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14. ABSTRACT The use of Military Police (MP) during expeditionary operations can be traced back to World War II. Though they were typically employed in a relatively limited scope during that conflict, the impact they provided was irrefutable. As the character of warfare has evolved over the decades, so has the utility of Law Enforcement (LE) personnel on the battlefield. Unfortunately, opportunities to maximize the abilities of MPs have not been fully exploited. The skill sets possessed by MPs could be employed during multiple phases of a respective operation. During Phase 0, they can be used to support the conduct of security cooperation activities. Their security and investigatory skills can maintain lines of communication and provide vital intelligence to support the main effort, during Phase III. The use of LE tactics, techniques, and procedures during Phase IV are essential to establish stability and facilitate a transition to the civil authority. Despite the benefits, there are several challenges associated with the employment of MPs. Policy restrictions limit the ability to employ MPs in support of certain training and security cooperation activities. Personnel limitations inhibit the ability to employ MPs in support of multiple lines of effort, simultaneously. Deficits in training and education restrict MP contributions in support of Major Subordinate Commands (MSC). This study identifies the most advantageous methods of employment for MPs, the challenges associated with them, and					
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Advantages, Challenges, and Considerations for the Employment of Military Police
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SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR: Major David S. Rainey, USMC

AY 14-15

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Bradford A. Wineman, Ph.D.

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Executive Summary

Title: Bolstering the Fight: Advantages, Challenges, and Considerations for the Employment of Military Police in Support of Expeditionary Operations

Author: Major David S. Rainey, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: Understanding the advantages, challenges, and other considerations associated with the use of Military Police will facilitate their successful employment and bolster the overall conduct of Marine Corps operations.

Discussion: The use of Military Police during expeditionary operations can be traced back to World War II. Though they were typically employed in a relatively limited scope during that conflict, the impact they provided was irrefutable. As the character of warfare has evolved over the decades, so has the utility of law enforcement personnel on the battlefield. Unfortunately, opportunities to maximize the abilities of Military Police have not been fully exploited. The skill sets possessed by Military Police should be employed during multiple phases of a respective operation. During Phase 0, they can be used to support the conduct of security cooperation activities. Their security and investigatory skills can maintain lines of communication and provide vital intelligence to support the main effort, during Phase III. The use of law enforcement tactics, techniques, and procedures during Phase IV are essential to establish stability and facilitate a transition to the civil authority.

Conclusion: There are several challenges associated with the employment of Military Police. Policy restrictions affect the ability to employ Military Police in support of certain training and security cooperation activities. Personnel limitations inhibit the ability to employ Military Police in support of multiple lines of effort, simultaneously. Deficits in training and education restrict Military Police contributions in support of Major Subordinate Commands (MSC). This study identifies the most advantageous methods of employment for Military Police, the challenges associated with them, and recommends measures to mitigate the restrictions they impose.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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PREFACE

The use of Military Police (MP) in the United States Marine Corps (USMC) has evolved since the beginning of the 20th century. As it established barracks at various locations, one of the principle responsibilities for all Marines assigned to them was guard duty.¹ When the Marine Corps developed the Advanced Base Force (ABF) concept, it became involved in a larger variety of missions on foreign shores. When the Republic of Haiti experienced a revolution in 1914, Marines deployed to protect U.S. interests on the island.² The Marine Corps' first use of Military Police type tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) occurred as Marines set out and established security garrisons in various Haitian towns and cities. Some Marine officers were even assigned the title of Provost Marshal, responsible for the maintenance of law and order within their designated areas of responsibility. By September of 1915, the Marine Corps was instrumental in the establishment of the Haitian Constabulary; a force of natives led by Marine officers and trained to enforce the law amongst Haitian citizens.³ The law enforcement skills acquired by Marines during deployments to Haiti were also employed during subsequent operations in Santo Domingo, Guam, and other like environments.⁴ While the establishment of specifically trained and named Military Police units did not occur for many years, the utility of law enforcement in support of Marine Corps operations had been established. Through World War I and II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm, MPs were used in a variety of ways, to include: security, law and order, traffic regulation, and Prisoner of War (POW) control. As the Marine Corps prepares to meet new challenges, after sustained operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, MP skills will be essential to support the successful conduct of future operations.

INTRODUCTION

MPs have played an integral role in the conduct of Marine Corps operations since World War II (WWII). MP units ranging from company to battalion size have been activated and employed to meet specific requirements during the conduct of operations. The doctrine governing the employment of MPs has progressed from Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) specific to amphibious operations, to those that reinforce a variety of expeditionary support tasks. Since the beginning of the new millennium, Marine Corps MPs have deployed in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the campaigns in each theater conclude, new situations will undoubtedly arise requiring the unique skills of the Marine Corps. Consequently, opportunities for the employment of Military Police will emerge to support the successful conduct of future Marine Corps operations.

