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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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**In Name Only: How the Army Reserve Struggles to Remain an Operational Force  
After Fourteen Years of War**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**AUTHOR: Major Brian Young, Logistics, U.S. Army**

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
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## Executive Summary

**Title:** In Name Only: How the Army Reserve Struggles to Remain an Operational Force After Fourteen Years of War

**Author:** Major Brian Young, U.S. Army Reserve

**Thesis:** Despite recent policy directives supporting an operational reserve and total force policy, the Army Reserve continues to struggle with maintaining this bright future due to equipment funding shortfalls, antiquated personnel practices, bulky organizational design, and outdated legal protections for its workforce.

**Discussion:** There is universal agreement on the value of the Reserve Component in today's Army. Congressional and Department of Defense rhetoric extols the importance of the Reserve Component in both past support to the Total Force over the last 13 years and the bright future of an "operational reserve" that is ready to fight alongside its active counterparts in the ongoing war against terrorism or in future engagements. The term "operational reserve" first appeared in 2007 and has been documented in numerous official documents such as the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve and Department of Defense Directive 1200.17. Almost seven years later, however, the Army Reserve is still at a crossroads. Initiatives to bring the total force in line with this concept have been slow and incomplete. The effects of the Budget Control Act have started to push the services (and their reserve components) into a pitched battle for relevancy and funding. The "old way of doing business" still mires personnel practices in the past. The nation's laws still focus on the Reserve component as a strategic reserve, rather than protecting the reemployment rights and funding for an operational force.

**Conclusion:** Positioning the Army Reserve as an operational force will require hard choices from the Army and, more importantly, Congress. There are immediate steps, however, that both organizations can take to bring down the walls to fulfill the Total Force concept. Funding and using the Army Reserve relative to the proportion of its enabling power may realign resourcing and demand with the Department of Defense's vision. Accordingly, Army Reserve leaders can work with their active-duty counterparts to tear down institutional barriers and truly make a "Total Force."

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## **Preface**

Legislative attention, funding, and years of experience in the Global War on Terrorism have catapulted the Army Reserve into a better condition – ready, resilient, and equipped – than ever before in its 107 year history. Now, at the crest of this funding wave and with a reduction in operational tempo, the Army Reserve finds itself at a crucial crossroads. This topic has never been more pertinent to the national security discussion. Hopefully, this study will add to the continuing dialog on the subject.

This study began out of a conversation one afternoon at Marine Corps University with Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Tlapa. He challenged me to “think strategic” for my master’s thesis, and for that I’m very grateful. I am also very grateful to Dr. Christopher Stowe for providing sound direction and guidance during the course of this study – one could not ask for a better mentor for this process. I am also thankful for Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Lemott, Jr., whose numerous edits and comments vastly improved the quality of the final product.

I want to thank my numerous mentors who have motivated, pushed, and shaped me into the officer I am today: Colonel Stephanie Q. Howard, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Tripp Blanton, Colonel (Retired) Courtney Taylor, Commander (Retired) Melvin Shafer, Lieutenant Colonel Carl Every, and Lieutenant Colonel Doug Bell. Each of them modeled the best of the Army to me, and I am eternally grateful for their personal support and guidance.

Finally, thanks for the unending support and patience of my wife Leah, who does the bulk of the heavy lifting to raise our five wonderful kids. Marrying her is the best decision I ever made.

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## INTRODUCTION

Despite recent policy directives supporting an operational reserve and total-force policy, the Army Reserve continues to struggle to achieve its full potential due to antiquated personnel practices, outdated training practices, and equipment funding shortfalls. This issue has significant impact for the future of the Total Force and beseeches Congress to capitalize on the nation's investment in a trained, ready, and more cost-effective reserve over the past 14 years. The Army Reserve has been sitting at a crossroads since the introduction of the operational concept in 2007 – moving forward more by natural momentum than strategic forethought towards a definable end state.

In his opening statement to the House Military Personnel Subcommittee in 2010, the Honorable Dennis McCarthy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, stated that “this is not your father's, mother's, or even your older brother's Reserve component anymore.”<sup>1</sup> His remarks were characteristic of every senior officer and congressman that spoke or wrote on the subject in the last decade. Without fail, these senior leaders quote the massive contribution of the Reserve component to the Total Force during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom – usually in terms of the number of mobilizations, simultaneous missions both at home and abroad, and the diminishing dwell time between deployments.

Another universal truth espoused with little controversy is the concept of an operational reserve. This concept describes the continuous employment of the reserve component within the context of a true Total Force, essentially in the same manner – if not the same frequency – it was used during the past 14 years. In these hearings, senior leaders warn of wasting a decade of investment in equipment, trained manpower, and

organizational reform to return the reserves to a strategic posture, shelving them for future use in a major conflict that may not come for another generation. They correctly describe the reserve component as a superb return on investment for the American people.

Yet these two accepted truths – the wild success in the application of reserves to supplement the Total Force in the recent past and the need to maintain this capability in an operational reserve for the future – have failed to secure the full funding necessary to maintain, train, and equip the reserve component for this mission. This paper focuses on one piece of the Reserve force, the Army Reserve (USAR), and explores what it needs to be poised for its operational future. Is the Army Reserve being funded according to what lawmakers and senior Army leaders agree is a vital investment in the Total Force? Is the Army Reserve postured to remain operational in the near future given the uncertainty of the Active Army’s involvement in large-scale stability operations? Will its equipment be funded to support the requirements of an operational force? Is the nation saying one thing and doing another out of political and organizational convenience? If there are no serious objections to an operational reserve, why is the Army failing to fund the Army Reserve relative to its part in the Army’s Total Force?

This study is divided into three components. The first section explores the historical context of the Army Reserve in order to fully understand how the force arrived to where it is today. Part two explains the manning and training aspects of the reserves with suggested improvements to meet the demands of an operational force. Part three discusses how the Army Reserve is equipped and outlines what risks the force faces at current funding levels for the near- and long-term future.

It is important to note the scope of this project. The term “reserve component” refers to all entities in the Department of Defense’s part-time structure – National Guard and federal reserves for all services. There are three components of the nation’s Army: the National Guard (primarily state-affiliated), the Army Reserve (a federal organization subordinate to the Department of the Army), and the Active Army (Title 10). This paper, while certainly addressing issues in the context of the Total Force (all three components listed above), focuses on the federal Army Reserve. This was intentional in order to focus research specifically to this unique component and offer targeted observations for consideration.

## **PART I: AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE ARMY RESERVE**

### **LEGISLATIVE ROOTS**

The Army Reserve's 107-year history is rich with congressional intervention, strong debate on the relationship between the regular and reserve component of the Army, and a consistent interweaving of change with the National Guard. When looking at the Army Reserve's history, one has to see it in the light of the trends at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century that created an entire reserve component system which was increasingly centralized and aligned more with the federal than with state governments.

