Even community-external thinkers like the Amphibious Capability Working Group recognize:

Crisis response is a 'come as you are' endeavor. While deliberate war

planning comes with prepared schedules and enabling activities, threats to national interests will present themselves on their own timelines. Forward deployed crisis response forces must be equipped, trained, and practiced for the entire range of contingencies they may find themselves in.<sup>24</sup>

But, such a correct assessment needs to be reflected in realities. As described above, Germany, as a European middle power, has neither the political ambitions nor the military means comparable to the United States. Nonetheless, the DSK can benefit from experiences of the USMC when it adapts its force to an appropriate scale for their given missions. “Come as you are” hints to a realistic approach with existing capabilities instead of focusing on desired procurement. Therefore, a realistic approach will guide the following examination; therefore, American approaches for limited (crises) responses serve as the primary reference – SPMAGTF.<sup>25</sup>

### **3.1. Africa-Oriented SPMAGTFs**

Recently the USMC visionary “Expeditionary Force 21” described the increasingly prominent role of SPMAGTFs as follows:

In the past, SPMAGTFs have been used to conduct security cooperation activities with partner nations in order to develop interoperability, facilitate access, build defense and security relationships, gain regional understanding, and position for immediate response to episodic crises.<sup>26</sup>

The USMC’s intention to deploy SPMAGTFs to the U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) AORs indicates success of this relatively new operational concept.

Since 2013, two USMC SPMAGTFs have focused on Africa – sharing Germany’s Area of Interest within its broader neighborhood: initially SPMAGTF-Africa (AF) that evolved into SPMAGTF-CR. Due to the absence of a standing Amphibious Readiness Group/ Marine Expeditionary Unit in the Mediterranean Sea, this SPMAGTF has been rotationally allocated (under OPCON) to Commander United States Africa Command (CDRUSAFRICOM) in Stuttgart, Germany. Common

nominators for the SPMAGTF are a complex command relation and their extended dislocation (external to the African AOR).

CDRUSAFRICOM exercises that command authority via its USMC service component: Commander Marine Forces Africa. This command structure changes during a crises response operation as “CDRUSAFRICOM would exercise TACON of SPMAGTF-CR or its subordinate elements participating in the response, either directly or through an intermediate command such as a joint task force (JTF).”<sup>27</sup> Overall, this seems to be a complicated command relationship within an extended multinational European environment as a larger “host area.”

This so called “European host area” includes Stuttgart (Germany), Sigonella (Italy), and Moron (Spain) with its political and military caveats.<sup>28</sup> A next German crises response approach needs to also consider the advantages and disadvantages for forward deployed forces in a host nation/area. German “domestic basing” seems to be beneficial to train and sustain specific skills. This general assessment needs to be refined for specific situations, and then should reflect rotational timings and deployments to foreign nations.

### **3.1.1. SPMAGTF-Africa (AF)**

Starting in 2011, seven rotations (see Annex E<sup>29</sup>) of SPMAGTF-AF conducted operations (Theatre Security Cooperation – TSC and/ or capacity building of host-nation military forces) in African countries such as Uganda, Senegal, Burundi, and Gabon. Based on CDRUSAFRICOM’s strategy to actively engage African leaders for increased stability, SPMAGTF-AFs (previously known as SPMAGTF-TSC too) have sent small training teams comprised of 5 to 50 personnel to African host nations from days to months at a time. The SPMAGTF’s Ground Combat Element (GCE), consisting of several teams, has conducted infantry, logistics, and engineering training with their African counterparts tailored to the respective local

security efforts (e.g. Ugandan field engineers counter al-Shabaab IED insurgency tactics in Somalia).<sup>30</sup> This scaled approach has matured over several rotations and SPMAGTF-AF's training efforts fit as a suitable model for a German CRO concept. Nevertheless, SPMAGTF-AF lack organic airlift and combat power remains limited. That said, the assessment of the evolution of SPAMGTF-AF into SPMAGTF-CR is necessary to support the creation of an appropriate structure for Germany – quickly available, robust and sustainable – in a violent environment during foreign crises.

### **3.1.2. SPMAGTF-CR**

The hostile events of Benghazi Libya in 2012 triggered the development and subsequent engagement of SPMAGTF-CR, a task force designed to operate on short notice during times of increased violence or disintegrating security. The task force focused on proactive measures (e.g. early reinforcement of U.S. facilities with Marines) at CDRUSAFRICOM's dedicated high-threat facilities and adjacent hotspots in Africa in the event of a crisis.<sup>31</sup>

Similar to SPMAGTF-AF, SPMATGTF-CR changed its setup over its four rotations as depicted in Annex F, where the GCE increased from 500 to 1,500 personnel, including six infantry platoons and the Air Combat Element (ACE) increased to twelve MV-22B Ospreys, four KC-130J (refueling and assault support aircraft), and one UC-35 medium range executive and priority cargo jet by summer 2014.<sup>32</sup>

The SPMAGTF-CR's security force deployment to the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, Libya and its subsequent land-based evacuation in May 2013 as well as the evacuation with one KC-130J (in coordination with the U.S. Army's East African Response Force) of 20 personnel out of the U.S. Embassy in Juba, South Sudan on January 3, 2014, present two examples of the nature of African crises: short notice and extreme distance. Sufficient organic air assets are reflective of the morphing

characteristics of CRO in a permissive environment.

Despite their operational success, the arguable limit – due to the lack of close air support, fire integration capabilities, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance – to permissive environments is, according some USMC internal critics, an organizational weakness of the SPMAGTF-CR. Furthermore, critics of the SPMAGTF-CR concept argued for a more robust crises prevention task force instead of crises response.<sup>33</sup> That said, the SPMAGTF-CR is purposefully an element of limited crises response and, under specific circumstances, an interim solution in the absence of a MEU possessing full CRO-capabilities. Moreover, for the purpose of a reflected German approach, the SPMAGTF's medium dispositive and its non-interventionist character seems best suited as a model. Therefore, the following thoughts for a German CRO concept will reflect the above mentioned capability gaps, but will not enhance any German interventionist approaches in Africa or the Middle East.

### **3.2. Capabilities and Limitations of the Bundeswehr**

So far, it has become clear that Germany has neither the ambition to operate on a global scale nor does it have the expeditionary capabilities to do so. Nevertheless, the following assessment seeks to identify the necessary capabilities and the gaps that may prevent the Bw from operating in a spectrum of limited crises response.

#### **3.2.1. Division Schnelle Kräfte**

The majority of the DSK's soldiers are used to operating on short warnings, in a “come as you are” setup, and against irregular threats.<sup>34</sup> The two airborne regiments can conduct smaller operations and provide redundant capabilities for the brigade.<sup>35</sup> An “operational interplay” between the two regiments is easy to accomplish and appropriate to balance high readiness and preparation phases. The two regiments

build the core of each CRO. Challenging is the support with lift capabilities and single augmenters.<sup>36</sup>

The DSK's three helicopter regiments belong to the division-level, so they are commanded two levels above the airborne regiments.<sup>37</sup> This structure is reasonable due to organizational, instead of operational necessities. Direct working relationships (e.g. unit partnering) should be established in exercises and for crises. An involvement of the division staff and/or the brigade staff has to be limited to the greatest possible extent. Instead of directly managing the helicopter units, the brigade staff should function as a managing connector to other necessary transport assets.

The DSK has no fixed wing or sea assets. It depends on other military services, multinational forces, or civilian transport enterprises for the strategic deployment, and, to a lesser extent, for tactical mobility as well. The regimental staffs are not manned to handle this extra challenge. This becomes a crucial task for the brigade – a conduit between the regiment and strategic movers.

### **3.2.2. Deutsche Marine (German Navy)**

The Deutsche Marine lacks – due to the historically reasoned neglect of expeditionary ships and its quantitatively limited amount of available other ships – now and for the foreseeable future, the capabilities to exploit the inherent advantages of sea-borne movements.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, the advantages described in *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*: sea-based logistics, sea-based fire support, and the use of the sea as a medium for tactical and operational movement, suffer for a German approach.<sup>39</sup> The Deutsche Marine can support a land-air operation with single capabilities,<sup>40</sup> as the above described NEOs in Albania and Libya exemplify, but the German naval capacities allow neither the build-up of standing joint armed forces nor are suitable to build the core element (main effort) for a German CRO.<sup>41</sup> A future

German CRO concept needs to reflect possible support capabilities and should not exclude the opportunities out of international waters and the littorals.<sup>42</sup>

Germany's lack of strategic and tactical lift via sea is likely to remain over the next decade(s). The Bw, within a Danish-German joint venture, contracted the civilian Danish shipping company "Det Forenede Dampskibs-Selskab" to operate two roll-on-/roll-off ships.<sup>43</sup> The agreement guarantees access to staggered transport space over time. The first ship is available at a German pier after 15 days, the second after 30 days, and a third after 60 days of notice.<sup>44</sup> This effort counters military disadvantages related to strategic transport for long term missions. Nevertheless, the contracted timings are not suited for initial phases of time-critical CROs. The next German CRO concept should focus on strategic airlift to a theatre and tactical air and ground movement within this theatre.

### **3.2.3. Deutsche Luftwaffe (German Airforce)**

Given the size of the African continent, access to air assets, especially with a lack of organic sea assets, is critical for CROs. The Deutsche Luftwaffe operates for tactical purposes 225 fixed wing combat aircraft, a variety of fixed wing transport aircrafts, logistical/ medical support aircrafts, and a squadron of transport helicopters.<sup>45</sup> The "Eurofighters" and "Tornados" with their air/air, air/ground combat, and reconnaissance capabilities tasks are sufficient force enablers for CROs in more permissive environments.<sup>46</sup> The four multi-role "Airbus 310-304" provide numerically limited strategic/ operational reach, air-refueling, and medical emergency capabilities.<sup>47</sup> The Luftwaffe's (old) working horse is the Transall C-160D. These complement the current transport fleet as reliable tactical cargo and personnel aircrafts with limited parameters of performance for a potential African or Middle Eastern scenario.<sup>48</sup> The Airbus 400M is the replacement of the Transall-fleet; 40 of these modern aircraft, were introduced between 2014 and 2019. The replacement is

associated with a significant increase of capabilities and closes the gap of green strategic/operational airlift.<sup>49</sup> All of the so far described aircraft are essential assets that need to be implemented in the CRO concept, similar to the strategic cargo lift.

The civilian enterprise Ruslan Salis GmbH – a chartering consortium of fourteen European partners<sup>50</sup> – assures the Bw's strategic deployments by operating six Antonov An-124-100; two of them are contracted for short-notice availability.<sup>51</sup> Despite the fact that some of these partner nations can also access Boeing C-17 transport aircraft within the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC), Germany competes with its partners over the An-124-100 in the case of a crisis.<sup>52</sup> This situation will relax when the A400M can take over many tasks. An A400M can transport all the weapons and equipment of DSK's arsenal up to an airborne infantry company (116 PAX) and helicopters within the above-described German area of interest.<sup>53</sup> That said, the proposed CRO concept should reflect both types of aircraft over a time continuum.

