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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**UNDERSTANDING THE ASEAN WAY:
AN EASTERN APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE
OPPORTUNITIES IT PRESENTS FOR WESTERN COOPERATION**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Preface

This report investigates the dynamics of ASEAN as a security community, and the influence it has had and continues to have in Southeast Asia. Existing study on the topic comes primarily from the Political Science and International Relations community. I have a background in neither. My study and analysis was guided by a decade of experience as a Submarine Warfare Officer and my expectations of the next decade as I transition to Foreign Area Officer in the PACOM AOR.

I wish to acknowledge the support of Dr. Matthew Flynn for his guidance as my research advisor, and Dr. Eric Shibuya for his inspiration to study ASEAN's impact on regional security and consider its implications for the future.

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Executive Summary

Title: Understanding the ASEAN Way: An eastern approach to conflict management and the opportunities it presents for western cooperation.

Author: Lieutenant Commander Carlson Schindler, United States Navy

Thesis: The historical and cultural background of ASEAN have created a forum with unique capabilities that are essential to a lasting resolution of the territorial conflicts of the South China Sea.

Discussion: Southeast Asia is a modern success story. Compared to other regions of the world that developed in the post-colonial era following World War II, Southeast Asia has enjoyed unprecedented economic and political prosperity and remarkable stability. This success is even more remarkable because Southeast Asia did not exist as a political region until the middle of the twentieth century. The success, stability, and regional identity of Southeast Asia are all at least partially due to the efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

ASEAN developed amidst a unique and dramatic combination of nation building, great power politics, and regional cultural values. A combination of political necessity and the culturally unique approaches to conflict resolution shaped ASEAN and Southeast Asia by extension. ASEAN is trying to modernize its role in the evolving security environment of Southeast Asia through the development of the ASEAN Political-Security Community. Based on previous experience and current progress, there is a great deal of skepticism among western observers about its ability to transition into an organization capable of active conflict resolution. This criticism is based on a mindset that does not take into account the regional cultural values that ASEAN represents.

Based on its history and environment, ASEAN developed a distinct set of norms concerning conflict management. Compared to the activist security policies of the United States, the ASEAN way is a less confrontational, cooperation based approach to conflict prevention. By exploring the historical and cultural origins of ASEAN, a security role for ASEAN emerges that is different from, but potentially complementary to, that of the United States.

Conclusion: It is necessary to understand ASEAN's role as a Southeast Asia security community, to understand its potential to continue to contribute to the stability of Southeast Asia. Such an understanding can foster a complimentary relationship with the United States that provides a possible strategy for a peaceful resolution to the growing security challenge presented by Chinese efforts to dominate the South China Sea.

Introduction

The Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN) played a significant role in the domestic development of its members, politically and economically, and helped to harness that growth toward the goal of regional stability and prosperity in Southeast Asia. ASEAN's growth and stability were exceptional when considered against the backdrop of building national identities while emerging from colonial rule and the civil unrest felt by the rest of the developing world during the Cold War. Today, the role of ASEAN has become integral to the very identity of Southeast Asia as a region, shaping both domestic policy of its members and international policy through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Capitalizing on its success, ASEAN has taken steps to increase its role in shaping the regional security environment, via ARF and the still developing ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC).

ASEAN's role in maintaining regional security in Southeast Asia is both unique and valuable, but ASEAN is also a victim of its success. As ASEAN attempts to maintain itself as a pre-eminent security community in both Southeast Asia and the greater Asian Pacific, it has encountered a clash between its core values and norms and the expectations of its larger and more proactive western security partners. Based on its unique role in the regional security environment, ASEAN represents an integral part of a long-term solution to resolving territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS). However, ASEAN must address these challenges on its own terms and must be careful not to shoehorn policy into other security frameworks. The continued support and encouragement of ASEAN is critical to future success, and impatience of

western security powers risks undermining ASEAN's capabilities by trying to solve these problems through other means. With proper enabling from its security partners, ASEAN and ARF represent a capacity that fulfills a crucial role in a comprehensive strategy to promote lasting security and stability in Southeast Asia, and the best chance for a peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in the SCS.

Literature Review

A great deal of literature exists on both the history and accomplishments of ARF. In the analysis of ARF, most authors naturally spend significant time discussing ASEAN. British International Relations scholar Michael Leifer, wrote on Southeast Asia since the inception of ASEAN.¹ He focused on a broad array of aspects including national identity and regional security. Using analysis that focuses on the development of the institutional norms of ASEAN and the role they play in the ARF, Leifer predicted many of the challenges that ARF continues to face nearly two decades later.² He identified the peacemaking process of ASEAN as not centered on active resolution of conflict, but rather through fostering an environment that supports informal conflict resolution through dialog and cooperation.³

The identity of Southeast Asia as a region is both relatively new (existing in the last 50 years) and essential in understanding the development of ASEAN and its current security priorities and challenges. Amitav Acharya, the current chair of the ASEAN Studies Center, has written extensively on regional and collective security. His book, *The Making of Southeast Asia*, ties the development of the regional identity of Southeast Asia with ASEAN itself and chronicles ASEAN's development as an influence on the regional security environment.⁴ Acharya argues that one of the primary motives of the member nations in the creation of ASEAN was to bolster their national identities and cement the existing regimes. This concept is an interesting argument that others have further developed in the analysis of intra-ASEAN conflict. Such analysis

indicates that ASEAN was so effective in creating national identities, its members may squabble over who should be able to claim cultural heritages that existed before current boundaries and the colonization of Southeast Asia.⁵ The primacy of national sovereignty is evident in ASEAN's official releases, and it continues to influence the norms that ASEAN values and western security authors claim are holding back ASEAN from its transformation into a security community.

The security efforts and advances made by ASEAN and ARF are the most contentious area of academic literature. Building on the weaknesses identified by Leifer, most western IR and security experts see the ARF as an ineffective talk shop that is incapable of achieving the stated goals of becoming 'a vehicle for promoting regional peace and stability.'⁶ Jurgen Haacke and Noel Morada, provide a detailed analysis of the sophisticated security relations that exist within, in parallel with, and in spite of ARF.⁷

The project of transforming ASEAN into an active security community is clearly an immense undertaking. Such a transformation will require significant cultural adaption, both in and around ASEAN. An analysis of and recommendation from an organizational culture change standpoint would be valuable to explore its feasibility, but no such assessment seems to exist at this time. The upcoming ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), which has a stated goal of functioning by the end of 2015, shares a similar fate in literature. Current scholars monitoring progress of the APSC acknowledge there is little literature on its development, and what is there concludes an uncertain future.⁸

