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Maritime Strategic Considerations for the US in the Western Pacific

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
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**AUTHOR:**

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## Executive Summary

**Title:** Maritime Strategic Considerations for the US in the Western Pacific

**Author:** Lieutenant Commander James R. Beaty, United States Navy

**Thesis:** Growing maritime challenges in the Western Pacific, particularly in regards to the People’s Republic of China, obligate the US to review its maritime strategy and strategic assumptions in order to ensure that resources and policy match desired ends.

**Discussion:** The rise of China and the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) present strategic challenges that the United States must address in its maritime strategy. This first requires a common understanding of what a maritime strategy is and how it integrates with a larger national strategy. Next, the regional context of the Western Pacific is analyzed. The current strategies of China and the United States are presented. Finally, a recommended maritime strategy is given.

**Conclusion:** The emerging naval environment of the Western Pacific may make it difficult to obtain the local control of the sea that the United States has historically maintained. If this is the case, the US should look to leverage naval forces outside of China’s “near sea” to affect their national interests through sea denial and sea control.

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## *Preface*

I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Dr. Craig Swanson, for all his assistance with this project. Additionally, Dr. Douglas Streusand and CDR Russell Evans USN provided inspiration with their elective course on Sea Power. Finally, my conference group advisors, LtCol Mark Liston USMC and Dr. Paul Gelpi, provided valuable guidance.

It is my intent that this thesis will help advance a discussion on the strategic course that the United States will take in the Western Pacific, particularly in regards to the growing maritime influence of the People's Republic of China. I sought to ground the discussion in the strategic principles of sea power as they have traditionally been and currently are understood. In an era of budgetary restrictions, I hope that these principles will help provide the guidance necessary for the United States to maintain the ability to use the maritime commons, in war or peace.

In March 2015, the U.S. Navy released a new edition of its strategic vision entitled, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*. This edition updated the original published in October 2007. The 2007 edition sought to relate the U.S. Navy's strategic vision into a broader understanding of its role in the global economic and political systems.<sup>1</sup> The more recent 2015 edition has been accused of shifting away from a maritime strategic vision and focusing on "operational and programmatic" issues.<sup>2</sup> This accusation is part of a larger call for the U.S. Navy to address strategic thought within its leadership. In 2014, Representative J. Randy Forbes (R-VA), chairman of the House subcommittee on Seapower & Projection Forces, sent a letter the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) writing, "I am concerned at the deficit in strategic thinking."<sup>3</sup> A June 2015 report released by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) echoes this wording with a section addressing, "The Navy's Strategic Deficit."<sup>4</sup> The paper's findings are strongly worded, alleging, "The Navy today suffers from...a profound strategy deficit. Strategy per se is not an institutional value in the Navy...Rather, the Navy values operational experience and competent program management above all."<sup>5</sup>

The alleged lack of strategic thought in the U.S. Navy is concerning because the U.S. Navy, particularly in the Western Pacific, is facing new challenges. These challenges threaten to disrupt its ability to operate freely in the waters it has patrolled since the Second World War. Most notably, some of these challenges are emerging from the People's Republic of China (PRC). US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter spoke in Singapore in 2015, declaring that the US would "continue to protect freedom of navigation and overflight principles," adding, "the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows."<sup>6</sup> Secretary Carter also expanded his remarks to include allies and partners in the exercise of "the rights of all nations."<sup>7</sup> That the US Defense Secretary should have to publically declare that the world's

largest military would continue to operate where “international law allows” might imply a substantial threat to the present international order and balance of power. Ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea could be viewed as the attempts by an assertive China to use its power to its benefit at the expense of its neighbors. It could also be argued that the PRC itself benefits from the international system and the free flow of maritime commerce it protects. Therefore, some, including Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, argue that conflict with China is unlikely.<sup>8</sup>

In this evolving geo-political situation, the U.S. Navy’s “strategic deficit” is of significant consequence. Given the substantial monetary and time requirements inherent in the development and construction of aircraft and especially ships, the Navy’s long term strategic vision is an important contributor to guaranteeing that its future fleet, the Navy’s means, is able to execute the missions required of it to meet US national interests. Growing maritime challenges in the Western Pacific, particularly in regards to People’s Republic of China, obligate the US to review its maritime strategy and strategic assumptions in order to ensure that resources and policy match desired ends.

## **Background**

### *Definitions and Concepts*

When addressing strategic thought in relations to navies, several words and terms are used for which a common definition is helpful. Unfortunately, the scholarly consensus appears to be that there is a lack of consistency with some of these terms.<sup>9</sup> The term “sea power” was original coined by the American naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan, though scholars have noted that he did not clearly define what he meant by it.<sup>10</sup> At one point in *The Influence of Sea Power*

*Upon History: 1660-1783* (1890), Mahan wrote, “(1) Production; (2) Shipping; (3) Colonies and Markets, - in a word, sea power,” which seems to emphasize, perhaps exclusively, the economic, rather than military, nature of sea power.<sup>11</sup>

The term strategy must also be defined. The US Department of Defense (DoD) defines strategy as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”<sup>12</sup> Milan Vego wrote that strategy is “the process of interrelating and harmonizing the ends with the means.”<sup>13</sup> He further breaks strategy down from “national security strategy (or grand strategy)” to “supporting strategy.”<sup>14</sup> It is further necessary to define “naval strategy” and “maritime strategy.” The early twentieth century British naval historian Sir Julian Corbett defined the terms thusly:

By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor. Naval strategy is but that part of it which determines the movements of the fleet when maritime strategy has determined what part the fleet must play in relation to the action of the land forces for it scarcely needs saying that it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone... Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided-except in the rarest of cases-either by what your army can do against your enemy's territory and national life, or else by fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.<sup>15</sup>

Vego argues that Corbett's definition confuses the strategic and operational levels of war.<sup>16</sup>

Corbett's definitions also conflict with some current scholarship on naval warfare. Till lists naval strategy as a subset of military strategy with maritime strategy as a separate and distinct category, possibly centered on civil maritime concerns.<sup>17</sup> Speller advocates Corbett's definition

but adds that “naval warfare” is only part of a broader national maritime strategy.<sup>18</sup> B. J.

Armstrong records frustration that the U.S. Navy often fails to distinguish between naval strategy, “the use of military force on the sea in war,” and maritime strategy, “the wider use of the naval, diplomatic, and economic levers of power in peace and war.”<sup>19</sup> The U.S. Navy's

“Maritime Strategy” does not define the term precisely but offers the statement that, “this maritime strategy describes how we will design, organize, and employ the Sea Services in support of our national, defense, and homeland security strategies.”<sup>20</sup> While national strategy is broader than defense strategy, no explicit mention of economic or diplomatic dimensions, or of the role of the nation’s civil maritime infrastructure is made in the U.S. Navy’s explanation of its maritime strategy. There seems to be fairly uniform agreement about “naval strategy” being limited to a type of military strategy. “Maritime strategy” is less uniformly defined though because of the tension between those conceptualizing naval forces as a military branch for warfare fighting and those that recognize that the use of the seas, or maritime common, has economic and diplomatic importance outside of merely being a dimension for military power projection.

