

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b>				
<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 27-04-2015		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Master of Military Studies Research Paper		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> September 2014 - April 2015
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b>  EXCESSIVE ADMINISTRIVIA: ELIMINATE THE BACKGROUND NOISE AND GET BACK TO BRILLIANCE IN THE BASICS			<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b> N/A	
			<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b> N/A	
			<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b> N/A	
Patrick, William J., Major, USMC			<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b> N/A	
			<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b> N/A	
			<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b> N/A	
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>  USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068			<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>  N/A	
N/A			<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>  N/A	
			<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>  N/A	
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b>  Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.				
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>  N/A				
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b>  Currently, annual training in the Marine Corps is excessive, ineffective, redundant and overly focused on symptoms rather than causation. Marine ethical failures gain attention in the media and the public eye. Many of these failures revolve around drugs, alcohol, suicide, domestic violence, and even sexual assault and rape. The sexual assault, rape and even pornography are now increasingly including children. These sorts of behaviors ought to be incapable of being conducted by Marines, but Marines who have been indoctrinated in the Marine Corps core values are perpetrating these behaviors. The Marine Corps has a linear approach to combating these issues. Certain training is mandated by the Department of Defense of the Department of the Navy, and even Headquarters of the Marine Corps. Most of the training is required to be given once annually, with the average time spent on these important areas of character flaws and misconduct equaling sixty to ninety minutes a year, per Marine. In addition to a one-hour approach to training, the emphasis unfortunately seems to be more heavily towards recording and reporting completion of the training to higher, rather than the standards the training is taught to meet or exceed. Developing leadership and ethics in Marines through guided discussions, values based training, decision games, coaching, counseling, mentoring and crafting personal mission statements can greatly assist a battalion or squadron				
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b>  Character ethics, annual training, leadership, ethics development, values based training and personal mission statement.				
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b> Unclass			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>  UU	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>  54
<b>a. REPORT</b> Unclass	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> Unclass	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> Unclass		
			<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)</b> (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)	

United States Marine Corps  
Command and Staff College  
Marine Corps University  
2076 South Street  
Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

---

---

**TITLE:**

EXCESSIVE ADMINISTRIVIA: ELIMINATE THE BACKGROUND NOISE  
AND GET BACK TO BRILLIANCE IN THE BASICS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**AUTHOR:**

MAJOR JASON PATRICK, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

AY 2014-2015

---

---

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member:

Approved:

Date:

J.W. Borden

Oral Defense Committee Member:

Approved:

Date:

Matthew Flynn

4/27/15

#### DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE

## Table of Contents

<b>Preface</b> .....	<b>ii</b>
<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	<b>iv</b>
<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	<b>v</b>
<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>Part One: The Nature of the Problem</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>Excessive, Ineffective and Redundant Training</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>Jack-of-All-Trades, Masters of None</b> .....	<b>12</b>
<b>Too Many Priorities, Too Little Time</b> .....	<b>16</b>
<b>Part Two: The Way Forward</b> .....	<b>18</b>
<b>Zero Tolerance vs. Accountability</b> .....	<b>19</b>
<b>Keep it Simple, Stick to “Brilliance in the Basics”</b> .....	<b>21</b>
<b>Leadership and Ethics Development—Ethical Fitness</b> .....	<b>22</b>
<b>Values Based Training</b> .....	<b>24</b>
<b>Personal Mission Statement</b> .....	<b>26</b>
<b>Conclusion</b> .....	<b>28</b>
<b>Appendices</b> .....	<b>30</b>
<b>Endnotes</b> .....	<b>37</b>
<b>Bibliography</b> .....	<b>41</b>

## **Preface**

There are a great number of Marine officers across the Marine Corps that feel the Marine Corps' annual training philosophy and the corresponding bureaucracy is ineffective and inefficient.<sup>1</sup> I chose to conduct research and write on this topic, because I believe that many of the prescriptive and reactive policies, programs, and processes utilized by the Marine Corps to standardize annual training are ineffective at best, and counterproductive at worst. I believe many of these training requirements that are levied upon the individual Marines are excessive, ineffective, and cause commanders at the battalion and squadron level to misallocate time and resources based on higher-headquarters over prioritization of treating symptoms, rather than treating causes.

The endstate of this short research paper is to determine if the multitude of annual training programs and requirements can be simplified into a more holistic and simplified set of training requirements that can be determined by the unit commander based on their training, education, experience, and knowing their unit's capabilities and limitations. My belief is that the many independent, disconnected annual training classes that revolve around safety, health promotion, respect and dignity towards the opposite sex, and suicide prevention are treating "symptoms" of an underlying condition. I believe the underlying condition that has a causal relationship to these "symptoms" is that in general, the Marine Corps is lacking in its ability to instill and develop character or virtue ethics.

There is currently a "draft" Marine Corps order called "*Marine Corps Leadership Development*," and although it does not create any real "new" programs or "new" requirements, the spirit and intent of this draft order could serve as the instrument for innovative and effective change as it relates to Marine Corps leadership and ethics training. Integrating the concepts of mission command, trust tactics, and Marine Corps Leadership and Ethics Development can serve to create a transformational environment where the commander's responsibility to conduct

leadership and ethics training is targeted to meet the needs and standards required of current annual training as the leader determines necessary for their specific unit. Commanders who are screened and slated for command by the Commandant of the Marine Corps deserve the trust and confidence of the institution to develop this leadership and ethics development program that meets or even exceeds the effectiveness and minimum standards of the current “hour” or “hour and a half” annual training requirements.

Trying to solve the character problems in an hour or so per year, in a non-integrated fashion only addresses the symptom, and benefits only the training reporting process. By using the unit commanders’ leadership and ethics development program training would be more holistic, less redundant, based on unit needs not just a laundry list, thereby greatly simplifying the process of completing the entire inventory of annual training classes by giving the unit commander the latitude and trust in a garrison environment that our doctrine encourages our Marines to implement in both training and combat.

Creating an environment for change will require trust. Commanders know their Marines and their units’ areas for improvement. Battalion and squadron commanders can meet these requirements as a greater approach to leadership and ethics development in a manner that is tied to the pulse of their individual command climate. This type of trust, and this type of change is required to make annual training topics more effective, and reinforces the kinds of adaptations that the Marine Corps will need to make in implementing *Expeditionary Force—21* and facing the uncertain contingencies and crises of the Marine Corps’ future operating environment.

## **Acknowledgements**

I would first like to thank Dr. John Gordon of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, whose guidance and assistance as a mentor were invaluable in researching, drafting, revising and finalizing this short research paper. I owe a great deal of thanks to Dr. Rebecca Johnson of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, whose subject matter expertise in professional military ethics and moral decision-making were exceptionally useful to my research for this paper. I would like to thank Dr. Kai Wang of the Center for Naval Analyses for his advice and assistance on locating research materials as I began to search for proof that there is not enough time to do everything that Marines and units are tasked with doing. Colonel Dennis Judge (Ret.) and Major Brett Morriss of Training and Education Command were very helpful in providing an inside look at the Marine Corps' current efforts to reduce redundant and ineffective annual training. Last and definitely not least, I am grateful to my wife Kristin for her patience, love, and support during this year of study as a geographical bachelor.

## Executive Summary

**Title:** Excessive Administrivia: Eliminate the Background Noise and Get Back to Brilliance in the Basics

**Author:** Major Jason Patrick, United States Marine Corps

**Thesis:** In order to successfully address the underlying cause of most topics of annual training, a lack of well-developed character or virtue ethics, the Marine Corps must take an innovative and adaptive approach to transforming its annual training catalog by using Marine Corps Leadership and Ethics Development as the central point of emphasis in reducing ethical failures tied to the wide range of annual training topics.

**Discussion:** Currently, annual training in the Marine Corps is excessive, ineffective, redundant and overly focused on symptoms rather than causation. Marine ethical failures gain attention in the media and the public eye. Many of these failures revolve around drugs, alcohol, suicide, domestic violence, and even sexual assault and rape. The sexual assault, rape and even pornography are now increasingly including children. These sorts of behaviors ought to be incapable of being conducted by Marines, but Marines who have been indoctrinated in the Marine Corps' core values are perpetrating these behaviors. The Marine Corps has a linear approach to combating these issues. Certain training is mandated by the Department of Defense of the Department of the Navy, and even Headquarters of the Marine Corps. Most of the training is required to be given once annually, with the average time spent on these important areas of character flaws and misconduct equaling sixty to ninety minutes a year, per Marine. In addition to a one-hour approach to training, the emphasis unfortunately seems to be more heavily towards recording and reporting completion of the training to higher, rather than the standards the training is taught to meet or exceed. Developing leadership and ethics in Marines through guided discussions, values based training, decision games, coaching, counseling, mentoring and crafting personal mission statements can greatly assist a battalion or squadron commander in focusing on their unit specific shortfalls and limitations in character and virtue ethics. With the appropriate trust and confidence, commanders can use these methods to creatively and effectively accomplish annual training requirements based on the needs of their units and individual Marines.

**Conclusion:** In order to successfully conduct annual training, the Marine Corps needs to admit it has a character or virtue ethics problem. The Marine Corps must design and institutionalize an innovative and adaptive approach to transforming its annual training requirements. By using Marine Corps leadership and ethics development as the fundamental point of emphasis in reducing ethical failures which are tied to the wide range of annual training topics, the Marine Corps can more effectively counter the occurrences of ethical failures such as drugs, alcohol, suicide, domestic violence, sexual assault, rape, child sex abuse and the alarming trend of child pornography.

*The challenges of an increasingly uncertain, complex, and decentralized operating environment will continue to place new demands on our leaders at all levels. Our recruiting standards, manning policies, training, and education must constantly evolve to produce Marines who can meet those challenges.*<sup>2</sup>

— General Joe Dunford, 36th Commandant of the Marine Corps

## **Introduction**

The Marine Corps proudly proclaims that their job and moral obligation is to fight and win the Nation’s battles.<sup>3</sup> To be most ready, when the Nation is least ready.<sup>4</sup> The Marine Corps’ current operating concept *Expeditionary Force – 21* expresses that the Marine Corps will be in “the right force, in the right place, at the right time.”<sup>5</sup> These are high-minded words, but the Marine Corps must make their actions speak louder than words. Historians often interpret the reasons a nation lost a war or fell from great power. A classic example is how Prussia fell to Napoleon after the battle of Jena in 1806. Frederick the Great had built the kingdom into a formidable and impressive empire, with good organization and great tactics, only to have his nephew and successor allow it to fail to innovate, adapt, and win when Prussia was invaded and soundly defeated by Napoleon at Jena and Auerstadt.<sup>6</sup> Fortunately, for Prussia this hallmark defeat served as the momentum for sweeping military reforms by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau that set forth a period of unprecedented military success for the next one hundred thirty years.

