

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 15-04-2015		2. REPORT TYPE Master of Military Studies Research Paper		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) September 2014 - April 2015	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Where did all the Defense Battalions Go? A Historical Examination of the Marine Corps' Ability to Defend Expeditionary Bases				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A	
6. AUTHOR(S) Wolcott, Seth, Major, USMC				5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A	
				5e. TASK NUMBER N/A	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) N/A	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A					
14. ABSTRACT In 1901 the Secretary of the Navy, ordered the Marine Corps to establish an Advance Base Force to secure and defend advance bases for the fleet. The Marine Corps struggled to man, train, and equip the Advance Base Force until the 1st Defense Battalion was created in 1939. The defense battalions repeatedly proved their worth on the battlefields of the Pacific but by the end of the war the majority of the battalions were redesignated as anti-aircraft battalions. This signaled the end of manned, trained, and equipped base defense units. The Marine Corps has paid a high price for the lack of base defense units since the successful defense of Hagaru-ri during the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir in December 1950. Irregular forces have repeatedly exploited undertrained and undermanned ad hoc Marine Corps base defense forces at places like Da Nang, Marble Mountain, Beirut, and Camp Bastion and have caused the destruction of valuable aircraft and have killed hundreds of soldiers, sailors, airman, and Marines. The Marine Corps has embraced the offensive aspects of our expeditionary crisis response mission and focused on the creation of offensive capabilities, largely at the expense of defensive capabilities. The historical record proves that the Marine Corps has struggled to adequately defend expeditionary bases since the end of World War II, and it is likely that the United States' enemies will continue to exploit this weakness during current and future conflicts.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Advance Base Force; Base Defense; Defense Battalions; Wake; Chosin; Da Nang; Marble Mountain; Beirut; Bastion					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 108	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Marine Corps University/Command a
a. REPORT Unclass	b. ABSTRACT Unclass	c. THIS PAGE Unclass			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

Where did all the Defense Battalions Go?

A Historical Examination of the Marine Corps' Ability to Defend Expeditionary Bases


SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:

Major Seth Wolcott, US Marine Corps


AY 14-15

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Donald F. Bittner, Ph.D., Professor of History
(Emeritus)

Approved: 

Date: 30 March 2015

Oral Defense Committee Member: Richard L. DiNardo
John W. Gordon, Ph.D., Professor of National Security
Affairs

Approved: 

Date: 30 March 2015

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Executive Summary

Title: Where did all the Defense Battalions Go? A Historical Examination of the Marine Corps' Ability to Defend Expeditionary Bases

Author: Major Seth Wolcott, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The Marine Corps has progressively lost both the capability to defend advance bases, and more importantly the cadre of defense professionals who possess the defensive mindset necessary to defend advance and expeditionary bases since the disestablishment of the defense battalions at the end of World War II.

Discussion: In the first 40 years of the 20th century the Marine Corps was small organization that underwent significant change and struggled to find a mission in the modern naval era. In 1901 John D. Long, the Secretary of the Navy, ordered the Commandant of the Marine Corps to establish an Advance Base Force to secure and defend advance bases for the fleet. The Marine Corps, hampered by a small budget, limited manpower, and numerous expeditionary deployments struggled to man, train, and equip the Advance Base Force until the 1st Defense Battalion was created in 1939. The defense battalions repeatedly proved their worth on the battlefields of the Pacific but by the end of the war, as the Japanese' offense capabilities waned, and the majority of the defense battalions were redesignated as antiaircraft battalions. This signaled the end of manned, trained, and equipped base defense units and with it the Marine Corps' ability to conduct base defense atrophied. The 1st Marine Division, blessed by fortune and an enemy lacking combined arms, was able to defend the key expeditionary base at Hagaru-Ri near the Chosin Reservoir despite the use of an ad hoc force. Unfortunately the Marine Corps' fortunes did not last and the Marine Corps has paid a high price for the lack of base defense units since December 1950.

The use of ad hoc defense forces continues to this day and the Marine Corps suffered the consequences of this policy at places like Da Nang, Marble Mountain, Beirut, and Camp Bastion. During this period, irregular forces have repeatedly exploited undertrained and undermanned ad hoc Marine Corps base defense forces and have caused the destruction of valuable aircraft and in the case of the Marine Corps Barracks in Beirut, the deaths of 241 soldiers, sailors, and Marines. More recently, this hodgepodge method again proved to be inadequate and had tragic results in Afghanistan on September 14, 2012 when 15 insurgents caused significant destruction at the Bastion Airfield in Afghanistan.

Conclusion: The Marine Corps has embraced the offensive aspects of our expeditionary crisis response mission and focused on the creation of offensive capabilities, largely at the expense of defensive capabilities. The historical record proves that the Marine Corps has struggled to adequately defend expeditionary bases since the end of World War II, and it is likely that the United States' enemies will continue to exploit this weakness during current and future conflicts; the unfortunate result will be the continued loss of valuable aircraft and the deaths of priceless Marines.

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Preface

The Marine Corps and the officers who command Marines have the burden of command and responsibility to defend expeditionary bases. It is enshrined in both Title 10 of the U.S. Code, and in official Marine Corps Doctrine. Force protection is a key element in the Marine Corps Planning Process and thoughtful consideration must be given to safety of the Marines, and material that will occupy expeditionary bases. I became interested in this topic after participating in the attack on Bastion Airfield on 14-15 September, 2012. While the attack came as a shock to many, it was not unexpected. Those of us who worked and lived on the eastern portion of the base knew that the security was shoddy and that Afghan civilians lived just a few feet from the fence line. We all heard the reports raising concerns that many of the young men on motorcycles riding the dusty roads outside of base were surveying our positions, later events ensued these suspicions were correct.

This paper will discuss the history of the Marine Corps' efforts to defend advanced naval and expeditionary bases. It will include the development of purpose-built Marine Corps units designed to defend bases prior to and during World War II, and the accompanying creation and later loss of a professional defensive mindset within the Marine Corps. In addition, the paper will discuss the Marine Corps' use of ad hoc base defense and units that were rerolled into base security elements after the defense battalions were disestablished. This paper is not intended to develop a 21st century defense battalion; rather, it will illustrate the importance of defense organizations, defense professionals, and the defensive mindset that previous generations of Marines deemed essential to base defense.

For the purpose of this paper will use the terms *advance naval base* and *expeditionary base* synonymously. Their uses will differ in that naval bases will be in the maritime

environment while expeditionary bases, like those at the Chosin Reservoir, Lebanon (1958), Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, were inland. The concepts, doctrine, and the “defensive mindset” required to defend both types of bases are similar and rely upon expertise in force protection and the ability to combine all the elements of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to effectively protect naval or joint assets. For the most part, the expeditionary base has replaced the advance naval base but the potential threat posed by a resurgent China necessitates a study of the history and problems associated with advance base work. It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify a model for a future defense battalion. This paper will however, illustrate why the Marine Corps needs a cadre of Marines that are subject matter experts on force protection and defensive operations and what happens to Marine Corps bases when they are not properly defended.

The paper will use a variety of case studies spanning from before World War I through World War II, the war in Afghanistan. For the paper I used both first and secondary sources including US Marine Corps History Division publications, civilian sources, personal interviews, military doctrinal publications and official Marine Corps reports.

First and foremost I would like to thank my family. My wife, Teresa, has supported me in good times and in bad and I owe her more than I can ever say. Our daughters, Josephine and Lucia keep me grounded and remind me of where my true priorities lie; they are a gift from God. I would also like to thank Dr Donald F. Bittner, Professor of History (Emeritus); from day one his knowledge, guidance and mentorship have kept me from drifting in the storm which is the MMS. Last but not least I would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Brian Ross, my Conference Group Military Faculty Advisor, who is a dedicated Marine officer and historian, and was a great sounding board throughout the academic year.

I would like to dedicate this paper to Lieutenant Colonel Christopher K. “Otis” Raible, USMC, and Sergeant Bradley W. Atwell, USMC. I hope that we don’t let the lessons of the past slip through our fingers.



Sergeant Bradley W. Atwell, USMC and Lieutenant Colonel Christopher K. “Otis” Raible USMC

Prologue

Bastion Airfield, Helmand Province, Afghanistan: September 14, 2012

On the night of September 14, 2012, fifteen insurgents breached the wire of Bastion Airfield, a coalition airbase located in Afghanistan's Helmand Province. Shortly thereafter, the insurgents broke into separate elements and then moved west towards the base's flightline. In the ensuing attack two Marines were killed, several U.S. and British service members were wounded, several aircraft were damaged, and six Marine Corps AV-8B aircraft from Marine Attack Squadron (VMA) 211 were destroyed. At the time of the attack the base's security had been relegated to a hodgepodge of elements consisting of everything from Jordanians to private contractor security elements. The airfield was surrounded by fences, guard towers, and limited roving patrols, but the measures proved inadequate. Sergeant Bradley W. Atwell, a Marine Avionics Technician, was killed as he responded to the attack while Lieutenant Colonel Christopher K. "Otis" Raible, the Marine Harrier Squadron's Commanding Officer, was killed as he led a counterattack against the Taliban fighters. The attack was ultimately repulsed on the ground by coalition forces in the air and on the ground.

During the subsequent investigation, two Marine Corps General Officers were found lacking and they were retired. By all accounts, the British commanders did not take responsibility for the attack and to this day many Marines who were there say that the British bear some responsibility for what happened that night. But what many Marines have forgotten is that the Marine Corps and the officers who command Marines have the burden of command and responsibility to defend their own expeditionary bases. This mission cannot be relegated to others.

Introduction: The Evolution and De-evolution of the Marine Corps' Defensive Capabilities

The modern United States Marine Corps emerged shortly after the Spanish American War. The United States and its Soldiers of the Sea faced new missions in support of an expanding American Empire; in the ensuing decades, the Marine Corps' mission changed from its traditional ship's company and Marine barracks role to supporting the seizure and defense of advance naval bases. The Fleet Marine Force (FMF) was created on 7 December 1933 and ushered in another mission change as the Marine Corps sought to both seize and then defend advance naval bases through the use of amphibious assault.¹

These combined arms teams were integrated with Marine aviation and were soon defending American Samoa, Midway, Johnson and Wake islands.² By December 1944 most the Japanese Empire's offensive power-projection capabilities had been eliminated. As a result, many of the defense battalions were re-designated as anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) battalions because the threat of Japanese attacks against American bases subsided. Some of those AAA Battalions remained active through the Korean War and into the 1960s.

The National Security Act of 1947 captured both the offensive and defensive nature of the Marine Corps' mission as the mission was codified in law as "seize and defend advanced naval bases."³ Despite this tasking in law, the Marine Corps eliminated much of its capability to defend advance naval bases during the fiscally austere period between World War II and the Korean War. After the Korean War buildup the remaining AAA battalions, the last vestige of the defense battalions, then evolved into anti-aircraft missile battalions during the Cold War.

Following World War II, the Marine Corps only dedicated a limited amount of funds and intellectual effort into the problem of defense of advanced naval or expeditionary bases. The AAA battalions were the sole defensive capability that remained and were slowly replaced by

missile battalions like the 1st Terrier Surface-To-Air Missile Battalion, which was re-designated the 1st Medium Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion (MAAM) in June 1956. MAAM was replaced in 1960 by light anti-aircraft missile battalions (LAAM), which remained the only Marine Corps unit, aside from military police, that focused on the defense of the MAGTF or Marine bases. During the Vietnam War the Marine Corps established a series of fire bases and a limited number of larger bases. The fire bases were generally “forward positioned” in nature while larger bases like Marble Mountain and Da Nang contained many of the comforts of home but generally featured temporary structures. These bases were defended by a variety of units, including LAAMs, and were surrounded by the enemy at all times and proved vulnerable to limited enemy raids and indirect fire. The Marine Corps struggles to protect the large bases like Da Nang and Marble Mountain, a problem that was complicated by the unconventional nature of the war in Vietnam.

After the Vietnam War the Marine Corps continued to ignore the subject of base defense and force protection. While low Altitude Air Defense Battalions (LAAD) were established in the early 1980s to augment the LAAMs’ MIM-23 Homing All the Way Killer (HAWK) missiles, little effort was given to this tactical and operational problem associated with advance base defense. In 1983 a suicide bomber drove a truck bomb through the inadequate defenses at the Marine Corps Barracks in Beirut and detonated at the buildings entrance, which resulted in the deaths of 241 soldiers, sailors, and Marines. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan large Marine Corps bases were often defended by poorly coordinated provisional security forces that included Marines, coalition allies and US or third country national (TCN) contractors. This hodgepodge method proved inadequate and had tragic results in Afghanistan on September 14, 2012.

The story of the Marine Corps since the Spanish American War has been one of both innovation and tribulation. During these decades the Marine Corps has slowly and systematically built and then eroded its ability to carry out its defensive mission. This defensive mission was originally assigned by the Secretary of the Navy in 1901 and later codified in Title 10 of the United States Code in 1947. Upon examination it appears as if the Marine Corps, which dedicated significant intellectual capital to the challenges associated with the defense of advance bases prior to World War II, has become so focused on “locate, close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver” that it has allowed its defensive capabilities, expertise, and mindset to atrophy since the defense battalions were disestablished at the end of World War II.⁴ The lack of dedicated defensive forces has been accompanied by a lack of defensive experts throughout the Marine Corps. In 1936 the Marine Corps even created a 10 month course base defense at Quantico, “despite the absence of primary base defense units,” it hasn’t even updated “Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 8-3, Advanced Naval Base Defense” since 1978.⁵ The Corps systematically reduced most of its defense capabilities since the end of the Cold War as the Corps eliminated the HAWK medium altitude missiles in the late 1990s and reduced Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) battalions from four to two in the 2000s. The Marine Corps reduced uniformed Military Police (MP) billets, and replaced MPs with civilian police while simultaneously changing the remaining MP’s focus from base defense and security to criminal investigation and counter intelligence.⁶

This is not to say that Marines cannot defend advance bases but it does mean that the Corps accepts significant risk because it does not possess a core capability base defense experts. This is a troubling in light of the Corps’ historical record, which includes a number of spectacular attacks on poorly defended expeditionary bases in 1965, 1983, and 2012. This should

be unacceptable to a Marine Corps that continues to be tasked to operate across the range of military operations (ROMO) and will undoubtedly continue to face the same sort of threats that have appeared in the past. This essay will examine how the Marine Corps has progressively lost both the capability to defend advance bases, and more importantly the cadre of defense professionals who possess the defensive mindset necessary to defend advance and expeditionary bases since the disestablishment of the defense battalions at the end of World War II. This essay will also illustrate that since 1946, the Marine Corps has relied upon ad hoc base defense units, often sourced from active and reserve infantry and artillery, which have repeatedly proved that they are not prepared to successfully conduct the base defense mission.

The Emerging American Empire and Formalized Defense: The Advance Base Force

The United States, following its victory in the Spanish-American War, emerged from the 19th century as an immature empire with new colonial possessions stretching from the Caribbean to the Philippines. With the new territory came new responsibilities as the country was quickly thrust onto the world stage. The age of sail had passed to the age of steam, and the nation needed a modern Navy to defend America's new possessions. This occurred within the context of two other emerging imperial powers. Rising German naval power raised the specter of a possible war in the Caribbean. However, the Navy's attention was focused elsewhere. In the Pacific, the Empire of Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1905). American war planners anticipated a future conflict with Japan and this planning soon absorbed a significant portion of the Department of Navy's strategic planning, and lasted until the end of World War II. New strategic and operational problems confronted the young empire as it attempted to solve the logistical problems associated with a naval war against Japan in the Pacific. This planning included an expanded role for the Marine Corps within a larger naval framework. The result was

the eventual creation of a Marine defensive force designed to hold advance naval bases that could serve as logistical and refueling hubs in a future conflict. While innovative, this role was still somewhat in line with many of the Corps traditions, which included guarding naval shipyards and performing other light expeditionary operations.

