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United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

The Challenges Associated With Using Marine Forces Reserve in Defense Support of Civil Authorities

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Major Eric M. Olson, USMC

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Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Joseph W. Ryan

Approved: [Signature]

Date: April 7, 2015

Oral Defense Committee Member: Anne Louise Intemoff

Approved: [Signature]

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Executive Summary

Title: The Challenges Associated With Using Marine Forces Reserve in Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Author: Major Eric M. Olson, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: Employing MARFORRES units to accomplish defense support of civil authority missions is not the most appropriate solution because it distracts leaders from the primary mission of MARFORRES, limits the readiness of the Corps as a whole, and fails to apply limited resources efficiently and economically in support of the civil authority.

Discussion: Natural and man-made disasters on the homeland will occur with little or no warning. Watershed events such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina have served as the catalyst for improving response capabilities of civil authorities, but despite these improvements, the Department of Defense must remain ready to support these authorities if and when the conditions on the ground overwhelm the civil authorities' capabilities. Although the current Marine Corps policy for providing forces to support civil authorities on the homeland calls for a total force solution, the Marine Corps should employ its reserve component in a defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) capacity only as the last possible option. The employment of the Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) appears as an attractive course of action for DSCA due to its presence across the United States and the downsizing of the active component. However, employing elements of MARFORRES for DSCA requirements presents a number of challenges. First and foremost, defaulting to MARFORRES for these emerging responsibilities would cause MARFORRES to focus its training on meeting these responsibilities and not on its ability to augment and reinforce the active component overseas. History has shown MARFORRES to be essential to the Marine Corps' ability to fight and sustain operations overseas. Second, employing MARFORRES is not the most efficient element to use as it is burdened by recall of forces, minimal access to equipment and maintenance capabilities, and the potential that key leaders may not be available due to civilian employment. Finally, MARFORRES is not arrayed in a manner that would allow it to form the Marine Corps' preferred response configuration, the MAGTF.

Conclusion: The Marine Corps should allocate reserve component forces to DSCA requirements only as the last possible option. MARFORRES needs to focus all of its time and resources to building and maintaining proficiency in its core mission essential tasks so that it is ready to fight alongside or augment the active component overseas without needing a prolonged training period.

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Preface

I was first exposed to DSCA while serving as the Inspector-Instructor for Golf Company, 2d Battalion, 24th Marines in Madison, Wisconsin. The unit was not called upon to execute DSCA and my exposure consisted of a short Power Point presentation and the Marine Corps order. I remember thinking at the time that it would be a good mission for the reserve component. However, as my time with the reserve component continued, I changed my mind because of the challenges that face the reserve component with respect to efficiency and readiness relative to the active component. Further research as part of this assignment has reinforced my feelings that the reserve component is not the best force for DSCA.

I would like to thank Dr. Joseph Ryan, Ph.D. who mentored me through the Masters of Military Studies Program. Additionally I would like to extend my gratitude to Lieutenant Colonel William Johnson and Lieutenant Colonel Karl Rohr who read early drafts of this paper and provided additional guidance and information concerning DSCA. Last, I would like to thank my wife, Karen, for encouraging me to participate in the Masters of Military Studies Program and for understanding when I needed time to complete the work.

Introduction

Although the current policy for sourcing forces to support civil authorities on the homeland calls for a total force solution, the Marine Corps should employ its reserve component in a defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) capacity only as the last possible option. With the downsizing of the active component, the employment of the reserve component as the default solution for DSCA requirements appears as an attractive, viable option for the Marine Corps to fulfill its responsibilities on the homeland. However, employing elements of Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) in DSCA is not the most appropriate solution for these emerging responsibilities because it distracts leaders from the primary mission of the reserve, limits the readiness of the Corps as a whole, and fails to apply limited resources efficiently and economically in support of the civil authority. Ultimately, the Marine Corps must remain capable of fulfilling its responsibility that was outlined by the 82nd Congress and highlighted in the Commandant's 2015 planning guidance.

The nation's shock troops must be the most ready when the nation is least ready...to provide a balanced force in readiness for a naval campaign and, at the same time, a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large-scale war.¹

Inherent in fulfilling this responsibility is ensuring that the MARFORRES is employed in accordance with its primary mission and that its training is focused on tasks that will allow the reserve component to serve alongside its active duty brethren to close with and destroy the nation's enemies.

The United States has manned, equipped, and trained its military forces to overcome a myriad of threats. Yet despite the historical employment and success of the military, threats have not diminished. Since 2001, the military has experienced significant strain on its resources as a result of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, numerous responses to natural and man-made

disasters, and the maintenance of operational and strategic responsibilities. As participation in Afghanistan and Iraq draws down, the military is undergoing significant post-war downsizing and budget cuts. Although this situation is not unprecedented, it requires military leaders to establish policy and set conditions for success in future crises. This time of reduced manpower and fiscal austerity forces the military's leadership to decide on how it will continue to do more with less in meeting the nation's challenges. These decisions have the potential to shape the force, establish a posture that facilitates a rapid response, and maintain flexibility in meeting emerging threats or crises. However, leaders must base any decision about employment of the total force on complete understanding of the force, the environment, and the problem. Policies founded on an incorrect understanding of a force's purpose, capability, or posture will have cascading effects on the response effectiveness and overall readiness.