The Marine Corps is promoting, and wants to execute *Expeditionary Force – 21*. *Expeditionary Force – 21* is a worthy goal in the evolution of Marine Corps operations doctrine. General Dunford’s current CMC’s planning guidance is reminiscent of “*First to Fight*” by Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak,<sup>7</sup> and Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication—1 *Warfighting*;<sup>8</sup> as he is guiding the Marine Corps into the future, embracing the past, and embracing maneuver warfare. These lofty aims of *Expeditionary Force – 21* and innovation, adaptation and winning are made difficult by sequestration budget issues, and by years of deployments that took time

away from general Marine Corps leadership and core values ethical principles, and focused more specifically on security and stability training in support of the Global War on Terrorism. The rapid deployment cycles, and the lack of emphasis on Marine Corps leadership and ethics training has started to erode public trust in Marines. The same sequestration and drawdown effects are now artificially making the job harder on Marines to meet the same operational commitments that the Nation is sending up a demand signal for Marines in crises and contingency operations that must be met with success. *Expeditionary Force – 21* and innovation are also all but made impossible by the way the Marine Corps conducts a large amount of its training.

There is currently a problem with how the Marine Corps conducts annual training. The type of training this refers to is the mundane, sometimes trivial, often redundant, daily administratively burdening type of training—call it Administrivia. This annual training is often referred to and treated as “check-in-the-box” training. Annual training is most always generated with the best intentions, but it is often badly executed by simply adding an “hour” of training to the long list of “must do” items. Currently, Marines conduct annual training for a wide assortment of topics relating to health, safety, suicide, sexual assault, and many other important health, safety and behavioral issues. The Marine Corps also conducts intensive pre-deployment training programs based on the particular geographic combatant command theater that a particular unit will deploy in support of. The annual requirements take a great deal of time, all things considered; and the pre-deployment requirements take as much if not more time to successfully complete. The two higher-headquarters (HHQs) driven requirements of annual and predeployment training add up to require more time than is available for units.<sup>9</sup>

The Marine Corps has recently recognized this problem, and has started to address it in small steps. The Unit Marine Awareness Program Integrated Training (UMAPIT) is an excellent example of how the Marine Corps was able to take several training requirements and programs and condense them down to an individual program with much less hourly requirements from HHQs.<sup>10</sup> Another example is the latest version of Marine Corps Bulletin 1500 that has removed a couple of training requirements, redesignated the frequency of certain training requirements, and has specified that alternative methods of delivery are available to commanders that they may have not been aware of until now.<sup>11</sup> Noting that these are positive steps, it must also be stated that these minor improvements are not anywhere near the magnitude of innovation or adaptation that is required to design and implement an effective annual training system. General Dunford, the 36th Commandant of the Marine Corps recently published his 2015, initial planning guidance for the Marine Corps. In this guidance, the Commandant expressed that we must innovate, adapt, and win. Our training and education must follow this trend to meet the needs of the future operating environment where Marines will operate on an increasingly complex battlefield, executing maneuver warfare in the form of *Expeditionary Force – 21*.

The Marine Corps needs to innovate its training and education and implement a new system. Annual and pre-deployment training are overwhelming when combined, so much so, that the Army recently published a study specifically about leaders and soldiers lying about accomplishing training.<sup>12</sup> The overwhelming nature of these two top-down driven requirements is paralyzing to commanders who are tasked with achieving combat effectiveness, and taking care of their Marines—by which all their essential missions are accomplished. Time is not given to commanders to conduct broad and holistic leadership and ethics training. If the annual training enterprise was the purview of the battalion commander and their leadership and ethics

development training plan was responsible for covering this training at the small unit level, then the annual training catalog would be achievable, effective, and mutually reinforcing. In order to successfully address the underlying cause of most topics of annual training, a lack of well-developed character or virtue ethics, the Marine Corps must take an innovative and adaptive approach to transforming its annual training catalog by using Marine Corps leadership and ethics development as the central point of emphasis in reducing ethical failures tied to the wide range of annual training topics.

This paper defines the nature of the problem, and projects a way ahead using tools currently available to Marines, and by suggesting a few new techniques be incorporated into a unit commander's training, counseling, leadership and ethics development plan.

*Effective decisionmaking requires both the situational understanding to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. Hence, an essential function of planning is to promote understanding of the problem—the difference between existing and desired conditions—and to devise ways to solve it.<sup>13</sup>*

— MCWP 5-1, The Marine Corps Planning Process

## **Part One: The Nature of the Problem**

“On the surface, problems like unethical behavior (urinating on dead Taliban corpses) and severe misconduct (sexual assault) seem to be driving this call for a reawakening. But these are symptoms of a subtler malaise within the Corps. While the past decade of conflict has brought an incredible amount of support and resources for our units and Marines, they perhaps came with an unperceived cost that will make it difficult for the younger generation of Marines to transition into a new period of fewer combat deployments and increased fiscal austerity if we don't help them. Perhaps the wakeup call is more suited for organizational-level leaders to understand the root causes of some of our conduct issues and better prepare our junior leaders for the future.”<sup>14</sup>

The Marine Corps has a virtue or character ethics problem. This lack of character or virtue ethics is leading to a depressing trend of moral failure; sometimes in combat, but

predominantly in a peacetime garrison environment between deployments. Years and years of stability and support operations (SASO), counterinsurgency operations (COIN), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (HA/DR); combined with living in hard-wired forward operating bases and firmbases has given the Marine Corps a new generation of combat veterans. However, this generation is not practiced at major ground combat operations. The types of training that are so specific for Iraq and Afghanistan are not the basics. They are skillsets that can be generated by a unit that knows the basics, but they should not be the centerpieces of training. They are consequential to knowing the basics. Similarly, as SASO, COIN and HA/DR have distracted the Marine Corps from the basics, the Marine Corps' annual training has detracted from even more activities. Just like the Marine Corps became specialists in asymmetric combat and conflicts, we are wrongly specializing in annual training, and the creation of single mission program offices like the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) office at Headquarters Marine Corps. Sexual assault is a really significant problem in the Marine Corps, but so are alcohol, drugs, and shockingly child pornography and child sex abuse incidents.<sup>15</sup> Why is there not an office that looks at ethical behavior as a whole, and specifically designs training to counter the types of incidents that are most damaging to the health of the force? Does the trend continue until there is a separate office for each and every type of misconduct? Did this trend start because of congressional pressure? Is this SAPR office the way to stop sexual assault, or is it possibly, and unfortunately a way to get Congressional oversight satisfied with our actions towards a specific symptom of ethical failure among the ranks of the Marine Corps?

A recent news release from the Marine Corps published Special and General Court-Martial dispositions for the first quarter of fiscal year 2015.<sup>16</sup> A disturbing trend can be seen in

this document that details over 100 individual convictions. Some cases had multiple convictions, and the categorization of several of the convictions such as child sexual abuse, child pornography, rape, sexual assault, and manslaughter are topics that most American citizens would not fathom as behavior that could be engaged in by a Marine. These serious and depraved convictions were committed by junior Marines, non-commissioned officers and commissioned or warrant officers. What is even more disheartening about this laundry list of convictions is that these are only the cases where the offenders were caught, and where there was enough evidence to convict them of their crimes when found guilty. There will likely always be a certain small percentage of society, where the Marine Corps draws its recruits, that are high-functioning psychopaths/sociopaths but Marine Corps leadership must be able to recognize the potential for this sort of propensity for universally unacceptable behavior during the entry-level training process.<sup>17</sup>

The Marine Corps has a proud heritage, and is historically known for not complaining, and doing more for and with less than anyone else. The “Marines get the job done, no matter what” attitude is starting to become problematic, particularly when it is not a requirement of a combat or crisis situation. Empirical data and unit-level evidence collected by the Center for Naval Analyses both strongly suggest that battalion and squadron-level units do not have enough time to complete annual training when combined with individual, small-unit, and collective mission essential training and readiness tasks.<sup>18</sup> This lack of training time is magnified when a unit has a significant volume of predeployment training requirements relating to combatant commander (COCOM) requirements in association with the Marine Corps Force Generation Process.<sup>19</sup> It very well might be time to revisit the mantra of “Mission First.” Without the Marines properly trained, there are missions that the Marine Corps will fail at accomplishing.

The Marine Corps must reform its annual training programs. There are too many requirements, redundancies, and separate offices that oversee the same training requirements. The sheer number of separate orders, bulletins, and Marine administrative messages (MARADMINs) that govern this training is dizzying.<sup>20</sup> It is time for the Marine Corps to consolidate programs, offices, requirements, and become more holistic, effective and efficient, so that the institution can apply the now well-known refrain “innovate, adapt and win.”<sup>21</sup> It is time for a new intellectual revolution in the Marine Corps, and innovating new, creative, effective, and multi-purposed training sessions and tools could lead the Marine Corps in that direction. A way of doing this is to utilize a conceptual model that the Lejeune Leadership Institute refers to as Marine Corps Leadership Development (MCLD) as the vehicle to meeting annual training requirements, by adapting this training spectrum into a continuous training process that the battalion or squadron commander owns. The essence of MCLD is analogous to the “Re-Awakening” message from General Amos, in that it requires engaged small unit leaders, knowing their Marines, training them, and leading, coaching and counseling by example. The nature of this problem is in ensuring these intermediate level commanders are given full flexibility and authority to lead organizational change, implement creative and effective training, and ensure their Marines are successful on and off the modern battlefield.<sup>22</sup>

*If you do not have the time to do it right, when will you have the time to do it over?*<sup>23</sup>

—John Wooden

### **Excessive, Ineffective and Redundant Training**

The Marine Corps has a tendency to make things difficult, partly because it is good training, and partly because it is proud, of its arduous, expeditionary self-label. But another

thing the Marine Corps bestow on itself is copious amounts of HHQs mandated training. Gone are the days that you can tell someone to do what they were taught or told and simply hold them accountable. Some might say that you have to show their Marines a specific PowerPoint® presentation, and that you must collect a roster and a database entry will follow that validates a specific number of hours per year were reached. That training must be entered into a computer database so that the HHQs can report to its HHQs, and even serve as a flak jacket, when a general officer must testify before Congress that the training was done.