The other major school of thought regarding ASEAN and ARF's performance as a security community employs an eastern (Asian) philosophy toward both progress and international relations. The eastern philosophy is not concerned about milestones or timelines for accomplishment. Eastern philosophy of international relations is instead focused on

incremental growth through mutual dialog, expecting progress to follow in time. Eastern conflict resolution is dependent on prevention, rather than resolution and eschews the western activist need to ‘get in there and fix it.’ Dr. Mikio Oishi delves into the methods of conflict management in Eastern Asia through historical analysis, identifying the methods discussed above as preferred by Asian nations to more interventionist policies.⁹ Michael Haas identifies specific regional attributes and patterns for conflict resolution in the regions of East Asia and the Asian Pacific and links the historical success of ASEAN to the embodiment of many, but not all, of those characteristics. His conclusion, is that peace and security in Southeast Asia are not going to look identical to what we believe it should look like, and that is not a problem as long as western powers do not turn it into one.¹⁰

Still, there is plenty of cause for concern over the security environment in Southeast Asia. Many authors have addressed the topic of Chinese irredentism, especially in the South China Sea.¹¹ The Chinese tactic of “salami slicing” in the region presents unique difficulties to the US in countering such activity to protect its vital interests in the region. The majority of literature focusing on ASEAN’s role in this issue presents a western perspective by focusing on potential for integrated military operations through ARF or the APSC, or ASEAN’s ability to reach a conclusive settlement in the near future.¹² Some authors present an analysis of ASEAN’s progress using an eastern perspective. These authors view ASEAN with optimism but consider the internal disputes of ASEAN as the greatest impediment to success.¹³

The primary criticisms levied against ASEAN fail to recognize the pluralism of eastern and western to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. From a western perspective, ASEAN is regarded as an ineffective security community; an Eastern perspective describes ASEAN in a much more positive light but fails to recognize limitations ASEAN suffers from in its norms and

processes. In this thesis, I will use existing academic literature and institutional discussions from ASEAN and ARF in the performance of a holistic analysis to understand potential options to continue stable peace in Southeast Asia. Using this analysis, a comprehensive strategy for a durable and peaceful resolution to the SCS becomes visible.

I employ the term ‘security community’ frequently to describe ASEAN and ARF in literature and this paper. Karl Deutsch first defined and analyzed the term in 1957.¹⁴ Deutsch defined a security community as “one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically but will settle their disputes in some other way.”¹⁵ This standard is achieved through the process of integration, which achieves a sense of community with enough institutional stability to expect long-term existence and an ability to change peacefully. Deutsch goes into elaborate detail assessing the process and of integration of analyzing historical and existing communities in the North Atlantic to determine which are successful security communities and what conditions might predict their creation. Acharya applies this analysis to ASEAN and deepens Deutsch’s analysis on the concept of security community in light of modern IR theory, recognizing the constructivist nature of a security community.¹⁶ Acharya applies a deliberate constructivist analysis to ASEAN and concludes that there are characteristics of a security community, but ASEAN’s path to functioning as a security community differs from the theoretical framework established by Deutsch. I will use the term security community here in loose agreement with Deutsch’s summary definition: a well-integrated, long lasting, institution in which its members do not consider physical fighting as a means for dispute resolution amongst each other.

Origins - ASEAN

The concept of Southeast Asia as a region was only just starting to take place following World War II. Prior to European colonization of the region, the vast environmental and cultural diversity the Mekong Delta, Malay Peninsula, and the Island chains and archipelagos of the area limited the concept of national identity in terms of modern nation states.¹⁷ Colonial influences established borders but focused on economic and security influences when creating them, which frequently placed a diverse spread of cultural identities within the same boundaries. These colonies interacted more regularly with their colonial powers than their neighbors as a region. Similarly, the rest of the world did not identify these colonies as belonging to a discrete region. Japanese occupation during World War II, and the establishment of Southeastern Asia Command by the allies did cause the rest of the world to think of the region as a unit administratively for the first time, but this did little for the citizens residing in the region, in terms of identifying with one another.¹⁸

Following the end of WW II and the process of decolonization around the world, the new nations of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Malaya (the future Malaysia and Singapore) and the Philippines all struggled to establish national identities. The cultural diversity within each new state and the fact that these heritages existed across borders limited the ability of these nascent nations to use any cultural background as a clearly identifying national characteristic set.¹⁹ This lack of clear identity resulted in weak nations forced to contend with internal rebellions, throughout the 1950s and 1960s.²⁰

Established in 1967, ASEAN formed in the context of the Cold War. In Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, multilateral defense agreements primarily involved the great powers of the United States and the United Kingdom attempting to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. This network of alliances included the Collective Defense Treaty for Southeast

Asia (Manila Pact), the resulting Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement (AMDA), and the Australian-New Zealand-US Treaty (ANZUS). SEATO was intended to be a joint military organization for collective defense like NATO, but ultimately failed when the US and Thailand declared the treaty obligations were both individual and collective.²¹ AMDA was formed in 1957 for Britain to guarantee the protection of its colonial holdings on the Malay Peninsula. After the United Kingdom declared its intention to end defense commitments in the region due to budgetary concerns in 1967, AMDA would become the more consultative in nature Five Power Defense Arrangement.²²

Between AMDA and SEATO, the protection of Southeast Asia may have seemed artificially split to those protected between the US and UK. With Thailand and the Philippines on one side and Malaysia and Singapore on the other, defense commitments to Southeast Asia were both unclear and shifting in the 1960s. Determined to remain free of the influence of Cold War politics, Indonesia instead played a significant role in the development of the Non-Aligned Movement. During this same timeframe, Indonesia also ended its *Konfrontasi* with Malaysia. Following its emergence from this conflict, Indonesia and other nations in the region sought a more positive leadership role to tie Indonesia to the region and prevent future use of force.²³

Under this context, the five original members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand formed ASEAN on August 8, 1967 for the purpose of promoting economic and social stability and accelerating development. ASEAN excluded any discussion of military cooperation and instead focused on shared responsibility to strengthen regional stability through collaboration and mutual respect.²⁴

Goals and Methods of ASEAN

At its creation, ASEAN's goal was to promote peace in the region and to support and protect the sovereignty of its members from both internal and external challenges. ASEAN recognized that the development of strong national identities, liberal economies, promotion of social justice, and extensive cooperation among its members was to the benefit of the entire region; promoting an improved quality of life for its citizens.²⁵ Improved regional stability and development enhanced regime stability, thereby preventing the revolutions and proxy wars of the Cold War finding useful footholds in the member nations of ASEAN. The lasting stability in turn kept the meddling of great powers to a minimum and protected the sovereignty of ASEAN members.