Captain Peter Haynes, USN, takes a strong view of maritime strategy in its broader sense. “A maritime strategy” he writes, “has always been more directly concerned with the relationship between the state and global markets than the strategies associated with land power or airpower, a statement as true during the Age of Sail as it is today.”<sup>21</sup> This argument, linking navies and commerce, could be extended farther back in time. Thucydides noted, “Minos, according to tradition, was the first person to organize a navy...And it is reasonable to suppose that he did his best to put down piracy in order to secure his own revenues.”<sup>22</sup> Mahan himself wrote that the strategy for naval forces, “differs from military strategy in that it is as necessary in peace as in war.”<sup>23</sup> This paper will use naval strategy to refer to the military use of the maritime commons and maritime strategy to refer to the civil and military use of the maritime commons.

## *Naval Theories*

Before continuing, it might also prove useful to introduce some naval theories. Though it loses many of its finer points when condensed, the naval theory of A. T. Mahan, is worth introducing, if for no other reason than there is a significant school of strategic thought in China based on it.<sup>24</sup> Similarly, Geoffrey Till's thoughts on modern and post-modern navies might be useful in applying some of this theory to current applicability.

Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan (promoted in retirement to Rear Admiral) served as President of the U.S. Naval War College and gained global prominence through his writing, most notably through his work *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783*.<sup>25</sup> Mahan believed that a strong Navy was necessary to protect trade. Trade, in turn, produced the financial benefits that would both enable a nation-state to fund a navy but also provide for national economic success. Merchant seaborne commerce would also develop infrastructure and personnel that could benefit naval forces.<sup>26</sup> Maritime trade and naval strength thus supported each other.<sup>27</sup> Mahan's works put an emphasis on battle between concentrations of warships in order to gain command of the sea and in general to the necessity of an offensive mindset in the employment of fleets.<sup>28</sup> By gaining command of the seas, a nation could use the ocean for its own military and civil purposes and deny the sea to an opponent, ideally through blockade. Mahan, who himself had served on blockade duty in the American Civil War, favored blockade, rather than *guerre de course* (commerce raiding), as the only effective means of denying an enemy the use of the sea for shipping.<sup>29</sup> While Mahan's view of sea power is fundamentally grounded in economics, his works were heavily concerned with naval forces and combat.<sup>30</sup> In the colonial context of his time, Mahan's view of the importance of overseas markets goods, created the potential for conflict with other powers in a "zero-sum" world of colonial possessions and

limited trade opportunities.<sup>31</sup> Mahan, unlike Corbett, has been criticized for not more fully developing a theory power projection ashore.<sup>32</sup> Corbett's statement that, "the object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it" fits better with Mahanian theory that essentially seeks control of the seas for a country's own military and economic benefit, while in war simultaneously denying the same to an adversary.<sup>33</sup>

In looking at the development of European maritime trade, Geoffrey Till, similar to Mahan, has observed what he calls a virtuous maritime circle between naval strength and maritime trade.<sup>34</sup> Moving forward in time, Till notes the transition from the British dominated maritime system to the post-World War II maritime system dominated by the United States. He quotes Walter Russell Meade (2007), "The world system today as managed by the United States preserves most of the chief features of the British system that existed before World War II: a liberal, maritime, international order that promotes the free flow of capital and goods and the development of liberal economic and political institutions and values."<sup>35</sup> Till develops his theory further by looking at sea power "in a globalizing world."<sup>36</sup> He theorizes that modern and post-modern countries will have navies that mirror their relative outlook on the world (noting that actual navies will possess a mixture of inputs from both philosophical standpoints).<sup>37</sup> Globalization, he writes: "encourages the development of a 'borderless world'," "is a dynamic system," and "depends absolutely on the free flow of sea-based shipping."<sup>38</sup> Because of its dynamic nature and dependency on maritime trade, globalization should, he argues, be of interest to navies, especially threats to that commerce.<sup>39</sup> Till argues that post-modernists will center their naval policy on defending the globalized system from threats in a rapidly changing world.<sup>40</sup> Modernists, however, applying a "realistic" model of international relations will continue to

believe that war is an aspect of the human condition and seek naval policies of state-centered self-interest.<sup>41</sup> Consequently, Till ascribes modern navies the general missions of sea control, nuclear deterrence and missile defense, maritime power projection, exclusive good order at sea, and competitive gunboat diplomacy.<sup>42</sup> In contrast, he lists the roles of post-modern navies as sea control, expeditionary operations, stability operations/humanitarian assistance, inclusive good order at sea, and cooperative naval diplomacy.<sup>43</sup> Till summarizes this by noting post-modern navies are interested in maintaining the international system instead of focusing solely on national security.<sup>44</sup>

### *A Theory of Sea Power*

Having looked at some aspects of traditional and current maritime strategy, this paper will seek to apply those theories to a usable framework. At its most fundamental level, a maritime strategy ought, in peacetime, to protect civil maritime commerce to promote a “virtuous maritime circle” and promote national, and, in a post-modern construct, even international prosperity as well other maritime tasks that address national interests. (That is protecting and promoting production, shipping, and markets, in a word “sea power”). Peace may also see naval power used in a deterrent mode to discourage rival powers from seeking to advance their goals through violent means. In times of war, the goal of maritime strategy is similarly to “secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it” and having secured command of the sea (or at least local control in a desired portion of it in the more nuanced language of Corbett) project power ashore.<sup>45</sup> Essentially wartime maritime strategy can be broken into the concepts of denying the enemy use of the sea (sea denial), gaining control of the sea (or “command of the sea” in Mahanian terms) for military and ideally civil maritime uses (sea control), and using this sea control to project power ashore (power projection). All this

should operate in a framework where sea power provides a means to the ends desired by overall national or grand strategy. For example, the strategic ends might be economic prosperity or conflict deterrence in peace or the ability to impose the state's will upon an enemy in war. While it has historically been a powerful "means," sea power is not an "ends" unto itself. While this construct is simplified, this paper will use it as a starting point for the development of a basic foundation for a maritime strategy.

The three basic wartime maritime strategic goals: sea denial, sea control, and power projection; have historical been achieved with varying degrees of difficulty. Traditionally, sea denial has been attempted without sea control through *guerre de course* and with sea control through blockade.<sup>46</sup> Commerce raiding, without sea control, has generally been seen as lacking the substantial results that can be obtained through sea control.<sup>47</sup> Sea denial is described by Vego as a negative objective (rather than the positive objective of sea control) and as the necessary course for the weaker naval power, as sea denial is strategically defensive (though it may be obtained through operational or tactical offensives).<sup>48</sup>

*Guerre de course* has still been an appealing option though for many nations because without requiring sea control it does not need the capital investments necessary for a sea control capable fleet. Prior to World War I, for example, the German Empire built, at considerable expense, a fleet of modern battleships.<sup>49</sup> Accepting Mahan's theory that *guerre de course* was ineffective, Germany had fewer than 50 U-boats by the summer of 1914.<sup>50</sup> In spite of Germany's financial contributions to build its navy, the full German High Seas Fleet would not meet Britain's Grand Fleet until middle of 1916, at the Battle of Jutland.<sup>51</sup> While the smaller High Seas Fleet inflicted a favorable loss ratio on the Grand Fleet, it never again attempted to gain control of the sea from the British, though its presence, as a "fleet in being," was still a matter of

concern for the Royal Navy.<sup>52</sup> This failure to gain sea control did not prevent Germany from engaging in commerce raiding, most successfully, by means of their U-boats, which seriously threaten to defeat the British Empire. At the height of the U-boat threat in 1917, when average monthly losses were averaging 640,000 tons, Royal Navy planners predicted that Britain had only a few months left to turn the tide before she would have to capitulate.<sup>53</sup>

Sea control allows a navy to not only deny an enemy military or civil use of the seas, or a specific part of the sea, but it also gives that navy the capability to employ the sea (or part of it) for their nation's own military and civil purposes.<sup>54</sup> Important to this concept is the premise that control of the sea is not concerned with possessing the ocean itself (or the sky above it) but rather being able to effect or deny the communications on it. Captain Wayne Hughes, USN, refers to these as "goods and services," and categorizes them into commercial activity or military means for power projection ashore.<sup>55</sup> Because of this near singular focus on enabling and denying communications, certain theories from land warfare, such as maneuver or attrition warfare, do not always translate perfectly into a sea control theory.