It should seem obvious to most, that somewhere in this process, the accountability is lost. The responsible agent is no longer the individual whose behavior is not in accordance with regulations and core values, and the responsibility now lies in the service to show that training is completed, or to the leader that proves that there was a sign-in sheet, or leave and liberty plan risk prevention worksheet that the offender signed. By providing a specific, mandatory PowerPoint ® the accountability is even further from the small unit level, because now the unit does not have to produce their own training, or know the material well enough to present it in front of an audience. This type of training is wasteful and ineffective. Small unit leaders need to be engaged, and they need to be involved in learning their material well enough that they can give their class from reaching into their hip pocket.

Today, many Marines believe that the Marine Corps has become a force that is overly prescriptive and reactive in mandating unit and individual training, particularly when that training relates to personal conduct or standardized pre-deployment training program. Marine Corps administrative and annual training has become so overwhelming and ineffective, that it is commonplace to hear leaders “sigh” in relief when they finally deploy to combat, or to any other deployment requirement, due to the relief of the gauntlet of training requirements. There exists a

perception among field grade officers and senior SNCOs that during the last 10-12 years, the Marine Corps has gradually transitioned away from a force that embraced the value of small unit leaders exercising judgment and initiative. Where there used to be a genuine appreciation for small unit leaders using their valuable years of training, education and leadership to lead Marines and prepare them for combat, now there are a great deal of controls in place that replace leadership.<sup>24</sup>

In addition to the surplus of annual and predeployment training requirements there are an immeasurable volume of daily-operations continuing actions some refer to as recurring responsibilities and daily habits of living. Even off-duty, Marines must transit to and from work, sleep, eat, spend time with friends and family, execute leave and liberty, and conduct physical training. During duty hours, the extensive amounts of time that small battalion and squadron staffs' spend on administration, reporting, planning, and building PowerPoint ® briefs is prodigious. Recent Marine Corps Quality of Life Surveys indicate that Marines are spending an average of eleven hours per workday, in the performance of their duties.<sup>25</sup> That does not count taking work home, or coming into the office on the weekend. Finally, there are a multitude of other factors that go into absorbing more hours of everyday such as transiting to and from training areas and the field, field operations, exercises, deployments for training, and even low-density high-demand requirements like rifle and pistol range qualification, water survival training, or a healthy dose of medical and dental readiness appointments.

The higher headquarters commander or staff officer that says “yes, we can always add one more mission or requirement” is not looking at the health of the force at the small unit level. Similar to “black ice” and “icebergs,” this is a danger that you cannot plainly see, and take at appearances. So many individual programs have spun off, and created additional training

requirements that it has created an environment of “glossing-over” topics that would otherwise normally get appropriate leadership attention.<sup>26</sup> As previously discussed, the U.S. Army is experiencing this same problem to the degree that soldiers and officer are actually compromising their integrity when it comes to approaching the excessive training requirements and policies that have built up into figurative obstacles.<sup>27</sup> Those battalion and squadron leaders and planners that are staying at work more than twelve hours a day are chasing “paper tigers” and fighting the “good fight” to make sure that reports and briefs are ready for HHQs and they are sometimes unknowingly wearing blinders to the leadership and ethics environment within their commands.<sup>28</sup> It is not hard to recognize that standards are beginning to slip across the Marine Corps because leaders are spending too much time at their desks, and not because of preference, but because planning, training and reporting requirements are all based around computers. These same leaders are slipping in their standards. Physical fitness scores are getting lower; Marines are gaining weight, and there can begin to develop a situation where the leader does not look so acutely at these attributes in their Marines, and as if that were not enough, the situation is not helped by the prospective recruiting pool in today’s society.<sup>29</sup>

On occasion it benefits to look at American society as a whole. Valuable lessons can be learned by the military, by observing how adult learning standards apply to responsibilities granted within state and federal law. Just as responsibilities in the military can be consequential, and even critically fatal, so are the responsibilities that are bestowed and managed by local and federal government. One such example is the frequency of required training once an American citizen receives a driver’s license. In most cases, an individual who meets the standards to qualify for a driver’s license is not retrained, familiarized, or otherwise required to refresh their training and education on operating a motor vehicle for decades after initial certification. States

believe that licensed vehicle operators will obey the law, and operate their vehicles safely, or they will be cited, fined, or their privileges will be lost. This same thought experiment can be applied to an American citizen reaching the age of twenty-one and enjoying the privilege of purchasing and consuming alcohol. No training is required prior to earning the right to purchase and consume alcohol, or as a matter of maintenance of knowledge pertaining to alcohol and its potentially deadly consequences. Other examples include purchasing firearms, or obtaining a concealed handgun permit. The United States trusts its states and citizens to regulate themselves. Citizens are generally treated like adults, and they act like adults. There is a strong argument that Marines are treated like teenagers, and therefore they act like teenagers. It just might be worth experimenting with methods that confer responsibility on the individual Marine.

An equally concerning negative trend has been the unfortunate increase in the Marine Corps dependence on passive training.<sup>30</sup> Training based on the internet is flawed, as this training almost always has a click next, multiple choices, try again, and in stride remediate testing pattern of education and training. Logging onto a computer, and learning nothing, and guessing at the right answers is not effective, and it surely does not develop leadership skills in our small unit leaders. Yet, a great deal of contemporary training is being conducted in this fashion. Another disturbing trend is a lack of standards based training. The Marine Corps appears to be trending towards a policy of training to “time.” It is seemingly more important that a roster exist, that shows the names of Marines who “attended” a brief or what we might call “training.” Often the training that we are required to do on an annual or semiannual basis is time based. One-hour of anti-terrorism training. What standard are we training to in this case? Is the standard that someone sat through a one-hour class, regardless of whether or not they listened or learned? The Marine Corps could more effectively accomplish its intent, by reorganizing and consolidating its

training efforts, simplifying the complex and confusing world of training down to leadership and ethics development at the small unit level. Commanders are able to know their Marines, know their strengths, limitations, and their likelihood of being a risk in an area that is foreseeable or preventable.

*He who defends everything—defends nothing.*

—Frederick the Great

### **Jack-of-All-Trades, Master of None**

There are many reasons a country can fail to prepare for the next war. The United States can look at the eventual successes of World War I and World War II, but then are perplexed at the end result of the Vietnam War. Currently, the Marine Corps and the United States are finding difficulty with the Global War on Terrorism. The failure is not conducting operations, accomplishing missions, or being outmatched by the enemy; the failure exists in the nexus between the public and the government. The Department of Defense (DoD) is dealing with budget uncertainty, while at the same time it is expecting more from its downsizing military than it can deliver.<sup>31</sup> New missions emerge, and the result is the Marine Corps increasingly begins creating and employing special purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces (SPMAGTFs) around the world. New internal crises occur with classified information, or a real or perceived increase in sexual assault cases, and the result is more training. As the requirements are ever increasing, and the time is decreasing, where is the time to innovate?

The Marine Corps has a great reputation of doing more with less. The Marine Corps is also proud of being expeditionary, where other services need some comfort, good food, and sources of morale and recreation. However, despite the great attribute this trait is in combat, it

becomes a critical vulnerability in day-in and day-out operations. Today's military has become all about production, and the military budget has started to affect the DoDs long-term capability to deliver the product that is called national security. Individual services are competing for missions and funding, and the signs of stress to the force are incredibly obvious to the media, Congress, and the American people; not to mention the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines at the small unit level that keep doing more with less. Over the years, the military of the United States has increasingly become a slave to the news cycle.<sup>32</sup> Rape, domestic violence, sexual assault, suicide, and depressingly incidents of the previous nature involving children are all topics that gain excessive amounts of attention from the media and Congress, and holds significant sway in determining how the majority of Marines will spend their time training.<sup>33</sup> It is important to ask, has this cycle adversely affected the military's ability to think and innovate effectively, and therefore prepare for the gravest threats to the Nation?

It seems evident that there is a great deal of requirements, and not enough time or resources to accomplish them. If the Marine Corps continues to be the silent sufferer who will always "do more with less" then the time for innovation, and implementation of future doctrine will not arrive, as the service will be bogged down in operations and requirements instead of thinking and leading critically toward future war. The Marine Corps must complain, fight for more time, or design a method that has less requirements, or it will surely be representative of the infamous "*jack-of-all trades, master of none*" label. The Marine Corps has global requirements, and they must be met, but someone must be cognizant of the situation, and must have the vision to stop saying that it is ok to operate at the breaking point for a decade or more, both in and out of combat. Repetitive, redundant, boring and ineffective training and administrivia is draining energy from the system. The Marine Corps' current annual training, as

it relates to personal conduct, is just that a drain on energy and morale, and it takes extremely valuable time and energy away from key leadership who need to be thinking and leading critically. This administrative and annual training enterprise must be simplified, made less reactive and prescriptive; while at the same time made to be more holistic and effective, thereby ultimately providing more time back to the unit commander.

Time is a precious resource that we cannot get more of; therefore, given the Marine Corps' mission of fighting and winning the Nation's battles, wasting time ought to be a deadly sin. The Marine Corps endorses a "one-third, two-thirds" principle of time management that allows for one-third of the time available to be utilized by the higher unit, and consequently allows for two-thirds of available time to be utilized by the subordinate unit. The "one-third, two-thirds rule" is useful in a time constrained combat environment, and ought to be ruthlessly applied across the total force in a peacetime garrison environment. The prescriptive approach of annual training and pre-deployment training programs are very well intentioned, yet there is a gap between aspiration and application. In many areas, the Marine Corps have created a training requirement for nearly everything. The concern is that when something "new" surfaces, a problem that the media, Congress and society suddenly "feel" is preventable in the Armed Forces, then a new program with associated training requirements will be developed. Regardless of the Marine Corps' acceptance that the lack of training time, sometimes referred to, as "whitespace" does exist; it is just a matter of time before new requirements are mandated, and the force is totally overwhelmed. The Marine Corps as an institution would do well to mind the time honored and often repeated maxims of "keep the main thing the main thing" and "brilliance in the basics." The Marine Corps aspires to positively influence the conduct of its Marines through a surplus of programs, offices, courses and initiatives, but the application is flawed.