Background

Military employment policies associated with disaster response in the homeland have matured in the last thirty years, but the greatest progress has occurred in the wake of a number of major disasters that have transpired during that same time. Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) established United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), thereby placing the responsibility of the defense of the homeland under a single military commander. Activated on October 1, 2002, USNORTHCOM consists of personnel from the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. According to its Office of History, USNORTHCOM's primary mission is to "deter, prevent and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests," as well as "providing defense support to civil authorities."² Since its founding, USNORTHCOM has not had to commit military forces against a hostile threat within its area of

responsibility (AOR).³ However, the nation has called on USNORTHCOM numerous times to provide military forces to assist local, state, or tribal authorities in a DSCA role.⁴

According to Joint Publication 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, DSCA missions, as part of the National Response Framework (NRF), “may occur in response to, or in anticipation of, a presidential declaration of a major disaster or an emergency” and when response requirements exceed the capabilities of the civilian authorities and organizations.⁵ During DSCA operations, once approved and assigned, military forces assume a supporting role to the primary response agency. Military forces provide additional capabilities and resources as well as additional capacity by supplementing the resources of other governmental and non-governmental entities already responding to the crisis. Military support continues until conditions and response efforts reach a point that is manageable for the resources and capabilities of the civil authorities. Hurricane Katrina provides one of the most recognized DSCA operations within USNORTHCOM’s AOR in recent history. In August 2005, Katrina caused significant damage to infrastructure, destroyed homes and threatened lives, and quickly overwhelmed local civilian response efforts along the coastal areas of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Civil authorities requested assistance, and USNORTHCOM responded with significant resources, contributing unique capabilities and additional capacity to deal with the hurricane’s aftermath. According to “A Short History of United States Northern Command,” USNORTHCOM’s response to Hurricane Katrina included:

22,000 personnel from every branch of the U.S. military participated in the effort which included search and rescue; security assessment, advice, and technical assistance; evacuation; recovery of deceased persons; health and medical support; debris removal; restoration of infrastructure; logistics, including distribution of food, water, and ice; temporary shelter; long-range communications; housing of FEMA officials and relief workers; and provision of geospatial products and evaluations.⁶

Although not all as well publicized, USNORTHCOM supported DSCA missions both before and after response to the Hurricane Katrina aftermath. Other examples of DSCA support include the space shuttle *Columbia* disaster in 2003, the I-35 bridge collapse in 2007, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, and the nearly annual wildfire firefighting support in the Western United States.⁷

As evidenced in the DSCA response to Katrina and other disasters, all services can be called upon to support civil authorities, and the United States Marine Corps is no exception. As an element of USNORTHCOM, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, North (MARFORNORTH) contributes to the overall capability and readiness of USNORTHCOM to fulfill its DSCA responsibilities in the wake of disaster.⁸ Besides a headquarters staff, MARFORNORTH has no organic forces, and depends on forces allocated by U.S. Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM), through the Global Force Management process.⁹ Drawing on the entire Marine Corps (active and reserve components), MARFORCOM determines the most appropriate, ready, and available forces to support DSCA requirements in the wake of a natural disaster within the continental United States.

HD, HS, and DSCA

A deeper understanding of the terms homeland defense (HD) and homeland security (HS) presented in Joint Publication 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, helps to frame the importance of DSCA with respect to the security of the homeland and potential challenges it presents to the defense of the nation. Homeland defense, as defined in JP 3-28, is the “protection of US sovereign territory, the domestic population, and critical infrastructures against external threats and aggression or other threats, as directed by the President.”¹⁰ HD is the responsibility of the DOD and typically corresponds to the employment of the military overseas to deter or

defeat threats as well as the immediate air, land, maritime, and ballistic missile defense of the nation.¹¹

JP 3-28 defines HS as the “concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the US; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur.”¹² HS efforts are focused internal to the territory of the United States and are the domain of federal, state, local, and tribal authorities and organizations. When these civil authorities, within their HS responsibilities, lack the expertise or resources to prevent or overcome a crisis, DSCA serves as a complementary effort and plays a critical role in assisting those civil authorities and organizations.

According to JP 3-28, DSCA consists of support from federal military forces “to prepare, prevent, protect, respond, and recover from domestic incidents including terrorist attacks, major disasters, both natural and man-made, and planned domestic special events.”¹³ As witnessed in prior DSCA responses, the additional capabilities and capacity of federal military forces that can be brought to bear, relatively rapidly, to augment civil authorities can have positive effects on mission success and directly contribute to homeland security. However, saddling DSCA responsibilities on or forcing a shift in training focus for any portion of the Marine Corps towards disaster relief requirements creates a risk to the overall readiness of the force.

The Role of the Marine Corps

As stated in MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations*, the United States Marine Corps is responsible to “develop concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures; organize, train, equip, and provide forces, normally employed as combined arms air-ground task forces, to serve as expeditionary forces in readiness.”¹⁴ With respect to these capabilities and the organization of

the forces, the Marine Corps makes no distinction between MARFORRES and the active component. MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations*, explicitly states that “Reserve Component units are indistinguishable from those of the Active Component with regard to the range of missions they are capable of performing.”¹⁵ As the nation’s middleweight, expeditionary force in readiness, the Marine Corps (active and reserve components) must be prepared to execute operations outlined in MCDP 1-0. These operations primarily focus on operations that contribute to homeland defense (HD), but MCDP 1-0 does make a brief reference to DSCA. DSCA is listed as the seventh out of eight Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations that the Marine Corps are most likely to face.¹⁶ As a result, Marine Corps leadership cannot ignore operations and challenges associated with DSCA.

The Marine Corps must be capable of responding across the range of military operations (ROMO) to fulfill its responsibilities overseas and on the homeland. The ROMO extends from security cooperation to crisis response to major combat operations. Within an environment of limited time and resources, leaders need to focus on the high-intensity conflict end of the ROMO. Tasks associated with major combat operations are the most complex, often translate to success in the intermediate range of limited contingency operations, and establish a solid foundation for theater security cooperation exercises. As an additional benefit for training to this end, preparation for high-intensity conflict typically facilitates greater development of subordinate units and personnel. Finally, the consequences of failure at this end of the ROMO are the costliest in both blood and treasure. Unfortunately, competence at the low-intensity end of the ROMO does not directly translate to higher probability of success during crisis response or major combat operations. Therefore, the total force Marine Corps must continue to focus training at the high-intensity end of the ROMO to maintain its foundation of being able to

respond across the ROMO.