Sea control can be obtained and enforced through a variety of methods. Two of these methods are the destruction of the enemy's maritime capability and the capture or destruction of an adversary's ports/bases.<sup>56</sup> These approaches are relatively direct from a conceptual standpoint. Two other methods are containing enemy forces and straits control.<sup>57</sup> Both of these methods operate over time to deny an adversary the benefits of the maritime commons.

One of the primary means of containing adversarial naval and civil maritime traffic has been through blockade. Though traditionally blockades have been defined as either "close" or "distant," technological developments at the turn of the twentieth century, such as aircraft and mines, have limited the application of "close" blockades.<sup>58</sup> Blockades may also be categorized as

naval, directed at an opponent's naval forces, or commercial, directed at an opponent's maritime commerce activities.<sup>59</sup> It is also possible to execute both naval and commercial blockades simultaneously.<sup>60</sup> In addition to the ensuring the attributes of sea control, as discussed earlier, blockades may also be used operationally as a tool to prevent a dispersed adversary from concentrating forces.<sup>61</sup>

Blockades are regulated by international law, including guidance from the "San Remo Manual on International Law Application to Armed Conflicts at Sea," adopted in 1994.<sup>62</sup> To abide by international standards, a blockade must be established and affected authorities notified, with defined spatial and temporal limits; be effective, though it need not be 100-percent so; and be imposed on vessels from all states while respecting the right of traffic to and from neutral states.<sup>63</sup> The difficulties in executing a legal blockade have sometimes resulted in nation-states applying what is essentially a blockade, but without the formal declaration. For example, Great Britain never formally declared a blockade of Germany in World War I because Britain lacked the means to fully stop Germany's trade with Sweden on the Baltic.<sup>64</sup> Similarly, the US used a "quarantine" during the Cuban missile crisis rather than a blockade or embargo.<sup>65</sup>

Blockades have seen some use since the end of World War II. In 1950, the US declared a blockade of North Korea at the outbreak of the Korean War.<sup>66</sup> The U.K., using the modern terminology of "exclusion zones," employed both a maritime exclusion zone and a total exclusion zone during the Falklands War.<sup>67</sup> When the United States mined Haiphong Harbor, during the Vietnam conflict, it did not declare a blockade but it did follow much of the protocol such as notification, effectiveness, and impartiality.<sup>68</sup> Similarly, NATO actions in 1999, during the Kosovo conflict, had the form of blockade but an official blockade was not employed because there was not a declared war and an embargo would have required approval through the

United Nations.<sup>69</sup> “Barrier operations” by NATO forces during the Cold War, also contained some of the employment elements similar to a “distant” blockade in their effort to prevent Soviet naval forces from reaching the open Northern Atlantic in the event of war.<sup>70</sup>

“Choke points,” which are straits, narrows, or canals, that limit the routes or flow of sea traffic can also be used in the exercise of sea control. Vego states that the one of primary objective of “choke point control” is confining or containing an opponent’s shipping to an “enclosed or semi-enclosed sea.”<sup>71</sup> The benefits of controlling a strait, particularly if that control also involves the adjoining land, is the difficulty in dislodging forces from such a placement.<sup>72</sup> One example of an internationally important strait is the Strait of Malacca. The Strait of Malacca is approximately 70-120 feet deep, 550 miles long, and 1.7 miles wide at its narrowest point.<sup>73</sup> Most, 85 percent, of China’s petroleum imports travel through this strait.<sup>74</sup>

One importance difference between the use of a blockade and the use of choke points is that while a blockade is generally imposed by the stronger naval power, a weaker naval power may use choke points to impose sea denial or offset the blue-water advantage of the stronger naval power. In this sense it shares some similarities to land warfare where a superior position can offset, to a certain amount, numerical inferiority. An example of a threat of a weaker naval power using choke points for sea denial would be that of Iran threatening to close, via mining, etc., the Strait of Hormuz. Themistocles’s use of the Strait of Salamis in the Persian Wars is an example of using choke points to offset the numerical superiority of an enemy.

While this paper has, thus far, treated sea control as if it were a binary system in which either one side has it or the other does, in many cases, there will be no single side that has clear control of the sea. An “uncommanded sea” may be the result of a lack of presence by a belligerent or it may be because no one belligerent has gained a clear advantage.<sup>75</sup> Particularly in

enclosed or narrow seas, the use of “uncommanded seas” by multiple belligerents can result in substantial losses, as was the case in the campaign for control of Guadalcanal in 1942-1943.<sup>76</sup>

Once sea control has been obtained, a naval force may seek to influence the conflict ashore through the denial of enemy civil and military traffic (“goods and services”) at sea, and above the sea, as discussed above, or through projection of power ashore. Power projection may take the form amphibious operations, naval air or missile strikes, shore bombardments, etc. The Athenian victory at Pylos is an example of leveraging naval forces to influence the fight ashore.<sup>77</sup> Any action taken in proximity to land must take into the influence which an adversary can exert there, such as land based anti-ship cruise missiles and tactical aircraft. For operations such as amphibious assaults, where sustained fleet support is required, control of the sea, in all three traditional dimensions (air, surface, and subsurface) is especially important. In support of the invasion of Normandy, a destroyer and five landing craft were lost to mines off Utah beach.<sup>78</sup> While supporting the invasion of Okinawa, the U.S. Navy, in spite of multiple aircraft carriers providing cover, had over four hundred ships sunk or damaged, many by kamikaze attack.<sup>79</sup>

When considering power projection ashore, it is important to consider how such operations influence the basic principles of naval strategy. The degree of influence varies with the type of power projection being utilized. A long-range cruise missile strike against a coastal target, for example, does not limit the attacker’s ability to maneuver in the sea space in the same way an amphibious landing would. While naval warfare, and maritime strategy in general, is more concerned with the traffic on, over, or under the sea, rather than the sea itself as territory, operations such as amphibious landings, while exploiting the maneuverability that the sea provides at a strategic and operational level, become about geography and the ability to take and hold a specific place in order to execute the operation. As a result, these operations can draw

opposing forces together at the focal point of the operation. Many of the great naval battles in the Pacific War resulted from attempted or executed amphibious landings, such as Midway, Philippine Sea, and Leyte Gulf.