ASEAN codified a distinct set of principles in the 1976 Treaty of Amenity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia: 1) Respect for sovereignty; 2) Freedom of each nation from interference; 3) Non-interference in domestic affairs of others; 4) Peaceful resolution of disputes; 5) Renunciation of use of force; 6) Cooperation.²⁶ These principles have led to operational norms within ASEAN known as 'The ASEAN Way' of conflict resolution. There is a great deal of debate about the value and limits of the ASEAN Way, most agree that the overall norms are consultation, consensus, and informal resolution methods to solve conflict.²⁷

The creation of ASEAN also served the underlying objective of strengthening individual national identities. The member nations viewed communist rebellions across the region as internal problems. Therefore, existing security arrangements like SEATO and AMDA did not apply.²⁸ ASEAN members collectively recognized the challenges to sovereignty the rebellions presented were a result of the weak national identities of their colonial pasts and saw partnership as a more practical way to fight communist rebellion than seeking external support.²⁹

ASEAN has also contributed significantly to the regional identity of Southeast Asia. As noted earlier, the concept of Southeast Asia as a region was not shared, either internally by nations in the region or externally by the rest of the world prior to World War II. ASEAN members' efforts at regional cooperation in order to bolster individual national identities shaped the very notion that Southeast Asia is a unique region to those states. More directly: region and regionalism developed together.³⁰ ASEAN also shaped the international perspective of Southeast Asia through its economic and diplomatic activities. Significant examples are the role of ASEAN in the UN in the condemnation of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, and the use of collective negotiations to achieve more beneficial economic agreements with China and Japan than the individual nations were able to accomplish.³¹ Conversely, ASEAN received substantial criticism for its performance during the Asian economic crisis in 1997.³² A poll conducted in 2008 concluded that 75% of citizens in ASEAN member nations consider themselves citizens of ASEAN and 90% of them think ASEAN is good for their country.³³ ASEAN's performance culturally, economically, and the development of its political norms have become synonymous with Southeast Asia.

Development of The ASEAN Regional Forum

The security environment in Southeast Asia was again changing in the early 1990s. The end of the cold war resulted in the decline of Soviet influence in the region. The end of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia further eroded the Soviet influence in the region and alleviated ASEAN's major regional conflict concern of the past decade.³⁴ With the departure of Soviet influence from the region, the members of ASEAN feared that the United States would withdraw its influence from the area as well. While never explicitly stated in ASEAN forums, the member nations recognized the stabilizing influence of the US presence in Southeast Asia,

especially in the face of an emergent China and ascendant Japan at that time.³⁵ When the US military was about to lose its basing rights in the Philippines in the early 1990s, other members of ASEAN worked to find alternative solutions to allow US forces to remain in the region.³⁶

With the end of the Cold War, China experienced less opposition in the area and enjoyed substantial economic growth at the same time. The combination of these opportunities allowed China to flex its newfound muscle in the region. In 1988, China and Vietnam (not yet an ASEAN member) skirmished over control of the Spratly Islands.³⁷ In 1992, China reasserted its 1947 claim of the South China Sea as sovereign territory with its nine-dash line declaration.³⁸ This elicited an immediate response from ASEAN in protest, seeking a resolution and declaring the sovereignty of its member states.³⁹ Indonesia lobbied for collective defense arrangements within ASEAN. The members concluded that even as a collective ASEAN would not be powerful enough to resist Chinese power.⁴⁰

It is in this context of changing great power roles, and new security threats that ASEAN determined the need for a broader reaching forum during its 1992 summit. ASEAN recognized the necessity of maintaining the relatively benign great power presence of the US while simultaneously pursuing the strategy of peace through dialog to keep China engaged.⁴¹ The ASEAN Regional Forum first convened in July 1994 with Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, New Zealand, and the United States as Dialogue Partners.⁴²

Goals and Structure of ARF

The objectives and structure of ARF are central to its unique characteristics, providing both advantages and disadvantages in its ability to influence security in the region. ARF's declared purpose is to sustain and enhance the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Since its inception, ARF has had a stated objective of achieving status as a forum for active conflict resolution. To reach this capability, ARF outlined a framework for its evolution, starting with Confidence Building Measures (CBM), progressing to Preventative Diplomacy (PD), and finally Conflict Resolution (CR).⁴³

ASEAN deliberately established itself as the institutional support for ARF. ASEAN member nations determine the working groups and agendas of ARF, which fosters an unusual and inverted organizational structure, with the regional and great powers following the lead of the smaller ASEAN states.⁴⁴ ASEAN also declared that ARF meetings 'shall be based on prevailing ASEAN norms and practices. Decisions should be made by consensus after careful and extensive consultation.'⁴⁵ It is important to recognize that ARF did not include the principle of non-interference as it conflicts with ARF's agenda to move beyond CBM. Nevertheless, based on other ASEAN norms and ASEAN leadership, ARF tacitly accepted the ASEAN way and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation for conflict resolution.⁴⁶

ARF achieves its diverse membership as a unique result of ASEAN's leadership. In the context of the post-Cold War, early 1990s, nations in the Asia-Pacific were unsure about the future international hierarchy and what threats it might bring. Joining an organization like ARF did not imply aligning in a coalition with or against any other nation, but instead working toward an agenda of peace.⁴⁷ This lowered the political cost of participating in ARF, maximizing its potential membership pool.

The fact that a great power is not leading ARF is also why so many great powers participate. The United States and Japan did not desire to lead a security community in the region.⁴⁸ In a region lacking a great power, but often contested by nations like US, China, Russia/Soviet Union, and Japan; a bid for leadership would carry the risk of appearing to establish hegemony over the region and spark fears of neo-imperialism. China would reject any security community led by the US or other western powers for fear of it being a containment policy.⁴⁹ Conversely, Chinese motives for leadership in such an organization would be suspect in light of growing economic and military power as well as its irredentist policies around its borders.

The ARF has made minimal progress toward the objective of CR, for a variety of reasons including ASEAN's leadership of the forum and adherence to the ASEAN way. The lack of progress has in turn fueled complaints that the ARF is incapable of effective security policy and is little more than a talk shop.⁵⁰ These challenges are explored in detail later.

ASEAN way and Conflict Resolution

ASEAN's success is observable in the relative peace in Southeast Asia and the resulting prosperity its members have enjoyed since its creation.⁵¹ The norms of consultation, consensus, and the use of informal resolution methods that comprise the ASEAN Way seem to be working in the context of ASEAN, but causing ARF to struggle.

To understand the ASEAN Way of promoting peace, it helps to contrast against Western practices for solving conflict. In a Western and activist mindset, promoting peace and conflict resolution are equated with the same thing. Peace is achieved by actively solving conflicts, frequently through intervention and positive action. This action may be military, economic, or political, but it intends to influence the behavior with incentives, positive or negative.⁵² The

ASEAN principle of non-interference and, therefore, the ASEAN Way does not integrate easily with the Western method of problem-solving. As will be discussed later, this conflict stands to be a major hurdle for ARF and ASEAN to overcome to become productive security communities capable of more than CBM.

