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14. ABSTRACT Rehabilitation programs that address the main motivating factors that lead individuals to join terrorist organizations have a greater chance of success at disengaging terrorists and reducing the likelihood of recidivism than incarceration that is merely retributive in nature. Terrorism has been increasingly used as a tactic of warfare for non-state actors in the latter half of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st. Nations are not only faced with combating acts of terror but preventing them as well. In the process of pre and post-terrorist attacks, dozens of accused terrorists are apprehended and placed in a state's judicial system. Some convicted terrorists are deemed too dangerous to release back into society and must serve indefinite prison terms for their crimes in order to protect society. The question arises; however, of what to do with those captured or convicted individuals who will eventually be released from prison and reintegrated into society. Many nations across the globe have instituted a soft approach to countering terrorism through the use of rehabilitation programs. These nations focus their rehabilitation programs on disengaging the prisoner from terrorist activities through various humane initiatives that may incorporate religious, psychological, social, or vocational treatments and education. Rehabilitation programs range from the non-existent, such as in the United States to highly involved, as in Saudi Arabia. Terrorist rehabilitation programs utilizing					
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
Using The Soft Approach To Rehabilitate Terrorists

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR: LCDR John P. Oliver, US Navy


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Executive Summary

Title: Using the Soft Approach to Rehabilitate Terrorists

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Thesis: Rehabilitation programs that address the main motivating factors that lead individuals to join terrorist organizations have a greater chance of success at disengaging terrorists and reducing the likelihood of recidivism than incarceration that is merely retributive in nature.

Discussion: Terrorism has been increasingly used as a tactic of warfare for non-state actors in the latter half of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st. Nations are not only faced with combating acts of terror but preventing them as well. In the process of pre and post-terrorist attacks, dozens of accused terrorists are apprehended and placed in a state's judicial system. Some convicted terrorists are deemed too dangerous to release back into society and must serve indefinite prison terms for their crimes in order to protect society. The question arises; however, of what to do with those captured or convicted individuals who will eventually be released from prison and reintegrated into society. Many nations across the globe have instituted a soft approach to countering terrorism through the use of rehabilitation programs. These nations focus their rehabilitation programs on disengaging the prisoner from terrorist activities through various humane initiatives that may incorporate religious, psychological, social, or vocational treatments and education. Rehabilitation programs range from the non-existent, such as in the United States to highly involved, as in Saudi Arabia.

Conclusion: Terrorist rehabilitation programs utilizing varying modes of rehabilitation and treatment methods have a greater chance of success when the underlying factors associated with terrorism are incorporated throughout the process.

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Preface

Having been involved with the Global War on Terror since its inception, I have a deep connection to the lives that have been destroyed by the evil of terrorism. Realizing early on that that we will never see an end to terrorism, I wanted to look past kinetic operations and into alternative ways of dealing with this global issue rather than strict retribution.

I would like to thank my family for allowing me the time and space to complete this course of study and for their sacrifices throughout my almost twenty-year career. Special thanks and acknowledgment goes to my advisor Dr. Rebecca Johnson and her team of second readers: Dr. John W. Gordon, Dr. Benjamin M. Jensen, and Dr. James H. Joyner Jr. Your positive encouragement, tough standards, and fair treatment have helped me grow as a student, researcher, and officer.

INTRODUCTION

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many nations around the world have been on the offensive in the Global War on Terrorism. One of the outcomes of increased worldwide kinetic operations against terrorists has been the incarceration of convicted and suspected terrorists. Former senior terrorism analyst with the State Department's Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Dennis A. Pluchinsky, estimated in a 2008 article that outside of Iraq and Afghanistan there are no more than 5,000 global jihadists imprisoned around the world.¹ Despite the relatively low number of terrorists imprisoned globally, convicted terrorists who are not executed or serving life sentences will eventually be released back into society. Released terrorists pose a serious threat to society if not properly rehabilitated prior to their release from prison or confinement.

Current efforts to rehabilitate terrorists take on many forms throughout the world and meet with varying levels of perceived success. Some programs utilize a combination of hard and soft methods; others adhere to a strictly soft approach while still others incorporate ad hoc methods. Success of a rehabilitation program is difficult to measure for one country, let alone several programs across the globe as each program is designed specifically for the population it is attempting to reach. Rehabilitation programs that address the main motivating factors that lead individuals to join terrorist organizations have a greater chance of success at disengaging terrorists and reducing the likelihood of recidivism than incarceration that is merely retributive in nature.

The eventual release of terrorists from prison not only poses a risk to society but also generates the question of how can states mitigate this associated risk? Many countries believe that one of the methods in which to mitigate this risk and reduce terrorist recidivism is through the incorporation of a terrorist rehabilitation program. If governments do not take steps to rehabilitate prisoners prior to releasing them there is a greater risk of that individual recidivating and remaining a threat to society. Governments that offer rehabilitation as a viable alternative to strict retributive incarceration of terrorist prisoners are considered to be using the soft approach to countering terrorism. These rehabilitation programs use humane methods to deal with prisoners in order to produce a disengaged individual who can reintegrate into society once released without posing a threat. Although allowing time for reflection and perhaps self-correction, strict incarceration or harsh punishment does not address the underlying factors that caused the individual to become a terrorist. Rehabilitation programs seek to discover the root cause of an individual's behavior, correct it, and provide that individual with the personal skills and tools necessary to avoid those factors and reintegrate successfully into society.

This paper will discuss some of the motivating factors associated with individuals joining terrorist organizations. Armed with an understanding of these motivators, the rehabilitation process will be examined and key elements and characteristics of programs identified and correlated to these motivating factors. Without a universally accepted standard of success, programs will be judged based on the likelihood of success by how well these key program elements and characteristics are incorporated. Realizing that some individuals will fail at rehabilitation, recidivism among released prisoners will identify the need for continued refinement of the rehabilitation process. Finally, three terrorist rehabilitation programs: Saudi Arabia, Denmark, and Indonesia will be examined and measured using the elements and

characteristics approach as well as their resulting recidivism statistics to determine the likelihood of their success and areas for improvement.

