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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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The United States Marine Corps Reserve: Reorganization for an Integrated Force.

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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## *Executive Summary*

**Title:** The United States Marine Corps Reserve: Reorganization for an Integrated Force.

**Author:** Major Mauro R. Sanchez, United States Marine Corps Reserve.

**Thesis:** After more than a decade of war, the Reserve Component must recognize, restructure, realign, and orient itself to directly support and better complement the Active Component, as the Marine Corps transforms to meet its new mission, Expeditionary Force 21.

**Discussion:** After the Korean War, the Reserve Components reformed to be a strategic reserve force designed to facilitate a rapid expansion of the armed forces for a major war with the Soviet Union. The Marine Corps Reserve is an essential piece of the Marine Corps, and throughout its existence, the Marine Corps' Reserve Component has been and continues to serve as an integral part of the Marine Corps. As the Marine Corps (Active Component) seeks out new ways to evolve and remain relevant, so too must the Reserve Component. With the introduction of Expeditionary Force 21, the Marine Corps is proactively changing to meet the next potential threat. An archaic structure such as the strategic reserve paradigm cannot deliver results when the nation calls its citizen soldiers to war. As it has throughout the decades since its inception, the Marine Corps Reserve must continue to evolve to meet the current operational environment and improve interoperability for future contingencies. Since the DoD recognizes that the Reserve Component are becoming an operational reserve, the Marine Corps should seize the opportunity to innovate its Reserve Component before its mandated. This paper examines a proposed method to integrate the two components to meet the needs of an operational reserve force, one that is integrated with the Active Component in peace and wartime, not one that must adjust in a combat theater.

**Conclusion:** The nation has evolved toward using the Reserve Component with much greater frequency than ever before, but with no major reform since the end of the Korean War. Although the United States has increased the employment of its Reserve Components, the Reserve Component will continue to contribute to an operational force. Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom proved that the ground and air units of Marine Reserve were critical to combat operations. As the Marine Corps innovates with plans such as Expeditionary Force 21 the Marine Corps as a whole must posture itself to leverage any advantage in a bid for continued success. Currently, reserve officers are no longer required to serve on Active Duty before entering into the reserve forces. Within ten years, the Marine Corps Reserve will have field grade officers who have never served in the Fleet Marine Forces or combat. Without these experiences, integrating the Active and Reserve Components will be difficult. Ignoring this future gap in experiences will only further divide the two components. Implementing this proposal will place the Marine Corps Reserve ahead of its sister services. By using the infantry as a model, each element of the Reserve Component can align smaller units under Active Component units studying and observing for trends and deficiencies to mitigate and resolve before implementing this strategy to the whole Marine Corps or worse being directed under the constraint of limited time.

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THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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## *Preface*

This paper examines a proposal for the potential future structure for the Marine Corps Reserve that would optimize integration with the Active Component. As the Active Component of the Marine Corps attempts to innovate and reevaluates how it fights through plans such as EF21. The Marine Corps Reserve will be called upon to augment the Active Component wherever and whenever needed. With the lessons learned over the past decade of war, the Marine Corps is evolving once again and so too must the Marine Corps Reserve. This community of highly skilled citizens is a force that could be leveraged to augment a particular Active Component battalion and be a real force multiplier for an AC commander. Too long has the Reserve Component served without direction or a mission statement. The current structure of the Reserve Component is a mirror image of the AC but will never deploy as a division. The Marine Corps should reevaluate and then restructure this outdated system to suit best it is intended as an operational reserve. This proposal suggests a possible a model that is designed to provoke thought and inspire innovation.

This topic appealed to me because of my experiences dealing with the challenges and problems that plagued me while serving in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve. My intention is to present a concept to inspire the leaders of both the Active and Reserve communities to change an archaic system, the reserves, and apply this proposal make those changes. By sharing my experiences and writing this proposal, I hope that I will stimulate discussion and possible solutions among the leaders of the Active and Reserve communities.

I would like to thank my mentor, Dr. Bradford Wineman, for his advice, guidance, and direction in my research, approach, and organization of this thesis.

Finally, I would like to thank my extremely patient wife, Tracey Sanchez, for her relentless support and contribution to my effort in completing this endeavor. I am forever indebted to her, as she had to endure the last several months almost as a single parent with patience and understanding while I spent countless hours in the library or locked in the basement. I truly appreciate you shouldering the weight of our family and for being my best friend. To Tatianna and Amelia, daddy's girls, thank you for the smiles and forgiveness when I could not be around. Everything I do is for you.

## **Introduction**

The US military has evolved the manner in which it employs its Reserve Components from its strategic reserve force to an operational reserve force. For the near future, the Reserve Components will continue its contributions as part of an operational force. This model began after the Korean War when the nation's Reserve Components were seen as a strategic reserve force designed to facilitate the rapid expansion of the armed forces for a major war with the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup> Since the commencement of the Global War on Terror, the nation has used the Reserve Components with more frequency, but no formal, strategic reform of the reserve force has occurred since the Korean War ended.<sup>2</sup> The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) released its final report on January 31, 2008. The CNGR report recommended that to meet the security challenges of today and tomorrow, the National Guard, and Reserves should transform into operational reserves.

The CNGR report provides a road map for an active, viable Guard and Reserve Components in the future, but it does not clearly discuss how each of the services should achieve it.<sup>3</sup> The Reserve component of the Marine Corps is an invaluable asset, one that has been called upon repeatedly for support and augmentation during many of the nation's contingencies. This component draws upon the skills of the men and women who serve in a multitude of capacities in their civilian careers and bring that expertise with them when they train or deploy. Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the nation has been burdened with more than a decade of war on two fronts. The Reserve Component of the Marine Corps (RC) is now, more than ever, an experienced force that has consistently and successfully engaged in an extensive Range of Military Operations (ROMO). These experiences are due significantly to the repetitive deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom

(OIF). According to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD/RA), across the services the level of reservists participating and, in some cases, leading federal missions is increasing.<sup>4</sup> OASD/RA reveal that in the years preceding the attacks on 9/11, reservists contributed approximately 1 to 13 million days of work per year to their respective services.<sup>5</sup> Post 9/11, this number spiked to its highest point of 68.3 million days in FY2005 and has since then decreased to 25.8 million in FY2012.<sup>6</sup> The persistent mobilization of reservists to participate in operations emphasizes the concept that the Reserve Component has transformed. The RC's transformation from a strategic, last resort, reserve force of the Cold War era is no longer a valid form of employment. The RC is now an essential "operational reserve" force for the military services, which demonstrates the need for a change or, at a minimum, a reevaluation of current structure and employment. The increased use of the reserve forces to support overseas contingency operations (OCO) has transformed the Reserve Component. The RC's transformations from a "strategic reserve" to an "operational reserve" obliges' more than only a change in name, but a change in the organizational structure.

