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Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Trying to get it right for the next time:  
Preparing Marine Advisors for a Counterinsurgency in Asia

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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AY 14-15

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## **Executive Summary**

**Title:** Trying to get it right for the next time: Preparing Marine Advisors for a Counterinsurgency in Asia

**Author:** Major Benjamin N. Preston, United States Marine Corps

**Thesis:** Historically, the Marine Corps has formed advisor teams for indigenous forces in support of counterinsurgency operations in an ad hoc manner; this is counterproductive, and historical insights from advisor operations may allow the Marine Corps to more effectively select, train, and equip its advisor teams for counterinsurgency operations in the Asia-Pacific Region.

### **Discussion:**

- History demonstrates that the most important piece of preparing advisor teams is selecting the appropriate personnel. The Marine Corps has normally conducted this in an ad hoc manner, simply selecting available personnel with little to no thought as to their suitability to conduct this demanding mission. Utilization of U.S. Army Special Forces selection criteria, coupled with current Marine Corps initiatives to identify personnel with advisor experience can better select the appropriate personnel to complete this mission. Additionally, steps must be taken to educate the force as to the importance of this mission that will remove the stigma that selection for this duty is detrimental or non-career enhancing to the individuals who complete it.

- Training for advisor teams should be tailored to their specific mission, which is direct and daily interaction with an indigenous military force. Therefore, culture and language training should be a primary focus area, but on a deeper level than that provided to conventional units deploying to the same theater. The author contends that selection of the appropriate personnel will aid greatly in the arena of culture and language by utilizing personnel with open mindedness and a stated willingness to interact with the indigenous forces. Personnel should also receive non-standard training, such as operation of Soviet Bloc weapons, communications and medical training, and detailed assigned reading geared specifically towards advisor duty.

- Advisor teams have unique equipment requirements due to their level of integration with indigenous forces. The Advisor Team Officer In Charge (OIC) should be empowered to set the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) levels for his team. This will allow the OIC to raise or lower PPE levels based on the mission being conducted, the threat, and the degree of integration with indigenous forces. Additionally, advisor team communication requirements cover the entire spectrum of currently fielded radios, and the degree of autonomy requires that each team have an organic Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC).

**Conclusion:** The United States Marine Corps is a force that is very well suited for advisory operations and has proven this through many conflicts. It also has a tendency to lose the hard fought lessons from previous conflicts almost immediately after their conclusions. As the battlefield becomes increasingly complex and the nation again calls upon for the Marine Corps to support the training of indigenous forces in a counterinsurgency fight, it is imperative that the institution take a critical look at itself and prepare its next advisor teams for success by providing them the appropriate personnel, training, and equipment for them to succeed.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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## *Preface*

I would like to begin by thanking my Master of Military Studies Advisor, Dr. Charles McKenna for his valuable feedback and guidance during the research process. He encouraged me to look at several issues differently than I initially planned to, which I believe made the finished product much better rounded.

The reason that I chose to write on this topic is somewhat addressed in the actual paper, but in 2005, I found myself selected for advisor duty in Afghanistan with very little notice or preparation. It seemed as though our team was “alone and unafraid”, without much outside support or guidance, and only through the hard work of the individual team members, along with our counterparts from the Afghanistan National Army, were we able to succeed.

For many years, this topic still evoked a heated emotional response whenever I thought about it. Having the opportunity to research the topic while at Command and Staff College, the question I kept coming back to is: How can we do this better the next time? As much as the country does not want to take on another counterinsurgency mission where we are asked to provide advisor teams, I believe that it is inevitable, and I hope that best practices from historical examples, coupled with insights from the modern operating environment can shed some light on a better way to approach this problem.

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**Introduction:**

During the American Revolution, a debate took place between those advocating a conventional military such as General George Washington, and those advocating unconventional methods such as Major General Nathaniel Greene.<sup>1</sup> The debate continues to this day, and there are those in the military establishment who would wish away the requirement to train our military for unconventional or counterinsurgency operations. The United States, and more specifically, the United States Marine Corps, has vacillated between training for large-scale conventional conflict and unconventional or counterinsurgency operations multiple times throughout its history. After more than ten years of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps finds itself at another crossroads and must ask itself an extremely difficult question. Should the Marine Corps disregard the hard fought lessons of the last ten years, or should it draw on its rich history of counterinsurgency and advisory operations to prepare itself for similar conflicts in the future?

Throughout its history, the Marine Corps has engaged in numerous small wars and counterinsurgency operations, normally forming and deploying advisor teams to train indigenous forces in support of these operations. From its early years fighting in the Philippines and the Banana Wars, to Vietnam, and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps has consistently found itself required to form and deploy some form of advisor teams in support of indigenous forces. Furthermore, with the guidance from national authorities to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific Region, it is timely to review lessons from the British Malayan Emergency and French war in Indochina to find common themes and lessons for advisors from additional conflicts in this region. Historically, the Marine Corps formed advisor teams for indigenous forces in support of counterinsurgency operations in an ad hoc manner. This method is

counterproductive, and insights can and should be drawn from historical conflicts that may allow the Marine Corps to more effectively select, train, and equip its advisor teams for future counterinsurgency operations in the Asia-Pacific Region.

### **Early Years, the Philippines and the Banana Wars:**

The early 1900's found the United States, and the United States Marine Corps in particular, attempting to find an identity, and colonial operations in the Philippines provided much of that identity. Both the United States Army and Marine Corps conducted what would now be considered counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines from 1899-1902, and both organizations learned several truisms about warfare in the Asia-Pacific region that remain relevant today. Since well before the time of Mao Tse-Tung, Asians have conducted guerilla style operations, and the Filipinos fighting against United States forces employed many of these tactics, including hit and run operations, living among and off the populace, and the employment of booby traps to level the playing field with a more technologically advanced foe.<sup>2</sup> Effective techniques employed by the United States included the use of a "carrot and stick" approach. The implementation of General Order 100 by General Arthur McArthur provides one example of this with the provision that subjected combatants not in uniform, and their supporters, to execution. This program forced civilians to take sides, and increasingly isolated guerillas from popular support. An additional example was the United States employment of political power to make cooperation lucrative in that as Filipinos' participation in the government increased, so did autonomy granted by the United States.<sup>3</sup> While the United States may not implement measures this extreme in a future counterinsurgency, the lessons of finding an effective mixture of punishments and rewards for cooperation with the host nation's government remain extremely valuable. Furthermore, the United States by and large treated prisoners humanely, and effectively

posted smaller garrisons in the countryside rather than conducting large-scale search and destroy operations.<sup>4</sup> Many of the challenges seen and tactics developed in the Philippines would be seen again and employed by the Marine Corps during their operations as part of what became known as the Banana Wars.