The federal reserve concept stemmed from the debate over the Army's composition after the United States became increasingly involved in world affairs at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Beginning as the Medical Reserve Corps in 1908, this new, federalized force set out to resolve mobilization issues of skilled medical officers and non-commissioned officers during the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the Philippine Insurrection from 1898-1902.<sup>2</sup> The National Defense Act of 1916, and its subsequent amendments, merged the Medical Reserve Corps into an Officer's Reserve Corps and Enlisted Reserve Corps.<sup>3</sup> Many aspects of the 1916 act remain in effect today, to include the one-weekend-per-month training regimen plus an annual training period.<sup>4</sup>

The creation of the Army Reserve was also tightly wound with the larger, and possibly more politically volatile, debate over the role of the Organized Militias – unofficially known at the turn of the century as the National Guard.<sup>5</sup> Major General Emory Upton could very well be considered the father of future discord between the Reserve and Active Component. His 1878 book *The Military Policy of the United States*, which was not officially published until 1903 by Secretary of War Elihu Root, inspired a

generation of active-duty officers. Upton's acolytes, which obviously included Root, advocated an expansible regular army of cadre units that would oversee and lead reserve forces in war. This traditional European system, molded in the Prussian image, would be under the direct influence of the regular army and filled during a contingency by reserve volunteers or draftees instead of localized recruits as was done during the Civil War.<sup>6</sup>

Public Law 57-33, commonly known as the Dick Act of 1903, began a series of reserve component reforms and debates that lasted more than two decades. The Dick Act, sponsored by National Guard Major General and Ohio Congressman Charles W. Dick, solidified the universal militia.<sup>7</sup> Along with the creation of a General Staff Corps, this legislation created federal standards for training, funding, and inspecting the reserve component, of which some aspects remain today. The Dick Act also instituted the role of full-time support for the reserves with its implementation of Regular officer details to provide training.<sup>8</sup>

Two bills created the force that would eventually evolve into the modern Army Reserve. The first, passed on April 23, 1908, created the Medical Reserve Corps.<sup>9</sup> This act would yield the Army 1,903 reserve medical officers by 1916, or approximately 81 percent of the total physicians in the force at that time. The second act, under Section 2 of the Army Appropriations Act of 1912, lengthened enlistments to seven years. This meant those under a normal Regular Army contract would serve three to four years on furlough in the federal reserve prior to final discharge.<sup>10</sup> This concept remains in effect today.

The debate over how the army would expand in a major war continued through these first years. Uptonites, mostly made from those in the Regular Army, continued to

push for a Prussian-style system of Regular officer cadre, augmented by the reserve forces, to include the National Guard. Those like John McAuley Palmer, a 1892 graduate of the United States Military Academy, countered Upton's supporters and is often considered the "father of the Army Reserve."<sup>11</sup> As an active-duty officer, prominent War Department staffer, and writer during this contentious debate, Colonel Palmer testified to Congress in 1919 that such a plan was "not in harmony with the genius of American institutions."<sup>12</sup> He believed that a citizen-soldier force unified by regional affiliation was inherently tied to the political support needed for a mass mobilization, and perhaps more importantly, the realities of American democracy. Following his potentially career-ending testimony to the Senate subcommittee, Senator James W. Wadsworth tasked him to craft legislation countering the Upton-like plans already in motion.<sup>13</sup> In June 1920, Congress passed an amendment to the 1916 act that defined the nation's army in three distinct components: the regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserve.

This early history is important to the debate surrounding the operational reserve because it provided the legislative framework that continues until today. Indeed, full-time support manning, mobilization for missions at home and abroad, the capability to rapidly expand the Total Force, and the overall cost efficiency are debates that continue today. Without an understanding of this foundation, it would be impossible to critique what remains fundamental to an operational reserve for the future or what is simply a legacy of the strategic reserve system.

## **WORLD WARS**

World War I marked the nation's first attempt to rapidly mobilize on a mass scale since the Civil War. The quick expansion of the Army tested the organizations ability to

integrate the new aspects of the 1916 law. By May 1917, three weeks after the United States entered the war, the War Department processed over 7,597 Reserve Officer appointments. By the end of the war, the Army Reserve, consisting of the Officers' Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps, had supplied 89,476 officers and over 80,000 enlisted soldiers to the force.<sup>14</sup> Of the officers, over one-third were medical doctors.<sup>15</sup>

During the interwar years, the reserves were subject to more turbulence as the nation worked through the constitutional questions resolved in the National Defense Act of 1933 as well as funding shortfalls as a result of a national security policy that maintained a smaller Regular Army. The 1933 act affirmed that the federal government could order the National Guard to federal service in wartime, thereby overriding its allegiance to state governments.<sup>16</sup> The federal reserve, however, struggled to even conduct training since – unlike the National Guard, whose paid drills were congressionally appropriated in the 1916 act – the reserve had no such guaranteed funding source.

The Officers' Reserve Corps struggled to perform two primary missions in the interwar years: to grow and train the force. The first was successful due to the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), which commissioned an average of 6,535 officers per year from 1920-1937.<sup>17</sup> A second commissioning program named the Citizens' Military Training Camps (CMTC), which enjoyed the patronage of influential political and prominent civilians and received a vastly disproportionate amount of funds compared with ROTC from 1925-1928, hampered this effort to some degree. During these years,

CMTC produced three percent of officer commissions while receiving 43 percent of the budget.<sup>18</sup>

With training funds scarce as well, the Officer Reserve Corps (ORC) struggled to give sufficient training to even a portion of the reserve force. In 1930, for example, only 28 percent of the 79,285 active Reserve Officers received funding for annual training.<sup>19</sup> ORC meetings often took place wherever they could find space, such as churches or community centers.<sup>20</sup> When active-duty training or service was plentiful, as was the case when President Franklin Roosevelt put the War Department in charge of all Civilian Conservation Corps camps, the Army fought to limit tours of active-duty personnel and spread valuable leadership opportunities across the force.<sup>21</sup> During the 1930s, 30,000 ORC officers assisted in the management of over 2,700 camps.<sup>22</sup>

Mobilization for World War II produced an interesting anomaly in the practical activation of reserve divisions compared with how many envisioned a full mobilization taking place. On paper, the ORC staffed 26 infantry divisions for the war. In reality, most of the officers manning those positions were not originally part of the organizations.<sup>23</sup> While providing over 180,000 officers through the course of the war, the ORC incrementally mobilized from 1939 to 1942 as events unfolded and, as a result, most cadre divisions decreased in strength as individual officers took assignments in the Regular Army or National Guard.<sup>24</sup>

Despite a seemingly messy, non-doctrinal mobilization of the reserves in support of World War II, both the National Guard and ORC performed well. In retrospect, putting aside the active/reserve acrimony that sometimes took place, the facts suggest that the three components meshed together into a cohesive fighting force that was, in reality,

dominated by citizen-soldiers throughout the ranks. Originally expected to act as the cadre for an expanding Army, the ORC ostensibly acted as a force generator to fill key positions throughout the National Guard and Regular Army. Following the war, it was hard to argue the sacrifice of either reserve component, or its importance in providing trained leaders to the rapidly expanding U.S. Army in the crucial first years from 1939-1941.<sup>i</sup>

The War Department began planning for the structure of the post-war Army before 1945, but quickly faced complexity between how its intent, Congress' role, and the public's desire would intersect in approving those plans.<sup>25</sup> The reserves were not immune from the national security restructuring which took place in the post-war years. After the war, the rancor between the National Guard and the Regular Army reached a fever pitch by 1947 when a commission led by Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray submitted a proposal to combine the ORC and National Guard. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal concurred, only to have the National Guard Association push Congress to ultimately ignore the report. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara would try again, and fail, to merge the two components in 1962.<sup>26</sup>