BACKGROUND

Terrorism as a tactic of warfare has been on the rise globally since the mid-twentieth century. Terrorist organizations range from local to transnational networks of highly organized, trained, and equipped fighters with radicalized views resulting in violent attacks against governments and civilians alike. States have been combatting the threat of terrorism for decades, yet it has been the post-9/11 world that has seen increased efforts to combat and defeat terrorism on a global scale. In the 31 years prior to September 11, 2001, there were a total of 72,369 incidents worldwide.² Following 9/11, the number of terrorist incidents skyrocketed, totaling 51,822 recorded incidents in just 13 years.³ Military and police operations over the past fourteen years have seen thousands of terrorists killed and captured across the globe and yet, the world is no closer to eradicating this scourge.




Figure 2. Terrorist Incidents Worldwide 1970-2001, 2001-2013, 1970-2013⁴

Several high profile terrorists who were released back into society have reengaged in terrorist activities and have emerged as serious threats to society on a global scale. Said Ali al Shihri was a member of al-Qaeda (AQ) who facilitated Islamist extremist movement into Afghanistan. He was captured in 2002, sent to the US Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO), and remanded to the custody of Saudi Arabia in November of 2007.⁵ Al Shihri was a participant in the Saudi terrorist rehabilitation program and was eventually released in 2008. Later that year, he played a direct role in the attack on the American Embassy in Sana'a, Yemen, which killed 10 civilians and was later named deputy commander of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).⁶ In 1981, Ayman al-Zawahiri was sentenced to three years in an Egyptian prison on weapons charges following the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.⁷ Al-Zawahiri is now AQ's leader following the death of Osama bin Laden and is at the top of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Most Wanted Terrorist List for a litany of continued terrorist activities including the 1998 American Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.⁸ Terrorists such as these represent the harsh reality of the consequences associated with releasing terrorists back into society following their sentences or incarceration without proper rehabilitation.

When assessing the likelihood of success in terrorist rehabilitation programs, it is necessary to set the parameters for assessment. In the case of terrorist rehabilitation programs, the terms *terrorism*, *rehabilitation*, *success*, and *failure* are key aspects and should be defined. Just as terrorist situations across the globe vary, so to do these definitions. Once these terms are defined, a comparison of the varying terrorist rehabilitation programs can be made.

The definition of *terrorism* is not a universally agreed on one and is often defined by an organization in order to marginalize an aggressor. One of the main issues with attempting to find

a common and agreeable definition of terrorism is that what may be perceived as terrorism by one group may also be seen as a legitimate use of force by another group. Bruce Hoffman, Director of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University and one of the world's foremost experts on terrorism, prefers a simplistic definition of terrorism being "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence, or the threat of violence, in pursuit of political change."⁹ Hoffman further acknowledges the difficulty the international community has in defining terrorism due to the obfuscation of the definition created by the "War on Terror" and its association with American exceptionalism. Hoffman's definition for the purposes of this paper will serve as the benchmark as it differentiates terrorists from common criminals.

The term *rehabilitation* can often conjure up negative images of torture, inhumane conditions, unjust confinement, and politically motivated punishment, especially when a government orders rehabilitation for individuals who see that government as an oppressive one. However, current terrorist rehabilitation programs are not intended to be oppressive, harsh, or retributive. To the contrary, current publicly acknowledged terrorist rehabilitation programs seek a change in prisoner behavior that ultimately ends in his disengagement from terrorist activity once released from prison. This change in behavior is achieved through various humane program initiatives that focus on the underlying causes that brought the individual to terrorism in the first place.

One of the most difficult aspects with regard to terrorist rehabilitation programs is that of determining what *success* looks like. Each country's program is unique not only in the specific components that make up the program itself but in the types of individuals they seek to rehabilitate. What is successful in one country among a certain population may not be successful elsewhere. What can be said about the ultimate success of a program is that success is not

guaranteed but each program should strive to lay the conditions for success through an institutionalized rehabilitation program. Specific measures of success will be discussed later in this paper.

Unfortunately, the *failure* of a rehabilitation program may often have dire consequences in that individuals who recidivate have the potential to cause serious harm to the civilian population and inflict great damage on public and private property. If a rehabilitation program's goal is to produce a disengaged terrorist then a released prisoner who continues with their terrorist activity after his release should be considered a failure of the program. Recidivism can take on many forms from active participation in violence to association with other known terrorist elements regardless of one's intentions. Failure, much like success, is not easily identifiable but recidivism rates do offer a partial picture of program failure and inversely, its success. Ultimately, success and failure depend on how well a rehabilitation program addresses the underlying factors associated with terrorist activity.

TERRORIST MOTIVATORS

In order to fix any type of device, we need to understand how it works and what is broken. This same concept is applicable to humans, specifically with terrorists and their subsequent rehabilitation efforts prior to release from prison. By examining large groups of terrorists through interviews and observations, experts are able to identify certain conditions that enable an individual to seek out and join a terrorist organization. Once these motivators are identified they can be addressed one at time or in combination and then married up with rehabilitation procedures to eliminate them. If countries are seeking to reduce or mitigate terrorists and their associated activities through rehabilitation, they must understand the driving

factors that cause individuals to join terrorist organizations. Armed with this knowledge, programs can focus their efforts and correct the conditions that are the main motivating factors to joining terrorist organizations.

While there is no standard terrorist profile, a 1999 report by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress found that there are several key factors that make an individual susceptible to terrorist recruitment. Most recruited terrorists are unemployed, socially alienated individuals who lack education and proper religious training.¹⁰ Middle Eastern terrorist organizations such as AQ and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or more simply the Islamic State (IS) take advantage of some of the uneducated and uninformed and present only a narrow interpretation of the Islamic faith; yet, to new recruits who do not know the difference, this version becomes truth. The Kennedy School's Jessica Stern has made the argument that education and poverty are factors contributing to terrorism.¹¹ Many world leaders such as President George W. Bush¹², Prime Minister Tony Blair¹³, King Abdullah of Jordan¹⁴, and President Bill Clinton¹⁵ have also echoed the idea that poverty and education are factors leading to terrorism.¹⁶ Princeton economist Alan Krueger argues to the contrary and states "any effect of economics and education on terrorism is indirect, complicated, and probably quite weak."¹⁷ Regardless of the strength of the argument for education and poverty and despite the millions of impoverished people around the globe who have not turned to terrorism, these factors are still associated with some aspects of terrorism and must be addressed.