The Navy General Board and the Creation of the Advance Base Force

In his changing strategic environment, President Theodore Roosevelt and congress eagerly supplied 14 new battleships and armored cruisers to patrol the world's oceans. Unfortunately, the United States lacked the overseas logistical infrastructure to support the new great white fleet.⁷ The problem was further complicated by the fact that the congress was also unwilling to fund the supply, auxiliary, and transport ships that the fleet required for extended operations. Those auxiliary ships simply did not possess the glamour associated with battleships and proved more difficult to fund. Modern warships of the era were fueled by coal and coaling stations were a requirement that Congress was not necessarily willing to fund. The US Navy repeatedly requested basing rights in China, Korea, Cuba, and in the Danish West Indies in order to secure coaling facilities for the Asian Squadron, but the Navy's attempt failed.⁸ In response to the difficulties associated with basing rights, the US Navy used the newly established Navy General Board to propose new methods to secure advance naval bases that could serve as coaling stations in the event of war.

In order to facilitate planning and naval policy, the Navy General Board was established in 1900 in conjunction with the Naval War College.⁹ In response to the lack of permanent infrastructure Navy planners at the General Board and the Naval War College proposed that the Navy could overcome that lack of permanent facilities with a series of temporary advanced naval bases that could function as coaling stations and logistics bases in the event of war. In 1901, John

D. Long, the Secretary of the Navy ordered the Marines to create an Advance Base Force which would be trained and equipped to seize and defend such temporary advance naval bases. It was designed to repel a limited raid by cruisers and establish an outpost ashore with “emplaced naval guns, high angle artillery, machine guns, infantry, and water and land minefields.”¹⁰ Throughout much of its history the Advance Base Force was plagued by operational commitments in both large and small wars that distracted the Marine Corps from fully implementing the concept behind the force.

The Marine Corps’ was embroiled in numerous expeditionary operations in China, and in post Spanish-American War duties in Cuba and Philippines, which hampered its initial efforts to build the advance base force. By 1910 the lack of progress prompted Secretary of the Navy George von L. Meyer, to order the Corps to assume responsibility for all the Advance Base Equipment that was in warehouses in Philadelphia.¹¹ After some initial hesitancy, and while embroiled in a conflict with the Navy about the Corps’ missions, the Marine Corps embraced advance base work as its primary mission and dedicated significant intellectual and financial resources towards the effort. In 1910 these efforts also included the creation of a “graduate-level” Advance Base School at New London, Connecticut, which then moved to League Island near Philadelphia one year later.¹² Progress continued to be slow. The Marine Corps only participated in one fleet exercise in 1907 and by 1913 the Secretary of the Navy was frustrated and ordered Major General (MajGen) Biddle, the Commandant, to conduct advance base operations during the 1914 fleet maneuvers at Culebra. The exercise was valuable and validated many of the advance base concepts.

During the period from 1914 until World War II, the Marine Corps worked diligently to fulfill its assigned mission to defend advance bases despite limited manning, budgets, and the

distractions caused by numerous expeditions in the Caribbean and Latin America. The Advance Base Force did participate in the combat operations and landings at Vera Cruz in April 1914, where both the “Fixed Defence Regiment” and the “Mobile Regiment” took part in the operation as part of an “Advanced Base Brigade for the Navy,” which was heavily equipped following fleet exercises the previous December.¹³

The Advance Base Force during World War I

World War I provided the Marine Corps with valuable combat experience but it fell outside of the Marine Corps’ traditional duties as ship’s company, expeditionary operations, and its emerging duty of advanced base duty. There was a conflict brewing within the Marine Corps as three camps fought for a dedicated Marine Corps’ mission and the future of the Marine Corps. The first group sought to maintain the traditional missions guarding barracks and serving as ship’s company. The second, led by small wars Marines like Smedley Butler wanted to focus on counterinsurgency operations. The third group advocated a new mission which would coalesce around the Advance Base Force and amphibious operations. This third group was led by influential visionaries like future Commandant John A. Lejeune, who in 1916, summarized the group’s position in the first issue of the Marine Corps Gazette.

In such a war the Marine Corps, if not assigned to Advance Base work, would in all probability be divided up into small detachments and either assigned to the vessels of the fleet, or held on shore in a state of inactivity as guards to navy yards, naval magazines, etc., while waiting for the war at sea to reach a decision. If, on the contrary, the Marine Corps be utilized as an Advance Base organization, it would have the opportunity to share with the Navy the glory always resting on those who strike the first blows at the enemy, and it also would have the satisfaction of feeling that it had an important, semi-

independent duty to perform and that on the manner of its performance would largely depend the success or failure of the Fleet.¹⁴

MajGen Lejeune and others could not imagine the massive expansion of the Corps experienced during World War I and the use of Marines as traditional infantry, which came to fruition when the 5th Marine Regiment arrived in France in June 1917, followed by the 6th Marines in February 1918.¹⁵ The Marine Corps established the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th Marine Regiments as the Corps quickly expanded to 79,254 Marines. In 1917 the threat posed by the German Fleet prompted the Chief of Naval Operations to reinforce the Advance Base Force's 1st and 2nd Regiments so that the force was capable enough to prevent German incursions in the Caribbean.¹⁶ As a result the 7th, 8th, and 9th were assigned to the Advance Base Force while the rest prepared for combat operations in Europe.¹⁷

This was a necessary action considering that the Advance Base Force was just a shell following deployments to Santo Domingo and Haiti in 1916. A reduced 1st Regiment maintained the force's guns and equipment in Philadelphia while the 2nd Marines operated in the West Indies. The Advance Base Force was soon depleted again as the 8th and 9th Regiments, who were the Advance Base Force's infantry, were forced to serve double-duty, and assigned to other missions. The 9th Marines deployed to Cuba to serve with the 3d Marine Brigade while the 8th Marines deployed to Fort Crockett, in Galveston, Texas, which allowed to 8th Marines to be in a position to capture the Mexican oil fields "and keep the peace in Mexico" if the Germans stirred up anti-American sentiment.¹⁸ The force had new motor transport and Captain Alfred A. Cunningham's aviation assets but lacked significant lethality, and an important part of its mission, when it lost its 5-inch coastal defense guns when the Navy reclaimed them to arm merchantmen. In all respects World War I was a quiet affair for the Advance Base Force.

Colonel Robert Heintz noted that the only true advance base operation conducted by the Marines during World War I was the deployment of the 1st Marine Aeronautics Company's seaplanes and a 7-inch coastal defense battery to the Azores for anti-submarine duties.¹⁹ Despite this relative setback, the growth of the force during the war and both the Commandant's and the Chief of Naval Operations commitment to the Advance Base Force were important. They allowed the Marines to further refine and codify concepts including the incorporation of aviation into the "combined-arms island-defense" team, an innovation that proved its importance on Wake Island in December 1941.²⁰ This deployment and the continued focus on advance base operations ensured that the Marine Corps maintained both an intellectual and physical cadre that remained committed to the unique mission.

The Interwar Period: The Banana Wars and the Creation of the FMF

The Marine Corps shrank quickly after the Armistice of 1918 and returned to the constant cycle of erratic "small wars" commitments in the Caribbean and Central America. The "Banana Wars" and deployments to China absorbed a significant number of personnel over the years and served as a distraction from the Corps' efforts to refine its advance base force mission and concepts.²¹ Despite this, in 1920 the Joint Army and Navy Board officially recognized the Marine Corps' "base-seizure" and defense mission; unfortunately these official proclamations were not accompanied by increased appropriations or manning.²²

In the 1920s and 1930s the Marine Corps focused on "readiness" in terms of its ability to quickly deploy and execute base defense for the fleet, in its' ability to deploy quickly to a variety of small war hot spots in Central America, the Caribbean, and China.²³ The Marine Corps also formalized its pursuit of a unique mission by creating the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico in 1920. The Schools consisted of The Basic Course, Company Officer's Course, and Field Grade

Course. In addition MajGen Lejeune moved the Advance Base Force from Philadelphia to Quantico, which was renamed the East Coast Expeditionary Force while the West Coast Expeditionary Force was located in San Diego. MajGen John A. Lejeune also created a planning section, the Division of Operations and Training, at Headquarters Marine Corps run by the Assistant Commandant. In response to the growing Japanese threat in the Pacific the Navy developed War Plan Orange.²⁴ As a part of that war plan, Marine Corps LtCol Pete Ellis then authored Operations Plan 712, “Advance Base Operations in Micronesia”, which envisioned a series of amphibious assaults across the Pacific to retake Guam and defeat the Japanese in the wake of a Japanese attack. One historian characterized Ellis’ work as “a war of advance bases—in a word, a war for Marines.”²⁵ In the wake of the Marines’ new mission the Corps exercised the renamed expeditionary force as both an amphibious force and, as commitments permitted, as a public relations tool.

Smedley Butler was the force’s commander and he engaged in a number of public demonstrations reenacting various Civil War battles. The battles included the Wilderness, Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg, New Market, and Antietam. While the reenactments did not improve the force’s ability to conduct advance base operations it did allow the Marines to “exercising the troops and reminded the public that it had a Marine Expeditionary Force.”²⁶ The East Coast Expeditionary Force was a force designed on paper to accomplish many of the problems associated with mobility and counterattack faced during the creation of the defense battalions more than 15 years later. The force consisted of an understrength infantry brigade with two infantry regiments and a mixed brigade. The mixed brigade consisted of the signals, engineer, searchlight, anti-aircraft artillery, and artillery battalions. In addition a small aviation element was attached to the expeditionary force.

During the early 1920s the force began to conduct exercises in the Caribbean and along the east coast. These valuable exercises and experiments were conducted on Cape Cod, Culebra and Panama.²⁷ In particular, the 1924 Fleet Problem was “similar to exercises conducted in 1902 and 1914” and provided valuable lessons that refined tactics, techniques, and procedures to seize and defend advance naval bases.²⁸ During Fleet Problems III and IV in 1924, the 10th Marines established a defensive base at Culebra while the 5th Marines conducted a rudimentary amphibious assault on Panama. By the late 1920s the “small wars” commitments drained resources away from the expeditionary forces, Fleet Maneuvers did not take place, and the force stagnated. While the Banana Wars provided a useful combat laboratory where the Corps refined close air support (CAS) and small wars tactics, it did not provide the Corps with the opportunity to refine the problems associated with defending advance bases against a near-peer opponent.²⁹ However there was one significant advancement made during the period, in 1927 the Joint Army and Navy Board released *Joint Action, Army and Navy*, which codified the Marine Corps’ amphibious mission “as the initial seizure and defense of advanced bases.”³⁰ Despite these challenges Commandant MajGen John A. Lejeune continued to champion for the Marine Corps to “have a mission all of its own” and remained a strong advocate for amphibious and advance base operations.³¹

By 1932 the Banana Wars were winding to a close; this freed the Corps to broaden its intellectual horizons and also allocate both time and funds to a various endeavors. The Marines, led by the efforts of Commandants Ben Fuller, John H. Russell, and Thomas Holcomb were able to focus on a number of innovations including the newly formed Fleet Marine Force (FMF), the *Tentative Landing Manual for Landing Operations*, a merit-based promotion system, a reinvigorated Marine Corps Reserve, the Platoon Leader’s Course, and the Aviation Cadet

program for new officers, a restructured Marine Corps headquarters, and the advance base problems.³² Commandant MajGen Fuller suspended classes at the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico in order to “proceed as expeditiously as practicable to prepare for publication a manual for landing operations.”³³ In January 1934 the students at the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico presented the first draft of *The Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*, which, after further revision, became Fleet Training Publication 167, *Landing Operations Doctrine* (1938). In addition the Commandant worked with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Secretary of the Navy to create the FMF’s charter with the release of General Order 241 on December 7, 1933.³⁴ The FMF was truly revolutionary in that, unlike the expeditionary forces, the FMF was under the control of the Commander in Chief US fleet, for planning and operations. Numerous fleet exercises followed every year until World War II, but they focused on the offensive, amphibious assault portion of advanced base work, not the defense.³⁵ Throughout the 1930s the Corps struggled to balance manpower with the new focus on amphibious assault, but Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939 signaled the dangers on the horizon and hastened the creation of the defense battalions and the expansion of the US military.³⁶

The Evolution and Execution of Base Defense: The Defense Battalions

The Marine Corps found it easier to advocate for and create defense battalions in the isolationist political environment of the 1930s than to ask for more forces for the Fleet Marine Force. Commandant MajGen Thomas Holcomb worked with the CNO, Admiral William Leahy, on the advance base problems.³⁷ Leahy concluded that the Marine Corps should ask for defensive units and avoid asking for offensive “interventionist” units in the isolationist political environment.³⁸ The German invasion of Poland provided the necessary “sense of urgency,” which allowed the Marine Corps to expand enough to develop new defense battalions for

“advance base service”.³⁹ On September 8th, 1939 President Roosevelt declared a limited national emergency and although the country was still constrained by domestic isolationist politics, the German invasion provided enough political motivation to establish four defense battalions to support a requirement identified in a 1938 Navy study.⁴⁰

By 7 December 1941, the Marine Corps had created seven defense battalions (Appendix B), which were designed to defend advance naval bases against “limited raids by an enemy force,” the new defense battalions looked similar to the Advance Base Force’s 1st Fixed Defense Regiment, later known as the “technical regiment” that took part in the 1914 Caribbean fleet exercises at Culebra.⁴¹ Five of those defense battalions were stationed in the Pacific on 7 December 1941; these battalions were known as the “Rainbow Five.” They received the name because they were part of the new Rainbow War Plans that replaced the colored plans like War Plan Orange. Most of the battalions took part in the actions that day when the Japanese conducted surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor, Wake, Midway, Palmyra, and Johnston islands.

The Marine Corps ultimately created a robust defensive capability (20 defense battalions), which used combined arms and new technologies like radar to defend advance naval bases.⁴² Throughout World War II the Defense Battalions served with distinction during a variety of battles including Wake, Midway, Guadalcanal, Rendova, New Georgia, Saipan, Tinian and Guam. (Appendix B). A study of the 1st and 9th Defense Battalions’ combat records illustrate the important role that defense battalions played during World War II and validated the defense battalion concept. During the one of the most heroic early episodes of the war, the 1st Defense Battalion’s small detachment on Wake Island dramatically illustrated both the battalion’s combat power and the tenacity of a small group of Americans in the face of grave odds. The battle of Wake Island also illustrated three critical vulnerabilities: the requirement for aviation, and a

mobile infantry force for counterattacks, plus the necessity for a relief force to come to the assistance of the defenders.