This thesis presents a model that, if implemented, would integrate the RC and AC. The proposed realignment would suit an operational reserve construct that would solve the ongoing challenge of achieving Total Force Integration (TFI). The proposal recommends using the infantry as a model to implement a new structure that would align reserve companies under active duty battalions, integrating the RC at a lower level than that of the strategic reserve. The realignment would prove to be mutually beneficial, allowing commanders to train a dedicated reserve force to the mission and needs of that particular AC unit. Likewise, the reserve company would benefit from having a dedicated relationship with an AC battalion and its commander.

The AC commander would provide the RC company with a mission to train to and provide it with current tactics techniques and procedures (TTP) to meet the commander's intent.

As the United States completes its mission in Afghanistan, the RC of the Marine Corps will continue to support its AC counterpart in fulfilling the nation's need; for protecting the homeland, building security globally, and projecting power and winning decisively.<sup>7</sup> The Marine Corps must exploit the experiences it gained from a decade of war. These wars have forced the AC and the RC to work together and, in some instances, bridged gaps between the AC and RC. Seizing the opportunity of these experiences can increase the quality of retention and an opportunity to implement a change that will substantially integrate the two components of the Marine Corps. OIF and OEF have provided many lessons learned that were captured and, when used, beneficial. These experiences had been applied immediately to maximize their effectiveness in areas such as technology, equipment, and tactics for the troops. However, within the RC, the task of integrating the RC with the AC of the Marine Corps has encountered significant friction. Much of this friction resulted from poor apportionment of Reserve units and personnel to augment the AC in wartime with little to no opportunity to work together during peacetime. Although RC has been successful in augmenting the AC, it has done so in what many describe as a crash course or on the job-training environment.

The objective of this thesis is to stimulate a discussion among the senior officers of the Marine Corps to reevaluate the manner in which the Marine Corps task organizes, supports, and employs the RC. An important element of the Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) is to integrate the Active and Reserve Components. If a mission of M&RA is to integrate the two components than the idea presented in this thesis may be used as a possible course of action for the restructuring of the Marine Corps RC to meet the future employment of the Marine Corps.

This recommendation is aimed at bridging the gap between the AC and RC and making the RC and AC a more unified force that will meet the future demands of military operations.

### **Evolution of the Marine Reserve**

To appreciate the RC, a brief reflection on its origins can clarify its intended purpose and current structure. The military Reserve Components encompass the citizens of a nation who simultaneously maintain a part-time military career and a full-time civilian job. In the event of a crisis, these citizen soldiers are ready to answer their nation's call to mobilize. Reserve forces allow a country to reduce its peacetime military costs while maintaining a force prepared for war. Typically, members of the reserve forces are civilians who maintain military skills by training one weekend a month and conducting larger scale, two-week training during the summer.

The RC of the Marine Corps has evolved over the decades with great success, adjusting to the needs of Marine Corps, the nation, and the citizen soldiers who comprise it. Prior to the establishment of a Marine Corps Reserve, the Marine reservists had primarily served with and in naval militias belonging to states that bordered large bodies of water. Congress officially established the Marine Corps Reserve in the summer of 1916 through the Naval Appropriations Act. (August 29, 1916)<sup>8</sup>

Through the years, the Marine Corps Reserve experienced substantial growth and changes, including the introduction of female enrollment in the Marine Corps Reserve. With the significant changes and growth to the reserve, in February of 1925, Congress passed the Naval Reserve Act, which superseded the Act of 1916.<sup>9</sup> The Act formalized organization, administration, and maintenance of the Marine Corps Reserves while instituting aviation units within the Reserves. The Naval Reserve Act created the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, an Organized Marine Corps Reserve, and a Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve.<sup>10</sup> In the 1950s,

Congress passed the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, which created three elements of the reserve force: a Ready Reserve, a Standby Reserve, and a Retired Reserve. In addition, it established a six-month training program and schooling available to reservists in 200 key occupational fields under the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1955.

In 1962, the Marine Corps Reserve reorganized to mirror the AC structure. The RC of the time was restructured replicating the AC with the establishment of 4th Marine Division and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing.<sup>11</sup> The division and wing team concept was applied to the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and served as the turning point. This turning point changed the intended use of reserve units from training camps for individual replacements to commands that were mobilized in units. The establishment of the 4th Marine Division and the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing was an attempt to bring about a new sense of unit identity to SMCR units and encouraged camaraderie among reservists.<sup>12</sup> The 25<sup>th</sup> director of the Reserves, General Ronald R. Van Stockum, stated that the reorganization gave the reserves a longer-range training goal of five to eight years.<sup>13</sup> This vision is not weak, but neither does it focus on integrating the AC and RC. By segregating the components, both McNamara and Shoup inadvertently began to divide the AC and RC.

On June 6, 1992, the Marine Reserve Force (MarResFor) was established and became the largest command in the Marine Corps. Two years later, on November 10, 1994, MarResFor was re-designated as Marine Corps Forces Reserve (MarForRes) in an attempt to keep the Reserve force's mirrored with its Fleet Marine Force Command counterparts.<sup>14</sup>

During the Cold War, Reserve Components were viewed as a manpower resource that were activated when needed. According to Lawrence Knapp and Barbara Salazar Torreon, from 1945 to 1989 reservists mobilized four times, Korean War, Berlin Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis,

and the Vietnam War/*U.S.S. Pueblo* Crisis.<sup>15</sup> In these cases, the use of the RC demonstrated the perception of the reserves as a force to facilitate a fast response to wartime or national emergencies. In 2000, the perception of the reserve force evolved, according to Charles Cragin former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Cragin described the evolution of the reserve force as such; “The role of our Reserve forces is changing in the United States. We have seen their traditional role, which was to serve as manpower replacements in the event of some cataclysmic crisis, utterly transformed. They are no longer serving as the force of last resort, but as vital contributors on a day-to-day basis around the world.”<sup>16</sup> In this instance, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs reinforces the need to identify that the role of the reserve force is changing. His statement lends credibility to the need to make changes to a structure that was implemented during an era in which a strategic reserve was appropriate. However, it is no longer applicable for today’s reserve force.