Marine Forces Reserve

The mission of the MARFORRES is to provide the “Active Component with trained units and individual Marines as a sustainable and ready operational reserve in order to augment and reinforce active forces for employment across the full spectrum of crisis and global engagement.”¹⁷ To accomplish this mission, MARFORRES is organized, trained, and equipped in the same manner and against the same standards as the Active Component, contributing to better interoperability throughout the total force. On paper, MARFORRES possesses the same combined arms competencies as the active component but at a reduced capacity simply due to the relative size of the reserve component. MARFORRES serves to extend the endurance of the active component and, as Lieutenant General Steven Hummer stated, to serve “as the essential shock absorber for the Active Component.”¹⁸ By deploying in support of overseas operations, whether combat or theater security cooperation operations, MARFORRES units alleviate the strain on active duty elements by shouldering some of the Marine Corps’ HD responsibilities. Lieutenant General Richard Mills, Commander of MARFORRES, stated that, in 2013, MARFORRES “remained an integral part of the Total Force Marine Corps and continued to serve in an operationally-focused manner...in direct support of combatant commanders’ requirements.”¹⁹ These commitments enable a more sustainable deploy/dwell rotation with regard to training and equipment readiness, family separation, and physical and mental health. Ensuring that MARFORRES is prepared and available to continue its contributions to the total force is clearly necessary for the health of the total force. A short review of the historical employment of MARFORRES highlights how MARFORRES has contributed to the defense of

the homeland and can offer some insight as to how and when they most likely will be employed in the future.

The Marine Corps Reserve was established in 1916 when Congress passed a Naval Appropriations Act that served as “the statutory authority for the creation of the Marine Corps Reserve.”²⁰ Since that time, the Marine Corps Reserve has fulfilled its mission of providing trained units and individual Marines to serve alongside the active duty Marine Corps, and it has done so in every major conflict since, and including World War I.²¹ According to ECP 15-2, *The Marine Corps Reserve – A Short History*, during World War II, Reservists carried more than their fair share of the load and “comprised approximately 68% of the total wartime Marine personnel.”²² Prior to the Korean War, the wholesale reduction in Marine forces left the active component so grossly undermanned that it could not independently fulfill its required force contribution. As a result, the Marine Corps depended heavily upon the reserve component to fill the ranks of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and 1st Marine Division. During the Korean War, 85,000 Reservists were mobilized and constituted a significant portion of all Marine Forces. ECP 15-2 states, “at one time, the Reserve comprised 50% of all personnel in the First Marine Division in Korea and over 85% of the Second Marine Division at Camp Lejeune.”²³ During the Vietnam War, mobilization of organized Marine Reserve units did not occur. Policy decisions made at the national-level prevented the recall and mobilization of organized Reserve forces—the same forces that proved critical to the nation’s and the Marine Corps’ success in Korea approximately decade earlier. However, those policies did not prevent Marine Reservists from participating in Vietnam. Marine Reservists rounded out the ranks of the Active Component by individually volunteering to serve in Vietnam.²⁴

A look at the more recent employment history of the Reserves, reinforces the fact that the

Reserve Component is essential to the Marine Corps ability to respond to and sustain the nation's call. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Marine Corps depended on its reserve component more than any other service, mobilizing a higher percentage of its reserve component than any other service. The mobilization of approximately 30,000 reservists brought the Marine Corps' active duty end strength to over 200,000. Of those reservists mobilized, approximately half were deployed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the remainder backfilled critical billets stateside or deployed elsewhere to support training exercises.²⁵ A review of MARFORRES's participation in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom further reinforces the contribution MARFORRES has made to the Marine Corps Total Force. Since September 11, 2001, more than 80,000 Marine Reservists have mobilized in direct support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, or other overseas contingency operations.²⁶ Regardless of location, MARFORRES units have served alongside and with active duty units, have been directly responsible for control of battlespace, and have been expected to perform the same missions as the active component.

Based on historical employment, it is evident that MARFORRES has continually fulfilled its mission to serve or fight alongside its active duty brethren overseas in support of homeland defense. Furthermore, this brief review of the reserve component's employment highlights the fact that MARFORRES is an essential element of the total force in meeting the enemy and sustaining the fight. To ensure MARFORRES remains a relevant component of the Marine Corps in the defense of the nation, its training focus, time, and resources must be protected.

Training and Readiness Cycle

In recent years, MARFORRES has renamed its force generation model to a training and readiness cycle and has refined it from a process that was based solely on a one to five ratio of

activated status to non-activated status to one of a training continuum. Under the previous model, a MARFORRES unit would be designated as ready for activation for a one-year period regardless of previous training exercises or level of proficiency. Following that year of potential activation, that unit would not be designated for activation for five years. MARFORRES's training and readiness cycle is more prescriptive and will ensure MARFORRES elements are better prepared to integrate with the active component and contribute to the total force. Under the new training and readiness cycle, a unit progresses through a five-year training and readiness cycle. The first four years constitute the training period during which a unit builds proficiency within its METs. Highlights of the training period include service and joint exercises during the second, third, and fourth years to develop and enhance interoperability within the MAGTF construct and across the DOD. During the fourth year, the unit is evaluated during a service or joint exercise. Satisfactory participation in this exercise establishes that unit as "ready," and according to Lieutenant General Hummer, this "ready" unit is able to "augment and reinforce a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) whether in support of a contingency response, part of a pre-planned, budgeted for, theater security cooperation mission, or in support of crisis response within the United States."²⁷ During the fifth year, the unit would deploy to support a combatant commander requirement such as participation in the unit deployment program (UDP), special-purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF), or direct support to ongoing combat operations. Although domestic crisis response is listed as a potential employment option during the fifth year, the major service and joint exercises during the Training and Readiness Cycle are focused and evaluate reserve units on their ability to execute major combat related tasks.