A term has surfaced recently, when referring to the surplus of training requirements and associated bureaucracy, and that term is “Total Force Overload.”<sup>34</sup> The volumes of annual and pre-deployment training requirements that exist are suffocating. There is a staggering and varied list of topics that must be done on an annual basis, in order to consider Marines are “trained.” The efficacy and the frequency of these requirements are subjects that are seemingly devoid of critical thought. The typical annual requirements for every Marine include topics such as marksmanship, water survival, tobacco use, sexually transmitted disease prevention, hazing, equal opportunity, sexual harassment, and the list goes on. These various requirements boil down to a certain number of hours that a Marine must train to, which also varies from 1 hour to 19 hours per topic—though most are simply an hour of training per year. On no occasion does a specific training requirement qualify for less than one hour of training, and each of these requirements are standardized to be repeated on an annual basis. Interestingly, the topics of organizational theory and adult learning have something applicable for this annual training philosophy. Previously the argument was mentioned that at the age of 16 in most places in the United States, a teenager can be trained to drive a motor vehicle. Once a license is granted, there are seldom any requirements for that teenager to ever be trained, evaluated or tested again. When you are 18 you can vote without training. When you are 21 you can drink without training. Note that our culture is determining what is morally right in these instances. As a Marine culture we do the same. By glancing at (Appendix 2 – Sample of Annual Training Requirements) you will note that the long list of training requirements are not often life and death matters. Note also, that training such as the use of deadly force is not an annual training requirement, but the effect of tobacco use is a requirement. It might be time for the Marine Corps to ask itself, are we training the right things? The Marine Corps teaches deadly force once

in boot camp, why do we not treat a topic such as sexual assault the same way, and dedicate at minimum annual refresher training for all Marines?

*Most of us spend too much time on what is urgent and not enough time on what is important.*<sup>35</sup>

—Stephen Covey

### **Too Many Priorities, Too Little Time**

There is only so much time a unit has. It is heard far and wide, across every unit, there is not enough time to conduct, and repeat the annual training, and conduct the pre-deployment training that is required. There are several reasons there is not enough time. Limited base resources. Limited training areas. Competing units, all needing to complete the training at these limited resources. In the case of annual training, fuel is added to the fire with the fact that almost all training expires within 12-months. Where else do you get quality training, certified that you are proficient, and then the clock expires, and you must repeat the same, mundane, trivial, boring PowerPoint® presentation. The two HHQs driven training programs (annual and predeployment) take a disproportionate amount of a unit's time. It is important to note that the Army's Strategic Studies Institute has recently published a study that details lying as it relates to the completion of annual required training.<sup>36</sup> The study discusses the concept in detail of assigning more requirements than can be reasonably done in space and time. It is meaningful, and perfectly illustrates the point of excessive, ineffective and redundant training, that at a certain point, professional soldiers willingly compromise their integrity, because following all the policies is simply not possible, and the training can be so meaningless and trivial, that it is not seen as an ethical failure.

Annual training requirements can be at competition with pre-deployment training requirements. Units often can train 100% of their Marines on a given requirement, but considering that units continue to be staffed throughout the year, new joins detract from training readiness percentages on all categories of training. Deployment tempo, and the arrival of key leadership similarly can stall the amount of time that can be allocated to completing training across the entire unit.<sup>37</sup> Many Marines strongly believe that there is not enough time in the 8-hour workday, 40-hour workweek, and pre-deployment work-up period to complete all training requirements. Some will surely hurriedly say that Marines will work many more hours than those just mentioned, although that is the standard that federal employees and military departments are held to except for in justifiable circumstances.<sup>38</sup> Any Marine needing to work more than this just demonstrates the inefficiency of the training that the institution requires. The amount of time many Marines spend at work far exceeds 40-hours a week. Some Marines work 6-7 days a week such as at recruit training for example. National holidays take away from "training" days. Deployments for training, add additional days of the calendar year that Marines are at work, as do actual combat and global response force deployments.

By now, it is obvious that the Marine Corps is occasionally biting off more than it can chew, and doing just well enough to not choke, while trying to swallow two handfuls of horse pills. There is not enough time to do both annual and predeployment training. The Marine Corps are becoming specialists, by creating programs and offices, and incessant reactive training instead of addressing the underlying sources of problems. Leadership and ethics development, self-discipline, and accountability are the answers to these ethical problems. These are basic Marine Corps fundamentals of leadership that have existed for years, and the Marine Corps would do well to stick to the basics that it has mastered, rather than re-inventing the wheel.

*Today, however, the Corps faces a more immediate threat to its ability to perform created by the times themselves. There is, across the land, an erosion of the work and service ethics, a general failure to provide incentives for excellence, a dimmed sense of industry and frugality and, most seriously, a degraded sense of national commitment—a reluctance to fight, no matter what the occasion or circumstance. It is from such a society that the young men and women comprising a citizens' Marine Corps must be drawn. It is a dilute reservoir. For the Corps to maintain its standards of dedication, professionalism, and patriotic commitment under the weight of this impediment is a sobering task.<sup>39</sup>*

—Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak

## **Part Two: The Way Ahead**

Part one of this paper discussed the nature of the problem. The Marine Corps is addressing a character ethics problem, and it is doing so in an ineffective fashion through annual training requirements that are seen as more important to have been completed, than to have completed them well. Part two of this paper will provide recommendations for adapting annual training into a continuous leadership and ethics development program that not only meets the current standards of annual training requirements, but exceeds them by being more holistic and effective, and truly enhancing the readiness of the force, instead of merely checking a box. To accomplish this change in the manner in which annual training requirements are met, thereby making the training effective and worthwhile, the Marine Corps must take an innovative approach. The remainder of this paper discusses how the Marine Corps can eliminate excessive administrivia, and get back to the basics, develop leadership and ethics, give Marines a better sense of direction in life with a coaching, counseling and mentorship that is centered on a individually developed personal mission statement, and fully integrated with core values based training.

*...errors by junior leaders stemming from overboldness are a necessary part of learning. We should deal with such errors leniently; there must be no 'zero defects' mentality. Abolishing 'zero defects' means that we do not stifle boldness or initiative through the threat of punishment. It does not mean that commanders do not counsel subordinates on mistakes; constructive criticism is an important element in learning. Nor does it give subordinates free license to act stupidly or recklessly.<sup>40</sup>*

—MCDP-1 Warfighting

### **Zero Tolerance versus Accountability**

At some point, there must have been a zero tolerance Marine Corps. Because ever since, Marines have been talking about eliminating the zero tolerance mentality. All humans are fallible, so Marines, a service with the average age of its service members being 21 years of age, is also imperfect. It is easy to take note of the type of juvenile, college fraternity style mistakes that many Marines make. There are ignorant and unfortunate mistakes that are forgivable once appropriate administrative or punitive action is taken. This is called accountability. Mistakes need to be lessons learned, for those that make the mistakes, and for others to learn from the mistakes without the need for repeating them. It is not zero tolerance. There are situations that merit a zero tolerance policy. By referring to the most recent dispositions of court martials for the Marine Corps, it is easy to notice the disgusting and horrifying trends of today's internet centric society are areas of moral and ethic failing that cannot be tolerated.<sup>41</sup>

There seemingly will always be a percentage of society that makes it into the Marine Corps that will create disciplinary problems—even horrific problems. These trouble makers will likely always continue to violate core values, professional ethic, and moral decision-making that the Marine Corps trains and cultivates in its Marines. Accountability is an important part of unit, peer, and self-discipline, particularly for core professional values violations. The Marine Corps' administrative and punitive action system allows for administrative, non-judicial, and judicial

actions to be taken to hold Marines accountable for their actions, performance or lack thereof. Holding Marines accountable for bona fide, legally proven incidents of violating the Marine Corps' professional set of core values is vital to preserving good order and discipline.

Critics argue that holding Marines accountable for first time offenses sets a zero-defect mentality. A zero-defect mentality goes against the current Commandant's guidance, as well as the Marine Corps leadership philosophy of the last 25 years or more. Holding Marines accountable for immoral decision-making and ethical violations of the institutional core values is not a zero defects policy. It is important to hold ethical conduct and leadership to a higher level of intolerance for failing to meet the standards. The Marine Corps cannot shift to a zero tolerance mentality, but the Marine Corps must hold Marines accountable when found guilty of violations of its institutional code of ethics. Certain types of misconduct and identified behavioral problems should be zero tolerance, or at least be grounds for processing Marines for administrative separation.

The best defense for ensuring that Marines do not experience a zero defect mentality for ethical failures is proper training. It is the commander's responsibility to ensure that their Marines have all the training, education, and tools that they need to survive—in or out of combat. Failing to teach core values, ethical behavior and moral decision-making is analogous to not giving your Marine small arms protective inserts for their protective vests, and exposing them to the lethal effects of enemy fires on the battlefield. A commander holds responsibility for equipping their leaders and their Marines with the right education, training, and mindset to succeed on and of the battlefield. MCLD is the key to developing ethical leadership in Marines. Where the Marine Corps order on mentorship failed, the MCLD concept must succeed. MCLD

must take hold, and be integrated into every facet of small unit training in order to thrive and influence the next generations of Marines for the better.

*The main thing is, to keep the main thing, the main thing.*

—Stephen Covey

### **Keep It Simple, Stick to “Brilliance in the Basics”**

In a concerted effort to not be a jack-of-all trades and master-of-none, the Marine Corps needs to get back to its core training—values and self-discipline. Just as the Marine Corps is trying to return to its amphibious roots, and meet its congressionally mandated mission sets, the Marine Corps needs to return to the roots of self-discipline and its professional core values. Something scholars call principle-centered leadership and character ethics. It is easy to imagine, if the Marine Corps could better develop character and self-discipline that centered on the Marine Corps institutional core values, that a more positive impact could be made on suicide, sexual assault, rape, and the terrifying instances of child pornography and child sexual abuse.

Part of the problem with values in the Marine Corps is the lack of recognition that today’s first-term Marines do not as quickly understand, accept, and embrace the professional value set of the institution that they joined. A common bias for an individual is to revert back to, or more fully embrace one’s personal value set. These personal values were learned and habituated over the course of an individual’s life. Family, friends, teachers, coaches and likely television helped the current generation of Marines to develop their personal values. When becoming a Marine, a recruit ought to clearly recognize that this transformational process is instilling them with a higher level of team-oriented values. More attention must be focused on entry-level training, and the entire initial military occupational specialty pipeline so that recruits are impacted by the

gravity of Marine Corps core values at their most impressionable state. Further efforts, such as MCLD must sustain the transformation at the small unit level, and continually develop outstanding Marines, and ultimately quality citizens out of the product that is entrusted to commanders in the fleet.