Punching Above Their Weight: The Marines on Wake Island

The small Marine garrison on Wake Island proved to be a formidable opponent that “punched above its weight” against a numerically superior Japanese force for more than two weeks in December 1941. The Marine garrison on Wake consisted of 449 Marines from the 1st Defense Battalion, commanded by Major James Devereux, and Major Paul A. Putnam’s Marine Fighter Squadron (VMF) 211.⁴³ The Marines were joined by 5 Army and 68 Navy personnel; in addition there were 1200 civilians on Wake, which consisted of Pan American World Airways (Pan Am) employees and contracted construction workers from the Morrison-Knudsen Company.⁴⁴ The entire US garrison was commanded by Winfield S. Cunningham, US Navy, who arrived on the island on November 28, 1941.⁴⁵ The 1st Defense Battalion detachment arrived on Wake arrived in August 1941 while 12 VMF-211 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats arrived on the island just four days prior to the attack. The defense battalion detachment was undermanned and deployed to Wake with six 5-inch seacoast guns, twelve 3-inch antiaircraft guns, searchlights, and .50 caliber and .30 caliber machine guns (Appendix C).⁴⁶ The detachment also had a heightfinder for the antiaircraft guns but it lacked a radar, an unfortunate circumstance, as the garrison was surprised by the initial attack even though four Wildcats were airborne. Unfortunately the defense battalion detachment was so undermanned that it could not fully man all of coastal, antiaircraft artillery, and machine gun positions, which hampered the Americans’ defensive efforts.⁴⁷

The 34 Japanese “Nell” bombers destroyed eight of VMF-211’s 12 F4F-3 Wildcats during the first attack at 1155 on December 8th, a severe blow that devastated most of the vital

air component.⁴⁸ Equally, if not more significant, 18 VMF Marines were killed and another 15 wounded; the dead included 13 irreplaceable maintenance Marines and two pilots.⁴⁹ In addition most of the squadron's spare parts and aviation fuel was lost.⁵⁰ This seriously hampered the squadron's ability to keep the Wildcat's flying and crippled the Marines' air-ground team. The only promising development was that first attack focused on the airfield which left most of the defense battalion's weapons intact.

The Japanese attempted an amphibious assault on December 11th which was repelled by the defenders and validated the defense battalion concept. The Marine lookouts spotted the Japanese invasion force and alerted Maj Putnam who placed his pilots on alert. Four Wildcats took off at 0500 and the Japanese began shelling the island 22 minutes later.⁵¹ The Marine gunners remained concealed and held their fire until 0610 as the Japanese ships closed to within a few thousand yards. The Marines struck the flagship *Yubari*, the *Oite* and the *Mochizuki*, while three shells hit the *Hayate*, which exploded and quickly sank with her entire 167-man crew at 0652.⁵² VMF-211's Wildcats pursued the retreating invasion force and attacked the *Kisargi*, which also sank quickly with the loss of her entire 167-man crew.⁵³ By the end of the attack the Marines had four wounded, while the Japanese suffered two ships sunk and damage to an additional seven ships.⁵⁴ The Japanese force retreated and did not attempt another landing until December 22nd when they were accompanied by carrier-based aircraft. During the next 12 days the Marines, soldiers, sailors, and civilians bravely defended the island. They constantly moved the antiaircraft guns to avoid destruction while simultaneously attempting to reinforce all the defensive positions. In the meantime the defenders' fierce stand prompted the caused Admiral Inoue to request help from Admiral Yamamoto, who diverted the aircraft carriers *Hiryu* and *Soryu*, veterans of the attack on Pearl Harbor, towards Wake. VMF-211's remaining aircraft

were slowly lost from enemy aircraft and bad luck. The Japanese carrier-based aircraft struck Wake on December 22nd and the last two Wildcats, flown by Capt Hebert Freuler and Second Lieutenant (2ndLt) Carl Davidson, sortied to meet them. The Marines, although greatly outnumbered, shot down three Japanese aircraft but Davidson was killed and Freuler's aircraft was damaged to such an extent that it was no longer flyable. Historian Robert Cressman noted that "Admiral Abe later paid homage to the Marine pilots who challenged his carrier planes, lauding them as having resisted fiercely, and bravely."⁵⁵

At 0230 on December 23, 1941 a second Japanese invasion force approached Wake. A sizable force landed in several places and, while the defenders fought bravely, the lack of aviation and a large counter-attack force hindered the Marines' defense. In addition, the hastily erected communications wires hadn't been buried and were severed quickly by the *Japanese Special Naval Landing Force*, which hampered command and control and initiated a premature surrender. The defenders destroyed the beached Japanese *Patrol Boat* No. 33 using a deadly 3-inch antiaircraft gun without sights. The gun ripped open the side of the ship while the Japanese were disembarking and the "magazine exploded, and the whole landing area...was illuminated."

⁵⁶ In all the Marines fought valiantly, Major Putnam's Marines, augmented by civilian ammunition bearers, fended off repeated Japanese assaults. On Wilkes Island, just west of Wake, a 37-man Marine force counterattacked and destroyed the Japanese landing force, killing 94 Japanese.⁵⁷ At dawn the Marines spotted *Patrol Boat* No. 32 and destroyed her with 5-inch fire. Japanese aircraft, lacking aerial opposition roamed free in the skies over Wake and attacked the Marine positions. Major Devereux and Commander Cunningham, Wake's commander, lacked communication with the western portions of Wake and the stalwart defenders on Wilkes. They conferred and agreed to surrender, not knowing that many of the Marines' positions held firm.

Major Devereux then traversed the island, having the sad duty to ask his Marines to stop fighting and surrender.⁵⁸ Devereux, who retired as a Brigadier General, found strong positions on the western portion of Wake still manned by 2ndLt Arthur Poindexter; Major Devereux then traversed the small channel by boat west to Wilkes island to implore the Marines to lay down their arms. Throughout the course of the battle the defense battalion killed 381 Japanese, sunk two ships, destroyed two more vessels on the beach, damaged several others, shot down seven aircraft, and damaged more than 40 other aircraft at the loss of 48 Marines, five sailors, and 70 civilians killed in action.⁵⁹ Their struggle was a testament to the fighting abilities of the defenders and also the utility and viability of the defence battalions and the defense battalion concept, even when deployed in partial strength.

Other elements of the 1st Defense Battalion faced limited raids at Johnston and Palmyra islands on December 7th and those elements returned to Hawaii in March 1942.⁶⁰ On Hawaii the 1st Defense Battalion's Marines quickly manned anti-aircraft machines guns but the lack of ammunition for the 3-inch guns hampered efforts to get them into service before the second attacking wave appeared. Like most of the defense battalions, the 1st saw limited action for the rest of the war but served with patience throughout the Pacific. On May 7, 1944, it was redesignated the 1st Antiaircraft Battalion, and later remained on Guam until 1947.⁶¹ Throughout the war there were other defense battalions who took part in a number of operations in the Pacific Theater, landing with, or soon after, the initial waves to fortify beachheads against Japanese ground, surface and air counterattacks. The 9th Defense Battalion's war record during World War II serves as a useful illustration of the flexibility and combat power of the defense battalions.

The Fighting Ninth: The 9th Defense Battalion Fights across the Pacific

The 9th Defense Battalion was established on 1 February 1942 at Marine Barracks, Parris Island, South Carolina.⁶² It endured the normal trials and tribulations associated with establishing a new outfit and deployed to Guantanamo Bay Cuba 12 days later with 165 veteran Marines and 650 “boots”, many of them officers who graduated from the Base Defense Course at Quantico on 31 January.⁶³ The 9th was a true combined arms force; it had a Headquarters and Service Battery, a 90mm antiaircraft group, a 155mm “Long Tom” sea coast artillery group, a special weapons group with 40mm Bofors guns, .50 caliber and .30 caliber heavy machineguns, and a light tank platoon.⁶⁴ The battalion also had five SCR268 and one SCR270 radars, six 60” Sperry searchlights, and M-5 and M-7 directors for the 40mm and 90mm guns. The tanks were significant in that they made the 9th the first “mobile defense battalion fielded” by the Marines.⁶⁵ The Marines trained at a furious pace on Cuba, in doing so, they not only trained with their 90mm and 155mm guns but they also patrolled the base and even guarded captured German submariners. The training was usually seven days-a-week and unnecessary ceremonies and formations were canceled. On October 4, 1942 the battalion lost its training detachment status and the Marines sailed through the Panama Canal on a 38-day journey to New Caledonia. The battalion transferred ships there and then sailed for Guadalcanal where the first elements arrived on November 30, 1942; the first echelon was soon followed by the rest of the battalion’s forward echelon by December 3rd.⁶⁶

By the end of the day on December 3rd the battalion had emplaced its 90mm and 155mm guns and was ready for action. The 9th Defense Battalion was charged with defending the Koli Point area and the new airfield that was under construction there. On January 14, 1943 the battalion shot down its first aircraft and thereafter patiently endured its duties as the Guadalcanal

operation wound down. The battalion's 90mm group shot down 12 Japanese aircraft its' stay on that island, and they were the only section that saw real action.⁶⁷ Japanese shipping never ventured within range of the Long Toms, nor did aircraft get with range of the 40mm and new 20mm guns.⁶⁸ The battalion was relieved by Army units and elements of the 14th Defense Battalion by June 18th and it sailed north up "the slot" towards Rendova and New Georgia.⁶⁹ (Appendix H) Guadalcanal was a valuable experience for all involved, for it allowed the battalion to "learn to organize positions, to construct field fortifications, and to operate under fire. Bitter experience was gained in the general conditions of living in the tropics, the ever present difficulties of life... malaria, pests, and inadequate diet."⁷⁰ The battalion's equipment changed after it was relieved as the sea coast artillery group converted into a 155mm field artillery battalion group in a mere 22 days in preparation for the planned invasion of New Georgia.

The battalion's actions at Rendova and New Georgia typified the flexibility and capabilities of the defense battalions and even gave a glimpse of the battalions' offensive capabilities. Operation TOENAILS was an "army show," with the 9th operating as one of the few Marines units in support of 43rd Infantry Division (ID) (USA).⁷¹ The 9th was assigned five tasks: occupy and defend Rendova, provide antiaircraft protection, employ their 155mm guns to engage Munda Airfield on New Georgia, repel hostile surface vessels and later occupy Munda after the airfield was captured by the 43rd ID.⁷² The Tank Platoon received the last task, as they were placed in support of the main attack on the Munda.⁷³ The 9th's Marines climbed down the nets into their landing craft on June 30, 1943. The 9th actually landed "ahead of the assault forces" but they fortunately encountered little opposition.⁷⁴ With this action, the battalion exhibited the flexible offensive firepower inherent in a defense battalion. On one memorable

occasion the battalion's band wiped out a Japanese machine gun position with .30 caliber water-cooled heavy machine guns (HMG).⁷⁵ The battalion struggled mightily as the torrential rains bogged it down, most of the trucks engines and transmissions burned out in the mud. Supplies and equipment had to be dismantled or carried by amphibious tractors (AMTRACKS), which revealed a significant motor transport deficiency when operating in the tropical South Pacific.

Despite these challenges it set up one 90mm battery and all of the Special Weapons Group the first day. Then, after the first echelon identified locations for the 155mm Long Toms, these were landed on 2 July and began firing on Munda later that day. That same day the "suicide point" beachhead came under attack and four 9th Defense Battalion Marines were killed.⁷⁶ Also Japanese "Betty" bombers and "Zero" fighters surprised the defenders the same as they had at Wake; although this time the defenders had radar, but the radar's generator was inoperable due to a diesel fuel can that was mislabeled as "gas."⁷⁷ From that point forward the battalion sounded Condition Red and responded quickly, repelling a number of Japanese air attacks. The battalion sent a small anti-aircraft detachments to cover the Zanana and Laina beachheads on New Georgia while the tank platoon "spearheaded the advance" on Munda, "knocking out enemy bunkers, pillboxes, and other strongpoints."⁷⁸ At the same time, the 9th's artillery continued to provide effective fire, aided by ground and air spotters.

As historian Charles Melson noted, "the 9th Defense Battalions most memorable individual action took place the night of 17 July" at Zanana, New Georgia where two of Lieutenant Wismer's young Marines, Private John Wantuck and Corporal Maier J. Rothschild operated two "scrounged" .30 cal light machine guns and repelled numerous attacks on the 43rd Infantry Division's command post.⁷⁹ The Marines killed 18 Japanese, including a 90mm mortar crew and wounded another 12-15 soldiers at the loss of Wantuck. They were credited with

saving the division headquarters and were nominated for the Medal of Honor; later, they both received the Navy Cross. As Rothschild's citation highlighted, "(l)ater, when his gun jammed and a Japanese officer viciously attacked him, Corporal Rothschild fought with him in hand-to-hand combat, killing his opponent. Despite his own injuries, he returned to his gun, repaired it and valiantly continued to battle the enemy forces until relief finally arrived."⁸⁰

The battalion fought valiantly at Rendova and New Georgia. They downed 26 planes while the tank platoon, reinforced by tanks platoons from the 10th and 11th Defense Battalions "cleared the way" to Munda Point after destroying more than 40 heavily fortified bunkers in the process.⁸¹ (Appendix H) Munda airfield was "captured and occupied by XIV Corps Army troops on 5 August 1943" and the entire battalion then displaced in echelon to defend Munda Point.⁸² It was in place by August 15th, defended the point, and later displaced artillery to shell Japanese positions on Kolombangra, a nearby island. The Japanese mounted several aerial attacks, the heaviest was in mid-September and the action died down by November 1943. The battalion, "minus one radar crew and two searchlight sections," was relieved on December 31, 1943 by the 77th AAA Group (USA).⁸³ Colonel Robert Debs Heinl, a World War II Marine and historian noted that the campaign, while successful, was generally "a feeble and fumbling advance."⁸⁴ Even Admiral William F. Halsey noted that "when I look back...the charred reputations still make me cough."⁸⁵ Still, the battalion could be proud of its accomplishments as it fought hard and played a key role throughout the fighting.⁸⁶ The 9th Defense Battalion downed 46 Japanese planes, the tank platoon killed countless Japanese, while the 155mm guns fired hundreds of fire missions, all at the loss of eight 9th Defense Battalion Marines.⁸⁷

Following its relief on New Year's Eve the battalion spent early January preparing to sail to Banika in the Russell Island Group to refit. The first elements departed in mid-January and the

last elements arrived in Banika on February 15, 1944. Its Tank Platoon left the battalion shortly after it arrived on Banika and was assigned to the I Marine Amphibious Corps. The battalion also acquired new radars, trained, and incorporated replacements after some of the officers and men returned to the states having spent 24 months overseas. In April the battalion received orders to prepare for Operation FORAGER, the invasion of the Marianas in the Central Pacific.⁸⁸ The battalion traveled to Eniwetok and joined the rest of the invasion force, embarked and sailed for its last campaign.

After more than 50 days on ship, the 9th Defense Battalion, operating in support of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, stormed ashore on Agat Bay, Guam, at 1100 on July 21, 1944, just two and a half hours after the first wave. At the same time one of the 9th's sister battalions, the 14th, landed at Red Beach with the 3d Marine Division.⁸⁹ The Marines established hasty defenses and helped to repel a "savage counterattack" by the 38th Japanese Infantry Regiment.⁹⁰ The battalion then established its Special Weapons Group's .50 cal, 20mm, and 40mm guns for ground defense missions in support of the brigade. The guns were used against ground targets and the 40mm guns were even used to mark for the naval guns.⁹¹ On 31 July the battalion "was designated as the III Amphibious Corps' reserve while the Marines and Army continued the attack. Its Special Weapons Group was then used as an infantry company."⁹² The battalion was tasked to secure the beachhead and began the gruesome duty of cleaning up the beach and burying the dead.