Peace through ASEAN is instead a preventative process. Leifer notes that the purpose of ASEAN was “to provide an institutional framework for intra-regional reconciliation and to establish a corresponding trust among former adversaries following Indonesia’s practice of Confrontation.”⁵³ In practice, ASEAN evolved into a forum in which conflict is not resolved. Rather, through consultation and communal effort, it prevents the generation of new formal conflicts and disagreements before the use of force is necessary.

The contrast between Western and Eastern security thinking resides in the consideration of peace as the means versus the ends. Western security strives for a balance of power to maintain stability through a manipulation of authority relationships and military buildups. Eastern security thinking strives for stability, resulting in competitive forces that are in check with one another and do not lead to conflict.⁵⁴

ARF and Conflict Resolution Shortcomings

As noted above, ARF, unlike ASEAN, has a declared goal of *security* cooperation, and the stated intentions to progress from CBM to PD and finally active CR. To date, ARF has been unable to progress from CBM for a variety of reasons. These reasons include composition of ARF, the leadership of ASEAN and the cultural norms of the ASEAN way.

The size of ARF has implications on the effectiveness of The ASEAN Way. The ASEAN Way has provided progress in the limited theater of ASEAN, but when applied to the substantially larger ARF with 27 member nations spanning the entirety of the Asian Pacific, the

ASEAN Way shows limitations in terms of security and conflict resolution. The capability to mitigate future conflicts through dialog has only proven effective for *non-existing* conflicts.⁵⁵ Non-existing, in this case, is meant as a contrast to current or recognized international conflicts, in which nations already have clearly stated positions, international precedence is established, or even the employment of force has been used in the past. Once a conflict has ‘gone hot’, there is little chance that the slow process of dialog and consensus will be able to create adequate action to resolve tensions. In the effort to engage the great powers through ARF, ASEAN invited a wide array of members that all brought along their previous baggage with hopes of addressing these conflicts but limited capability to do so.⁵⁶

ARF recognizes an array of challenges that require resolution, but since they already exist, little progress has been made in terms of ARF activities. These conflicts include maritime disputes in the South China Sea, Senkaku / Diayou Islands, and North Korea. It is interesting to note that ARF is unable to address the existence of a conflict between Taiwan and China as ARF would lose the participation of China if it were to do so.⁵⁷ There is some hope for progress among ASEAN member nations and China in the disputes of the South China Sea, which is explored in detail later.

The ASEAN norm of consensus requires that all members participating agree with the resolution. This practice receives criticism as producing results of only the lowest common denominator; non-challenging resolutions that carry little effect, often contributing to ARF’s image of a talk shop. To resolve an existing conflict, it is very unlikely that there will not be at least one party that considers itself a ‘loser’ in the resolution. By relying on consensus as a part of the resolution process, the door is left open for ‘spoiler actors’ who refuse to accept any but the blandest resolutions.⁵⁸ Member nations recognize the challenge of achieving consensus as a

growing concern. As the membership of ASEAN has grown from six in the early 1980s to 10 nations, with political institutions ranging from authoritarian to liberal democracy, so too has the barrier to consensus.⁵⁹ The broader membership of ARF amplifies this problem further.

The ASEAN principles of respect for sovereignty and non-interference further impede ARF's ability to practice PD or CR. PD and CR are inherently intrusive. There are very limited scenarios in which one can attempt to resolve a problem actively without identifying an actor at fault. The most likely candidates for progress under these limitations are Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Recovery (HA/DR) and combatting Counterterrorism / Transnational Crime (CT/TC). Even if a state is not explicitly at fault through belligerent activities, it is difficult not to challenge the sovereignty of a nation receiving assistance since it implies they are not able to help themselves.⁶⁰ Similarly, CT/TC also suggests an inability to combat illegal activities within one's borders, but contains the additional challenge of jurisdiction of law enforcement personnel when cross-border operations occur.

The age old struggle of freedom versus security is similar to the issue of respect for sovereignty and compliance. ARF has no institutional provisions for conflict or use of force, instead relying upon the ASEAN Way.⁶¹ Without a means of ensuring compliance or the ability to compel action, it may be very difficult to ensure a lasting solution to conflict amongst reluctant actors. The members of ASEAN and ARF recognize this limitation but have to identify a means to balance the need for compliance while still respecting the primacy of national sovereignty.

ASEAN's lack of experience in the field of CR negatively affects the credibility of ARF.⁶² As discussed earlier, ASEAN does not resolve conflicts but prevents them. This does not provide the same institutional skillset required for PD or CR and is an active indicator why

ARF seems to be entrenched in the CBM phase well past its declared transition to PD starting in 2005.⁶³ As a separate mark against ARF's CR credibility, the majority of the conflicts ARF hopes to be able to influence are in East and Northeast Asia, which is not ASEAN's traditional sphere of influence. This creates tension between many member nations and ASEAN, implying that ASEAN desires to maintain the 'center of gravity' of ARF in Southeast Asia while its challenges are elsewhere.⁶⁴

To address the wide array of limitations in the security field, while capitalizing on the economic and political success, ASEAN developed a new framework in 2003 of three subordinate pillar communities: The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) and the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC).⁶⁵ The APSC identifies six essential components: political development, shaping and sharing of norms, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict peace building, and implementing mechanisms.⁶⁶ While more proactive in its language, the APSC also declares it will continue to "be guided by well-established principles of non-interference, consensus based decision-making, national and regional resilience, respect for the national sovereignty, the renunciation of the threat or the use of force, and peaceful settlement of differences and disputes which have served as the foundation of ASEAN cooperation."⁶⁷

As of this writing, ASEAN maintains the goal of an operational APSC by the end of 2015. As stated in the literature review, there is little evidence to suggest that ASEAN will succeed in achieving this goal without modification. Progress toward the APSC continues slowly; it is reasonable to expect the APSC to be operational eventually.⁶⁸ Whether it happens at the target date or not, ASEAN has a significant challenge to overcome in determining a balance between future APSC goals and capabilities and existing ASEAN principles of non-intervention.

Thankfully, the pace of ASEAN and ARF's transition to active CR does not diminish the value and credibility of these institutions with respect to their accomplishments as Eastern security communities. Western criticism of ASEAN and ARF focuses only on the lack of progress toward the end goal of CR and conclude that they are ineffective institutions. Eastern approaches, however, do not necessarily consider a gap between objectives and actions to be a failure.⁶⁹ The Asian way of conflict reflects these considerations and is discussed in more detail later. The credibility of ASEAN and ARF is essential to their effectiveness as security communities. Others must be careful not to undermine that credibility when ASEAN and ARF's performance does not meet Western expectations that the institutions do not embody. The credibility of ASEAN and ARF is at risk if the US decides to more seriously explore other security alternatives.