## **COLD WAR CONFLICTS AND THE STRATEGIC RESERVE**

At the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the immediate need was that individual replacements to bring their ranks up to full strength.<sup>27</sup> Due to a rapid

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<sup>i</sup> Crossland and Currie point out that over 50% of those officers killed in action and over 25% of those missing in action or captured were from the ORC. Also, 18 of the 1,065 general officers during the war were from the ORC, to include notables such as James H. Doolittle, William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan of the Office of Strategic Services, and Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.

demobilization after World War II, and service members' desire to get back to civilian life, only 3.2 percent of enlisted veterans elected to retain their affiliation with the military through the Enlisted Reserve Corps.<sup>28</sup> The mobilization was, however, predominately an officer's call-up in the beginning. A general outcry from World War II veterans followed the initial call-up of lieutenants and captains not assigned to specific units in the ORC. They railed against the policy of calling up unpaid and untrained (for at least five years) officers before calling up those in paid ORC units that drilled regularly. After complaints filtered up to Congress, Army Secretary Frank Pace, Jr. issued a change in priority, but not until 1952.<sup>29</sup>

Numerically, the ORC contributed more manpower to the Korean War effort than all of the National Guard. The War Department activated over 240,500 ORC service members by the end of the war, with 83 percent of those called-up in the first year of fighting.<sup>30</sup> The rough handling of the mobilization of the ORC would lead to the last major reserve reform legislation until the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 renamed the ORC the United States Army Reserve (USAR) and defined three categories of federal reservists: ready, standby, and retired. Congress designated the Ready Reserve to be called upon in a national emergency and should be done so with regard to unit integrity.<sup>31</sup>

The mistakes of the Korean War call-up repeated themselves during the Berlin Crisis in 1961. Now firmly rooted as a strategic reserve, over 30 percent of the Pentagon mobilization plan targeted unpaid, non-drilling reservists to be used as individual augmentees.<sup>32</sup> The Chief of the Army Reserve also played a part in exaggerating the USAR's readiness by stating in 1960 that his organization was "at its highest state of

readiness ever and was basically sound and ready.”<sup>33</sup> When units were still lingering at the mobilization site after nine or more months of training, the resulting outcry was transmitted to service member’s representation in Congress and even in staged protests by the unit members and their wives.<sup>34</sup>

The political defeat of McNamara’s attempt to combine the National Guard and Army Reserve in 1964, coupled with the blowback from failed mobilizations during the Berlin Crisis, undoubtedly lingered in his mind as he advised President Lyndon Johnson on whether to use the reserves in Vietnam.<sup>ii</sup> There was extensive debate after the Defense Secretary’s visit to Saigon in 1965 that ended with a proposal to the President to increase total force strength in the country to 600,000 by mid-1966, with a call-up of 235,000 reservists.<sup>35</sup> President Johnson ultimately decided not to ask Congress for authorization to call-up the reserves in large numbers, most likely due to the political drawbacks. If reservists were to be used, it would have forced him to ask Congress for a declaration of national emergency, which some argue could have led to a public introspection on the entire war itself.<sup>36</sup> Other historians point out that the decision was due to political forces in the reserves which, on the whole, were much “better connected, better educated, more affluent, and whiter” than their peers being drafted into the active army. Thus, as more citizens flocked to the reserves to avoid the draft, especially from 1965-1968, it was more politically viable for the President to rely upon draftees to supply the Pentagon with a continuous flow of manpower.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>ii</sup> Incidentally, McNamara’s defeat was the first major victory for the Reserve Officer’s Association, the new lobbying firm on behalf of the USAR. Jacobs writes that the National Guard was a proponent of the merger, because it would consume all organized USAR units, leaving the USAR with just individual augmentees. The ROA fought, and won, against this proposal.

## **TOTAL FORCE POLICY, DESERT STORM, AND THE DRAWDOWN**

Senior Pentagon and political leaders sought to rectify the mistakes of Vietnam in a variety of reforms following the war. Some were politically driven, such as the movement to an all-volunteer force, while other reforms strove to guarantee the reserves a key role in the next conflict. This latter reform, the Total Force Concept, certainly developed in the context of the all-volunteer force, was a product of President Johnson's decision not to mobilize the reserves in greater numbers. By solidifying a total-force policy, Pentagon leaders established a mobilization system that would force the issue to the political forefront during the next contingency. It was an important change for the simple fact that the President would be faced with having to justify short-term deployments of troops to the small towns and populations where reservists lived and worked. During the next fight, as a result of the Total Force Policy, these troops would respond to the crisis alongside their active-duty counterparts in the first wave of deployments.

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird first expressed the total-force approach, and then it was further propagated by his successor, James Schlesinger in 1973.<sup>38</sup> Laird's policy statement expressly placed the reserves as the "initial and primary source for augmentation of the active force in any future emergency."<sup>39</sup> Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams ensured this vision would be executed by reorganizing the Army to place significant amounts of combat support and combat service support into the Reserve Components. The "Abrams Doctrine" put 66 percent of combat support into the reserves by 1973, solidifying decision points for future presidents should they commit combat power abroad.<sup>40</sup>

Due to the poor state of the Army Reserve's equipment and manning following the Vietnam War, this policy would drive a revitalization campaign for the component that lasted well into the 1980s. Higher pay for all services in 1980, coupled with a reorganized recruiting command in the Army Reserve, would drive up the quality of recruits as the effects of Vietnam faded. Full-time civilian support in the Army Reserve almost doubled to nine percent. Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) staff grew threefold in the Army Reserve during the same period.<sup>41</sup>

The equipping gains from 1970-1989 started out strong, but faded as the years past. The initial transfer of equipment into the reserves following the policy's implementation was valued at over \$726 million and replaced World War II end items such as M-1 rifles and M48 tanks. Generosity gradually decreased in subsequent years, and by the end of the Carter administration, the Army Reserve was at 26 percent of its wartime requirements, with an estimated balloon payment of \$9.1 billion to fully equip the force set.<sup>42</sup> Congress recognized the Army Reserve equipping budget was being starved to feed the active component and acted to appropriate funds, specific to the Reserve Components that yielded \$705 million for the Army Reserve from 1982-1988.<sup>43</sup>

Operations in Southwest Asia to liberate Kuwait from Iraq Forces were the first major test of the Total Force Policy on three levels. First, Desert Storm was a test of the civilian and military leadership as to whether they would actually adhere to the concept when faced with an actual contingency. There were real political consequences to President George H. W. Bush's decision to issue a call-up in 1991. In his book *Citizen Warriors*, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Stephen M. Duncan describes the decision to call-up reservists as a series of extended discussions between

senior leaders regarding the domestic and international impact.<sup>44</sup> Ultimately, the most controversial aspects of the decision were internal. Duncan and his office fielded a range of questions from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and other leaders such as “Will they show up if called?”<sup>45</sup> There was also concern over mobilization timelines and expectations of the individuals in regards to their role as a strategic reserve. Perhaps the most potent recognition of this discussion, especially by the political handlers, was the undeniable link between the activation of the reserves and the impact it would have on communities across America – both from a human resource standpoint and their intimate involvement with the national security decisions of the government.