## **Asia-Pacific Region and Comparative US & PRC Forces**

### *Region*

One area of the world that is of particular relevance from a maritime perspective, especially if international commerce is considered, is the Asia-Pacific region. China and Japan are the world's second and fifth largest economies respectively, with Gross Domestic Products (purchasing power parity) of \$18 trillion and \$4.7 trillion.<sup>80</sup> As Japan is archipelagic, physical interactions between the two states must be done on, over, or under the sea. The United States is a Pacific country and possesses territories close to Asia, such as Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas. It possesses formal alliances with several Pacific nations including Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Australia.<sup>81</sup> Though China considered itself a continental power as recently as 1995, it has a 7,800 nautical mile coastline and has since announced that it intends to be a maritime power.<sup>82</sup> The annual value of trade through the South China Sea is estimated to be around \$5.3 trillion and include 85% of China's crude oil imports.<sup>83</sup> China claims approximately 2 million square km of the sea inside the "nine-dash line" (figure 1).<sup>84</sup> Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea overlap with the claims of other countries in the region, producing tension. Interactions in the South China Sea have regularly involved armed Chinese patrol craft Vietnamese and Filipino vessels, including commercial vessels.<sup>85</sup> The PRC is also disputing the Senkaku (Diaoyu in Chinese) Islands with Japan in the East China Sea.<sup>86</sup>




Figure 1 China Dashed Lines  
 (United States Department of State: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf>)

The geography of the Western Pacific is also significant to strategic maritime strategy considerations. Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia are archipelagic and several other significant countries, such as Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore, are defined by Peninsulas. The first and second island chains construct, developed in China, recognizes the importance of this.<sup>87</sup> In turn, this leads to the importance of straits in the region. Direct access from Northern China to the Philippine Sea and wider Pacific Ocean involves transiting through the Japanese Ryuku Islands.<sup>88</sup> Likewise, access to the Indian Ocean is limited. The Strait of Malacca forms a primary connection between East Asia and the Indian Ocean though the Chinese Navy has also used straits in Indonesia such as the Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar Straits.<sup>89</sup>

Several countries in the Asia-Pacific region are both major oil importers and possess large merchant marine registries. China imports over 6 million barrels of crude oil a day, a number comparable to the combined total of US allies Japan and South Korea (Table 1).<sup>90</sup> China possesses the world's third largest merchant marine fleet and the Chinese territory of Hong Kong has the fifth largest. In comparison, the US ranks 26<sup>th</sup> internationally with just 393 registered ships (Table 2).<sup>91</sup> Globally, 90% of trade, by volume, is transported by sea.<sup>92</sup> China transports more than 90% of its international trade by volume and 65% of its trade by value, on the seas.<sup>93</sup>

Global Rank	Country	Barrels per Day	Date of Information
1	UNITED STATES	9,080,000	2013 EST.
2	CHINA	6,167,000	2014 EST.
3	INDIA	3,812,000	2013 EST.
4	JAPAN	3,441,000	2014 EST.
5	KOREA, SOUTH	2,949,000	2014 EST.
7	PHILIPPINES	1,503,000	2014 EST.

Table 1 Crude Oil Imports (CIA World Factbook, accessed: 5 January 2016)

Global Rank	Country	Merchant Marine	Date of Information
3	CHINA	2,030	2010
5	HONG KONG	1,644	2010
14	KOREA, SOUTH	786	2010
16	JAPAN	684	2010
23	PHILIPPINES	446	2010
26	UNITED STATES	393	2010

Table 2 Merchant Marine (All ships engaged in carriage of goods or all commercial vessels. Excludes fishing vessels, tugs, oil rigs, etc.) (CIA World Factbook, accessed: 5 January 2016)

### *US and PRC Forces*

Militarily, both China and the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) have considerable assets. USPACOM has approximately 360,000 military and civilian personnel assigned to the region.<sup>94</sup> The US Pacific fleet has five Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) (figure 2), and includes around 200 ships total, plus 86,000 Marine Corps personnel.<sup>95</sup> Approximately 1,100 Navy aircraft, 640 Marine Corps aircraft, and 420 Air Force aircraft support the Pacific Combatant Command.<sup>96</sup>



Figure 2 US Carrier Strike Group

(United States Navy:

<http://www.public.navy.mil/airfor/cvn69/PublishingImages/USSenterpriseStrikeGroup.jpg>)

The PRC possesses a modernizing Navy. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), possesses 25 destroyers (DD), 52 frigates (FF), 22 corvettes, 129 fast attack craft (FAC), and 4 strategic missile submarines (SSBN).<sup>97</sup> Reports claim that the PLAN has at least 60 attack submarines (including 5 nuclear attack submarines) compared to the U.S. Navy's 55 nuclear attack submarines.<sup>98</sup> By 2020, 64% of these submarines are expected to be anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) capable.<sup>99</sup> The PLAN's SS-N-27 sub-launched ASCM reported range is approximately 120 NM, and the Chinese produced YJ-18 sub-launch ASCM is thought to be similar in its performance.<sup>100</sup> China has one aircraft carrier (CV), the *Liaoning*, in service and equipped with PLAN Air Force (PLANAF) J-15 strike fighters.<sup>101</sup> The PLANAF also includes land based fixed wing aircraft that perform a variety of missions sets as well rotary wing assets that take advantage of hangars installed in the PRC's newer classes of warships.<sup>102</sup> The H-6 launched YJ-12 is believed to be one of the longest range aircraft launched ASCM with an estimated range over 200 NM.<sup>103</sup> Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are expected to become an important part of the PLAN's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.<sup>104</sup> PLAN warships are equipped with ASCM, including the YJ-62 family thought to have a range in excess of 150 NM, as well as datalinks and over-the-horizon targeting (OTH-T)

to support them.<sup>105</sup> The Chinese Navy possess over 50 major auxiliary vessels, including oilers that have been on continuous deployments to the Middle East in support of counter-piracy operations.<sup>106</sup> China has more than 50,000 mines in its inventory.<sup>107</sup> These mines can be laid by aircraft, surface ships, submarines, merchant ships, or fishing vessels.<sup>108</sup> A large maritime law enforcement fleet supports China's military fleet. The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) has 95 large (>1,000 tons) and 110 small (<1,000 tons) vessels.<sup>109</sup> Several thousand Chinese fishing vessels are equipped with the GPS-like Beidou that reports their position back to the Chinese government.<sup>110</sup>

China also has considerable resources ashore, in space, and operating in cyberspace that could be leveraged at sea. The People's Liberation Army Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) possesses the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) with a range of at least 810 NM.<sup>111</sup> ISR satellites can monitor maritime activity and the "skywave" over-the-horizon (OTH) RADAR uses reflection off the ionosphere to extend its range.<sup>112</sup> Chinese strategic writing, while unclear as to how cyberspace would be used in a conflict for maritime purposes, does stress the importance of cyber warfare and China is thought to be active in this field.<sup>113</sup>

## **Strategies**

### *Chinese Strategy: To Be a Maritime Power*

For most of its history, the Naval branch of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has focused on coastal defense under Mao's concept of "active defense."<sup>114</sup> This began to change in the mid-1980s under the leadership of Admiral Liu Huaqing.<sup>115</sup> In 1985 ADM Liu released a new maritime strategy based on "Active Defense, Offshore Operations" which, while maintaining an overall defensive strategy, would see naval forces operate offensively in order to

engage threats away from the coast.<sup>116</sup> ADM Liu developed the concept of the first and second island chains that form both conceptual defensives lines and aspirational markers for the goal of sea control (figure 3).<sup>117</sup> Because of this, some analysts see evidence of Maoist and particularly Soviet influence, possibly a result of Liu's time studying in the USSR.<sup>118</sup> Liu himself attributed his understanding of naval warfare to Mahan and, agreeing with Mahan, saw control of the sea as critical for national prosperity.<sup>119</sup>