The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) compiled interviews and personal histories of 2,032 al-Qaeda foreign fighters in a 2010 report. The motivations of these al-Qaeda fighters were assessed to fit into four categories: revenge seekers, status seekers, identity seekers, and thrill seekers.¹⁸ These four categories fit into the overall assessment that many terrorists are

socially alienated individuals. Revenge seekers are frustrated and perceive themselves as victims in society.¹⁹ They seek an outlet for their frustration and terrorist organizations often provide that outlet through a target that is not associated with the root cause of their frustration. A lack of self worth often leads the status seeker in search of some sort of recognition of his value. This type of individual is often found in immigrants who do not feel they are valued in their adopted country. Many Muslim immigrants to European or Western countries are given low paying and menial jobs and face perceived discrimination and injustice. They believe that by joining AQ or IS, the respect associated with those organizations will transfer to them. Whereas the status seeker looks to stand out from a group, the identity seeker is looking to be a part of something bigger than him.²⁰ The exclusivity associated with any organization that is selective of its membership provides a greater sense of being elite and a desire to uphold the group's identity and values. Thrill seekers make up only 5% of those interviewed and were found to be adventurous but bored and unchallenged in their home life.²¹ The aura and associated glory of these organizations and their exploits is highly promoted and thrill seekers feel that such a challenge may be what is needed to improve their life.

Once inside a terrorist organization, members of the group become further distanced from a society that has already alienated them. One of the most difficult aspects to overcome with regard to terrorism is that of the radicalized viewpoints of the group and its leaders. While many newcomers to terrorist organizations are not radical to begin with, they are indoctrinated into the organization's ideology and fanaticism. A recruited member may have joined the cause not based on ideological goals but something much simpler, which can be found on Maslow's hierarchy of needs.²² Despite joining a terrorist organization with the sole purpose of meeting those needs or to seek revenge, status, identity or thrills, members may eventually become so

immersed in a culture built on misinformation and distorted foundations that it is difficult to escape. Rehabilitation programs seek to look past the radicalization and focus on the root causes of terrorist activity among individuals.

REHABILITATION

Governments maintaining custody of terrorists have the ability to execute, incarcerate, or rehabilitate based on the individual in question. If a terrorist is to be released back into society after a period of time, a government may choose to simply release or rehabilitate the prisoner prior to release. This rehabilitation process is considered to be a soft approach, as opposed to non-corrective confinement for the duration of their sentence or physical torture and/or hard labor. Rehabilitation is therefore humane and not wholly retributive. In using the soft approach method, the custodial government sees value in the individual and his ultimate release back into society as a contributing member. Terrorist rehabilitation programs should, at a minimum, have three goals associated with them: disengage the prisoner from terrorist activities, prepare them for reintegration into society, and provide them with the tools and resources to recognize and negate those influences that may lead them back to terrorism. These goals are accomplished using four main modes of rehabilitation.

In an earlier Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation (UNISCI) paper from 2009, international terrorism expert and head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, Rohan Gunaratna, explains that there are four principal modes of rehabilitation: religious, psychological, social, and vocational.²³ Most criminal and terrorist rehabilitation programs incorporate one or all of these. Using the four modes of rehabilitation, programs can address the

main underlying factors of terrorism: education, poverty, and the four seekers. Gunaratna stresses the importance of catering each program to meet the needs of the subjects involved. In doing so, programs are able to treat the causes of terrorism rather than the symptoms of it.

Religious rehabilitation is one of the most difficult modes to administer because religion is a personal commitment that carries different meanings and practices based on geographic and cultural norms. This mode of rehabilitation helps to identify and address the revenge and status seeker. Many Islamic terrorist organizations focus individuals' frustrations on the West and a perceived injustice to Islam. While not the original cause of frustration, terrorists justify their acts based on religious injustice backed by misinterpretation of religious teachings from terrorist leaders who are not religious scholars. Through proper understanding of their faith, prisoners can begin to realize that the West is not their source of frustration nor is religious jihad the way to vent that frustration. Religious rehabilitation also helps to dispel the status seeker who sees groups like AQ and IS as glorious organizations whose membership infers status. With proper religious counseling, status seekers learn to see these organizations for the violent reality they are rather than the defender of Islam they claim to be. Western nations will most likely have difficulty implementing the concept of religion being entwined with state programs, as there is normally a separation of church and state. Even for those Western countries that have state-sponsored religion, such as Denmark, incorporating a non-state and non-Christian based religion into their rehabilitation programs creates the problem of legitimacy.

Vocational rehabilitation addresses some of the most basic and easily identifiable underlying factors associated with terrorism, those of poor education and poverty. The status seeker may also find success through vocational rehabilitation. Providing prisoners with the educational and work skills necessary to be successful in society allows the status seeker to find

his self worth when he previously was denied such value. Vocational rehabilitation is also commonly found in domestic prison rehabilitation programs and is used to provide common criminals with a marketable skill set when released.

Both psychological and social rehabilitation modes encompass and address all of the seeker motivations. Psychological rehabilitation can take on many forms such as one on one professional counseling, group therapy, and mentorship all with the purpose of ridding the individual of his sense of being alienated from mainstream society. Seekers find comfort in the group mentality and these two modes of rehabilitation provide that more than any of the others. One of the most common ways social rehabilitation addresses these seekers is through the use of sports. The same reasons that generations of children and adults play sports provides prisoners with the answers to what they were seeking. Sports provide individuals and groups with camaraderie, the thrill of victory, commitment to others, an outlet for frustration, a chance to find or be a role model, and the opportunity to be successful. The core concepts of these two modes of rehabilitation help to break down the sense of alienation and reinforce a sense of belonging to a team, a sport, and society in general.