Similarly, the use of medium transport helicopters Sikorsky CH-53 needs to be evaluated for CRO.<sup>54</sup> This is the Bw's only rotary asset capable of transporting an infantry platoon. Such a capability can become critical in CROs with contested access, limited space, and restrictions to operate with more helicopters.<sup>55</sup> So far, two major obstacles have hampered the use of this asset outside Europe. The first obstacle was the time-consuming self-traverse from Germany to an area of operation. This means the (legal) traverse over foreign airspace and the not proportional and hampering logistical effort for the helicopters. The second obstacle was the gap of adequate fixed wing transport. The CH-53's possible dismantling, followed by the fixed wing airlift, and finalized by the helicopters reconstruction, lasts too long in a crisis. The A400M and/or a forward presence can effect changes for the use of CH-53 in CROs.<sup>56</sup>

### **3.3. Comparison of Mission Sets and Capabilities – SPMAGTF and DSK**

The New Normal, enforced by the aftermath of Afghanistan and Iraq, requires flexible, scalable, air-ground units that are organized, equipped, and trained for a variety of unpredictable rapid responses in order to pursue national interests in states far away from the home country. Both the USMC with its SPMAGTF-CR and the Bw with the DSK, have overcome the traditional military mindset focused on major campaigns and created versatile formations, although both military organizations had different approaches so far.<sup>57</sup>

Despite the comparably limited capabilities of the Bw and its more restricted use of military force, the DSK even has some advantages over to the SPMAGTF-CR. Its domestic basing allows better training and sustainment of its forces. Moreover, the DSK has, for two reasons, better opportunities to tailor internally its task force in the eve of a crisis. On the one hand, its personnel are available and (within its limits) scalable in Germany – in comparison with the USMC –without additional deployment to the European host area. On the other hand, all personnel, at least within the DSK, are earmarked for CRO. Therefore, these personnel are already trained, equipped, and familiar with each other.

Strong personal relationships result from the DSK's permanent mission-set for CRO in contrast to the rotationally manned and tasked SPMAGTFs. Such an advantage could be transferred to personal relationships between DSK's military leadership and diplomatic personnel abroad. The advantage for Germany is the smaller scale of its military forward presence so far. In contrast to the sometimes-perceived confusion about responsibilities of various US task forces in one area, the DSK – and therein pointed military leaders – could operate on a single point of contact principle to the respective German diplomatic posts.<sup>58</sup>

A future German concept needs to reflect the opportunities of a permanent forward presence in Africa. The U.S. failed in its attempt to establish its Africa Command on African soil and still struggles, according to General J. M. Paxton, Jr. to “find African partners” while focusing on permanent presence in countries “like Ghana, Liberia, or Nigeria.”<sup>59</sup> Germany’s different reputation and its external perception as a political middle power could result in opportunities.<sup>60</sup> This, and a close German cooperation with the former colonial power France, could build the basis for a German forward presence in a divergent German CRO concept.<sup>61</sup> In particular, the already established French bases in Senegal (Northwest Africa) and the Republic of Djibouti (Northeast Africa) offer additional opportunities and fit the German regional level of ambition. Possible German and/or German-French forward deployment bases in Africa could minimize the negative effects of Germany’s shortfalls of maritime lift as well as strategic and tactical airlift.

#### **4. Concept of Operation – the Way Ahead for DSK in order to Engage, Assist, and Cooperate with Coalition Forces, new Partners, and Local Actors**

As Professor Michael A. Lewis has mentioned, most of the approaches to establish a systematic governmental change in a fragile state by “cutting off the head of the snake” were not successful in the past.<sup>62</sup> Creating sovereignty and stability in states via reorientation is another approach to establish favorable conditions in fragile states, therefore, minimizing the negative effects. Following this train of thought, Germany, by establishing small changes in the geographically neighboring states in (Northern) Africa and the Levant could decrease the negative external effects to the EU and its homeland. Based on the understanding that such approaches need whole-of-government efforts, the following paragraphs will focus on military contributions.

##### **4.1. Development of a Reoriented Military Concept**

The DSK could contribute militarily to a foreign security policy by Theatre

Security Cooperation (TSC), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Counter Terrorism (CT) in a foreign country of national German interest.<sup>63</sup> Permanent forward presence would decrease the military challenges of strategic lift, minimizing the operational distances, and increasing necessary personal relationships on the tactical level within these environments for CROs. Moreover, DSK's support of foreign security forces should have stabilizing effects, so it should also have a preventing character for crises. That said, a forward-present DSK contributes to security by shaping, supporting, deterring, and responding to crises. The best military advice for the political leadership is to establish forward presence(s) either in joint ventures with the French Armed Forces or as bilateral partnerships with the host nation. Besides the mentioned benefits, it is necessary to add framing pillars (preparation, conduct of engagement, and organization) that build this military vision. Otherwise, this bottom up-initiative will lose the support, and finally the political permission for sure.

#### **4.2. Preparation of German Forces**

Overall, the soldiers of the DSK are militarily prepared due to their experience in various conflicts and the ongoing (multi-) national training.<sup>64</sup> Also the mix between CRO-focused, airborne, and conventional combat focused exercises seems relevant to maintain the greatest variety of military skills and should be continued.<sup>65</sup> This recommendation differs when talking about cultural skills.

The limited – despite very complex – scope of Germany's area of interest also provides opportunities to focus the soldiers' language and cultural skills to specific countries and regions. To take advantage of such opportunities, it needs the organization's initial investments in additional language training (e.g. French, Arabic) as well as historical and religious education.<sup>66</sup> This initial knowledge will be elaborated with each engagement in that region, driven by the personal valence of the

soldiers.<sup>67</sup> Hence, it minimizes the need for local interpreters and avoids the moral responsibility for them in case of a crisis.<sup>68</sup>

Embassy relation trainings – similar to the USMC – are not recommended or should be conducted in a different setup for two reasons. First, these trainings were criticized by different SPMAGTFs as unsuitable preparations.<sup>69</sup> Second, these relationships seem to be dependent on acting personalities; therefore, they differ from country to country.<sup>70</sup>

#### **4.2.1. Cooperation and Coordination**

Personal relationships and trust building are often used phrases within recent conflicts in the “new normal.” But, more than the legitimate demand, it is necessary to create personal contact before a crisis and to maintain it continuously. Germany’s recent lessons in Afghanistan and the experiences of SPMAGTF-AF have shown the need for continuity. Ever changing points of contact are counter-productive in this human engagement. Long-standing tactical personnel need to be discovered and engaged in long-term commitments with the German diplomatic mission abroad.

In country working relationships with personnel from the embassy are essential. A solid coordination and cooperation – supervised by the ambassador – could increase the information flow, situational awareness, and mutual understanding.<sup>71</sup> The actual personnel that conducted the necessary preparation for security and evacuation are an initial point of contact for coordination and cooperation. Based on intense personal relations, a (informal) concept for embassy protection/reinforcement as a contingency planning seems a logical next step for security professionals.

Another coordination effort is the information sharing when other German security assets operate in the country or area. This is necessary to demonstrate to the host nation the professionalism and unity of effort within the German forces.<sup>72</sup> Shared

training and social events increase mutual (role) understanding and overcome service-perspectives – important prerequisites for CROs. But, most importantly, valid and timely information avoids confusion when answering to the host nation unit.

#### **4.2.2. Liaison**

Unified action is required to successfully conduct CROs and should include essential host nation-, German-, and multinational partners.<sup>73</sup> This paper cannot assess the various already established committees, working groups, boards, and liaison elements. But, it is a matter of fact that all these coordination efforts are manned with personnel beyond DSK's responsibility. In other words, the DSK has no direct input in these efforts. Furthermore, this indicates that the level of coordination is limited to operational and strategic levels. This situation seems to be a weakness or at least a missed opportunity.

The DSK needs to be informed about the content in the higher committees, working groups, and boards. Moreover, the DSK should replace/send organic personnel to multinational partners. Based on the analysis of this paper, a broad network of liaison to French and US standing staffs and rotational contingents seem of most importance.<sup>74</sup> For specific regions/countries, this liaison effort should be adapted to other (western) partners.

#### **4.2.3. “Krisenunterstützungsteams” – Crises Support Teams (CST)**

For crisis preparedness and preventive measures for the protection of German diplomatic missions abroad, the Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defense established an interdepartmental agreement on the posting of CST for German missions and implemented an emergency preparedness information system in 2000. CST's objective is to prepare the best possible protection of Germans abroad in crisis situations. CST advises the respective embassy, collects relevant pieces of information, and conducts preventive NEO planning and preparation.

Experts from both ministries merge into CSTs; the actual composition depends on the circumstances and mission in the respective host nation.<sup>75</sup> This approach meets the requirements for a comprehensive approach; nevertheless, it is limited to strategic-operational levels. These levels normally lack the level of detail and current knowledge to plan for CROs.<sup>76</sup> A reoriented approach should implement the tactical level into the CST.<sup>77</sup>

### **4.3. Conduct of Engagements**

While the preparation of forces and the shaping efforts of liaisons are requirements of a continuous professional preparation process – independent of the availability of forward bases – the following recommendations are based on assumed forward presence.

#### **4.3.1. Operational Rhythm – Rotation of Training and Mission**

Operational engagements should fit the culture, capabilities, and requirements of the host nation(s) to avoid any imperial or colonial perception. An approach that fits to the host nation’s strategic culture will underline the perception of an assisting role of German forces. In addition, for national German purposes, the (limited) DSK should aim for a small but sustainable approach over time. In contrast to SPMAGTF’s, the DSK’s approach should focus on prolonged engagements with consistent personnel.<sup>78</sup>

The key for such an approach is the “operational interchange” between the equally trained, equipped, and organized airborne regiments. Such a rotational system ensures the consistent opportunity to engage C2, infantrymen, engineers, medics, logisticians, intelligence personnel, communications, and support elements. These forces should be reinforced with helicopter units.<sup>79</sup> These rotations – without going into tactical details of task organizations – could ensure a permanent footprint in the

host nation and allow the German forces operational pauses back home. In this way, sustainability is ensured.

#### **4.3.2. Deployments/ Crisis Engagement**

The permanent operational footprint in host nations increases the flexible response options (FRO) for Germany, too. Due to permanent deployments, resulting in increased situational awareness, availability of pre-deployed assets, and higher response readiness for respective countries/areas, the DSK provides Germany's political leadership more FROs. Deployed forces (potentially reinforced in the development of a crisis) can respond out of forward bases in Africa or the Levant; a hub and spoke model seems suitable.<sup>80</sup> This is a familiar model to diplomatic and military organizations – a common denominator that could make the implementation more comfortable.<sup>81</sup>

Meanwhile, the government can react with forces out of Germany to counter other crises.<sup>82</sup> This option is basically the continuation of the current CRO concept.<sup>83</sup> While using both options in a new CRO concept, the DSK could better manage the unlikely situation of two parallel CROs due to (overall) limited need of strategic lift and deployment of tactical units.