MPs provide essential support during the conduct of various types of expeditionary operations, such as: security cooperation missions, major combat operations, stability operations, etc. Unfortunately, there are challenges related to the employment of MPs; policy restrictions, personnel limitations, and training shortfalls prevent them from being employed in the most advantageous manner. Providentially, the challenges are not without feasible and attainable solutions. The office of the Deputy Commandant (DC) for Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O) should implement an interagency liaison program to mitigate the policy restrictions, while still operating in accordance with the law. The DC for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) should ensure MPs are sourced appropriately, in order to staff essential billets and alleviate personnel limitations. The DC for Combat Development and Integration (CD&I) and the Marine

Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), through the Training and Education Command (TECOM), should develop and implement new Programs of Instruction (POI) to ensure MPs of all grades are trained and ready to meet the respective operational requirements. Understanding the advantages, challenges, and other considerations associated with the use of MPs will facilitate their successful employment and bolster the overall conduct of Marine Corps operations.

ESTABLISHING THE REQUIREMENT

Each generation of expeditionary forces has required different capabilities to facilitate mission accomplishment. No matter the conflict, Marine MPs throughout history have demonstrated their utility across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). As the U.S. transitions into a new era, beyond the bounds of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), different strategies will be required to secure U.S. national interests. These strategies demand that operations employ a variety of military skills. The National Security Strategy (NSS) outlines the U.S. approach to future operations, in order to protect and preserve national interests. Expeditionary Force 21 (EF-21) identifies opportunities for the employment of the Marine Corps, to assist with accomplishment of NSS objectives. The combination of the NSS and EF-21 highlights opportunities for the employment of Marine Corps Law Enforcement (LE) personnel to support the overall security objectives of the U.S.

The National Security Strategy of 2015

President Barack Obama published the NSS in 2015 to outline the U.S. national security priorities.⁵ It suggested several initiatives to facilitate the accomplishment of the overall national security objectives, some of which will require a combination of efforts

from multiple elements of the U.S. government. One of the actions called for in the NSS is an increase in cooperation between U.S. LE and intelligence agencies, as well as those of foreign nations.⁶ This initiative requires the skills of personnel from the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Justice (DoJ) to ensure it is successful. Another effort outlined in the NSS was directed at improving the ability for vulnerable U.S. partners to defeat terrorists within their respective borders.⁷ To accomplish this task, the DoD will need to increase the conduct of security cooperation activities to expand the security capacity of a respective partner nation. LE personnel will be essential to ensure terrorists are detained, interrogated, and prosecuted in accordance with the rule of law.⁸ As the strategies of the NSS are implemented, LE personnel from a variety of government agencies will be required to ensure they are successfully completed.

Expeditionary Force (EF) - 21

EF-21 links employment opportunities for the Marines Corps to the strategies of the NSS. One of the overarching themes within EF-21 is a return to the expeditionary ethos that is a foundational concept for the Marine Corps.⁹ EF-21 highlights the future roles and functions for the Marine Corps, which include: seize and defend advanced naval bases, conduct security and stability operations, assist with the establishment of a military government and the transfer to civil authority, the protection of naval bases and stations, as well as other crisis response operations.¹⁰ The employment of MPs, in support of each of the aforementioned activities, will enhance their conduct and facilitate the more efficient execution of each type of operation. As the NSS identified occasions requiring the expertise of civilian and military LE agencies, the future missions of the Marine Corps should capitalize on the proficiency of Marine MPs. They are imbued with a

number of skills that should be used to support security cooperation efforts, assist with the establishment and improvement of security, or conduct any number of activities designed to maintain the rule of law.

The NSS indicated that future U.S. security objectives will progress far beyond the boundaries of OEF and OIF. It outlined a number of opportunities for interagency coordination, with respect to LE skills, across multiple executive departments. EF-21 defined the future roles for the Marine Corps and highlighted opportunities for the employment of MPs. The NSS and EF-21 solidified the requirement for law enforcement personnel in support of future Marine Corps operations.

MILITARY POLICE IN EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 3 defines expeditionary operations as military operations with specific objectives that are conducted on foreign soil.¹¹ They encompass a number of activities that span across the spectrum of conflict. JP 3-0 established a phasing construct that commanders use to plan expeditionary operations. The established phases are: Phase 0 - Shape, Phase I - Deter, Phase II - Seize Initiative, Phase III - Dominate, Phase IV - Stabilize, and Phase V - Enable Civil Authority.¹² Each phase includes activities that can encompass the full range of military operations. Phase 0, I, and II include actions that are designed to promote military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence. The activities in Phase III are most closely associated with major combat operations and campaigns. Phase IV and V are characterized as crisis response or limited contingency operations. The characteristics of the phases highlight opportunities for the employment of MPs. The use of MPs in pursuit of operational

objectives will support the overall accomplishment of a commander's strategy during expeditionary operations.

Security Cooperation

Phase 0, I, and II include activities that are designed to dissuade or deter adversaries and reassure friends.¹³ The primary methods for completing the efforts of these phases are military engagement and security cooperation activities. Security cooperation activities are executed by the Department of Defense (DoD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the U.S. and achieve strategic objectives.¹⁴ Each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) plans and conducts Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) exercises within a respective Area of Operations (AO). To facilitate the successful conduct of TSC operations, the rule of law must be present and established security forces must exist within the respective region. The most advantageous method of employment for MPs during TSC activities is to be partnered with the security forces of a Host Nation (HN). In this capacity, MPs train HN forces on the application of modern law enforcement TTPs.¹⁵ They also train HN forces on the methods to recruit and train new law enforcement personnel, or teach them to establish, operate, and administer law enforcement stations. The result of these efforts will be two fold: 1) MPs help the host nation establish the necessary provisions to maintain the rule of law and 2) MPs help HN forces identify and destroy criminal networks, which will contribute to mission success if future operations are required.