MOTIVATOR	MODE			
	RELIGIOUS REHABILITATION	VOCATIONAL/EDUCATIONAL REHABILITATION	SOCIAL REHABILITATION	PSYCHOLOGICAL REHABILITATION
	REVENGE IDENTITY STATUS THRILL	EDUCATION POVERTY STATUS	REVENGE IDENTITY STATUS THRILL	REVENGE IDENTITY STATUS THRILL
TREATMENT	DIALOGUE DEBATE CLERICS PRAYER SESSIONS ROLE MODELS	JOB TRAINING JOB ASSISTANCE INCREASED EDUCATION FINANCIAL SUPPORT PERKS	SPORTS FURLOUGHS FAMILY VISITS MENTORS COMMUNAL LIVING ARRANGED MARRIAGES ROLE MODELS	DIALOGUE PSYCHOLOGICAL COUNSELING MEDICATION

Figure 2. Motivators, Modes, and Treatments

Over the years, there have been several terrorist rehabilitation programs throughout the world including: Egypt, Colombia, the United Kingdom, Philippines, Singapore, Yemen, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Denmark. There are at least fifteen publicly known terrorist rehabilitation programs and most likely many more operating covertly.²⁴ For those countries that have rehabilitation programs, the soft method of rehabilitation offers a humane and alternative option to kinetic operations against terrorism. Rehabilitation programs benefit the individual by changing his behavior and also providing the necessary skills and coping mechanisms in order to reenter society. Overall success of these programs benefits society by removing the potential threat of future terrorist attacks and also by establishing an acceptable standard of behavior that may also form the basis for a broader de-radicalized and prevention effort within a country.

MEASURING SUCCESS

Most experts and researchers have found it difficult to assess the success or failure of

terrorist rehabilitation programs due to inaccurate, intentionally skewed, or unavailable data, as well as the lack of common grading criteria. John Horgan, Director of the Center for Terrorism & Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts Lowell, has authored several books and articles related to the topic. His paper “Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs” examines five rehabilitation programs in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and South America.²⁵ He and his coauthor Kurt Braddock conclude that despite numerous programs throughout the world: 1) there is no explicit criteria with which to assess the success of a program, 2) there is little data on these initiatives that can be reliably corroborated independently, and 3) there has been no institutionalized effort to study these programs either en masse or individually.²⁶ Absent tangible data and universal grading criteria with which to evaluate program success, we must look at the elements and characteristics of a program that will most likely lead to success. If the goal of rehabilitation is to produce a disengaged former terrorist who is able to reenter and participate productively in society then those programs containing elements that are geared to accomplish these goals should prove to be successful. This assessment method will allow programs to directly link causes of terrorism to desired outcomes through the use of specific and targeted treatment options while at the same time making program improvement easier.

It is good practice for countries to study multiple programs and decide which elements and methods seem to be successful and utilize them in program improvement, however not all programs are interchangeable. Other scholars, such as the late Christopher Boucek of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, are quick to note, that purportedly successful programs like Saudi Arabia are solutions that are unique to Saudi Arabia.²⁷ Boucek focuses on the Saudi program’s religious aspect, as religion is the center of Saudi society and the foundation

of its rehabilitation program. A comparative analysis of four European countries including Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden was conducted by Riazat Butt and Henry Tuck from the Institute of Strategic Studies as part of a European Union Commission report in May of 2014.²⁸ Despite these four countries being of similar culture and geographic origin, the report highlights that their respective rehabilitation programs are not necessarily transplantable and that success may not be guaranteed in neighboring communities.²⁹ Butt and Tuck observe that each program specifically targets an at-risk group that is normally unique to the individual country. Of note, they highlight that most European programs steer clear of theological based arguments that challenge the jihadi ideology in favor of addressing the social issues that lead to radicalization. In doing so, European countries may be missing an opportunity to build more potential for success within their programs as religious rehabilitation is directed at the revenge and status seekers.

The common goal among of all terrorist rehabilitation programs is to produce an individual who, when released, will not be a threat to society but rather a contributing member to it. Horgan argues in a 2012 journal article that terrorist de-radicalization and rehabilitation programs represent creative and innovative approaches to counter-terrorism that are an alternative to the archaic methods of Western penal institutions.³⁰ In another recent article, Horgan further states that the most effective programs focus on preparing prisoners for the challenges of reintegrating into everyday life.³¹ Rehabilitation programs that focus on countering the motivational factors leading to terrorism will provide prisoners with life skills they can use once they reenter society. Successful programs create a disengaged former terrorist but unfortunately, no program can guarantee 100% success.

RECIDIVISM

While each country has a different philosophy on the best way to rehabilitate terrorists and varying ways to measure success, recidivism rates are often used to publicly proclaim program success. Recidivism is a difficult statistic to track but it can be used as a program assessment tool. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) does not specifically define recidivism but sets three criteria: a starting point (release from custody, completion of a program, or probation), a measure of failure following the start event (re-arrest, conviction, etc.), and a recidivism window of time.³² Recidivism however, is not a completely accurate depiction of program success, rather just an indicator. Terrorist incidents and the number of active terrorists in a country do not directly correlate with rehabilitation programs, as new actors are not accounted for in recidivism statistics. Looking at terrorist detainees previously housed at GTMO offers one of the few well-tracked data points on recidivism around the world.

The goal of any terrorist rehabilitation program should be to encourage disengagement from terrorist activities and release a productive member of society all in the hopes of preventing recidivism and further terrorist incidents. Recidivism statistics only represent those repeat offenders who have been discovered by authorities and is not a complete depiction of those released terrorists who have reengaged in activities and remain at large and undiscovered. Despite being an incomplete data set, recidivism statistics provide a reliable pattern of reengagement in the years following release. Terrorist recidivism is often presented in various forms by governments, and while recidivism data may have varying and unequal windows of time, starting, and failure points they are relatively similar in trend.

The United States' Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) has been the holding place for hundreds of individuals captured during the Global War on Terrorism.

Domestically, the United States holds approximately 442 convicted terrorists in supermax facilities around the country.³³ These individuals have been convicted of international and domestic terrorism-related events since September 11, 2001. Prison sentences range from as little as a few years to life in prison. The question arises, again, of how to handle those prisoners being released back into society. Formally, the United States does not have a domestic rehabilitation program for terrorists. Convicted and suspected terrorists not being sent to supermax facilities are often returned to their native country, a country willing to accept custody of the prisoner, or remain in custody at the GTMO facility.

Assessing recidivism is a difficult task considering that recidivism is only discovered after the fact. Using the DOJ's criteria of recidivism, the statistic itself only includes those terrorists who have been released and then rearrested. Therefore, recidivism statistics are not a true reflection of the number of released prisoners who have reengaged in terrorist activities since many of them remain at large, operating under the radar of law enforcement, or unconfirmed in reengagement activities. However, recidivism is the only measurable statistic available to relate back to any sort of rehabilitation program.