The nation has relied more heavily on the Reserve Components since the end of the Cold War. The history of the reserve demonstrates that change is not only possible, but also needed to adjust to requirements set forth by the needs Marine Corps and the nation to which it serves. The nation and the Marine Corps have endured repeated changes to maintain it relevantly and postured to meet the challenges of its time. As the Marine Corps moves forward after a decade of lessons learned in combat, its Reserve Component must adapt to complement the Corps in all future endeavors.

### **Components of the Marine Corps Reserves**


Title 10, United States Code, states the mission of the reserve forces are to provide trained and qualified units and individuals to be available for active duty in time of war, national emergency, and at such times as national security may require.<sup>17</sup> Three components comprise

the Marine Corps Reserve: the Standby Reserve, the Ready Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.<sup>18</sup>

Figure 1 displays the breakdown of the Marine Corps Reserve along with its sub-components.

These components account for both, units and individuals who are trained and prepared for recall to active duty in case of a national emergency or as directed under any of the circumstances outlined in Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces. The Standby Reserves primarily comprises reservists who are a part of neither the Ready nor Retired Reserves (See Figure 1).

These individuals choose not to regularly participate or are unable. The Retired Reserve consists of those Marines who have either requested or approved for retirement. The Ready Reserve provides the significant portion of the manpower resources used to augment active duty forces and consists of the Selected Reserve (SelRes) and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).<sup>19</sup> The SMCR gives the Marine Corps a source of trained units and/or individuals for mobilization while its IRR provides qualified individuals. For the purpose of this thesis, the focus is on the Ready Reserve and its two components: the SelRes and the IRR.



The Ready Reserve represents the majority of the Marine Corps Reserve manpower available for immediate activation. The SelRes is comprised (Figure 1) of members from three different categories: the SMCR, Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), and the Active Reserve (AR). The majority of the members of the SelRes consist of SMCR Marines. These members typically belong to 4th Marine Division (4th MarDiv), 4th Marine Air Wing (4th MAW), 4th Marine Logistics Group (4th MLG) and/or other Force level units of Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES). These Marines serve their obliged time in service by participating in regularly scheduled training periods such as weekend drilling, two weeks annual training (AT), or supplementary training prescribed by a Marine's respective unit. SMCR unit personnel are required to attend 48 drill periods and 14 days Annual Training (AT) to acquire the minimum annual points for satisfactory performance.<sup>20</sup>

The IMA Marines are reservists who are assigned to or volunteer for an AC billet to meet mobilization requirements. The IMA members coordinate their drill requirements with their AC

unit. The requirements are similar to that of a drilling reservist. However, because the member is supporting an AC unit, drill schedules typically do not coincide with that of a drilling reservist assigned to an SMCR unit. However, the schedule does allow the member to acquire the minimum annual points for satisfactory performance. The IMA tour length is three to five years barring any approved extensions, at which point the individuals are transferred to the IRR, SMCR unit, or another unit IMA billets.

The Marine Corps Active Reserve (AR) Program is under Marine Corps Reserve Affairs office and is operated by the Marine Forces Reserve. The AR program's mission is to integrate Marine RC and AC units into a seamless whole. The Marine AR Program is used to enhance Marine Corps Reserve readiness and serve as integral parts assisting RC units deploy when called to active duty. Previously known as Full-Time Support (FTS) Marines, the mission has been reconfigured over the last decade in keeping with the focus on the total force integration between the RC and AC units of the Marine Corps. AR Marines constitute about one-third of all active-duty support personnel assigned to the Marine Corps Reserve to assist and support Marine Reserve units. The AR program consists of those reservists in a full-time active duty capacity in support of the reserve forces. The members of the AR program assist in facilitating, organizing, recruiting, retention, administration, and training of the Marine Corps Reserve.<sup>21</sup> Members of the AR program are the middle ground between the AC and RC. Officers and Enlisted members advocate the integration of two components and serve as facilitators and educators to both components. AR members may serve on AC staffs as well as with Inspector & Instructor (I&I) staffs assigned to SMCR units.

The I&I staffs are comprised of active duty support personnel from AC and AR, who provide instruction and assistance to the SMCR units to maintain a continuous state of readiness

for mobilization. The I&I staff inspects and provides technical advice to command functions including administration, logistical support, and public affairs, and execute such collateral functions as may be directed by higher authority. The majority of AC, AR, and SelRes personnel are integrated into a single chain of command that passes from individual units through the appropriate MSC. These Marines are subject to deployment with their assigned unit in the event of mobilization. Between drill periods, they often perform the unit's tasks while its members are busy with their civilian careers.<sup>22</sup>

The next component of the Ready Reserve is the IRR. The IRR is perceived as a pool of trained Marines ready for mobilization. These members were previously on active duty or obligated to drill in the SelRes and have completed their contractual obligation. These Marines belong to the IRR by way of voluntary assignment or due to having not completed their Military Service Obligation (MSO).<sup>23</sup>

The Ready Reserve section embodies the complexities of one part of the Marine Corps Reserve. With its multitude of components, understanding the RC is challenging to comprehend when juxtaposed to the AC. The AC's lack of understanding or difficulty in understanding the functioning elements of the reserve, its employment, and administrative needs reduces attempts made to integrate the RC. Subsequently, these lost efforts add to the difficulty in the integration of the RC and the AC.

### **Active vs. Reserve Culture**

Significant differences exist in culture among the reservists and the active duty members. Schein defines culture as "A pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well

enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”<sup>24</sup>

Without question, the US military has its culture. The military culture primarily entails putting the unit and mission above personal and individual needs and desires.<sup>25</sup> Although military culture may differ from service to service, the underlining core values of discipline, obedience, courage, trust, and self-sacrifice are essentially the same.<sup>26</sup> Regardless of which branch of service, most members believe that the team or group is more important than is the individual. Self-sacrifice puts the unit and its mission ahead of the individual service member.<sup>27</sup> Self-sacrifice is evident when soldiers give their service at a personal cost to their family. This mindset of discipline, obedience, courage, trust, and self-sacrifice are deep-rooted and strengthened at the basic schools of each service.