The Marines remained on the island well after the end of organized Japanese resistance on August 10th. They established AAA positions, served as porters, and also served as provisional infantry as they helped the 3d Marine Division to sweep the island for the 10,000 Japanese holdouts.⁹³ Like the 1st Defense Battalion before it, the 9th Defense Battalion was then

redesignated as Antiaircraft Battalion in September 1944, but also had a seacoast artillery group attached until November 1944, whereupon it completed the full transition to the AAA mission.⁹⁴ The 9th's Antiaircraft Battalion's Marines, along with the rest of the III Amphibious Corps patrolled the island, laid ambushes, and hunted for the Japanese stragglers. It was a slow process in which 6,267 Japanese were killed between August and November.⁹⁵ The Marines continued this pattern until relieved in June 1945 by the 52d Defense Battalion, which was composed of African-American Montford Point Marines. The 9th AAA Battalion then prepared for Operation OLYMPIC, the planned invasion of the Japanese mainland. After Victory-Japan (V-J) Day the battalion sent "three separate landing parties to various islands in the Mariana and the Caroline islands" to induce the Japanese garrisons to surrender.⁹⁶ The 9th remained on Guam until January 1946 when it returned to Camp Lejeune where half the Marines were discharged and the other half were given leave. The 9th has an impressive record; it downed 58 enemy planes and had a number of "firsts," including being the first "mobile battalion" and "the first defence battalion to convert to field artillery."⁹⁷ On May 12, 1946 the battalion was redesignated as the 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMF. It was redesignated several more times and was finally deactivated as the 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion on September 15, 1956.⁹⁸

The threat of Japanese counterattacks, especially in the form of naval task forces, waned by the beginning of 1944. This negated the requirement for the coastal artillery pieces that had been a fixture in Marine defense forces since the early 1900s. As historian Charles L. Henry noted, the changes grew out of the fact that it had now become "apparent that once an island was secured from the enemy, any attempts at its recapture were very unlikely...the enemy was incapable of threatening an area effectively once that area had been secured by the Marines."⁹⁹ At the same time the Corps struggled to find the manpower to raise six divisions and four combat

aircraft wings.¹⁰⁰ In July 1944 a new table of organization was released and “reflected the emphasis on 90mm and 40mm antiaircraft guns” vice coastal and traditional artillery.¹⁰¹ As a result, most of the defense battalions converted to antiaircraft artillery (AAA) battalions by January 1945 and two of the battalions were deactivated outright. The remaining units continued to serve during and immediately after the war, but as the Marine Corps shrank rapidly after V-J Day most of the battalions were deactivated. As the Marine Corps shrank it also lost capabilities, including the defence battalions, which previously “freed infantry and artillery units of the Fleet Marine Forces from responsibility for the protection of bases.”¹⁰² In May 1946, the 52d Defense Battalion was redesignated as the 3d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Composite) at Montford Point. This signaled the end of an era, for not only was the 52d the last to be established it was also the last of the defense battalions. From that point forward the Corps lost the unique capability to “free infantry and artillery” to fight. The FMF would now have to furnish its own defense by dedicated precious maneuver and support units to the task, which is ironic considering the Corps’ long fight for an advance base force and the stipulations in the National Security Act of 1947. The National Security Act of 1947 defined the Marine Corps mission as “(t)he Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”¹⁰³ The lack of a dedicated defense force often carried a serious burden and forced the Marine Corps to relearn many hard lessons about defending expeditionary bases; especially after the Corps became involved in unconventional wars in Vietnam, Lebanon (1983), Afghanistan, and Iraq.

The Cold War: The Slow Erosion of Base Defense

The Marine Corps only conducted a limited number of defensive operations in support of expeditionary bases from the period spanning from the end of World War II to the beginning of the war in Vietnam. These actions included the Marine Corps' operations in the vicinity of the Chosin Reservoir in late 1950 and the Marines establishment and occupation of temporary expeditionary bases in Lebanon in 1958. The actions during 1950 reflect the significant downsizing that occurred following the Japanese surrender. The Marine Corps numbered just 74,000 Marines, down from a World War II strength of more than 480,000, when the North Koreans invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950.¹⁰⁴ The Corps had lost significant capabilities and it had to mobilize the Marine Corps Reserves and transfer Marines from the east coast in order to man the 1st Marine Division after North Korea's invasion of South Korea.

Hagaru-Ri: Korean War Expeditionary Defense at the Chosin Reservoir

The 1st Marine Division's initial actions, starting with the Inchon landing on 15 September 1950, until the Chinese People's Liberation Army's (PLA) counterattack at the Chosin Reservoir in late November 1950, were largely offensive. This gradually changed as the United Nations forces began to encounter Chinese forces as they neared the Yalu River. The Marines were fortunate in that the Chinese lacked most of their heavy weapons, artillery, and armor. It was also fortunate that MajGen Oliver Prince "O.P" Smith, the 1st Marine Division's Commanding General, was a product of the Advance Base Force and Defense Battalion eras and served as an instructor at the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico starting in 1932.¹⁰⁵ MajGen Smith also attended the L'Ecole Superieure de Guerre in Paris for two years, arriving in France in January 1934.¹⁰⁶ In his after action report to the Commandant he emphasized that terrain analysis was a key element in its curriculum. Marines who served under Smith, who retired as a General, noted that he emphasized the importance of terrain. In fact, the French doctrine at the

Ecole was “completely defensive, as emphasized by frontier fortifications...and the disposition of forces.”¹⁰⁷ While he derided the focus on the defense, and the lack of “offensive initiative” he undoubtedly gained an appreciation defensive operations.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, as the Commanding Officer of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, O.P. Smith served alongside the 5th Defense Battalion under the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional) on Iceland from June 1941 to March 1942.¹⁰⁹ This experience likely reinforced his appreciation of, and familiarity with, defensive operations, and further instilled in Smith a mindset that prevented the destruction of the 1st Marine Division after being surrounded by Chinese forces near the Chosin Reservoir.

The series of events that pushed MajGen Smith and the 1st Marine Division’s to the defense are well illustrated in historian David Halberstam’s book *The Coldest Winter*.¹¹⁰ The 1st Marine Division was the vanguard of the US Army’s X Corps, commanded by Major General Edward Almond, US Army. On October 18, 1950 General MacArthur ordered X Corps to march north from Wonsan, North Korea past the Chosin Reservoir towards the Yalu River on the peninsula’s eastern flank using the watershed of the Taebaek Mountain Range as the boundary between the 8th Army in the west and X Corps in the east.¹¹¹ As the Division marched north, Smith continuously consolidated forces and created logistics hubs and defensive positions to sustain the Marines despite calls from Almond to accelerate the division’s rate of march. MajGen Smith took these preventative measures because he felt that the enemy’s strength was far in excess of GEN MacArthur’s headquarters and that the Americans were being lured into a trap.

On 2 November, the PLA 124th Division attacked the 7th Marines at Sudong, located on the road between Hungnam and Kot’o-ri. The Chines had some initial success as the “ferocity of the fighting, momentarily rocked the 7th Marines.”¹¹² While the 7th Marines eventually pushed the Chines back, this encounter with the PLA served as a valuable lesson for the entire 1st

Marine Division. The division's leaders quickly realized that they had to use consolidated battalion-strength positions vice scattered company-sized positions, to defend against Chinese night attacks and infiltration techniques.¹¹³ In many ways they had to establish a series of island-like outposts, similar to what the Advance Base Force and the defense battalions were expected to do in the Pacific. The attack on the 7th Marines also reinforced MajGen Smith's belief that a large Chinese force was waiting to spring an "immense trap" on the Marines, something that both Almond and MacArthur considered impossible.¹¹⁴ MajGen Smith's appreciation for both the terrain and his Chinese enemy also informed his belief that the Chinese, a "formidable and shrewd enemy," did not blow the bridge in the treacherous Funchilin Pass because they "wanted the Americans to come across, and that they were going to blow the bridge" after (the Americans) crossed, thus completely isolating" the Americans north of the pass.¹¹⁵ That scenario had never occurred to Almond, and when he ordered MajGen Smith to "barrel up the road" on November 15th, MajGen Smith responded with a simple "no."¹¹⁶ By the time the Chinese attacked the 1st Marine Division around the Chosin Reservoir on November 27, 1950, the Marines possessed major strongholds in three separate locations from south to north at Kot'o-ri, Hagaru-ri, and Yudam-ni. In addition, critical airfields at Kot'o-ri and Hagaru-ri were constructed that were later used to resupply the encircled forces and evacuate the wounded, while Marine aviators operated from airfields to the south and on carriers offshore

The battle of the Chosin Reservoir is replete with stories of valor in the gravest of circumstances. One engagement in particular, the defense of Hagaru-ri, is often overlooked in comparison to Fox Company, 2d Battalion, Seventh Marine Regiment's (2/7) stand at Toktong Pass and the 5th and 7th Marines' march from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri. At Hagaru-ri, British Royal Marines, US Army infantrymen, two understrength Marine infantry battalions, engineers

and other support personnel were able to repeatedly repel Chinese attacks from 28 November to 4 December. MajGen O.P. Smith wisely ordered the construction of a logistics base and airfield at Hagaru-ri, south of the Chosin Reservoir, in order to strengthen his position and logistics train during the division's march north toward the Yalu River. By the time the Chinese attacked Hagaru-ri on 28 November the camp had a complete although understrength defensive perimeter. Similar to Wake Island, the presence of combined arms, including artillery and joint close air support, coordinated by the Marine Direct Air Support Center at Hagaru-ri allowed the understrength force to survive repeated attacks by multiple Chinese regiments.

Additionally, the Marines had both good intelligence and a fair amount of luck on their side. The Marines captured Chinese soldiers in the weeks prior to the attack who provided intelligence on the growing Chinese force in the area, and the Chinese 58th Division, which was tasked to attack Hagaru-ri, got lost and were delayed until 28 November. This delay allowed for final preparations and ensured that almost every man in the camp was on alert by 2130 on 27 November.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, the Chinese 80th, which was tasked to attack Hagaru-ri, hit RCT-31 on the eastern side of the reservoir, and blunted much of the initial attack on Hagaru-ri. Despite their limited preparations General Smith soon realized that the Marines' position at Hagaru-ri was tenuous at best. On 29 November he ordered Colonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller to form a task force to reinforce the vital crossroads at Hagaru-ri. The result was the creation of the 900 man Task Force Drysdale, led by Royal Marine Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, the commander of the British Royal Marines' 41 (Independent) Commando; the task force also included Marine and Army companies.¹¹⁸ Tragically, a significant portion of the force was annihilated as it marched north from Kot'o-ri after a destroyed vehicle cut off the rear element in

Hell Fire Valley, but the remaining elements of the beleaguered task force marched in Hagaru-ri the night of 29 November.

The remaining 400 men of Task Force Drysdale arrived in time to plug the gaps in the eastern portion of the defensive perimeter around East Hill.¹¹⁹ Hagaru-ri was still lightly defended prior to Task Force Drysdale's arrival, the defense forces amounted to little more than one battalion, (3rd Battalion, 1st Marines), artillerymen, Army engineers, and service and support personnel from various logistics units and the 1st Marine Division headquarters. This consolidated force had a complete, if undermanned, defense perimeter and was able hold until the 5th and 7th Marines completed their march into Hagaru-ri from Yudam-ni. The Marines had learned their lessons from the Chinese attacks on 2 November. The deliberate defense at Hagaru-ri stands in stark contrast to the tragic stand of the US Army's Regimental Combat Team 31, later known as Task Force Faith, which had unwisely spread itself thinly along the eastern portion of the reservoir. Repeated Chinese attacks whittled down the RCT, which was leaderless after the loss of the RCT's commander, Colonel Allan D. Maclean and later Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Faith, the commander of 1st Battalion, 31 Infantry Regiment, who assumed command after Maclean's death.

1050 of Task Force Faith's original 2500 soldiers eventually straggled into Hagara-ri. In RCT-31's case, Major General Almond, lacking proper judgment, was able to exert pressure for Maclean to maintain his offensive posture, and his precarious position north of Hagaru-ri despite a personnel visit to RCT-31's obviously vulnerable position on November 28th.¹²⁰ Fortunately Smith ignored Almond's orders, which allowed the Division to create defensible strongholds. Army historian Roy Appleman noted that the "caution on the part of General Smith in concentrating the division and his insistence on securing its supply lines and of establishing a

base for further operations in the frigid, barren wastes of the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir area were to prove the division's salvation.”¹²¹ Furthermore, it is apparent that MajGen Smith learned the lessons he gained from more than 33 years of service, culminating with the Chinese attack on 2 November, and thus ensured that his forces were prepared for the defense of their expeditionary bases near the reservoir. Unfortunately it was a lesson that many of his Army peers across the Korean Peninsula, as revealed when the 8th Army fell back in disarray to the west.¹²²

The 1st Marine Division began the slow march south to Hungnam on December 6th with the 7th Marines in the vanguard with the remains of RCT-31 while the 5th Marines held Hagaru and then followed in trace. The 5th Marines marched in Kot'o-ri the night of December 7th while the Chinese captured the Funchilin Pass and blew the Treadway Bridge. A joint logistical miracle was performed by USAF C-119 Flying Boxcars, which dropped eight bridge sections to Marine and Army engineers. The engineers installed the bridge and the Chosin Few marched south past the 3rd Infantry Division's Task Force Dog, who had been holding the road open south of the pass. The last elements left the pass on December 11th as the first elements reached Hungnam. US X Corps began to evacuate and by December 24th the last UN forces left Hungnam having evacuated more than 200,000 military personnel and civilian refugees.

This success rests firmly on O.P. Smith's shoulders, the Marine General's appreciation for his Chinese enemy, terrain, and defensive operations likely saved the 1st Marine Division and the remnants of RCT-31. Smith ensured that his forces mounted a credible defense at Hagaru-ri, despite a number of limitations, including the lack of manned, trained, and equipped defensive forces. Perhaps the most valuable lesson is that the force was quite lucky in that the Chinese and North Koreans were unable to deploy the deadly artillery and armor that would probably have overwhelmed the battalion at Hagaru and cut off the forces retreating from Yudam-ni and the

eastern side of the reservoir. In a conventional fight in expeditionary conditions, defensive forces are a valuable commodity and, like during World War II, they could free infantry and artillery while providing stalwart force protection. Had the 1200-man 9th Defense Battalion been emplaced at Hagaru-ri protecting the 1st Marine Division headquarters with 155mm artillery, and 20mm, 40mm, and 90mm guns firing in direct mode, with a tank platoon providing a mobile reaction force, the issue would not have been in doubt. This was, not, however the case. The Marine Corps never reacquired the defensive capabilities it lost when the 52d Defense Battalion folded its colors in 1946 and the Corps' defensive capabilities continued to slowly erode.

The Hogaboom Board: The Defensive Mindset in an Era of Empty Pockets

In the years after the Korean War, the Marine Corps adapted to the changing Cold War environment and the Eisenhower administration's New Look strategy. The 1956 Fleet Marine Force Organization and Composition Board, more commonly known as the Hogaboom Board, was a reaction to Eisenhower's new strategy and this board had a significant impact on the Marine Corps' force structure during that era. The Hogaboom Board was not a unique case as the Marine Corps convened a number of force structure boards during the Cold War. In fact, force structure boards, driven by defense policy and fiscal realities, have been a continuous feature in Marine Corps planning into the 21st Century.

The Hogaboom Board, chaired by Major General Robert E. Hogaboom in 1956, was arguably the most important force structure board the Marine Corps conducted between World War II and Vietnam War. The board members considered the merits of various force structure proposals in light of the Cold War's strategic landscape, which focused on a war in Europe against the Soviets, featured tactical nuclear weapons, and saw significant advances in aviation technology including supersonic jet aircraft and the increased helicopter capabilities.¹²³

The board operated in an era of fiscal constraints; by 1956 the Eisenhower Administration was committed to the New Look policy. The New Look Policy was introduced in the Fiscal Year (FY) 1955 budget and reflected Eisenhower's long-term commitment to balance U.S. military strategy and the Department of Defense's budget against the health of the U.S. economy. The policy deemphasized large standing ground forces due to their expense, and focused on what were seen as a more affordable policy based on nuclear weapons and the U.S. Air Force (USAF). The USAF was emphasized because it was seen as the primary agent who would deliver the nation's nuclear arsenal in any conflict with the Soviets. The New Look Policy reduced the budgets of the Army and Marine Corps who then advocated for the acquisition of a limited number of tactical nuclear weapons in order to get into the nuclear fight and gain relevance and additional funding.