*One must put himself in the place of those whom he would lead; he must have a full understanding of their thoughts, their attitude, their emotions, their aspirations, and their ideals; and he must embody in his own character the virtues which he would instill into the hearts of his followers.<sup>42</sup>*

—General John A. Lejeune, 13th Commandant of the Marine Corps

### **Leadership and Ethics Development**

The Marine Corps has great resources that allow Marines to be counseled, and to learn to counsel their subordinates. Counseling sessions can be for a variety of reasons. Performance, conduct, promotion, career, mentorship, and the list goes on. Several years ago, the Marine Corps noticed that generational change, and technology started to impact the personal values that Marines held when they joined, as well as the immediate acceptance of new institutional values was not being so well transitioned as previous generations of Marines. Two things occurred. Values Based training and the Mentorship program. The mentorship program was an effort to expand upon young Marines experience base with counseling and venture into the realm of the corporate world successes and try to use coaching and mentoring in addition to counseling. The mentorship program was a failure, simply because it did not get enforced, and it seemed superfluous.

Currently the Lejeune Leadership Institute has staffed a draft Marine Corps order that has been submitted to Headquarters Marine Corps for revision, and signature by General Dunford, the Commandant of the Marine Corps. This draft order is entitled, Marine Corps Leadership

Development. MCLD is designed to replace the Mentorship program, and it is designed to compliment actions that are already taking place within units. The idea is to create a fusion of counseling, coaching, mentorship, along with small unit leaders that are focusing on functional areas of a Marine's personal and professional life. The functional areas all begin with an "F" and are: fidelity, fighter, fitness, family, finances, and future. The program sounds good, and it advertises that there are no "new" unit commander requirements, but the key question about this program is, as Malcolm Gladwell would say, what is going to make MCLD stick, when Mentorship did not?

In the Marine Corps during the late 1980s and the early to mid 1990s there was a tactics revolution. This revolution in thinking inside the Marine Corps centered on the ideas behind maneuver warfare and war studies, and the Marine Corps was acutely focused on tactics, tactical decision games, (TDGs), sand table exercises (STXs) war studies, and battlefield staff rides. It is now time for another thinking revolution in the Marine Corps, and this revolution ought to exist along two fronts—ethics and innovation. In the same manner TDGs were often conducted, now values-based training (VBT) through guided discussion and decision games ought to be the new normal that fills down time while waiting to use the range, or while eating a meal-ready-to-eat (MRE). Unit leaders can use VBT just as they use drill. To instill obedience, and responsible behavior in their subordinates, while allowing junior leaders the ability to practice speaking in front of small groups, show a mastery of ethical concepts.

*Our Values-Based-Training must be central to a Marine's professional development and expanded beyond its current entry-level focus. We will infuse it throughout our training and education system, ensuring our core values remain central throughout our service.*<sup>43</sup>

—General James F. Amos, 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps

### **Values Based Training**

Marine Corps Leadership Development is focused on the whole Marine, and a key element of MCLD must be character development. An existing element of Marine Corps Leadership is VBT. VBT is an excellent tool to ensure that individuals that become Marines, learn how to build upon their foundation of personal values and take up the responsibility of the Marine Corps' core values—honor, courage and commitment. VBT not only focuses on core values, but on the fundamental Marine Corps leadership traits and principles. The transition to MCLD must put a greater amount of emphasis on VBT, and on the process of the individual Marine developing and emulating the institutional values during their initial training pipeline, and throughout their first tour, and as a lifelong learner and leader. The key distinction that must be stressed in MCLD is the difference in personal values as compared to professional values, and individual values versus institutional values. These two sets of terms essentially mean the same thing, which is that an individual can choose or not choose to align themselves with their institution's values. Choosing between competing values sets is generally referred to as a moral dilemma, but that is an oversimplification. The choice actually has to be rooted in difficulty and confusion for it to be a dilemma. Generally, a choice to let personal or self-interested values win the day, is based on laziness, stubbornness, or selfishness. These traits are not on the list of Marine Corps leadership traits, so it is easy to recognize what set of values should win when there is a conflict.

Values based training (VBT) is the key to developing better Marines and leaders of Marines. VBT started to be emphasized at Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego in 2007.<sup>44</sup> For the first several years of this period, this heightened interest in VBT was based on avoiding future incidents such as Haditha and Abu Ghraib.<sup>45</sup> Officers at the time were struck by the incomprehensible frequency by which drill instructors (DIs) would shave time off of guided discussion VBT sessions with recruits, in order to spend more time reinforcing close order drill (COD). Drill instructor duty, also known as the “Drill Field” has a culture all its own. Marine Corps recruit training is world famous. Marines have a sense of it being a sacred right of passage, and that there are just some things that DIs know best. Close order drill has many extremely useful purposes. The problem with instituting a crucible, and even later introducing VBT into recruit training is that the inherited culture of the drill field and the perceived legacy of “the DIs know best.” Unfortunately, popular examples of Hollywood “boot camp” have a more lasting impression on how DIs behave and train recruits than the Marine Corps Order on Recruit Training and the Standing Operating Procedures for Recruit Training.<sup>46</sup> One of the problems with implementing VBT, and seeing success in the guided discussions between the senior drill instructor and the recruits was what can only be called a skewed emphasis on COD. DIs ought to instill instant obedience to orders, and confidence in their recruits through drill; however, COD was a graded event for the recruit platoon, and VBT was not. Grading recruit platoons on a 100% scale incentivizes drill. In order to emphasize the importance of VBT, and slightly reduce the excessive focus on COD that takes away from other learning, COD ought to be a master or non-master event for recruits. DIs can still be evaluated on a 100% scale, as to their performance as a unit leader, but the grading of the recruit platoon on anything but mastery or non-mastery

will continue to ensure that other training and education at recruit training takes a back seat to COD.

*[Begin with the end in mind]...is based on imagination—the ability to envision in your mind what you cannot at present see with your eyes...There is mental (first) creation, and a physical (second) creation. The physical follows the mental, just as a building follows a blueprint.<sup>47</sup>*

—Stephen Covey

### **Personal Mission Statement**

Focusing on VBT is a key element to successfully incorporating MCLD. It is easy to notice that today's generation of young men and women have a lack of direction in life. Modern technology such as smartphones and wireless internet are making young people less social and more private. These modern technologies can negatively affect sleep, nutrition, and can be disruptive to the conduct of one's work. These technologies combined with the lack of an effective transition from personal values to professional values can create a blind spot within young people, including Marines. In addition to a renewed and concentrated focus on VBT, the Marine Corps ought to incorporate a concept made popular by Stephen Covey, the author of "*The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People*." This concept is the "personal mission statement." Similar to how a Marine Corps squad, platoon, company or battalion has a mission statement; a personal mission statement is how an individual can reflect on their actions, behaviors, personal and professional conduct, and perform some frequent self-analysis to determine if they are on track with where they want to direct their efforts in life. Covey defines a personal mission statement as requiring deep introspection, careful analysis and thoughtful expression.<sup>48</sup> This is not something Marines accomplish in one sitting. It requires retooling and sharpening from time

to time, to ensure that the individual is still on track, and as the environment changes, the individual will desire to improve and adjust their personal mission statement.

The current generation of Marines faces a complex future of warfare. Technology continues to make modern warfare more complex, dangerous, and increasingly chaotic. Technology can be seen as a combat multiplier, enhancing a force's ability to be lethal; but technology has also begun to be noticed as a critical vulnerability of US forces. Just as technology has exponentially increased on the modern battlefield, technology too has increased in everyday life. Meals are more convenient due to technology, Americans are more sedentary to technology, and Marines are often caught up in this adverse influence of technology in their off-duty and personal lives.<sup>49</sup> An effective tool for giving first-term Marines the morally mature perspective that is required for embodying Marine Corps core values is the "personal mission statement. A PMS includes roles and goals. Roles identify the various positions of responsibility that an individual holds. Examples of roles are father, husband, Marine, squad leader, officer or commander. Each of these roles can and should have different goals, yet the endstate of these roles and goals should all lead to the "end" that the individual wants to see at the end of their accomplished life. Goals are also an important part of a personal or professional mission statement. Goals can be short term, mid term, or life-long goals. Goals can be related to personal achievement, family, work, and many other areas of interest. It is important that the personal and professional goals are centered on an ethically principled and balanced life. This mission statement concept can "tie-in" the MCLD concept very easily. MCLD is a menu, options, resources, checklists, and the personal mission statement is the vehicle to strategize 5 to 50 years of personal and professional objectives that help keep an individual on track. The personal mission statement is a good instrument to maintaining a healthy work—life balance.<sup>50</sup>

*New and significant intellectual constructions usually emerge at times of fundamental change or paradigmatic shifts, when prevailing ways of interpreting and coping with reality no longer seem adequate.<sup>51</sup>*

—Azar Gat

## **Conclusion**

This paper has identified that there is a real character ethics problem in the Marine Corps, and that the Marine Corps knows this, and is doing a great deal to address this problem.

Although the Marine Corps is creating new training, new programs, and new separate offices to address individual ethical failures, the Marine Corps has not successfully created a single, comprehensive, holistic, effective, and user friendly program that addresses the root causes of these moral failings in its Marines. With the proper messaging, buy-in at key leader levels, and a guiding coalition, the Marine Corps Leadership Development Order (MCLD) could be an optimal solution. MCLD can be a solution, particularly if this program can effectively replace and encompass the disparate and unwieldy annual training program that the Marine Corps currently endorses. MCLD is a medium that will allow the same training requirements to be met, but that the emphasis and responsibility of the training is internal to the small unit (battalion or squadron level) commander, and it is at that organizational level commander's discretion to ensure how the training is best to be completed. Prescriptive, top-down, single source PowerPoint ® presentations do not train leaders how to lead and teach. The responsibility needs to be on the individual Marines and their small unit leaders.