#### **4.4. Organization**

CROs are time-critical, risky, and small-sized complex operations in (often enough) perceived “pop-up environments.” That said, speed, surprise, simplicity, and operational security are their military demands. At the same time, CROs are high prestige, sensitive political operations that affect other states' sovereignty. Therefore, political and consequently the strategic military leadership, feels the need to hold close control over the conduct of CROs. Media becomes another driver as soon as it discovers a (potential) CRO. That describes the domestic environment in which a proper organization – C2, logistics, transport – needs to reflect the nature of CROs.

#### **4.4.1. Command and Control**

A solid C2 structure for CROs focuses on comprehensive leadership in respective levels of the operation (tactical, operational, strategic) and the ability of continuous communications. Central to this paper is the question: how many headquarters (HQ)/ command posts (CP) must be manned, equipped, and if needed moved to accomplish their respective level-tasks for a CRO?<sup>84</sup> The following proposal for a concept reflects minimum requirements for C2 in CROs.

Strategic relationships with domestic and foreign political entities are already established in Germany, predominantly in Berlin.<sup>85</sup> Similar, the Bundeswehr Operations Command (BWOPC), responsible for all out of area missions, is already in place. As a certified and mission proofed operational headquarters for the EU, the BWOPC provides many advantages to function as the linkage between the political-strategic leadership located in Berlin and the tactical leadership tasked to the airborne brigade. The command is located in Potsdam (adjacent to Berlin), the working relationships have been established during other missions, and thirteen of the major partner nations have liaison officers included. In addition, the operations command's staff and tactical staffs of DSO/DSK have trained to build up (parallel) operations centers and to proof interoperability during various exercises. A next step should focus on a shared operations center including collaborative planning. In contrast, on the tactical level, a solution is not that obvious.

The traditional tactical claim to lead in close contact with subordinated operating forces seems valid and suitable. CROs with often-small decisive forces hold the burden of too many involved levels/ headquarters and ranks in the field – ending in a crept leadership-culture. The recent demand (mostly in COIN) to remember back to decentralized C2 should also be considered for CROs. Each forward moving HQ/CP takes time and (limited) lift capacity at the expense of the operating forces.

The new CRO concept – in comparison to the old one – should mitigate these risks and burdens by the abandonment of additional assembly areas prior to an operation and the reduction of a FMB to its logistical necessities.<sup>86</sup> The brigade leadership needs to review such ideas and should elaborate flexible command post concepts tailored to various scenarios.<sup>87</sup>

#### **4.4.2. Logistical Support of Engagements**

Besides reduced requirements concerning C2, logistical support and sustainability benefits the most from forward deployed basing. While not core task of a CRO, logistics and transport become the crucial factors to establish speed, tempo, and flexibility, especially in the above described environments. Moreover, logistics is always an operational part of the mission for its management with host nation agents/contractors and its training involvement.<sup>88</sup>

Organic logistics companies can manage additional supply tailored to the needs of the different rotations.<sup>89</sup> In contrast to specific demands, the pre-stationing and maintenance of mission essential material is a permanent logistical task in the forward base to mitigate potential operational risks.<sup>90</sup> Overall, logistical forward basing will be gaining access to the crisis theatre quickly enough and initially sustaining the effort in an austere operational environment.

The remaining logistical challenge is the follow-on support for the operational forces when prolonged CRO's consume the airborne brigade's organic logistics.<sup>91</sup> This is the interface to Bw logistics. Therefore, the BWOPC, as operational HQ, is in lead to provide this support. The organic logistics, as essential element in the regiments, needs to at least buy the logistical time at the beginning of a CRO to allow the larger but slower Bw logistics to assist/ take over if necessary.

#### **4.4.3. Considerations about Transport**

The merging of infantry with army aviation results in an increase of maneuverability for the DSK's tactical units in theatre – a step in the right direction, but not the solution to overcome the tactical challenges.<sup>92</sup> Therefore, C-160 fixed wing support, as an inter-service coordination effort, should complement the rotary wings to overcome the challenges of heavier lifts and to enlarge the tactical (possible) distances. But fixed wing support requires tactical airstrips, which are rare infrastructure in Africa. Hence, these spots are likely contested ground. So, the forward deployed forces should also have the capability to parachute into a theatre and need to hold that equipment on hand.<sup>93</sup>

The pre-deployment of C-160s is a tactical demand to address the geographical challenges of the expected theaters, so it becomes an important request to national military leadership in a new CRO concept. Without this critical force enabler the tactical forces need to limit their operations in accordance with ground and helicopter ranges. Otherwise, the lack of organic fixed wing assets creates the risk of delay or stranding in a crisis region, which can have dramatic effects for resupply and/or medical emergency care to name some. While other options seem also suitable to mitigate these risks, the attachment of C-160s to the rotational engagements of the tactical units would at most increase operational outcomes. Consequently, this paper recommends the forward deployment of fixed wing assets to the host nation.<sup>94</sup>

#### **4.5. How would this new approach increase Germany's capabilities?**

This approach – as a precursor for a new CRO concept – fits with German political ambitions, responsibilities, and current demands to rethink security politics.<sup>95</sup> This proposed crises response approach could operationalize high payoff effects such as greater situational awareness, better cooperation and coordination, and finally a faster response in a crisis.<sup>96</sup> Moreover, forward presence in potential crisis theaters

increases indications/warnings and mitigates logistical problems in the event of a crisis.

Due to internal and direct lines of communications, faster and more detailed information sharing processes between the forces abroad and the remaining forces in Germany are other expected positive effects. This shortens time and minimizes communications failures (fewer links, less interpretation). Moreover, the mitigation of uncertainty by proper intelligence direction and collection is essential for political and military risk management. That said, decision makers' and operators' confidence – based on more reliable and accurate information – should increase.

The same applies for better cooperation and coordination with the relevant actors in a CRO theatre. Hence, the above-proposed establishment of an inter- and intra-relationships network of liaison and personal knowledge, over years, includes the relevant diplomatic and military entities. Cooperation with host nations, partner nations, and inter-service in the region helps to increase accountability and trust – starting during continuous efforts in peacetime. This will have its payoff in the course of a crisis. The forward deployed CRO taskforce will profit from its steadfast network of personal relationships, and could even serve as a coordination hub for a larger force.

##### **5. A forecast: What are the next steps and attributes for future scenarios**

This precursor for a concept includes various recommendations that focus on a reoriented approach for German CRO. In doing this, it overcomes traditional, outdated methods to counter complex, fast moving, and far-reaching security issues. Therefore, this paper has also the potential to serve as a litmus test for other security, humanitarian, and military campaigns/ operations in the challenged European neighborhoods – or wherever politically demanded.

### **5.1. What can it look like in the (near) future**

While most military advice mentioned here reflects the operational (and sometime tactical) level, the need to push ideas and terminology to the strategic and political actors is a prerequisite for the development of a new concept. A clarification of roles, limits, and relationships – with a shared terminology – should be the content in intra-military discussions, and in the following military-political talks.<sup>97</sup>

Necessary political support also includes the coherent and consistent messaging of the mutual narrative, as another recommended future step, to increase the support of various actors and to legitimize the concept.<sup>98</sup> For this legitimacy, the strategic messaging has to affect the German society too.<sup>99</sup> The advice here is to take the initiative in this strategic communication that provides momentum and domestic backing.

In parallel, the Bw – in particular the DSK– should do its homework in the military field.<sup>100</sup> The current engagements, including the new missions in Iraq and Ukraine, helped to maintain an expeditionary mindset for individuals. The Bw needs to find additional methods to prepare larger parts of its organization. The DSK should have priority; nevertheless, other elements need to change their mindset too.

In addition, the DSK is in the lead to articulate its military confines and stress limits to superior leadership in order to ensure an enduring approach. Internally, the DSK should focus on methods to mitigate burdens for its personnel and their families. Increased amounts of engagements, high readiness, and physical deprivation will, especially for the above demanded mature personnel, affect the operating forces. These expected effects would unbalance the burden within the Army/ Bw. It seems necessary to establish a form of a reward system for these personnel.

## **5.2. Ways to continue (mid- and long-term future)**


Personal incentives (e.g. reward systems) will have short-term effects for motivation. But soldiers in elite forces like the USMC or the DSK stay and fight for values – cohesion, pride, and warrior spirit. Therefore, these soldiers request the best possible support, by organizational measures and with material. This request often clashes with inherent persistence in the Bw – a large, hierarchical organization.<sup>101</sup>

Regardless, this paper envisages the organizational shift of fix-wing assets to the DSK. Direct subordination for increased freedom of action is a major (final) step that complements the crisis response capabilities within the DSK. Moreover, acquisition and/or contracting of a vertical takeoff and landing aircraft such as the USMC's MV-22B would further increase the DSK's operational capabilities.<sup>102</sup> Sea-based logistics, in responsibility of the German Navy, is another debatable argument. While such demands are long term in character and arguably – in the German context – idealistic military requests, these further developments would support the DSK to become an almost autonomous, perfected crisis response force – an international partner of high quality.

## Annexes

### Annex A

#### **Current missions of the Bundeswehr as of December 2014**



Source:

[http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw!/ut/p/c4/04\\_SB8K8xLLM9MSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pPKU1PjUzLzixJIqIDcxu6Q0NScHKpRaUpWqX5DtqAgASPKsIg!!/](http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw!/ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pPKU1PjUzLzixJIqIDcxu6Q0NScHKpRaUpWqX5DtqAgASPKsIg!!/)

## Annex B

### **Democratic Republic of Congo (2006) –the Responsibility to Lead**

The EU – based on the UN resolution 1671 (2006) – conducted the operation EUFOR RD CONGO in the center of Africa from July until December 2006. The mission was to support the UN-mission MONUC (Mission des Nations Unites en République Démocratique du Congo) by providing a robust force for the protection of the first “free” election in the DRC. For the first time, Germany took the lead of a relevant contingent (2,400 soldiers from 23 different nations) without United States (US) / NATO support. The strategic headquarters (HQ) was located in Potsdam (Germany) and Germany was – together with France – one of the two major force contributors. Furthermore, Germany conducted, for the first time, all phases of an expeditionary mission with its own means and responsibility. After a pre-deployment phase, the 780 German troops established a Forward Mounting Base (FMB) in Libreville (Gabon) and finally a Forward Operating Base (FOB) in Kinshasa (DRC). Following the conduct-phase, the Bw managed the strategic re-deployment by air- and sealift within one month.<sup>103</sup> Germany operated as lead nation for an international EU-force including strategic maneuver and logistics (without superpower support). These experiences were important for the internal evolution of the Bw as a force on mission.