GUANTANAMO BAY RECIDIVISM RATES						
Month/Year	Total XFRS	Confirmed	Suspected	Dead	Captured	At Large
Oct-10	598	13.5%	11.5%	13	54	83
Dec-11	599	15.9%	12.0%	14	54	99
Jul-12	602	15.8%	12.1%	17	52	99
Jan-13	603	16.1%	11.9%	16	51	102
Jul-13	603	16.6%	12.3%	19	52	101
Jan-14	614	16.9%	12.1%	22	51	106
Jul-14	620	17.3%	12.4%	25	39	120
Jan-15	647	17.9%	10.7%	27	35	122

Figure 3. Guantanamo Recidivism Rates³⁴

The initial recidivism rates for the first 598 transfers were 13.5% confirmed of reengaging in terrorist activities and another 11.5% suspected of reengaging in terrorist activities. Compared to the most recent DNI report of January 2015, the increasing rates of confirmed, killed, and at large former GTMO detainees is a troubling statistic but still within what appears to be an acceptable range of recidivism percentages. While these statistics are fairly accurate and a good indication of recidivism among former GTMO detainees, it represents only a portion of those terrorists who have been incarcerated and then released throughout the world.

CASE STUDY

There are multiple terrorist rehabilitation programs across the globe, each with their own perspective on how best to rehabilitate terrorists. The likelihood of success for three terrorist rehabilitation programs: Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Denmark will be assessed by determining whether their programs address these terrorist motivators through proper corrective treatment methods. These cases will demonstrate which terrorist motivators are addressed by the various modes of rehabilitation. Just as the face of terrorism changes throughout time, programs must also adapt by determining areas for improvement.

SAUDI ARABIA

As one of the United States' most important allies in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia plays a pivotal role in combating Muslim extremism in the region. According to a January 15, 2015 *New York Times* investigative report, 135 of the approximately 780 GTMO detainees are citizens of Saudi Arabia. Second only to Afghanistan at 203, Saudi Arabia has also received 123 of the

released detainees from the GTMO facility.³⁵ What began in 2003 as a secret program to rehabilitate terrorists in Saudi Arabia has developed into a well-known model for handling terrorists. Saudi Arabia was selected as a case study due to it being one of the more established, supported, and advertised programs making it one of the best examples of a terrorist rehabilitation program to date. Examination of this in-depth and elaborate program suggests that Saudi Arabia's rehabilitation program addresses almost every aspect of terrorist motivational factors. Saudi Arabia's approach incorporates a wealth of resources that provide the best possible support to all facets of their program. Other terrorist rehabilitation programs around the world can also look to Saudi Arabia's program and use those aspects of the program that address the underlying factors applicable to their countries.

Saudi Arabia's program focuses on three phases when attempting to rehabilitate a convicted terrorist. The program strategy is known as Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (PRAC).³⁶ It is a three-pronged approach to the problem of extremism within the kingdom. Saudi Arabia relies on the adherence and respect for the rule of law and the official government interpretation of Islam as the foundation of its program. It aims to show extremists that violence is not the way to bring about change within the kingdom nor is a twisted version of Islam the true interpretation of the faith. By highlighting the violent methods of organizations such as AQ and IS and their devastating results, Saudi Arabia's rehabilitation program hopes to disengage the status seeker. Saudi rehabilitation serves to demonstrate compassion rather than retribution to detainees, the understanding being that most detainees were seeking to learn more about their faith but were instilled with a distorted interpretation along the way.³⁷ After successful completion of the rehabilitation stage, PRAC seeks to reintegrate detainees back into Saudi society under careful observation.

While all three parts of the PRAC strategy are important, rehabilitation and aftercare are the main focus. Four sub-committees: Religious, Psychological and Social, Security, and Media are under the supervision of the Advisory Council of the MOI and are designed to encourage and assist the detainee in every way possible during the rehabilitation process.³⁸ These four subcommittees incorporate the main modes of rehabilitation in the execution of their responsibilities. Originally met with skepticism, the use of scholars, clerics, and religious experts has been able to lend legitimacy to the program over the years. The initial step of the counseling process occurs with the Religious Subcommittee, which comprises over 160 of these scholars, clerics, and religious experts. Their job is to engage the detainee in constructive dialogue that attempts to show how misguided the form of Islam they were following was while they were associated with terrorism.³⁹ Realizing that the West is not the enemy of Islam and that the underlying frustrations they were feeling initially are due to some other reason placates the revenge seeker. Instruction and constructive conversation on the true, state approved, version of Islam helps to meet what was originally the individual's aim of learning more about their faith. Through constant mentoring and learning, the detainee can begin to understand how misguided they were.

Aside from dialogue and assessment, the Psychological and Social Subcommittee also identifies the needs of the detainee's family. Often times, individuals join terrorist organizations in order to meet the simplest of needs in Maslow's hierarchy.⁴⁰ By determining what a family may need upon reintegration of their loved one, the subcommittee seeks to reduce the potential for recidivism of the individual or radicalization of other family members. In a 2004 study of 639 participants, the Advisory Committee found that most were from low to middle class families with parents and children alike having little formal education.⁴¹

The most crucial point and true test of the PRAC strategy occurs once an individual graduates from the program and begins reintegration into Saudi society. The reintegration process is introduced slowly through the use of an eight to twelve week stay at a care rehabilitation center.⁴² Prisoners are permitted to participate in sports and other activities, have family visitation, and even day trips and furloughs. One of the initial signs that an individual may be susceptible to extremism is the feeling of exclusion.⁴³ The concepts behind the use of team sports, communal living, and reengagement with family members and social networks help to bring back a sense of inclusion and self worth to the detainee. Activities like these directly counter the revenge, identity, status, and thrill seekers. In its final effort, the Advisory Committee leverages the strong belief in the social network of families and tribes.

The committee recognizes that these program participants are most often alienated and misguided individuals who have lost their way and are identity seekers. Leveraging the family as a support network as well as putting pressure on the family and community is often enough to keep the released participant on the proper path to being a good citizen of the country. Saudi Arabia further reiterates the importance that individuals are part of a community and do not relapse to their previous extremist ways by holding family members directly accountable for the individual.⁴⁴ This concept is introduced early on at the care rehabilitation centers when participants are given furloughs to visit family members. Three family members must guarantee a furloughed detainee's return or else those three members will take the place of the detainee.⁴⁵ The government will also withhold certain benefits to extended families for failing to keep the individual from his previous life of extremism. This form of leverage is used to promote the idea that the individual is part of a greater collective whether it is his family, clan or community. The

terrorist seeking an identity has the opportunity to find it once again among the very people from whom he perceived to be alienated originally.