In addition to MCLD replacing the current annual training program, MCLD must effectively conduct VBT and institute the concept of the personal mission statement as a coaching, counseling and mentorship tool that all Marines must maintain. The great number of conduct problems that have allowed the public's trust and confidence in the Marine Corps to

erode is a significant problem. The Marine Corps will not win in this fight to combat such moral issues as sexual assault, rape, and child pornography by doing what it has always done. The Marine Corps will prevail when in the words of the current Commandant, it “innovates, adapts, and wins.”

## **Appendix 1**

### **USMC LEADERSHIP AND ETHICS TRAINING SURVEY QUESTIONS**

1. I understand the definitions and role of institutional core values and professional ethics within the Marine Corps.
2. I fully understand the difference between personal values and professional values.
3. Senior officers in my current/previous command exemplify core values.
4. Junior officers in my current/previous command exemplify core values.
5. SNCOs in my current/previous command exemplify core values.
6. NCOs in my current/previous command exemplify core values.
7. Core values positively affect my professional decisions.
8. Core values positively affect my personal decisions.
9. Leadership and ethics training and education positively impact the ethical climate and morale of my current/previous unit.
10. Leadership and ethics training and education positively impacted the ethical climate and morale of my current/previous unit.
11. I received formal and worthwhile leadership and ethics training and education at entry-level training (Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Officer Candidates School, or Service Academy).
12. I received formal and worthwhile leadership and ethics training and education while at my follow on training (Marine Combat Training, School of Infantry or The Basic School).
13. I received formal and worthwhile leadership and ethics training and education while at my primary military occupational specialty (MOS) school.
14. I have continued to receive formal and worthwhile leadership and ethics training during my career directly from superiors in my operational force and/or supporting establishment unit(s).
15. Local regimental or division schools and resident Professional Military Education (PME) courses have prepared me well for leadership roles and ethical responsibilities throughout my career.
16. Leadership and ethics training is applicable to daily operations in my current/previous command.

17. I am counseled on my leadership performance and ethical behavior in my current/previous command.
18. Existing leadership and ethics training and education positively impact my job performance.
19. Leadership and ethics training and education have prepared me to deal with equal opportunity, sexual harassment, and hazing issues.
20. Leadership and ethics training and education have prepared me to deal with issues affecting unit readiness (discipline, esprit-de-corps, morale and proficiency).
21. Leadership and ethics training and education have prepared me to deal with a wide range of military issues (cultural awareness, detainee handling, use of deadly force).
22. Leadership and ethics training and education have prepared me to deal with a wide range of personal issues (e.g., domestic violence, sexual assault, substance abuse, honesty vs. loyalty).
23. Leadership and ethics training and education have prepared me to lead subordinates.
24. My current/previous command spends more focus on mission accomplishment than developing leadership and ethics in Marines.
25. My current/previous command has difficulty scheduling and completing all annual, predeployment, and advanced career training (PME) during dwell time between deployments, therefore the command leadership has difficulty focusing on leadership and ethics.

Fill-In Questions:

26. List the three most important leadership and ethics skills you have received from training and education programs in the Marine Corps.
27. What leadership skills are lacking from formal training and education?
28. What is the most valuable leadership and ethics training and education program, school or course currently provided by the Marine Corps?
29. On average, how many hours do you work per workday?
30. On average, how often do you work on weekends (number of days per month)?

Please provide any additional comments:

## Appendix 2

### SAMPLE OF ANNUAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS (PER TECOM MCBUL 1500)

- A. Marine Corps Water Survival Training (MCWST) MCO 1500.52D  
(8 HOURS)
- B. Hazing MCO 1700.28A  
(1 HOUR)
- C. Marine Corps Substance Abuse Program MCO 5300.17  
(1 HOUR)
- D. The Effects of Tobacco Use MCO 1700.29  
(1 HOUR)
- E. STD/HIV Transmission Prevention MCO 1700.29  
(1 HOUR)
- F. Additional Health Promotion Training MCO 1700.29  
(1 HOUR)
- G. Sexual Assault Prevention and Response MCO 1752.5B  
(1.5-3 HOURS)
- H. The Marine Corps (OPSEC) Program MARADMIN 701/11  
(1.5 HOURS)
- I. CBRN Defense Training Requirements MCO 3400.3G  
(2 HOURS)
- J. Marine Corps Combat Marksmanship Rifle / Pistol MCO 3574.2K  
(19 / 6 hours)
- K. Operational Risk Management MCO 3500.27B  
(1.5 HOURS)
- L. Marine Corps Equal Opportunity (EO) and Sexual Harassment  
MCO P5354.1D (1 HOUR)
- M. Marine Corps Heat Injury Prevention Program MCO 6200.1E  
(1 HOUR)
- N. Marine Corps Physical Fitness Program-PFT/CFT MCO 6100.13  
(1/1 HOUR)

## **Appendix 3**

### **Recommended Garrison 5-3-5**

#### **Habits of Thought, Habits of Action, and Semper Fidelis Rules**

##### **Moral Habits of thought**

1. Develop and refine your Personal and Professional Mission Statement. Short term and lifelong goals.
2. Continuous self-analysis and improvement. Self-mastery. Embody the 14 Leadership Traits and 11 Leadership Principles.
3. Be proactive. Use Initiative. Make good decisions.
4. Principle centered life. Positive Paradigm. See the world in an optimistic and mature manner.
5. Loyalty is to the Constitution, Country and Corps. This is institutional loyalty.

##### **Moral Habits of Action**

1. Exhibit Esprit de corps and teamwork.
2. Display self-discipline and develop it in others.
3. Moral, mental, physical, financial and family fitness.

##### **Semper Fidelis Rules**

1. Marines serve the mission, and leaders serve their Marines. The goose (Marines) and the golden egg (Mission Accomplishment). Taking care of Marines requires tough and realistic training, which leads to mission accomplishment. In combat, typically the mission has priority. There is a fine balance between accomplishing whatever task is assigned and taking care of Marines.
2. Understand the difference in personal and professional values. Develop and display Marine Corps core values.
3. Marines take care of one another regardless of race, gender, religion, rank, etc. This is individual and unit loyalty.
4. Train like you fight. Just as pre-combat checks and inspections are lifesavers in combat, use these same types of principled techniques in garrison and during peacetime.

5. Always do these four things: Do what you are told, do “your” job, do the right thing, and do your best.

## **Appendix 4**

### **Recommended Marine Corps Code of Conduct**

*Similar to the POW code of conduct, or the NCO / SNCO creeds, the USMC Code of Conduct would be a short and concise set of Articles, or a paragraph that centers all Marines on what it means to dedicate ones self to the profession at arms, and live up to the institutional values of the Marine Corps.*

Draft Marine Corps Code of Conduct Statements:

1. I am a United States Marine, professionally trained in the lawful and disciplined application and management of violence.
2. As a professional warrior, when required by the Nation to protect the Constitution, and the American democratic way of life, I will always be most ready, even when the Nation is least ready.
3. I am a professional within the military and society, both ethically and technically; and as a continuing action, I train my mind ethically and my body physically to serve, as a member of the world's finest expeditionary force-in-readiness.
4. My performance and conduct will serve as an example to the American people and the world that when the Marines have landed, the situation will always be well at hand.
5. I am always prepared for hardship, adversity, and chaos; because being expeditionary means that I can indefinitely operate mentally and physically in arduous terrain, danger, and thrive in unforgiving environments of chaos.
6. My professional loyalty is to the Constitution, the Office of the President of the United States, the American people, and to the Marine Corps.
7. Our institutional values of honor, courage and commitment constantly guide my habits of thought and action in every clime and place.

## **Appendix 5**

### **Sample Personal Mission Statement (Lance Corporal)**

I am a United States Marine. My duty and moral obligation is to prepare for war. As a rifleman, it is my responsibility to be technically and tactically proficient, and to develop self-discipline, teamwork, and leadership within myself. I obey the orders of my superiors, and I use judgment based on the Marine Corps leadership traits, leadership principles, and core values.

In the short term, I desire to prepare for, and to earn promotion to the rank of corporal. It means a great deal to me to earn the privilege of being a non-commissioned officer, wear the blood stripe, and have the responsibility of leading and training Marines.

In the mid term, my goals center on attending a college and gaining a baccalaureate degree. To do this, I will need to use the resources available to me that are provided by the Marine Corps such as the base education center. I will need to be wise with my finances, apply for tuition assistance, and make good grades.

I would also like to meet the right significant other, and start a family someday soon. Spending my off-duty time in the right places, pursuing education, and saving for my future will ensure that I stay on track for a college degree, and perhaps pursue a commission as an officer in the Marine Corps after college or through the Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Education Program.

In the long term, at the end of my life, I hope to be financially stable, retired, enjoying leisure activities and travel. I hope to be blessed with children and grandchildren, and I hope to tell them of my decades of experiences and adventures in the United States Marine Corps.

## Endnotes

---

<sup>1</sup> The author conducted extensive formal and informal interviews with students from the Academic Year 2014-2015 Marine Corps War College, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting during the period of July 2014 to March 2015. Additionally, the author contacted several battalion and squadron commanders and their operations and executive officers during this same period that remained in command or had recently completed successful tours in command or in the aforementioned staff officer positions.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph F. Dunford Jr. *U.S. Marine Corps 36th Commandant's Planning Guidance*. United States Marine Corps, Washington DC, 2015.

<sup>3</sup> Charles C. Krulak. "The 31st Commandant's Intent." *Marine Corps Gazette* Volume 79, Issue 7: 18-19.

<sup>4</sup> 82nd Congress deliberating the role of the Marine Corps, specifically directed the Marine Corps as the force intended to be "most ready when the Nation is least ready."

<sup>5</sup> James F. Amos. *Expeditionary Force 21*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, March 4, 2014), 7. Accessed on 7 August 2014. <http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/ef21>

<sup>6</sup> Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert eds. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* Princeton University Press, 1986, 100-105,123; and Hew Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War* Routledge, 2005.

<sup>7</sup> Victor H. Krulak. *First to Fight: An Inside View of the US Marine Corps*. Naval Institute Press, 1999.

<sup>8</sup> U.S. Marine Corps. "MCDP 1: Warfighting." *Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps* (1997).

<sup>9</sup> Daly, Margaux; McGuckin, Laura; Pearson, John; Lee, Gary. *Constraints on Training Whitespace for II MEF Units*. Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010.

<sup>10</sup> U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Administrative Message 512/14: Implementation of Unit Marine Awareness and Prevention Integrated Training." United States Marine Corps, 2014. <http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/171542/implementation-of-unit-marine-awareness-and-prevention-integrated-training.aspx>.

