

report documentation page		FORM APPROVED - - - OMB NO. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the office of management and budget, paperwork reduction project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (LEAVE BLANK)	2. REPORT DATE 7 April 2015	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED STUDENT RESEARCH PAPER 1 Oct 2014 – 1 Apr 2015	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Blueprint for Successful Stability Operations		5. FUNDING NUMBERS  N/A	
6. AUTHOR(S)  Major Barry R. Veen			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  USMC COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 2076 SOUTH STREET, MCCDC, QUANTICO, VA 22134-5068		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER  NONE	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  SAME AS #7.		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER:  NONE	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  NONE			
12A. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  NO RESTRICTIONS		12B. DISTRIBUTION CODE  N/A	

**ABSTRACT (MAXIMUM 200 WORDS)**

**14. SUBJECT TERMS (KEY WORDS ON WHICH TO PERFORM SEARCH)**

**Stability Operations**

**15. NUMBER OF PAGES: 32**

**16. PRICE CODE: N/A**

**17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE:**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**

United States Marine Corps  
Command and Staff College  
Marine Corps University  
2076 South Street  
Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

**MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES**

---

**TITLE: Blueprint for Successful Stability Operations**


**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES**

**AUTHOR: Major Barry R. Veen**

**AY 14-15**


---

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Christopher Stowe

Approved: 


Date: 4/7/15

Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. John W. Gordon

Approved: 

Date: 4/7/2015

Oral Defense Committee Member: Lt Col Michael A. McMellon

Approved: 

Date: 7 APRIL 2015

## **DISCLAIMER**

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

## Executive Summary

**Title:** Blueprint for Successful Stability Operations

**Author:** Major Barry R. Veen, United States Air Force

**Thesis:** The end state for successful Stability Operations consists of a legitimate government based on a political framework that reflects the governed: democracy should not be the sole mark of success. Stability success hinges on a functioning system based on a democratic construct that provides three key components: security and safety, functioning infrastructure, and economic opportunity.

**Discussion:** A legitimate government is the first step in the process of state-building. The process of building the institutions of government consist of elections and franchise of local leaders into the political system. This process offers the greatest possibility that the population will accept the government and provide it with their labor and revenue. Some of the various institutions required for government legitimacy are political parties, a sustainable economy, police and military forces, and an active free press. The building blocks of the process to legitimacy hinge on safety and security, a functional civil infrastructure, and economic opportunity. The international community must leverage its wealth and power in an effort to bring to bear the resources needed to support a failed state. Agriculture and industry provide opportunities for people to work and earn a living wage, which in turn requires a sound educational system that promotes vocations such as engineering, computer science, medical professionals, and many other technical fields that can sustain a viable economy. However, education, jobs, economic opportunities, and other basic services are meaningless without safety and security.

**Conclusion:** State-building and Stability Operations are not simple endeavors that one can just jump into without a plan. They are complex, difficult, and very demanding enterprises for any nation to undertake. Success is possible if one follows the fundamental tenets outlined in this paper. The end state for successful Stability Operations consists of a legitimate government based on a political framework that reflects the governed. Democracy should not be the sole mark of success; rather a functioning system based on a democratic construct that provides the three key components: security and safety, functioning infrastructure, and economic opportunity.

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**DISCLAIMER..... II**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....III**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS .....IV**

**PREFACE..... V**

**INTRODUCTION.....1**

**SECTION 1: STABILITY OPERATIONS .....2**

**SECTION 2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .....7**

**SECTION 3: CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS .....18**

**CONCLUSION .....20**

**REFERENCES.....22**

**BIBLIOGRAPHY .....25**

## *Preface*

Since 1789, the United States of America has ventured into the realm of “nation- or state-building.” Building a state has met with varying degrees of success and failure over two hundred and twenty-five years. The desire and effort required to build a state consumes a significant amount of time and treasure. This paper will explore the history of state-building from the perspective of the United States military and how the doctrine of Stability Operations governs the role of the military, the successes and failures the U.S. has had, why “state-building” is or is not important to the U.S., and lastly, what does “success” look like.

The topic of state-building is very important to the U.S. and the international community. State-building affects geopolitical relationships as well as the global economy. Many organizations and individuals explore the topic of state-building in order to understand the complex nature of how states form; such as, the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the RAND Corporation, leading universities such as Harvard and Yale, and many other institutions and organizations both public and private. State-Building is one of the most relevant issues facing today’s military. The goal of this paper is to highlight the difficulties involved in State-Building and provide key components for successful Stability Operations. The research garnered from this project hopefully serves as a guide to future planners within the United States military when designing and planning for Stability Operations.

## **Introduction**

The modern, post-industrial-revolution world has been obsessed with the concept of nation- or state-building. From the end of the Napoleonic Wars, to the Treaty of Versailles and on to the twenty-first century, virtually every Western government and many non-Western governments have engaged in state-building<sup>1</sup> in one form or another in an effort to influence or control a group of people or a region for economic gain or political stability. The process of state-building is usually the result of post-conflict order and typically led by the victorious side's military and political leaders. The West shaped many of the geopolitical constructs in the world today, and the predominant leader shaping the landscape since the end of World War II (WWII) is the United States (U.S.):

The American vision of nation, state, and the society of states is sophisticated and shallow at the same time. The same could be said for American policies since the Revolution. No other country has devoted more resources to building a world that would support its way of life—including open markets, individual rights, and private property protections. No other country has created more problems for itself and others, especially in the twentieth century, by interfering in foreign societies and pursuing impractical changes—including the rapid “modernization” of traditional communities, the heavy investment in centralized economic “development,” and, most of all, the imposition of constitutional democracy.<sup>2</sup>

According to Dewey Browder, “History tells us that the 21<sup>st</sup> century will continue to witness powerful states attempting to guide new or unorganized states to make them respectable members of the world community.”<sup>3</sup> There have been very few success stories and many failures in the State-Building process. Future State-Building requires examination and understanding of past success and failures in order to apply lessons learned in future operations.