One advantage that Saudi Arabia has over almost any other rehabilitation program is that it has virtually unlimited resources available. In 2014 alone, Saudi Arabia spent \$35 million on prisoner perks such as family travel expenses, food assistance, wedding gifts, rent payments, and school fees.⁴⁶ The Saudi government uses these perks to not only transform a prisoner's attitude and behavior but also to prevent the family members from turning to radicalism and terrorism. Such perks address the lesser motivator of poverty by providing for basic needs. Perks and financial support also correlate to the status seekers as they address the individual's need to have value. While counseling and dialogue help to reestablish a detainee's self-worth, vocational and educational programs provide detainees with skill sets to improve their quality of life. Other perks such as arranged marriages, housing, stipends, and vehicles help to alleviate some of the burden placed on lower and middle class families eliminating grievances that may generate a revenge or status seeker.

Over the years, the Saudi government has claimed varying success rates of rehabilitation for the over 3,000 program participants although proper data is difficult to obtain. According to Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, second in line to the throne and the Minister of the Interior (MOI), 35 program graduates (as of November 2007) have been rearrested, equating to a recidivism rate of 1 to 2 percent.⁴⁷ It is naïve to think or expect a recidivism rate to be so low considering that Saudi Arabia is the number two source of Guantanamo detainees and the number two recipient of released detainees and the GTMO rates are 13-18% on average. In 2009, five years after the start of the program, Saudi Arabia admitted that the recidivism rate could be as high as 10-20%.⁴⁸ In a recent *Washington Post* article, spokesman for the Ministry of Interior, General

Mansour al-Turki, placed the current recidivism rate for program graduates at 20%.⁴⁹

Government propaganda aside, recidivism is a difficult statistic to track as confirmation or suspicion of reengagement in terrorist activities may take years to discover or not be discovered at all. It is safe to assume that any recidivism data presented is on the low side as a result of a reengaged terrorist's ability to avoid being rearrested and the government's inability to detect such terrorist activity.

Saudi Arabia's program was most recently dealt a blow when it was discovered during a round up of 88 al Qaeda operatives that 59 of them were graduates of the program.⁵⁰ Despite the large number of program graduates being arrested during this incident and considering the number of program graduates thus far, the actual recidivism rate of the Saudi program still fits within the 10-20% recidivism rate acknowledged by the Saudi government and the GTMO rates. This particular failure in the Saudi program could be due to the possibility that participants in the program were not sincere in the recanting of their extremist views or not properly supervised upon release. Safeguards within the PRAC strategy, such as case monitoring and mandatory check-ins, should be able to recognize such anomalies. The final point of failure has to rest with the Security Subcommittee and its inability to successfully monitor such a large number of individuals.

The tenets of the Saudi program are sound but just as the threat is continuously changing, the PRAC strategy also needs to follow suit. The PRAC strategy targets almost every aspect of terrorist motivation from the seekers to economics and education. The program also utilizes the four types of rehabilitation mentioned by Gunaratna, as its subcommittees are aligned and tasked with religious, psychology, social, and vocational awareness and education. Saudi Arabia has created a model program; however, as the Butt and Tuck report has shown, not all programs are

transferable. Most countries that have the ability to create a rehabilitation program will most likely not be able to generate the financial support needed to maintain such an ambitious program filled with perks, rewards, and facilities as the Saudis have been able to do so far.

Denmark

Denmark is relatively new to terrorist rehabilitation initiatives. However, it is not new to having ideological extremists living within its borders. Despite being an open society with the potential for such tragic terrorist events as the London bus and Madrid train bombings, until as recently as February 2015; Denmark has been somewhat immune to deadly terror attacks. According to the Global Terrorist Database, from 1978 until 2013 of the three-dozen terrorist attacks committed in Denmark, only two fatalities have resulted.⁵¹ In February, a lone gunman killed two men and injured five others in Copenhagen in a Charlie Hedbo-style attack, bringing with it a renewed threat of terrorism within Denmark.⁵² Since Denmark has a relatively small problem with terrorists and terrorist attacks it makes it an interesting program of study due to an increase in Danish jihadists fighting in Syria and Iraq. Linking the modes of rehabilitation within the Danish program to the motivators of terrorism will provide an assessment of its potential for success.

For years, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA) have been concerned with the radicalization of members of its Muslim population.⁵³ The growth of IS has only fueled this fervor and drawn many fighters from Denmark. Over the past several years, 38 Danes have left Denmark to join IS. While some have been killed in fighting, 16 have chosen to return to Denmark.⁵⁴ Fighters who have returned to Denmark have promised not only that an Islamic caliphate will be established in Europe but also

that Denmark would suffer attacks.⁵⁵ The way in which Denmark handles its returning jihadists is what makes it unique among other programs.

Rather than meet these jihadist fighters with harsh penalties and disdain, the official Danish policy is to attempt a soft approach. As part of PET's rehabilitation program, these returning fighters are not treated as terrorists or jihadists worthy of criminal prosecution. Rather, they are treated as misguided individuals who have the potential to become productive members of Danish society. Unlike the Saudi program, jihadists are not met with prosecution and prison terms and are free to move about the country. Denmark is using a three-tiered approach to handling current terrorists/jihadists as well as those who are being radicalized or have the potential for radicalization within Danish Muslim communities (see Figure 1). PET's program focuses on an exit strategy for violent extremists, capacity building for groups and individuals at risk, and outreach within the community.




Figure 4. PET Points of Intervention in the Process of Radicalization⁵⁶

The use of Danish local government and business owners in partnership with Muslim community leaders helps to establish an understanding of the issues faced by native Danes and Danish Muslims. The motivating factors of terrorism, as pointed out by USIP and Stern, are also present in Denmark. Unemployment, perceived discrimination, and political inequality are many of the top issues faced by the Muslim community. These concerns match the types of seekers who end up joining terrorist organizations. Educators, mentors, religious, business, and political leaders in a proactive dialogue focusing on these driving factors should be able to reach disenfranchised youth who are most vulnerable to radicalization within their communities. Since Denmark is a relatively small country it has the ability to use a mass of resources against a small and targeted group of at-risk individuals.