The United States Marine Corps cut its teeth fighting guerillas throughout the Caribbean and Central America as part of the Banana Wars during the early years of the 20th century, eventually codifying their lessons into a seminal publication dubbed the *Small Wars Manual*, originally published in 1940. Many of the lessons from the manual remain relevant to forces fighting insurgents today and will be discussed later in this paper. For the Marine Corps, their first large scale experience conducting what would today be known as Security Force Assistance (SFA) or advisor operations occurred in Haiti, when then Major Smedley Butler was installed as the first commandant of the Haitian Gendarmerie, with Marines serving as officers and the Haitians initially filling the rank and file of the force.<sup>5</sup> This basic arrangement, with Marines serving as officers in a Gendarmerie or constabulary force, would be seen again in both the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua during later operations.

One of the main lessons identified during these operations that remains relevant today proved to be the usefulness of having advisors that spoke the language. There are numerous examples of this principle throughout the literature on these conflicts, and the *Small Wars Manual* noted it as one of its key lessons.<sup>6</sup> An additional lesson from these conflicts is the value in close coordination between isolated troops and aviation assets. Time and again, isolated Marine advisors used aviation to conduct close air support, resupply, and casualty evacuation, increasing their combat power and are highlighted by multiple sources as being critical to successful operations.<sup>7</sup> It is a testament to the hard work and sacrifice of the Marines who fought and

recorded these lessons, that the *Small Wars Manual*, written over 70 years ago contains many relevant and important tenets for counterinsurgency operations today.

### **Malaya and Indochina, Lessons From Two of our Closest Allies:**

The British counterinsurgency effort during the Malayan Emergency is often held up as the blueprint for successful counterinsurgency operations, and there are numerous lessons that can be drawn for both advisory missions and larger counterinsurgency operations as a whole. Early on in their campaign, the British identified three key facts, which remain applicable to the majority of counterinsurgency operations today. “First, that this was to be a long and arduous campaign, that there was no easy road to success. Second, that it could not be won unless a first-class intelligence organization was built up. Third, and most important, that this was a war that the military could not win on its own”.<sup>8</sup> An additional lesson identified in Malaya, along with many other counterinsurgencies, is that large-scale sweep operations are generally unsuccessful, and that the focus should ideally be on company level and lower operations. This idea is best summed up by a quote from Lieutenant Colonel Rowland S. N. Mans, a former British Battalion Commander in Malaya, “In the jungle, the sledgehammer has a habit of missing the nut.”<sup>9</sup>

Additional innovations from the British effort applicable to future Asian conflicts include the development of a jungle training school for all units assigned to the theater. The British school in Malaya trained units in the terrain they would be operating in and culminated with a multi-day patrol in an actual operational area. These patrols were so realistic that they were known to occasionally make enemy contact.<sup>10</sup> Similar to the Marine Corps and its *Small Wars Manual*, the British continually published doctrine and lessons learned throughout their campaign to refine their tactics.<sup>11</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Mans also identified four principles he considered vital for

success in Malaya, which retain their applicability today, especially for operations conducted in dense jungle environments:

1. A spirit of initiative and aggression.
2. A high standard of marksmanship at short ranges.
3. Continued training in jungle navigation.
4. The development of junglecraft.<sup>12</sup>

While at first glance these lessons may seem like they belong strictly at the tactical level, the likelihood of a counterinsurgency in Asia being conducted in a dense jungle environment is extremely high. Therefore, these principles for effective operation in this environment retain a high level of applicability to future advisors there and should be incorporated into training packages.

Concurrently with the British in Malaya, the French were fighting another war against communist insurgents in its colony of Indochina. Unlike the British, the French were unsuccessful in their endeavor, but numerous lessons remain applicable to advisors today. Early on in their campaign, the French identified a lack of cultural and language proficiency amongst the majority of their troops.<sup>13</sup> Additionally, the French experienced extremely limited success in attempting to conduct large-scale operations against the Viet Minh.<sup>14</sup> Several other lessons drawn from the war include the idea that a well-trained, lightly armed and lightly equipped company can be very successful with local knowledge and the ability to operate in a jungle environment.<sup>15</sup> There are several themes that are prominent in both the British and French experiences in Malaya and Indochina. These include training your forces to have the ability to live and operate effectively in the jungle, the idea that successful operations in the jungle are generally conducted at the company level and below, and that language and cultural knowledge are invaluable to any force fighting with an indigenous military.

**United States Advisors in Vietnam:**

During the United States war in Vietnam (Hereafter, The Vietnam War), the United States undertook the largest and longest advisory program in its history. The principal unit responsible for advisory operations was the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) formed in 1950, and from 1955 until withdrawal in 1973, it fielded advisor teams to Republic of Vietnam (RVN) forces.<sup>16</sup> The Vietnam advisory effort as a whole had both successes and failures at every level from the tactical to strategic, and a careful review of these efforts provides many important lessons for the future.

Early on, the United States focused on turning the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) into a mirror image of United States forces with the goal of repulsing a North Vietnamese attack on the RVN.<sup>17</sup> During this period, the United States imposed its own doctrine, and didn't develop any additional or different doctrine for ARVN forces.<sup>18</sup> This strategy of a mirror image force proved ineffective as the Viet Cong increased its proficiency and both United States and ARVN forces faced an enemy they were not prepared to fight. As the war progressed, many advisory teams turned into de facto liaison elements between United States and ARVN forces, essentially providing a link for fire support and medical evacuation.<sup>19</sup> Additionally, many commanders viewed advisory duty as non-career enhancing, and as a place to hide their undesirable soldiers and Marines.<sup>20</sup> In different portions of Vietnam, there were distinctive efforts made by the Army and Marine Corps to conduct advisory operations, and one of the most successful proved to be the Marine Corps' Combined Action Platoons (CAP).

In an attempt to conduct pacification of villages in its area of operations (AO), the Marine Corps took an approach with roots in its history of small wars. The CAP involved the placement of a Marine rifle squad and a Navy Corpsman, composed of volunteers, into a village to integrate

with a Vietnamese Popular Forces (PF) platoon. The squad leader advised the platoon commander and took de facto command during operations, and the fire teams integrated with the squads of the platoon.<sup>21</sup> The program's key idea was that the Marines living in the village would prove to the population that the Marines had a stake in their security, thus increasing the proficiency of the PF platoon and giving the villagers an incentive to cooperate with the Marines in the CAP. The program was by no means perfect, and the challenges faced by advisors throughout history, chiefly language and culture, proved problematic for many of the CAP's. There are differing opinions on the overall success of the program. As it was a Marine only program, and since General Westmoreland never approved its implementation outside of the Marine AO, there was no way to determine whether it could have been successful countrywide.<sup>22</sup>

Challenges of understanding the language and culture of a vastly different people hindered success for all advisors in Vietnam. The United States attempted to man advisor teams with French speaking officers, and eventually settled on a program of teaching English to the ARVN forces, further exacerbating the problem by not deferring to the host country.<sup>23</sup> This problem is best summed up by a quote from former Chairman of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff General Cao Van Vien, when he stated, "over the war years, I know of no single instance in which a U.S. adviser effectively discussed professional matters with his counterpart in Vietnamese."<sup>24</sup> Developing an effective strategy for the overall conduct of an advisory effort, along with preparation of forces for the challenges of dealing with a vastly different language and culture, are key lessons to be drawn from the advisory experience of The Vietnam War.