What should the end state of U.S. military Stability Operations be in the state-building process? Should democracy be the only mark of success for Phase IV Stability Operations? What are the most crucial components for political and economic success based on historical

precedent? The end state for successful Stability Operations consists of a legitimate government based on a political framework that reflects the governed: democracy should not be the sole mark of success, rather a functioning system based on a democratic construct that provides three key components: security and safety, functioning infrastructure, and economic opportunity.

To answer the main questions posed in this paper, a separate set of questions will outline the main body of the text. First, what are Stability Operations, and what are the roles of the military, civilians, and contractors in such an environment? Second, what historical perspectives offer both success and failures of Stability Operations, and what are the lessons learned? Lastly, what conditions are required for success and what are the crucial components that lay the foundation for lasting stability?

## **Section 1: Stability Operations**

What are Stability Operations? According to Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07:

Stability aims to create conditions so that the local populace regards the situation as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. Stability first aims to lessen the level of violence. It aims to enable the functioning of governmental, economic, and societal institutions. Lastly, stability encourages the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior.<sup>4</sup>

There are three main phases or missions within Stability Operations: initial response, transformational activities, and sustainment activities.<sup>5</sup> The U.S. government conducts both strategic and tactical actions in all three phases and each phase targets a set of actors and actions, which ultimately will determine if the operations will be a success or failure. The actors in each phase are the people comprised of public and private organizations, military and government officials, the affected population, and the actions range from security to medical treatment.

The military has a specific role to play during Stability Operations. Joint Publication 3-07 states that “the primary military contribution to stabilization is to protect and defend the population, facilitating the personal security of the people and, thus, creating a platform for political, economic, and human security.”<sup>6</sup> Each branch of the U.S. military brings to bear different resources and capabilities in the conduct of Stability Operations, each uniquely tailored to the service’s overarching mission. For instance, the lead for providing security in post-conflict or natural disaster areas is the U.S. Army (USA). The Army saturates a conflict zone with large numbers of personnel, equipment and resources and is capable of handling any contingency or Stability Operation. The USA has one major setback, due to its large nature as an organization: it is typically very slow in getting to a conflict zone. The USA requires the assistance from other military branches in the form of transportation, primarily the Navy and the Air Force. However, in some instances, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) provides a security umbrella when a quick response or a short duration contingency calls for rapid employment and deployment of military support. The USMC can deploy at a moment’s notice with an extremely large amount of manpower, equipment, and resources. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) provides airlift capacity to the conflict zone, marshalling needed supplies and equipment as well as personnel. In addition, the USAF can rapidly bed-down any mission the U.S. military deploys, providing contingency billeting, field sanitation units, messing units, and the infrastructure to support these functions with power production and distribution, and water and wastewater services. The U.S. Navy (USN) delivers major muscle movements of cargo and equipment ultimately utilized by all branches of the U.S. military while conducting Stability Operations. The functions described above are not the only contributions that the U.S. military provides, but

they represent the major contributions before, during, and after a natural disaster or post-conflict crisis.

Civilian organizations, both government and non-government, too play an important role in Stability Operations. The Department of State (DoS) is responsible for providing the staff and resources required to manage the process of Stability Operations. While all agencies design and plan for Stability Operations, it is DoS's job to coordinate the multi-agency effort and work closely with DoD to maintain security and safety for the duration of the operation.<sup>7</sup> Government civilians have the responsibility of establishing transitional governments or providing aid to the Host Nation (HN) government. Whole hosts of activities are associated with civilian personnel that focus on establishing or strengthening the political framework within the conflict zone. The level of effort can range from financial assistance to the HN government or creating the political space for a new legitimate government. Civil servants are crucial to military leaders in that they drive the direction of all three phases of Stability Operations and interface with the HN or new government representatives.<sup>8</sup>

The last major contributor to Stability Operations is non-governmental organizations (NGO), which offer a variety of capabilities. David Ekbladh suggests, “many of the institutions involved, ranging from the World Bank to the smallest NGOs, saw the need for development aid to build state capacities and strengthen civil society—elements found in all post-World War II nation-building-in troubled areas as a means to prevent conflict and build peace.”<sup>9</sup> Contractors have the technical ability and the experience to fill the gaps between the DoD and DoS, and these gaps are all too often wide and deep. The significant issue for debate on whether to use contractors or not relates to their relative cost. For example, contractors are expensive and limited by contractual constraints. The cost associated with contractors hinges on the relative

security environment in a post-conflict zone. These costs are not just fiscal in nature but can also have both positive and negative human and political expenses, such as impact of employment opportunities and diplomatic capital gained or lost due to scandal and corruption. In addition, contractors have no authority and do not act on behalf of the U.S. government. While contractors may have patriotic motivations for seeking U.S. contracts in a contingency environment, their primary function in the process is to make a profit. The simple fact is the U.S. is unable to engage in Stability Operations without contractors and unless the U.S. is willing to make huge investments in personnel and reconstruction capacity, future operations will likely see the continued use of contractors as major contributors to Stability Operations.<sup>10</sup>

In order to understand Stability Operations and the role of the U.S. military, a brief historical perspective will establish a foundation. The U.S. has engaged in fewer than a dozen conventional wars over the last two hundred and twenty five years. However, the last two and a quarter centuries provided global conflicts where the U.S. ventured into several hundred Stability Operations.<sup>11</sup> In the past, the USA found itself the proprietor of the Stability mission, yet considered the function of Stability Operations as a nuisance; after all, as the saying goes, the primary mission of the USA is to fight and win the nation's wars. The Army's reluctance to give Stability Operations its full attention fostered an attitude of indifference that survives to today. However, changes that began in 2006 edition of the Army's field manual for Stability Operations initiated a change in the USA attitude of indifference. Several edits of Field Manual 3-07 in 2008 and 2014 and the addition of Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 3-07 (which broke down Stability Operations into concise parts) provide a model for change within the USA. In November 2014, General David Perkins, commander of USA Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Command, established the framework for a new doctrinal policy of the USA, which focuses on

Stability Operations as a crucial component of securing the peace of future conflicts.