Despite the threat of nuclear Armageddon the Hogaboom Board displayed great insight when it dismissed the likelihood of war with the Soviets and determined that armed conflict "has considerable probability of being limited to the small-war type of action."¹²⁴ In addition it continued to recognize the importance of seizing and defending advance naval bases and stated that "the occupation or seizure, and the defense of bases will continue to be vital to the defense of the United States, to the control of essential lines of communication and to the support of overseas offensive operations. Seizure or occupation of bases in Iceland, the Azores, North Africa and the Middle East will required immediately at the inception of war if such bases are not already occupied by the United States or her allies."¹²⁵

Within the strategic context the Hogaboom Board chose to lighten the standard Marine division in order to mitigate the nuclear threat in an amphibious operation and provide the division with the mobility to employ both by helicopter and allow Marine divisions to deploy via

methods other than amphibious shipping. The goal was to enable an entire Marine Division to assault by helicopter while heavy equipment would be brought ashore from amphibious shipping by water in later assault waves. The Hogaboom Board stripped logistics and repair capabilities from the division and integrated the capabilities in logistics regiments and other logistics units. Despite their determination to lighten the division, the board chose to retain heavy capabilities such as tanks, self-propelled 155mm and 8-inch guns, and Honest John surface-to-surface rockets and place them with the Force Troops.¹²⁶

The board retained important defensive capabilities like the Terrier Missile for medium-altitude aircraft threats and the 75mm anti-aircraft artillery guns for low-altitude antiaircraft defense in light of the recognized need to defend both advanced bases and the Fleet Marine Force. The board chose to maintain two Terrier Surface-To-Air Missile Battalions and four 75mm AAA battalions, two of which were self-propelled (SP) 75mm AAA battalions.¹²⁷ The efforts to retain the 75mm guns was due to the fact that a suitable low altitude missile replacement had not appeared by 1956, and the 75s remained in service until the early 1960s.¹²⁸ The 75's eventual replacement was the Redeye, the first U.S. infrared man-portable air defense system (MANPAD) shoulder-fired surface to air missile (SAM), which was introduced in 1968. The Redeye was initially incorporated with the Marine divisions in Vietnam before the Redeye batteries were transferred to the Marine Aircraft Wings (MAW) in 1969. These capabilities, especially the Terrier Missiles, were purely defensive in nature and reflected the Marines continued, if not reduced, commitment to maintaining defensive capabilities.

Lebanon: A Small-Scale Defensive Mindset in Expeditionary Operations

The Marine Corps had a limited number of combat/contingency deployments of more than two battalions during the period spanning from the end of the Korean War in 1953 until the

major commitments to Vietnam and the Dominican Republic in 1965. One such example was Operation BLUE BAT, during the Lebanon Crisis in 1958. The Marines Corps was involved in the Lebanon Crisis from July to October 1958 during which Marines continued to display a strong defensive mindset despite the lack of kinetic action that had been forged in World War II and Korea. The Marine forces operated in Lebanon as part of the 2d Provisional Marine Force, which consisted of three separate battalion landing teams (BLT) including 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (1/8), 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment (3/6), and 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment (2/2). The Marines deployed at the request of the government of Lebanon; President Eisenhower and his advisors were willing to accede to the Lebanese government's request to deploy the Marines, and later US Army forces as a stabilizing force because of rising tensions in the Middle East. The internal unrest in Lebanon followed the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the July 14th uprising in Iraq. Lebanon's President Camille Chamoun requested that the Marines deploy to Lebanon for two reasons: the possibility of civil war between Muslims and Maronite Christians, and because of President Chamoun's lack of confidence in the Lebanese Army.¹²⁹

The Marines of 2/2 initially came ashore with a light footprint because a significant portion of their heavy equipment was loaded aboard the USS Plymouth Rock (LSD-29), which had sailed for Malta for repairs to the ship.¹³⁰ The Marines' initial encounters with Lebanese forces were somewhat tense but the two sides quickly established mutual understanding. The forces conducted joint checkpoints while Lebanese Army Officers were assigned to each of the Marine battalions. The Marines continued to improve their positions and appeared to take defense operations and force protection seriously even though they had incorporated liaisons to mitigate misunderstandings with the Lebanese Army. 1/8 followed 2/2 ashore and 1/8's actions

were a prime example of the serious considerations given to defensive operations and protecting the Marines' expeditionary base near the Beirut airport.

Marines from 1/8, driven by their commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel John H. Brickley, spent a great deal of time improving its force protection. 1/8's Marines constantly improved their positions during their time ashore as they constructed bunkers with high explosives because Lebanon's solid rock prevented 1/8 from digging bunkers with personal entrenching tools (e-tools) or even heavy equipment. In addition 1/8's Marines used more than "23,000 sandbags to reinforce 108 different emplacements" in the battalion's area of responsibility.¹³¹

The Marines continued to approach defensive preparations in a serious manner after the Korean War despite the lack of formal schools or a dedicated defensive force such as the defense battalions that could inculcate a defensive mindset. The continued appreciation for the defense is not surprising considering the Marines relatively recent outpost combat experiences along the Kansas Line following the stabilization of the lines in Korea from 1951 to 1953, in what became known as the "Outpost War".¹³² The presence of both World War II and Korean War veterans likely contributed to the defensive mindset since they had firsthand experience battling capable and lethal conventional forces. In general, the Marines' displayed an appreciation for the construction and implementation of a defensive plan during their operations in Lebanon despite the lack of enemy opposition. The BLUE BAT deployment was relatively short in duration but throughout the operation Marines incorporated defense and force protection in conjunction with an active offensive patrolling plan indicative of the continued appreciation of defense and force protection.

Vietnam: Force Protection in a Hybrid Insurgency

The Marine Corps attempted to maintain a defensive mindset and defensive capabilities during operations in Vietnam. However, the Marines paid a heavy price and learned valuable lessons in doing so because of the use of ad hoc and over-tasked defensive forces. The initial lack of dedicated “defense professionals” hampered the Marines efforts to coordinate and create complementary defensive measures at the various Marine bases in Vietnam. These ranged from small fire bases to major installations such as airfields at Da Nang. The Marines had a significant amount of time to learn valuable lessons during the long Vietnam War. However, the Marine Corps appeared to take the mission of base defense seriously throughout the conflict and especially after the loss of a large number of aircraft in 1965 via ground attack on their bases. In addition, some of this dedication to base defense may be attributed to the continued presence of senior Marines of World War II experience, like Lieutenant General (LtGen) Victor “The Brute” Krulak, and MajGen Lew Walt. Both had exposure to the traditional Fleet Marine Force and defense battalion’s concepts both before, during, and after World War II. These Marine generals took personal interest in base defense; MajGen Walt, in particular, gave specific orders concerning base defensive measures such as when he “expanded the authority of the base defense coordinator and appointed Colonel George W. Carrington to this position in place of Lieutenant Colonel Clark.”¹³³ As pre-World War II Marines, it was part of their DNA.

The generals were even aware of the threat posed by conventional forces and deployed appropriate forces, like 1st and 2nd LAAM to Vietnam to defend a possible a North Vietnamese air threat. Unfortunately the Marine Corps had a challenge incorporating a counterinsurgency doctrine to contain the ground threat; the Marine Corps’ efforts were hampered by the fact that the Corps’ strategy was not aligned with the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Commander General William Westmoreland’s search and destroy doctrine.¹³⁴ The uncoordinated

counterinsurgency strategy hampered efforts to conduct both conventional and non-conventional operations and created tactical gaps that opened air bases and major installations to attack. The facilities were vulnerable because many of the forces that could, and arguably should, have conducted base defense operations in the areas directly around Da Nang and Chu Lai were committed by MACV to offensive operations elsewhere.

Initial Marine operations in Vietnam were limited to advisory/mentorship and limited Operation SHUFLY missions, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron deployments in support of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces. Major Marine combat operations began in 1965 as small elements initially trickled into Da Nang. The Marine forces came from all the elements of the MAGTF, including HAWK antiaircraft missile battalions, which remained in Vietnam until 1970. On February 8th Battery A, 1st LAAM arrived at Da Nang to counter potential North Vietnamese air attacks and strengthen the defensive posture of the South Vietnamese Air Force Base.¹³⁵ The 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) arrived in Vietnam on March 8th, 1965 with orders to defend the airfield at Da Nang. The 9th MEB was the first significant Marine deployment to an active combat zone since Korea. By April 10th Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 531, flying F-4Bs, arrived at Da Nang. This enlarged the required footprint and highlighting the Marine's arrival in a very loud and a visual way.

1965: A Steep Learning Curve

The Marines learned hard lessons by July 1965 about the inherent difficulties of incorporating base defense in a hybrid war, which combined conventional and insurgency operations. The problems associated with the lack of a traditional rear area that was safe from enemy attack meant that the Marines had to defend everywhere. Deployed Marines quickly discovered that they needed more troops to secure the tactical area of responsibility (TAOR)

around the various Marine bases in order to reduce enemy sanctuaries and prevent the enemy's indirect fire assets from ranging the base. This was important because of the valuable aircraft present at the major air installations at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Marble Mountain. An example of the relatively ad hoc nature of defense, lack of adequate manpower, and coordination challenges was illustrated by the large scale attacks on Marine Corps bases in July and October 1965.

By the summer First Battalion, Ninth Marines (1/9) was responsible for the security at Da Nang, including the US Air Forces portion of the line.¹³⁶ As operations intensified 1/9 began to transition to active patrolling in a larger area in order to “increase the offensive capability in the Da Nang area.”¹³⁷ 1/9's commander, LtCol Verle E. Ludwig, moved two line companies, and “most of Headquarters and Service (H&S) Company” to compounds outside the wire to patrol the area surrounding the base.¹³⁸ This left Da Nang's defensive lines thin and unfortunately coincided with an enemy attack early in the morning of July 1st. An 85-man VC Special Operations Company, augmented by 13-man sapper team breached the thin defenses and used indirect fire and satchel charges to destroy two US Air Force F-102s and two C-130s. The VC also damaged an additional two F-102s and another C-130. While 1/9's reaction force responded quickly they were unable to inflict substantial casualties because the enemy quickly withdrew and the “the counter-mortar radar installation failed to function properly.”¹³⁹ As LtCol Ludwig noted, MajGen Walt took “a calculated risk” when he chose to divide 1/9 and reduce Da Nang's defensive forces in order patrol in the local countryside; an inherent dilemma when using maneuver forces for base defense. It was simply a case of trying to do too much with too few assets. In reaction MajGen Walt requested, and was granted an extension of the TAOR to the west south by the General Thi, the South Vietnamese I Corps Commander. In addition, the

Marines sent recently arrived reinforcements to DA Nang vice sending them to reinforce other areas.¹⁴⁰

MajGen Walt made other ad hoc attempts to reinforce the base, including the creation of a 949-man provisional airbase defense battalion on July 19th. This was formed from the base's service unit personnel. While this freed 1/9 to move to the offense it simultaneously crippled many of the supporting units and was deactivated less than one month later after many of the 3rd Marine Division's vehicles were "deadlined" due to a lack of drivers and mechanics.¹⁴¹ By early August, MACV, in coordination with Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, requested additional Marine infantry battalions to secure the TAOR around the airfields. These additional forces continued the same pattern of establishing an active Marine presence in the areas around the base to that they could provide a buffer against enemy indirect fire and eliminate Viet Cong (VC) sanctuaries close to major US installations. 1/9 was reassigned responsibility for the airfield following the provisional battalion's deactivation and 1/9 was then replaced in mid-August by 3/9, which had recently arrived from Okinawa as part of President Johnson's 28 July troop increase.¹⁴² Unfortunately these efforts proved to be inadequate as small-scale attacks increased throughout I Corps despite the significant increase in forces.

The number of Marine forces in country increased from 1,248 personnel in February 1965 to more than 36,000 by October 1965. Despite this, the base defense forces were still ad hoc in many ways and lacked the command and control (C²) required to mount a cohesive defensive effort.¹⁴³ The increase in forces was not accompanied by an increase in C² or coordination with other defensive forces in the area. By October 1965 the Marines had still not been incorporated with South Vietnamese and US Air Force security personnel on Da Nang, let alone coordinating with the other USMC bases in the area.¹⁴⁴ The Marine Corps official history “

US Marine in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup 1965, noted that “(t)he 41st Fighter Wing VNAF (Vietnamese Air Force) was responsible for its defensive perimeter, while U.S. Air Police and Vietnamese MPs controlled” Da Nang’s main gate.¹⁴⁵ The security was not centralized and did not tie in well with the Marine forces despite the fact that the Marines were specifically deployed to Vietnam to defend Da Nang. The lack of centralization and clear command and control was a violation of one of the basic tenets of base defense, and revealed another problem inherent in ad hoc defense, one which appeared again in Afghanistan. The provisional defense battalion at Da Nang may have been replaced by 3/9 but the other bases were still guarded by a mixture of Marine infantry companies and non-infantry personnel who were cobbled together to operate as security forces. These efforts however, proved to be inadequate as the Marines TAOR expanded again after MajGen Walt requested another expansion on September 13th.¹⁴⁶

The Marines were spread thin again despite 3/9’s arrival in August; many Marine bases still lacked a proper manned, trained, and equipped defensive force. This critical vulnerability was exploited during the night of October 27-28, 1965 as the VC attacked the Marine expeditionary bases at Chu Lai and Marble Mountain. The attacks occurred simultaneously; a 20 man VC team infiltrated into Chu Lai. Colonel Leslie E. Brown, the Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12) commander, noted that they were “barefoot and had on a loin cloth...they were spraying the aircraft with Tommy guns and...throwing satchels into tail pipes.”¹⁴⁷ The VC destroyed two Douglas A-4 Skyhawks and “severely damaged six more.”¹⁴⁸ Fifteen of the Chu Lai attackers were killed, but had proved to be a capable and dangerous foe. Meanwhile a larger force struck the Marine helicopter base at Marble Mountain. The VC force that attacked Marble Mountain numbered 90 men, broken down into 4 demolition teams.¹⁴⁹ The VC attacked under the cover of 60mm mortar fire towards the airfield and hospital while a diversionary force fixed

1/9 to prevent them from reinforcing Marble Mountain.¹⁵⁰ Marble Mountain's defense force was ad hoc, composed of Seabees and Marines from MAG-16 and other support troops. The VC exploited this vulnerability and infiltrated the inadequately defended MAG-16 parking ramp, destroyed 19 helicopters, and damaged an additional 35. According to Colonel Thomas J. O'Connor, the MAG-16 Commanding Officer, the VC had literally "wiped out" Marine Observation Squadron 2 (VMO-2).¹⁵¹ The Marble Mountain attack revealed the risk inherent in ad hoc base defense measures and was a resounding success for the VC, who succeeded at a cost of only 17 killed and 4 wounded out of the 90 man force. Still, the VC managed to hamper Marine aviation operations for six months. Fortunately for the Marines, the lead elements of another force that was destined for Da Nang, was engaged by Marines in ambush and never attacked Da Nang's airfield.¹⁵²

The Marines quickly incorporated a number of additional measures to improve base defense after the Marble Mountain attack, many of which appear, in hindsight, to be common sense. The first initiative was to centralize base defense. General Walt, the commander of the III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), assigned Colonel George W. Carrington to serve as Da Nang's new base defence coordinator, which had previously been a LtCol's billet. This was done in order to elevate the importance of the rank and ensure the proper coordination between the base and the airfield's tenants. Colonel Carrington almost immediately ordered the construction of a fence around the airfield, an obvious security measure that had not been built before the attack.¹⁵³ Additional measures were introduced at all of the airfields. 9th Marines' CO assumed the title of Marble Mountain airfield coordinator with the responsibility of overseeing the defense and security of the air field. In addition, 3d Engineer Battalion and MAG-16 personnel built a "barrier of minefields and barbed wire."¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, the Marines began to incorporate

dog teams and “sophisticates electronic seismic devices” to monitor the bases’ perimeters.¹⁵⁵

Lastly, a Marine Infantry Battalion was assigned to guard each of the three bases, while Marines aggressively patrolled the countryside near the bases.