### **Afghanistan (2002 - 2014) – High Intensity Combat Operations and Partnering**

Nested in the multinational combat and counterinsurgency campaigns, the Bw conducted action across the whole range of military operations. In contrast to the time after World War II, German forces conducted high intensity joint and combined combat. These experiences for Special Forces and conventional combat units provided knowledge, self-confidence, and trust in their own capabilities, especially for the young/ operating generation within the Bw. Nevertheless, it also resulted in the death of 55 soldiers (35 killed in action) and other negative outcomes of war (e.g. Post Traumatic Stress Disorders) for many combat veterans.<sup>104</sup> For the first time after World War II, a generation of German soldiers managed a wide spectrum of war effects. Over the recent years, within the hostile Afghan environment, a new combat proven generation arose.

As the phasing in AFG proceeded to stabilization and transition, the main effort shifted to train, advise, and assist tasks for AFG security forces. Due to the lack

of western civil and police personnel the German armed forces partnered with Afghans, those even from other entities outside the military domain such as the Afghan National Police, the Afghan National Border Police, and the National Defense Service. This unintended but necessary support, in order to build Afghan capacities, affected the soldiers (mostly) in a positive manner. No matter if young non-commissioned officers or colonels, they received another new experience. All earned cultural skills; they created personal working relationships within different languages, religions, and professions. Such experiences are difficult to train and educate in a national training environment. The real life circumstances in AFG matured the soldiers and created new qualities that allowed them to operate in the broad field of security assistance (mentoring, advising, partnering, training, assisting, etc.) within the current personnel body of the Bw. This quality should be sustained, even after the commitments in AFG, to support future missions.

## Annex C

### **Albania (1997) – a hasty NEO**

In Albania the situation became critical, including violent riots in Tirana, after the breakdown of the Albanian financial system in March 1997.<sup>105</sup> The Albanian crisis culminated in a massive civil disorder known as the Lottery Uprising (with some 1500 killed people). Thousands of people had lost their entire savings after the pyramids of the usurers had collapsed. The people took their rage against the state to the streets. After army and police weapons depots were looted by the insurgents, the danger for foreign citizens in Albania increased enormously. In parallel to Italian and US operations, the German decision makers (Chancellor H. Kohl and Minister of Defense V. Rühle) called for a NEO of the German Embassy, including foreign personnel. The hasty operation was conducted under command of Colonel H. Glawatz (commander LLBrig 26) and included further 88 soldiers and five CH-53Gs. The soldiers, at that time, were part of the SFOR-contingent and deployed in Bosnia. This task force operated, after its transition, from Dubrovnik (Croatia). In parallel, three C-160s transport planes were stationed in Podgorica (Montenegro) and one frigate operated in the port of Durrës (Albania). The heliborne operation rescued – after a firefight with unknown armed forces – 98 persons from 22 different countries on March 14, 1997. The refugees were taken to Podgorica after the successful end of the operation, from where they were transported to Bonn, Germany.

### **Libya (2011) – a doctrinal NEO**

Fourteen years later, as a reaction to the violence in Libya, and based on the political decision from February 25, the Bw – in coordination with the British armed forces – conducted operation “Pegasus” from February 26 until March 3, 2011. The phasing for “Pegasus” was conducted in accordance with the current doctrine.<sup>106</sup> Commanded by Brigadier General V. Bescht (deputy commander of the division), the task force after assembling in Seedorf – main barracks of LLBrig 31 – then deployed to Crete (Greece) into the FMB. In parallel, political (from Berlin) and military leadership (from Potsdam) tasked other actions. Minister of Defense K.T. zu Guttenberg informed the government and initiated diplomatic contact with the Libyan authorities.<sup>107</sup> Furthermore, he requested that both government and press to keep silent about the planned NEO for operational security. The military leadership in Potsdam coordinated the strategic deployment and space management in the area of

operation with other international militaries. Moreover, the military leaders ordered two frigates and one support ship into the Gulf of Sidra as a supporting effort. The forward HQ in Crete provided intelligence and established communication to a former British Special Air Service member (now employed for BASF-Wintershall) in Nafurah (Eastern Libya).<sup>108</sup> Finally, in a joint effort with two C-130s from the British Royal Airforce, two C-160 Transall packed with airborne soldiers conducted the evacuation of 132 civilians in Nafurah and headed back to Crete. After a short stand-by phase in Crete, the task force redeployed on March 5, 2011.

Annex D


Organizational Chart Division Schnelle Kräfte (DSK) – Rapid Forces Division



# Structure DSK

SION SCHNELLE KRÄFTE

EINSATZBEREIT - JEDERZEIT - WELTWEIT



Source: Division Schnelle Kräfte

Annex E

**Summary of SPMAGTF-AF deployments to date**

FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014
<p><b>SPMAGTF 12.1</b>            (Oct 2011– Mar 2012)  <input type="checkbox"/> - 180 Marines and sailors (reservists)            - CE from 4<sup>th</sup> Recon Bn<input type="checkbox"/>            - Sent teams to five African nations<input type="checkbox"/>            - Episodic, planned air (not organic)</p>	<p><b>SPMAGTF 13.1</b>            (Oct 2012*– Jan 2013)<input type="checkbox"/>            - 50 Marines and Sailors  <input type="checkbox"/> - Manned by IAs            - Episodic, planned air (not organic)</p>	<p><b>SPMAGTF 14.1</b>            (Jan 2014–Aug 2014)<input type="checkbox"/>            - 150 Marines and sailors<input type="checkbox"/>            - CE and majority of Marines from 3/8, but with augments from 2<sup>nd</sup> MLG  <input type="checkbox"/> - Attached to SPMAGTF-CR in February 2014<input type="checkbox"/>            - “Dedicated” air via SPMAGTF-CR</p>
<p><b>SPMAGTF 12.2</b>            (Apr 2012– Aug 2012*)<input type="checkbox"/>            - 125 Marines and sailors<input type="checkbox"/>            - Commanded by 3<sup>rd</sup> Force Recon Co (reserve unit)            - Included CE and six TSC teams            - Episodic, planned air (not organic)</p>	<p><b>SPMAGTF 13.2</b>            (Jan 2013–Jul 2013*)<input type="checkbox"/>            - 130 Marines and Sailors<input type="checkbox"/>            - Manned by reservists            - Limited crisis response capability<input type="checkbox"/>            - Episodic, planned air (not organic)</p>	<p><b>SPMAGTF 14.2</b>            (Aug 2014–present)<input type="checkbox"/>            - 230 Marines and sailors<input type="checkbox"/>            - CE and most of the Marines from CLB 2<input type="checkbox"/>            - Attached to SPMAGTF-CR            - “Dedicated” air via SPMAGTF-CR</p>
	<p><b>SPMAGTF 13.3</b>            (Jul 2013*– Jan 2014)<input type="checkbox"/>            -150 Marines and sailors<input type="checkbox"/>            - Majority from 4<sup>th</sup> Combat Engineer Battalion, but included Marines from more than 30 different active and reserve units            - Episodic, planned air (not organic)</p>	

Source: CNA Analysis & Conclusions, page 11

Annex F

**Summary of SPMAGTF-CR deployments to date**

FY 2013	FY 2014
<p><b>SPMAGTF-CR 13.1 (Jan 2013–Jul 2013)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 500 Marines and sailors □</li> <li>- CE from 22<sup>nd</sup> MEU □</li> <li>- GCE sourced primarily from 2<sup>nd</sup> Recon Bn</li> <li>- ACE from VMM-365 □</li> <li>- LCE from 2<sup>nd</sup> MLG □</li> <li>- Short rotation for CE</li> </ul>	<p><b>SPMAGTF-CR 14.1 (Jan 2014–Aug 2014)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 850 Marines and sailors □</li> <li>- CE from 8<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment □</li> <li>- GCE from 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn, 8<sup>th</sup> Marines (3/8)</li> <li>- ACE from VMM-162 □</li> <li>- LCE from 2<sup>nd</sup> MLG</li> </ul>
<p><b>SPMAGTF-CR 13.2 (Jul 2013–Jan 2014)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 500 Marines and sailors □</li> <li>- CE from 24<sup>th</sup> MEU □</li> <li>- GCE from 2<sup>nd</sup> Recon Bn □</li> <li>- ACE initially from VMM-365, then VMM-162</li> <li>- LCE from 2<sup>nd</sup> MLG</li> </ul>	<p><b>SPMAGTF-CR 14.2 (Aug 2014–present)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 1500 Marines and sailors (includes SPMAGTF- AF) □</li> <li>- CE from 26<sup>th</sup> MEU □</li> <li>- GCE from 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment (2/2)</li> <li>- ACE from VMM-264 - LCE from CLB 2</li> </ul>

Source: CNA Analysis & Conclusions, page 11

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Paul McLeary, Defense News, Washington, February 15, 2015. Accessed February 16, 2015. <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/policy/2015/02/15/us-nato-weapons-sharing-plan/23316549/>

“[...] on Feb. 5 NATO defense ministers voted to enhance the capabilities of the 30,000-strong NATO Response Force by adding a "Spearhead Force" of 5,000 soldiers to the organization. This new spearhead will be backed up by two more brigades that will be capable of deploying within 48 hours of a crisis breaking out. [...] As part of this new posture, NATO is also establishing six command-and-control units in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Stoltenberg underscored the need for the asset-sharing program and a greater emphasis on networking the allies in times of crisis, telling the ministers that if a crisis arises, these new units "will ensure that national and NATO forces from across the alliance are able to act as one from the start. They will make rapid deployment easier. Support planning for collective defense. And help coordinate training and exercises."

<sup>2</sup> Compare <http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/2plusfour8994e.htm> Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany. September 12, 1990.

The “Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany” or the “Two Plus Four Agreement” regulated a decrease of force strength and overall maximum from 500,000 to 370,000 servicemembers. Furthermore, Germany dispenses nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (according to this treaty).

<sup>3</sup>[https://www.bundestag.de/blob/195096/324b17baf5ce50c3149b3c2e7a51c879/parlb\\_et\\_gesetz-data.pdf](https://www.bundestag.de/blob/195096/324b17baf5ce50c3149b3c2e7a51c879/parlb_et_gesetz-data.pdf) Gesetz über die parlamentarische Beteiligung bei der Entscheidung über den Einsatz bewaffneter Streitkräfte im Ausland (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz).

The Bw is by law allowed to conduct these operations as a national effort. The conduct of timely critical rescue operations as part of CRO can be mandated after the operation. In such a case, the German parliament needs to be informed before the operation and mandates the time sensitive operation afterwards. This is another exception for this specific mission set within the German law.

<sup>4</sup> The absence of German forces in Iraq for Operation Enduring Freedom or in Libya for Operation Unified Protector are indicators of the restrictive use of military force by the German government. This restrictive and tough political process is unpleasant for coalition partners. Moreover, this sometimes unpredictable security policy causes problems for the Bw, and shortens timings within CRO scenarios.