However, a fissure does exist in the culture, a fissure that is apparent at the completion of basic training and the assignment to an active or reserve status. Most active duty members reside at their assigned military installation. Whether bachelor quarters or housing areas on the military post, the service members’ neighbors are also service members. Being continuously co-located with others that share the same set of values reinforces these values and assumptions initial received upon entry into the military. Furthering this point, most of these individuals also work together, so they never break away from this culture. This culture is a way of life that includes the installation itself.<sup>28</sup> The active duty lifestyle promotes social cohesion at a larger, community level. For example, if the facility is threatened by hazardous weather, power outage, or a security breach, all of the service members and their families feel the effects. The reservists rarely experience this aspect of the active duty culture. However, the AC members do, because they principally live and work on or near military posts, and their sole livelihood, while on active

duty, is to prepare for and perform the mission associated with their military occupation. As such, these service members are regularly exposed to the military's demanding influences.

Reservists do not have this environment of reinforcement as these individuals hold full-time jobs with civilian employers or are students (full/part-time) who sacrifice additional time to reserve duty. Reservists are essentially civilians, and the opportunity to live on a military installation is rare. Reservists have to set temporarily aside this culture and adapt to a new culture. A culture that is more independent and relevant to their new lifestyle, whether it is as a student or as an executive. The reservist's exposure to this culture is on a limited scale, which is typically during their scheduled training events, which are approximately twelve weekends and two weeks per year. This equates to approximately thirty-nine days of training in any given year, resulting in a significantly fewer training and exposure than their active duty counterparts.<sup>29</sup> However, reservists who work typical 2,000-hour work years work only 1,920 of these hours because they are be involved in two weeks of training with the reserve system.<sup>30</sup> These same reservists put in approximately 304 hours of work time with the Reserve. Of the total hours worked by these reservists, under 14% of the time spent working was with their reserve unit.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, by necessity, these reservists must push aside the culture that is reinforced on the AC side. Additionally, the limited exposure to the military culture they do receive is from fellow reservists who have also placed other priorities before it. This is not to say the reservists dismiss the military culture, quite the opposite. During Operation Desert Storm, reports indicated that some reservists were suffering a loss of income due to military activation in support of missions. This loss in pay from their civilian employee was in addition to putting their lives on the line alongside the AC members.<sup>32</sup>

This difference in culture is important, as it is an obstacle in attempting to merge the AC with the RC. During a mobilization, the culture barrier is often the reason for so much disparity between the AC and the RC. At times, cultural differences between the AC and RC have resulted in preferential treatment of AC over RC. Task assignments represent one example of differential treatment between AC and RC units; often, commanders give AC members preferential treatment over reservists. The perceived and sometimes actual preferential treatment is because commanders are more than likely to work with AC service members in the future and will probably not work the reservist again, especially under the current construct. Another possible reason commanders may feel more comfortable working with AC units because the commanders appreciate the amount of time that the AC members spent training for the execution of various types of missions. Whereas the AC commanders have little knowledge of the quantity or quality of training and level of proficiency possessed by RC units.<sup>33</sup> While no definite direct evidence exists that these examples are the reasons for differences in treatment of reservists, these examples do demonstrate some practical reasoning on the part of commanders.<sup>34</sup>

While discrimination between the Marine Corps' AC and RC may not be as apparent as in other services, reserve forces soldiers have identified what they believe to be unfairness in treatment based on their status.<sup>35</sup> Impartiality in the treatment of individuals does influence behavior and overall command climate. By assigning smaller units, such as reserve companies, to AC battalions, as suggested by the model, AC units can acknowledge the abilities and capabilities of their reserve personnel. Instead of being given a unit to work with at the last moment before operations, commands can develop their reserve company to mirror its culture and train them in the capacity that suits the needs of the command.

## **Integrating the Total Force**

As mentioned earlier, the current construct of the RC is that of a strategic reserve designed to facilitate an immediate expansion of the armed forces for a major contingency. This plan revolved around a Cold War model. Although DoD recognizes the fact that it is now employing an operational reserve, the Marine Corps must seize the opportunity to make advancements towards disengaging from the Cold War model. The change from a strategic reserve and innovate a new model for its reserve force that will maximize the employment of an operational reserve. The key will be to incorporate its active and Reserve Components appropriately to achieve a Total Force Integration.

To bring about change for the future of the Marine Corps Reserve, a break from the old strategic structure is in order. Since the Korean War, reserve divisions or regiments have not mobilized in support of contingencies. Since 9/11, 100 percent of Marine Corps' RC battalion or squadron level commands have either been activated or tasked-organized as detachments in support of OIF, OEF or other OCO.<sup>36</sup> The most recent conflicts have demonstrated that the Cold War strategic reserve concept and its structure of forces are archaic and no longer valid. Maintaining this structure will result in a costly maintaining of a force that does not facilitate an operational reserve and integrated reserve force to the AC.

As defined by Colonel David Antonik, Head of Reserve Affairs, US Marine Corps Forces Command, "Integrated Reserve Forces," means "To combine reserve units, detachments, and individuals with Active Component elements to form an integrated total force organization, ensuring unity of command related to personnel administration, training, logistics, and command and control before, during, and after deployment or other operational employment. Integration includes the coordination and management of support (to include sourcing of equipment and

sustainment to fill mission-specific deficiencies) and oversight of pre-deployment training.

[DoD Dir 1235.10, MCO 3000.19B, MCO 3502.6A].” The word “combining” is the key to successful integration of the two components. The RC has and continues to be a separate and not equal component of the force and will continue to hinder the force if set aside because it is too complicated to understand and employ.

Other than in combat or the immediate preparation for combat, the only interactions that the AC has with RC forces are during exercises. These limited practices do not reflect the level of effort required to support a mobilization, activation, and integration of AC with RC forces and individuals. Many of the items above are significantly due in part because the RC is not a part of the AC, and so in almost every aspect, it is treated, as an external unit. The Marine Corps’ attempt to integrate the AC and the RC at the upper echelons are fated to failure because the larger signature creates large-scale logistical and administrative issues.

Part of the difficulties in attempting to have a Total Force Integrated Marine Corps is dispelling the rumors and educating the AC members about the reserve force that stands ready to augment them when the occasion presents itself. Unfortunately, most of the AC members do not comprehend the role of the RC; this is in part due to its complexity. As described in the previous section of this paper, the RC of the Marine Corps has many facets, and may be difficult to work with when not accustomed to its needs. Additionally, the AC does not need to invest time and energy into learning about the reserves because under the current construct, it is a separate division; thus “not their problem” or “too high maintenance.” The complexity of the RC without any requirement to deal with the RC on a daily basis cultivates as the negative connotation of reservists and their contribution to the Marine Corps as a whole. To achieve the desired effect of “Total Force,” the AC must educate itself about the capabilities and limitations of the RC.