Liu envisioned a three-phase expansion of Chinese naval power.<sup>120</sup> In the first phase, China would be able to exercise sea control within the first island chain by the year 2000. The second phase would see sea control expanded out to the second island chain by around the year 2020. Finally, in the third phase, the PLAN would become a global force by 2050.<sup>121</sup> The use of terrain to mark objectives as a guide for naval strength caused criticism for its "continentalist perspective," but the island chains do form chokepoints that could be useful if China were only seeking to establish local control of the sea.<sup>122</sup>

The 1991 Persian Gulf War and particularly the 1995-6 Taiwan Strait crisis, during which the US stationed two aircraft carrier Strike groups near Taiwan without a significant Chinese threat to deter them, encouraged China to modernize its defense forces.<sup>123</sup> In a continuation of the "active defense" portion of their strategy, China has incorporated modern sensor and missile developments to form, what the US terms, an "anti-access/area denial" (A2/AD) doctrine in its "near seas" (the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea).<sup>124</sup> PLA modernization has emphasized "informationization," the use of technology to link assets, command and control (C2), and ISR capabilities; and "non-contact warfare," using platforms and long-range weapons to engage adversaries from beyond their "defended zone."<sup>125</sup> Though China is producing new

resupply ships, at least one analysis has indicated the PLAN is not currently built to fight a long war but rather a quick, local, high-tech conflict.<sup>126</sup>

In May 2015 the PRC released a new white paper on “China’s Military Strategy,” stating the aspiration “to join hands with the rest of the world to maintain peace, pursue development and share prosperity.”<sup>127</sup> Seeking to “realize the Chinese Dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” the strategy retains the concept of “active defense” and also calls for more rapid modernization.<sup>128</sup> The strategy provides specific guidance for the PLAN,

In line with the strategic requirement of offshore waters defense and open seas protection, the PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from “offshore waters defense” to the combination of “offshores water defense” with “open seas protection,” and build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure. The PLAN will enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuvers, joint operations at sea, comprehensive defense and comprehensive support.<sup>129</sup>

As such, there is a clear intention to develop a blue-water capable Navy. The emphasis on survivable nuclear deterrence, presumably in the form of SSBNs might also be worth consideration for a major power, like the US, because it could limit military options in a desire to prevent nuclear conflict. China’s military strategy also covers “force development in critical security domains,” and the first domain mentioned is the maritime domain,

The seas and oceans bear on the enduring peace, lasting stability and sustainable development of China. The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests. It is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic [sea lines of communication] SLOCs and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power.<sup>130</sup>

The pairing of “national security and development interests,” as well as the mention of strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs) indicates an appreciation for the civil uses of the maritime domain. Ian Speller addresses lines of communications (LOC) noting “both

Mahan and Corbett recognized that the only thing that mattered at sea was the movement of ships, and thus command of the sea meant, in effect, command of communications at sea.”<sup>131</sup> Speller also expands on the subject by declaring that, unlike land LOCs, SLOCs tend to “run parallel” that is both sides tend to employ the same SLOCs so control of them becomes both an offensive and defensive action, at least in conflict.<sup>132</sup> Therefore, executing this military strategy requires sea control, not just locally, but for the length of strategic SLOCs. As this would require China to deny the sea to an enemy so that it could employ the maritime commons for its own uses, it would follow that a substantial and credible naval force, capable of action far from China’s shore, is required if the potential for conflict is foreseen with another naval power. Even if threats to Chinese strategic SLOCs were limited to “post-modern” non-state actors, such as pirates or terrorists, China’s reliance on petroleum imports from the Indian Ocean through the Straits of Malacca would still require a blue water fleet capable of operating far from the PRC’s shore.<sup>133</sup> The maritime, rather than naval, aspect of the strategy is accentuated by the fact that the PLAN is called upon to support the building of a maritime power rather than being viewed as that power in and of itself. This might indicate a view of maritime power that views the Navy as on part in a broader use of the maritime commons to promote national prosperity.

*United States Strategy: Domain Access*

*A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, released in March 2015, provides US maritime strategy, as agreed to by the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.<sup>134</sup> The Navy supplemented this with *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*, released in January 2016 by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Both of these documents fall under the broader US *National Security Strategy* released in February 2015.

The US *National Security Strategy* covers several topics relevant to a maritime strategy. In its opening pages, it identifies the importance of economic prosperity to national strength stating, “America’s growing economic strength is the foundation of our national security and a critical source of our influence abroad.”<sup>135</sup> The strategy notes the “rebalance to Asia and the Pacific” as well as that while “our cooperation with China is unprecedented” that “we remain alert to China’s military modernization and reject any role for intimidation in resolving territorial disputes.”<sup>136</sup> The document lists four “enduring national interests.”

- The security of the United States, its citizens, and US allies and partners;
- A strong, innovative, and growing US economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
- Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and
- A rules-based international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.<sup>137</sup>

In addition to security, which the U.S. Navy addresses through its role as a military service in the Defense Department, the Navy has a direct influence on the “open international economic system” and the “rules-based international order” through its control of the international maritime common. The national strategy also is clear about the need for “access to shared spaces,” of the cyber, space, air, and ocean domains, with the South China Sea specifically mentioned.<sup>138</sup> A vision for economic prosperity is clearly articulated through a desire to place the US at the center of global free trade zones and the declaration that the US has “one of the most open economies in the world.”<sup>139</sup> Based on the Earth’s geography, this global economic network would necessarily be based on maritime trade for the shipment of goods.

While the US strategy “welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China,”

the US insists, “that China uphold international rules and norms” to include maritime security.<sup>140</sup> The strategy asserts, “while there will be competition, we reject the inevitability of confrontation.”<sup>141</sup>

The US *National Security Strategy* envisions a world in which national strength is economically derived and a world of interconnected national economies that promotes prosperity and peace across the globe. The former fits well into the Mahanian concepts of sea power (production, shipping, markets) where national strength is based on economic strength and where trade is the engine of economic growth. The latter places US strategy firmly in the post-modern structure of globalized commerce. As such the US strategy’s view on China is one that recognizes the economic potential of commerce with the PRC but also is concerned with the potential for the PRC to upset the established international system.

*A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower* is written to support national, defense, and homeland security strategies by describing how the naval services (Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) will be designed, organized, and employed.<sup>142</sup> The *Cooperative Strategy* is based on the principles of forward naval presence and joint and multi-national operations.<sup>143</sup> It defines the sea services’ four traditional essential functions as deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security.<sup>144</sup> It adds a fifth essential function of “all domain access” encompassing sea, air, land, cyber, space, and the use of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum (EMS).<sup>145</sup> The *Cooperative Strategy* also lists forward presence as supporting “naval missions derived from national guidance: defend the homeland, deter conflict, respond to crises, defeat aggression, protect the maritime commons, strengthen partnerships, and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster response.”<sup>146</sup> It also states that forward presence ensures “the protection of the homeland far from our shores, while providing the President with decision space and options to deny an

adversary's objectives, preserve freedom of action, and assure access for follow-on forces."<sup>147</sup>

The traditional functions of naval forces in *A Cooperative Strategy* match well with theories of maritime strategy. Maritime security and deterrence promote trade in peace while sea control and power projection are essential functions in conflict. Domain access, in turn, is what allows a naval force to execute the traditional functions. In its analysis of the benefit of forward presence though, the *Cooperative Strategy* takes a narrow view of the usefulness of the sea services. The strategy's frame of reference for missions, from the leading mission of "defend" to the final statement assuring "access for follow-on forces," seems to be a strictly military, rather than a maritime, force. While "protect the maritime commons" is listed among various other missions, even "protect the maritime commons" might betray a bit of continentalist influence because it is not the commons themselves, unlike terrain on land, which is being defended but rather the ability to use the commons.