#### **United States Advisors in Afghanistan and Iraq:**

During the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, both the United States Army and Marine Corps undertook extensive advisory efforts in both countries. Early on in the conflicts, the

manning of advisor teams was normally ad hoc. One prime example is the Marine Corps' case, where tasking to man teams came from Headquarters Marine Corps to the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level, which then tasked their subordinate units to provide personnel.<sup>25</sup> The main issue with this method of manning is that units did not have any incentive to provide their best personnel for this mission, and because advisor teams were not tasked as a Permanent Change of Station (PCS), the units did not receive a replacement Marine for one assigned to an advisor billet. In After Action Reviews (AAR) published by the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), multiple MEF's also stated that they did not solicit volunteers for this duty, and normally assigned personnel based only on their ability to make the deployments in the time allotted, with little or no consideration given to whether or not these personnel were well suited for advisor duty.<sup>26</sup> The most significant theme from multiple AAR's covering advisor teams in Iraq and Afghanistan is the lack of attention given to selecting the best people for the advisor mission, and simply providing the most available personnel. Despite the shortfalls in advisor selection, many of these teams not only completed, but also excelled in their missions, and provided many valuable lessons for future advising efforts in any theater.

Many of these lessons will be addressed in later sections of this paper, but the main themes are as follows. Advisory duty in many cases provides an extreme level of autonomy, which places an inordinate amount of responsibility on team members, especially the Officer In Charge (OIC). Advisor Team conferences almost universally stated that the OIC should be screened by a board prior to assignment, should have the ability to remove team members during training who are identified as not being suited for advisory duty, and should be able to set the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) level for his team based on the local conditions.<sup>27</sup> Providing the appropriate decision making authority at the OIC level could enable the team to operate more

effectively with indigenous forces by allowing the OIC to determine the best method of employing his team in accordance with the local situation, in conjunction with his commander's intent. Additional lessons learned included novel ideas like having every team member (including officers) licensed to drive vehicles, the importance of a robust training block on Soviet Bloc weapons, and more traditional ideas such as highlighting the importance of sharing hardships and building strong relationships with the indigenous force.<sup>28</sup>

The idea that advisor duty is not career enhancing, or is even detrimental to a career, first came to the front during the Vietnam War, but still permeates through the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) thought this idea important enough that it addressed it in a 2014 study on Security Force Assistance.<sup>29</sup> The study states that there is no hard evidence of advisor duty being detrimental to a career, but the perception that it cannot help a career is potentially more damaging, as many commanders are unlikely to assign their best personnel to an advisory assignment. This perception must be addressed if the United States hopes to be successful in future advisory efforts.

### **Advisor Team Selection:**

In multiple AAR's from OIF and OEF, the first sections of the reports were dedicated to the importance of assigning the correct personnel to advisor duty.<sup>30</sup> The consensus was that it is more important to have the right personnel assigned to this task, above all other considerations. Reasons for this idea are many, but the most important are the small team size, and the potential for geographic isolation. For example, an infantry platoon has approximately 40 Marines, and is part of a larger infantry company. If one Marine is not performing, there are other Marines to help spread the load. On an advisor team of less than 20 Marines with no larger support structure, it is extremely important to have quality personnel to ensure force protection as well as

mission success. This section will cover considerations for selection to advisor duty, examine current Marine Corps actions to formalize advisor experience, propose incentives for serving on advisor duty, and provide a proposed team structure to advise an indigenous infantry battalion.

The author's own experiences with selection for an advisor team early on in Afghanistan may provide insight into some of the challenges the Marine Corps will likely face if it is asked to provide advisors for a future conflict. In August 2005, having just returned from a deployment to Okinawa, I was preparing to deploy to Afghanistan in early 2006 with a Hawaii based infantry battalion as an artillery forward observer. In August 2005, 3d Marine Division tasked 1st Battalion, 12th Marines to provide one combat arms Captain, and four combat arms staff non-commissioned officers for a one-year deployment on an Embedded Training Team (ETT) advising the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) with a deployment date of October 2005. Short timing, coupled with time on station and PCS rotation limits severely limited the pool of Marines available to complete this deployment.

The division gave the battalion the ability to select personnel one rank up and one rank down for the deployment. Even with this flexibility, it still proved extremely difficult to find personnel with the appropriate time on station and End of Active Service (EAS) dates to make the deployment. Eventually, the battalion selected myself, a newly promoted 0802 First Lieutenant, two 0811's (Cannoneer) with one Staff Sergeant and one Sergeant, and two 0844 (Field Artillery Fire Controlman) Sergeants. Two of the Sergeant's were still on their first enlistments and were given one-year EAS extensions to make the deployment, and one of the Sergeants re-enlisted prior to the deployment. With the exception of the Staff Sergeant, we were all extremely junior and none of us received additional screening for our suitability other than being able to make the deployment within EAS and PCS dates.

After receiving orders, we met the remainder of our team, who came primarily from 3d Marine Division on Okinawa, in Quantico, Virginia for a one-month training package. The training included instruction on the incorrect language for the area we would be deployed to, almost no foreign weapons training, and extremely cursory cultural training. This was very early on in the effort, and my team was the third advisory team the Marine Corps sent to advise this particular ANA Kandak (Battalion). Unfortunately, experiences like mine were very common during much of the Marine involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and while the Marine Corps eventually improved its training for advisor teams, many challenges remain in the question of how to select and provide the best personnel for advisor duty.

Selection for advisor duty is often a double-edged sword for Marines. On the one hand, you are being asked to perform a challenging assignment that often involves exciting independent duty. On the other hand, you are being taken away from your regular unit and duties, limiting experience in your regular Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and potentially hindering your chances for promotion. The challenge for the Marine Corps is to optimize its selection process for advisor teams, looking for specific types of people and experience to put the proverbial “round pegs into round holes,” while also ensuring that the duty is not viewed negatively or as a detriment to a Marine’s career. Historically, specific personality types have excelled at advisor duty. For example, The United States Army Special Forces (SF), who often perform missions very similar to those examined in this paper, have very stringent selection criteria for their members that could be adapted and used by the Marine Corps to select more effectively the types of people likely to excel at this demanding duty.