The Army Reserve served with distinction during Desert Storm, but the experience still produced significant flaws in the total-force concept. Of the 79,118 USAR soldiers activated, over 35,000 were deployed.<sup>46</sup> The Army Reserve provided 626 total units and activated over 17 percent of the Individual Mobilization Augmentee force.<sup>47</sup> Mobilization times showed a range of readiness and were sometimes hampered by inconsistent training practices at various locations. Mobilization sites sometimes became overloaded and ill-equipped to handle the surge, delaying forward movement and the link-up with their parent units in theater. Condensed training qualification training for some Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), such as water purification, were deemed insufficient.<sup>48</sup> “To say it was messy was an understatement of the first degree,” stated Major General Max Baratz, the deputy commander for reserve affairs at Forces Command (FORSCOM).<sup>49</sup>

The next major milestone in Army Reserve history came again as a result of Congressional intervention and oversight. Beginning with Congressman Bill Chappell,

who brought the issue of USAR command and control to Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, a series of reforms ended with the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, which established the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) as a major subordinate command of FORSCOM.<sup>50</sup> The Chief, Army Reserve would now be the commanding general of USARC as well as the head of the Army Reserve component and chief advisor to the Army Chief of Staff on all USAR issues. More importantly, USARC took control of funding for the entire Army Reserve force for the first time.<sup>51</sup>

The “Bottom’s-Up” review during the Clinton Administration produced the second major historical event for the Army Reserve. As a product of this review to reevaluate force structure for a post-Cold War environment, Army component chiefs agreed on a major shift in force structure between the National Guard and Army Reserve. The USAR transferred about 14,000 positions to the National Guard and received about 10,000 in return – mostly combat support and combat service support.<sup>52</sup> The realignment capped the Army Reserve end-strength at 208,000 and further shaped it as the sustainment, military police, and civil affairs force provider for the active component.

## **9/11 AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM**

Following 9/11, integration with the active component accelerated as transformation initiatives took place simultaneously with higher operational tempo. As General Peter Schoomaker compared these efforts to “tuning an engine while the car is moving – complex and potentially dangerous.”<sup>53</sup> The focus of Lieutenant Generals James Helmsly and Jack Stultz, Chiefs of the Army Reserve during this timeframe, centered around how to sustain the extended deployment cycles while providing

predictability to family members and soldiers without breaking the force. In line with these efforts, General George W. Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army, began to articulate how the Army Reserves must transform to match the operational mission they were tasked with performing. Testifying in front of the Senate Army Services Committee in 2007, General Casey stated the reserves were already “performing an operational role for which they were neither originally designed nor resourced.”<sup>54</sup> General Stultz’s “implementation imperatives” further codified how this transformation would be a paradigm shift for the Army Reserves, writing that the mobilization process must change from “train, alert, train, and deploy to train, alert, and deploy.”<sup>55</sup> The Army Reserve has been attempting to implement this since 2008 with varied success. The provision of manpower has been conducted at the most exponential pace since World War II. Since 2001, 275,542 Army Reservists have been mobilized in support of the war effort, with about 19,000 soldiers deployed worldwide in support of the Combatant Commands (COCOM) and almost 4,000 deployed to Afghanistan.<sup>56</sup>

The lessons of history cannot always be clearly related to future problems the Army may encounter. However, it would be foolish to ignore obvious trends of the last century. First, there was consistently a demand signal from the Regular Army that was either met with a delay, or mishandled to some degree in the administration of the call-up policy. This could be attributed to either a flaw in the train, activate, train, and deploy cycle, or insufficiencies in the law that prohibits civilian leadership from accessing the reserve component in the way it was needed. There is also a cultural disconnect between the Army Reserve and Active Army that is aggravated by inconsistent quality of Army Reserve leaders, uneducated active component officers with little or no experience with a

peacetime reserve, and disparate technical systems that complicate the continuum of service. Third, the full-time support system has evolved into a siloed promotion and service system that further isolates the two components. These factors will be explored in the remainder of this study.

## **PART II: MANNING AND TRAINING THE FORCE**

As the Army's force provider for combat support and combat service support, the Army Reserve must provide trained and ready soldiers and units as required by the active component. Unlike the National Guard, which has comparable structures such as the Brigade Combat Teams that mirror their active-duty counterparts, the Army Reserve is focused on providing mostly sustainment, military police, engineering, and civil affairs capabilities to the Total Force. In short, the Army Reserve exists to complement the active component, and as constructed through the Abrams Doctrine and subsequent force mix changes throughout the 1900s, the active force is reliant upon the Army Reserve for most extended operations. Despite recent progress in some areas, outdated personnel systems, policies, and training practices are still inhibiting the full transformation of the Army Reserve into an operational force.

The Army Reserve is structured in three parts according to federal law. The first is the Ready Reserve, which consists of the Selected Reserve (Troop Program Unit, Active-Guard Reserve, and Individual Mobilization Augmentee) and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Troop Program Unit (TPU) soldiers are traditional reservists that serve in a designated unit one weekend per month and two weeks of annual training per year. Active-Guard Reserve (AGR) are Title 10 soldiers that support reserve units and organizations full time. The Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) is assigned to an active component unit and usually has the option of performing battle assemblies (formerly known as drills), but is required to perform annual training with the Active Component (AC) parent unit. The IRR is composed of soldiers who still have a remaining service obligation with the AC or Reserve Component (RC), but are not

required to attend training. This program has expanded in recent years to ensure the Army maintains contact and accurate records for these soldiers since they have been relied on for mobilizations in support of ongoing operations.<sup>57</sup> The second part is the Standby Reserve, which consists of soldiers not assigned to the ready reserve or retired reserve. These individuals are still eligible for mobilization, but cannot serve in a reserve status for pay or be promoted.<sup>58</sup> For example, Standby Reservists could be individuals in key civilian positions. The third part is the Retired Reserve, which mostly consists of soldiers who are receiving retirement benefits from the government, but have not yet reached age sixty.<sup>59</sup> In addition to the military workforce, there are also three types of civilian employees that support that Army Reserve. The first are Military Technicians (MT), who are federal civilian employees that must also maintain simultaneous membership in the Selected Reserve as a condition of their employment. The second are Non-Dual Status Technicians (NDST), which are MTs without the dual-status requirement in the Selected Reserve. The third are federal civilian employees, who cannot be ordered to active-duty unless they voluntarily choose to join the reserve component.<sup>60</sup>

## **THE CONUNDRUM OF FULL-TIME SUPPORT**

Full-time support (FTS) for the reserve components has always been a key readiness driver. FTS soldiers, civilians, and technicians maintain equipment during the month while TPU members are working at their civilian employment. They perform administrative functions, prepare training schedules, and coordinate activities for annual training and battle assemblies to ensure the 39 days of training each year are productive,

planned, and properly resourced. FTS staff also work in remote locations across the country and in its territories, often far away from major installations. As a result, they generally work in small groups at the reserve centers with little daily supervision from the commander.