Training on a regular basis is one answer; however, unless a reserve unit is on the AC Table of Organization (T/O), an enduring and concerted effort to self-integrate from either the RC or AC will not be made. Additionally, commanders and senior enlisted have a significant impact and influence on perceptions that subordinates formulate of reservists. Most junior Marines will not even have an opportunity to work with reservists before they speak ill of them because their senior leadership has already spoken poorly of reservists. Lack of education, limited experiences, and the influence of senior leadership all play significant roles and have the potential to be obstacles or bridges towards the total force integration concept.

The Force Structure Review Group (FSRG) revealed the Marine Corps AC downsizing from 202,000 to 182,000 over five years, but no parallel decrease in the size of the RC.<sup>37</sup> As the Marine Corps continues reduce its size, it will lose valuable, skilled Marines who may choose not to transfer to the RC due to the stigma that has been placed on it. This stigma arises mostly because the AC and the RC do not train together regularly. Implementing the proposed model will expose these exiting Marines increasing their knowledge and understanding of the potential opportunities in the RC for themselves and for their Marines who would encourage transitioning into the RC. With more exposure to the opportunities to the RC, the Marine Corps Reserve may opt to become more selective with the Marines they select for continued serve in the RC. This is an excellent opportunity for the AC, and RC as the quality of the Marine Reservist could expectedly increase.

Integration of the two components will require time and a period of adjustment. If this period is rushed then, integration may not fully occur. As with any group, an adjustment period must occur. Bruce W. Tuckman's theory of group development claims that virtually all groups will pass through a series of stages. The stages he describes are formation (forming), conflict

(storming), structure development (norming), productivity (performing), and dissolution (adjourning).<sup>38</sup> According to Tuckman, in the forming stage, the group members become oriented toward one another. In the storming stage, tensions may rise, and some level of conflict may present itself as members compete for status within the group. Tuckman continues by stating that these conflicts subside when the group enters the norming stage and becomes more structured, as standards emerge. As the group reaches the performing stage, the group moves past disagreement and begins to focus on the work to be completed. Tuckman completes the series with the group's continued ability to function together until it reaches the adjourning stage, at which time it disbands.

Although some degree of AC/RC tension is to be expected, all Marines should be treated with respect. The Forming – Storming – Norming – Performing – Adjourning model of group development is an excellent way to see what AC and RC units go through while under the pressures of preparing for combat. These phases are necessary and inevitable in order for a team to grow, to face up to challenges, to tackle problems, to find solutions, to plan work, and to deliver results.<sup>39</sup> To mitigate this, the AC and RC should be allocated the time to develop this relationship before entering into combat operations together. At the individual level, reservists tend to believe that active duty Marines do not accept them initially, but eventually, after passing through Tuckman's model they do feel accepted. Like all outsiders, reservists, and active units have to prove themselves to each other. Understandably, AC units will repeatedly cycle through some of these stages due to the nature of rotational billets and assignments. However, the RC units tend not to have such a rapid cyclic rotation in personnel because most members of the reserves force typically remain with the unit for their initial obligated term of six years. This stability allows the reserve element to bring to the table longevity and commitment.

## **Mission of the AC vs. RC**

The goal of the Active Reserve is to facilitate the integration the Reserve Component (RC) and the Active Component (AC) so that when the time arises the two can work together as a Total Force.<sup>40</sup> The AR faces challenges in their ability to facilitate integration because the current structure in place is flawed. Integration is difficult when units are not only physically separated, but more importantly do not train for the same mission. The AC has its divisions 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Divisions (MARDIV) and the RC its 4<sup>th</sup> MARDIV, yet none of these divisions integrate their forces at any level.

To see this clearer, the mission statements of 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> MARDIV are the same: “Today, 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division is a multi-role, expeditionary ground combat force. The Division is employed as the ground combat element (GCE) of I MEF or may provide task-organized forces for assault operations and such operations as may be directed. The 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division must be able to provide the ground amphibious forcible entry capability to the naval expeditionary force (NEF) and to conduct subsequent land operations in any operational environment.”<sup>41</sup> Reviewing 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Division’s mission statement provides different guidance towards mission preparation: “On order, as a multi-role ground combat element (GCE) for III MEF, deploy and conduct expeditionary operations across the range of military operations in support of national security objectives. Be prepared to execute forcible entry, such as an amphibious landing force, and conduct sustained land operations ashore.”<sup>42</sup> The common attribute that each of these mission statements contain is that the commanders provide direction and guidance towards potential operations.

Interestingly, 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Division does not have a mission statement. However, the Commander for MARFORES provides the force with this mission statement: “Commander,

Marine Forces Reserve (COMMARFORRES) commands and controls assigned forces for the purpose of augmenting and reinforcing the Active Component with trained units and individual Marines as a sustainable and ready operational reserve in order to augment and reinforce active forces for employment across the full spectrum of crisis and global engagement

COMMARFORRES is the principal advisor to the Commandant of the Marine Corps on matters pertaining to Marine Forces Reserve.”<sup>43</sup>

According to this mission statement for COMMARFORRES, the commander of the force, does not provide his subordinates with a direction in which to train. “Commands and controls assigned forces for the purpose of augmenting and reinforcing the Active Component.” This mission offers no direction to subordinate commands to establish training criterion yet the mission statement explicitly indicates that the Force is an operational reserve. 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Division was established, in 1962, to mirror the AC division and to mobilize the RC in the event it is needed. With this mission statement, it seems as if the Division’s mission accepts the probability that it will not mobilize as a division and has resigned itself never to assume a combat role. Deducing from the fact that the reserve division or regiment does not have a mission statement and has not been mobilized since the Korean War, the AC battalion commanders are better suited to have assigned to them one reserve company to train and maintain a company sized reserve force. At a minimum, under the guidance of an AC battalion commander the RC company would receive guidance for training and the integration process could begin taking shape.

Although Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) standards are maintained in the RC, unit cohesion and, more importantly, the trust will not be achieved until after the RC unit is assigned to an arbitrary AC unit. The goal of any unit, regardless of the size, is to ensure that all

of its facets are integrated to maximize its performance. DOD Directive 1200.17 recognized that the Reserve Components provide both operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet US defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict.<sup>44</sup> Not until an RC unit is assigned to an AC unit, whether platoon or battalion size, will it enter into Tuckman's group development stages and hopefully, yet doubtfully, be able to complete them before entering a combat zone.