Alternatives – Bilateral

While ASEAN does influence the security environment in Southeast Asia, it is not the only means of conflict resolution. ASEAN operates as a forum, providing a starting point for dialog and then shifts its role to work as a facilitator of bilateral discussions for disputes that arise among its members. Recognizing that not every issue needs the full attention of ASEAN in its entirety, these discussions can take place outside of the multilateral framework of consensus building that ASEAN itself employs.⁷⁰ Given the informal nature of ASEAN dialogs, there are no criteria to determine when an issue merits the entirety of ASEAN to weigh their opinions. The need to respect sovereignty balances the risk of instability in the region before all ASEAN members desire involvement in the discussion.

As ASEAN attempts to increase its direct role in shaping the security environment through the evolution of APSC, individual bilateral defense ties remain a reality in Southeast

Asia as well. The member nations seem to accept that even with a goal of liberal peace through consensus and cooperation this does not ensure security from aggression and other conflicts spilling into their region. After the collapse of the Southeast Asian multilateral defense organizations SEATO and AMDA in the 1960's, bilateral alliances ties remained for nations seeking protection from communism.⁷¹ Today the United States maintains formal defense alliances with Thailand and the Philippines and continues to work to improve security ties to nations throughout the region including establishing relatively new relationships with Indonesia and Vietnam.⁷² Malaysia and Singapore both maintain defensive alliances with Australia via the Five Powers Agreement.

Bilateral arrangements are the preferred method of negotiation for more powerful nations. Such negotiations enable larger nations to better leverage resources and dictate terms more quickly when negotiating with only one party. The United States and China both prefer to employ bilateral negotiations with smaller nations in Southeast Asia when possible, especially in the realm of security. The pragmatic concerns of the efficacy of multilateral negotiations discussed above such as simplicity and authority are relevant, but the advantage a larger nation can achieve through bilateral negotiations is significant.

While these bilateral ties are by no means mutually exclusive with the multilateral cooperation sought by ASEAN, they may interfere with ASEAN's attempt to take a greater role in regional security. Bilateral models are certainly easier to organize, and that simplicity can provide a strong attraction to both nations rather than the invest time and energy in a potentially ambiguous and less efficient multilateral arrangement. Bilateral and unilateral operations also have the reward of sole proprietorship of any benefits and prestige they may produce for the member. ASEAN and its member nations believe in a policy of "Prosper Thy Neighbor," but are

not immune taking action contrary to the desires of ASEAN as a whole.⁷³ This may be most apparent in recent populist moves by Indonesia, and its crackdown on illegal fishing vessels in its waters, which analysts have argued could risk the solidarity of ASEAN.⁷⁴

Alternatives – Minilateralism Without ASEAN

Other security arrangements involving concerns in Southeast Asia that do not include ASEAN have taken shape as well. These approaches involve larger nations and have frequently focused on maritime security since access to the global commons is an issue with implications well beyond Southeast Asia. In assessing ARF's performance in resolving international conflicts in the maritime domain, J. N. Mak identifies three different sets of objectives nations consider: assurance of access to the global commons by the great maritime powers, establishing regional sea control by the rising maritime powers, and security of littoral areas in coastal nations.⁷⁵ The members of ASEAN represent interests in all three of these sets. The great maritime powers of the US, Australia, and Japan do not share all of these concerns. To address their particular concern of access they can, and do, form multilateral arrangements. The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) is an example of such an arrangement.

The TSD is a Minister/Secretary level forum between the US, Australia and Japan and represents a gathering of great maritime nations only. The TSD first convened in 2002 and was borne out of frustration with the pace of ARF to progress beyond CBM into more proactive security activities.⁷⁶ The formation of the TSD is a direct attempt to bypass the limits of multilateral operations and the ASEAN way, with a group of likeminded and activist nations.⁷⁷ Given the similar objectives and reasonable expectation that peaceful solutions to disagreements between its members, the TSD represents an alternative security community to ASEAN.

The TSD is minilateral, involving cooperation amongst a small number of privileged states.⁷⁸ Minilateralism requires a multilateral example to contrast against for identification. While not necessarily exclusive, it is not deliberately inclusive, which is in contrast to an organization like ARF.

Minilateral communities have several implications on regional security both in the alienation of nations of those not included as well as effects on the legitimacy of other multilateral organizations. The membership of these minilateral groups, or more precisely, who is not a member is significant. The conspicuous absence of China in these dialogs does not go unnoticed. China has formally opposed meetings with concerns of containment, warning them to stay out of China's disputes.⁷⁹ To the credit of the TSD, released statements do include calls for positive engagement and invitations for China to participate in the dialog. However, those invitations seem to fall on deaf ears as China instead regards the TSD as a defensive alliance intended to check Chinese regional influence.⁸⁰

The fact that these four nations represent the largest democratic powers in the region should not be overlooked as well. This exclusive membership sends several signals to nations in SEA and the greater Asia Pacific region. For ASEAN and ARF, it highlights an internal seam that not all members are politically identical. This in turn exacerbates the tension between activist and reluctant nations inside ASEAN, interfering with the already complicated process of consensus that ASEAN and ARF struggle to achieve.⁸¹

The very presence of minilateral security communities like the TSD may provide a challenge to the legitimacy of the APSC and its goal to become the preeminent security community in the region. While there are no direct conflicts of jurisdiction, nations that participate in other security communities comprised of only powerful nations may cast into

doubt their commitment to ASEAN.⁸² Additionally, the alienation caused by minilateral communities, especially the perceived containment of China, can spill over to ARF causing an unwillingness to cooperate on a broad spectrum of topics.

The South China Sea

Perhaps nowhere else are the capabilities of ASEAN and ARF to resolve conflict more intensely examined than in the South China Sea. Clashes in the SCS represent concerns of both regional and global concern. Regionally, member nations of ASEAN have conflicting claims to islands and territories in the SCS.⁸³ These conflicts are in varying states of resolution.⁸⁴

The internal jurisdictional conflicts of ASEAN pale in comparison to the global concern over China's maritime claims within the SCS. China is employing a complex set of tactics to establish itself as the controlling power of up to 90% of the South China Sea.⁸⁵ This approach is multifaceted, employing both historical and legal approaches to its claims. China continues to operate in the SCS as if they were the territorial waters of China and is taking aggressive action to support these claims. The other primary tactic China employs is historic waters, which UNCLOS exists separately from the framework offered by UNCLOS. Through China's submission of the "Nine-Dash Line" chart to the UN in 2009, China has declared nearly all of the SCS as historic territorial waters.⁸⁶ If China receives full historic territorial water rights for this region, all of the claimed SCS would be considered internal waters, placing the entire sea under China's exclusive control. China's intentional vagueness about what they claim within this area is very worrying. Such ambiguity allows maximum flexibility to justify behaving as if all parts of the SCS are sovereign waters so long as no official arbitration exists.