United States Army Special Forces selects its members to be able to operate successfully in small teams and with minimal supervision. Additionally, SF personnel often perform SFA or

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions, which are very similar to the type of advisor missions being examined in this paper. Special Forces Soldiers form Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) Teams composed of twelve members of varying skill sets that include intelligence, operations, communications, weapons, and medical.<sup>31</sup> Additionally, SF selection is based on eleven Special Forces roles that include: teacher, diplomat, professional, planner, soldier/survivor, administrator, weapons expert, engineer, communications, medical, and leader.<sup>32</sup> During SF selection, soldiers are evaluated on 29 attributes, the 10 most critical of which are: team player, maturity, judgment / decision making ability, dependability, adaptability, cultural/interpersonal skills, physical endurance, initiative, perseverance, and autonomy.<sup>33</sup>

In support of future advisor team deployments, the Marine Corps should establish a board at the MEF level to screen advisor team Officers In Charge. As mentioned in the section on Iraq and Afghanistan, one of the most cited lessons is the requirement to select the correct personnel for advisor duty. Establishing a board to screen potential OIC's could help to ensure that the most qualified personnel are selected for this duty. Additionally, there should be a formal record made in the officers personnel file that they were formally selected for this duty, thus ensuring that promotion boards take this selection into consideration for future promotion.

For members other than the OIC, a formal board does not need to be convened, but the subordinate commands providing the personnel should be instructed to select the appropriate personnel for this duty based on the SF list of the ten attributes listed above. Again, this is very much in line with the recommendations and AAR's from the most recent advisor efforts undertaken by the Marine Corps and could aid in formalizing the process so that future teams are composed of the best and most qualified individuals available. Additionally, Headquarters Marine Corps should be brought into the selection process and allow commands to extend

individuals past their normal rotation dates if they volunteer or are selected for an advisor team. The Marine Corps is currently embarking on an effort to track and identify personnel with advisor experience that will further aid in the efforts to source the most capable advisor teams.

In response to the GAO report on SFA, the Marine Corps has established a Foreign Service Force secondary MOS (MOS designator 0570 for 1stLt to Col, and 0571 for Sgt to SgtMaj/MGySgt) to formalize the experience gained during the decade plus of advising operations Marines have conducted.<sup>34</sup> The Marine Corps has developed this MOS as a way to track advisory and irregular warfare experience within the Marine Corps, and is intended to provide a tool for commanders to identify and potentially utilize personnel with previous advisory experience if the need arises again. This program is currently being implemented as a three phased operation, with the first phase being an extensive review of Marines records in the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS) to identify Marines with the requisite advisor experience to qualify for the MOS. As of January 23, 2015, this initial phase identified 448 Marines (281 Officers, 167 Enlisted) who qualify for the MOS. The second phase involves identification of Marines who complete the advisor basic course conducted by the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG) in preparation for deployment. The third phase is the solicitation of Marines through Marine Administrative Message (MARADMIN) traffic for identification for the MOS via an experience track that includes the completion of a deployment as an advisor of more than six months.<sup>35</sup> As of the writing of this paper, the completion of the second and third phases is still pending.

The formal identification of Marines with an advisor MOS is an excellent step towards providing commanders with a starting point of identification of personnel for future advisory missions. Anecdotal evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan, along with experiences from Vietnam

suggest that in previous conflicts, much of the advisor experience gained through these difficult missions is often lost soon after the conflicts end. One area where the FSF MOS could be extremely useful will be in the board for selection of advisor team OIC's proposed earlier in this section. With a board comprised at least partially of personnel who have successfully completed an advisor tour, the selection process would be improved by leveraging the experience of those who have already completed a tour. Additionally, even if FSF MOS personnel are not selected for future advisor deployments, the Marine Corps can utilize their experience to better train the next generation of advisors by again drawing on their previous experiences. AAR's from Afghanistan suggest that some of the most valuable training provided to advisor teams comes from former advisors themselves.<sup>36</sup> Thus, the FSF MOS should definitely be continued and expanded as the Marine Corps continues to provide and deploy teams in support of advisory missions.

The GAO report identified the perception that deploying as an advisor can be seen as harmful to a career, and thus many quality individuals may be discouraged from requesting or serving in this role. Furthermore, the report goes on to suggest that this idea of advisor duty being harmful to a career may not have any factual basis, but that the perception is there may cause commanders to avoid assigning their best personnel to this duty. In both the Army and Marine Corps, officers are required to complete certain assignments, chiefly company level command as a Captain, and operations or executive officer as a Major in order to be competitive for selection to battalion level command. If assignment as an advisor takes an officer out of this track or causes them to miss a "key billet", then the potential for damage to a career may be very real indeed. Both services set the requirements for promotion and command screening. Therefore it is important at the service level for the institutions to give more than lip service that duty as an

advisor makes you competitive for promotion and command. With the proposal to add a letter to the Officer's personnel record that they have been selected for advisor team OIC duty by a MEF selection board, this could further underscore the importance placed on this duty by the larger Marine Corps, and should work to reduce much of the stigma currently associated with advisor duty.

In the Marine Corps, recent promotion board precepts, which are instructions to the board as to which type of qualifications to examine when determining who to promote, have stated that special attention should be given to those individuals who have served on an advisor team.<sup>37</sup> With instructions like these, it is apparent that portions of the Marine Corps understand the importance of this duty and have taken steps to formalize its inclusion in the promotion process. However, it is the author's view that substantial portions of the Marine Corps still view advisor duty as ancillary to service with an operational unit, and continue to counsel their best Marines to avoid the duty if possible. Therefore, this is an education issue that must be addressed Marine Corps wide that service with an advisor team will not only avoid harming a career, but can also be career enhancing.

As stated earlier in this section, SF ODA teams are composed of members with specific skills, and the Marine Corps should adopt a similar model for manning advisor teams for future counterinsurgency missions. The author's proposed makeup of an advisor team for a battalion-sized element is listed below:

1. Team Leader / Officer In Charge: Maj (Combat Arms)
2. Team Chief / Staff Non-Commissioned Officer In Charge: MSgt/GySgt (Combat Arms)
3. Logistics Officer: Capt/Lt (0402/3002)
4. Operations Chief: GySgt/SSgt (0369, Infantry Platoon Sergeant)
5. Intelligence Chief: SSgt/Sgt (0231, Intelligence Specialist)
6. Communications Chief: SSgt/Sgt (0629/0621, Radio Chief / Field Radio Operator)
7. Engineer Chief: SSgt/Sgt (1371, Combat Engineer)
8. Joint Terminal Attack Controller: SSgt/Sgt (8002, JTAC)

9. Independent Duty Corpsman: HMC-HM1 (IDC)
10. Corpsman: HM1-HM3 (8404, Corpsman)
11. Company Advisor: Capt/Lt (Combat Arms)
12. Company Advisor: Capt/Lt (Combat Arms)
13. Company Advisor: Capt/Lt (Combat Arms)
14. Company Instructor: SSgt/Sgt (Combat Arms)
15. Company Instructor: SSgt/Sgt (Combat Arms)
16. Company Instructor: SSgt/Sgt (Combat Arms)

This structure provides a more robust and conventional makeup than an ODA by weighting it with Company Grade Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers to serve as advisors to the line companies of the indigenous unit. Additional personnel could be added to the basic structure for specific missions or force protection as required. Proposed tasking for advisor units should be at the MEF level, as they have the best visibility on their deploying and non-deploying units that are best positioned to provide personnel. For the different ranks, since maturity and judgment are extremely high on the list of desired attributes, local commanders should attempt to provide the appropriate ranks, but if extremely strong and mature Corporals are available, the waiver requirement should lie with the first O-6 in the chain of command. Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) could be an additional source of manpower for advisor teams, but as they fall under the purview of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) rather than the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), the likelihood that they will be available for tasking is extremely small.