“Throughout U.S. history, the Army has learned that military force alone cannot secure sustainable peace.”<sup>12</sup> The U.S. military needs a comprehensive approach to stability operations including a detailed understanding of a post-conflict situation in order to apply the U.S. instruments of power. There has been a change in DoD senior leadership’s views in believing that Stability Operations are now vital to winning the peace post-conflict. The change in DoD doctrine regarding Stability Operations and the inculcation of stability tenets reflect current instruction in professional military education.<sup>13</sup>

The prevailing American consensus post-WWII state-building found its roots in Reconstruction dating back to the American Civil War. “Fusing two nations into a single union, Reconstruction was the most intensive and aggressive nation-building endeavor of the nineteenth century.”<sup>14</sup> The path to stability predicates its existence on safety and security. These two pillars allow for the more mundane actors and actions to take place that foster the environment of peace and stability. Industry, agriculture, and manufacturing pave the way to stability but these institutions rely on functioning infrastructure. In order to build and sustain the required infrastructure such as road networks, water production and distribution, power production and distribution, and many other industries, an educated population and sustainable birth rate to feed institutions of learning and secondary education is paramount. The engineers, doctors, lawyers, scientist, and many other vocations are the foundation upon which civil society can operate and facilitate peace and stability.

Today, the DoS is the lead agency for Stability Operations and requires vital support from the Department of Defense (DoD) in its conduct and execution. Stability Operations have encompassed a variety of functions from law enforcement to humanitarian aid, and the U.S.

military has both led and supported these functions for U.S. allies and partners. From the Marshall Plan to the Negroponte Agreement<sup>15</sup>, the U.S. has learned many lessons, some good and some bad; application of these lessons to current and future Stability Operations is crucial to future success of not just Stability Operations, but state-building in general.

## **Section 2: Historical Background**

Dr. Lawrence A. Yates from the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas published a paper in 2005 that covered U.S. military experience in Stability Operations from 1789 – 2005 and selected 28 operations as case studies. This paper will look at two of those case studies as examples of success for historical background. Next, an overview of Iraq and Afghanistan will profile examples of unsuccessful Stability Operations. The examination of these four case studies will highlight the components of Stability Operations that worked and failed and what ultimately lead to success or failure. The components that worked will shed light on the most critical components that is required for success in future Stability Operations.

One cannot look at American state-building without an examination of the Marshall Plan and Operation Blacklist, and their implementation in Western Europe and Japan. The Marshall Plan, named after George C. Marshall (President Harry Truman’s Secretary of State) officially called the “European Recovery Program” and aimed to provide economic support over \$17 billion in fiscal aid and reconstruction assistance in Western Europe after WWII. The plan targeted the industrial sectors of the European economy and focused on rebuilding infrastructure. The lion’s share of the sum total went to Great Britain, France, and Germany, but most European countries received aid based on a prewar percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). The Marshall Plan, considered one of the most successful Stability Operations in U.S. history, was largely due to the

relatively short time consumed for most of Western Europe to reach or surpass prewar economic stability. Additionally, the U.S. eliminated many barriers to free trade in Europe that existed prior to WWII. The unfettered access to European markets stimulated by the U.S. provided outlets to American manufactured goods which in-turn stimulated economic growth in the U.S.<sup>16</sup>

Operation Blacklist, conducted by General Douglas MacArthur, was the complete transformation of Japanese society from imperial control to a democratic form of government. Legitimacy extended to the American occupation of Japan based on the unconditional surrender of the Emperor. The U.S. pumped billions of dollars in economic aid, humanitarian relief, and equipment into the new government established under MacArthur's command. All major Japanese cities required a herculean reconstruction effort after over 70% of the buildings and infrastructure suffered complete destruction.<sup>17</sup> Operation Blacklist denied Soviet access to Japan and initially stationed 644,000 us military personnel in the country that ultimately fell below 200,000.<sup>18</sup>

An in-depth look of the Marshall Plan's effect on Germany reveals some positive lessons learned essential for future Stability Operations. A note of historical fact, the Marshall Plan had a competitor from the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., known as the Morgenthau Plan, which both President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed to in part for covering Germany into an agricultural based society by dismantling its war making industry.<sup>19</sup> The German reconstruction presents an ideal model of state-building in the classic sense of a post-conflict crisis proceeded by cessation of hostilities by major belligerent states. "After four years of bitter fighting and some initial friction between American combat units and the defeated German population, the US Army shifted from its combat missions and literally reorganized and retrained its forces for their new peacetime role."<sup>20</sup>

The daunting task ahead, of German reconstruction by the U.S. and its allies seemed insurmountable. Four years of continuous war ravaged the landscape and the scars of battle dominated the German cityscape with demolished buildings and infrastructure.