As of 2013, the Army Reserve authorized end strength is 205,000 and decreasing to 195,000 by 2015.<sup>61</sup> While actual end strength has fluctuated between about 185,000 and 199,000 in recent years, the FTS structure has increased 28 percent since 9/11 – from 19,278 to 24,672.<sup>62</sup> Compared with other services, the Army Reserve maintains about six percent less FTS than the average for the other services. While most other reserve components maintain a FTS rate of 19.4 percent of their total force, the Army Reserve has maintained a low FTS rate of only 13 percent. As a result of this and other factors, this component can provide 20 percent of the total force for only six percent of the Army's budget.<sup>63</sup>

In the early 1980s, the Chief of the Army Reserve (CAR), sought to phase out the civilian workforce and replace it with uniformed soldiers. This pilot program became the AGR program today. Because of backlash from the civilian workforce, the intention to phase-out the civilian workforce was halted before completion. Subsequent commanders, to include the current CAR, pushed to reduce the MT program and hire more federal civilians and NDST in order to simplify the workforce and provide more flexibility for workers. The problem with the FTS system is that the workforce structure has failed to evolve with the operational force concept. The Department of the Army promotes and assigns AGRs separately from their active-duty counterparts, and as result, produces a varied quality of officer. The Army confines key and developmental positions to the

Army Reserve force. In addition, the MT system is antiquated at best, further restraining the Army Reserve from selecting, retaining, and assigning the best leaders possible.

The AGR program does not produce the highest quality officer and NCOs that it could simply because it is a siloed system from the other two Army components. An operational force requires an integrated FTS that is proactive in anticipating the needs of the active force, closes the culture gap between the components, and facilitates the highest quality mentorship and training possible for TPUs in their command. Currently, there are eight types of soldiers in the Army, divided across three components.<sup>iii</sup> AGR assignments and promotions are isolated from the active component, producing radically different career paths for officers and NCOs in each of the components.

Major General (Retired) Jeffrey A. Jacobs, a former commanding general in the USAR, wrote:

Currently, Army Reserve AGR soldiers are, for the most part, isolated from the active component. AGR soldiers at the unit level work in reserve centers that are largely deserted during the week. Although many AGRs serve tours on higher level AC staffs, they do not serve in AC units at the brigade level and below. Neither do AC soldiers serve in tactical RC units, even though AC-RC integration has taken a quantum leap forward with the advent of Training Support XXI. This separate but equal policy perpetuates the distinct AC and RC cultures.<sup>64</sup>

Jacobs brings an important point to the discussion – this siloed system is not just a problem with the AR, but the AC as well. AC officers and NCOs are just as likely to know very little about the daily struggles and opportunities of the AR because of their assignments only to AC units. In 2013, the Army assigned only 68 AC officers and NCOs to regular duty with an AR unit.<sup>65</sup> So, as the “new normal” of the last 14 years draws to a close, and each component stops working together en masse as the wars

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<sup>iii</sup> USAR AGR, TPU, IMA, IRR, ARNG AGR (Title 32), ARNG AGR (Title 10), M-Day (ARNG equivalent of USAR TPU), and finally, Active-duty.

required them to do, how does the Army ensure they have the most diversified work experience across the entire force?

One solution would be to simplify the system. The AGR program could be abolished and all officers currently serving in that system accessed into the active-duty pool. Congress would need to legislate the fill rate for AR positions to ensure the Active Army did not starve vital FTS from reserve units. In addition, key and developmental positions, which are essential leadership positions governed by Army Regulation, could be updated to include assignments in the AR. At company- and field-grade ranks, all officers would be required to serve in both components to ensure that officers would be educated, versed, and culturally attuned to aspects of service across the full spectrum of service.<sup>iv</sup>

Simplifying and reducing the civilian system would also serve the AR well. Currently, MTs are required to resign their civilian employment when selected for a command that is outside the terms of their employment. Since most would likely not resign their full-time employment for a part-time job, the AR is inhibiting itself from selecting the best TPU commanders. By mirroring the active component in its hiring and professional development of the civilian workforce and properly identifying key and essential positions protected from mobilization, the AR could continue what it started and transition MTs to become military positions – able to train and deploy with their units as intended. Too many MTs have “grown” their entire careers in the same battalion or

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<sup>iv</sup> There have been numerous variations of this idea dating back to the early 1980s. Martin Bilkin’s book talks about congressional concern that AGR and AC service are not equivalent. Jacobs recommends alternating assignments between the components, focusing on the importance of company command in the AC. These suggestions, however, leave the fundamental problem in place – the separate promotion and career paths, along with two distinct types of active service that drive the cultural divide.

brigade, violating a central tenet of Army leadership that grows leaders through diverse of assignments and opportunities within a given career field.

Simplifying the FTS program for the AR would force the culture gap between the AR and AC to shrink at an even faster pace. Without mass future deployments in the near future, which compel the components to grow and work together, the integration efforts over the past 14 years may fall apart. The Army must bring down the walls and cultural boundaries that divide the continuum of service for its FTS in the USAR.

## **THE TPU AND IMA WORKFORCE**

A soldier's training begins to immediately atrophy after the last training event or operational experience. It is like water in a fountain – once turned off, it begins to stagnate until the flow is turned back on. Only through periodic training do skills remain sharp and improve with time. The simple truth is that 39 days of training per year is simply not enough time, especially when funded to only train at the individual level, to maintain or improve soldier proficiency in basic combat or military occupational specialty tasks. Lieutenant General Jeffrey Tally notes that the individual Warrior Training Tasks (WTT) alone – the foundation of basic soldiering – takes 34 days of training each year.<sup>66</sup> In addition, there are currently about 40 hours of mandatory training (both computer-based and group instruction) required by Army Regulations.<sup>v</sup> The basic functions of supply accountability, soldier administration, and routine equipment maintenance are not included in these estimates. A reserve commander must make

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<sup>v</sup> From an informal audit conducted by the author in 2012 for a personnel productivity study

choices on where to accept risk in the training plan, because not only is there not enough money to train beyond the individual or squad level, there is also not enough time.

An operational reserve requires more time for the soldier and the unit to train at both the individual and collective level if it will be deemed ready to execute the “train, mobilize, deploy” model that Lieutenant General Stultz envisioned.<sup>vi</sup> This concept has largely been treated in the past – incorrectly – with consistency across occupational specialties. For a reserve soldier, the fact remains that one mold does not fit every case. This is especially true if there is overlap between the soldier’s civilian and military professions. Physicians, attorneys, nurses, and some military police specialties are a few examples. Some of these occupational specialties are ready to deploy immediately, and require minimal collective training to accomplish their missions. Other units, such as military police and sustainment brigades, require more time to train to the requisite level of readiness to meet the operational model.

The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model was meant to resolve these concerns by providing a timeline for deployment readiness driven by deployment cycles set at a 1:5 ratio (one year activated, followed by five years of reset and training). The model provided a six-year reset, train, available cycle that would progressively focus resources on particular units as they approach the “available” year for utilization.<sup>67</sup> From an equipment standpoint, the model works well. It harkens to the Contingency Force Pool (CFP) model of the 1990s that focused on resourcing and manning units based on their Latest Arrival Date (LAD) in the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD)

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<sup>vi</sup> The “train, mobilize, deploy model” requires the statutory minimum number of training days in the first two years, followed by 45 days in year three, then 53 days in year four, according to congressional testimony and the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) final report.

plan. From a manning standpoint, it is not quite as clean. Due to the inability of the AR to maintain the right force mix at full strength, as well as a mix of other factors such as professional schooling, promotions, and migration between units, mobilized units experience a high rate of cross-leveling (transfers) from other reserve units immediately prior to mobilization. The result is a stressed force with a less than ideal deployment ratio of 1:5.