<sup>5</sup> Germany operates a large variety of police forces. Besides the national police forces (e.g. Federal Criminal Police Office - Bundeskriminalamt, Federal Police – Bundespolizei), each federal state operates its own police (e.g. State Criminal Police Office – Landeskriminalamt, State Police - Landespolizei). This system becomes even more complex due to the different intelligence agencies, divided by national (German Intelligence Agency – Bundesnachrichtendienst; Military Counterintelligence Service - Militärischer Abschirmdienst; Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution – Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) and federal state responsibilities (16 State

<sup>6</sup> This argument is based on the author's experience with the embassy in Accra (Ghana) in 2005 and in Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo) in 2006. Moreover, recent conversation with members of the German crisis response teams confirm this assessment in reference to other members of the German diplomatic corps.

<sup>7</sup> General Carter F. Ham, "United States Africa Command: Statement of General Carter F. Ham, USA, Commander," House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, April 5, 2011. Accessed <http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/testHam04052011.pdf>

Rapidly developing and violent crises (often involving many nations) characterize the "New Normal". Examples include: the Arab Spring, overthrow of the governments in the Middle East and North Africa, the civil war in Syria, and the spread of al Qaeda factions to countries including Yemen and Mali. All these challenges also occur in Germany's immediate European neighborhood (e.g. Balkans, Poland) as well as in the adjacent regions like the Middle East and Africa.

<sup>8</sup> The Bw conducted the following missions with minor contingents:

- Iraq (Operation United Nations Special Commission UNSCOM): August 1991 until September 1996 (30 Army personnel in Bagdad and 7 Airforce personnel in Bahrain)
- Cambodia (Operation United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia UNAMIC): October 1991 until March 1992 (150 medical personnel)
- Somalia (United Nations Operation in Somalia UNOSOM II): August 1992 until March 1994 (1200 Army personnel in Belet Uen, 600 Navy personnel and 120 Airforce personnel in Kenya)
- Rwanda (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNAMIR): July until December 1994 (30 Airforce personnel)
- Kuwait (Operation Enduring Freedom OEF): February 2002 until July 2003 (250 NBC-personnel in Kuwait)
- Macedonia (NATO Operations ESSENTIAL HARVEST, AMBER FOX, ALLIED HARMONY and EU-Operation CONCORDIA): August 2001 until December 2003 (max. 500 personnel)

<sup>9</sup> Kosovo became a hallmark for German Military for various reasons. The author bases this assessment on the following arguments. For the first time after World War II, Germany sent a combat force – including combat tanks – abroad. With a significant peak of max. 8,500 mandated personnel, Germany's responsibility of their own Area of Responsibility (AOR) and General Klaus Reinhard's command authority this mission became the first full spectrum mission for the Bw, at least in the perception of the German population in 1999/2000.

<sup>10</sup> As a side effect of the war, 11 German civil employees of the radio station "Deutsche Welle" were encircled in the capital Kigali. Germany, at that time, had no

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forces available to rescue these citizens. Belgian Para-Commandos evacuated the Germans in Kigali.

<sup>11</sup> Bundeswehr Online, “Geschichte”, accessed December 13, 2014.  
[http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/heer/!ut/p/c4/DcLBDYMWdAXQWVjAvvfGFqU3N\\_kkVoKDYIOkTt\\_qPX7xn8IH4QOk85P3pI-3jdVYFJWmIcHZW9UuiJjXlaojeMQy8NPfFV6m4I9QAWeqqYa4LOtyw-AvKKP/](http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/heer/!ut/p/c4/DcLBDYMWdAXQWVjAvvfGFqU3N_kkVoKDYIOkTt_qPX7xn8IH4QOk85P3pI-3jdVYFJWmIcHZW9UuiJjXlaojeMQy8NPfFV6m4I9QAWeqqYa4LOtyw-AvKKP/)

<sup>12</sup> Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr, “Grundsatzweisung zur Vorbereitung und Durchführung Militärischer Evakuierungsoperationen.” Potsdam, December 2, 2011.

According to the current doctrine/concept the division builds the leading HQ and establishes C2 in a crisis response mission (e.g. a NEO). The division’s signal bataillon was responsible for the C2 connection between Germany and the FMB in a foreign country. The connection from the FMB to the FOB was a shared effort with means from division and brigade level. Furthermore, the Longe Range Reconnaissance Company 200 was an organic asset of the division and part of the crises response dispositive. This paper will focus on the specialized forces within the „Division Spezielle Operationen“ (DSO) and its successor the „Division Schnelle Kräfte“ (DSK). The KSK (special forces) is not the focus of the paper.

<sup>13</sup> The specific training together with the airborne combat and combat support units, established personal relationships, and mutual trust were important arguments to exceptionally keep the logistics and medics within the airborne brigades. All other conventional German army brigades temporarily get their medical support from the Bw’s “Joint Medical Service.”

<sup>14</sup> To the author’s knowledge, the mission specific training was supposed to be rotational – an annual cycle. While readiness for deep operations and early entry operations was always expected, the training for operations against irregular operating forces and NEOs should rotate based on an annual cycle. But the proposed cycle never happened in reality. One brigade (LLBrig 26) was mainly focused on NEO’s and the other brigade (LLBrig 31) became professionalized in operations against irregular operating forces. Due to the political restraint to keep the NEO task force as a national reserve in Germany, the mission experience between the two brigades was unbalanced. LLBrig 26 lacked for a long time (2000-2006) mission experience while LLBrig 31 got a lot. Part of the problem was the unwillingness to shift the missions due to the necessary after-mission phase for the personnel of the deployed brigade. The rotational system with only two brigades failed. Moreover, this became a lesson for the whole armed forces. Nowadays, the mission rotation is always with three elements.

<sup>15</sup> On the one hand, this motivates the personnel within the airborne units. On the other hand, it is an incentive for volunteers to join these units. The high reputation – as a hard trained, successful, and demanding force – is a second factor for the high numbers of volunteers. The third factor is related to the successfully accomplished missions. The use of the airborne units as the first force in mission (in all major land missions so far) or as a replacement for other conventional forces if the situation is

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more challenging (e.g. hot spots in AFG 2006-2009) affects young men (and some women) to serve within these units. All these factors are interdependent and characterize the airborne community.

<sup>16</sup> Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr, “Grundsatzweisung zur Vorbereitung und Durchführung Militärischer Evakuierungsoperationen.” Potsdam, December 2, 2011.

<sup>17</sup> Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/436, “Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte an dem Einsatz der Internationalen Sicherheitsunterstützungstruppe in Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF) unter Führung der NATO auf Grundlage der Resolution 1386 (2001) und folgender Resolutionen, zuletzt Resolution 2120 (2013) vom 10. Oktober 2013 des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen.” February 5, 2014. Accessed January 5, 2015. <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/004/1800436.pdf>

Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/3246, “Entsendung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte am NATO-geführten Einsatz Resolute Support Mission für die Ausbildung, Beratung und Unterstützung der afghanischen nationalen Sicherheitskräfte in Afghanistan.” November 19, 2014. Accessed January 5, 2015. <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/032/1803246.pdf>

The mission transition from ISAF to Resolute Support Mission (RSM) decreases the amount of personnel. The last mandate for ISAF (2014) has a bar of 3,300 armed personnel. RSM has – according to the mandat of the German Bundestag from January 1 – December 31, 2015 – the limit of 850 armed personnel. The conventional army divisions and other augmenties will fill this maximum amount of 850 soldiers. Therefore, the DSK will not have the responsibility to contribute as rotational lead division into RSM.

<sup>18</sup> This shift also changes the personal focus of the service members, modifies their direction for training as well as education, and decreases the level of mission experiences over time.

<sup>19</sup> Department of the Navy, “Naval Amphibious Capability in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Strategic Opportunity and a Vision for Change,” HQ United States Marine Corps, Amphibious Capability Working Group Report, Washington, DC: US Navy, April 27, 2012. Executive Summary p. 3.

“While future threats are inherently unpredictable, some emerging trends are clearly discernable. Diffusion of power to a wider range of state and non-state actors increases the likelihood of local instabilities, competition for resources, and regional power struggles. [...] The Nation’s most frequent security interventions will continue to be small scale contingencies.”

<sup>20</sup> First, the US is the only remaining superpower with global responsibility. Second, Germany has no ambition; therefore, no concept and capabilities for gaining access to a intact defended country – A2AD capabilities are not available or planned. Third, the German approach has a far more restrictive use of the military instrument of power.

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<sup>21</sup> The DSK includes now the KSK, three army aviation regiments (two transport regiments and one combat helicopter regiment), and one remaining 1<sup>st</sup> Airborne Brigade (Luftlandebrigade 1/ LLBrig 1) – comprising two airborne regiments, one reconnaissance company (LLAufklKp 310), and one engineer company (LLPiKp 270). Both airborne regiments (numbered 26 and 31) keep their own logistics company and medical support company.

<sup>22</sup> Bundeswehr Online, “Division Schnelle Kräfte,” accessed December 19, 2014. [http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/heer/!ut/p/c4/04\\_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP315EyrpHK9jNTUIr2UzNS84pLiEr2U4mz9gmxHRQC5SF74/](http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/heer/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP315EyrpHK9jNTUIr2UzNS84pLiEr2U4mz9gmxHRQC5SF74/)

<sup>23</sup> Robert M. Gates, speech, West Point, NY, February 25, 2011. In Kevin Stringer & Katie Sizemore, “The Future of US Landpower: Special Operations Versatility & Marine Corps Utility.” *Joint Force Quarterly* (Vol 69, 2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter, 2013), 84-90.

<sup>24</sup> Department of the Navy, “Naval Amphibious Capability in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Strategic Opportunity and a Vision for Change,” HQ United States Marine Corps, Amphibious Capability Working Group Report, Washington, DC: US Navy, April 27, 2012. Executive Summary p. 4.

<sup>25</sup> It is already clear that Germany has neither the means nor the intent to build capabilities comparable to the USMC. Therefore, it would be illusory to refer to a larger MAGTF, like the Marine Expeditionary Unit, as a capable force in the complete spectrum of crises response.

<sup>26</sup> Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, “Expeditionary Force 21,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, March 4, 2014), 14.

<sup>27</sup> Julia McQuaid, Patricio Asfura-Heim, Annemarie Randazzo-Matsel, and William Rosenau. “Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces in Africa: Development, Performance, and Challenges”, CNA Analysis & Conclusions November 2014, 17/18.

<sup>28</sup> Julia McQuaid, Patricio Asfura-Heim, Annemarie Randazzo-Matsel, and William Rosenau. “Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces in Africa: Development, Performance, and Challenges”, CNA Analysis & Conclusions November 2014, 29.

These national caveats include restrictions according force strength, logistical support, and training (e.g. Mission Essential Training for aviators) in European national territories.