Although there were pockets of resistance from defeated SS troops, loyal to the Third Reich, the war fatigued German people craved peace and stability and the majority of the German population submitted to either Soviet or U.S. occupation. The Soviet threat to Western Europe created a sense of urgency for implementation of the Marshall Plan as the communist bubble expanded throughout Eastern Europe. Hence, the U.S. went about reconstruction in a methodical way by the USA distributing troops throughout the countryside in an effort to maintain safety and enforce martial law. In order to aid the USA in law enforcement and provide security to the worn torn country, the U.S. established the U.S. Constabulary Force in 1946. Phase I, initial response activities, achieved success quickly in part because the USA planned for occupation and deployed personnel skilled in diplomatic abilities to administrate German cities after combat forces invaded Germany. The first step in securing the peace and implementing population safety began with Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of combatants according to Lawrence Yates,

Under the auspices of an Allied Control Council (ACC), the US military government under Army General Lucius Clay launched a comprehensive program of disarmament, demilitarization, denazification, democratization, and economic and financial reform within the American zone of western Germany and the US sector of Berlin.<sup>21</sup>

The process of DDR took longer than the U.S. expected, but the acceptance of occupation aided U.S. forces. The next phase, transformational activities, offers the deepest pool from which to draw positive lessons from for future Stability Operations. The German people shared a common ideology based on democracy and Judeo-Christian constructs. Both the commoner and elite in German society accepted the democratization of their political institutions. Other tenets

of a free society, including capitalism, free speech, a free press, and freedom of religion served as a common foundation to a new legitimate government.<sup>22</sup>

Let us explore the positive take aways from the Marshall Plan as applied to German occupation post-WWII. First, the USA had a detailed plan to secure the peace and provide safety and security after the invasion of German and post-German surrender. Next, the U.S. created a civilian force to head up reconstruction efforts. “Democratization was the biggest and most important task faced – and accomplished – by the Western Allies in postwar Germany.”<sup>23</sup> The authority given to the constabulary force accelerated the political restructuring of Germany, but this was only possible due to the relative similar ties German society and culture had with the U.S. German culture lived under several decades of a constitutional political structure and readily accepted the construct during reconstruction. A bottom up approach to political reorganization led by German officials, creating political parties at the local level, spearheaded the rapid transition from the totalitarian Nazi régime to a functioning democracy. To be sure, the key to success hinged on the fact that the U.S., its allies, and Germany shared a common religious socio-cultural identity, yet the most important issue was a political identity. In the end, a stable legitimate government built under a common identity between occupier and HN, founded on sound economic principals and relying on a functioning civil infrastructure resulted in a successful Stability Operation.<sup>24</sup>

Next, a comprehensive look at Operation Blacklist under the command of General MacArthur reveals many similarities to the plan and the successes the U.S. experienced in Germany. “The success of Western stability operations and nation building in Germany was duplicated in Japan, although the process often differed considerably.”<sup>25</sup> The unconditional surrender of Japan to the Allies gave General MacArthur essentially tabula rasa during occupation. First, and probably the

biggest difference between the German occupation and that of Japan was the fact that Japan retained its emperor after he renounced his claim of divinity. It was dubious to believe that occupation and reconstruction could well proceed without conceding this point to the Japanese. Second, the Japanese culture is very different from Western culture and relies on submission, first to the Emperor and down the line of hierarchy to the commoner. The submissive undertones in Japanese culture and the fact the Japanese recognized Westphalia – type political structures were a breeding ground for democratic ideals ripe for cultivation.<sup>26</sup>

General MacArthur used the U.S. military in much of the same way as in Germany and throughout Western Europe, but the establishment of a large civilian force to facilitate the state-building process did not exist in Japan, though there was a civilian force in Japan that MacArthur relied on for technical expertise and experience. According to Lawrence Yates, early success with DDR did not result in an easy transition on the political front:

With the emperor's backing, the first goal, the demobilization of all Japanese military forces, proved easy to achieve. The process of democratization and liberalization, which aimed at social, economic, and political reform at all levels of Japanese society, was exceedingly more complicated and took much longer to accomplish.<sup>27</sup>

Despite the challenges, the U.S. succeeded in creating a democratic political framework within Japanese society and culture. Again, this could not have happened without the emperor remaining in his position even if it was mostly symbolic. Prior to the Japanese surrender, the U.S. expected heavy casualties on both sides; and thus the plan developed prior to 1945 presumes the U.S. must completely subdue the Japanese population. The sudden unconditional surrender proved the initial plan obsolete and MacArthur tailored subsequent effects to his needs and as the situation dictated. Peter F. Schaefer and P. Clayton Schaefer suggest that the success in Japan resulted from a convergence of a great leader in General MacArthur and a solid plan implemented with precision.<sup>28</sup>

A major obstacle in achieving success in Japan stemmed from the fact that the U.S. destroyed virtually every major city in the country. The entire civil infrastructure of Japan lay destroyed, dysfunctional, or non-existent and the U.S., along with the new democratic Japanese government, invested heavily in public work projects to rebuild the civil infrastructure.<sup>29</sup> The U.S. became the largest employer in Germany and the rest of Europe during reconstruction stimulating the economy and providing markets of commerce for American goods. MacArthur dismantled the Zaibatsu (the industrial and financial sector of Japan, which held influence over the Japanese economy) throughout Japan, which had a significant impact on the economic recovery of the Japanese government and its industrial capital. As a result, a Keiretsu (a loose conglomeration of companies in Japan that make up a business group tied by share holdings and informal relationships) formed to fill the void left by the Zaibatsu and eventually dominated the economic landscape into the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>30</sup>

Many historians of military and political history (Lawrence A. Yates, S. Frederick Starr, Gregg Kaufmann, and Francis Fukuyama) who study state-building and Stability Operations suggest it is difficult to compare or use Japan as a model in these endeavors because Japan unconditionally surrendered to allied forces. However, there are important lessons learned from Japanese reconstruction and occupation when applied to future operations that aim to set the conditions for success. The key components gleaned from Japan again rest with acceptance of the population for a new, legitimate system of government. In addition, the safety and security established by U.S. military personnel provided the climate for economic growth and reinvestment in the civil infrastructure of the country.