Finding the proverbial “round pegs” to serve as advisors, and placing them in the appropriate “round holes”, is the most important step in ensuring success in any advisory effort. Education must be provided across the Marine Corps and formalized to force commanders to assign the appropriate personnel to an advisor mission. Additionally, Regimental and Battalion level commanders must be educated to the types of personnel to assign to advisor duty, and the duty must continue to be formally viewed with the same importance as more traditional “key billets”.

Only after taking these steps will advisor duty be provided the appropriate individuals to succeed on a consistent basis.

### **Advisor Team Training For The Asia-Pacific Region:**

In his most recent National Security Strategy published in February 2015, President Barack Obama continued to state the importance of the strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific Region.<sup>38</sup> That the importance of the rebalance is highlighted even in the face of increasing threats from Islamic Extremists throughout the Middle East provides clear direction to the armed forces that they must continue to prepare to undertake operations in this increasingly important region. Additionally, the often difficult terrain throughout much of Asia, including many dense jungles and the majority of the countries having large coastlines present many challenges that the Marine Corps is well suited to face.

This section will focus on building a training package for advisor teams to prepare them for success performing this extremely demanding mission. First, the extremely important areas of culture and language training will be examined, along with recommendations for specific training. Next, historical lessons, and more recent lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, will be examined to provide a roadmap for training that could likely remain relevant to future advising efforts. Another key for successful advisor training is a robust reading list tailored to the Asia-Pacific Region with required discussions for teams prior to deployment. Lastly, characteristics common throughout much of the Asia-Pacific Region, such as operating in jungle environments, will be explored in detail.

Every conflict examined during the research for this paper highlighted the importance of understanding the language and culture and the indigenous force. Because of their close proximity and daily contact with indigenous forces, cultural understanding is even more

important than in conventional units. The teams should receive basic instruction on the history and customs of the country they are deploying to, but it is the author's contention that the selection of the appropriate personnel to the team is more important than the specifics of the training conducted. Many of the challenges typically associated with misunderstandings of local cultures and customs can be overcome by the selection of the appropriate individuals proposed in the previous section. If the right open-minded personnel are assigned to the team, the likelihood that they will conduct themselves in a culturally appropriate manner is much greater.

The requirement to have advisors trained in the language of the forces they are advising is another item that is continually highlighted in the literature on this topic. Because this paper is not concerned with sending advisors to any specific country, the question of how to conduct effective language training in a potentially time compressed environment is a difficult one. The author believes that similar to the importance of selecting the right people to an advising mission, the selection of people willing to attempt to learn another language is just as important. Language proficiency of its personnel is something that the Marine Corps keeps data on, and this can be used as a starting point to find language skills already present in its force. Additionally, the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) can be used as a tool to identify those personnel who have difficulty with languages and avoid their selection for advisor duty. For the advisors themselves, the training must stress that much of their language work will have to take place once they deploy, and that it must be a continual effort to work on language proficiency over the course of the deployment.

For the formal nuts and bolts training of advisor teams, the first question that must be asked in the development of any training program is what kind of advisor training is applicable to all types of counterinsurgency operations? Examination of the *Small Wars Manual*, along with

historical lessons from Indochina, Malaya, Vietnam, and more recent lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan provide a roadmap for the development of an advisor-training program.

The program should focus mainly on basic infantry skills at the company level and below, to include vehicle and foot-mobile patrolling, medical, communications (Very High Frequency (VHF), Ultra High Frequency (UHF), High Frequency (HF), and Satellite Communications (SATCOM)), weapons proficiency (to include the weapons used by the advised force), intelligence, and air-ground operations. The basics of training in these areas will provide a foundational baseline for the advisor team to survive while building a basis for the training they will be expected to provide to the indigenous force.

Weapons proficiency, including those of the host-nation or indigenous force, form a common theme in AAR's from both Iraq and Afghanistan. Many teams deployed with little to no foreign weapons training, thus hampering their ability to provide quality training to the indigenous force. A Marine Corps Advisor Team Conference proposed the establishment a Soviet Bloc weapons armory at each MEF specifically for advisor team training.<sup>39</sup> This is an excellent suggestion that should be implemented, as most militaries in the Asia-Pacific Region operate mainly on Soviet Bloc weapons, and also because of their general proliferation throughout the world. An additional suggestion for further weapons training is assigning a minimum of two team members to receive instruction as designated marksmen (DM). The capability of being able to employ a scoped rifle at ranges past 500 meters provides the team with much needed additional combat power, and can also be extended to the advised force. The suggestion of having this capability on advisor teams is not new, and is one of the training recommendations made in the *Small Wars Manual*.<sup>40</sup>

Intelligence sharing and collection is another key area that must be addressed prior to deployment. Much of the information on the modern battlefield comes from platforms or media that are classified above a level available to an indigenous force. Thus, the inclination to classify everything at a level at or above SECRET/NOFORN (Secret / No Foreign) must be thoroughly examined and challenged. Classification at this level creates issues where the host nation does not have access to the same information or intelligence as the advisor team, and can also create tension as it can appear that the advisors are withholding information. The classification plan must be thoroughly discussed prior to any deployment. Additionally, one team member, likely the intelligence chief, should be certified as a Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO), which provides the team an ability to classify or declassify items that meet certain thresholds.<sup>41</sup> Intelligence requirements and responsibilities are unique to each theater and must be addressed prior to deployment to enhance operations for both the advisor team and indigenous force.

One of the historical lessons highlighted time and again is that counterinsurgency forces should focus their operations at the company level and below. From the British in Malaya, to the French in Indochina, and again with the United States in Vietnam, the need to aggressively conduct operations at the company level remains a key tenet of counterinsurgency operations.<sup>42</sup> Additionally, for indigenous militaries requiring United States advisors, the likelihood is extremely high that their proficiency to conduct operations above the battalion level is limited. The advisor team structure proposed in the previous section addresses the focus towards company level operations by designating two specific advisors for each line company within the indigenous battalion. This habitual relationship can allow the team to more fully engage at the company level and focus their daily operations with their direct counterparts of the advised force.