<sup>30</sup> Kevin D. Stringer and Katie M. Sizemore, “The Future of U.S. Landpower Special Operations Versatility, Marine Corps Utility” *JFQ* / issue 69, 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter 2013, 89/90. Accessed January 18, 2015. [https://www.mca-marines.org/files/JFQ-69\\_84-91\\_Stringer-Sizemore.pdf](https://www.mca-marines.org/files/JFQ-69_84-91_Stringer-Sizemore.pdf)

<sup>31</sup> Julia McQuaid, Patricio Asfura-Heim, Annemarie Randazzo-Matsel, and William Rosenau. “Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces in Africa: Development, Performance, and Challenges”, CNA Analysis & Conclusions November 2014, 14/34.

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The African high threat missions are the diplomatic facilities in Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tunisia.

<sup>32</sup> Julia McQuaid, Patricio Asfura-Heim, Annemarie Randazzo-Matsel, and William Rosenau. “Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces in Africa: Development, Performance, and Challenges”, CNA Analysis & Conclusions November 2014, 16.

In addition: presentation USMC University CSC “Warfighting Lecture: Special Purpose MAGTF – Crisis Response.” Speaker: 8th Marines SPMAGTF for Command and Staff College, USMC University, Quantico, October 2, 2014.

<sup>33</sup> The author bases this assessment on personal interviews with USMC Majors from Command and Staff College in Quantico in winter 2014/2015 and the interviews conducted by CNA during their studies.

<sup>34</sup> Especially, the operators in the remaining airborne brigade share this mindset, a warrior ethos, and maintain the necessary mission attributes (see 2.3.2. and 3.).

<sup>35</sup> The regimental staff organically commands and controls nine combat ready companies: seven combat, one logistics, and one medical. Collocated to the regiments are the respective engineer and reconnaissance companies. These independent units are brigade assets; nevertheless, they can also operate on order for the regimental commander.

<sup>36</sup> Without running too much into tactical proposals for a next CRO concept, single capabilities like legal advice, military policing, information operations, press/media, or a second Air Liason Officer can become requirements for scenarios in a crisis. The DSK has most of the respective personnel in its organization and needs to augment it if necessary. The DSK is already tasked by its higher command to support the brigade for an operation.

<sup>37</sup> The Dutch air assets are (status quo) only available for peace time training due to national political restrictions. Therefore, this paper does not reflect these helicopters.

<sup>38</sup>[http://www.marine.de/portal/a/marine/!ut/p/c4/04\\_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK93MQivfLEtLTUvNI8\\_YJsROUAZGDc3Q!!/](http://www.marine.de/portal/a/marine/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK93MQivfLEtLTUvNI8_YJsROUAZGDc3Q!!/)

The Bundesmarine operates the following tactical ships and boats: eleven frigates (4xF124, 3xF123, 4xF122 – all carry at maximum 2 light transport helicopter „SeaLynx“); five corvettes K130 (1 light transport helicopter spot); six E-boats 143A; 3 replenishment ships 702 (max. 2 light transport helicopter – „SeaKing“); three reconnaissance vessels 423; four submarines 212A; two multi-purpose landingcrafts 520. Germany has no aircraftcarrier and no helicotercarrier.

<sup>39</sup> Department of the Navy, “Operational Maneuver from the Sea.” Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., January 4, 1996.

<sup>40</sup> The Deutsche Marine can support CROs within a limited scale by different means e.g. reconnaissance vessels for strategic intelligence; frigates, corvettes, and

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submarines for naval gun fire support and tactical ISR; replenishment ships and helicopters for logistics, transport, and medical support.

<sup>41</sup> Department of the Navy, “Naval Amphibious Capability in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Strategic Opportunity and a Vision for Change,” HQ United States Marine Corps, Amphibious Capability Working Group Report, Washington, DC: US Navy, April 27, 2012. Executive Summary p. 5.

The Amphibious Capability Working Group’s desirable vision of “standing combined arms forces that only require tailoring on the margins when a specific mission is assigned. Standing MAGTFs, strike groups, or larger naval formations, complemented by a range of specialized mission modules would allow mission tailoring around a well-trained and highly cohesive base” seems illusory for the German armed forces within the context of the next decades.

<sup>42</sup> That said, DSK’s tactical personnel needs to intensify the training with the Deutsche Marine to increase interoperability, to create personal relationships, and to establish standards.

<sup>43</sup> Both ships, with a capacity of 342 standard containers, operate regularly for international freight route service. However, they are available for commercial strategic maritime transport by German (and Danish) military forces.

<sup>44</sup> Generalleutnant Rainer Glatz, “Grundsatzweisung zur Vorbereitung und Durchführung Militärischer Evakuierungsoperationen.” Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr, Potsdam, December 2, 2011. Anl. O Nr. 1.5.3.

<sup>45</sup> <http://eatc-mil.com/>

After the commissioning of the European Air Transport Command (EATC) at the Dutch Air Base Eindhoven on September 1, 2010, the EATC coordinates the assigned air transport fleets of the partner nations Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Spain. It commands the German air transport squadrons 61, 62, and 63 (“green fleet”) and Germany’s Airbus A310 (“gray fleet”). This joint venture seems to be effective and increases mission readiness.

<sup>46</sup>[http://www.luftwaffe.de/portal/a/luftwaffe!/ut/p/c4/04\\_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP315EyrpHK9nHK9\\_KJ0vZzStJjc\\_YJsR0UAQvLrLg!/](http://www.luftwaffe.de/portal/a/luftwaffe!/ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP315EyrpHK9nHK9_KJ0vZzStJjc_YJsR0UAQvLrLg!/)

The 140 “Eurofighters” are very modern air/air and air/ground combat aircraft. The aircrafts are fully operational day and night and provide full interoperability with ground forces. In addition, the 85 Multi Role Combat Aircraft PA-200 “Tornado” can operate as fighter bomber IDS (Interdiction Strike) and as Tornado ECR (Electronic Combat and Reconnaissance). Some of the IDS aircrafts have special optical and infrared sensors – “Recce Tornado’s”. Fire, reconnaissance, as well as show of force tasks could support CRO’s.

<sup>47</sup>[http://www.luftwaffe.de/portal/a/luftwaffe!/ut/p/c4/04\\_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP315EyrpHK9nHK98sS0NL2SosQ8vURjQwP9gmxHRQA0EB3t/](http://www.luftwaffe.de/portal/a/luftwaffe!/ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP315EyrpHK9nHK98sS0NL2SosQ8vURjQwP9gmxHRQA0EB3t/)

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The four multi-role A310-304 can operate as personnel transport assets, mixed personnel/ cargo assets, medical emergency aircraft with an capacity of 44 recumbent casualties, or strategic air to air refueling tanker with maximum 72 to fuel load and 45 to fuel release. An A310-304 has a maximum range of 11,000 kilometers.

<sup>48</sup>[http://www.luftwaffe.de/portal/a/luftwaffe/!ut/p/c4/04\\_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP315EyrpHK9nHK98sS0NL2SosQ8vWRDMwP9gmxHRQBBAWIE/](http://www.luftwaffe.de/portal/a/luftwaffe/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP315EyrpHK9nHK98sS0NL2SosQ8vWRDMwP9gmxHRQBBAWIE/)

The Transall C-160D is a French-German aircraft and operates within the Luftwaffe since 1968. It needs a airstrip of at least 730 meters for starts and at least 550 meters for landings. The aircraft is limited to 14 tons, then has a maximum range of 1,200 km (5 tons – approx. 3,800 km). The C-160D is a twin-engine aircraft. That results in further limitations due to safety regulations in case of an engine failure at airfields with difficult conditions (e.g. in a mountainous terrain). Four-engine aircrafts have lower safety limits in such cases.

<sup>49</sup>[http://www.luftwaffe.de/portal/a/luftwaffe/!ut/p/c4/04\\_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP315EyrpHK9nHK98sS0NL2SosQ8vUQTAWP9gmxHRQCZEQ9B/](http://www.luftwaffe.de/portal/a/luftwaffe/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP315EyrpHK9nHK98sS0NL2SosQ8vUQTAWP9gmxHRQCZEQ9B/)

The A400M is a modern four-engine military transport aircraft, technologically comparable with the civilian A380. The A400M provides a significant increase due to its lift capacity to 32 tons, its longer range of approx. 4,500km (by 30 tons lift), and its capability for dirt strip-starts and landings in comparison to the C-160. Furthermore, the A400M is air-refueling capable and can by itself be modified as a tanker aircraft. Moreover, the aircraft can operate in a medical evacuation role. An electronic self-protection module increases its suitability in more permissive environments. The only obvious disadvantage (in comparison to the C-160) is the need for a 2,000 meter operational start strip and a 1,100 meter operational landing strip. This could restrict operational options, especially in regions with limited infrastructure.

<sup>50</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS),” last updated April 8, 2014. Accessed January 23, 2015. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_50106.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50106.htm)

Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS): “The consortium includes 12 NATO nations (Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom) and two partner nations (Finland and Sweden).”

<sup>51</sup> <http://www.antonov.com/aircraft/transport-aircraft/an-124-100-ruslan>

These aircraft, with a maximum lift capacity of 150,000 kg and a range of 4,800 km (with 120 tons of cargo) ensure Germany strategic deployments of “outsize” (unusually large) cargo, heavy equipment and weapons.

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<sup>52</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Strategic Airlift. Giving Alliance forces global reach,” last updated July 11, 2014. Accessed January 23, 2015. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_50107.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50107.htm)

The Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) includes ten NATO nations (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the United States) and two partner nations (Finland and Sweden). The first C-17 was delivered in July 2009 with the second and third aircraft following in September and October 2009, respectively. Its operational arm, the Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW) at Pápa Airbase in Hungary operates the aircraft. Germany is no member of this initiative.

<sup>53</sup> The A400M can transport all the weapons and equipment of DSK’s arsenal. Nevertheless, even for the A400M, lift of outsized cargo remains a challenge for more permissive operations and could become critical for follow-on forces when the DSK has established an initial entry.

<sup>54</sup>[http://www.luftwaffe.de/portal/a/luftwaffe!/ut/p/c4/04\\_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9nHK98sS0NL2M0qRiveQMU2P9gmxHRQC6cbSa/](http://www.luftwaffe.de/portal/a/luftwaffe!/ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9nHK98sS0NL2M0qRiveQMU2P9gmxHRQC6cbSa/)

The Luftwaffe operates the approx. 62 CH-53 in the following four versions:

1. CH-53G with IFR equipment
2. CH-53GS, "protected" helicopter IFR equipment, external auxiliary tanks for range extension, compatible lighting for low altitude night flying, and self protection kits. In addition, this aircraft can be equipped with ballistic protection parts and self-defense weapons.
3. CH-53GE, "protected" helicopter, similar equipped like CH-53 GS. But, the CH-53GE operates with inner auxiliary tanks for range extension.
4. CH-53GA, modified helicopter, with improved skills in navigation and communication as well as the self-protection equipment.