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Corps Bulletin 1500, Annual Training and Education Requirements." United States Marine Corps, 2015. <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/MCBUL1500 DTD 20FEB15.pdf>.

<sup>12</sup> Leonard Wong, and Stephen J. Gerras. "Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession." *Strategic Studies Institute* (2015).

---

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Marine Corps. "MCWP 5-1, The Marine Corps Planning Process." *Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps (2010).*

<sup>14</sup> Russell, Brian E. "Organizational-Level Leadership." *Marine Corps Gazette* Volume 98, Issue 7 (2014): 10-13.

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Corps General and Special Court-Martial Dispositions October 2014 – January 2015." United States Marine Corps, 2015.  
<http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/61/Docs/courtsmartial0115.pdf>.

<sup>16</sup> Court-Martial Dispositions.

<sup>17</sup> Judith Aquino, and Abby Rogers. "20 Signs that You are A Psychopath." *Business Insider*, 2015. <http://www.businessinsider.com/how-do-you-know-if-youre-a-psychopath-2013-2>.

<sup>18</sup> *Constraints on Training Whitespace.*

<sup>19</sup> Thomas D. Waldhauser. Marine Corps Order 3502.6, Marine Corps Force Generation Process. United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 2010.

<sup>20</sup> The bibliography of this paper contains well over thirty separate orders, MARADMIN messages, and separate bulletins that give guidance on how the Marine Corps will accomplish specific and separate individual service member annual training. A Marine major at Training and Education Command actually has a full-time job of making sense of all of it, and recently concluded a study that allowed a couple of trivial training requirements to fall by the wayside, and lengthen the frequency between training from "annual" to bi-annual or every two years for certain types of training. Needless to say, this is not a great deal of time-savings for unit commanders, and it has done nothing to make the training more effective.

<sup>21</sup> Dunford, *36th Commandant's Planning Guidance.*

<sup>22</sup> For more on battalion and squadron level leadership, read Russell, "Organizational-Level Leadership."

<sup>23</sup> John R. Wooden, and Steve Jamison. *Wooden on leadership.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005.

<sup>24</sup> The author conducted extensive formal and informal interviews with students from the Academic Year 2014-2015 Marine Corps War College, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting during the period of July 2014 to March 2015. Additionally, the author contacted several battalion and squadron commanders and their operations and executive officers during this same period that remained in command or had recently completed successful tours in command or in the aforementioned staff officer positions.

---

<sup>25</sup> *Constraints on Training Whitespace.*

<sup>26</sup> *Constraints on Training Whitespace.*

<sup>27</sup> *Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession.*

<sup>28</sup> The author believes that the amount of Administrivia that commanders and their staffs currently are responsible for has reached a tipping point in a negative way. The majority of an officer's day can be comprised of reports and presentations, and sets the conditions for lacking supervision at any subordinate echelon of the command. General officers in the military ought to take a careful look at the amount of time their subordinate commanders and staffs spend at work. Over the course of the last twenty years, the officer has observed, and gained a consensus among peers that the workload is increasing at an unsustainable rate.

<sup>29</sup> Executive Advisory Panel. *Mission Readiness, Military Leaders for Kids, "Too Fat to Fight"* 2010.

<sup>30</sup> Peter J. Munson. "Commentary-Reducing Nonoperational Inefficiencies." *Marine Corps Gazette* Volume 95, Issue 9 (2011): 86.

<sup>31</sup> Nick Simeone. "Hagel Outlines Budget Reducing Troop Strength, Force Structure." American Forces Press Service 2014, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121703>.

<sup>32</sup> Margaret H. Belknap. *The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?* Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2001.

<sup>33</sup> Congressional military oversight and the media are a good thing, particularly when it comes to case examples of those institutions leading change on issues that the military may have become blind to recognizing properly, such as sexual assault; but some of these elements of media interest and oversight end up taking a life of their own, and disproportionately take time away from units and individuals who are not at risk, and have already been trained to a reasonable standard.

<sup>34</sup> Marine Forces Reserve topic suggestion submitted by Robert McGuiness.  
[https://cdet.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-40265-dt-announcement-rid-816270\\_1/orgs/MCUCSCMMS/MCU%20Research%20Topics%202014-2015.pdf](https://cdet.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-40265-dt-announcement-rid-816270_1/orgs/MCUCSCMMS/MCU%20Research%20Topics%202014-2015.pdf)

<sup>35</sup> Covey, *7 Habits*, 152.

<sup>36</sup> Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras. "Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession." *Strategic Studies Institute* (2015).

<sup>37</sup> Daly, Margaux, Amelia MacSleyne, Laura McGuckin, Yolanda Peterson-Jones, and Gary Lee. *Constrained Training Time: Why it Matters and what can be done.* Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2012.

---

<sup>38</sup> The Office of Personnel Management prescribes an 8-hour workday for all federal branches, including military. Note that the military has to provide justification to exceed the 8 hour day. Is it worthwhile to revisit enforcing this standard? It could compare to industrial revolution, long workdays, injuries and deaths, unsafe conditions, poor morale, and efficiency suffers in and out of combat.

<sup>39</sup> Krulak, Victor H. *First to Fight: An Inside View of the US Marine Corps*. Naval Institute Press, 1999.

<sup>40</sup> MCDP 1: Warfighting.

<sup>41</sup> Court-Martial Dispositions.

<sup>42</sup> John A. Lejeune. "Marine Corps Order 29: Relations between Officers and Men." United States Marine Corps, 2014.  
<http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/leadership/LLI%20site%20documents/LDDS/Relations%20Between%20Officers%20and%20Men.pdf>.

<sup>43</sup> James F. Amos. *35th Commandant of the Marine Corps Commandant's Planning Guidance*. Washington DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2010.

<sup>44</sup> Author's professional experience implementing values based training (VBT) at Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD SD) San Diego, CA. 2007-2010.

<sup>45</sup> Training and Education Command and the Recruit Training Regiment at MCRD SD developed vignettes and the concept of guided discussions led by senior drill instructors.

<sup>46</sup> There exists a culture within drill instructors, and sometimes tacitly or quietly approved by staff non-commissioned officers (SNCOs) and senior SNCOs. Officers tend to allow certain aspects of this culture to take hold to the degree that the orders, policies, and even the hourly schedules are not always followed by drill instructors. Images from Hollywood, such as "Full Metal Jacket" by Stanley Kubrick sometimes have more of an effect on how drill instructors behave than do the existing policies and punitive orders that govern the conduct of recruit training.

<sup>47</sup> Covey, *7 Habits*, 99, 146-147.

<sup>48</sup> Covey, *7 Habits*, 129.

<sup>49</sup> *Too Fat to Fight*.

---

<sup>50</sup> Drew Hendricks. "Personal Mission Statement of 13 CEOs and Lessons You Need To Learn." Forbes, 2014. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/drewhendricks/2014/11/10/personal-mission-statement-of-14-ceos-and-lessons-you-need-to-learn/>.

<sup>51</sup> Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War* (2001).

### **Bibliography**

Amos, James F. *35th Commandant of the Marine Corps Commandant's Planning Guidance*. Washington DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2010.

Amos, James F. *Expeditionary Force 21*. Washington DC: United States Marine Corps, 2014.

Amos, James F. "Marine Corps Order 1700.28B: Hazing." United States Marine Corps, 2014. [http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO 1700.28B.pdf](http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%201700.28B.pdf).

Aquino, Judith and Rogers, Abby. "20 Signs that You are A Psychopath." Business Insider, 2015. <http://www.businessinsider.com/how-do-you-know-if-youre-a-psychopath-2013-2>.

Bailey, Ronald L. "Marine Corps Order 3070.2A: Marine Corps Operations Security Program." United States Marine Corps, 2014. <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%203070.2A.pdf>.

Bartone, Paul T. "Resilience Under Military Operational Stress: Can Leaders Influence Hardiness?" *Military Psychology* Volume 18, (2006): 131.

Bartone, Paul T. "Understanding Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib: Psychological Considerations and Leadership Implications." *The Military Psychologist* Volume 20, Issue 2 (2004): 12-16.

Beatty, Richard W. and David O. and Ulrich. "Re-Energizing the Mature Organization." *Organizational Dynamics* Volume 20, Issue 1 (1991): 16.

Belknap, Margaret H. *The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?* Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2001.

Conway, James T. "Marine Corps Order 6100.13 W/CH 1: Marine Corps Physical Fitness Program." United States Marine Corps, 2014. [http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%206100.13%20W\\_CH%201.pdf](http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%206100.13%20W_CH%201.pdf).

Covey, Stephen R. *The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990.

- 
- Daly, Margaux, Amelia MacSleyne, Laura McGuckin, Yolanda Peterson-Jones, and Gary Lee. *Constrained Training Time: Why it Matters and what can be done*. Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2012.
- Daly, Margaux, Amelia MacSleyne, Laura McGuckin, Sarah Stevenson, and Gary Lee. *Constrained Training Time: Defining and Characterizing the Problem*. Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2011.
- Daly, Margaux, Laura McGuckin, John Pearson, and Gary Lee. *Constraints on Training Whitespace for II MEF Units*. Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010.
- Dunford Jr., Joseph F. *U.S. Marine Corps 36th Commandant's Planning Guidance*. Washington DC: United States Marine Corps, 2015.
- Executive Advisory Panel. *Mission: Readiness, Military Leaders for Kids, "Too Fat to Fight"* 2010.
- Ficarrotta, J. Carl. "Are Military Professionals Bound by a Higher Moral Standard." *Armed Forces & Society* Volume 24, Issue 1 (1997): 59-75.
- Flynn, George J. "Marine Corps Order 1500.52D: Marine Corps Water Survival Training Program." United States Marine Corps, 2014.  
<http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%201500.52D.pdf>.
- Gat, Azar. *A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War* Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Glueck, Kenneth J. "Marine Corps Order 3574.2L: Marine Corps Combat Marksmanship Program." United States Marine Corps, 2014.  
<http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/MCO%203574.2L.pdf>.
- Grissom, Adam. "The Future of Military Innovation Studies." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* Volume 29, Issue 5 (2006): 905.
- Hagee, Michael W. "Marine Corps Order 1500.58: Marine Corps Mentoring Program." United States Marine Corps, 2014.  
<https://www.tecom.usmc.mil/Mentoring%20Program%20Documents/MCO%201500.58.pdf>
- Hagee, Michael W. "Navy Marine Corps Directive 1500.58: Marine Corps Mentoring Program Guidebook." United States Marine Corps, 2014,  
<http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/NAVMC DIR 1500.58.pdf>.
- Hendricks, Drew. "Personal Mission Statement of 13 CEOs and Lessons You Need To Learn." Forbes, 2014. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/drewhendricks/2014/11/10/personal-missionstatement-of-14-ceos-and-lessons-you-need-to-learn/>.