Objective research requires a look at both positive and negative aspects of any topic. While Germany and Japan as presented in this paper highlight positive components of state-building

and Stability Operations, they suffered many problems and obstacles. The leaders solved some of these, yet some remained unsolved. A look at negative lessons learned is the issue for discussion over the next several pages, focusing in the recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

An outside observer can look at the U.S. invasion of Iraq and conclude that it was a complete failure when looking at the state-building process and the Stability Operations conducted by the U.S. military in support of the diplomatic mission. The reality is that many successes resulted during the reconstruction effort in Iraq, due in large part to the extensive planning that took place prior to combat operations. However, ultimate failure overshadowed any success garnered in Iraq. The initial phase of providing security and safety in Iraq became increasingly difficult to manage. The most important function of the military during Stability Operations is providing the civilian population security and safety. The first mistake made centered on mishandling the DDR of Iraqi military personnel. A lack of interagency coordination and planning permeated the “Future of Iraq Project” ran by DoS under the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which later became the Coalition Provisional Authority. The DoD had little faith that the DoS understood the gravity of post-conflict Iraq and failed to coordinate with DoS on many issues crucial to reconstruction. After Ambassador Paul Bremer banned the Ba’ath Political Party and disbanded the Iraqi Army, an entire sector of the Iraqi population instantaneously became unemployed with no means to support themselves or their family. Disbandment of the army with no plan of reintegration met stiff resistance from DoD, but to no avail. The lens of history suggests that this was a colossal mistake, which led ultimately to a violent insurgency funded by external state actors. Iraq’s failed DDR plan or lack of a cohesive plan compounded the security environment throughout Iraq during the entire occupation.

General Tommy Franks and General George Casey frequently complained to the administration that the security threat demanded additional forces.<sup>31</sup>

The next lesson learned centers on two components that are indivisible – Iraq’s economy and its civil infrastructure. “With the conviction that Saddam Hussein had an ability to ignore the financial realities of thirteen years of international sanctions in the aftermath of the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the G.W. Bush administration did not focus on the state of virtual collapse of much of the Iraqi infrastructure.”<sup>32</sup> Iraq’s economy and dysfunctional civil infrastructure presented a monumental hurdle for U.S. reconstruction efforts. The tenets of stability rely on the transitional government’s ability to provide basic needs such as food, potable water, electricity, sanitation management, and the security blanket in which each of these components rests. The military could not meet the Iraqi population’s demand for these basic services. Additionally, the influx of military-aged males with no vocation perpetuated an insurgency that offered very little safe haven for military personnel outside of U.S. military compounds. An increasing gap of perception from Iraqi citizens witnessed American occupiers as the “haves,” living in relative safety of concrete walls with potable water, an endless supply of food trucked in from Turkey and Kuwait, sanitation management, and a stable supply of electricity. Animosity and hate fueled a spike in terrorist activity throughout Iraq.<sup>33</sup>

The last major lesson learned from Iraq was political indifference. Prior to the U.S. invasion in 2003, Iraq lived under the totalitarian rule of Saddam’s Ba’ath Party. Saddam was a brutal dictator that routinely persecuted his people. The idea of democracy was a foreign construct for most Iraqis and the elections in 2004 did little to change this sentiment. A significant factor that plagued the democratization of Iraq rested on the tribal and religious nature of many people throughout the country. Western liberal democracy does not play well in Southwest Asia, which

is predominately Muslim and ruled by dictators or established monarchies. The U.S. unsuccessfully tried to impose a system of government not received well by either the ruling elite or at the commoner level. This is not to say that everyone felt disenfranchised in Iraq (because some did not), yet the majority of the population did not accept the imposed democracy. For example, the Sunni population that lost control of the government after Saddam was deposed. Legitimacy of the provisional government never surfaced in the political sphere or the general population. “It is important to emphasize that the achievement of a reformed security sector in governance is very much a function of the extent to which the new régime is broadly perceived as legitimate.”<sup>34</sup>

The lessons of legitimacy, security, and viable civil infrastructure are a recurring theme in state-building and Stability Operations. If any one of these issues suffers systemic failure, the entire framework will collapse. The ultimate result in the wake of failure from U.S. occupation of Iraq is an increasingly unstable country currently threatened by an Islamic militia known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) or now Da’ish.<sup>35</sup>

The final historical case study used as a negative lessons learned is Afghanistan. Afghanistan suffered under the brutal régime of the Taliban for the better part of a decade, under the auspice of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 sought to eliminate the Taliban, find Al Qaeda and its leader Osama Bin Laden, and establish a sovereign government, according to S. Frederick Starr:

Afghanistan presents fundamental issues of nation-building in the starkest light possible. The immensity of the task that America and its partners faced after bringing down the Taliban was staggering. Even before the Soviet invasion and occupation, civil war, and the Taliban rule left the country and its partially built structures of rule in utter shambles. It is no exaggeration to say that by the time the Taliban fell, the entire country had become, for the nation-builder, a tabula rasa.<sup>36</sup>

From the standpoint of most Afghans, sovereignty was not a major issue; the central problem that plagued the provincial government was legitimacy. The Bonn conference in December 2001 focused on the issue of sovereignty and designated the government in Kabul as an “Interim Authority” which became a “Transitional Authority” and finally the “Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan”<sup>37</sup> that would ultimately lead to a legitimate government based on democratic elections. The problem of legitimacy stemmed from the power grab by the Northern Alliance after Kabul fell. The Northern Alliance leaders systematically filled most of the government posts with their people and alienated the largest population in Afghanistan, the Pashtuns. The Hamid Karzai government suffered from illegitimacy and corruption at every level. The general population did not trust the government and its sphere of influence did not extend much beyond the city limits of Kabul.<sup>38</sup>