*A Cooperative Strategy* continues by looking at "the global security environment."<sup>148</sup> The first region analyzed is the "Indo-Asia-Pacific" region, and its importance economically, based on its "immense volume of trade."<sup>149</sup> Noting shared interests, the strategy advocates strengthening ties with allies and partners in the region.<sup>150</sup> China's growing Navy is directly addressed. The *Cooperative Strategy* views that expansion as having "both opportunities and challenges."<sup>151</sup> China is praised for its participation in international actions, such as counter-piracy operations and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).<sup>152</sup> It is criticized for using intimidation against other states over territorial claims and the opaque nature of its military intentions.<sup>153</sup> Later, in "the global security environment" section, the flow of energy resources by sea is discussed, with the role of chokepoints, such as the straits of Hormuz and Malacca, mentioned.<sup>154</sup> Though noting that America is a net energy exporter, the strategy expresses

concern over how an interruption of energy resource transportation could adversely affect the global economy.<sup>155</sup>

Though the strategy identifies the importance of trade to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, it does not elaborate on the naval services' role of protecting and expanding international commerce. The strategy's tact of praising China for productive actions while articulating US concerns is probably appropriate for a public document, which communications technology makes easily available throughout the world. This section of the strategy continues to establish a worldview that is post-modern with its emphasis on collaborative actions with partner and allied states, as well as with what it praises China for doing, such as participating in multinational exercises.<sup>156</sup> The concern for global energy transportation likewise recognizes the post-modern, international economic system.

“Military challenges” are also addressed in the *Cooperative Strategy*. Anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) threats are listed first. Specific technologies are mentioned, as well as threats to domains beyond the sea and air, such as cyber, space, and the EMS.<sup>157</sup> The strategy states that A2/AD threats are relevant in peacetime do to their capability to disrupt the “free flow of goods and services.”<sup>158</sup>

The second section of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower* covers “Forward Presence and Partnership.” It records the goal to 60% of Navy aircraft and ships stationed in the region by year 2020 and states the intention to base the most technologically advanced assets in the region.<sup>159</sup> The strategy also outlines an increased role for the U.S. Marine Corps and Coast Guard.<sup>160</sup>

*Cooperative Strategy's* third section is titled “Seapower in Support of National Security.” “All domain access” is a primary concern, with A2/AD technology providing threats to the

access and use of domains.<sup>161</sup> The document lists capabilities threatened by the denial of domains including: battlespace awareness, assured C2, cyberspace operations, electromagnetic maneuver warfare (EMW), and integrated fires.<sup>162</sup> The benefits of “cross domain synergy” and of peacetime operations with partners is also mentioned.<sup>163</sup> The third section then details the strategic goals of the essential functions provided earlier, deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security.<sup>164</sup> Of note, the sea control subsection mentions “the destruction of enemy naval forces” as well as the “suppression of enemy sea commerce,” while protecting “vital sea lanes” and facilitating “follow-on forces.”<sup>165</sup>

Section IV of *A Cooperative Strategy* addresses “Force Design: Building the Future Force.” The document argues that it is imperative for the Navy to have at least 300 ships and the Coast Guard at least 91 cutters, in order to fulfill the maritime strategy that the document describes.<sup>166</sup> In the “concepts” subsection the “Joint Operational Access Concept” to gain and maintain access in the global commons is mentioned as is the use of Marines to establish advanced expeditionary bases and the need to kinetic and non-kinetic actions to exploit adversary vulnerabilities.<sup>167</sup> A “capabilities” subsection details prioritized capabilities for each of the five essential functions, beginning with all domain access.<sup>168</sup>

Overall, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower* envisions a strategy that is thoroughly post-modern in its outlook. It continually emphasizes, as the “cooperative” nature of the title suggests, the need to work with allies and partners. It views the unobstructed use of the “global commons” as essential for the international economic system to function. The strategy does not mention US flagged merchants and given the relatively small size of the US merchant fleet the focus on the international perspective of trade is logical. In an international system, where the maritime commons are open to all equally and were the openness of the nation to

international trade is a point of pride in the national security strategy, the nationality of merchant vessels is far less important than the goods they transport. Only a brief mention, buried in section III, acknowledged that the US might need to “suppress” an adversary’s maritime commercial activity during a conflict.

*A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*, released by the CNO in January 2016, further articulates the Navy’s strategy within the broader *Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower* strategy. The *Design* is intended to be guide for both the Navy’s “behavior” and “investments.”<sup>169</sup> It states that the U.S. Navy’s mission is to “be ready to conduct prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea.”<sup>170</sup> The document lists four forces shaping the strategic environment for the Navy: the increased traffic within the classical maritime system, the “rise of the global information system”, the rate of technological change, and the budgetary pressure of the national government that appears to preclude increased spending as a solution to the first three forces.<sup>171</sup> The rise of “great power competition” from Russia and China is also noted.<sup>172</sup> Four lines of effort are listed and expounded upon: strengthening naval power at and from the sea, achieve high velocity learning at every level, strengthen our navy team for the future, and expand and strengthen our network of partners.<sup>173</sup> The desired outcome is readiness for “decisive actions and combat.”<sup>174</sup> Though much of the “how” is not elaborated upon in this document, it does provide an initial vector for the CNO’s vision of how the Navy should be run.

### **Suggested American Maritime Strategy for the Western Pacific**

The fundamental goal of a maritime strategy is to support an overall national strategy. Because of the unique role that naval services play as part of a broader national maritime system, and therefore as part of an international economic system, this maritime strategy must be broader

than a naval strategy concerned solely with the application of military power “incident to operations at sea.” While the bulk of the sea services’ strategy will revolve around the security of the United States and the rules-based international system and its economic components, the ends supported by the services are greater than simple security. In order to gain and maintain support in a political environment marked by limited fiscal resources, the value of this “virtuous maritime circle” must be clearly explained to policymakers and their constituents. This is of particular importance in the United States today because, though the US is thoroughly integrated into the international system with the “most open” economy in the world, relatively few Americans have direct contact with the maritime trade that ties the US to the rest of the globe.<sup>175</sup> In spite of the size of the American economy, the United States ranks 26<sup>th</sup> in terms of the size of its merchant marine fleet (Table 2), with less than 400 merchant vessels out of some 74,000 ships globally, and much of the US is located inland.<sup>176</sup> The role of the world’s ocean, with 90% of trade by volume moved by sea, continues to be critical to nations’ economic prosperity.<sup>177</sup>

The People’s Republic of China appears to have both modern and post-modern tendencies in its maritime strategy and actions at sea. China’s military strategy has post-modern sounding language, such as aspiring “to join hands with the rest of the world to maintain peace, pursue development and share prosperity.”<sup>178</sup> Participation in multi-national exercises, such as Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC); counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden; and HA/DR missions, such as typhoon response in the Philippines in 2013, demonstrate a post-modern mindset in action.<sup>179</sup> On the other hand, contested territorial claims, particularly in the South China Sea, and the use of exclusive (rather than inclusive) “good order at sea” indicate the nationalist mindset of a modern state.<sup>180</sup> The PLAN and Chinese Coast Guard are equipped and engage in each of Till’s priorities for a modern navy: sea control, nuclear deterrence, maritime

power projection, exclusive good order at sea, and competitive gunboat diplomacy.<sup>181</sup> At a larger scale, China lacks the formal alliances that might bind them to an international system in the way that the United States has formal obligations with NATO and with several nations in China's own region such as Japan, Korea and the Philippines. While there might be cultural reasons for this, such as China's continental perspective (at least in the last few centuries) and the land-based rise of the Chinese Communist Party, and China is active in international organizations such as the United Nations, China does not appear to have fully embraced the international order in the way that many other nations have. Given that the United States and its allies and partners, in the years following the Second World War, have largely shaped the current order, it is likely that the international order benefits the interests of these established powers more so than a growing power such as China but this rules based global network of trade has also brought with it unprecedented levels of prosperity to nations around the globe. This prosperity extends to states like China who were and are able to use the world as a market place for their rapidly industrializing economy. Further, the alternative to accepting the current international order, for a growing power, would be to upset it, either through establishing an alternative order or by altering or abolishing the current system. Any of these moves, other than acceptance, would necessarily be detrimental to US, and most likely partner nation, interests.