China's strategy of control in the SCS is called "salami slicing."⁸⁷ This approach involves a series of small actions that are individually under the threshold that warrants a

significant response, but over time building a pattern of control in the region. In time, this growth of control over the area becomes the law of the land, and historical or legal precedent ceases to be the deciding factor with regards to control of the region. Chinese officials have referred to their strategy in the area as “Cabbage Strategy,” in which they wrap the region in layers of fishing, coast guard and naval warships like leaves of cabbage.⁸⁸ Regardless of the name, China’s strategy of slow annexation and delay is so far proving effective.

While every member of ASEAN has some interest in protecting the SCS from Chinese domination, the internal maritime conflicts of ASEAN members prevent effective cooperation and unity of effort. Such conflict plays into China’s preferred tactic of bilateral negotiations with individual nations.⁸⁹ Analysts readily acknowledge Chinese preference for bilateral negotiations in the South China Sea.⁹⁰ Half of the nations in ASEAN (Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Brunei, and to a lesser degree Indonesia) have maritime disputes with China in the region. China has stated as recently as December 2014 that it will not accept any arbitration outside of bilateral negotiation.⁹¹ ASEAN and China signed a joint declaration in support of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 2002 but a legally binding resolution has been elusive.⁹² Carlyle Thayer notes that while ASEAN members have abided by the Declaration of Conduct (DoC) by avoiding aggressive action until a legal resolution is achieved, China has accelerated its aggressive policies in the SCS. Furthermore, China uses a lack of progress in the provisions of the DoC as an excuse to delay progress toward a legal Code of Conduct.⁹³

ARF and the SCS

The salami slicing of the SCS is an issue of concern for any nation concerned about freedom of navigation through the SCS. Unfortunately, ARF has not received high marks for its

performance in the SCS. China stall tactics to avoid resolution have gone so far as preventing SCS issues from being discussed at ARF meetings.⁹⁴ Based on ARF's insistence on the ASEAN way and desire to keep China as a participant member, it is unable to resolve this significant, but already existing conflict.

Despite such challenges, ARF has a role to play in the SCS. UNCLOS presents a possible path to resolution. Completion and ratification of the previously mentioned legally binding Code of Conduct is another option. The ARF's expansive membership can direct the political will to support such legally binding measures and ensure enforcement. Miles Kahler's analysis of multilateral institutions concludes that larger multilateral institutions are most able to achieve success on global issues of common concern, especially in the maritime domain.⁹⁵ Undoubtedly, this is a slow process, perhaps more so with the ASEAN way. History tells us that the failure of such negotiations is rarely the result of the majority failing to come to a consensus. It is usually powerful nations acting as spoiler agents by reserving the ability to walk away from negotiations, such as when US decided not to ratify UNCLOS itself based upon a desire to reserve rights of seabed extraction outside of its EEZ.⁹⁶ For the same reasons that China joined ARF in the first place, ARF possesses valuable characteristics that help keep China at the table. China recognizes the risk of ARF becoming an organization of China's containment if China were to isolate itself from the Forum. Participation in ARF not only ensures Chinese engagement with the entire region, but ARF has influenced China to settle disputes through more peaceful actions compared to options without ARF.⁹⁷ Due to its nature and China's membership, ARF is unlikely to be a forum that delivers resolution in the SCS. However, the engagement ARF does foster with China may prove to be a powerful CBM allowing ASEAN the political support to seek actual resolution.

Problems for the West, opportunities for the East

The very nature of salami slicing thwarts the ability of Western activist policy to influence the outcome of a meaningful and lasting matter for at least three major reasons: time, jurisdiction, and the threshold of proportionality. The slow creep of growing control by China means there will be no quick resolution to the disputes in the SCS. The attention span of democratic regimes tends to be too short to develop a strategy with a time horizon measured in decades, especially for something as geographically distant from the US as the South China Sea.

China's plan for domination in the SCS extends beyond the use of its military. The employment of fishing vessels and coast guard promote Chinese control of the region but do not make acceptable targets for US instruments of power. The US military, while free to operate in the global commons, does not possess the jurisdiction to intervene in disputed territorial waters and EEZs.⁹⁸ In combination with the jurisdictional problems, China's incremental progress renders most policy options far too heavy handed a response to any individual act. China's strategy has effectively negated the advantage of the United States' superior military forces, as their employment would be far too escalatory.

It is in response to these particular problems that ASEAN, and possibly the APSC in the future, have a unique opportunity to achieve what the US and other western powers are unable. The Asian way of conflict resolution includes decision through consensus building, informal and incremental steps toward progress, and the primacy of politics over administration or a willingness to separate lofty goals from actual policy.⁹⁹ Clearly, these principles are synchronous with principles of the ASEAN way. Haas credits these principles for the relative stability and dynamic growth of Southeast Asia since its emergence from colonialism.¹⁰⁰ It is important to understand that Haas' research indicates that the Asian way transcends Southeast Asia and ASEAN, finding the norms applicable throughout the Asian Pacific.¹⁰¹

“Asian solutions to Asian problems” is another principle of the Asian way of conflict management. This principle is also strongly reflective of ASEAN’s mantra of regional solutions to regional problems. At first glance, this resembles nothing more than common sense, but the significance lies in the perspective that “Asian diplomats tend to see Western models and solutions to problems as inappropriate.”¹⁰² The ability of ASEAN to navigate the issue of the SCS with China is improved by the very fact that Western powers are excluded, even if ASEAN is influenced by Western nations. This improvement is conditional, however, on ASEAN being able to work together in opposition to China and not be “salami sliced” themselves.

ASEAN departs from the larger eastern way of conflict management on the subject of intervention. Both Eastern and Western security scholars recognize ASEAN’s principle of non-intervention as a limiting factor. It limits ASEAN’s role as an Eastern pacifistic facilitator and progress toward Western activist APSC.¹⁰³ As discussed earlier, the unique domestic and geopolitical events influencing ASEAN at the time of its creation demanded the development of strong national identities, which required an agreement of non-interference.