Training Time and Focus

Time is a valuable resource in both MARFORRES and the active component, but the time available for training in MARFORRES pales in comparison to the time available to the active component. Yet despite having less time than the active component to plan, coordinate, execute, and evaluate training, units from MARFORRES are assessed against the same individual and collective training standards as the active component. There are personnel and policies in place to mitigate some of the delta with respect to available training time between the two components, but the Inspector-Instructor (I-I) staff and the MARFORRES specific requirement exemptions do not return any significant amount of training time to units within MARFORRES. Because of MARFORRES's limited time, any training or preparation not specifically directed at building proficiency in its core mission essential tasks (METs) is a distraction to MARFORRES's primary purpose.

Having a clear understanding of what constitutes a training year within MARFORRES and the challenges those units face highlights the importance of focusing training and avoiding distractions. The baseline training time for MARFORRES consists of forty-eight inactive duty training (IDT) periods and one active duty training (ADT) period. These IDT periods and ADT period constitutes approximately thirty-eight days for training – one weekend a month and two weeks a year. Already presented with an insufficient amount of time, relative to the active component, many units within MARFORRES suffer additional drains on training time. Travel to and from training locations is among the factors that decrease available training time. Most home training centers (HTCs) are not located on larger DOD or National Guard installations, and these HTCs do not support on-site training of core METs.²⁸ Most are located within civilian communities and are merely locations to complete administrative tasks, conduct maintenance,

and store equipment. As a result, many units within MARFORRES spend valuable training time traveling to and from installations that have maneuver areas, live-fire ranges, and other facilities needed for training. Additionally, maintenance and administrative responsibilities that cannot be accomplished solely by the I-I staff between drills further reduces valuable training time during both monthly and annual drill periods. The number of requirements, both formal and informal, levied against drill time creates an environment of hurried execution and marginal proficiency. However, during these thirty-eight days, individuals and units within MARFORRES are expected to accomplish both annual training requirements as well as develop and demonstrate proficiency in core METs.

Further complicating the matter is that annual training requirements, such as Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) and Marine Corps Equal Opportunity and Sexual Harassment training, among others, have reached a perceived level of importance higher than the unit's proficiency in its core METs. Annual training statistics are continually tracked by and briefed to higher headquarters.²⁹ Unfortunately, units report proficiency in its core METs less frequently and not nearly as comprehensively. Marine Corps Order 3000.13 Marine Corps Readiness Reporting Standard Operating Procedures outlines reporting occasions, but it typically occurs monthly for MARFORRES units. The unit's commander formally submits, via the Defense Readiness Reporting System – Marine Corps (DRRS-MC), whether or not his unit is proficient in its core METs.³⁰ Unless evaluated by an outside organization like the Tactical Training Exercise Control Group (TTECG) during an Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) or similar event, a unit's readiness regarding its core METs is based solely on the unit commander's assessment. Within MARFORRES, unit commanders (battalion and higher) often do not have the opportunity to personally observe and evaluate training due to the dispersed footprint of

subordinate units, time constraints, and training facility limitations. As a result, assessments are extremely subjective and often based on whether training within a specific MET has occurred or not rather than if the unit has demonstrated proficiency. The subjective nature of proficiency reporting of core METs and the constant tracking of annual training statistics influences commanders to commit an inordinate amount of time to accomplishing tasks that have little impact on the unit's direct ability to execute its core METs. If MARFORRES were to become the default force for DSCA, it is reasonable for one to assume that additional training would be prescribed and tracked that would further distract units from focusing its limited training time to preparing to reinforce the active duty during combat operations.

The one annual ADT period offers the greatest amount of uninterrupted training time and allows MARFORRES units the best opportunity to progress towards proficiency within their METs. Opportunities to participate in short-duration theater security cooperation operations, such as Partnership of the Americas, are often available to MARFORRES units during their annual training. These operations provide both an opportunity and a venue for MARFORRES to ease the burden of overseas commitments on active duty forces, build or reinforce partner capability, and hone their own conventional capabilities. Additionally, during the annual training period, MARFORRES units participate in major exercises within the United States. Those units tasked to participate in these exercises typically have the opportunity to operate within the construct of the MAGTF, integrate with units, active duty and reserve, not usually available during other training, and be evaluated by an outside party. The best example of one of these major exercises is the ITX held aboard Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) at Twentynine Palms, California. Not only does the ITX enable MARFORRES

units to enhance their ability to accomplish their core METs and work within the MAGTF, it also provides them the opportunity to integrate with the active component and joint forces.

The reserve component is often advertised as the shock absorber for the active component in that it provides additional capacity to respond to crisis until a steady state rotation can be established. However, the last ten years have demonstrated that although MARFORRES is a capable force, additional training within core METs is both prudent and effective to better integrate elements from MARFORRES with the active component. This additional need is a product of severely limited training time, and reinforces the position that the reserve component's training focus, time, and resources should be focused on its primary mission.