<sup>55</sup> A NEO of an embassy in an urban capital in Africa, surrounded by buildings with corrugated iron roofs, and contested canalizing ground lines of communications can exemplify the operational suitability of a CH-53.

<sup>56</sup> The same applies for the possible use of the Luftwaffe’s Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) “Heron 1” to complement the tactical UAS’ of the DSK.

<sup>57</sup> Edward P. Donnelly and Robert Maginnis, “Preparing Soldiers to Help Foreign Partners Meet 21st Century Challenges,” *Military Review* 91, no. 3, May-June 2011.

<sup>58</sup> Julia McQuaid, Patricio Asfura-Heim, Annemarie Randazzo-Matsel, and William Rosenau. “Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces in Africa: Development, Performance, and Challenges”, CNA Analysis & Conclusions November 2014.

<sup>59</sup> General John M. Paxton Jr., Assistant Commandant USMC, interviewed by Maik Muenzner, Command and Staff College, Pentagon, November 19, 2014.

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<sup>60</sup> Germany, in comparison to other European states, has no colonial heritage in Northern Africa and the Levant. This is also important for the different German perception in this regions.

<sup>61</sup> German military planners have solved the African geographical challenges – especially the large distances and limited key infrastructure –in various operations (e.g. Gabon, Senegal, Central African Republic) by colocating German contingents to French bases. France operates with approximately 10,000 soldiers out of three large bases in Dakar (Senegal), Libreville (Gabon), and the Republic of Djibouti as well as some smaller military bases in Africa.

<sup>62</sup> Michael A. Lewis, “Challenges to Sovereignty” presented to Command and Staff College, USMC University, Quantico, January 5, 2015.

<sup>63</sup> Lieutenant General Lloyd J. Austin III, Joint Chief of Staffs, “Foreign internal defense.” Joint Publication 3-22, Washington, July 12, 2010.

Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.

Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) refers to those activities conducted with allies and friends, in accordance with Secretary of Defense Guidance, to build relationships that promote specified [national] interests, build allied and friendly capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, and provide [their own] forces with peacetime and contingency access. This definition encompasses a wide variety of activities overseen and implemented by Combatant Commands and the Military Services, including military exercises and training events.

Additional comment: This paper does not focus on Counter Terrorism or special forces. Nevertheless, the KSK (SOF) as part of the DSK can also operate in these countries if necessary or if requested by the HN. These are hypothetical options, dependent on political decisions.

<sup>64</sup> Due the author’s experience over the last fifteen years in the airborne community, the brigades conducted an annual exercise, each airborne battalion conducted at least two more battalion-level exercises, and companies conducted further trainings. Approximately one third of these exercises are multinational in character.

<sup>65</sup> Due the author’s experience over the last fifteen years in the airborne community, one of the bataillon level exercises is normally conducted in the Combat Training Center (Gefechtsübungszentrum), a training facility comparable to “Twenty-nine Palms.” Moreover, bilateral exercises, similar to these conducted by the SPMAGTFs in Europe, have a long tradition between various European units and non-European partners such as the United States Army, the Canadian Armed Forces, Argentina, and Brasil.

<sup>66</sup> Julia McQuaid, Patricio Asfura-Heim, Annemarie Randazzo-Matsel, and William Rosenau. “Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces in Africa: Development,

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Performance, and Challenges”, CNA Analysis & Conclusions November 2014, 23.

USMC staff officers mentioned in the CAN report: “This [pre-deployment] training was roughly three months in duration and focused largely on cultural courses for Central and East Africa. It also included training on embassy relations in addition to tactical skills. However, there was nearly unanimous consent among SPMAGTF-AF staff officers that additional language and cultural awareness training would have been of significant benefit for the unit’s TSC teams.” This assessment is similar to the author’s personal experiences in various African/Middle East missions with the German Armed Forces.

<sup>67</sup> Rotational long-term engagements can motivate these military personnel to become local experts. Additional positive effects are the strong symbols of personal commitment and respect towards the host military and the host nation.

<sup>68</sup> The end of the ISAF mission provides example for such moral responsibility and its follow on effects. Germany gave asylum for some hundred Afghans working for the Bw.

<sup>69</sup> Julia McQuaid, Patricio Asfura-Heim, Annemarie Randazzo-Matsel, and William Rosenau. “Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces in Africa: Development, Performance, and Challenges”, CNA Analysis & Conclusions November 2014, 23.

The pre-deployment training was provided by the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG) at Fort Story, Virginia. “This training was roughly three months in duration and focused largely on cultural courses for Central and East Africa. It also included training on embassy relations in addition to tactical skills. However, there was nearly unanimous consent among SPMAGTF-AF staff officers that additional language and cultural awareness training would have been of significant benefit for the unit’s TSC teams.”

<sup>70</sup> A proper start could be the implementing of lectures or information briefings about the mission, role, and opportunities of the prepositioned forces in the country as part of the training for future ambassadors and diplomats. Invitations for visiting the DSK in Germany, getting first contact with the responsible military leaders, should break the ice early on for both sides.

<sup>71</sup> The military attaché normally seems the suitable point of contact within the embassy. Nevertheless, the tactical element needs to follow the instructions of the ambassador and can elaborate specific relationships in different countries. Institutional and bureaucratic guidelines should not hamper initiative and personal engagement by other personnel in the embassy. Reality evidenced that other personnel of the embassy (e.g. German Intelligence Services, GSG 9) had created the plans to protect the embassy. Furthermore, these personnel prepared the necessary preparation for security and evacuation. Therefore, the close coordination and cooperation with this personnel is important.

<sup>72</sup> Even if a frigate anchors in the harbor, that could create opportunities for exchanges, exercises, or building personal relations with the DSK forward element.

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<sup>73</sup> As in COIN, these lessons are important in all mission within the “new normal” – so in CROs.

<sup>74</sup> An incomplete list of proposed liaison elements to the US comprises the following: US AFRICOM, US CENTCOM, US EURCOM, SPMAGTF-CR, SPMAGTF-AF, and SOCEUR. Liaison to the French partners has a long tradition since the Élysée Treaty was established in 1963. Various cooperation – including mixed infantry and reconnaissance bataillons in a brigade and complete officer trainings in the partner nation– have been established. The “German-French brigade” could be another door-opener for shared forward bases. Furthermore, one of the airborne brigades (LLBrig 26) holds a long lasting partnership with the French. The airborne units annually train in a combined exercise named “Colibri” since 1962. The 47<sup>th</sup> exercise took place in Southern France in 2014.

<sup>75</sup> To the author’s personal knowledge: Germany has sent over 80 CSTs since the beginning of the contract in 2000. These are basically conducted in three categories. The first category is a routine CST in a country of interest with a currently stable situation. The second category operates in countries with internal tensions and violence. This CST can become a category three when the situation escalates and the diplomatic evacuation starts.

<sup>76</sup> The tactical level needs to be represented in CSTs. The operational and strategic level normally lack the level of detail and current knowledge to conduct CROs. That said, these levels are not suited to plan CROs. The author’s experience in Kinshasa provides an example. Due to the latest report the CST reconnoitered 4 potential helicopter landing sites and colocated collection points. The detailed professional reconnaissance by the combat control party (CCT with JFACs) ended in four helicopter landing site reports (HELSREPs). Three of the four proposed sites were not suited for any German helicopters. The fourth site was suitable for a one-time use. As a result the whole evacuation needed to be re-planned. A further clarification with the CST provided evidence about their lacking knowledge. The reconnaissance was purely based on the available groundspace. Neither condition of the adjacent house’s roofs nor the condition of the ground was part of their assessment. The procedure of an HELSREP was not known or available.

<sup>77</sup> The platoon leaders and company commanders can provide tactical expertise for the CSTs, contact embassy personnel, and sharpen their situational understanding. It is recommended to assign these tactical leaders only to these CSTs that operate in their region of forward presence.

<sup>78</sup> While SPMAGTF’s occasionally engage their functional teams for short durations to respective partner units, the DSK’s approach should focus on prolonged engagements with consistent personnel. The average mission for teams teaching basic infantry skills is four weeks. Logistics team missions typically last twelve weeks or longer.

<sup>79</sup> As described above, the airborne regiments (and possibly the units within the regiments) should have a partnership/ working relationship with the helicopter units.

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<sup>80</sup> Hub and spoke approaches seem to have the greatest effectiveness in oversized environments with limited forces available. Indications for this assumption provide the (intended) use of “hub and spoke” by SPMAGTF CR in Africa and by NATO for “Resolute Support” in Afghanistan since 2015. While actual circumstances and caveats will have impact on such decision making, for military operational requirements it is necessary to ensure flexibility. Long term visas for targeted countries would increase flexibility for the forces. The proposed rotations with permanent earmarked personnel could ease the overcoming of diplomatic obstacles (as experienced by SPMAGTFs with always new personnel).

<sup>81</sup> <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/332372/publicationFile/203767/DtAuslandsvertretungEnListe.pdf>

The use of embassies and their respective responsibility of additional accreditation for adjacent countries is a similar diplomatic approach of “hub and spoke.” The Federal Republic of Germany has currently established diplomatic relations with 195 countries, but embassies exist only in 153 countries.

<sup>82</sup> Other crises describe extreme situations outside Germany’s normal scope. This is most likely for NEOs. The conducted NEO in Bolivia provides an example.

<sup>83</sup> CSTs, in coordination with embassies, explore/ develop preplanned security locations, intermediate staging bases, and collection points; on which the forces in Germany elaborate the conduct of CROs.

<sup>84</sup> The next consequent step is the fitting of world-wide, redundant communication assets to the different HQs and forces in the field to provide continuous communications.

<sup>85</sup> These interministerial and intergovernmental relations benefit from personal links and established procedures. Any breach into this system by external actors appears disturbing and should be avoided.

<sup>86</sup> The author assesses that various scenarios require the establishment of a FMB as a logistical base and provide tactical advantages e.g. reduction of tactical movement cycles. Nevertheless, the majority of the tasks in a FMB are logistical in nature: the transition from strategic to tactical transport, medical support, resupply, support of evacuated personnel, etc.. The operational command should be limited to HN liaison, multinational coordination, and eventually media response. All other operational decision can be done either from the FOB in country or from Germany (with the same means of communications that would be necessary in a FMB). Scenarios with forward bases can likely minimize the need for additional “logistical” bases due to the already established lines of support and the pre-deployed equipment and manpower.

<sup>87</sup> In principle, the brigade should operate the tactical C2 in more complex and surprising CROs; on the contrary, the operational regiment can lead smaller and earlier monitored CROs within its own capabilities and with requested enablers.

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<sup>88</sup> Support management includes rental cars/ busses/ boats, sale of fuel/ food/ bottled water, etc. The training with host nation forces includes also logistical processes.