ASEAN has evolved over the decades into an engine of regional prosperity and security, but the principle of non-intervention has not kept pace. The most frequently cited example of an increasing willingness to forgo the principle of non-interference is ASEAN’s interaction with Myanmar on the issue of human rights abuses in the early 1990s and 2000s. In the face of sanctions to Myanmar from most of the world, ASEAN pursued a policy of ‘constructive engagement.’¹⁰⁴ While ASEAN intended this policy to be in contrast to the isolating effects of the economic and political sanctions levied against Myanmar, some in the international community interpreted as tacit acceptance by ASEAN of continued human rights abuses. In 2006, Myanmar passed up its opportunity as ASEAN chair after being convinced by other

members of ASEAN, nominally so Myanmar could focus its efforts on democratization.¹⁰⁵ This outcome was the result of an internal debate of ASEAN members regarding how best to respond to the problem and avoid tarnishing ASEAN's image either by interfering with the internal affairs of a member or as approving of an abusive regime. Indonesia and Malaysia wanted a more punitive approach including a discussion of expelling Myanmar from ASEAN for its failure to progress on to democratization. Singapore, the ASEAN chair in 2005, argued in favor of allowing Myanmar to take its turn as chair to ensure ASEAN's ability to continue constructive engagement.¹⁰⁶ In 2007, ASEAN voiced concern in response to renewed violence within Myanmar but took no more substantial action. Since 2010, there has been slow progress in Myanmar's transition toward democracy, but much progress remains.¹⁰⁷ The steps taken by ASEAN, though mild in comparison to sanctions or other activist policies do show a departure from non-intervention and openly expresses an opinion toward the domestic politics of a member nation. Whether this instance is an anomaly, or a sign of future institutional reform remains uncertain.

Hope for success

If the members of ASEAN can overcome their internal conflicts and act in unison, ASEAN represents an opportunity to resist salami slicing in the SCS. ASEAN has shown an ability to bring China to the table through the DoC of Parties in the South China Sea.¹⁰⁸ The direct stake of some ASEAN member nations in the fate of the SCS ensures a close watch on Chinese activity and offers the jurisdictional authority to object directly to those actions.¹⁰⁹ The patience inherent in the ASEAN Way provides a lasting resistance to Chinese efforts. ASEAN's incremental approach to policy ensures a measured response to small actions by China, and that ASEAN will not give up in frustration when progress is elusive.

ASEAN can prevent the loss of control of the SCS, but the internal squabbles of its members are interfering with that ability.¹¹⁰ ASEAN's norm of non-interference perpetuates the internal squabbles, preventing them from getting better or worse. If the members of ASEAN can resolve, or even put aside, their differences, ASEAN could provide a unified front and powerful platform to negotiate with China on behalf of its members toward legal resolution to the disputes of the SCS. This unified front does not necessarily require immediate legal decision amongst ASEAN's members, but it does require the strategic insight to recognize that the internal maritime border squabbles of ASEAN plays directly into China's ability to direct bilateral negotiations. Actual legal resolution will require bilateral agreement eventually, however, establishing the jurisdictional norms and the pace and tone of the legal resolution does not.

If a unified ASEAN presents a force to resist salami slicing, it does not necessarily guarantee an ability to roll back what has already been 'sliced.' Nor does it guarantee enough power to resist China's more overt activities in the SCS. Here, Western activism can be helpful.¹¹¹ While direct employment of US Naval forces to prevent Chinese expansion in the SCS is not a reasonable option, the Navy can act as a powerful unifying and training element for the various maritime forces of ASEAN members. Increased engagement through multilateral naval exercises between the US and ASEAN strengthens ASEAN's ability in several ways. Training in maritime interdiction will improve the ability of those who do have jurisdiction to challenge Chinese violations. Furthermore, participating in multilateral exercises promotes confidence and provides an opportunity for inroads to the internal ASEAN maritime disputes. Also, increasing the presence of US Naval vessels in the region sends a strong signal of US commitment. Finally, the hybridization of mediation and alliance systems of conflict resolution

allows flexibility in addressing ongoing problems which is an influential concept in Asian conflict management.¹¹²

Conclusion

Unique domestic and geopolitical elements led to the creation of both ASEAN and ARF. These institutions developed in the presence of changing great power relationships that left the member nations of ASEAN with uncertain futures. The combination of the complex security environment produced during the periods of historic change and the natural tendencies of the Asian way of conflict management created a crucible in which self-reliance, pacifism, and non-interference became the guiding principles for achieving a lasting peace in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN developed reliance upon the norms of peaceful conflict resolution, non-interference, and consensus out of the necessity to build strong national identities and stable regional politics. These norms contributed to Southeast Asia's rapid and peaceful development over the last 50 years, and they resonate with Asia Pacific nations in a way that is difficult for Western countries to comprehend. The primacy of non-interference in ASEAN's politics represents its greatest barrier to progress in the development of the APSC and ARF's transition beyond CBM. There are indications of ASEAN's willingness to challenge its non-interventionist policies in its recent criticism of the unacceptable behavior of its members, but much progress remains. Criticism toward ASEAN and ARF about the policy of non-interference has had minimal effect. Any shift in policy must it will likely be on ASEAN's terms. Perhaps only a crisis could catalyze such a change. The continued encroachment of China in the SCS upon the members of ASEAN may represent such a crisis.

ASEAN and ARF are essential elements in a comprehensive strategy first to resist Chinese salami slicing, and eventually resolve jurisdictional disputes in the SCS. ASEAN

represents the collective bargaining power of every other party that China's aggressive policies threaten in the SCS. The ARF provides an international platform for lasting engagement that China cannot afford to ignore without risking a loss of cooperation in the region across a broad spectrum of economic, political, and security opportunities. A definite unity of effort from ASEAN and its leadership in ARF is essential to balance the lopsided bilateral negotiations that China enjoys today. ASEAN has proven its ability to make progress in negotiations with China in the past, and it needs to resume that effort and secure a legally binding solution to this looming crisis.

The continued support of Western powers for ASEAN and ARF ensures adequate time and maneuver space for negotiations. This support provides insurance that China will not be able to strong-arm an unfair resolution to the conflict in the SCS. The US must exercise caution in dealing with its frustration at the pace of the ASEAN way. Otherwise its search for alternative venues may impede progress toward a lasting solution by marginalizing ASEAN or alienating China.

A quick resolution of the dispute over the SCS is unlikely, but that does not preclude a peaceful solution. A failure to challenge salami slicing with an appropriate strategy all but ensures eventual Chinese domination of the SCS, or open conflict to ensure continued access to these valuable global commons. Such a strategy must incorporate both Eastern and Western conflict management approaches. It is important to separate the criticism of ASEAN's ability to transition to an active security community through the APSC from its value as a forum that finds solutions without resorting to conflict. Whether or not ASEAN successfully transitions to an active security community, should not determine the value of ASEAN and its ability to achieve

peace. The US and other Western powers must appreciate the norms and institutional capabilities as an essential piece of the strategy that only ASEAN can achieve.

¹ Leifer was considered to be a foremost authority on Southeast Asia and ASEAN until his death in 2001. His 1996 book *The ASEAN Regional Forum* provided a detailed and clear-eyed assessment of the still very new ARF drawing on his decades of ASEAN historical knowledge.

² Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum : Extending ASEAN's model of regional security." *Adelphi paper*. Vol. 302 (Oxford University Press), 1996.

³ Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," 14

⁴ Amitav Acharya, *The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).

⁵ Jinn Winn Chong, "'Mine, Yours or Ours?': The Indonesia-Malaysia Disputes," *SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* Vol. 27, No. 1, (2012).

⁶ Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," 4

⁷ Jürgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada, *Cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific*, (New York: Routledge, 2010)

⁸ Marlouize E. Villanueva, "Charting into new waters: Toward ASEAN Political-Security Community 2015," www.academia.edu, 2015, 4

http://www.academia.edu/7042110/Charting_into_New_Waters_Towards_ASEAN_Political_Security_Community_2015

⁹ Mikio Oishi "In Search of an East Asian Way of Conflict Management: Three Regional Cases," *International Journal of China Studies* 5 (3), 2014.

¹⁰ Michael Haas, *Asian and Pacific Regional Cooperation: Turning zones of conflict into regional cooperation*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013)

¹¹ Ronald O'Rourke, *Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress*, CRS Report for Congress R42784, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 26, 2014), 14; Thomas G. Mahnken, *Secrecy and Stratagem: Understanding Chinese Strategic Culture* (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2011); Robert Haddick, "How U.S. Allies Can Counter China's Strategy," *Real Clear Defense(Blog)*, September 9, 2014. Adapted excerpt from Robert Haddick's *Fire on the Water: China, American, and the Future of the Pacific*.

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/09/09/how_us_allies_can_counter_chinas_strategy_107423.html.

The above are authors all discuss Chinese tactics in the SCS. This author previously cited these works in a discussion of the specific dispute between Vietnam and China over the Paracel Islands. The tactics employed by China are applicable to the entire region.

¹² J. N. Mak, "Maritime security and the ARF: Why the focus on dialogue rather than action," In *Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Jürgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada, (New York: Routledge, 2010); *Janes Defense Weekly*, "ASEANs slow security evolution," *Janes Defense Weekly* Vol. 49 Issue 9, 2012; Brad Glosserman, "The United States and the ASEAN Regional Forum," In *Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum*, ed. Jürgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada, (New York: Routledge, 2010), 47

¹³ Rodolfo C. Severino, "ASEAN and the South China Sea," *Security Challenges*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Winter 2010; Ankit Panda, "Why Hasn't Maritime Multilateralism Worked in Southeast Asia?" *thediplomat.com* (blog), February 24, 2015,

<http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/why-hasnt-maritime-multilateralism-worked-in-southeast-asia/>

¹⁴ Karl Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

¹⁵ Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic*, 5.

¹⁶ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009).

¹⁷ Acharya, *The Making of Southeast Asia*, 5

¹⁸ Acharya, *The Making of Southeast Asia*, 51-52

¹⁹ Chong, "Mine, Yours or Ours," 21. The author concludes that each nation instead developed a core national identity to compensate for the lack of individual heritage: for Burma - Burman, Singapore - consensual Asian values, Indonesia - Panca Sila, Malaysia - Bumiputra attribute, Thailand - central Thai monarchy and culture.

²⁰ Acharya, *The Making of Southeast Asia*, 126

²¹ Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," 9

²² Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, 2004, s.v. Anglo-Malayan/Malaysian Defense Agreement (AMDA).

- ²³ Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community*, 59
- ²⁴ Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," 10; ASEAN, "The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration)" *asean.org*, August 8, 1967, <http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration>
- ²⁵ ASEAN, "Bangkok Declaration".
- ²⁶ ASEAN, "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation," *asean.org*, February 24, 1976, Article 2, <http://www.asean.org/news/item/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976-3>.
- ²⁷ Katja Weber, "Lessons from the ASEAN Regional Forum : Transcending the image of paper tiger," In *The security governance of regional organizations*, ed. Emil J. Kirchner and Roberto Dominguez, (New York: Routledge, 2011), 222
- ²⁸ Acharya, *The Making of Southeast Asia*, 138
- ²⁹ Acharya, *The Making of Southeast Asia*, 126-130
- ³⁰ Acharya, *The Making of Southeast Asia*, 290-291
- ³¹ Acharya, *The Making of Southeast Asia*, 191, 170
- ³² Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community*, 6
- ³³ Acharya, *The Making of Southeast Asia*, 289-290
- ³⁴ Le Hong Hiep, "Vietnam's Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 35.3, 2013: 339.
- ³⁵ Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," 7.
- ³⁶ Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," 7. These alternatives included logistic considerations out of Singapore, and opening ports in Indonesia and Malaysia to US Naval ships.
- ³⁷ Lyle Goldstein, "Q. and A.: Lyle Goldstein on China and the Vietnamese Military," interview by *NYTimes.com*, July 5, 2014, http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/05/q-and-a-lyle-goldstein-on-china-and-the-vietnamese-military/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1.
- ³⁸ Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," 17
- ³⁹ ASEAN, "1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea," *National University of Singapore (cil.nus.edu.sg)*, 11 July 1992, <http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/1992%20ASEAN%20Declaration%20on%20the%20South%20China%20Sea-pdf.pdf>
- ⁴⁰ Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," 8
- ⁴¹ Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," 8
- ⁴² Encyclopedia Britannica, "ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)," *Encyclopedia Britannica.com*, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/752823/ASEAN-Regional-Forum-ARF> (accessed March 6, 2015).
- ⁴³ ASEAN Regional Forum, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper," *aseanregionalforum.asean.org*, August 1, 1995, para. 1, <http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/library/Terms%20of%20References%20and%20Concept%20Papers/Concept%20Paper%20of%20ARF.pdf> 1995.
- ⁴⁴ ASEAN Regional Forum 1995, "Concept Paper".
- ⁴⁵ ASEAN Regional Forum 1995, "Concept Paper," para.18
- ⁴⁶ Weber, "Lessons from the ASEAN Regional Forum," 224
- ⁴⁷ Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," 26
- ⁴⁸ Rizal Sukma "The Accidental Driver: ASEAN in the ASEAN Regional Forum." In *Cooperative security in the asia-pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum*, ed. Jürgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada (New York: Routledge, 2010), 112
- ⁴⁹ Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," 26
- ⁵⁰ Sukma, "The Accidental Driver," 116
- ⁵¹ Acharya, *The Making of Southeast Asia*, 295. Acharya emphasizes his conclusion with a direct quote from Michael Leifer: "categorically, that ASEAN has become an institutionalized vehicle for intra-mural conflict avoidance and management. ASEAN has been able to prevent disputes from escalating and getting out of hand through containing and managing contentious issues."
- ⁵² Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community*, 208
- ⁵³ Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," 11
- ⁵⁴ Acharya speaks to this distinction in terms of a balance of power as approach to stability versus an outcome of stability. Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community*, 208
- ⁵⁵ Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," 45
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