The security situation in Afghanistan was hardly that. A porous Pakistan boarder provided many terrorists and remnants of the Taliban safe passage into Afghanistan to conduct terrorist and insurgent activities throughout the country. Once again, the U.S. military pleaded for additional troops to conduct security operations; however, Washington routinely denied the requests as major combat and Stability Operations in Iraq were ongoing. Mobility also plagued the military’s ability to establish security for the general population and the insurgents took full advantage of this deficiency. The non-existent road network created a logistical nightmare for coalition forces and the USAF virtually airlifted everything brought into the country. These challenges proved to be a significant obstacle to success.<sup>39</sup>

As if legitimacy and security were not major issues to resolve, the biggest problem that hindered success was the complete lack of civil infrastructure. Afghanistan only has one major highway through the country and road networks literally end at city limits. All the basic services

for modern-day living are absent from many villages and cities. Power production is limited and electrical distribution does not exist. Generators and batteries pepper the landscape and most Afghan citizens do not have power or have limited access that consistently produces prolonged blackouts. The lack of central power production facilities and distribution grids directly affects water production and distribution. Running water is a luxury in Afghanistan; most people manually pump their water from a well. Wastewater and sanitation services do not exist except in major cities. The complete lack of basic services and the non-existent civil infrastructure to support the people leads many Afghanistan citizens to distrust the central government even more so on top of the systemic lack of legitimacy.<sup>40</sup>

Among the many challenges to Afghanistan, the lack of education and a stable economy suffocates any potential growth stimulated by the international community. Limited natural resources and high rates of illiteracy feed the drug industry and terrorist groups that move in and out of the country. Many citizens that receive an education leave the country for a better life in a developed nation that offers opportunity in a multitude of vocations. A country filled with military aged males faced with no opportunity or education often resorts to a life crime or in this case terrorism.

If the U.S. studied the history of Afghanistan, a realization that state-building and Stability Operations had little chance of success. It is difficult to achieve success if one component of Stability Operations has little chance for success, but when all three share that fate, blood and treasure cannot make it so. The lessons learned in Afghanistan serves as a textbook case filled with negative outcomes. Lack of security, illegitimate government, and no civil infrastructure to support basic services or an economy, highlight the Afghan experiment. Additionally, the fact that democracy meant very little to the people of Afghanistan and their religion, culture, and

societal norms are 180 degrees in the opposite direction of a liberal Western system serve as red flags for future state-building and Stability Operations.

### **Section 3: Conditions for Success**

Post-conflict strategy requires extensive planning and coordination for a chance at success. The notion that one size fits all is not applicable to state-building or Stability Operations. This process is very complicated and involves every aspect of a modern society: its economy, politics, education, infrastructure, and culture. As stated earlier in this paper, each actor (military, civil servants, and contractors) has a part to play in the state-building process. There are, however some key elements required for consideration before any group should tackle a Stability Operation or a state-building endeavor. To begin, the process requires a plan for adequate staffing trained in diplomacy and support staff skilled in the intricacies of forming a legitimate government based on a solid political framework that represents the people. As Terrence Kelly reveals:

The resulting plan should be detailed but flexible. The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the lead HR office should develop a notional work-force plan that planners could scale for larger operations or modify to meet unanticipated requirements. The plan should designate the agency responsible for each billet, time lines for filling positions, sources of candidates, and resource requirements and funding sources or responsibilities.<sup>41</sup>

The political climate is the most crucial element and for any chance at success, the U.S. and its allies must insert the right people at the right time into the right position. One of the problems in Iraq and Afghanistan was a lack of personnel to deal with the many crisis that occurred. Diplomats, engineers, police forces, military personnel, lawyers, medical staff, and many other support people and teams are crucial and need a central authority to control the flow of these people and teams in and out of the situation as needed. A huge lesson learned centered on

identifying people, hiring them, and getting them to the field in a timely manner if at all to address problems.<sup>42</sup>

Additionally, the U.S. and its allies approach each situation from a Western construct and try to force a democratic system based on a said construct to each post-conflict Stability Operation. state-building must be sensitive to the cultural and ethnic realities. As Timothy Sisk suggests,

The recent transition in the middle East suggest that the post-Cold War tidal wave of transitions from authoritarian or war-torn countries to democracy is not yet over. Democratization, as these transitions have poignantly shown, can be conflict-inducing, and in the worst instances can degenerate into civil war when maniacal elites cling to power and turn the coercive force of the state against their own people.<sup>43</sup>

Albeit the U.S. should seek a democratic solution to a failed state, or post-conflict reconstruction. However, the people must have a voice and buy-in during the process so that ownership of the outcome belongs to them and not to a perceived occupying force. The framework established for a legitimate government relies on the conditions of a post-conflict situation. As this paper suggests, the difference between defeat and unconditional surrender, from deposing a dictator or a brutal régime, varies as to the breadth and depth that a Western type democracy can take hold and flourish. In addition, the cultural and religious similarities of each side can determine the compatibility of a democratic system and its potential success.

The path to government legitimacy lies with the government's ability to provide basic services to its population; without this ability, it is a dubious belief that the people will support the government regardless of franchise to local leaders across the state. Services provided range from a modicum amount of social service to power, water, and sanitation. However, these services require a stable environment with an economy that can produce taxable revenue. Security is also a major issue of concern and underlies all other key factors. The military's role in Stability Operations is to provide safety and security as well as disarm militant factions among

the population. Once safety and security is established, the other elements can begin the difficult work of establishing a legitimate government, which can provide the services its population demands. Thus, the dichotomy and the problem, which is why state-building and Stability Operations is very difficult and more often than not winds up in failure.