In constructing its maritime strategy and in considering how it might employ its naval forces, the United States should consider the larger international economic system. At a national level this concern is captured in the four enduring national interests given in the 2010 and 2015 *National Security Strategy*: security of the US and partners; US economic growth in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; respect for universal values; and a rules-based international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace,

security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.<sup>182</sup> These interests are relevant to the mission of naval forces in a larger maritime strategy. They recognize the commerce-based prosperity that can be realized through the trade in a global economic system that is peaceful and stable. In the words of Mahan, these interests value the “commercial interest of the sea powers in the preservation of peace.”<sup>183</sup> While these interests value peace and exemplify the values of a “post-modern” maritime worldview, US maritime strategy must be prepared to defend its interests and the system at large. “Sea control” remains the primary mission of “post-modern” navies as well as “modern” navies.<sup>184</sup>

The United States must continue to ensure that the world’s oceans remain open to its fleets in order that they remain a global common for international commercial traffic. One definition that has been given for victory and defeat in a conflict between the US and the PRC has been whether the US is able to maintain its current freedom of action in the Western Pacific.<sup>185</sup> However, given a rapidly modernizing and expanding Chinese fleet and A2/AD systems, as well as US budgetary restrictions, a US maritime strategy must be carefully calibrated to achieve its objectives in a realistic fashion.

During peacetime maintaining the *status quo* of unrestricted US naval access is a feasible and desirable goal because it ensures the free flow of commerce. In the event of a conflict though, maritime strategy ought to be view within the classic progression of sea denial, sea control, and projection, in order to achieve larger national policy objectives. While the ultimate progression of sea control would allow the US to use the entire Western Pacific, outside of territorial waters, for its military and commercial interests, while positioning it to project power ashore, it is conceivable that in waters China considers its “near seas” A2/AD technologies utilizing the proximately of Chinese continental positions could preclude US military and civil

use. In this case, one of an uncontrolled sea or even an adversary controlled region, US strategy should focus on maritime objectives it can achieve.

Even though the US might not have local control of a region, sea denial might be a viable option that should be addressed in a maritime strategy. Stealth platforms such as submarines, long-range standoff weapons such as ASCM, and long-range platforms such as aircraft, could be viable means to achieve sea denial. Naval platforms, with the benefit of mobility are at an advantage in executing sea denial because their mobility, operating ideally at long range from enemy assets, provides them a defense that fixed bases ashore lack. An aircraft carrier strike group at sea, like an airfield ashore, can be protected by missile defense assets, but unlike an airfield, a carrier strike group must be located near real-time and a warhead must be able to hit a moving target.

If military action is precipitated by the need to defend or retake territory in the “near seas” region, then sea control is necessary in order to achieve the desired power projection and effect onshore. If this is not the case, other options may be able to effectively and more efficiently leverage the current US advantage in naval strength and partner nations. At sea, it is not territory itself that is of consequence but rather what the oceans allow, namely the movement of goods and services in the civil realm and movement and projection of military assets and force in the military realm. The geography of the Western Pacific is dominated by a series of archipelagos extending from Japan to the Strait of Malacca (the first island chain). Using this natural geographic feature, the US might be better positioned to execute barrier operations and chokepoint control as part of a distant blockade rather than fight its way into the strength of China’s land-based defenses.

China’s dependence on oil imports, 85% of which flow through the Strait of Malacca,

could prove to be an exploitable weakness if the US had the means to effectively control this chokepoint and others in the region such as the Sunda and Lombok Straits. Close cooperation from regional states would greatly aid such operations. While such operations might not inflict damage on an adversary fleet, they could draw an adversary out to fight. Instead of fighting under an umbrella of A2/AD protection, contest for control of the sea could take place in the open waters of the Western Pacific or in the region of chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca where neighboring nations would more likely be friendly or neutral toward the United States. If an effective blockade could be maintained the resulting economic damage would probably be insufficient to pose an existential threat to the PRC regime, perhaps a good thing considering China is a nuclear-armed state with SSBNs, but might be sufficient to place domestic pressure on a government whose claim to legitimacy is concerned with economic success, particularly when combined with the break in economic ties that would necessarily result between it and the United States.

In order to execute a blockade-based strategy, the United States must plan for such a strategy. The legal requirements for a blockade that demand effectiveness and protection for neutrals present challenges that should be addressed systematically through strategic planning rather than trying to simply make do in conflict and 'go to war with the Navy you have.' The cost in production, maintenance, and operation of cruisers and destroyers, for a hypothetical example, as well as allocating their combat capabilities, might dictate that these classes are not as well suited to blockade of commercial traffic as frigates. However, if this is not part of a long-term strategy connected to the budgeting and acquisitions process, a desirable balance of maritime vessels may not be available in needed for operations. Further, in contrast to a purely naval strategy, a maritime strategy must also account for what to do with civil traffic in the conflict

zone. For example, it would be necessary to ensure the destination and safe transit of neutrals, a task challenged by a globalized maritime system that has made vessel flagging inconsequential and where 60% of vessels are owned by entities in different nations from which they are flagged. Plans would be required for vessels intercepted steaming for adversary ports or seized flying an adversary's flag. Perhaps an earlier issue should be how the US sea services can address a national civil and military approach to maritime strategy in the confines of their position within the defense department and its legally mandated structure, emphasis on managerial leadership, and the continental perspectives of the other services.

Ultimately, a maritime strategy would need to address how US maritime assets and capabilities, civil and military, could remove a state from the international economic order that is based primarily on maritime trade, should that state disrupt the system, and use the seas to continue to protect US and partner interests. For this to happen, US policymakers first need to accurately recognize the realities of the unique environment that is the sea. Second, a strategy that takes these factors into account must have sufficient influence in the budgeting, acquisitions, and readiness processes to provide the fleet with sufficient capabilities and capacity to effectively execute the strategy in peace and war in order to provide the nation a means for achieving national objectives. While naval forces are inherently expensive, they are also an investment in nation and international trade. Through providing a stable, secure, and peaceful global maritime common, naval forces ensure that commerce flows affordably and reliably around the world, offering the potential for economic prosperity for those states who choose to participate in this international system.



Figure 3 Western Pacific Island Chains

<sup>1</sup> Peter D. Haynes, *Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 1.