PET leverages influential community leaders and specialized field workers trained at recognizing the conditions and signs that lead to radicalization.⁵⁷ Once at-risk individuals and groups are identified, workers seek to encourage changes in social behavior through the vocational/educational and social modes of rehabilitation utilizing methods such as encouraging a return to school, reconnecting with friends, and participating in community activities and sports. These PET workers become crucial in interrupting the path to radicalization. Without such intervention these individuals and groups begin to narrow their views, which lead to extremist beliefs and behaviors.

The Danish counseling program, however, is not soundly based in addressing the motivators of those seeking revenge, status, identity, and thrill. Of the four principal methods of rehabilitation Gunaratna mentions, Denmark does not fully address the psychological or religious issues associated with these seekers. Since Denmark does not place its returning fighters into

prison environments when they return, there is a risk that the individual may not be ready to return to society immediately. Whereas Saudi Arabia slowly reintegrates their prisoners back into society, Danish program participants are returned to the same environments from which they came without any adjustment period or tools to counter these influences.

With only 16 fighters currently in need of rehabilitation, Denmark tries to mitigate a premature immersion back into society through counseling. However, just six of the returning fighters have accepted the offer of counseling while the others only accepted social assistance. As a socialized state, Denmark is able to provide terrorists interested in rehabilitation with education, vocational, and welfare just as it would any other citizen. While social welfare addresses the education and poverty motivators, those ten not accepting counseling risk falling victim to the same factors that drove them to terrorism.⁵⁸ The current counseling offered is only that of a mentor who attempts to dissuade the terrorist from his extremist views by pointing out flaws in an individual's interpretation of Islam. Being a Western and Christian nation, Denmark is inherently weak on religious rehabilitation as the government lacks legitimacy on the subject of Islam. Denmark is attempting to utilize the religious mode of rehabilitation without the requisite expertise found in Muslim clerics and scholars.

Denmark's rehabilitation program is highly organized and modestly resourced but it falls short of fully utilizing all modes of rehabilitation to address the motivators of terrorism. The Danish program is strong in the social and vocational modes of rehabilitation that do touch on all of the motivators. While counselors are a positive first step, Denmark must incorporate the psychological mode of rehabilitation through caregivers who can professionally address the seeker issues. With relatively few individuals entering the Danish model in the exit stage, Denmark is able to focus its energy on the outreach and capacity building stages. The low

number of actual terrorists in Denmark should allow the program to focus its resources on this concentrated group of individuals. While the Danish initiative is commendable it only briefly addresses the underlying issues of terrorism. However, the program may be more successful if it addresses these motivators across all four modes of rehabilitation.

INDONESIA

Throughout its history, Indonesia has been no stranger to terrorism but has taken recent measures to mitigate such events. As the most populous Muslim nation in the world, Islamic extremism is in a continual clash with the established government. What makes Indonesia a viable case study is that despite limited resources and low government support, its rehabilitation program continues to make a valiant effort to be a part of a larger counter-terrorism strategy within the country. An examination of Indonesia's terrorist rehabilitation program will highlight how it focuses its initiatives on countering some of the motivators of Indonesian terrorists.

From 1999 to 2013 alone, there were almost 500 domestic terror attacks within Indonesia that have claimed hundreds of lives and injured scores more.⁵⁹ The most infamous terror attack occurred on October 12, 2002 at the resort destination of Bali, which killed and injured over 200 people, mostly tourists.⁶⁰ Following the Bali attack, Indonesia enacted the anti-terrorism law of 2002. This law gave the government broader reaching powers with which to combat terrorism. Despite the increased powers and traditionally weak prosecutions, the Indonesian government has tried over 450 suspected terrorists and convicted over 250.⁶¹ Few convicted terrorists receive execution or life sentences, resulting in release from prison and reintegration into society, creating a need for rehabilitation.

Indonesia seeks to rehabilitate some of its convicted terrorists. In order to accomplish this, it tackles the problem from within the prison system itself. In general, low-level terrorists are not the most radicalized and often join a cause based on the motivations presented by USIP and Stern. The first goal for Indonesia is to identify and separate those individuals deemed capable of being rehabilitated. By separating these individuals from the general population they are removed from the ability to be further corrupted by such radical masterminds as Abu Bakar Bashir, a founding member of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and one of Indonesia's most notable convicted terrorists. He is currently serving a 15-year sentence in connection with supporting a jihadi training camp.⁶² Such radical men as Bashir may be beyond the possibility of rehabilitation; yet, he will one day be released from prison creating a dangerous situation.

Just as Saudi Arabia's program focuses on Islam as the foundation of rehabilitation, so too does Indonesia. What is unique to Indonesia's program though is that it uses a former JI commander, Mohammed Nasir Bin Abbas, to spearhead its effort to establish dialogue with prisoners as well as form the basis of a prevention program within prisons and communities. Abbas' former position with JI gives him instant credibility among prisoners and he spends an inordinate amount of time with captured suspects often before police even have an opportunity to interrogate them.⁶³ Abbas, too, focuses on the misguided interpretations of the JI movement and its deviations from true Islam.

Drawing on his experiences and the violence associated with the JI, Abbas attempts to deflate the group's superstar image that status and identity seekers crave. Abbas is quick to point out to detainees that joining JI or any other terrorist group is not as glorious as the propaganda makes it out to be. Thrill seekers will also be easily dissuaded once the realities of camp life are experienced and a counselor makes clear to the inmate the distinction between propaganda and

reality. Having been one of the individuals seeking revenge, identity, status, and thrill, Abbas is able to translate his experiences and counsel terrorists on how to meet their needs through outlets other than terrorist organizations.