## **Conclusion**

“States are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations.”<sup>44</sup> This quote from the U.N. Secretary General in 2011 highlights the pandemic problem with the third world and to a greater extent, emerging second-world-tiered states and underlines the three main points of this paper: security and safety, functioning infrastructure, and economic opportunity. These three key elements form the building blocks upon the foundation of a legitimate government and political system.

A legitimate government is the first step in the process of state-building but as Dr. Timothy Sisk states “Democratization after war can be deeply destabilizing.”<sup>45</sup> However, Sisk argues that the institutions that support democracy must be established prior to an officially functioning government. Once the institutions are built than the process of elections and franchise of local leaders into the political system offers the greatest possibility that the population will accept the government and provide it with their labor and revenue. Some of the various institutions required for government legitimacy are political parties, a sustainable economy, police and military forces, and an active free press.

The building blocks to establishing government legitimacy hinge on safety and security, a functional civil infrastructure, and economic opportunity. The international community must

leverage its wealth and power in an effort to bring to bear the resources needed to support a failed state. Agriculture and industry provide opportunities for people to work and earn a living wage, which in turn requires a sound education system that promotes vocations such as engineering, computer science, medical professionals, and many other technical fields that can sustain a viable economy. However, education, jobs, economic opportunities, and other basic services are meaningless without safety and security.

In a failed state or a post-conflict region, safety and security of the population trumps almost every other need, the exception being basic human necessities such as food, water, shelter, and clothing. Whether dealing with an insurgency, defeated enemy, or an unconditionally surrendered foe, the population must feel safe and secure. This is no easy task depending on the situation and requires a substantial amount of resources and personnel to achieve, yet once established, the business of state-building or Stability Operations can begin almost unhindered.

State-building and Stability Operations are not simple endeavors that one can just jump into without a plan. They are complex, difficult, and very demanding enterprises for any nation to undertake. Success is possible if one follows the fundamental tenets outlined in this paper. The end state for successful Stability Operations consists of a legitimate government based on a political framework that reflects the governed. Democracy should not be the sole mark of success; rather a functioning system based on a democratic construct that provides the three key components: security and safety, functioning infrastructure, and economic opportunity.

## References

---

- <sup>1</sup> Timothy D. Sisk, *Statebuilding: Consolidating Peace After Civil War*, (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2013) 46-77.
- <sup>2</sup> Jeremi Suri, *Liberty's Surest Guardian, Rebuilding Nations After War From The Founders To Obama*, (New York, NY: Free Press, 2011), 35.
- <sup>3</sup> Dewey A. Browder, *Stability Operations and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies: Colloquium Report*, ed. Gregg Kaufmann, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 59.
- <sup>4</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-07 Stability*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February 25, 2013), 1-1.
- <sup>5</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-07 Stability*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 11, 2011), I-3.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, I-2.
- <sup>7</sup> Joint Publication 3-07 Stability, I-1 – I-2.
- <sup>8</sup> United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2009), 1-3 – 3-21.
- <sup>9</sup> David Ekbladh, *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, ed. Francis Fukuyama, (Baltimore, MA: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 35-36.
- <sup>10</sup> United States Agency for International Development, *ADS Chapter 201 Planning*, (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2014), 24, 71, 77-78. United States Agency for International Development, *Human and Institutional Capacity Development Policy Paper A Mandatory Reference for ADS Chapter 201*, (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2009), 2-6.
- <sup>11</sup> Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, January 2006) 2.
- <sup>12</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM 3-07 Stability*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 2, 2014)iv.
- <sup>13</sup> Joint Publication 3-07 Stability, C-20, E-8 – E-9, F-4.
- <sup>14</sup> Suri, *Liberty's Surest Guardian*, 48.
- <sup>15</sup> Negroponte Agreement – named after John D. Negroponte, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq June 2004 to April 2005. Set up requirements required to achieve security for democratic elections in

---

Iraq and the disposition of U.S. forces after the transitional government relinquishes authority over to the Iraqi government.

<sup>16</sup> “Marshall Plan,” United States History, <http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1852.html>.

<sup>17</sup> David Fedman and Cary Karacas, "A Cartographic Fade to Black: Mapping the Destruction of Urban Japan during World War II," *Journal of Historical Geography* 38, no. 3 (July, 2012): 306-328. <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ahl&AN=78091390&site=ehost-live>.

<sup>18</sup> Reports of General MacArthur MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase Vol 1 supplement, Washington, D.C. January 1966, 4-47. <http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1%20Sup/Ind ex.htm>.

<sup>19</sup> Warren F Kimball, *Swords or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany, 1943-1946*, ed. Harold M. Hyman, (Rutgers University, Newark College: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1976), 3-24.

<sup>20</sup> Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations*, 74.

<sup>21</sup> Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations*, 12.

<sup>22</sup> Allen W. Dulles, *The Marshall Plan*, ed. Michael Wala, (Providence, RI: Berg Publishers, Inc., 1993), 108-125.

<sup>23</sup> Browder, *Stability Operations and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies: Colloquium Report*, 63.

<sup>24</sup> Dulles, *The Marshall Plan*, 63-95.

<sup>25</sup> Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations*, 13.

<sup>26</sup> Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations*, 77.

<sup>27</sup> Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations*, 13.

<sup>28</sup> Peter F. Schaefer and P. Clayton Schaefer, *Stability Operations and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies: Colloquium Report*, ed. Gregg Kaufmann, (Westport, CT: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 69-88.

<sup>29</sup> Mark Selden, “The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus In-depth critical analysis of the forces shaping the Asia-Pacific...and the world,” <http://japanfocus.org/-Mark-Selden/2414>.