When forecasted or following mobilization, MARFORRES authorizes the selected units to conduct a pre-mobilization annual training period, and many are afforded additional training at an intermediate location (ILOC). During both the pre-mobilization annual training period and ILOC, the unit typically focuses on its core METs and specific tasks that it anticipates being assigned once deployed. A pre-mobilization annual training period is typically planned and executed internal to the unit. However, during an ILOC, a commander who does not belong to the activated unit is responsible for organization, training and equipment requirements.³¹ During OIF and OEF, units would execute a training package similar to the Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) exercise that active duty forces would execute prior to deployment in support of those operations. These additional training periods were viable during OIF and OEF because both theaters were mature when most elements of MARFORRES were committed. As a theater matures, it provides additional time for leaders and planners to develop a force rotation, refine training requirements, and establish a pre-deployment training program (PTP). However, this level of theater maturity will not always be the case. One only needs to look to the employment

of MARFORRES during the Korean War to find evidence of the importance of having a reserve that is ready immediately. When the Marine Corps established the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, there was no time afforded to mobilized reservists to execute a pre-mobilization annual training period or comprehensive ILOC. From mobilization notification to embarking on shipping for the Far East, reservists had only days to get their matters in order and get to Camp Pendleton, California.

If the current training environment within MARFORRES produces units that need weeks or months of additional training following mobilization and before employment, then the training environment is not producing the most responsive force - a force that is “most ready when the nation is least ready.”³² Clearly, any time spent on specific preparation for DSCA employment or the actual conduct of a DSCA mission would detract from time to conduct mandatory and core MET training. However, MARFORRES has not only been mobilized and employed in support of combat operations. Like the active component, elements of MARFORRES have also been activated to provide support to civil authorities. Historically, natural disasters have created conditions that have required the capabilities of the DOD. Fourth Amphibious Assault Battalion’s response to Hurricane Katrina provides a vivid example of such participation.

National Guard vs. MARFORRES

According to the 2015 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement, approximately 98% of all crisis response efforts are successfully conducted without federal support.³³ However, during the other 2% of the time, military forces must be prepared to respond. Following natural or man-made disasters or emergencies, the National Guard is typically the first military organization to respond.³⁴ The National Guard, depending on its employment option, is the most appropriate resource to leverage. The employment options – state active duty, Title 32 duty, or Title 10 duty

– offer additional flexibility to authorities when committing resources in support of disaster relief.³⁵ Furthermore, the geographically dispersed locations of National Guard units present a force that is well postured to respond rapidly to crisis. Dispersed over all fifty states and the District of Columbia, the National Guard has facilities in over 2600 communities nation-wide. The National Guard’s presence in communities makes it the most visible and well-postured force to respond to domestic crisis. However, the possibility of the National Guard becoming overwhelmed with response efforts forces all services to ensure they are prepared respond to DSCA requirements.

Similar to the National Guard, the MARFORRES forces are also dispersed across the nation. According to the 2014 Almanac Special Issue of *Continental Marines*, MARFORRES has over 160 facilities spread across forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.³⁶ Although not represented in as many communities as the National Guard, the geographical dispersion of MARFORRES forces presents the image of a similar response option to DSCA requirements as the National Guard. However, that is where the similarity stops, as MARFORRES is a Title 10 force under federal control and subject to the Posse Comitatus Act, same as the active component.³⁷ The National Guard, unless federalized, is under the command of the governor and is not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act.³⁸ Without doubt, the positioning of MARFORRES units contributes to a relatively rapid but significantly limited response, especially in areas away from major military installations. The most likely response under these dispersed conditions would be via local commanders invoking immediate response authority (IRA). Marine Corps Order 3440.7B, Domestic Support Operations, authorizes local commanders to employ forces and other resources under IRA to “save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions when time

does not permit approval from higher authority.”³⁹ Response under this authority is based on a request from local authorities and is usually expected to last no more than seventy-two hours. The response by 3d Platoon, Company A, 4th Amphibious Assault Battalion (AABN), operating only two amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs), serves as an example and demonstrates the valuable contribution the dispersed MARFORRES units provide, under an IRA. In the first seventy-two hours of the unit’s response in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the unit rescued 200 people. Over the next sixteen days, a larger force of AAVs rescued only sixty-three people.⁴⁰ Beyond these extremely limited, short-term IRA actions, commitment of MARFORRES elements in a DSCA role is not the most efficient response to crisis, because of personnel availability, the time required to recall, move, and employ additional reservists as well as the availability of mission essential equipment.

Recall

The dispersed nature of MARFORRES contributes to the Marine Corps’ response under IRA because unique equipment and other resources are potentially near to the location of the disaster. The two amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) from 4th AABN, located in Gulfport, Mississippi, provide a great example of the benefit of this co-location. However, this same dispersed nature presents a challenge to building additional capacity in the form of personnel or equipment. Company-sized units and detachments typically establish the framework for the locations of the HTC’s throughout MARFORRES. With the exception of a few locations that are either tied to a major military installation or the location of a higher headquarters element, each company-sized element is geographically separated from other units. This situation creates both a challenge and a delay should a response require more than a company-sized element.

To further retard the response, reservists must be notified of the situation and recalled to the HTC. Recall is executed via a process called a fast response on short transmission (FROST) call. The time standard to establish positive contact with all of the unit's members during a FROST call is twenty-four hours, but "in the event of an actual disaster, national emergency, or other emergent event, the 24 hour time constraint may be further restricted contingent on the nature of the event" according to the Force Order.⁴¹ Reserve units exercise these recall procedures monthly and are inspected on the same procedures as part of the Commanding General's Inspection Program (CGIP) and the Force Readiness Assessment and Assistance Program (FRAAP). The continual exercising and periodic inspection of recall procedures have created a relatively efficient system of contacting reservists and transmitting information. However efficient the procedure, MARFORRES estimates that its subordinate elements will not attain initial operational capability (IOC) until forty-eight hours after notification, and it will not be full operational capability (FOC) until ninety-six hours has passed.⁴²

Once contact is made with a reservist, that individual must move to the HTC to collect equipment, link up with transportation to the disaster location, or perform other necessary tasks. Prior to arrival, a number of other requirements may further slow the response time. Many, if not most, reservists work or attend school when not attending drill. As a result these reservists will need to coordinate their absence with, or at the very least inform, employers, professors, and family prior to departing for the HTC. Depending on the time of recall, this notification and coordination may not happen immediately, leading to subsequent delays for some personnel.