Major Combat Operations

Major combat operations occur during Phase III. This phase includes activities that are designed to break the will of the enemy and control the operational environment.¹⁶

During combat operations, the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is employed in a manner that supports the single battle concept. This enables a commander to unify the time, space, and purpose of his efforts while synergizing the activities of deep, close, and rear area operations within a respective AO.¹⁷ It may consist of traditional combat operations or include counterinsurgency operations, as recent conflicts have demonstrated. MP actions in the deep area are possible, but their skills are best employed in the close and rear areas of operations.

The decisive activities of a campaign occur in the close area of operations.¹⁸ The priority of effort in this area is given to the Ground Combat Element (GCE), in effort to destroy the enemy's ability to fight and achieve overall mission success. MPs conduct a variety of activities in the close area to support the efforts of the GCE. As elements secure designated objectives, MPs conduct Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) to collect any pertinent evidence and ensure it is maintained, processed, and stored appropriately.¹⁹ MPs perform route regulation and enforcement activities to ensure the continued flow of personnel and equipment along Main Supply Routes (MSR) throughout operational areas.²⁰ As the GCE or other elements detain personnel during operations, MPs conduct the transport and processing of captured personnel to the rear areas.²¹ The support activities conducted by MPs during decisive operations helps to relieve GCE elements of restrictive and technical tasks, affording them the ability to maintain momentum.

The rear area is where friendly forces conduct security and sustainment activities to support the continuity of operations.²² MPs are an essential component to the conduct of activities in the rear area. They assist with the establishment and maintenance of security throughout the MAGTF rear area, through the conduct of mobile and foot patrols.²³ If an

operating base is established, MPs provide law and order support in and around its perimeter.²⁴ This may include the conduct of law enforcement activities, providing security for critical infrastructure, or by providing reactionary forces for response to security threats.²⁵ The rear area is also where Marine MPs establish their initial EPW and detainee holding areas, before transferring detainees to more permanent facilities.²⁶ During rear area operations, the activities conducted by MPs are critical to ensure the MAGTF commander is able to concentrate his efforts on achieving the overall objectives of the mission.

Phase III may also include the conduct of counterinsurgency operations, which are designed to defeat an insurgency and address its underlying issues.²⁷ During counterinsurgency operations, MPs provide the same type of support as is done during traditional combat operations. Given the complexities of counterinsurgency operations, they may also be needed to provide additional support to friendly and HN forces. MPs are well equipped to serve as the core for Police Transition Team (PTT) operations, which are essential to improving the capacity of HN security forces.²⁸ MPs have the knowledge and skills to serve as law enforcement advisors to elements of the GCE that are directly involved in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.²⁹ The support provided by MPs during counterinsurgency operations is essential to assist in setting the conditions to protect the local populace, defeat the insurgency, and facilitate the transition to stability operations.

Stability Operations

EF-21 indicates that stability operations will be a key aspect of future Marine Corps employment. Joint Publication 3-07 defines stability operations as activities that are

designed to establish or reestablish a secure environment, reinforce stability, and support the transition to a civil authority.³⁰ The activities may occur as a part of Phase IV of a larger operation, following a conflict. They may also occur in response to some type of humanitarian or other regional crisis.³¹ Some of the primary efforts during stability operations consist of the activities that resemble peace operations: peacekeeping, peace making, peace enforcement, or peace building. MPs provide the most significant contributions during peacekeeping and peace building operations.

Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts to establish and maintain peace in a give AO.³² The primary missions for MPs during peacekeeping operations involve active participation in the establishment and maintenance of a secure environment, in order to facilitate the transition of control to a civil authority. MP units and personnel may establish checkpoints, conduct mounted and dismounted patrols, or provide protection for critical infrastructure.³³ Should the need arise, they are essential to provide the core for crowd control operations in order to quell or contain a civil disturbance.³⁴ The use of force training and experiences possessed by MPs makes them some of the most appropriate personnel to employ during peacekeeping operations.

Peace building operations are focused on the reestablishment of civil institutions to prevent a return to conflict.³⁵ Given the nature of peace building operations, they are best conducted by elements from agencies other than the Department of Defense (DOD), such as the Department of State (DOS) or the Department of Justice (DOJ). Occasionally, DOD elements may be needed to assist other governmental agencies. One area in which MPs are of the greatest assistance, is when they support justice and reconciliation

activities in a given region. The purpose of this function is to establish a self-sustaining public law and order system.³⁶ In this function, MPs provide assistance to the HN police forces. They conduct initial and entry level training for executive, mid-level, and basic police officers.³⁷ They train the HN on the requirements for police station operations, to include: building and protecting, administrative requirements, and other support capabilities.³⁸ MPs also assist HN police forces with the establishment, conduct, and sustainment of LE patrols, special operations, and investigative activities. The overall goal is to facilitate the creation of a viable law enforcement system that is capable of supporting the requirements of the judiciary and confinement systems.