As the advised battalion's proficiency increases, the team can shift its focus more to the battalion level as the indigenous force takes on more autonomy at the company level.

Additionally, instruction of team members in these subjects should focus on developing the advisors themselves as instructors. After receiving instruction on a subject, the advisors should teach the class back to their fellow team members along with their formal instructors, and receive feedback on their instruction. This method is known in many military schools as a "murder board" and has proved effective at preparing instructors at formal United States military schools. Focusing on teaching advisor team members not only how to execute operations, but on teaching them to be effective instructors, can pay dividends as the team deploys into an operational theater. An additional suggestion would be to force the use of an interpreter to conduct the training to begin forcing the teams to understand the limitations of working through an interpreter or translator. If speakers of the language used by the indigenous force are available, their incorporation into the training packages can provide further benefits.

Numerous reading lists exist that are dedicated to providing recommendations for COIN operations (A proposed reading list is provided in Appendix A of this paper). Learning vicariously from those who have gone before is an essential truth of all military operations. Personnel assigned to advisor teams should immediately begin reading after their identification for the team, and the advisor team Officer In Charge (OIC), and Staff Non-Commissioned Officer In Charge (SNCOIC) should be required to drive the reading program for their teams. This focus should be mandatory for all deploying teams and can provide vital team building benefits and internal communication as well as essential knowledge for the teams.

Since this paper focuses specifically on preparing advisor teams for operations in the Asia-Pacific Region, preparation for operations in the jungle is imperative. One of the best historical

examples of preparing forces for jungle operations is the British in Malaya. As mentioned earlier in this paper, the British establishment of a jungle warfare school allowed them to provide tailored training for all their forces deploying to the theater. The Marine Corps currently has an excellent facility in the region, its Jungle Warfare Training Center (JWTC) on the island of Okinawa, which provides a currently operating training center with a trained staff that could be used to aid in the instruction of advisor teams. The difficulties of operating in the jungle are many and JWTC's mission is directly tied to preparing Marines to operate in this difficult environment. "The Jungle Warfare Training Center provides expert instruction to prepare Marine and Joint Forces for the rigors of combat in a dense jungle environment. Building upon small unit leadership, a tactical mindset and unit cohesion our instructors instill confidence, bolster leadership, and challenge all individuals who train aboard JWTC."<sup>43</sup>

Development of an effective pre-deployment training package focused specifically on advisor teams is key to their success. The subjects proposed in this section of the paper provide a foundation, but the Marine Corps must continue to formalize development of its advisor training in preparation for future conflicts. Enough historical literature and precedent exist that a basic package should be developed that can be expanded and tailored based on the specific advisory mission set and location.

### **Equipping Advisor Teams:**

In the modern battlespace that will likely be extremely chaotic and spread out over large distances, Marine advisor teams must have the ability to survive, and also coordinate support from outside agencies. The latest technology and equipment should be embraced as the Marine Corps equips advisor teams, but there should also be a balance to ensure that these teams remain light and agile while executing operations. Additionally, advisor teams have different

requirements than conventional units because of their unique mission, and should be equipped with this in mind. This section will explore the different force protection equipment levels and how they affect operations, along with examining special equipment requirements, especially regarding communications, and the manning and employment of Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) to increase the lethality of the team.

From advisor team AAR's covering Iraq and Afghanistan, one item that continually is mentioned is that advisor team OIC's should be able to set their force protection requirements based on their local situation.<sup>44</sup> Often, the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) levels for conventional forces are set extremely high, and indigenous forces do not have the same level of equipment. Therefore, advisor teams are placed in situations where it appears that American lives are more valuable than indigenous forces if they are required to wear safety equipment the host nation does not even have available to them. The advisor team OIC should be given latitude to raise or lower the PPE posture as the situation dictates. Additionally, operations in a jungle environment, as is expected throughout much of the Asia-Pacific region will necessitate changes in PPE posture based on the type of terrain where operations are being conducted.

Similar to PPE levels, there may be situations where local vehicles, or those utilized by the indigenous force, may be much better suited for the local terrain than those normally employed by the United States military. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States continually increased armor levels on vehicles in order to combat IED's, while indigenous forces often utilized outdated United States vehicles, or operated in unarmored trucks. This presents another instance where it can appear that the lives of American advisors are more important than those they advise, potentially increasing cultural friction and being counterproductive. Especially early on in an advisory effort, the team OIC should again be given the authority to operate the

type of vehicles best suited to the local situation. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, minimum limits were often placed on the type and number of vehicles to operate outside of a base, and with extremely small team sizes, it often required an entire advisor team to leave the base at one time in order to satisfy these requirements. This places advisor teams in a precarious situation where they are forced to either disregard rules, or avoid going on patrols or operations with their advised forces. The best way to avoid pitfalls like this is to explicitly delegate the authority for decisions related to a protective posture to the team OIC who best understands the situation on the ground.

Another area where advisor teams have special requirements is in the arena of communications equipment. As this paper focuses on preparing for the Asia-Pacific region, special attention will be paid to the types of communications requirements for operating in a jungle environment. Standard VHF radios operate generally along a line of sight path, which is often very short in the jungle. Thus, VHF may have little to no usage in many types of jungles. HF radios are better for long haul communications due to their skywave or “skip” wave propagation characteristics. This makes HF more suitable for operation in a jungle environment. However, HF radios can have difficult operating characteristics that make practice with the radios prior to deployment an absolute must. UHF radios utilize direct line of sight, and are the primary means of communications with aircraft. Lastly, SATCOM radios provide the ability to talk around the world by linking into a larger satellite network for communications.<sup>45</sup> However, they require a line of sight to the sky to acquire the satellites, and may not be able to operate in some types of jungle environments.

Currently, the Marine Corps has fielded a wide range of Harris brand radios that meet the needs of an advisor team operating in a remote location. The first radio that should be issued to

an advisor team is the PRC-117F or PRC-117G radios. They operate on multiple bands, to include VHF, UHF, and SATCOM by utilizing different antennas. The PRC-117G also provides limited ability to conduct data communications with the radio. For HF, the PRC-150 radio is the primary fielded radio in the Marine Corps. By utilizing these three radios, an advisor team would be able to operate on multiple redundant communications bands, greatly increasing their ability to coordinate with other Marine units. Of concern to this communications discussion, the Marine Corps recently conducted a Company Landing Team (CLT) experiment in Hawaii. This experiment, and the comments regarding communications with disparate elements, to include data communications are pertinent to advisor teams in that they are likely to be distributed much as the CLT's were during this experiment.<sup>46</sup> As the formal AAR's from this experiment are published, the lessons for communications should be incorporated into future advisory efforts. As discussed in the training section, this is a vital area that must be embraced by all team members, not just those with a communications MOS or background.