Recent Department of the Army initiatives to shift towards regional alignment will meet the same difficulties due to low-strength and unbalanced force structure in the Army Reserves. Understrength units in a Brigade, even if identical in their Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), will be forced to continue cross-leveling soldiers to meet one or two upcoming deployment cycles. The recently activated Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Support Battalions are an example of this practice. Activated in January 2013, the LOGCAP Support Battalions supply the active Army with a continuous flow of LOGCAP Support Officers that assist the LOGCAP Program Office in overseeing and administrating the largest support contract in the Department of Defense. On the surface, it is the perfect model for an operational Army Reserve unit. The AGR deputy commander of the LOGCAP Support Brigade is collocated with the active component LOGCAP Program Management Office (PMO) at Rock Island, Illinois. Funding is rarely an issue. The unit has no active component counterpart – it is the only unit of its type in the Army’s inventory. Thus, the AC must rely on the brigade for all military support to the PMO.

The predecessor of the LOGCAP Support Brigade was the LOGCAP Support Unit, which continuously deployed soldiers in support of the LOGCAP PMO since 2001.

Two years after their activation, and despite being constructed of branch immaterial positions, cross-leveling has been the standard procedure for filling vacancies for the past two deployment cycles. Shortly following their activation, the battalions were regionally aligned with COCOMs, but only in theory. In practice, a pool of volunteers man joint exercises from across the Brigade.

So how does the Army Reserve man and train its force to meet the intent of regional alignment and other demand signals for ongoing operations in support of contingency operations? As per the mission statement, the USAR provides “trained, equipped, and ready soldiers, leaders, and units to meet...requirements.”<sup>68</sup> There are three aspects important in this statement: individual soldiers, leaders, and units. They must all be trained and ready, to the Army standard, available to complement AC forces as quickly as possible in customized-force packages. One mission may require individual soldiers, while another may require trained leaders to bring a staff to full strength, and yet another may require an entire unit to complement a deploying AC brigade or division.

In order to fulfill the soldier and leader portion of the mission statement, the USAR should expand and refine the IMA as an operational asset. In the past several years, this program’s end strength was decreased.<sup>69</sup> From an operational perspective, however, the IMA force provides the optimal flexibility to AC commanders for immediate staff augmentation, fast mobilization, and close working relationships with AC commanders on a regular basis. Since IMAs are assigned to AC commands and required to perform annual training with their AC units, these officers and NCOs know the units’ mission and gain invaluable pre-mobilization experience with the AC. When AC commanders embrace this “temporary” workforce, it can enhance the overall

readiness and provide swift expansion options to commanders during contingency operations. For the IMA officer or NCO, it provides a predictable, yet flexible training schedule for their civilian lives. Since the program does not require monthly battle assemblies, training can be pooled in larger increments during annual training periods.

An expanded IMA program should be coupled with increased funding for short and long tours with AC units. These Active-duty for Operational Support (ADOS) tours were common over the last 14 years and provide AC commanders with the flexibility to choose from a “best qualified” pool of candidates to fill temporary shortages in their ranks. Reservists, thereby reducing the need for excess contractors or temporary civilians in the Army workforce, could fill low-priority staff positions, special projects, and contingency positions. Once the demand signal decreases, tours could be curtailed or ended as needed. In line with Total Force Policy, the Army should first turn to the reserve component for additional manpower needs, not contract or temporary federal civilian employees as it has done in the past. This will accelerate the reduction of a culture divide between the two components and invest in future USAR leaders while achieving integration as an operational force.

The second effort should be a reinvigoration of TPU training and a realization that the current TPU force structure does not align with budget or end-strength reality. The Army has wisely reduced force structure in its current downsizing to ensure the remaining Brigade Combat Teams receive the training and funding they need to meet readiness standards. Army leaders have worked to avoid the previous post-war drawdowns that left force structure (headquarters) in place resulting in a “hollow force.” The current Chief of Staff of the Army has stated on numerous occasions, a “hollow

force” must be avoided. Likewise, the Army Reserve must continue to transform to budgetary reality and eliminate force structure that cannot be manned or trained to standard.

By downsizing this “hollow” structure, the Army Reserve could shift those soldiers into the reinvigorated IMA force to provide closer integration with the AC as described above. The force could still maintain its 195,000 end-strength goal, but the headquarters overhead would be reduced accordingly and MOS rebalancing would be immediate. As units are deactivated, their equipment funding could be shifted towards modernization and acquisition efforts for the remainder of the force. Some examples of this initiative would include deactivation of a portion of the functional commands and further consolidation of understrength training divisions.

## **A WORKFORCE POSITIONED FOR AN OPERATIONAL FUTURE**

Lieutenant General Dennis M. McCarthy describes the continuum of service concept as a rheostat – one where a service member can dial their involvement up or down based on life circumstances at the time and ranging from a couple of days each year to full mobilization.<sup>70</sup> This continuum of service would allow military professionals to seamlessly transition between components and civilian employment with ease, cross-pollinating valuable lessons of leadership, civilian skills, and marketplace ingenuity as they bring a broad set of skills between the various lives – civilian, active, and reserve – a reservist inhabits.

This ideal could be closer than most think. Some of the changes outlined in this section are administrative and would not require congressional approval. Certainly, the

most impactful change, the merging of AGR and Active Component promotions and assignments, could move towards transcending the cultural gap between the two components.

### **PART III: EQUIPPING AN OPERATIONAL FORCE**

Equipment readiness directly correlates to pre-mobilization readiness for a reserve unit. The CNGR stated in the 2008 final report that “With few exceptions, the Commission’s analysis of data and testimony indicates that units and individuals from all components are well-equipped and supplied when they deploy an operational force.”<sup>71</sup> The report goes on to state that units not in queue for deployment have degraded states of equipment readiness. As the deployment model for an operational force changes to a train, mobilize, and deploy concept, equipping Selected Reserve units with modernized and full equipment sets is immediately crucial to ensuring service members are conducting pre-mobilization training. Without this, valuable post-mobilization training is spent issuing and training on newer equipment prior to deployment.

Yet, since the year after the CNGR published its final report, and in the midst of subsequent Total Force policy directives, funding for Army Reserve Equipment as a percentage of the base budget has decreased from 5.5 to 2.6 percent.<sup>72</sup> Compared with other Army components, the AR is also the least modernized at 76 percent. In 2013, the AR reported their modernization at 66 percent.<sup>73</sup> These statistics could mislead some to believe that the AR received a dramatic increase in modern equipment from FY 2013 to 2014. In reality, equipment on hand remained constant at 86 percent both years. In fact, the Army G-4 recoded many sets of older equipment as “modern” during this timeframe, which dramatically increased a large percentage of modernized equipment without modifying or transferring any actual end-items.<sup>vii</sup>

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<sup>vii</sup> From an interview with the staff of the Strategic Equipping Division.