Support to Expeditionary Operations

Expeditionary operations will be a key component in the future employment of Marine Corps forces, as indicated by EF-21. MPs support the conduct of various phases of expeditionary operations, across the spectrum of conflict. While supporting the TSC plan of a respective GCC, MPs assist HN police forces through the conduct of security cooperation exercises. TSC activities help sustain the rule of law and assist with the identification of potential criminal networks, which may need to be destroyed during a future campaign. MPs provide support to the GCE and other MAGTF elements during combat operations. They perform any number of functions related to maintaining law and order, conducting detainee operations, or providing necessary advice and assistance to units and commanders across the deep, close, and rear areas of operations. During stability operations, MPs assist with the sustainment of a secure environment during peacekeeping or aid in the establishment of the rule of law during peace building. Regardless of the phase of the operation, the support provided by MPs will help the

MAGTF commander achieve his objectives in an efficient manner, while minimizing risks to friendly, enemy, and non-combatant personnel.

CHALLENGES TO EMPLOYMENT

Despite the abundant benefits related to MP support to expeditionary operations, there are several challenges regarding their employment. Policy and legislative restrictions concerning the use of MPs to train foreign police forces have limited their ability to participate in extensive TSC activities. An inadequate number of personnel and units have reduced the overall ability for MPs to support a substantial number of operations concurrently. Insufficient Initial Entry Training (IET) for basic MPs, as well as sustainment training for senior MPs, has constrained the breadth and quality of their knowledge. Each of the training issues presents considerable challenges for the employment of MPs. Recognizing the challenges, and the issues associated with them, will allow for the development and implementation of the necessary measures to mitigate their effects.

Policy Restrictions

The use of MPs during TSC missions would greatly strengthen the law enforcement capabilities of U.S. partners, enhance their ability to maintain law and order within their borders, and allow the U.S. to acquire additional information related to criminal networks and other elements within a given nation. Unfortunately, legislation currently exists which specifically prohibits the conduct of police training for foreign nations. In 1975, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), Title 22 of the U.S. Code (USC) (USC), which includes a prohibition on foreign police force training in subsection 2420.³⁹ This act prohibits the use of foreign assistance funds and personnel to train the police

forces of foreign countries. The act applies to all executive departments, but it primarily relates to the use of DoD personnel and funding. The purpose of this law is to prevent assistance initiatives in support of potentially repressive regimes, which may be responsible for the conduct of human rights violations.⁴⁰ There are a number of caveats and exceptions to the provisions in the law that allow funds and personnel to be used for antiterrorism, counter-narcotics, and post conflict assistance.⁴¹ The majority of that assistance is provided by DoJ entities like the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF).⁴² The limitations of the FAA restrict the ability for DoD entities, including the Marine Corps, to directly interact with the police forces in certain countries. That restricts the amount of unfettered information the Marine Corps can attain about the rule of law or status of criminal activities in a given nation. While the Marine Corps could still acquire any desired data from DoJ elements that are authorized to operate in a given nation, the absence of an interagency liaison policy or program presents some challenges regarding the exchange of information.

The negative effects of the policy limitations can be seen in Africa. There, assistance to the police forces of almost 38 countries has been restricted as a result of their enactment of anti-homosexuality laws.⁴³ In Uganda, the government has been combating organizations like the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The DoD has been prohibited from conducting TSC or bilateral training efforts there, however the FBI has been conducting antiterrorism training via programs like the DoS led Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program.⁴⁴ If the situation were to continue to deteriorate in Uganda, Marines could be called upon to execute or assist with the conduct of some type of stability operation. The lack of first hand knowledge concerning the

operating environment would force Marines to be reliant upon the DoJ for intelligence related to the security force capabilities, criminal networks, or other information related to the rule of law. The lack of intelligence could lead to potential information gaps, resulting in inefficiencies as the Marine Corps begins to conduct operations there.

Personnel Limitations

Another challenge related to the employment of MPs is the limited number of personnel available for the operating forces. The Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E) for the three active duty LE Battalions indicate a need for approximately 1300 total MPs, within the operating forces.⁴⁵ Due to some contract extensions and personnel overages, there are close to 2900 MPs currently in the Marine Corps. That number is divided with approximately 1200 supporting installation Provost Marshal Offices (PMO), close to 1400 supporting the operating forces, and the remaining personnel engaged in training or other Special Duty Assignments (SDA) away from the MP community.⁴⁶ Additional MP personnel are taken from the operating forces as a result of the Fleet Assistance Program (FAP). In effort to support FAP agreements, the operating forces are required to send close to 300 MPs to support the conduct of garrison law enforcement duties at installation PMOs.⁴⁷ The personnel limitations force operational units to conduct their tasks with approximately 80 percent of the required personnel. The limited number of MPs available in the operating forces requires the Marine Corps to use other MOSs for transition teams, create in-lieu-of MP units, or employ other creative measures to fill security shortfalls. The solutions sought by MAGTF commanders have not always resulted in the acquisition of the most proficient security forces, but they have satisfied the need when a sufficient number of MPs were not available.