Additionally, travel time to the HTC is dependent on the reservist's physical address. Personnel are typically assigned to the nearest unit, but assignment is dependent on available structure within each unit. More structure for junior enlisted ranks within units usually equates

to a better chance of assignment to the nearest unit. However, staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) and officers are often shuffled between company-sized units or to battalion-level positions to align with available billets. When this shuffling occurs, personnel may be required to travel longer distances to their HTC. In major metropolitan areas, the chances are better that the majority of unit personnel resides within fifty miles or 1 ½ hours of travel time from the HTC. However, in rural areas, it is not uncommon for a reservist to have to travel multiple hours to get to his HTC. Marine Corps recruiters and representatives from the MARFORRES unit screen potential recruits to determine if they live within a “100-mile radius of the reserve unit or what can normally be traveled in 3 hours or less.”⁴³ As with most other requirements, this requirement can be, and often is, waived resulting in a delayed arrival of many reservists to their HTC.

In contrast, active duty elements are poised for a more rapid response. Except during liberty or leave periods, the active component does not have to execute such a heavy and time-consuming recall. The preponderance of active duty Marines resides in barracks or base housing facilities, making notification significantly more efficient. The limited numbers of personnel living off base are within reasonable daily commuting distance and do not require multiple hours of travel time. Time saved through rapid notification and recall can be allocated to planning, rehearsals, or movement to the disaster location. Furthermore, active duty personnel have ready access to additional equipment that may be beneficial or necessary for response. Both the central issue facility (CIF) and the contingency training equipment pool (CTEP) are located on major bases facilitating the rapid issue of equipment to active duty personnel, where as most reserve units would require this equipment to be shipped to an HTC.

Personnel Availability

Another concern is availability of personnel. Unlike the active component, MARFORRES personnel have competing interests the other twenty-eight days of the month – most notably a civilian occupation. MARFORRES’s Sergeant Major, Sergeant Major Anthony Sparado stated in *Continental Marines* that reserve personnel take an “oath that places duty and obligation before competing interests.”⁴⁴ Unfortunately, not all personnel will be available when recalled. According to MARFORRES’s DSCA response policy, personnel considered as first responders and those employed in the utilities sector are waived from their recall.⁴⁵ Many reservists work for fire departments, local law enforcement, and emergency medical services. Unlike junior Marines, who are often unemployed or are students, these first responders are typically noncommissioned officers (NCOs), SNCOs, and officers. As a result, mobilization of MARFORRES personnel to support a local DSCA mission may result in voids of leadership and degradation to performance.

Response Configuration

The Marine Corps prefers to configure all of its responses, including DSCA, around a MAGTF construct. The MAGTF provides the Marine Corps with the greatest capability and flexibility. Although sourcing of the MAGTF elements can come from either the active or reserve component, or a combination of both, the active component offers the best solution because of geographical co-location, greater familiarity, and availability for planning and rehearsing. First, geographical co-location of forces and equipment necessary to build a MAGTF, or at the very least a task force tailored to the crisis, facilitates a more prompt response. Secondly, active component elements typically have greater opportunity to work with other elements of the MAGTF allowing them to build greater familiarity with the capabilities and

limitations as well as operating procedures. The environment as well as MARFORRES's training and readiness cycle limit the opportunities that reserve units train within a MAGTF configuration. The first two benefits, co-location and familiarity, contribute to a third -- preparation. The proximity of units and familiarity with operating procedures enable units to begin response planning and rehearsals sooner following notification of intended employment. Key leaders and staff are able to meet face-to-face to frame the problem, develop and wargame courses of action, develop orders, and direct rehearsals. Reserve units typically do not have this luxury, and as a result, planning is slower and valuable time for wargaming and rehearsals is lost. Preparation and understanding of the mission are necessary to ensure that Marines will support the response effort effectively and efficiently and enable the rapid restoration of response efforts to a level that can be handled by civil authorities.

Economy

With respect to monetary costs against the DOD, DSCA has few when requested by another federal agency under the Economy Act. According to the Economy Act, the DOD is entitled to full reimbursement of all costs, including pay and allowances, incurred when supporting another federal entity.⁴⁶ However, when DSCA is provided following declaration of national disaster or emergency under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, neither full nor partial reimbursement is guaranteed.⁴⁷

Although the DOD may not end up holding all or any of the bill, the Marine Corps must strive to be good stewards of the government's money, especially when cheaper options exist. Furthermore, there are additional costs associated with mobilizing MARFORRES personnel that do not apply to active component forces. Reserve Marines are entitled to travel pay and partial per diem when traveling from their home of record to the HTC for mobilization processing. If

the mobilization processing takes longer than a day, the government must provide lodging for Marines not residing within fifty miles of the HTC. Contracted hotels in the local area usually provide lodging because many HTCs do not have adequate facilities. Additionally, most reserve units do not possess organic buses, trucks, and trailers to move all of their personnel and equipment to the disaster location or to an aerial port of embarkation (APOE) for onward movement. There are low-cost government buses such as those operated by the Southwest Region Fleet Transportation (SWRFT) located on Marine Corps Installations in southern California, however, only MARFORRES units located on or near major DOD or National Guard installations that possess similar resources could leverage them. Most HTC are located some distance from those installations, forcing MARFORRES to contract commercial buses at a higher cost. Although costs associated per diem, travel pay, lodging, and contracted buses are relatively insignificant, they are costs not usually associated with the commitment of active component forces.

Non-monetary Costs

Even if the supported federal agency reimburses the DOD for all costs associated with the DSCA response, there are also non-monetary costs that need to be considered. Costs associated with lost training time and degraded readiness must be addressed. Two non-monetary costs that could manifest themselves easily are force health and equipment maintenance. In the course of any operation equipment gets damaged and personnel get injured, and in both areas, these situations can have a considerable effect on training and readiness.