By the time of the Tet Offensive in 1968, the Marines had implemented a robust defensive plan near all the bases. As a result, the VC’s ground attacks were not as successful. Dozens of VC sapper and infantry teams failed to penetrate the Marines’ defenses. The Marines, however were not able to completely eliminate the threat. VC rockets did strike the airfields repeatedly, and damaged or destroyed dozens of aircraft in 1966 and 1967.¹⁵⁶ During the Tet Offensive, VC rockets destroyed five aircraft and numerous pieces of equipment, in addition, the VC rockets damaged 14 more aircraft. In response to the rocket attacks, the Marines used rotary wing gunship close air support, which patrolled at altitude to hit the rocket teams immediately after they fired their rockets.¹⁵⁷ While this did not prevent the VC from firing, it did prevent second volleys, and took the teams off of the battlefield. In addition, the Marines used artillery and rotary wing close air support at danger close distances to defend dozens of US and allied bases and compounds, including the I Corps headquarters’ compound.¹⁵⁸ The rocket attacks continued until the end of the Marine Corps’ involvement in Vietnam. As the range of the VC’s rockets increased, the Marines continued to have trouble creating a rocket belt big enough to prevent VC rocket team incursions.¹⁵⁹ By the end of Vietnam the Marine Corps had, “beyond question...conducted the most distinctive air base defense system and (in the eyes of the Air Force) the most satisfactory.”¹⁶⁰ In the years after Vietnam the Marine Corps lost many of the hard-learned lessons and emphasis on base defense it absorbed during the Vietnam War. Unfortunately, this was tragically revealed in Beirut, less than 10 years after the end of the Vietnam War.

Tragedy in Beirut: Defending the Expeditionary Base

The Marine's deployment to Beirut in 1983 proved tragic and exposed the Marine Corps' vulnerabilities, and a lack of defensive expertise and a defensive mindset in an age of unconventional warfare. On October 23, 1983 a massive explosion destroyed the Marine Barracks at Beirut International Airport (BIA). While the attack was similar in many ways to those in Vietnam, it ushered in the harsh reality of warfare in an age of rising nationalism and Muslim extremism in the Middle East. The barracks housed Marines and Sailors from 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit's (MAU) ground combat unit (GCE), and other US military personnel. 241 Americans, including soldiers, sailors, and Marines were killed instantly in the blast or died while waiting to be rescued or later succumbed to their injuries. The attack was carried out by a lone suicide bomber in a five ton Mercedes Benz stake bed truck. The truck bomb breached the unreinforced barbed wire perimeter and a suicide bomber detonated a gas-enhanced explosive device estimated at 0622.

The driver was able to enter the barracks outer public parking lot and then accelerated to approximately 35 miles per hour before impacting and breaching the barbed and concertina wire fence. He then passed two guard posts "without being engaged, entered an open gate, passed around one sewer pipe and between two other pipes, flattened the Sergeant of the Guard's sandbagged booth, entered the interior lobby of the building and exploded."¹⁶¹ The truck was loaded with "12,000 pounds of high explosives wrapped in canisters of flammable gases and was said to be the largest non-nuclear blast ever detonated on the face of the earth."¹⁶² The blast was focused and amplified due to the unique nature of the building's construction but the result was catastrophic, the entire building, housing 350 members of 1/8's headquarters and the security force, collapsed. The explosion threw debris for hundreds of feet, historian Eric Hammel noted

one tragic scene as two Marines looked up and “saw a sleeping-bag shrouded Marine impaled upon a leaf stripped branch” just over their heads.¹⁶³

The concentration of so many people in a single building, a violation of a basic tactical principles, certainly contributed to the high number of casualties. The Long Commission, which was appointed to investigate the attack, noted that “the BLT commander failed to observe the basic security precaution of dispersion.”¹⁶⁴ Another troubling aspect of the attack was recorded in the commission’s report. This stated that the driver was able to conduct a reconnaissance at 0550 and that “a yellow Mercedes Benz type truck was observed at about 0500 by the sentry on Post 6 entering the parking lot south of the BLT Headquarters building. The truck circled once, then exited to the south. Because that truck did not stop, it was not reported.”¹⁶⁵ This indicated a lack of discipline and seriousness on the part of the security force regarding vehicles despite the US Embassy bombing just six months before.

In the Marines’ defense, their mission was complicated by an unclear mission, and poorly formulated, incomplete, and unclear Rules of Engagement (ROE), which forced the Marines manning the barracks’ guard posts to remain in weapons condition four. This meant that a magazine was not inserted in their M-16A1 rifles. This ROE was issued by US Commander in Chief Europe (USCINCEUR) on September 23, 1983 and was derived from US European Command Directive 55-47A for "Peacetime Rules of Engagement."¹⁶⁶ The battalion’s ROE was still in place despite the bombing attack on the US Embassy on April 18, 1983. The Commander of Joint Task Force 62 requested changes to ROE that were granted in May 1983 for the US security forces at the “new US Embassy at the Duraffourd Building, the British Embassy, and at the US Ambassador's Residence at Yarze.”¹⁶⁷ Unfortunately the new ROE did not appear to cover the Marines at BIA.¹⁶⁸

The embassy bombing featured a 2,000 pound car bomb carried in a delivery van; this "gas enhanced device capable of vastly more destructive force than a comparable conventional explosive."¹⁶⁹ The embassy bombing occurred in the wake of a series of attacks on US, French and Italian peacekeeping forces which increased during March and signaled a distinct change in the operating environment for the multinational peacekeeping force. The blast collapsed the front portion of the embassy and killed 63 people, including 17 Americans, 32 Lebanese embassy employees, and 14 people who were visiting the embassy. The embassy bombing was followed by a dire warning from the Islamic Jihad Organization who claimed that the "we shall keep striking at any imperialist presence in Lebanon, including the international force."¹⁷⁰ This attack and the Islamic Jihad's warning should have provided the motivation and a valuable lesson learned regarding the attackers' tactics, techniques, and procedures. The lack of proper ROE was just one portion of the defensive measures that 1/8 and the 24th MAU should have initiated following the attack on the embassy. That attack should have initiated a series of actions and protective measures to harden facilities by creating a layered-defense with standoff, limited vehicle access through the use of barriers and multiple checkpoints, and increased overall perimeter security in general.

The loss of 241 Soldiers, Sailors and Marines at the Marine Barracks in Lebanon on October 23, 1983 taught the Marine Corps many lessons. However, like Vietnam, many of these lessons appear to have been forgotten in subsequent years. The Commandant, General P.X. Kelley's actions did not necessarily provide the motivation required to implement long standing change; the commandant was "compelled to protect the reputation of the 24th MAU's commanders and their superior chain of command."¹⁷¹ This likely prevented a wide-scale change in mindset required to defend advanced and expeditionary bases by holding them accountable. A

review of doctrinal publications released in the 1980s reveals that the emphasis on base defense was limited. Marine Corps publications including the *LAAD Platoon Commander's Handbook* (1986), *Employment of Forward Area Air Defense Battalion* (1986), and *Employment of Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion* (1988), all lack references to base defense despite the fact that these forces were charged with both air and ground defense of aviation bases. The lack of proper force protection at the barracks has some similarities to the attacks on Marine Forward Operating Bases (FOB) in Afghanistan. The Beirut attack was yet another example of the lack of preparation, expertise, and training on the subject of base defense and force protection first encountered by Marines in Vietnam, which was revealed again in Afghanistan.

Ad Hoc: Base Defense since September 11, 2001

The organization and employment of base defense operations in Afghanistan illustrated the continuing ad hoc nature of Marine Corps defensive operations since 1983. Afghanistan and Iraq before it also revealed the lack of residence expertise in the field in force protection. The successful attack against a disjointed and partially trained provisional defense force in Afghanistan demonstrated the high price of neglect by Marine Corps planners and force structure boards. These boards repeatedly reduced defensive capabilities; Marine Corps military police (MP) are currently one the last vestiges of base defense but there is some evidence that even that capability is slowly disappearing. A current MP student at Command and Staff noted that the MP's doctrinal focus has "changed now to policing, rule of law, and investigation," which further reduces the focus on force protection and defensive operations and thereby decreases number of defense experts in the Marine Corps.¹⁷² The lack of MPs and other force protection experts and manned, trained, and equipped base defense units forced the Marine Corps to utilize other units, like artillery battalions in the base defense role.

Marine Artillery: Training the Ad Hoc Force

The use of “in lieu of” forces during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was significant, for example only one battalion in the 11th Marine Regiment was a firing battery at the height of the war in Iraq. The rest of the battalions executed in lieu of missions.¹⁷³ A significant number of base defense/security forces were composed of artillery battalions that received pre-deployment training in a variety of areas but the training was limited in scope and the results were mixed. A Marine artillery officer assigned to the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in 2014-2015 noted that his battery received orders to become the security unit vice a firing battery just 90 days prior to deployment to Iraq because another battery failed its Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP) evaluation.¹⁷⁴ The result was that the battery had to start training all over again. However, their schedule and available instructors and ranges were such that they executed the training package in reverse order. While this event may have been a rare occurrence it also illustrates the difficulty in properly training an ad hoc or “in lieu of” base defense force. As the following material illustrates, the units’ base defense mission is made even more difficult when combined with poor defined and disjointed chains of command.

While many Marine Artillerymen were both willing and capable of executing base defense missions, they were not defensive experts. The artillery battalions did not receive professional preparation prior to deployment and the units lacked expertise in base defense. The units were generally undertrained, and their pre-deployment training (PTP) was a mixture of artillery, patrolling, base security, counter improvised explosive device (IED), and other miscellaneous training. One Marine officer noted that his battalion did not receive training on “joint base security/defense terms and concepts like the use of a Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC), joint security area (JSA), joint security coordination center (JSCC), dedicated and

cluster base forces, LOC security forces, or mobile security forces (MSFs)” prior to deployment.¹⁷⁵ The battalion’s operations department was forced to learn quickly after they arrived in country.¹⁷⁶ This is a disturbing trend, especially when combined with limited training on defensive equipment like the Ground-Based Operational Surveillance System (G-BOSS), an optical sensor that is similar to a helicopter’s forward looking infrared (FLIR) sensor.¹⁷⁷ The G-BOSS and other sensors are extremely valuable, the sensors provide day and night surveillance in a variety of weather conditions, but their utility is limited when operated by untrained or undertrained operators.

The situation was confusing and not conducive to proper base defense. The following example of the confusing system employed in Afghanistan was relayed by another Marine Corps Command and Staff Student who deployed with 2nd Battalion, 10th Marines (2/10) to Afghanistan in 2012. The officer noted:

One battery “reported to MHG for base security of Leatherneck where” the battery commander “was tasked with mounted patrolling out of the North Entry Control Point (ECP) and providing Marines to guard the Soak Lot and the Main Entry Point. Battery G was sent to Patrol Base (PB) Boldak to conduct local security patrols south of Leatherneck. Both HQ and Golf Battery were partnered with the Jordanians and in our S3 (operations) shop to include the Battalion Headquarters, we were partnered with the British soldiers.” Our other chain of command was to MEF due to Battery F’s requirement to shoot artillery out of Kajaki. Echo Battery was provided to Regimental Combat Team (RCT-6) for base defense at two other locations...¹⁷⁸

As this illustrates the units were not only spread across the area of operations but they had a variety of missions, which required numerous chains of command. Unity of command was

lacking, which violated a primary element in military doctrine and was determined to be a contributing factor in the Bastion Attack on September 14-15, 2012.

Bastion: The Hard Lessons of Poor Base Defense

On the night of September 14-15, 2012 15 insurgents penetrated the eastern perimeter of Bastion Airfield, a coalition airbase located in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The insurgents, trained in Pakistan and wearing discarded US Army uniforms, bypassed an unmanned guard tower, broke into three separate elements and then moved west towards the airfield's flightline. One force moved north toward the newly constructed and relatively unsecured VMA compound and hangars, which held McDonnell Douglas AV-8B "Harrier II" attack aircraft. The VMA's compound was the northern-most of a series of hangars oriented from south to north in-between the base's main north-south oriented eastern road and the runway. The central element moved into the cryogenic facility located east of the road roughly a half mile south of the VMA compound. The southern insurgent element moved towards the Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMM) and Marine Medium Tiltrotor (VMM) squadron compounds also located between the road and the runway. In the ensuing attack Sergeant Bradley W. Atwell, a Marine Avionics Technician, was killed as he responded to the attack while Lieutenant Colonel Christopher K. "Otis" Raible, the Marine Harrier Squadron's Commanding Officer, was killed as he led a counterattack against the Taliban fighters. In addition, several US and British service members were wounded, six Marine Corps AV-8B aircraft from VMA-211, were destroyed, "two AV-8B Harriers severely damaged, one C-12 damaged, three MV-22B damaged, one C-130E severely damaged, one UK SKASaC (Sea King) minor damaged, two UK Jackal vehicles significantly damaged, and three fuel bladders destroyed."¹⁷⁹

At the time of the attack the base's security had been relegated to a mishmash of elements consisting of Marine Corps, British, Jordanian, Tongan, and private contractor security elements. The massive coalition base was shared by US Marines, US Army, USAF, British, and Danish forces. The base's perimeter was surrounded by fences and prominently featured guard towers and roving patrols, but the measures proved inadequate. Internal security and barriers around the individual aviation compounds was non-existent except for at the Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) compound, which had been reinforced by HMLA-267 the previous summer (2011). The HMLA compound had a manned entry control point and was surrounded by HESCO barriers, cement Texas Walls (T-Walls), the larger versions of the more typical "Jersey barriers" found on many US interstates, and concertina wire. The northern portion of the HMLA compound was the only portion that was not hardened but it did feature triple-strand concertina wire that was approximately 5 feet tall.

The attack was repulsed on the ground by Marine mechanics, supply Marines, crew chiefs, pilots from the Marine squadrons, civilian contractors and a British Quick Reaction Force (QRF). Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 469 immediately launched all available aircraft while British Apaches were diverted from other missions back to the airfield. As at Wake, the Chosin Reservoir, and in Vietnam, the airborne elements played a decisive role in repelling the attack. The helicopters provided close air support (CAS) at the cryogenic facility, and on the VMA flightline. The pilot's resolve and skill during the fight has received little recognition outside of the Marine Corps. The "strip alert" section leader, acting as a Forward Air Controller (Airborne), deconflicted air and surface fires and provided sound judgment that likely prevented friendly fire incidents.¹⁸⁰

A number of problems were revealed in the subsequent investigation. The base defense violated one of the first rules of command and control, the defense force was divided between the British and the Americans.¹⁸¹ The US Marines were responsible for Camp Leatherneck on the western portion of the base while the British were responsible for Camp Bastion and the Bastion Airfield to the east. The Marines, in charge of overall security could not task the British forces. Both Marine Corps and UK assets patrolled outside the wire in the Base Defense Zone but weren't always in contact. At the time of the attack one US Marine patrol was outside the wire, but it was several kilometers away. The MAW's squadrons and detachments on the eastern side of the airfield were not tied into the base plan and most of them did not have regular contact with the BDOC. In general, the MAW's Marines had no idea what to do in the event of a ground attack except for what they had learned at Marine Combat Training (MCT). In addition, the Living Support Area (LSA), which was located adjacent to the perimeter fence and was where hundreds of the squadrons' personnel were billeted, did not have external communications, could not sound the alarm in the event of an attack, or properly account for missing personnel in the event of a muster.¹⁸²

The attack on Camp Bastion was the culmination of years of neglect in the field of base defense and force protection. The defenses were inadequate, and ultimately two Marine Major Generals were forced to retire. The Commandant, General James Amos noted in his September 30, 2013 Memorandum for the Record on the attack that the Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) ((MEF (Fwd)) commander "made an error in judgment" and that he was "doctrinally responsible for executing a layered, integrated, defense in depth force protection plan."¹⁸³ The Commandant noted that this is a difficult task, but what history has proven is that it is unobtainable one without a dedicated force that is manned, trained, and equipped to specifically

execute the defense mission. Force Protection is difficult, it is even more so when no one in the service is an expert on base defense or what may be now known as the *expeditionary base problem*. The Corps' now typical ad hoc methods ensure failure, repurposing units to base defense or scrounging support personnel only harms readiness and hampers offensive capabilities. The Marine Corps, as an institution accepted this risk decades ago and the institution must accept responsibility for the results.