At the individual level, reservists believe that active duty Marines do not accept them initially but do accept them eventually. Like all outsiders, reserve units had to prove themselves. However, tensions sometimes went deeper, and reservists recounted many stories of put-downs and condescension by active duty Marines. Although some degree of active/reserve tension is probably inevitable, all Marines should treat each other with respect. From personal experiences as a reconnaissance platoon commander, two reconnaissance units were mobilized to augment an active duty reconnaissance company during OEF 9.2. The members of the AC unit were concerned that they had to work with more than (40) reservists. The concern stems from the thought that the reservists did not receive the same training and preparations as they had during the workup, would not be synchronized with the company, and AC boat spaces were given up for RC members. This concern was valid because the company did not receive the augmented platoons until approximately two months before deployment. Two months is barely enough time to meet the demands of the Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP) and go experience the Forming, Storming, Norming, and Adjourning Stages.<sup>45</sup>

Since the RCs of the nation's military services have been so heavily involved in both OIF and OEF, many discussions have surfaced over the mode of their employment. This model of an operational reserve, in which reserve forces participate routinely and regularly in ongoing military missions, are becoming the expectation from the RCs. According to John D. Winkler,

PhD., Senior Behavioral Scientist at the RAND Corporation in Washington, DC, the DoD has accepted and endorsed the concept of an operational reserve concept via DoD Policy Directive 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force” and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report.<sup>46</sup> He continues to state that report identifies, “Prevailing in today’s wars requires a Reserve Component that can serve in an operational capacity—available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployment.”<sup>47</sup> This recognition and acceptance of the operational reserve has not come quickly or easily. The CNGR characterized this transition from a strategic to an operational reserve as “unplanned,” but a necessity with no reasonable alternative that requires further scrutiny by the public and Congress.<sup>48</sup> The CNGR report added significant substance needed to support the legitimate need to embrace the concept of an operational reserve and to frame the consequential debates on the approach to implementing a force that is workable near-term and sustainable in the long term.<sup>49</sup> Winkler also mentions that, “at the same time, it should be noted that the establishment of an operational reserve can be seen as part revolution and part evolution.”<sup>50</sup> This brings about the need for each service to bring forth their concept on how to evolve their strategic reserve concept into a functional asset that will complement and serve as an operational reserve. Developing an operational reserve structure from the lowest possible level, will allow for the most amenable application in change that can be applied, studied, and eventually implemented. In this case, the infantry reserve company and the infantry active duty battalion may be used to examine and eventually apply such as structure change.

The 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), General James F. Amos, reported to the House Armed Services Committee the posture of the Marine Corps Reserve’s operational orientation and construct when he stated: “The transition in utilization of the Marine Corps

Reserve from a strategic to operational Reserve, as affirmed by our force structure review, expands our ability to perform as America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness." Sharing the culture of deployment and an expeditionary mindset that has dominated Marine Corps culture, ethos, and thinking. Since our beginning more than two centuries ago, the Marine Corps Reserve is optimally organized, equipped, and trained to perform as an operational Reserve."<sup>51</sup>

Recognition of the RC as an operational reserve is a step in the right direction. However, the problem is not that simple.

### **The Proposal**

The current construct of 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Division is structured to emulate the AC Divisions. As mentioned, it is a strategic design that is no longer valid. This design was purposeful when conceptualized as it was created to meet the threat of its time, the Soviet Union. It met the needs of the time, addressing the reserves' need of reform to its structure and organization to meet the threat of the Cold War. General David M. Shoup, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, believed that the reorganization into a 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Division and Wing would bring about Division pride.<sup>52</sup> In 1962, under his aggressive training promotion, he noted specifically that he wanted more emphasis placed on mobilization training at home armories. Additionally, Shoup desired to have reserve units integrate with regular (meaning AC) units during the summer training period.<sup>53</sup> Although, this design is conceptually sound, the application leaves many opportunities for refinement. Having a separate division that mirrored the AC but without a mission, other than to support the AC with minimally trained personnel as needed, hardly gave way to the promotion of division pride that would last more than the initial conception.

This proposal follows a similar direction to the disposition presented in Major Johnathan Riggs' thesis, "Making the Marine Corps Reserve Truly Operational: A Case Study in the

Reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve,” Command and Staff College 2012. He proposed that the restructuring should begin at the regiment and group level. He believes that subordinating RC regiments and groups to AC division general officers will facilitate integration.<sup>54</sup> Additionally, his recommendation suggests that the restructuring should be facilitated geographically. The example he provides elects the Mississippi River as the divider and that units to the west or east of it would fall under I or II MEF respectively. This proposed division will facilitate improved command and control. Although Major Riggs’ perspective of the RC’s disjointedness and outdated is accurate, the recommendation he provides is too vague. His recommendation is broad and leaves many questions unanswered, but more importantly, it does not facilitate integration. Attempts to resolve the issue with integration at the bureaucratic level will only bring about bureaucratic solutions. Solutions that will only create busy work that gives the illusion of integration. To be effective, integration of an operational reserve that will foster a Total Force concept must occur at the lowest level. From this point, the Marine Corps can apply bottom-up refinement to improve the developing relationship.

This concept is best imagined by using the infantry as a model for the application and implementation. Figure 1 displays the current construct of a typical AC battalion. Figure 3 provides a potential recommendation of what the new structure could resemble. The intent is to integrate the two components to make a stronger and more flexible Marine Corps adaptable to an operational reserve concept. The concept goes deeper than the regimental level; it delves down to the company level on the RC side and the battalion level on the AC side. The proposed model assigns one RC infantry company to one AC infantry battalion. An infantry battalion consists of

one Headquarters and Service Company, three-Line Companies, and one Weapons Company.




Figure 2 Marine Corps Standard AC

Under the new structure, one reserve company will fall under the AC battalion but will not geographically relocate. Currently, the Marine Corps includes twenty-four RC infantry Line companies, eight Headquarters & Service (H&S) companies, and eight Weapons companies. These companies will be distributed among the seven AC regiments, assigning each reserve line company to an AC battalion. The H&S and Weapons Company may be assigned to regiments. As with any modification, not all the companies line up perfectly, and some modifications will have to be made so that each regiment and battalion receives reserve units. Under this construct, the I&I staff is a member of the AC staff and serves as an added support structure. To optimize efficiency, the I&I staff will be realigned under the S-3/Operations Office. This new relationship will ensure that the reserve company is conducting its training in accordance with the battalion commander's intent and reported on by an I&I staff on a consistent basis. Additionally, the I&I would serve as the AC commander's link to MARFORRES for the funding for his reserve company. For the reason that funding for the reserves is sourced differently than the AC the I&I will be a critical element in ensuring that the reserve company is employed and funded in accordance with the rules and regulations set forth in the MCO 1001r.1k Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual (MCRAMM).