Overall funding for AR equipment is decreasing as well. From FY2013 to 2014, the AR saw a 29 percent reduction (\$611 to \$431 million), and projections point to this trend continuing through FY 2018 (\$403 million).<sup>74</sup> Congress appropriates specific funds for reserve component equipment annually through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA). Established in 1981, this fund was originally to supplement the base equipping budget for the RC, not replace the AC's responsibility to appropriately fund the Total Force. The NGREA's intent is to "enhance readiness" by giving the Chief of the Army Reserve flexibility to procure items outside the base budget. Given the reduced funding environment described above, however, the NGREA took a greater role in FY 2014 where the \$175 million in purchasing power represented about 30 percent of the total procurement funds.<sup>75viii</sup>

## **DEPENDABLE FUNDING FOR AN OPERATIONAL FORCE**

This evidence shows that the Army and Congress have not effectively funded the USAR as an operational force or as a percentage of its contribution to the total Army. USAR equipment procurement represented 2.7 percent of the overall Army budget, despite providing 20 percent of the force.<sup>76</sup> But the question remains – what level should the Army fund the USAR to be an effective operational force? Certainly no one expects for the AC to fund either reserve component as a comparative percentage of its total contribution to the entire force. After all, as current Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno has stated, as the AC force draws down more aggressively than the

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<sup>viii</sup> From FY2011 to 2013, NGREA funds procured 30 percent of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, 23 percent of Field Logistics, 16 percent of engineering equipment, 13 percent of simulators, and 12 percent of aviation equipment.

RC in coming years, it will be proportionally smaller by FY 2017 – 46 percent AC compared with 54 percent RC.

The Army would not be well served by funding its force proportionally by component. First, the RC should be comparatively less expensive since the equipment should never be used as often as AC equipment, except in the case of a full mobilization. Maintenance and supply costs should therefore be cheaper in the RC. A more realistic expectation would be to compare historical equipment funding trends over the last decade and target a realistic expectation for the operational force of the future.

At the height of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2007 to 2012, the AR received a maximum percentage of the Army's budget in 2011 for equipment at 8.9 percent.<sup>77</sup> An eight percent minimum equipment budget for the USAR, mandated in law and based on the overall Army budget, would protect funding for the operational reserve while allowing for overall fluctuation in defense spending in the long term. This figure also represents an acceptable continuation of the value an operational USAR provides as one-fifth of the overall force structure. Congress will have to protect this piece of the budget, either through expansion of NGREA funding, or through future defense authorization acts, because it is apparent that the AC will cannibalize USAR funding to feed the AC force during budgetary crises.

## **DUAL-USE EQUIPMENT AND RISKS TO HOMELAND DEFENSE**

The 2012 National Defense Authorization Act allows for Governors to request the federal government for USAR capabilities that could assist in major natural disasters or emergencies within the homeland. This new mission set to provide forces to Defense

Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) requires a greater focus on funding for dual-use USAR equipment. Dual-use equipment is an essential capability DoD provides to supplement emergency response efforts, such as water purification, bulk petroleum transport, bridging, medical services, and other sustainment functions. Most of the AC capabilities in these areas reside within the USAR.<sup>78ix</sup>

Access to Critical Dual Use (CDU) equipment in the AR is unhindered by state boundaries, unlike the National Guard. As a federal Title 10 force, the CAR has authority, upon direction from the Secretary of Defense, to assist Governors with key capabilities across state lines in a time of crisis. Yet, the average age of some of this equipment is endangering compatibility with the AC and the USAR’s ability to effectively respond to major emergencies.<sup>79</sup>

**Army Reserve Top Five Legacy Equipment<sup>80</sup>**

<b>Nomenclature</b>	<b>Average Age (years)</b>
Semitrailer – 25-ton	53
Rough Terrain Forklift	30
Water Purification System	29
Truck Ambulance – HMMWV	25
Truck Tractor – M915	21

Extended procurement timelines for some of this equipment is also trending towards the absurd. For example, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), set to replace the Army’s current light trucks, will begin the procurement cycle in 2015. By FY 2022, the USAR projects to receive only a 7 percent fielding, significantly lower than the ARNG’s 18 percent and the AC’s 23 percent. By 2035, the USAR will be fielded just

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<sup>ix</sup> Army assets residing in the AR: bulk petroleum – 93 percent, medical – 59 percent, engineer – 36 percent, field services – 73 percent, transportation – 43 percent, and military police – 24 percent.

over half its requirement. Finally, by 2038 the USAR will receive its entire fielding. This cycle would mean that a new lieutenant commissioned in the USAR today could possibly never see a JLTV in his unit after 23 years of service. Reality will also dictate whether that capability will fulfill operational needs in 2038, having been designed in 2015.

Another CDU system at risk is the M967A1 seven and a half thousand gallon semi-trailer tanker and the HMMWV ambulance. The M967 fuel tanker, with an average age of 27 years, is critical to providing bulk fuel line-haul transportation. The USAR's inventory of the M967 accounts for 68 percent of the Total Army's assets, yet a plan to fund the \$48 million modernization cost is unfunded. The HMMWV Ambulance fleet requires \$100 million in replacement costs, yet to date only \$15 million has been contributed from the NGREA appropriation for a new build effort.<sup>81</sup>

## **EQUIPPING AN OPERATIONAL FORCE**

The Army and Congress have not heeded the long-term implications of its failure to fund the USAR as an operational force. The solution here is simple – consistent funding mandated as a percentage of the total budget. If Congress is earnest in its desire for an operational USAR, and the Army is sincere in its determination to execute that vision, more must be done. The implications to homeland security and DSCA grow year over year as the total amount needed for a modern USAR grows exponentially over time.

## CONCLUSION

Contingency operations over the last fourteen years have forced the three Army components to work closely together, despite their cultural differences. As the operational tempo decreases a bit in the coming years, compared with the height of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a troubling temptation for the three components to return to corners, consolidate resources, and fight for parochial interests. This trend, of course, is a microcosm of what could be happening in the larger battlefield of inter-service fights. Hopefully, senior leaders will look to the lessons of history on this matter and choose a new way forward for the Reserve components full integration with its active component counterparts, rather than waiting for the next major conflict to force a fleeting solution.

For closer integration between the active component and Army Reserve, leaders should consider personnel system changes and equipment funding recommendations outlined in this study. A combination of the USAR AGR workforce into one, seamless workforce would knock down institutional boundaries the current siloed system created and nurtured. One federal Army officer corps that serves across both components would educate future leaders on the capabilities of the Total Force and work to seal the cultural gap. In addition, Congress and the Department of the Army must fund crucial equipment shortages and modernization efforts that support DCSA and interoperability. This issue is not about inter-component rivalry but rather about capability readiness for mission success.

An operational reserve will never be obtained with the fragmented personnel systems or the grossly disproportionate equipment funding the Army employs today. In

order for cultural gaps to be sealed and institutional growth to occur, the walls of self-interest must come down to allow for the nation to field one army – not three. The natural momentum of budget and training cycles will not carry the Army to this desired end state – only leaders in Congress and the Department of Defense willing to expend political capital and calculated risk to make tough decisions can make that happen.

## APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
ADOS	Active-duty for Operational Support
AGR	Active Guard/Reserve
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
ARNG	Army National Guard
CAR	Chief of the Army Reserve
CDU	Critical Dual Use
CFP	Contingency Force Pool
CMTC	Citizens' Military Training Camps
CNGR	Commission on the National Guard and Reserves
COCOM	Combatant Command
DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FTS	Full-time support
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
JLTV	Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
LAD	Latest Arrival Date
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
MOS	Military Occupational Specialties
MT	Military Technicians
NCO	Non-commissioned officer
NDST	Non-Dual Status Technicians
NGREA	National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations
ORC	Officer Reserve Corps
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PMO	Program Management Office
RC	Reserve Component (National Guard and Reserves)
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
TPU	Troop Program Unit
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USARC	United States Army Reserve Command
WTT	Warrior Training Tasks

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> *Supporting the Reserve Components as an Operational Reserve and Key Reserve Personnel Legislative Initiatives: Hearing before the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services*, 111<sup>th</sup> Cong. 2 (2010), 44-45.