<sup>89</sup> Even here, a permanent relationship between logistic teams and their combat troops seems beneficial.

<sup>90</sup> This applies to ammunition, vehicles, helicopters, heavy equipment, sensible material (communications and intelligence), cargo handling equipment, parachutes, etc. The pre-stationing and maintenance will mitigate the potential risks of delayed/rejected foreign fly-over permissions and increase the available space for strategic/tactical lift of reinforcements.

<sup>91</sup> Julia McQuaid, Patricio Asfura-Heim, Annemarie Randazzo-Matsel, and William Rosenau. “Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces in Africa: Development, Performance, and Challenges”, CNA Analysis & Conclusions November 2014, 31.

“The logistics staff estimated that the SPMAGTF could be sustained for about five days, given its organic assets. Anything beyond that would be difficult and likely cause significant operational problems.”

<sup>92</sup> To operationalize this increase of maneuverability the new CRO concept needs to follow the above described recommendation to link tactical infantry with aviation units and forward deploy these on a permanent basis. Nevertheless, due to limited performance parameters of the helicopters (e.g. lift capacity, range, climate restrictions) – in combination with the described challenges of distances, limited infrastructure, and climate in Africa and the Middle East – this merging is only a step in the right direction, but not the solution to overcome the tactical challenges at all.

<sup>93</sup> France – a military power with comparable airborne infantry capacities – operated in Mali (2013) and Tschad (2006) with parachuted maneuver elements.

<sup>94</sup> In the absence of DSK’s own organic fixed-wing support the approach for the strategic assets with SALIS could work as a Bw-internal model. That means, a defined set of aircrafts, personnel, and air logistics is determined for the DSK. Hence, these assets are not part of the Luftwaffe-fleet committed to the EATC, and have not the time-consuming preplanning demands of “purple air”. Instead, these assets stay on hold for DSK’s training and missions in Germany. Another option is direct liaison and request for assets in adjacent missions (e.g. Mali for North Africa, Lebanon for the Middle East). Both options mitigate the risk, but hamper freedom of action for the operational units. That said, the third option seems favorable for increased operational outcomes: attachment of C-160/ A400M to the rotational engagements of the tactical units. Consequently, this paper advises the forward deployment of fixed wing assets to the host nation. This ambitious military advice leads to the consequence to organize an aircraft transport wing within the DSK (against all organizational challenges and service policies/agendas).

<sup>95</sup> Johannes Leithäuser, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 2, 2014. Assessed January 22, 2015. <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/afrika/ursula-von-der-leyen-im-gespraech-alleingaenge-mit-deutschen-soldaten-wird-es-nicht-geben->

This CRO approach is in line with the assessment of the German Minister of Defense Ursula von der Leyen. Von der Leyen, asked by reporters about the new Africa policy, argued that – in contrast to Afghanistan – the African Union and other organizations in Africa are willing to take responsibility for their contingent. Nevertheless, as long as these organizations cannot independently solve acute crises the international community and Germany needs to support/ bridge the gaps.

<sup>96</sup> Coordination, cooperation, and situational awareness are (too) often-used phrases. Nonetheless, as proved in many previous missions, all of these factors are essential for success in human environments and dependent on permanent ground engagements over a certain amount of time. For example, SA is the base of military planning processes and is heavily reliant on intelligence (processed information). This is a proper way to look for the normal and the novels in an operational environment (monitor the patterns) and the best way to perceive the indications for a crisis at first hand from the indigenous people.

<sup>97</sup> Only informed political leadership can build the necessary political will, financial alimentation, and political support for a new approach.

<sup>98</sup> Compare Julia McQuaid, Patricio Asfura-Heim, Annemarie Randazzo-Matsel, and William Rosenau. “Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces in Africa: Development, Performance, and Challenges”, CNA Analysis & Conclusions November 2014, 43. “SPMAGTF mission success requires the understanding and support of a variety of actors, including host nations, the GCCs, U.S. diplomatic posts, and the U.S. Congress. Our analysis indicates that the Marine Corps needs to do more to inform potential SPMAGTF “customers” about these units’ capabilities and constraints.”

<sup>99</sup> To implement enduring military engagements in a future CRO concept, political and military leadership need to be proactive in sending their messages pro-active to the various audiences. Initiative will provide momentum and backing. Otherwise, opponents will use their capabilities to explain their narrative first. This could have negative impacts for a reoriented concept. Lessons from ISAF, DRC, and other missions should be used to make it better this time. Strategic communications have priority for most future engagements.

<sup>100</sup> The DSK’s homework in the military field: the tactical concept for the airborne brigade/regiments, the elaboration of cultural education as well as language trainings, and the review of current liaison structures as an act of military professionalism in a time of reorientation.

<sup>101</sup> Both processes – organizational changes and aquisition – require money, time, and the need to overcome the inherent persistence of the bureucratic apperatus.

<sup>102</sup> Julia McQuaid, Patricio Asfura-Heim, Annemarie Randazzo-Matsel, and William Rosenau. “Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces in Africa: Development, Performance, and Challenges”, CNA Analysis & Conclusions November 2014, 16.

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Even if any above mentioned military advice related to fixed wing support becomes part of the new CRO concept, the Bw has no air asset like the MV-22Bs. SPMAGTF's reported "The MV-22Bs are capable of quickly executing long-distance flights [...]. In addition, the MV-22Bs vertical takeoff and landing capability greatly expands the area where the force can operate." These performances increase the capabilities for operational environments like Africa or the Middle East dramatically.

<sup>103</sup> Bundeswehr Online, "Demokratische Reublik Kongo - EUFOR RD Congo," accessed December 12, 2014.  
[http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw/!ut/p/c4/LclBDoQgEAXRs3gB ej-7uYXOhjTwRQLTbQQ18fRiYmr1UvSjnvCRIrekwoVGmnz6uNO4M8AiSeV2dbK LqH4pWivkHWgXTMBf82Y3rDarRDXYZ-001j-kNX-HG-DsBJ4!/?](http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw/!ut/p/c4/LclBDoQgEAXRs3gB ej-7uYXOhjTwRQLTbQQ18fRiYmr1UvSjnvCRIrekwoVGmnz6uNO4M8AiSeV2dbK LqH4pWivkHWgXTMBf82Y3rDarRDXYZ-001j-kNX-HG-DsBJ4!/)

Bundeswehr Online, "Operation Rückverlegung": Fünftes Schiff setzt den Schlusspunkt." Accessed February 12, 2015,  
[http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/NYtNC8IwEET\\_UbY5iNabbS7eR AStl7JtlhLMR0k2FsQfb3JwBt7lzcATSj2-zYJsgkcLDxhmc5w2MW2aBL44k7WUBOY0anljGZ-QP3Cvz7KYgyeuZPJscpeIHKJYQ2RbTY6xGGE0DI1Undw3\\_8hve1P9pT\\_sWnXur rA6d\\_oBLe4KbQ!!/?](http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/NYtNC8IwEET_UbY5iNabbS7eR AStl7JtlhLMR0k2FsQfb3JwBt7lzcATSj2-zYJsgkcLDxhmc5w2MW2aBL44k7WUBOY0anljGZ-QP3Cvz7KYgyeuZPJscpeIHKJYQ2RbTY6xGGE0DI1Undw3_8hve1P9pT_sWnXur rA6d_oBLe4KbQ!!/)

The strategic redeployments from DRC was a successful experience for the logistical chain of command. The lessons identified and lessons learned became added value for the largest logistical operation of German Forces since World War 2, the redeployment of ISAF in 2014/2015. The ISAF redeployment successfully ended with the final ship destination in Emden/Germany on February 3, 2015.

<sup>104</sup> BundeswehrBw Online, "Todesfälle im Auslandseinsatz." Accessed December 13, 2014,  
[http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/DcjBDYAgDAXQWVyA3r25hXo hRT7YgMUE1ITpJe\\_2aKdB-ZXITYpyppW2Q2b3Gfd5mAgPTVDT-cxQ-6i3gVMb04pHDYycYeWyEK3cOt1pmX5GIQYT/#par4](http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/DcjBDYAgDAXQWVyA3r25hXo hRT7YgMUE1ITpJe_2aKdB-ZXITYpyppW2Q2b3Gfd5mAgPTVDT-cxQ-6i3gVMb04pHDYycYeWyEK3cOt1pmX5GIQYT/#par4)

<sup>105</sup> Wikipedia, "Operation Libelle," accessed December 13, 2014.  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation\\_Libelle](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Libelle) (This open source describes the circumstances relevant for this paper. The German classified information are similar to the here mentioned timings, numbers, and circumstances.)

<sup>106</sup> Compare Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr, "Grundsatzweisung zur Vorbereitung und Durchführung Militärischer Evakuierungsoperationen." Potsdam, December 2, 2011.

<sup>107</sup> Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 17/5359, "Einsatz bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte in Libyen." April 4, 2011, 7. Bundeswehr Monitoring accessed December 16, 2014. [http://www.bundeswehr-monitoring.de/fileadmin/user\\_upload/media/BT1705359.pdf](http://www.bundeswehr-monitoring.de/fileadmin/user_upload/media/BT1705359.pdf)

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Matthias Gebauer, “Riskante Rettungsmission hinter feindlichen Linien,” in *Spiegel.de*, Cairo, February 28, 2011. Accessed December 16, 2014.  
<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/bundeswehroperation-nafurah-riskante-rettungsmission-hinter-feindlichen-linien-a-748020.html>

<sup>108</sup> Bundeswehr Online, “Operation Pegasus – Bundeswehr hilft bei Ausreise deutscher Staatsbürger aus Libyen.” February 26, 2011. Accessed December 16, 2014.  
[http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/NYrBCsJADET\\_aLMLRcVblxbx6kGtt7QNJdBmS4wWxI939-AMvMO8gQfkCr55QuMkOMMduoGP\\_eb6bSRHLE8k-xDcyjMvQxKyQiMxzpwULalb9pczEs1G8cjdD40Mez9P-F7aE\\_xWld-15zjBdZlqX8dpKfO/](http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/NYrBCsJADET_aLMLRcVblxbx6kGtt7QNJdBmS4wWxI939-AMvMO8gQfkCr55QuMkOMMduoGP_eb6bSRHLE8k-xDcyjMvQxKyQiMxzpwULalb9pczEs1G8cjdD40Mez9P-F7aE_xWld-15zjBdZlqX8dpKfO/)

The former SAS-soldier commanded 25 regional tribal militias, temporarily blocked the landing spot, and secured the foreign civilians.

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Bundeswehr Online, "Operation Pegasus – Bundeswehr hilft bei Ausreise deutscher Staatsbürger aus Libyen." February 26, 2011. Accessed December 16, 2014.

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Bundeswehr Online, ""Operation Rückverlegung": Fünftes Schiff setzt den Schlusspunkt." Accessed February 12, 2015,

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