<sup>30</sup> Brian Twomey, “Understanding Japanese Keiretsu,” <http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/japanese-keiretsu.asp>.

- 
- <sup>31</sup> Larry Diamond, *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, ed. Francis Fukuyama, (Baltimore, MA: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 173-181.
- <sup>32</sup> Cynthia A. Watson, *Nation-Building and Stability Operations: A Reference Handbook*, (Westport, CT: Prager Security International, 2008), 33.
- <sup>33</sup> Johanna M. Forman, *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, ed. Francis Fukuyama, (Baltimore, MA: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 196-212.
- <sup>34</sup> Sisk, *Statebuilding :Consolidating Peace After Civil War*, 82.
- <sup>35</sup> Murat Yetkin, "ISIL or DA'ISH, wasn't born yesterday," last updated November 1, 2014, <http://factsonturkey.org/12444/isil-or-daish-wasnt-born-yesterday/>.
- <sup>36</sup> S. Frederick Starr, *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, ed. Francis Fukuyama, (Baltimore, MA: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 107.
- <sup>37</sup> Starr, *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, 110.
- <sup>38</sup> S. Frederick Starr, *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, ed. Francis Fukuyama, (Baltimore, MA: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 107-124.
- <sup>39</sup> Marvin G. Weinbaum, *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, ed. Francis Fukuyama, (Baltimore, MA: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 125-144.
- <sup>40</sup> Larry P. Goodson, *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, ed. Francis Fukuyama, (Baltimore, MA: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 145-167.
- <sup>41</sup> Terrence Kelly, Ellen Tunstall, Thomas Szayna and Deanna Prine, *Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing :Developing U.S. Civilian Personnel Capabilities*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation Monograph Series, 2008) xviii.
- <sup>42</sup> Kelly, *Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing :Developing U.S. Civilian Personnel Capabilities*, 1-26.
- <sup>43</sup> Sisk, *Statebuilding :Consolidating Peace After Civil War*, 127.
- <sup>44</sup> Report of the Secretary General, *Preventive Diplomacy, delivering Results*, August 26, 2011, S/2011/552.
- <sup>45</sup> Sisk, *Statebuilding :Consolidating Peace After Civil War*, 130.

## Bibliography

- Ahmed, Mohammed M. A. *Iraqi Kurds and Nation-Building*. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Browder, Dewey A., Greg Kaufmann, and Army War College. *Stability Operations and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies : Colloquium Report*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008.
- Castillo, Graciana del. *Rebuilding War-Torn States: The Challenge of Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Dobbins, James and Inc ebrary. *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*. Rand Corporation Monograph Series. Vol. MG557-SRF. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Security Research Division, 2007. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/usmcu/Doc?id=10225514>.
- Dulles, Allen W. *The Marshall Plan*. ed. Michael Wala. Providence, RI: Berg Publishers, Inc., 1993.
- Fedman, David and Cary Karacas. "A Cartographic Fade to Black: Mapping the Destruction of Urban Japan during World War II." *Journal of Historical Geography* 38, no. 3 (07, 2012): 306-328. doi:10.1016/j.jhg.2012.02.004.  
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ahl&AN=78091390&site=ehost-live>.
- Fukuyama, Francis and Inc ebrary. *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*. Forum on Constructive Capitalism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.  
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/usmcu/Doc?id=10188492>.
- Headquarters Department of the Army. *ADRP 3-07 Stability*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February 25, 2013.
- Headquarters Department of the Army. *FM 3-07 Stability*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 2, 2014.
- Kelly, Terrence K. and Rand Corporation. *Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing :Developing U.S. Civilian Personnel Capabilities*. Rand Corporation Monograph Series. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2008. [http:// www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG580.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG580.pdf); <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG580.html>.
- Kimball, Warren F. *Swords or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany, 1943-1946*. ed. Harold M. Hyman. Rutgers University, Newark College: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1976.
- Logan, Michael. *Nation-Building*. Opposing Viewpoints Series. Detroit: Greenhaven Press, 2007.

“Marshall Plan.” United States History. <http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1852.html>.

Paine, S. C. M. *Nation Building, State Building, and Economic Development :Case Studies and Comparisons*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2010.

Reports of General MacArthur MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase vol 1 supplement. Washington, D.C. January 1966.  
<http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1%20Sup/Index.htm>.

Report of the Secretary General. *Preventive Diplomacy, delivering Results*. August 26, 2011.

Selden, Mark. “The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus In-depth critical analysis of the forces shaping the Asia-Pacific...and the world.” <http://japanfocus.org/-Mark-Selden/2414>.

Sisk, Timothy D. *Statebuilding :Consolidating Peace After Civil War*. War and Conflict in the Modern World. Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2013.

Suri, Jeremi. *Liberty’s Surest Guardian, Rebuilding Nations After War From The Founders To Obama*. New York, NY: Free Press, 2011.

Twomey, Brian. “Understanding Japanese Keiretsu.”  
<http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/japanese-keiretsu.asp>.

United States Agency for International Development. *ADS Chapter 201 Planning*. Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2014.

United States Agency for International Development. *Human and Institutional Capacity Development Policy Paper A Mandatory Reference for ADS Chapter 201*. Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2009.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 3-07 Stability*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 11, 2011.

United States Institute of Peace. *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2009.

Watson, Cynthia Ann. *Nation-Building and Stability Operations :A Reference Handbook*. Contemporary Military, Strategic, and Security Issues. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008.

Yates , Lawrence A. *The US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, January 2006.

Yetkin, Murat. "ISIL or DA'ISH, wasn't born yesterday." last updated November 1, 2014.  
<http://factsonturkey.org/12444/isil-or-daish-wasnt-born-yesterday/>.