The effects of the insufficient quantity of MPs are evident in the use of non-MPs for law enforcement and security related missions. A variety of MOSs were employed on Police Transition Teams (PTT), some of which had no MPs at all.⁴⁸ Numerous provisional and in-lieu-of MP units were employed during OIF and OEF. Various infantry and artillery units were organized and employed as Task Force Military Police (TFMP), which was responsible for providing Forward Operating Base (FOB) security, convoy security, and other MP related support tasks in Iraq.⁴⁹ In Afghanistan, infantry and artillery units served as a part of TF Belleau Wood, which was responsible for security and LE support aboard Camp Leatherneck and other Marine Corps operated FOBs.⁵⁰ While the operations were generally successful, After Action Reports (AARs) from TFMP and TF Belleau Wood identified a lack of efficiency in their operations, due to the absence of a sufficient number of MPs.⁵¹ The need for law enforcement and security support in a deployed environment is essential for the protection of rear areas and other vulnerable sites. Mitigating the lack of sufficient MP personnel is critical to ensure the LE and security operations are conducted efficiently, while also enabling Marines from other MOSs to return to their primary duties.

Training Shortfalls

Training is one of the areas that presents one of the most significant challenges to the successful employment of MPs. Initial Entry Training (IET) provides significant focus on LE skills for garrison duties, but falls short on some of the expeditionary support functions. A limited number of professional development training opportunities has restricted the breadth of MP knowledge regarding emerging LE TTPs. The lack of career progression training fails to prepare MPs for the advisory, assistance, and training

functions they will assume as they progress through the ranks. Identifying the shortfalls associated with MP training is important to understand what adjustments are necessary to improve the quality of support provided to the MAGTF commander.

MP IET consists of a robust 12 week Program of Instruction (POI) with more than 500 hours of law enforcement and security related education.⁵² Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5525.15 established the training requirements for garrison LE duties, which encompasses approximately 65 percent of the MP POI: 328 hours.⁵³ While that adequately prepares MPs to operate at most Provost Marshal Offices (PMO), it does not sufficiently train them to complete other tasks necessary to support expeditionary operations. Expeditionary forensics, detainee operations, and civil disturbance operations are some of the tasks that are essential to support MAGTF operations. The periods of instruction associated with the respective subjects only account for 16 hours, eight hours, and seven hours of the POI, respectively.⁵⁴ It is imperative that additional time be added to the POI to make Marines more proficient in these and other tasks related to expeditionary operations. This will ensure the next group of MPs are better able to support the MAGTF accordingly.

Limited opportunities for professional development training inhibit chances for MPs to expand their knowledge regarding the most current and relevant LE TTPs. The Marine Corps does not run any courses designed to train MPs on the conduct of community-oriented policing or problem-oriented policing techniques.⁵⁵ As Marines are promoted, they are expected to know and perform in certain positions within the structure of a law enforcement organization. Marines must understand and be able to perform the roles of Field Training Officer (FTO), Patrol Sergeant, Watch Commander, Operations Chief, and

Provost Sergeant as they progress through the ranks, in order to garner the skills necessary to fulfill their LE training and advisory roles. Currently, there is no standardized professional development program to train MPs on the skills required for the aforementioned positions during expeditionary operations. The Marine Corps must identify the means to provide the requisite professional development training for MPs to ensure they are prepared to perform their HN LE training and assistance functions in an expeditionary environment.

One of the most significant issues related to the use of MPs as law enforcement advisors is attributed to a lack of career progression training. MPs are required to perform certain planning, supervisory, and managerial functions as they reach the Staff Non-Commissioned Officer (SNCO) ranks. They currently rely on On-the-Job Training (OJT) to acquire the Knowledge, Skills, and Attributes (KSA) necessary to perform their respective duties. The result is a wide disparity in the capabilities of the MP SNCOs in the operating forces, which 2nd Law Enforcement Battalion identified as a significant deficiency in its AAR following its deployment to OEF 13.1.⁵⁶ A standardized career progression training program is necessary to ensure MP SNCOs understand and are able to efficiently and effectively conduct the training and advisory requirements associated with large scale MP operations.

Overcoming the training challenges is imperative for the successful employment of MPs in the future. Without changes to the IET POI, MPs will continue to be ill prepared to execute some of the tasks they are expected to conduct in support of the MAGTF. The training and application of the most up-to-date LE TTPs are restricted due to the limited professional development training opportunities. The lack of a career progression training

program limits the knowledge and expertise that MPs are able to provide commanders as they serve in advisory positions. Implementing the necessary provisions to improve the training MPs receive will ensure they are better prepared to conduct the range of LE capabilities required by the MAGTF.

Understanding the Challenges

The restraints imposed by the respective challenges forced Marine Corps leadership to look elsewhere for the law enforcement support required during MAGTF operations. The personnel limitations required units to use other MOSs to fill billets best suited and specifically designed for MPs. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the composition of PTTs, advisor elements, and security forces consisted of infantry, artillery, and a variety of other occupational specialties. During rear area security operations, security battalions like that of TFMP and TF Belleau Wood were created to support security requirements and were regularly filled by infantry and artillery battalions. Initiatives like that of the Law Enforcement Professional (LEP) program were created, using a contract solution, due to a lack of training and not enough MPs to fill the required advisory billets. Implementing processes, procedures, and programs to overcome the identified challenges will mitigate their effects and improve the overall efficiency of Marine Corps operations.

OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES

Mitigating the Policy Restrictions

The restrictions of the police training prohibition, within the FAA, prevent the use of funding and assistance to train foreign police elements. This prevents CCDRS from using MPs to train the law enforcement personnel and departments of foreign countries, in a manner that supports their TSC plans. There are certain exemptions in the FAA that

authorize the use of funding and assistance to foreign police departments. The exemptions include training and operations directed towards counter-narcotics control, antiterrorism and counterterrorism initiatives, investigative support, as well as certain police force development initiatives.⁵⁷ The efforts conducted in accordance with the exemptions are generally executed by elements from the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of Justice (DoJ). The Marine Corps conducts exchange and fellowship programs with both agencies, in accordance with the Marine Corps Interagency Integration Strategy (MCIIS). While there are some Marines serving in liaison positions with these agencies, none of the individuals possess a law enforcement background.

The DOS and DEA conduct counter-narcotics and investigations training courses in Latin America and the Asia-Pacific, at U.S. led International Law Enforcement Academies.⁵⁸ The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) conducts counterterrorism, counter-criminal, and law enforcement leadership development training at various other international institutions.⁵⁹ Having a Marine MP in a fellowship or exchange position within the aforementioned agencies would improve the flow of information, prior to the conduct of operations in a respective area. With the FAA preventing Marines from directly engaging in security cooperation activities with law enforcement elements in certain countries, the amount of information Marines receive about criminal and security activities is limited. Employing a Marine MP liaison within the DOS, DOJ, and other interagency partners will enable the Marine Corps to garner the necessary information pertaining to criminal networks, organizations, and security capabilities while operating within the provisions of the FAA.

An example of the potential benefits of this type of program can be seen in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2009, President Obama announced the intent to rebalance U.S. interests there.⁶⁰ The military efforts associated with the rebalance will require the Marine Corps to conduct training, bilateral security exercises, and counterterrorism operations in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and other countries across the region.⁶¹ The FBI runs the Pacific Training Initiative, which helps train LE officials from various countries on transnational crime and terrorism.⁶² Having a Marine MP serving as a fellow or exchange officer within the International Operations Division would provide the opportunity to engage with the international LE officials, allowing for the acquisition of significant insight into the criminal activities in their respective countries. MPs would be able to garner information pertaining to criminal networks, High Value Individuals (HVI), and other potentially important security information. In the absence of authorization to conduct TSC, the use of an MP liaison could provide a greater degree of situational awareness prior to conduct of operations in the region.

Surpassing the Personnel Limitations

The Marine Corps will reduce to 182K personnel by 2017.⁶³ The reduction in the number of Marines negates the possibility of any potential increase in MP endstrength. Without an increase in personnel, MPs must find other methods to maximize the support provided to the operating forces. Individually, Law Enforcement Professionals (LEP) provide LE and force protection advice to units and commanders at varying operational levels. At the small unit level, Police Transition Teams (PTT) assist HN security elements achieve and maintain stability following a conflict.⁶⁴ Training in-lieu-of MP forces provides platoon, company, or battalion size units to conduct security related

operations. Capitalizing on opportunities to employ the above measures will help mitigate the shortage of MPs by employing them in the most efficient manner.

LEPs provide LE advice and assistance to battalion, regimental, division, and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) commanders. During traditional combat operations, they assist commanders understand and implement procedures for the collection and processing of exploitable material.⁶⁵ During COIN operations, LEPs assist units with the application of the TTPs required to protect the HN population.⁶⁶ The LEPs employed during OEF and OIF were civilians, contracted to provide the aforementioned support.⁶⁷ This limited the scope of employment for LEPs, as they were unable to engage in the full range of operations. Using MPs as LEPs would greatly increase the level of support provided to the operational units. Marines can advise, train, and even assist units during the conduct of operations. The use of Marine MPs as LEPs would increase the LE capabilities on the battlefield, without having to increase the number of MPs in the Marine Corps.

Following a conflict, Police Transition Teams (PTT) are responsible for advising and assisting HN law enforcement elements with the establishment and maintenance of security.⁶⁸ During recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the majority of personnel within a PTT were not MPs. The teams consisted of Marines from a variety of MOSs: infantry, artillery, aviation, and logistics.⁶⁹ The size of the teams varied, based upon the level of responsibility of the unit to which they were assigned. As Marines, the members of the teams understood the basic concepts of security and were capable of providing minimal assistance. Since they did not possess the requisite LE background, they could not provide the level of LE expertise necessary to sustain the security environment.⁷⁰ The

PTTs would have likely reported significantly better results if they had employed MPs within them. Using MPs as the core of a PTT would increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations. This would greatly improve the capacity of HN police forces, improve security, and reduce the requirement for the overall size of Marine Corps forces in a given region.