MARFORRES units only maintain their training allowance of equipment, not their full unit table of equipment requirement (UTR).⁴⁸ Not only does this minimum amount of equipment limit response capability and capacity, but it also highlights the importance of safeguarding the

equipment MARFORRES does possess. The minimal equipment allotted to each MARFORRES unit is critical to supporting and executing training focused on core METs. Unserviceable or damaged equipment is difficult to replace or repair because of the geographically dispersed nature of MARFORRES units and priority of funding. Furthermore, unserviceable or damaged equipment degrades the unit's readiness to augment or reinforce the active component. Specifically any mission essential equipment (MEE) or principle end items (PEI) that are listed as deadlined impact the unit's readiness within DRRS-MC.

Similar to damaged equipment, injured Marines limit training and reduce overall readiness. A reserve Marine who is injured while in a drilling or activated status is entitled to medical care. However, civilian practitioners usually provide this medical care as the preponderance of MARFORRES personnel do not live near a military treatment facility (MTF). Unfortunately, the administrative system in place to assist these Marines – to receive and pay for the treatment they need – is not efficient and causes delay in treatment. The delay in treatment often leads to months where the Marine cannot train nor is he eligible for mobilization. If the injured Marine is a key leader, his or her absence can have a significant effect on the readiness and proficiency of the unit. Certainly, commitment of active duty forces may result in injury to Marines, but their access to MTFs enables more timely treatment. As a result, active duty Marines are typically returned to full duty more quickly and without the administrative burden experienced in MARFORRES.

Conclusion

General Joseph Dunford, 36th Commandant of the Marine Corps, stated in his planning guidance that, “[t]o meet the expectations of the American people, everything we do must contribute to our combat readiness and combat effectiveness.”⁴⁹ Additionally, as a part of the

National Response Framework, the Marine Corps must be ready to respond to natural and man-made disasters and assist civil authorities should they lack the capability to respond effectively. However, preparation to this end should not interfere with the Marine Corps preparedness to fight and win against the nation's enemies. As a critical component of the Marine Corps Total Force, MARFORRES has contributed to the Marine Corps' readiness and effectiveness since its inception in 1916. As the size of the active duty Marine Corps is reduced, MARFORRES will play a more significant and potentially more frequent role in missions overseas. Because of this situation, and the very real possibility of immediate mobilization and employment, the Marine Corps must avoid saddling MARFORRES with any requirement, including DSCA, that would distract them from fulfilling its homeland defense responsibilities. Furthermore, MARFORRES must focus its limited training time on its core METs if they are to achieve interoperability with and levels of proficiency comparable to the active component. Finally, when required, the Marine Corps should avoid MARFORRES and look to its active component to provide DSCA for any prolonged period of time. In addition to preventing readiness concerns within MARFORRES, employment of active duty forces in DSCA roles presents the more effective, efficient, and economical response.

¹ Commandant of the Marine Corps, *36th Commandant's Planning Guidance 2015*, accessed February 15, 2015, 4, http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/2015%20CPG_Color_FINAL_2.pdf.

² U.S. Northern Command Office of History, *A Short History of United States Northern Command*, accessed December 16, 2014, 4, <http://www.northcom.mil/Portals/28/Documents/A%20Short%20History%20of%20USNORTHCOM%20%28current%20as%20of%20March%202014%29.pdf>.

³ USNORTHCOM, History, 5. USNORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR) includes "all air, land and sea approaches to North America, encompassing the continental U.S., Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water areas out to approximately 500 nautical miles."

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, JP 3-28 (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, July 31, 2013), I-2. Defense Support of Civil Authorities definition: "The support provided by federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and

NG forces (when the Secretary of Defense [SecDef], in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, USC, status or when federalized) in response to a request for assistance (RFA) from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.”

⁵ JCS, JP 3-28, I-5.

⁶ USNORTHCOM, History, 7.

⁷ USNORTHCOM, History, 5.

⁸ “Marine Forces North,” United States Marine Corps, *Marines: The Official Website of the United States Marine Corps*, January 18, 2015, <http://www.marfornorth.marines.mil/About.aspx>.

MARFORNORTH lists three principle lines of operation within its mission: homeland defense (HD), theater security cooperation (TSC), and defense support to civil authority (DSCA).

⁹ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Operations*, MCDP 1-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, August 9, 2011), 1-19.

¹⁰ JCS, JP 3-28, I-4.

¹¹ Thomas Goss, “Who’s in Charge?” *New Challenges in Homeland Defense and Homeland Security*, *Homeland Security Affairs* II, no.1 (2006): 8-9.

¹² JCS, JP 3-28, I-2.

¹³ JCS, JP 3-28, I-2

¹⁴ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1-0, 1-14.

¹⁵ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1-0, 1-20.

¹⁶ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1-0, 5-1 – 5-10.

¹⁷ “Marine Forces Reserve,” United States Marine Corps, *Marines: The Official Website of the United States Marine Corps*, December 15, 2014, <http://www.marforres.marines.mil/About/MissionStatement.aspx>.

¹⁸ *Guard and Reserve Overview: Statement Before the Subcommittee on Defense of the Senate Appropriations Committee*, 113th Cong., 1 (2013) (LtGen Steven A. Hummer, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Reserve), 1.

¹⁹ Marine Forces Reserve, “2014 Almanac Special Issue,” *Continental Marines: Official Magazine of the Marine Corps Reserve*, 2014, 5, www.marforres.marines.mil/Portals/116/Docs/ConMar/Almanac6.pdf.

²⁰ Marine Corps Development and Education Command, *The Marine Corps Reserve – A Short History*, ECP 15-2 (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps, 1979), 1.