It is discomfoting that the Marine Corps initially appeared as if was going to bury its head in the sand and ignore the problem after the attack. There was a massive engineering plan implemented on Camp Bastion following the attack, as the HESCO barriers and T-Walls that had long been requested finally appeared. However there was little public outcry, the attack occurred in the wake of the attack on the US Special Mission in Benghazi, Libya on September 11th, which garnered most of the media's and Congress' attention over the next few months. Another significant aspect appeared, there was very little professional outcry or soul-searching about the Marine Corps' defensive doctrine followed this attack. The Marine Corps did not initiate an investigation until General James Mattis, USMC, the Commander, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) ordered a theater-level investigation into the attack. Had the investigation not taken place then valuable lessons would have been lost as the Marines attacked the next problem on the horizon.

Conclusion: Where have all the Defense Battalions Gone?

The Marine Corps has proved in the past that it could develop and innovate in the field of both offensive and defensive operations despite its small size. This innovation occurred even during the "threadbare days" of the 1930s when the Marine Corps made both intellectual and technology innovations in the field of amphibious operations and advance base defense.¹⁸⁴ World

War II was a vital turning-point in the Corps' history as it rapidly grew to size far beyond most pre-war Marines' imaginations. The Marine Corps growth and attempts to retain forces did not go unchallenged. However, the Corps, like the rest of the US military, shrank rapidly after the war but it was still far larger than it was in 1941. The Marine Corps emerged in 1951, with the help of the Douglas-Mansfield Bill and the National Security Act of 1947, as a robust "expeditionary force-in-readiness."¹⁸⁵ The Marine Corps embraced this expeditionary role that was similar to the Corps' history before World War II as a crisis response force. As the Corps changed its focus back to crisis response it lost its focus on the defense of advanced naval, and overtime, expeditionary bases. This change is only understandable given the strategic realities of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. The country had forward deployed forces throughout the globe — and although an offensive mindset existed a responsibility for defense was always inherent in a presence in so many areas away from the homeland. Given the Corps' history since the end of World War II it is apparent that the later deemphasized at best and atrophied at worst.

The United States has operated with relative impunity since the end of the Cold War. The US has not faced a near-peer competitor who could mount a credible challenge to US expeditionary bases and this has influenced Marine Corps planners' force structure decisions. Many US strategists assumed that any engagement with the Soviets, who constituted the one force with significant conventional power projection capabilities, would likely be a nuclear war. While many Marines, including the members of the Hogaboom Board thought that nuclear war was unlikely, this environment still left the question of advance base defense somewhat moot. Marine Corps planners focused on offensive expeditionary operations both because that is the mission of an expeditionary force in readiness and because they felt that nuclear war was ultimately unlikely. For that reason, the Marine Corps lost its impetus to focus on defensive operations and

capabilities with the subsequent result being that the Corps lost much of its ability to adequately and professionally defend advanced naval and expeditionary bases. The focus for more than 70 years has been on the offense, which, has in-turn eroded the Corps' ability to defend bases. It is ironic, however, that the Marines Corps' recycled naval crisis response mission has repeatedly thrust the Marie Corps into numerous operations where a knowledge of defensive operations, and more specifically the defense of expeditionary bases, was required.

The requirement for base defense has not been eliminated. The rise of the Chinese near-peer threat and anti-access weapons in the Pacific and continued hybrid and low-intensity conflicts across the globe necessitate the creation of a knowledgeable core of defensive-minded Marines who can serve as the cadre in a variety of force protection and base defense scenarios. The size and scope of those capabilities will likely result from future force structure boards conducted in the same spirit as the Hogaboom Board. The Corps' decisions in this area will test the Marine Corps' dedication to its legally mandated defensive mission and its ability to obtain and retain a cadre of Marines who possess the mindset, training, and capability necessary to ensure that the Corps can be adequately prepared for and mitigate the threat of future attacks that are reminiscent of Da Nang, Marble Mountain, Beirut, and Bastion.

The Marine Corps prides itself on being an "air-ground, combined arms task force," it is for that reason that the Marine Corps must do its utmost to protect the aviation assets in that combined arms force.¹⁸⁶ The Marine Corps lost six AV-8B Harriers in less than two hours at Camp Bastion when it hadn't lost a single fixed-wing aircraft to enemy fire since September 11, 2001. The vulnerability of aviation to ground attack has been long noted, in 1921, Italian air power theorist General Giulio Douhet noted that "it is easier and far more effective to destroy the enemy's air power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than hunt his flying birds in

the air.”¹⁸⁷ The Marine Corps has repeatedly left itself vulnerable to ground attack, which can both cripple the Corps’ aviation efforts as it did in Vietnam in October 1965, or provide an enemy, especially an unconventional one, with an opportunity to cause a “strategic event, an incident that is as damaging politically to the conduct of a war as loss of a major battle is operationally or militarily.”¹⁸⁸ The Marine Corps’ mindset must change in an era where aviation assets are becoming ever more expensive and limited, it must protect the nest. The Marine Corps must adopt Winston Churchill’s attitude that everyone “should be armed...should have his place in the defence scheme....and every (Marine) should be at his post. 90 percent should be at their fighting stations within five minutes. It must be expected by all hands that they are expected to fight and die in defence of their airfield. Every building...should be prepared. Each of these posts should have its leader appointed. In two or three hours the troops will arrive; meanwhile every post should resist and must be maintained.”¹⁸⁹ This emphasis on, and understanding of, the importance of the base defense mission is vital to the Marine Corps’ future success.

Appendix A: Timeline

Timeline

Cessation of Spanish-American War	Aug 1898
Navy General Board Established	Mar 1900
Secretary of the Navy ordered the Marines to create an Advanced Base Force	Nov 1901
Russo-Japanese War	Feb 1904 - Sep 1905
Subic Bay Fleet Exercise	1907
Advance Base School founded	Apr 1910
Advanced Base Force brigade formed	Jun 1913
Culebra Fleet Maneuvers	Jan 1914
Landings at Vera Cruz	Apr 1914
World War I	Jul 1914 - Nov 1918
Chief of Naval Operations reinforced the Advance Base Force's 1st and 2nd Regiments	1917
1st Marine Aeronautics Company and a 7-inch coastal battery deploy to the Azores	Oct 1917
Army and Navy Board recognized the Marine Corps' "base-seizure" and defense mission	1920
LtCol Pete Ellis authored Operations Plan 712	1921
Fleet Problems III and IV	1924
<i>Joint Action, Army and Navy</i> released	1927
Fleet Marine Force created	Dec 1933
First draft of the <i>Tentative Manual for Landing Operations</i> released	Jan 1934
Capt O.P. Smith serves as an instructor at the Marine Corps Schools	Jun 1932 - Jan 1934
Capt O.P Smith attends the L'Ecole Superieure de Guerre in Paris	Jan 1934 - Nov 1936
Fleet Training Publication 167, <i>Landing Operations Doctrine</i> released	Aug 1938

World War II begins	Sep 1939
1st Marine Defense Battalion established	Nov 1939
1st Marine Defense Battalion deploys to the Pacific	Mar 1941
5th Marine Defense Battalion deploys to Iceland	Jun 1941
Battle of Wake Island	Dec 1941
9th Marine Defense Battalion established	Feb 1942
Operation WATCHTOWER (Battle of Guadalcanal)	Aug 1942 – Feb 1943
Operation TOENAILS (Rendova and New Georgia)	Jun - Aug 1943
52nd Defense Battalion established	Dec 1943
Operation FORAGER (Guam)	Jul - Nov 1944
1st Marine Defense Battalion redesignated as 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion	May 1944
9th Marine Defense Battalion redesignated as 9th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion	Sep 1944
World War II ends	Sep 1945
52nd Defense Battalion disestablished	May 1946
Korean War begins	Jun 1950
Battle of the Chosin Reservoir	Nov - Dec 1950
Korean Outpost War	Jun 1951 - Jul 1953
Operation BLUE BAT (Lebanon)	Jul – Oct 1958
9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade deploys to Da Nang, Vietnam	Mar 1965
Viet Cong attack on Da Nang	Jun 1965
Viet Cong attack on Marble Mountain and Chu Lai	Oct 1965
Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut	Oct 1983
Attack on Camp Bastion	Sep 2012

Appendix B: Table of Marine Corps Defense Battalions


Battalion	Dates	Operations	Comment
1st Defense Bn.	Nov 1939- May 1944	The 1st Defense Battalion arrived in Hawaii in March 1941. The battalion had detachments on Wake Island, Pearl Harbor, Palmyra and Johnston Island on 7 Dec 1941. The battalion reconstituted in Mar 1942. The unit deployed to Kwajalein and Eniwetok in the Marshall Islands for garrison duty in Feb 1944. It repositioned to Majuro in Mar 1944.	Activated in San Diego. Designated 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 7 May 1944, Guam Garrison duty as until 1947
2nd Defense Bn.	Mar 1940- Apr 1944	The 2nd Defense Battalion deployed to Hawaii in Dec 1941. It then deployed to Samoa in Jan 1942. The battalion landed on Tarawa in Nov 1943. It returned to Hawaii in 1944 and then redeployed to Guam in late 1944. As the 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion it landed on Okinawa in Apr 1945. The battalion returned to the US in 1946 and was deactivated.	Activated in San Diego. Designated 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 16 Apr 1944
3rd Defense Bn.	Oct 1939- Jun 1944	The 3rd deployed to Hawaii in May 1940. Then to Midway in 1941 then returned to HI in Oct 1941. Detachments augmented the 6th Defense Battalion at Midway during the battle in Jun 1942. Participated in the landings on Guadalcanal and Tulagi in Aug 1942. The battalion had R&R in New Zealand, which was followed by the landing at Bougainville in Nov 1943. It remained in the northern Solomon Islands until Jun 1944.	Activated at Parris Island. Redesignated 3rd Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 15 June 1944. Disbanded on Guadalcanal 31 Dec 1944.
4th Defense Bn.	Feb 1940- May 1944	The 4th Defense Battalion deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in Feb 1941. Detachments were on both HI and Midway on 7 Dec 1944. The 4th deployed to New Hebrides in Mar 1942. It then landed at Guadalcanal and then Vella Lavella in Aug 1943. The 4th later returned to Guadalcanal and then deployed to Okinawa in Apr 1945.	Activated at Parris Island. Redesignated 4th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 15 May 1944.
5th Defense Bn.	Dec 1940- Apr 1944	The 5th Defense Battalion deployed to Iceland in Jun 1941 with the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional) and redeployed to the US in Mar 1942. The 5th arrived in the South Pacific in July 1942, detachments were located on numerous islands including Tulagi. The bulk of the	Activated at Parris Island. Tulagi detachment redesignated as the 14th Defense Battalion on 16 Jan 1943. The remainder of the battalion became the Marine Defense Force, Funafuti. Redesignated

		battalion deployed to the Ellice Islands. Deployed to HI in April 1944 as the Marine Defense Force, Funafuti and became the 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion.	5th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 16 Apr 1944.
6th Defense Bn.	Mar 1941- Feb 1946	The 6th deployed to HI in Jul 1941 and Midway in Sep 1941. It was on Midway during the battle in Jun 1942. The 6th remained on Midway until 1946 when it was redesignated.	Activated in San Diego. Redesignated the Marine Barracks, Midway on 1 Feb 1946
7th Defense Bn.	Dec 1940- Apr 1944	The battalion deployed to Samoa in Mar 1941. The 7th stood garrison duty on Upolu, Savaii and in the Ellice Islands. It redeployed to HI in Apr 1944. The battalion deployed to Anguar, Palau Islands in Sep 1944 where it served on garrison duty until the end of the war.	Activated in San Diego as a composite infantry and artillery battalion. Redesignated 7th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 16 Apr 1944.
8th Defense Bn.	Apr 1942- Apr 1944	The 8th Defense Battalion deployed to Wallis Islands in May 1942. Deployed to Apamama in the Gilbert Islands in Nov 1943. Redeployed to HI in April 1944. Took part in the Okinawa Campaign in 1945, and returned to the US in Nov 1945.	Formed in Samoa from various Marine units. Redesignated 8th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 16 Apr 1944.
9th Defense Bn.	Feb 1942- Spet 1944	The 9th deployed to Cuba in 1942. Sailed for Guadalcanal, where it landed in Nov 1942. It took part in the Rendova and New Georgia Campaigns in 1943. The battalion also took part in the invasion of Guam in July 1944. The unit returned to the US in 1946.	Activated at Parris Island. Redesignated 9th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion in Sep 1944.
10th Defense Bn.	Jun 1942- May 1944	The 10th arrived in the Solomon Islands in Feb 1943. The battalion's tanks fought on New Georgia and Arundel Island. Landed on Eniwetok in Feb 1944.	Activated in San Diego. Redesignated 10th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 7 May 1944.
11th Defense Bn.	Jun 1942- May 1944	The 11th Defense Battalion deployed in Dec 1942 to the New Hebrides. In Jan 1943 it went to Tulagi and then the unit fought in the campaigns on Rendova, New Georgia, and Arundel Islands. The battalion deployed to Guadalcanal in 1944 and was then disbanded 31 Dec 1944.	Activated at Parris Island. Redesignated 11th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 16 May 1944.
12th Defense Bn.	Aug 1942- Jun 1944	Deployed to HI n Jan 1943. Deployed to Australia and then Woodlark island, off of New Guinea. It landed on Cape Gloucester, New Britain in Dec 1943. The battalion deployed to Peleliu in June 1944, where it remained until 1945.	Activated in San Diego. Redesignated 12th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 15 Jun 1944.
13th Defense Bn.	Sep 1942- Apr 1944	The battalion remained on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba throughout	Activated at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Redesignated

		the war.	13th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 15 Apr 1944.
14th Defense Bn.	Jan 1943- Sep 1944	Supported the landing on Emirau, St Mathias Islands in Mar 1944. Trained on Guadalcanal and landed on Guam in July 1944 where it remained until after the war.	Formed on Tulagi from elements of the 5th Defense Battalion. Redesignated 14th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 15 Apr 1944.
15th Defense Bn.	Oct 1943- May 1944	Deployed to the Marshall Islands in Jan 1944.	Activated in Hawaii from the 1st Airdrome Battalion. Redesignated 15th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 7 May 1944.
16th Defense Bn.	Nov 1942- Apr 1944	Redeployed to HI from Johnston Island in Aug 1944 and then deployed to Tinian. Deployed to Okinawa in Apr 1944.	Formed on Johnston Island from elements of the 1st Defense Battalion. Redesignated 16th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 19 Apr 1944.
17th Defense Bn.	Oct 1942- Mar 1944 (As 2nd Airdrome Battalion) Mar 1944- Apr 1944	The 2nd Airdrome Battalion was established on 28 Oct 1942. The unit was intended for the China-Burma Theater. Arrived in HI in May 1943. Deployed to Funafuti in the Ellice Islands in Aug 1943. Detachment deployed with the 2nd Defense Battalion to Tarawa in Nov 1943. Returned to HI in Mar 1944. Sailed for the Marianas and landed on Tinian on 2 Aug 1944. Conducted numerous patrols as it guarded North Field on Tinian. The battalion was on Tinian when then Enola Gay took off on 6 Aug 1945. The battalion's Marines unloaded the atomic bombs "Fat Man" and "Little Boy" from the USS Indianapolis. The Marines sailed for San Diego on 1 Nov 1945.	The 2nd Airdrome Battalion was activated in San Diego on 28 Oct 1942. Redesignated as the 17th Defense Battalion in Kauai, HI from elements of the 2nd Airdrome Battalion. Redesignated 17th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 19 Apr 1944. Disbanded on 6 Dec 1945 at Camp Pendleton, CA.
18th Defense Bn.	Oct 1943- Apr 1944	Deployed to Saipan and Tinian in Aug 1944. The battalion then regrouped on Tinian where it remained until the end of the war.	Activated at New River, NC. Designated 18th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 16 May 1944.
51st Defense Bn.	Aug 1942- Jan 1946	Composed of African-American Marines who trained at Montford Point, but who were commanded by white officers. Originally designed as a composite infantry and artillery battalion it became a traditional defense battalion in Jun 1943. Deployed to the Ellice Islands in Feb 1944 and to Eniwetok in Sep 1944. It sent detachments to Kwajalein in Jun 1945 and then sailed for Montford Point in Nov 1945.	Activated at Montford Point, NC in Aug 1942. Disbanded at Montford Point in Jan 1946.