Incentives are also granted to prisoners as a reward for cooperation with police and investigators. In November of 2012, Indonesia took steps to strengthen requirements for prisoner remission and conditional release. The Ministry of Law and Human Rights issued Regulation 99 which requires prisoners seeking release to have a verified record of good behavior from an outside institution not associated with the prison, a written loyalty oath to the Indonesian government, and the willingness to provide information to police and prosecution efforts.⁶⁴ Regulation 99 also stipulates that any convicted terrorist must also participate in the rehabilitation program. This is unique to Indonesia, where as the Danish and Saudi programs rely on self-referrals, voluntary participation, or careful selection of worthy prisoners. Making rehabilitation a condition of release ensures that the prisoner receives some basic level of care prior to reintegration. These perks are able to meet such simple needs as logistical and financial support, providing travel and accommodations for family members to visit, and educational opportunities is part of the idea that benevolent treatment will go a long way in changing the belief systems of prisoners.⁶⁵ Such incentives help to address the motivators of poverty, education, and identity seeking as they help the prisoner reconnect with the family and society by which he felt abandoned initially.

Indonesia also has a strong counter-terrorism unit, known as Detachment-88, headed by Brigadier General Surya Dharma. Dharma also takes a lead in the rehabilitation program by conducting prayer sessions with captured JI members.⁶⁶ Prisoners are often confused at first by Dharma's participation but the common link of faith in Islam is often the first step in the

disengagement and rehabilitation process. While religious dialogue helps to address the seekers, the fact that the head of the counter-terrorism unit and two former terrorists administer this part of the program rather than government recognized clerics and scholars suggests that the religious rehabilitation mode is also not as formalized as it could be.

The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) September 2013 report on released Indonesian extremists used a five-year period as the recidivism window, previous convictions as opposed to arrests, and included terrorist suspects killed during police operations before they could be brought to justice a second time. IPAC found that the recidivism rate for terrorist offenders is approximately 10 percent.⁶⁷ While initiatives such as the use of former JI members, prayer sessions, perks, and rewards are all beneficial to the prisoner and his eventual rehabilitation, Indonesia's rehabilitation program as a whole lacks institutionalization.

Indonesia has suffered from five times the amount of terror attacks of Saudi Arabia and over 100 times that of Denmark between 1999-2013 yet their program is not as robust as the Saudi's or as organized as the Danish program.⁶⁸ Indonesia's 10% recidivism rate is commendable but as discussed earlier, the rate should increase as those terrorists convicted under the strengthened terrorism laws begin to be released from prison in the coming years. The Indonesian rehabilitation program is not institutionalized across the government or as well funded. The program relies on the Indonesian police and former terrorists to administer the program rather than officially recognized Islamic clerics, scholars, and expert psychologists. Providing prisoners with humane treatment, dialogue, and family interaction is a step in the right direction. However, in order to encompass more key motivators to terrorism and provide sustainability, Indonesia must reorganize its efforts and put the full weight of the government behind the program. There is little point to the government enacting tougher terrorism laws if it

is not fully supporting efforts to rehabilitate those individuals it incarcerates by addressing the underlying causes of terrorism.

CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS

As seen in these examples, there is no one exact blue print for terrorist rehabilitation programs; however, there are best practices throughout multiple programs. With no agreed upon criteria for success, individual programs are left to decide how successful they are. While recidivism rates are a good indicator, focusing on the motivational factors of terrorism and addressing them through the four modes of rehabilitation should allow programs to be successful at reintegrating terrorists and reducing recidivism. Of the programs discussed, Saudi Arabia positions itself for the best chance at maintaining a successful program. It addresses almost all of the underlying factors associated with terrorism and is highly organized, supported across the government, and well funded. Saudi Arabia cannot rest on its current successes, however. Publicly, programs will seek to inflate their success to the world but privately; they have a better understanding of where their failures may be. A continuous evaluation process within each program must be supported in order to keep pace with the changing threat and the interpretation of the trends associated with released prisoners.

While Butt and Tuck argue in their EU report that participation in these programs must be voluntary, there is no gain in a purely retributive penal system, especially for terrorists. Governments should make use of the time that prisoners spend behind bars. One Saudi official was quoted as saying, "if they do not help them, someone else will" and not likely someone with good intentions.⁶⁹ Governments have nothing to lose by attempting to rehabilitate those who will ultimately be released from prison.

The programs that have been initiated in Muslim countries focus squarely on the religious aspect as their foundation. Previously, European governments were mostly dealing with non-religious affiliated extremists. The rise of Islamic radicalism in Europe will require a refinement to European programs. Community outreach, involvement, and dialogue with Muslim leaders are steps in the right direction but the EU countries must go further. EU programs must now incorporate religious teachings from respected scholars and clerics that can counter the radical messages being presented by non-conformist members of the Muslim community. Programs seeking to alter radical religious views may need to seek cooperation from Muslim nations in order to gain legitimacy for the religious aspect of their programs.

Further, each program must be catered to the demographic it seeks to influence; however, some elements can be universal. The three-pronged approach is generic enough to engage society as a whole and allow government to tackle the issue at all levels. The amount of effort and specific methods can be tailored for each target group. No one element of the three-pronged approach will succeed on its own but a continuous and supporting relationship and refinement has the best chance of affecting the greatest amount of at-risk individuals. Programs that focus more heavily on the underlying factors that lead individuals to join terrorist organizations may have a greater chance of success by offering alternative outlets to these issues. Failure to address the key motivational factors of terrorism and not providing prisoners with the tools to handle these situations once released back into society will most likely increase the chances of recidivism.

Governments can no longer rely solely upon kinetic means to combat terrorism. Gunaratna further stressed the point that while “operational counter terrorism initiatives have received both investment and attention, strategic counter terrorism initiatives that ultimately end

violence including terrorism but require patience and sustained efforts have been neglected by governments and received inadequate public coverage.”⁷⁰ Governments must realize that most convicted terrorists will eventually leave their penal institutions and determine which path to take: conforming to societal norms or reestablishing terrorist ties.

Governments should do everything in their power to lead prisoners down a path toward reintegration through structured rehabilitation and after care programs rather than leaving them susceptible to the elements that brought them to terrorism in the first place. Investment in these programs is a small price to pay considering the death and destruction that may result if prisoners who are released resort to their previous ways, not to mention the expense of keeping these individuals in prison. Rehabilitation is not an instantaneous fix for an issue that has been brewing for decades. While a zero or single-digit recidivism rate would be ideal, it is an unrealistic goal. Governments should decide what an acceptable recidivism rate is and adjust their programs accordingly. Continuous refinement, multi-national cooperation, and a determined and dedicated government and society are what will ultimately succeed in transforming a dangerous and turbulent globe into a peaceful existence of differing values and cultures among people.

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