---

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* Harvard University Press, 1957.

Immel, August R. *Getting Marines to Behave Ethically: The Ethical Fitness Assessment*. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, School of Advanced Warfighting, 2013.

Jansen, John M. "Group Order 1050.3: Post-Midnight Liberty Mission Planning." United States Marine Corps, 2015. <http://docslide.us/documents/gruo-10503-post-midnight-liberty-mission-planning-1.html>.

Jones, James L. "Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare." *Marine Corps Gazette* Volume 86, Issue 2 (2002): 36.

Jones, James L. "Marine Corps Order 1700.29: Marine Corps Semper Fit Program Manual." United States Marine Corps, 2014. <http://www.ndri.org/ctrs/ibhr/docs/Marine%20Corps%20Order%20P1700.29%20Semper%20Fit%20Program%20Manual%208%20Nov%20.pdf>.

Kidder, Rushworth M. *How Good People make Tough Choices: Resolving the Dilemmas of Ethical Living*. New York: Harper, 2009.

Krulak, Charles C. "The 31st Commandant's Intent." *Marine Corps Gazette* Volume 79, Issue 7 (1995): 18-19.

Krulak, Victor H. *First to Fight: An Inside View of the US Marine Corps*. Naval Institute Press, 1999.

Lejeune, John A. "Marine Corps Order 29: Relations between Officers and Men." United States Marine Corps, 2014. <http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/leadership/LLI%20site%20documents/LDDS/Relations%20Between%20Officers%20and%20Men.pdf>.

Mayer, David M., Maribeth Kuenzi, and Rebecca L. and Greenbaum. "Examining the Link between Ethical Leadership and Employee Misconduct: The Mediating Role of Ethical Climate." *Journal of Business Ethics* Volume 95, Issue 1 (2010): 7-16.

McCoy, Bryan P. *the Passion of Command: The Moral Imperative of Leadership* Marine Corps Association, 2006.

Mills, Richard P. "Marine Corps Order 3400.3G: Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Defense Training Requirements." United States Marine Corps, 2014. <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%203400.3G.pdf>.

- 
- Milstead Jr., Robert E. "Marine Corps Order 1700.29: Semper Fit Fitness and Health Promotion Policy." United States Marine Corps, 2014. <http://www.mccscp.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Fitness-MC-Policies.pdf>.
- Milstead Jr., Robert E. "Marine Corps Order 1720.2: Marine Corps Suicide Prevention Program." United States Marine Corps, 2014. <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%201720.2.pdf>.
- Milstead Jr., Robert E. "Marine Corps Order 1752.5B: Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program." United States Marine Corps, 2014. [http://www.marines.mil/portals/59/MCO%201752\\_5B.pdf](http://www.marines.mil/portals/59/MCO%201752_5B.pdf).
- Milstead Jr., Robert E. "Marine Corps Order 1754.11: Marine Corps Family Advocacy and General Counseling Program." United States Marine Corps, 2014. [http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%201754\\_11.pdf](http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%201754_11.pdf).
- Milstead Jr., Robert E. "Marine Corps Order 5300.17: Marine Corps Substance Abuse Program." United States Marine Corps, 2014. <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%205300.17.pdf>.
- Mundy Jr., Carl E. "Some Thoughts on Expeditionary Warfare." *Marine Corps Gazette* Volume 79, Issue 3 (1995): 26.
- Munson, Peter J. "Commentary-Reducing Nonoperational Inefficiencies." *Marine Corps Gazette* Volume 95, Issue 9 (2011): 86.
- Murray, Williamson R., and Millett, Allan R. eds. *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Paret, Peter, Craig, Gordon A., and Gilbert, Felix eds. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Paxton Jr., John M. "Marine Corps Order 3500.27C: Operational Risk Management." United States Marine Corps, 2014. <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/MCO%203500.27C.pdf>.
- Posen, Barry. *the Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* Cornell University Press, 1986.
- Rhodes, M. L. "Marine Corps Order P5354.1D W/CH 1: Marine Corps Equal Opportunity Manual." United States Marine Corps, 2014. <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%20P5354.1D%20W%20CH%201.pdf>.
- Robinson, Paul. "Ethics Training and Development in the Military." *Parameters* Volume 37, Issue 1 (2007): 23-36.

---

Rosen, Stephen Peter. *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* Cornell University Press, 1994.

Ruhl, Robert K. "The Code of Conduct." *Airman* (1978).

Russell, Brian E. "Organizational-Level Leadership." *Marine Corps Gazette* Volume 98, Issue 7 (2014): 10-13.

Simeone, Nick. "Hagel Outlines Budget Reducing Troop Strength, Force Structure." *American Forces Press Service* 2014, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121703>.

Strachan, Hew. *European Armies and the Conduct of War* Routledge, 2005.

Thomas, Joseph John. *Leadership Education for Marines: A Quantitative and Qualitative Study of a Leadership Curriculum at Marine Corps University* George Mason University, 2000.

Tryon, Richard T. "Marine Corps Order 5580.3: Violence Prevention Program ." United States Marine Corps, 2014. <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%205580.3.pdf>.

U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Administrative Message 294/13: 2013 Never Leave a Marine Behind Annual Suicide Prevention Training Updates." United States Marine Corps, 2014. <http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/144527/2013-never-leave-a-marine-behind-annual-suicide-prevention-training-updates.aspx>.

U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Administrative Message 512/14: Implementation of Unit Marine Awareness and Prevention Integrated Training." United States Marine Corps, 2014. <http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/171542/implementation-of-unit-marine-awareness-and-prevention-integrated-training.aspx>.

U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Administrative Message 524/12: Never Leave a Marine Behind Annual Suicide Prevention Training and Master Training Team Requirements." United States Marine Corps, 2014. <http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/110342/never-leave-a-marine-behind-annual-suicide-prevention-training-and-master-train.aspx>.

U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Administrative Message 101/10: Combating Trafficking in Persons Annual Training Requirement." United States Marine Corps, 2014. <http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/112119/combating-trafficking-in-persons-annual-training-requirement.aspx>.

U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Administrative Message 118/11: Annual Cyber Awareness Training." United States Marine Corps, 2014. <http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/111441/annual-cyber-awareness-training.aspx>.

- 
- U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Administrative Message 122/13: Leave a Marine Behind, Annual Suicide Prevention Training Completion Milestones." United States Marine Corps, 2014.  
<http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/139484/neve-r-leave-a-marine-behind-annual-suicide-prevention-training-completion-miles.aspx>.
- U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Administrative Message 288/13: Updates to Annual Cyber Awareness Training for 2013." United States Marine Corps, 2014.  
<http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/144273/updates-to-annual-cyber-awareness-training-for-2013.aspx>.
- U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Administrative Message 593/12: Mandatory Annual Records Management Training." United States Marine Corps, 2014.  
<http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/128584/2012-mandatory-annual-records-management-training.aspx>.
- U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Administrative Message 658/12: Call to Action for Preventing Marine Suicides." United States Marine Corps, 2014.  
<http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/tabid/13074/Article/134396/call-to-action-for-preventing-marine-suicides.aspx>.
- U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Administrative Message 690/13: Clarification of MARADMIN 288/13 Updates to Annual Cyber Awareness Training for 2013." United States Marine Corps, 2014.  
<http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/156501/clarification-of-maradmin-28813-updates-to-annual-cyber-awareness-training-for.aspx>.
- U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Administrative Message 701/11: Annual Operations Security (OPSEC) Training." United States Marine Corps, 2014.  
<http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/110900/annual-operations-security-opsec-training.aspx>.
- U.S. Marine Corps. "Draft Marine Corps Order 1500.61: Marine Corps Leadership Development." United States Marine Corps, 2015.  
<https://www.mcu.usmc.mil/sites/leadership/SitePages/main.aspx>.
- U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Corps Bulletin 1500, Annual Training and Education Requirements." United States Marine Corps, 2015.  
<http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/MCBUL%201500%20DTD%2020FEB15.pdf>.
- U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Corps Bulletin 1500, Annual Training and Education Requirements." United States Marine Corps, 2014.  
[http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/135/Docs/ReserveLSSSJRS/MCBul%201500%20DTD%2017DEC13%20\(Training\).pdf](http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/135/Docs/ReserveLSSSJRS/MCBul%201500%20DTD%2017DEC13%20(Training).pdf).

---

U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Corps General and Special Court-Martial Dispositions October 2014 – January 2015." United States Marine Corps, 2015.  
<http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/61/Docs/courtsmartial0115.pdf>.

U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Corps Order 3302.1E: Marine Corps Antiterrorism Force Protection Program." United States Marine Corps, 2015.

U.S. Marine Corps. "MCWP 5-1, The Marine Corps Planning Process." *Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps (2010)*.

U.S. Marine Corps. "MCDP 1: Warfighting." *Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps (1997)*.

Waldhauser, Thomas D. "Marine Corps Order 3502.6: Marine Corps Force Generation Process." United States Marine Corps, 2014.  
<http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%203502.6.pdf>.

Williams, Michael J. "Marine Corps Order 6200.1E W/CH 1: Marine Corps Heat Injury Prevention Program." United States Marine Corps, 2014.  
[http://www.imef.marines.mil/Portals/68/Docs/IMEF/Surgeon/MCO\\_6200.1E\\_W\\_CH\\_1\\_Heat\\_Injury\\_Prevention.pdf](http://www.imef.marines.mil/Portals/68/Docs/IMEF/Surgeon/MCO_6200.1E_W_CH_1_Heat_Injury_Prevention.pdf).

Winand, Timothy E. "Regimental Order 1500.1: Marine Corps Leadership Development in 3d Marine Regiment." United States Marine Corps, 2014.  
<http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/sites/leadership/Orders/3D%20Marine%20Regiment.pdf>.

Wong, Leonard and Stephen J. and Gerras. "Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession." *Strategic Studies Institute (2015)*.