<sup>2</sup> Office of the Army Reserve History, *Army Reserve: A Concise History* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Reserve Command, 2013), 4, [http://www.usar.army.mil/ourstory/History/Documents/Concise%20History%20Brochure\\_FA\\_revised%20April%202013\\_web%20version.pdf](http://www.usar.army.mil/ourstory/History/Documents/Concise%20History%20Brochure_FA_revised%20April%202013_web%20version.pdf).

<sup>3</sup> Jeffrey A. Jacobs, *The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force: Issues and Answers* (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 37.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

<sup>5</sup> Jonathon M. House, “John McAuley Palmer and the Reserve Components,” in *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force*, ed. by Bennie J. Wilson III (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 30.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>7</sup> Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), 13.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>11</sup> Jacobs, *The Future of the Citizen Soldier*, 38.

<sup>12</sup> House, “John McAuley Palmer”, 35.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

<sup>14</sup> Crossland, *Twice the Citizen*, 31.

<sup>15</sup> OCAR, *Army Reserve: A Concise History*, 4.

<sup>16</sup> Jacobs, *The Future of the Citizen Soldier*, 40.

<sup>17</sup> Crossland, *Twice the Citizen*, 38.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 45-46.

<sup>22</sup> Office of the Command Historian, *The U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC): The First Years* (Atlanta, Georgia: United States Army Reserve Command, 1994), 183.

<sup>23</sup> Crossland, *Twice the Citizen*, 67.

<sup>24</sup> Jacobs, *The Future of the Citizen Soldier*, 41.

<sup>25</sup> Crossland, *Twice the Citizen*, 78.

<sup>26</sup> Charles E. Heller, “Total Force: Federal Reserves and State National Guards” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), 13.

<sup>27</sup> Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufman, *U.S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, and Risks* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989), 42.

<sup>28</sup> Jacobs, *The Future of the Citizen Soldier*, 42.

<sup>29</sup> Binkin, *U.S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, and Risks*, 43.

<sup>30</sup> Crossland, *Twice the Citizen*, 99.

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<sup>31</sup> Office of the Army Reserve History, *United States Army Reserve Mobilization for the Korean War* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Reserve Command, 2013), 48, [http://www.usar.army.mil/ourstory/History/Documents/Korean%20War%20Pub\\_Revised%20June%202012-2013.pdf](http://www.usar.army.mil/ourstory/History/Documents/Korean%20War%20Pub_Revised%20June%202012-2013.pdf)

<sup>32</sup> Binkin, *Rhetoric, Realities, Risk*, 44.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 48.

<sup>36</sup> Crossland, *Twice the Citizen*, 209.

<sup>37</sup> Binkin, *Rhetoric, Realities, Risk*, 50-51.

<sup>38</sup> Edward J. Philbin and James L. Gould, "The Guard and Reserve: In Pursuit of Full Integration," in *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force*, ed. by Bennie J. Wilson III (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 46.

<sup>39</sup> Binkin, *U.S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, and Risks*, 63.

<sup>40</sup> Office of the Army Reserve History, *The Indispensable Force: The Post-Cold War Operational Army Reserve, 1990-2010* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Reserve Command, 2013), 19, <http://www.usar.army.mil/ourstory/History/Documents/IndispensableForce.pdf>.

<sup>41</sup> Binkin, *U.S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, and Risks*, 70-71.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.

<sup>44</sup> Stephen M. Duncan, *Citizen Warriors: America's National Guard and Reserve Forces and the Politics of National Security* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997), 14-18.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>46</sup> OARH, *The Indispensable Force*, 19.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 326.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 328.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 330.

<sup>56</sup> Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, "The United States Army Reserve 2014 Posture Statement," (Fort Belvoir, VA: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 2014), 3, <http://www.usar.army.mil/resources/Media/FINAL%20OMB%20Cleared%20%20-%20Army%20Reserve%20Posture%20Statement%202014.pdf>.

<sup>57</sup> Human Resource Command, "IRR Handbook" (Fort Knox, KY: Human Resource Command, 2011), 4, [https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/reserve/soldierservices/programs/irr\\_handbook.pdf](https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/reserve/soldierservices/programs/irr_handbook.pdf).

<sup>58</sup> "Standby Reserve," *Human Resource Command*, accessed January 19, 2015, <https://www.hrc.army.mil/Enlisted/Standby%20Reserve>.

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<sup>59</sup> Department of the Army, *Army Reserve Assignments, Attachments, Details, and Transfers*, Army Regulation 140-10 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 15, 2005), 39-40, [http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r140\\_10.pdf](http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r140_10.pdf).

<sup>60</sup> Lawrence Kapp and Barbara Salazar Torreon, “Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 6-7, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL30802.pdf>.

<sup>61</sup> OCAR, “Army Reserve 2014 Posture Statement”, 5.

<sup>62</sup> *Army Active and Reserve Force Mix: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services*, 113<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2 (2014), 2, <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/14-33%20-%204-8-14.pdf>.

<sup>63</sup> OCAR, “The United States Army Reserve 2014 Posture Statement,” 3.

<sup>64</sup> Jeffrey A. Jacobs, “Transforming Army Reserve Senior Leadership: A Matter of Cultural Change,” *Army Magazine*, March 2005, 15, [http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2005/3/Documents/FC\\_Jacobs\\_0305.pdf](http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2005/3/Documents/FC_Jacobs_0305.pdf).

<sup>65</sup> Kapp, “Reserve Component Personnel Issues,” 8.

<sup>66</sup> *Army Active and Reserve Force Mix: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services*, 113<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2 (2014), 29, <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/14-33%20-%204-8-14.pdf>.

<sup>67</sup> John D. Ellis and Laura McKnight Mackenzie, *Operational Reservations: Considerations for a Total Army Force* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2014), 41, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1215>.

<sup>68</sup> “Our Story,” *Army Reserve Homepage*, accessed January 19, 2015, <http://www.usar.army.mil/ourstory/Pages/default.aspx>

<sup>69</sup> Based on author’s conversations with IMA program office, Human Resource Command.

<sup>70</sup> Dennis M. McCarthy, “The Continuum of Reserve Service,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 36 (2005), 32, [www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA523860](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA523860).

<sup>71</sup> Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 214.

<sup>72</sup> Strategic Equipping Division, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, “Army Reserve Senior Leader Overview Engagements with Industry,” (PowerPoint presentation for Association of the United States Army Conference, Fort Belvoir, VA, 13 October 2014).

<sup>73</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2015*, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015), 2-24.

<sup>74</sup> Strategic Equipping Division, OCAR, AUSA PowerPoint presentation.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Strategic Equipping Division, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, “Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee Equipment Funding Overview,” (PowerPoint presentation, Fort Belvoir, VA, 22 October 2014).

<sup>78</sup> Strategic Equipping Division, OCAR, AUSA PowerPoint presentation.

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<sup>79</sup> OASD-RA, *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for FY 2015*, 2-27.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> Strategic Equipping Division, OCAR, AUSA PowerPoint presentation.

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