In the case of a reserve weapons company, the weapons company either can remain as a weapons company or convert to a line company. In the situation of an H&S company, the billets of the company could be redistributed throughout a regiment to serve as augments.




Figure 3: AC Battalion augments with a Reserve company and an I&I Staff.

This apportionment could be achieved by geographic allocation of the RC units relative to the AC unit or vice versa. Regardless of the manner in which the alignment occurs, this model does not intend to relocate reserve units; it only addresses realigning the command structure. By applying this model, the RC can focus training and direction. General Shoup’s intent to build unit pride through the establishment of 4<sup>th</sup> MARDIV will never be realized because as an operational reserve 4<sup>th</sup> MARDIV, will not deploy as a division. COMMARFORRES tasks his force with being ready to augment the AC and not to be prepared to fight. The mission statement is similar to the adage, “defending everywhere is to defend nowhere,” attempting to train to everything bestows little benefit. The Reserve Component’s current structure does not meet the need for an operational reserve.

## **Benefits**

The AC's attitude towards the RC has not been optimal. The AC's poor attitude towards the RC could be a result of being poorly influenced or possibly uninformed about the RC. This outlook is greatly in part due to a limited exposure to the RC. Many AC members will conclude their initial tour without ever the experience of working alongside the RC. Limited exposure to the RC limits a services member's options for future service opportunities. Perhaps the AC member has completed the obligated time and seeks a new path, but with limited exposure to the RC, it may not even be considered an option. Restructuring the RC as mentioned would expose the Marine to several benefits. One, the Marine should have a better understanding of the RC and how it complements the AC instead of being a mystery. Perhaps the Marine no longer wants to remain on active duty but does not wish to sever ties with his unit. Transferring to the reserve unit that supports his former AC unit could now be an option that would benefit both the Marine and the Marine Corps. The Marine receives the satisfaction of remaining with his unit but with the option to pursue a full-time career or education. The Marine Corps benefits by not losing a trained, skilled, and experienced Marine.

Unit integrity is an additional benefit from this model. In some cases, for an RC unit to support an AC exercise or deployment the RC would have to request, from multiple RC units, for personnel to meet the task. Often what would be provided would be a "patchwork" of personnel whom may have never worked together. This often frustrates both the AC and RC units because this is not an accurate representation of the RC. The implementation of this model would mitigate this because the AC would be able to receive support from its organic reserve company.

Although the reservist may take their commitment to the Marine Corps Reserve seriously and with dedication, the pay and benefits received do not cover the expenses to maintain a family

or a palpable lifestyle. Therefore, his/her civilian career takes the priority. Although this situation is expected, it does equate to a lack of commitment, one that an AC commander could provide. Unfortunately, many a drill weekends there are many officers and senior enlisted that break from training to attend to civilian business-related matters. Unfortunately, this is expected because these senior officers and senior enlisted are peaking in their civilian careers and require their attention. Additionally, when the strategic concept was conceived, cell phones did not exist and progress in the civilian sector took time; careers were more stable too, with many people being employed at the same company for their entire careers. In this day and age, technology has reshaped society. These Marines should not leave the RC, quite the opposite. These individuals bring unique and valuable skill sets to the Marine Corps. What should occur, for the benefit of the junior officers and enlisted is to remove the opportunity of command past the company level in the reserves. Command at the battalion level and above, both the unit and members that compose it, ought to be led by someone whose job it is to dedicate himself entirely to that role. Field grade officers, not in command, and senior enlisted Marines should be given the opportunity to augment the AC regiment and higher staffs. Augmenting the AC regimental and division staffs with reserve members could reduce the demands of IA's in the future.

### **Opportunity Gained**

Under the command of an AC battalion commander, a reserve company commander is given a mission, direction, and the latest information needed to accomplish the mission. Incorporating the model at this lower level allows the reservists to collaborate closely with the AC members. At this lower level, integration is needed most. The AC battalion commander may now receive augmentation by a force that he can shape, train, and mentor. From the reservist's perspective, the company commander and his men will have access to fellow AC Non-

Commissioned Officers (NCO), Staff-NCOs (SNCO), and Junior Marine Officers (JMO). Currently, only this level of access rarely exists. Where it does exist, it is due to the relationships built while on active duty. This experience will be lost among the officers ranks, as Second Lieutenants may now enter directly into the SMCR without serving in the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF). Although this is an excellent opportunity for the SMCR, it will eventually lead to a gap in FMF knowledge and experience in the SMCR if the strategic reserve construct remain in place. If left in a strategic reserve environment, these young officers will mature in an environment with little to no fleet experience. Lacking these experiences these Marines will be expected to meet expectations of integrating with the AC without the benefit of fleet or AC experiences.

Officers, whose careers have only been in the RC, will one day be field grade officers leading Marines without ever undergoing the challenges of the FMF. Although there is no substitute for first-hand experiences, the proposed model in this thesis will provide young officers access to Marines, both enlisted and officers, on a familiar basis whom they can lean on for advice, assistance, and guidance. Under the current reserve force structure, it will only be a matter of time before young reserve officers will be asking for advice from their senior officers on situations they may have to face, but there will be no guidance to pass because they would have never experienced the FMF or had access to AC officers.

Staff officers and senior enlisted Marines (RC and AC) were in high demand during the OIF and OEF wars. These Marines served as members of a staff proving invaluable support to commanders and the operations being executed. Similar to the JMOs and NCOs these members of a staff need time to pass through the Forming – Storming – Norming – Performing – Adjourning stages but no longer as members of an RC unit but instead as staff augments to an

AC Battalion, Regiment or Division. Although the new structure would seem to take away opportunities for reservists, in fact, it would provide opportunities to remain in the reserve forces, working alongside AC Marines without the obligations and commitments of command. Serving as staff officers may not seem as appealing to some, but the benefits for the commands will be similar across the board.