Training in-lieu-of MP units is one of the most significant ways to provide a substantial increase in the number of law enforcement and security personnel available for the operating forces. Given the limited number of LE Battalions, the ability to provide continuous MP support to the MAGTF is restricted. In-lieu-of and provisional MP units provide the MAGTF with additional personnel for the conduct of specific law enforcement and security related missions. This technique was used during OEF and OIF to satisfy personnel shortfalls. Infantry, artillery, and other non-MP units were trained to conduct MP functions.⁷⁰ The units performed security aboard FOBs, assisted with the conduct of detention operations, and even provided route security for Combat Logistics Patrols (CLP).⁷¹ While the units were generally successful, the use of in-lieu-of MP units should be limited to specific tasks. The lack of LE expertise and limited training for the personnel in the provisional units results in a significant reduction in proficiency, especially as the variety of LE tasks increases. In addition to participating in a robust in-lieu-of training program, provisional units should also be augmented with an actual MP squad, platoon, or company. The size of the augmenting unit will be dependent upon the size of the designated provisional force: platoon, company, battalion, respectively. Employing in-lieu-of MP units will help alleviate some of the MP personnel shortfalls

and ensure the MAGTF has the security support required to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict throughout the context of the single battle.

The limited number of MP personnel and units is not an insurmountable challenge to the availability of LE support for the operating forces. Using MPs as law enforcement advisors will provide platoon, company, battalion, and other levels of GCE commanders with LE advice, assistance, and training during the conduct of full spectrum operations. The use of MPs in the employment of a PTT will increase the effectiveness of the teams and expedite the return of security forces to HN control. The training and employment of provisional MP units will provide a sufficient forces for the conduct of large scale security related operations. The measures taken to mitigate the MP personnel and unit limitations will ensure the necessary LE and security support is available to the MAGTF for the conduct of the full spectrum of expeditionary operations.

Overcoming the Training Limitations

Training is one of the areas that requires some the most significant improvements to increase the LE and security support Military Police provide to MAGTF commanders. IET requires an increase in the instruction of the expeditionary support tasks that are associated with MP employment. Professional development training needs to be expanded, in order to improve the advisory and assistance capabilities required of MPs during expeditionary operations. A standardized career progression training program will improve senior MP proficiency and increase the quality of support provided to operational commanders. Improving the training for MPs will increase the overall quality of law enforcement support across the MAGTF.

During IET, more time needs to be dedicated to ensure MPs are familiar with the fundamental concepts associated with their expeditionary support tasks of expeditionary forensics, detainee operations, and civil disturbance operations. Expeditionary forensics is a critical tool to identify, collect, and process evidence during multiple phases of an operation. Detainee operations are essential to ensure the proper collection, processing, and holding of enemy personnel. Civil disturbance TTPs are important for the conduct of detention operations, as well as the suppression of civil unrest during peace and stability operations. The amount of time currently dedicated to the instruction of each subject is inadequate. Instruction related to expeditionary forensics, detainee operations, and civil disturbance operations should be increased to at least 40 hours. Increasing the time allotted for the training of each respective function will enable MPs to attain the requisite degree of proficiency in the related subjects.

The development and implementation of a professional development program will better prepare MPs to perform their required duties, as they progress through the ranks. When Marines are promoted to Lance Corporal (LCpl), they need to attend an FTO course, which will prepare them to teach the application of LE TTPs to basic police officers in a foreign or domestic setting. To ensure NCOs have the skills necessary to complete police station administrative and operational requirements, Corporals (Cpls) need to attend at a Desk Sergeant course. Sergeants (Sgts) need to attend at Patrol Supervisor and Watch Commander courses to prepare them to manage the personnel and operational requirements related to LE activities. Each of the respective courses will ensure MPs receive the necessary professional development to perform their requisite duties in the operating forces.

One of the most important career progression courses needed is one specifically designed to prepare MP SNCOs for their supervisory and operational duties. MP SNCOs require a multitude of skills to ensure they are able to communicate the capabilities and limitations of MPs to higher or supported commanders. They must be prepared to participate in planning evolutions that are designed to prepare for the training of foreign LE entities or in-lieu-of MP units. MP SNCOs must ultimately be capable of establishing an LE department and ensuring its operation in accordance with the requisite laws, orders, rules, and up-to-date procedures. Unfortunately, no such course currently exists, which requires MPs to acquire the necessary skills via on the job training. The Marine Corps needs to create an MP Unit Leaders course that is similar to the ones used to educate SNCOs from the infantry, engineer, and other MOSs. A comprehensive course for MP SNCOs will ensure they have the necessary skills to accurately and effectively fulfill their responsibilities.

Eliminating the Challenges

Overcoming the current training challenges and shortfalls is critical to ensure MPs are able to provide the requisite support to the operating forces. Increasing the hours in IET that are dedicated to expeditionary forensics, detainee operations, and civil disturbance operations will ensure MPs are better prepared to support the MAGTF during expeditionary operations. The development and implementation of courses to train FTOs, Desk Sergeants, Patrol Supervisors, and Watch Commanders will ensure MPs are able to perform and instruct the requirements for basic police operations in deployed and garrison environments. Finally, creating an MP SNCO course will prepare senior MPs to perform their staff planning and execution functions within the operating forces. The

development, implementation, and completion of the respective courses will ensure MPs of all ranks support the MAGTF with the requisite level of LE support to the MAGTF.