52nd Defense Bn.	Dec 1943- May 1946	The 52nd was also composed of Montford Point Marines. In Oct 1944, the battalion arrived at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands. Deployed to Guam in Mar 1945. The 52nd relieved the 51st on Kwajalein in Nov 1945. Returned to Montford Point in Late 1945.	Activated at Montford Point, NC 15 Dec 1943. Redesignated as the 3d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Composite) in May 1946.
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Appendix C: Defense Battalion Equipment and Weapons¹⁹⁰



Sperry 60-inch searchlight



5-inch 50 caliber Guns as they appear today on Midway



155mm "Long Tom" Artillery



M3 3-inch Antiaircraft Gun



M1A1 90mm Antiaircraft Gun



9th Defense Battalion M1 Bofors 40mm Antiaircraft Gun



3rd Defense Battalion M1 Bofors 40mm Antiaircraft Gun on Bougainville



9th Defense Battalion "Twin Twenty" 20mm on New Georgia



9th Defense Battalion "Twin Twenty" 20mm on Guam



9th Defense Battalion M1921 .50 Caliber Water-Cooled Heavy Machine Gun manned by 1stLt William A. Buckingham, PFC Francis W O'Brien, Cpl Paul V Duhamel, and PFC Nemo Hancock, Jr., on Rendova. This gun was credited with shooting down the first Japanese aircraft on Rendova.




Montford Point Marines training with a M1917 .30 Caliber Water-Cooled Heavy Machine Gun




9th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion firing on Okinawa during a Japanese attack


Appendix D: Defense Installations on Wake




Appendix E: Battle of Wake Island Surface Action December 11, 1941¹⁹¹




Appendix F: Landing on Wilkes Island¹⁹²



Appendix G: Counterattack on Wilkes Island¹⁹³



Appendix E: 9th Defense Table of Organization during Operation TOENAILS




Appendix H: 9th Defense Battalion¹⁹⁴



Marine Defense Battalion on an unknown LST



9th Marine Defense Battalion sails towards "Suicide Point" on Rendova



9th Defense Battalion 90mm being offloaded at Rendova



A 9th Defense Battalion Stuart Light Tank on New Georgia



9th Defense Battalion Stuart Light Tanks on New Georgia

Appendix I: Montford Point Marines




51st Defense Battalion 90mm




51st Defense Battalion during training at Montford Point


Appendix J: Battle of the Chosin (Changjin) Reservoir Map 27-29 November 1950




Appendix K: Battle of Sudong 2-3 November 1950¹⁹⁵




Appendix L: Hagaru Defensive Perimeter 28-29 November 1950¹⁹⁶




*Appendix M: Attempts to Reinforce Hagaru*¹⁹⁷




Appendix N: Task Force Drysdale Ambush¹⁹⁸




Appendix O: Retreat from the Chosin (Changjin) Reservoir Map 6-11 December 1950



Appendix P: Diagram of Attack on the Marine Barracks in Beirut¹⁹⁹



Appendix Q: Photos of Insurgents planning the Bastion Attacks²⁰⁰



Appendix R: Photos of AV-8Bs and hangars destroyed during Bastion attacks²⁰¹



Endnotes

¹ Merrill L. Bartlett, "Ben H. Fuller: 1930-1934," in *Commandants of the Marine Corps*, edited by Allan R. Millett, and Jack Shulimson (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 232.

² Charles D Melson, *Condition Red: Marine Defense Battalions in World War II* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 6.

³ *The National Security Act of 1947*, Public Law 253, 80th Cong., Congressional Record, Chapter 343, 1st Session; S. 758., (26 July 1947), retrieved from <http://global.oup.com/us/companion.websites/9780195385168/resources/chapter10/nsa/nsa.pdf>

⁴ This quote is the mission of Marine Infantry, from the squadron to the battalion, which is "is to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, or to repel his assault by fire and close combat." For more see US Marine Corps, "1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 1st Marine Division," *Marines.mil*, retrieved from <http://www.1stmardiv.marines.mil/Units/1STMARINEREGT/1stBattalion.aspx>

⁵ For more on the 10 month course at Quantico see Charles D Melson, *Condition Red: Marine Defense Battalions in World War II* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 29. FMFM 8-3 is still used as a reference in more recent joint publications despite its age. For more see Marine Corps Development and Education Command, *Advanced Naval Base Defense*, Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 8-3 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Development and Education Command, January, 1978).

⁶ Jason Ruedi, (Marine Corps Major and Military Policemen currently attending Marine Corps Command and Staff College), interview by Seth Wolcott, January 10, 2015.

⁷ Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 269.

⁸ Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 269.

⁹ Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 268.

¹⁰ Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 275.

¹¹ Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 276.

¹² Robert J. Cressman, *Commandants of the Marine Corps*, ed. Allan R. Millett, and Jack Shulimson (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 160.

¹³ Anonymous, "With the United States Marines in Mexico," *The Marine Corps Gazette*, September 1916, <https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/1916/09/united-states-marines-mexico>

¹⁴ John A. Lejeune, "The Mobile Defense of Advance Bases by the Marine Corps," *The Marine Corps Gazette*, March 1916, <https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/1916/03/mobile-defense-advance-bases-marine-corps>

¹⁵ US Marine Corps History Division, "Brief History of U.S. Marine Corps Action in Europe during World War I," *MCU.USMC.mil*, last updated 2007 http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/pages/frequently_requested/WWI_Brief_History.aspx.

¹⁶ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 222

¹⁷ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 193.

¹⁸ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 222

¹⁹ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 222-223.

²⁰ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 223.

²¹ The Banana Wars were a series of U.S. military interventions and expeditions in Latin America and the Caribbean, which were often conducted for the benefit of U.S. business interests in countries like Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. For more on Banana Wars see Ivan Musicant, *The Banana Wars: A History of United States Military Intervention in Latin America from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990).

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- ²² Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 321.
- ²³ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 253.
- ²⁴ For more on War Plan Orange see Edward Miller, *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007).
- ²⁵ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 257.
- ²⁶ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 258.
- ²⁷ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 258.
- ²⁸ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 260.
- ²⁹ Edward C. Johnson, *Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years, 1912-1940*, ed. Graham A. Cosmas (Washington DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters US Marine Corps, 1976).
- ³⁰ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 258.
- ³¹ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 253.
- ³² Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 298-299.
- ³³ Merrill L. Bartlett, "Ben H. Fuller: 1930-1934," in *Commandants of the Marine Corps*, edited by Allan R. Millett, and Jack Shulimson (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 232.
- ³⁴ Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 330. and Merrill L. Bartlett, "Ben H. Fuller: 1930-1934," in *Commandants of the Marine Corps*, edited by Allan R. Millett, and Jack Shulimson (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 232.
- ³⁵ For more on the fleet exercises see Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 335-343.
- ³⁶ For more on the Marine Corps during the era of Commandant General Thomas Holcomb see Robert W. Gordon, "Thomas Holcomb: 1936-1943," in *Commandants of the Marine Corps*, edited by Allan R. Millett, and Jack Shulimson (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 253-281.
- ³⁷ For more on the advance base problems see Donald Bittner, "Taking the Right Fork in the Road: The Transition of the US Marine Corps from an "Expeditionary" to an "Amphibious" Corps, 1918-1941," in *Battles Near and Far: A Century of Operational Deployment*, ed. Peter Dennis, and Jeffrey Grey (Canberra, Australia: Army History Unit, Department of Defence, 2005), 116-140.
- ³⁸ Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 336.
- ³⁹ For more on why a "sense of urgency" is required to create change in organizations see the work of Dr. John Kotter and Kotter International on the 8-Step Process for Leading Change. "The 8-Step Process for Leading Change," Kotter International, last accessed Dec 14, 2014, <http://www.kotterinternational.com/the-8-step-process-for-leading-change/>
- ⁴⁰ Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 344.
- ⁴¹ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), and 161 (1st Fixed Defense Regiment) and 306 (technical defense regiment). For a detailed study of the defense battalions see Charles D. Melson, *Condition Red: Marine Defense Battalions in World War II* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 5.
- ⁴² Charles D. Melson, *Condition Red: Marine Defense Battalions in World War II* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 4.
- ⁴³ Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 355.
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- ⁴⁵ Robert J. Cressman, *A Magnificent Fight: Marines in the Battle for Wake Island* (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1992), 7.
- ⁴⁶ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 325.
- ⁴⁷ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 325.
- ⁴⁸ Robert J. Cressman, *A Magnificent Fight: Marines in the Battle for Wake Island* (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1992), 4.
- ⁴⁹ Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 355.
- ⁵⁰ Robert J. Cressman, *A Magnificent Fight: Marines in the Battle for Wake Island* (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1992), 7.
- ⁵¹ Robert J. Cressman, *A Magnificent Fight: Marines in the Battle for Wake Island* (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1992), 11.
- ⁵² Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 328.
- ⁵³ Robert J. Cressman, *A Magnificent Fight: Marines in the Battle for Wake Island* (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1992), 13.
- ⁵⁴ Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 355.
- ⁵⁵ Robert J. Cressman, *A Magnificent Fight: Marines in the Battle for Wake Island* (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1992), 22.
- ⁵⁶ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 333.
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- ⁵⁸ Robert J. Cressman, *A Magnificent Fight: Marines in the Battle for Wake Island* (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1992), 34.
- ⁵⁹ On a sad note five Wake defenders were executed on board the *Nitta Maru* and 100 civilian contractors were executed by the Japanese following US air raids in October 1943. For more see Robert J. Cressman, *A Magnificent Fight: Marines in the Battle for Wake Island* (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1992), 35-36.
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- ⁶¹ Charles D Melson, *Condition Red: Marine Defense Battalions in World War II* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 29.
- ⁶² Charles D. Melson, *Ninth Marine Defense and AAA Battalions* (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishers, 1998), 11.
- ⁶³ Charles D. Melson, *Ninth Marine Defense and AAA Battalions* (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishers, 1998), 11.
- ⁶⁴ Charles D. Melson, *Ninth Marine Defense and AAA Battalions* (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishers, 1998), 10.
- ⁶⁵ Charles D. Melson, *Ninth Marine Defense and AAA Battalions* (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishers, 1998), 12.
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- ⁶⁹ Charles D. Melson, *Up the Slot: The Marines in the Central Solomons* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993).
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22. ⁷³ Charles D. Melson, *Ninth Marine Defense and AAA Battalions* (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishers, 1998), 22.
- ⁷⁴ Charles D. Melson, *Up the Slot: The Marines in the Central Solomons* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 11.
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- ⁷⁶ Charles D. Melson, *Up the Slot: The Marines in the Central Solomons* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 14.
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- ⁸⁰ Military Times, "Maier J. Rothschild Navy Cross Citation," *Military Times Hall of Valor*, retrieved March 8, 2015 from <http://projects.militarytimes.com/citations-medals-awards/recipient.php?recipientid=8396>
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- ⁸² Charles D. Melson, *Up the Slot: The Marines in the Central Solomons* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 23.
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- ⁸⁵ Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 378.
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64. ⁹⁰ Charles D. Melson, *Ninth Marine Defense and AAA Battalions* (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishers, 1998), 64.
64. ⁹¹ Charles D. Melson, *Ninth Marine Defense and AAA Battalions* (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishers, 1998), 64.
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- ¹⁰⁹ Charles D Melson, *Condition Red: Marine Defense Battalions in World War II* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 5.
- ¹¹⁰ David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 427-441
- ¹¹¹ Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950)*, (Washington, DC: Center Of Military History United States Army, 1992), 522.
- ¹¹² Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 471.
- ¹¹³ Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 471.
- ¹¹⁴ David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 435.
- ¹¹⁵ David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 435.
- ¹¹⁶ David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 433.
- ¹¹⁷ Roy Appleman, *Escaping the Trap: The US Army X Corps in Northeast Korea, 1950* (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Military History Series, 1990), 163.
- ¹¹⁸ In addition to 41 Commando, Task Force Drysdale included B Company of the 31st Infantry, G Company of the 1st Marines and Company D, 1st Marine Tank Battalion. For more see Patrick K. O'Donnell, *Give Me Tomorrow: The Korean War's Greatest Untold Story—The Epic Stand of the Marines of George Company*. (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2010).
- ¹¹⁹ Task Force Drysdale consisted of Royal Marines from the 41st Commando, G Company, 1st marine Regiment, and the 31st U.S. Army Tank Company. The force began the march from Koto-ri with 921 men and was under attack during the entire advance from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri. The Task Force arrived during the evening of 29 November with 300 infantryman and 100 tankers, who were immediately placed into Hagaru-ri's eastern perimeter. For more on Task Force Drysdale see, Patrick K. O'Donnell, *Give Me Tomorrow: The Korean War's Greatest Untold Story—The Epic Stand of the Marines of George Company* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2010).
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- ¹²¹ Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950)*, (Washington, DC: Center Of Military History United States Army, 1992), 590.
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- ¹³⁰ Jack Shulimson, *Marine in Lebanon 1958* (Washington, DC: Historical Branch Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1966), 9.
- ¹³¹ Jack Shulimson, *Marine in Lebanon 1958* (Washington, DC: Historical Branch Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1966), 29.
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- ¹³³ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965* (Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, 1996), 129.
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¹⁸¹ William B. Garrett III, Thomas M. Murray, *US Central Command AR 5-16 Investigation into the Camp Bastion Attack* (Orlando, FL: US Central Command, 2013),

¹⁸² The author experienced this as a member of HMLA-469 on the night of the attack. HMLA-469 attempted to get a headcount but was hampered in its efforts until the author discovered that the living support area's (LSA) Wi-Fi was still turned on. At that point the squadron's executive officer, who was off-shift at the time of the attack and located in the LSA was then able to establish email contact with the squadron's operations officer, who was located in the squadron's work compound.

¹⁸³ James F. Amos, Commandant, US Marine Corps, memorandum for the record, 30 September 2013, 3.

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