### **Conclusion:**

The Marine Corps Reserve has achieved many milestones since its inception. It has successfully supported many wars and contingencies that have validated its need. However, the time has come to integrate the Reserve and Active Components in a manner that will enhance a command's effectiveness, understanding and keep precious assets (personnel) in the Marine Corps. The nation has evolved toward using the Reserve Components with much greater frequency than ever before but with no major reform since the end of the Korean War.<sup>55</sup> Reserve officers are no longer required to serve on active duty before entering into the reserve forces. The Marine Corps must posture itself to leverage any advantage in a bid for continued success. Within ten years, the Marine Corps Reserve will have field grade officers who have never served in the Fleet Marine Forces or combat. Without these experiences, it will be difficult to integrate the Active and Reserve Components.

Reserve units have played and will continue to play a critical role in the accomplishment of Marine Corps missions. Although the United States has evolved the employment of its Reserve Components, its role as part of an operational force for the foreseeable future is secure. However, the Marine Corps Reserve must adapt to the needs of an operational reserve concept and shed itself from the archaic strategic design. Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom proved that the ground and air units of Marine Reserve were critical to operations.

These operations further validated that 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Division will not be mobilized as a division and this structure is no longer necessary.

As the Marine Corps innovates with such plans as Expeditionary Force 21, it will need to retain highly qualified Marines in the organization in preparation for future operational commitments. As a means to retain and recruit highly qualified Marines in the organization, and prepare for future operational commitments, the Marine Corps will need a more robust integration of its AC and RC. By using the infantry as a model, each element of the RC can align smaller units under Active Component units. Once in place, these units can be studied and observed for trends and deficiencies to mitigate and resolve before implementing this strategy to the whole Marine Corps. Ignoring this opportunity will only further divide the two components. Implementing this proposal will place the Marine Corps Reserve ahead of its sister services.

The momentum gained over the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan and other engagements around the globe continues to keep the Marine Corps Reserve in an operational mindset. This mindset and the actions taken demonstrate that the RC is fully committed and capable of being used in an operational construct, but the Marine Corps must provide it with a command structure to facilitate its continued success.

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## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR): Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force. Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense. (January 31, 2008): 6

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Christine Wormuth, “The CNGR Final Report: The Best Shot for a Stronger, Sustainable Reserve Component” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, (February 2008):1.

[http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/080201\\_wormuth\\_cngr.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/080201_wormuth_cngr.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> Lawrence Kapp and Barbara Salazar Torreon, “Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers” *Congressional Research Service*, (June 13, 2014) 9-10.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> 2014 QDR *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 31.

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<sup>8</sup> Allan Reed Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: Free Press, 1982), 307 (Herein forth known as *Semper Fidelis*).

<sup>9</sup> Marine Corps University, History Division, “Highlights of Marine Corps Reserve History: 1916-2006” (accessed January 18, 2015).

[http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/pages/frequently\\_requested/Highlights.aspx](http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/pages/frequently_requested/Highlights.aspx)

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., [http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/pages/frequently\\_requested/Highlights.aspx](http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/pages/frequently_requested/Highlights.aspx)

<sup>11</sup> *Semper Fidelis*, 552.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Reserve Officers of Public Affairs 4-1. “The Marine Corps Reserve: A History.” *Washington D.C.: Division of Reserve, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1991*, 230.

<sup>14</sup> Highlights of Marine Corps Reserve History: 1916-2006

<sup>15</sup> Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers, 9-10.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL30802.pdf>

“During the Cold War era, the reserve components were a manpower pool that was rarely tapped. From 1945 to 1989, reservists were involuntarily activated for federal service four times, an average of less than once per decade. These activations occurred only during wartime and national emergencies: the Korean War (1950-1953; 857,877 reservists involuntarily activated), the Berlin Crisis (1961-1962; 148,034 reservists involuntarily activated), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962; 14,200 reservists involuntarily activated), and the Vietnam War/U.S.S. Pueblo Crisis (1968-1969; 37,643 reservists involuntarily activated).”

<sup>16</sup> Charles L. Cragin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, remarks printed in *The Officer*, September 2000, 34.

<sup>17</sup> United States Code Armed Forces Code Title 10, US Code Armed Forces§ 10102.

Purpose of Reserve Components The purpose of each Reserve Component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112HPRT67344/pdf/CPRT-112HPRT67344.pdf>

<sup>18</sup> MCO 1001r.1k Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual (SHORT TITLE: MCRAMM), 1-2. <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%201001R.1K.pdf>

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 1-2.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 3-4.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 1-3.

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- <sup>22</sup>MARFORRES Website  
<http://www.marforres.marines.mil/MajorSubordinateCommands/ForceHeadquartersGroup/MarineCorpsIndividualReserveSupportActivity/Definitions.aspx>
- <sup>23</sup> MCRAMM, 1-3
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- <sup>25</sup> Jack L. Howard, "The role of Culture in Shaping Perceptions of Discrimination among Active Duty and Reserve Forces in the US Military," *Employ Response Rights J* (November 2006), 174.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., 172.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., 175.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid., 174.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid., 183.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid., 184.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid., 183.
- <sup>36</sup> LtGen John Kelly, USMC Commander Marine Corps Reserve, "Operational Mindset" *The Officer*: (January-February 2001), 44.
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- <sup>41</sup> 1stMARDIV Mission Statement from its website <http://www.1stmardiv.marines.mil/>; 2ndMARDIV Mission Statement from its web site <http://www.2ndmardiv.marines.mil/>
- <sup>42</sup> 3dMARDIV Mission Statement from website <http://www.3rdmardiv.marines.mil/>
- <sup>43</sup> U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve, Mission statement.  
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- <sup>44</sup> John D. Winkler, Developing an Operational Reserve: A Policy and Historical Context and the Way Forward, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 59, (4th quarter 2010), 15.  
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- <sup>45</sup> Bruce W. Tuckman-forming, storming, norming and performing in group.
- <sup>46</sup> Developing an Operational Reserve: A Policy and Historical Context and the Way Forward, 15. The authors use the Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1200.17, "Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force," October 2008 to reinforce his findings. After reading the selected sections, it was evident that the author's conclusion was valid.
- <sup>47</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>51</sup> James F. Amos, "Report to the House Armed Services Committee on the Posture of the United States Marine Corps." (2011): 19.

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<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> Major Jonathan L. Riggs, USMC, “Making the Marine Corps Reserve Truly Operational: A Case Study in the Reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve” (master’s thesis, Marine Corps University, 2012), 15-16.

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