CONCLUSION

As the Marine Corps returns to its expeditionary competencies, MPs will play a significant role in the successful conduct of future operations. The support provided by individual MP personnel and entire MP units increases the efficiency of efforts during each operational phase and across the entire spectrum of conflict. The LE expertise possessed by MPs are necessary to assist HN LE agencies during security cooperation activities or to advise a respective MAGTF commander during combat, COIN, or stability operations. The ability to identify, collect, and process forensic material is a skill that will help the HN or MAGTF commander identify threats to the successful conduct of operations and eliminate the dangers they may pose. In the rear area, MPs provide the security and LE support required to protect LOCs, FOBs, and other elements operating behind the areas of engagement. When the skills possessed by MPs are incorporated into an operation, the probability of success increases, while the chances for collateral damage and ill-intended effects will decrease.

The challenges associated with the employment of MPs require measures to mitigate their potentially pernicious effects. The provisions of the FAA prohibit the use of military funds and personnel to train police forces of foreign nations. A limited number of personnel and units restricts the size, scope, and overall depth of employment options for MPs. The training and educational shortfalls within the MP community limit the knowledge and expertise of MP personnel and reduces the quality of their contributions to the operating forces. Implementing the measures necessary to mitigate the current

challenges is imperative to facilitate the successful employment of MPs in the future. Improving the knowledge, proficiency, and overall quality of the personnel will enhance the value of LE support provided to the operating forces.

A comprehensive interagency coordination initiative with DOS, DOJ, and other agencies authorized to train foreign police will allow the Marine Corps to achieve its information and assessment requirements, while operating in compliance with the law. Using MPs as LE advisors and employing small groups of them in a PTT will assist with the conduct and transition of combat and stability operations. Training in-lieu-of MP units significantly increases the capacity of LE and security forces available to the MAGTF commander, provided they are trained to a sufficient standard. Implementing the necessary adjustments in IET, creating a professional development program, and facilitating the execution of a standardized career progressing program will improve the overall quality of MP support to the operating forces.

The strategy outlined in the NSS identified the need for law enforcement expertise in support of national objectives. EF-21 identified opportunities for the employment of the Marine Corps in support of the NSS. The activities of international terrorists, criminals, and other potential belligerents will require the integration of law enforcement type skills to counter their potentially hazardous effects. As the Marine Corps increases the conduct of expeditionary operations, MPs should be positioned to make significant contributions to mission success. Before they are able to do so, the current policy, personnel, and training challenges must be eliminated. When the challenges are effectively mitigated, MP contributions to expeditionary operations will bolster the efforts of the MAGTF within the single battle concept and across the range of military operations.


APPENDIX A

MP CAPABILITIES AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

MILITARY POLICE (MP) CAPABILITIES AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS					
MP T/O&E	UNIT/ELEMENT		OFFICER	SNCO	E1-E5
	Platoon (x3 per Company)		1	1	39
	Company (x4 per Battalion: H&S, A, B, & C)		5	4	119
	Battalion (x1 per MEF: 1st LE BN, 2nd LE BN, & 3rd LE BN)		21	17	400
MP CAPABILITY/ACTIVITY	UNIT/ELEMENT SUPPORTED	MP ELEMENT SIZE REQ'D	OFFICER	SNCO	E1-E5
Law Enforcement Professional (LEP) / Law Enforcement Integration Officer (LEIO) (Police Training & Advising)	Platoon	-	0	0	1 (>E5)
	Company	-	0	1	0
	Battalion	-	0	1 (>E7)	0
	Regiment	-	0	1 (>E8)	0
	Division/Wing/Marine Logistics Group (MLG)	-	1	1 (>E7)	0
	Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)	-	1	1 (>E7)	0
	Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)	-	1	1 (>E7)	0
Police Transition Team (PTT) (Police Training & Advising)	Station/Precinct	Squad	0	1	13
	District	Platoon	1	1	39
	City	Company	5	4	119
	State/Province	Battalion	21	17	400
In-Lieu-Of MP Unit Training (Police Training & Advising)	Platoon	Detachment	1	1	13
	Company	Detachment	1	1	13
	Battalion	Platoon	1	1	39
	Regiment	Company	5	4	119
Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) / Detainee Operations	Company (Collection, Processing, & Transport: Close Area)	Detachment	0	1	13
	Battalion (Collection, Processing, & Transport: Close Area)	Detachment	1	1	13
	Regiment (Processing, Holding, & Transport: Close Area)	Platoon	1	1	39
	Division (Processing, Holding, & Transport: Rear Area)	Company	5	4	119
	MEB (Processing, Holding, & Transport: Rear Area)	Company	5	4	119
	MEF (Processing, Holding, & Transport: Rear Area)	Battalion	21	17	400
Expeditionary Forensics / Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) (Law & Order)	Company (SSE Team: Close Area)	Detachment	0	0	10
	Battalion/Regiment (SSE Team: Close Area)	Squad	0	1	13
	MEB (SSE Team(s): Close Area)	Platoon	1	1	39
	MEB (Expeditionary Analysis Cell (EAC): Rear Area)	Detachment	1	1	13
	MEF (SSE Team(s): Close Area)	Company	5	4	119
	MEF (Expeditionary Analysis Cell (EAC): Rear Area)	Detachment	1	1	39
Expeditionary Law Enforcement (Law & Order)	MEB Position/Rear Area (Security Force Battalion)	Company	5	4	119
	MEF Position/Rear Area (Security Force Regiment)	Battalion	21	17	400

APPENDIX B

RECOMMENDED MP LIAISON POSITON IN DOJ



Approved by:

Date: July 15, 2014

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