²¹ Marine Corps Development and Education Command, History, 5.

²² Marine Corps Development and Education Command, History, 9.

²³ Marine Corps Development and Education Command, History, 11.

²⁴ Marine Corps Development and Education Command, History, 13.

²⁵ Les Aspin and William Dickinson, *Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War* (Washington: Brassey’s (US), Inc., 1992), 64-65.

²⁶ Marine Forces Reserve, 2014 Almanac, 11.

²⁷ Hummer, Reserve Overview, 6.

²⁸ Chris Landry, “DSCA Response,” (PowerPoint presentation, Marine Forces Reserve, New Orleans, LA, 11 June 2013).

²⁹ Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Annual Training and Education Requirements*, MCBul1500, 20 February, 2015,

<http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/MCBUL%201500%20DTD%2020FEB15.pdf>.

Marine Corps Bulletin 1500 lists annual training and education requirements.

³⁰ Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Readiness Standard Operating Procedures*, MCO 3000.13, July 30, 2010, 4-3,

<http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%203000.13.pdf>.

³¹ Commandant of the Marine Corps, *U.S. Marine Corps Total Force Mobilization, Activation, Integration, and Deactivation Plan*, MCO 3000.19B, December 20, 2013, 2-4,

<http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/MCO%203000.19B.pdf>.

³² CMC, Planning Guidance, 4.

³³ National Guard Bureau, *2015 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement*.

<http://www.nationalguard.mil/portals/31/Documents/PostureStatements/2015%20National%20Guard%20Bureau%20Posture%20Statement.pdf> , 30.

³⁴ JCS, JP 3-28, I-6.

³⁵ Alice R. Buchalter, *Military Support to Civil Authorities: The Role of the Department of Defense in Support of Homeland Defense* (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division Library of Congress, February 2007, 3, www.hsdl.org.

State active duty—States employ their National Guard forces under state control for state purposes and at state expense; command and control rests with the governor.

Title 32 duty—Under authority of Title 32 of the U.S. Code, the National Guard is federally funded but under the command and control of the state’s governor even though the Guard is employed “in the service of the United States.” The purpose of the service may be either shared state/federal or for a primary federal purpose.

Title 10 duty—Under authority of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, the National Guard is deployed by the President for a federal purpose; command and control rests solely with the President and the federal government.

³⁶ Hummer, Overview, 13.

³⁷ JCS, JP 3-28, III-1. “Except as expressly authorized by the Constitution of the United States or by another act of Congress, the [Posse Comitatus Act] prohibits the use of Title 10, USC, Army and Air Force personnel, as enforcement officials to execute state or federal law or to perform direct law enforcement functions.”

³⁸ JCS, JP 3-28, III-2.

³⁹ Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Domestic Support Operations*, MCO 3440.7B, 27 Dec 2011, 2-3,

<http://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/ELECTRONICLIBRARY/ElectronicLibraryDisplay/tabid/13082/Article/141214/mco-34407b.aspx>.

⁴⁰ Inspector-Instructor, 4th Amphibious Assault Battalion, *After Action Report – 4th AABN in Support of Hurricane Katrina Disaster Relief Operations* (Tampa: Marine Corps Training Center, 2005), 5, <https://www.mccll.usmc.mil>.

⁴¹ Commander, Marine Forces Reserve, *FROST Call Systems/Recall Procedures*, Force Order 3061.2A, 3 July 2007, 2, http://www.marforres.marines.mil/Portals/116/Docs/G-1/Adjutant/Directives/Force_Orders/ForO%203061.2A%20-FROST%20CALL%20SYSTEM%20RECALL%20PROCEDURES.pdf.

⁴² MARFORRES, DSCA Response PPT.

⁴³ Commander, Marine Corps Recruiting Command, *Marine Corps Recruiting Command Enlistment Processing Manual*, MCRCO 1100.1, April 1, 2014, 4-34.

⁴⁴ Marine Forces Reserve, 2014 Almanac, 4.

⁴⁵ MARFORRES, DSCA Response PPT.

⁴⁶ CMC, MCO 3440.7B, 3.

⁴⁷ JCS, JP 3-28, E-3.

⁴⁸ CMC, MCO 3000.19B, 3-8.

⁴⁹ CMC, Planning Guidance, 4.

Appendix A: Acronyms

AABN	Amphibious Assault Battalion
AAV	Amphibious Assault Vehicle
ADT	Active Duty Training
AOR	Area of Responsibility
CGIP	Commanding General's Inspection Program
CIF	Central Issue Facility
CTEP	Contingency Training Equipment Pool
DOD	Department of Defense
DRRS-MC	Defense Readiness Reporting System - Marine Corps
DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
EMV	Enhanced Mojave Viper
FOC	Full Operational Capability
FRAAP	Force Readiness Assessment and Assistance Program
FROST	Fast Response on Short Transmission
HD	Homeland Defense
HS	Homeland Security
HTC	Home Training Center
I-I	Inspector-Instructor
IDT	Inactive Duty Training
ILOC	Intermediate Location
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
IRA	Immediate Response Authority
ITX	Integrated Training Exercise
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MARFORNORTH	United States Marine Corps Forces, North
MARFORRES	United States Marine Corps Forces, Reserve
MCAGCC	Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center
MEE	Mission Essential Equipment
MET	Mission Essential Task
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NRF	National Response Framework
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PCA	Posse Comitatus Act
PEI	Principle End Item
PTP	Pre-deployment Training Program
ROMO	Range of Military Operations
SAPR	Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
SNCO	Staff Noncommissioned Officer
SPMAGTF	Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force
SWRFT	Southwest Region Fleet Transportation
TTECG	Tactical Training Exercise Control Group
UDP	Unit Deployment Program
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command

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Unit Table of Equipment Requirement

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