The next area discussed will be the assignment of a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) to each battalion level advisor team. Currently, the Marine Corps has assigned has three enlisted JTAC's to support each infantry battalion, and they are administratively assigned to the direct support artillery battalion for each infantry regiment.<sup>47</sup> Additional JTAC's are held at the Air Naval Gunfire Companies (ANGLICO) for each MEF. In order for advisor teams to deploy with a JTAC, the author believes the best place to draw from is the teams assigned to support infantry battalions. This is because each infantry battalion also is assigned three aviators who serve as Forward Air Controllers (FAC) and Air Officers, and are also qualified as JTAC's. Therefore, the least impact would come from pulling the JTAC's from this pool.

Having a JTAC assigned to each advisor team is essential to operations on the modern battlefield due to the large numbers of both manned and unmanned aircraft present. The JTAC also increases the survivability and lethality of an advisor team by making their access to aircraft delivered ordnance much easier than utilizing Joint Fires Observers (JFO) or other uncertified personnel. Additionally, JTAC's can conduct training with the indigenous force on the employment of aviation delivered ordnance and other fire support assets. The key point is that the benefits of having a certified JTAC on the chaotic modern battlefield is quickly becoming a requirement that cannot be overlooked, and the Marine Corps must develop a method for providing them to all deploying advisor teams.

It may be easy to write off equipping advisor teams by simply taking the idea of treating them like any other deploying unit, forcing them to abide by existing regulations, and providing them with the same equipment as an infantry unit. This misses the mark of the unique nature of the advising mission and must be accounted for in the final responsibilities provided to an advisor team OIC. Only by understanding the unique nature and requirements of this mission will the Marine Corps set these teams up for success.

**Counter arguments:**

There are two main counterarguments against the Marine Corps focusing on advisory efforts. First, there is an idea that the Marine Corps will not undertake another prolonged advisor effort during a counterinsurgency. Second, that the Marine Corps should focus on its core missions of amphibious assault, and serving as the nation's expeditionary force in readiness. History has proven the first argument false on multiple occasions, and the second is addressed by a thorough examination of the latest capstone concept document for the Marine Corps, *Expeditionary Force 21*.

In much of the research for this project, a common theme in after action reports and official histories is the idea that once the United States gets out of a counterinsurgency or advisory effort, it will be the last time the country undertakes such an effort. Time and again, this idea has proven false, and the armed forces, particularly the Marine Corps, have been forced to cobble together advisor teams on extremely short notice. Currently, the United States is conducting an advisor effort again in Iraq, this time attempting to gird the Iraqi Armed Forces in their fight against the Islamic State (IS). As IS continues to grow and morph, and if they further expand their influence, it is extremely likely that the United States advisor effort will increase in size. The Marine Corps should continue to undertake efforts to better select, train, and equip advisors for this extremely demanding mission.

The second counter-argument suggests that the Marine Corps' missions should not involve providing advisor teams because that does not fit within the current operating concepts of the Corps. *Expeditionary Force 21 (EF 21)* states that the Marine Corps is the nation's expeditionary force in readiness, and reiterates the Corps' primary missions, one of which remains the conduct of stability operations.<sup>48</sup> Stability operations, wherever they are undertaken, will likely require partnering with host-nation forces, and if the partnerships are of an extended length, advisor teams can provide assistance at a relatively low cost and with a small footprint. Additionally, *EF 21* recognizes that many of the potential future crisis spots are in the littoral regions of the world, which the Marine Corps, due to its forward presence and amphibious capability, is uniquely prepared to support. Furthermore, the document's emphasis on conducting distributed or dispersed operations on the future battlefield also nests well with maintaining a plan to provide geographically dispersed advisor teams in support of a larger expeditionary force. Even if the Marine Corps does not wish to embark on another advisory mission, history, current operating

concepts, and the current state of the world tell us this requirement will be levied again, and the Marine Corps should be better prepared to answer the call the next time it comes.

**Conclusion:**

The United States Marine Corps is a force that is very well suited for advisory operations and has proven this during many conflicts throughout much of its history. It also has a tendency to lose the hard fought lessons from previous conflicts almost immediately after their conclusions, when a transition back to more “conventional” operations is expected. As the modern battlefield becomes increasingly complex and the nation again calls upon for the Marine Corps to support the training of indigenous forces in a counterinsurgency fight, it is imperative now for the institution to take a critical look at itself and prepare its next advisor teams for success by providing them the appropriate personnel, training, and equipment for them to succeed.

## NOTES:

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- <sup>2</sup> Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002), 112-113.
- <sup>3</sup> Timothy K. Deady, “Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899–1902,” in *U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1989-2007: Anthology and Selected Bibliography*, compiled by Stephen S. Evans (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2008) 30-32.
- <sup>4</sup> Boot, 126-127.
- <sup>5</sup> Boot, 166.
- <sup>6</sup> Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. *Small Wars Manual*. FMFRP 12-15 (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 22 December 1990), 4-22 and 12-9.
- <sup>7</sup> Boot, 238-241, and *Small Wars Manual*, 9-1.
- <sup>8</sup> Rowland S. N. Mans. “Victory in Malaya.” in *The Guerilla and How to Fight Him*, FMFRP 12-25 ((Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 2 January 1990), 120.
- <sup>9</sup> Mans, 123.
- <sup>10</sup> John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 69-70.
- <sup>11</sup> Nagl, 97-98.
- <sup>12</sup> Mans, 142-143.
- <sup>13</sup> Rand Corporation. *A Translation from the French Lessons of the War in Indochina, Volume 2*. Translated by V. J. Croizat. Memorandum RM-5271-PR (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, May 1967), 34, 40, 158-159.
- <sup>14</sup> Bernard Fall, *Street Without Joy* (New York, NY: Schocken Books, 1972), 144-173.
- <sup>15</sup> *A Translation from the French Lessons of the War in Indochina, Volume 2*, 160-162.
- <sup>16</sup> Cao Van Vien, et al., *Indochina Monographs: The U.S. Adviser* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980). 1-3.
- <sup>17</sup> Nagl, 118-119.
- <sup>18</sup> Vien, 3.
- <sup>19</sup> Vien, 7.
- <sup>20</sup> Nagl, 139, and Yates, 150.
- <sup>21</sup> Lawrence A Yates. “A Feather in Their Cap? The Marines’ Combined Action Program in Vietnam,” in *U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1989-2007: Anthology and Selected Bibliography*, compiled by Stephen S. Evans (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2008) 147-149.
- <sup>22</sup> Nagl, 157.
- <sup>23</sup> Vien, 32.
- <sup>24</sup> Vien, 31-32.
- <sup>25</sup> Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. *Transition Team Conferences, I, II, and III MEF, November and December 2007: Lessons and Observations from OEF and OIF*. April 9, 2008, 6, <https://www2.mccll.usmc.mil/index.cfm>

<sup>26</sup> *Transition Team Conferences, I, II, and III MEF, November and December 2007: Lessons and Observations from OEF and OIF*, 6.

<sup>27</sup> *Transition Team Conferences, I, II, and III MEF, November and December 2007: Lessons and Observations from OEF and OIF*, 6-7, 13-14. and Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. *Embedded Training Teams (ETT) with the Afghan National Army (ANA): Lessons and Observations from a May 2008 Conference*. June 17, 2008, 6, <https://www2.mccll.usmc.mil/index.cfm>

<sup>28</sup> *Transition Team Conferences, I, II, and III MEF, November and December 2007: Lessons and Observations from OEF and OIF*, 9-10, 13. and *Embedded Training Teams (ETT) with the Afghan National Army (ANA): Lessons and Observations from a May 2008 Conference*, 5.

<sup>29</sup> Cary Russell, *Security Force Assistance: The Army and Marine Corps Have Ongoing Efforts to Identify and Track Advisors, but the Army Needs a Plan to Capture Advising Experience*. GAO Report for Congress GAO-14-482. (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, July 2014), 16-18.

<sup>30</sup> *Transition Team Conferences, I, II, and III MEF, November and December 2007: Lessons and Observations from OEF and OIF*, 6-8. and *Embedded Training Teams (ETT) with the Afghan National Army (ANA): Lessons and Observations from a May 2008 Conference*, 2-3.

<sup>31</sup> Anonymous. "Special Forces: Shooters and Thinkers." *Soldiers* 64, no. 11 (November 2009): 3-4. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/205324414?accountid=14746>.

<sup>32</sup> Michelle M. Zazanis, et al., "Special Forces Selection and Training: Meeting the Needs of the Force in 2020." *Special Warfare* 12, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 2. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/199394116?accountid=14746>

<sup>33</sup> Zazanis, 3-4. For a full list of the attributes, review the article.

<sup>34</sup> "Approval of the Foreign Security Force Advisor Free MOS", MARADMIN 472-14 accessed on 2 January 2015,

<http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/170876/approval-of-the-foreign-security-force-fsf-advisor-free-mos-and-process-for-exp.aspx>

<sup>35</sup> LtCol Jeffrey McCormack and Mr. James Miller (Security Cooperation Section Head, Strategy & Plans Division, Plans, Policies & Operations Department (PP&O), Headquarters Marine Corps), interview by Major Benjamin Preston, January 23, 2015.

<sup>36</sup> *Embedded Training Teams (ETT) with The Afghan National Army (ANA)*, 3.

<sup>37</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Precept Convening the Fiscal Year 2016 U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Promotion Selection Board and Major Continuation Selection Board*, August 8, 2014, 12.

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<sup>38</sup> The White House, *National Security Strategy*, February 2015, 24-25.

<sup>39</sup> *Transition Team Conferences, I, II, and III MEF, November and December 2007: Lessons and Observations from OEF and OIF*, 9-10. and *Embedded Training Teams (ETT) with the Afghan National Army (ANA): Lessons and Observations from a May 2008 Conference*, 5-6.

<sup>40</sup> *Small Wars Manual*, 4-3.

<sup>41</sup> A detailed discussion of Foreign Disclosure Officer duties and responsibilities is contained in Army Regulation 380-10 (AR 380-10, revised 2013).

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<sup>42</sup> Bernard Fall, *Street Without Joy*, 144-173., Rowland S. N. Mans. “Victory in Malaya.” in *The Guerilla and How to Fight Him*, 123., and John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 133-138.

<sup>43</sup> “Jungle Warfare Training Center,” accessed on January 5, 2015,

<http://www.3rdmardiv.marines.mil/Units/JungleWarfareTrainingCenter.aspx>

<sup>44</sup> *Transition Team Conferences, I, II, and III MEF, November and December 2007: Lessons and Observations from OEF and OIF, 13-14.* and *Embedded Training Teams (ETT) with the Afghan National Army (ANA): Lessons and Observations from a May 2008 Conference*, 6.

<sup>45</sup> A detailed discussion of characteristics of various radios is contained in: Harris Assured Communications, *Radio Communications in the Digital Age: Volume 2, VHF/UHF Technology*, Harris Corporation, 2000, 1-4.

<sup>46</sup> Commanders and Staff of SPMAGTF 3 during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2014 “Company Landing Team: Employment from the Seabase,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 99, no. 1 (January 2015): 8-9.

<sup>47</sup> Fiscal Year 2013, Table of Organization and Equipment for a United States Marine Corps Artillery Battalion Headquarters Battery.

<sup>48</sup> Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Expeditionary Force 21* (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 4 March 2014), 5.

## Appendix A: Suggested Reading List

This is an extremely small and condensed reading list that should better prepare advisors for their duties, and is focused specifically on the Asia-Pacific Region. For further reading, the author recommends that teams research additional reading materials in their area of operations.

1. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. *Small Wars Manual*. FMFRP 12-15. Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 22 December 1990.
  - Readings should focus on Chapter I (pg 1-32), Chapter IV, and Chapter VI. Additional readings can be used as the situation dictates.
  
2. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. *The Guerilla and How to Fight Him*. FMFRP 12-25. Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 2 January 1990.
 

Recommended Readings:

  - "Mao's Primer on Guerilla War", Translated by Samuel Griffith, pg 5.
  - "Time, space, and will: The Politico-Military Views of Mao Tse-Tung", E.L. Katzenbach, pg 11.
  - "Victory in Malaya", Rowland S.N. Mans, pg 115.
  - "Inside the Vietminh", Vo Ngyuen Giap, pg 147.
  - "Marines, Geurillas, and Small Wars", Michael Spark, pg 251.
  
3. Boot, Max. *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002.
  - The entire book is extremely useful and fascinating, but with limited time, the author recommends focusing on Chapters 5-7, 10, and 12-15.
  
4. Lederer, William J. and Eugene Burdick. *The Ugly American*. New York, NY: Fawcett Crest, 1958.
  - This entire book is another extremely useful one, but specific chapters and vignettes can be used to hold discussions with an advisor team. Recommended readings are "The Iron of War", pg. 96, "The Lessons of War", pg. 111, and "The Ugly American", pg. 196.
  
5. West, Bing. *The Village*. New York, NY: Pocket Books, 1972.
  - If used, this book should be read in its entirety, and describes operations of a Marine Corps Combined Action Platoon in Vietnam.
  
6. Ramsey, Robert. *Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.
 

Recommend Readings:

  - "Twenty-Seven Articles", T.E. Lawrence, pg 3.
  - "Some Advice for the Prospective Advisor", David L. Shelton, pg 65.
  - "Marine Foreign Military Advisors: The Road Ahead", Andrew R. Milburn and Mark C. Lombard, pg. 111.

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