<sup>2</sup> B. J. Armstrong, "The Brutal Realities of Naval Strategy," Review of *Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era*, by Peter D. Haynes, *War on the Rocks*, July 29, 2015, <http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/the-brutal-realities-of-naval-strategy/>

<sup>3</sup> B. J. Armstrong, "The Brutal Realities of Naval Strategy," review of *Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era*, by Peter D. Haynes, *War on the Rocks*, July 29, 2015, <http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/the-brutal-realities-of-naval-strategy/>

<sup>4</sup> Naval Research Program, *Navy Strategy Development: Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 6, <http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/45622>

<sup>5</sup> Naval Research Program, *Navy Strategy Development: Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, p. 6.

<sup>6</sup> James Holmes, "The Two Words That Explain China's Assertive Naval Strategy," *Foreign Policy*, June 3, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/03/the-two-words-that-explain-chinas-naval-strategy-active-defense/>

<sup>7</sup> James Holmes, "The Two Words That Explain China's Assertive Naval Strategy," *Foreign Policy*, June 3, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/03/the-two-words-that-explain-chinas-naval-strategy-active-defense/>

<sup>8</sup> James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The turn to Mahan* (New York: Routledge, 2008), xi.

<sup>9</sup> Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 6.

Ian Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 6.

<sup>10</sup> Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, p. 6.

Till, *Seapower*, p. 23.

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- <sup>11</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783* (New York: Dover, 1987), 71.
- <sup>12</sup> Naval Research Program, *Navy Strategy Development: Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 1.
- <sup>13</sup> Milan Vego, *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 1.
- <sup>14</sup> Vego, *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control*, p. 1.
- <sup>15</sup> Julian S. Corbett, *Principles of Maritime Strategy* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911; reproduced by Dover, 2004), 13-14.
- <sup>16</sup> Vego, *Maritime Strategy*, 3.
- For more on the levels of warfare as defined by the DoD and U.S. Navy see Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP 1) *Naval Warfare* 2010 ed. p. 21-22.
- <sup>17</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 24.
- <sup>18</sup> Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 6.
- <sup>19</sup> B. J. Armstrong, “The Brutal Realities of Naval Strategy,” review of *Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era*, by Peter D. Haynes, *War on the Rocks*, July 29, 2015.
- <sup>20</sup> US Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower* (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Navy, March 2015), iii.
- <sup>21</sup> Haynes, *Toward a New Maritime Strategy*, 3.
- <sup>22</sup> Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin, 1972), 37.
- <sup>23</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783*, 22.
- <sup>24</sup> Holmes and Yoshihara, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 39.
- <sup>25</sup> Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 41.
- <sup>26</sup> Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 42.
- <sup>27</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 57.
- <sup>28</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 57-58.
- <sup>29</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 58.
- Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 41, 43.
- <sup>30</sup> Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 43.
- <sup>31</sup> Holmes and Yoshihara, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 12.
- <sup>32</sup> Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 43.
- <sup>33</sup> Corbett, *Principles of Maritime Strategy*, 87.
- <sup>34</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 17.
- <sup>35</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 2.
- <sup>36</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 27.
- <sup>37</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 28.
- <sup>38</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 28-29.
- <sup>39</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 29-30.
- <sup>40</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 31.
- <sup>41</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 31-32.
- <sup>42</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 32.
- <sup>43</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 35.
- <sup>44</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 40.
- <sup>45</sup> Corbett, *Principles of Maritime Strategy*, 100.

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- <sup>46</sup> Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, p. 51. Speller: “This approach was, and remains, the dominant narrative in maritime strategy.” Note that a challenge to this dominant theory can be found in Speller p. 52, in reference to the views of historian Richard Harding.
- <sup>47</sup> Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 51-52.
- <sup>48</sup> Vego, *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control*, 25.
- <sup>49</sup> E. B. Potter, *Sea Power*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 198.
- <sup>50</sup> Potter, *Sea Power*, 198.
- <sup>51</sup> Potter, *Sea Power*, 207.
- <sup>52</sup> Potter, *Sea Power*, 211.
- <sup>53</sup> Potter, *Sea Power*, 224, 227.
- <sup>54</sup> Vego, *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control*, 24. For a rather thorough list of historical examples of sea control, see Vego p. 28-34.
- <sup>55</sup> Wayne P. Hughes, “Naval Maneuver Warfare,” *Naval War College Review* Vol. L, No. 3 (Summer 1997), 28.
- <sup>56</sup> Vego, *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control*, 75.
- <sup>57</sup> Vego, *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control*, 75.
- <sup>58</sup> Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 49-50.  
Till, *Seapower*, 180.
- <sup>59</sup> Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 116.
- <sup>60</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 178.
- <sup>61</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 179.
- <sup>62</sup> Vego, *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control*, 173.
- <sup>63</sup> Vego, *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control*, 173-174.  
Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 117.
- <sup>64</sup> Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 117.
- <sup>65</sup> Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 119.
- <sup>66</sup> Vego, *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control*, 172.
- <sup>67</sup> Vego, *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control*, 173.
- <sup>68</sup> Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 118-119.
- <sup>69</sup> Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 119.
- <sup>70</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 181-182.
- <sup>71</sup> Vego, *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control*, 193.
- <sup>72</sup> Vego, *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control*, 202.
- <sup>73</sup> Vego, *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control*, 191.
- <sup>74</sup> Haddick, *Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 10.
- <sup>75</sup> Vego, *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control*, 45.
- <sup>76</sup> Vego, *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control*, 45.
- <sup>77</sup> Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Warner, 271-273.
- <sup>78</sup> Potter, *Sea Power*, 281.
- <sup>79</sup> Potter, *Sea Power*, 350.
- <sup>80</sup> CIA Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>, accessed: 5 January 2016

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- <sup>81</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC, 2015), 24,  
[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015\\_national\\_security\\_strategy.pdf](https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf)
- <sup>82</sup> CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>, accessed: January 5, 2016
- Chinese Ministry of National Defense, *China's Military Strategy*, (Beijing, China: The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2015. Published by the U.S. Naval Institute), <http://news.usni.org/2015/05/26/document-chinas-military-strategy>
- <sup>83</sup> Haddick, *Fire on the Water*, 31, 33.
- <sup>84</sup> Haddick, *Fire on the Water*, 18.
- <sup>85</sup> Haddick, *Fire on the Water*, 18.
- <sup>86</sup> Haddick, *Fire on the Water*, 16.
- <sup>87</sup> Haddick, *Fire on the Water*, 11.
- <sup>88</sup> Christopher H. Sharman, *China Moves Out: Stepping Stones Toward a New Maritime Strategy*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2015), 19.
- <sup>89</sup> Sharman, *China Moves Out*, 30-31.
- <sup>90</sup> CIA World Factbook, accessed: 5 January 2016
- <sup>91</sup> CIA World Factbook, accessed: 5 January 2016
- <sup>92</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, March, 2015), vi,  
[https://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/CS21R\\_Final.pdf](https://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/CS21R_Final.pdf)
- <sup>93</sup> Office of Naval Intelligence, *The PLA Navy, New Capabilities and Missions for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015), 9,  
[http://www.oni.navy.mil/Intelligence\\_Community/china\\_media/2015\\_PLA\\_NAVY\\_PUB\\_Interactive.pdf](http://www.oni.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/china_media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Interactive.pdf)
- <sup>94</sup> “Headquarters, United States Pacific Command,” accessed: January 5, 2016,  
<http://www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM.aspx>
- <sup>95</sup> “Headquarters, United States Pacific Command,” accessed: January 5, 2016,  
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- <sup>96</sup> “Headquarters, United States Pacific Command,” accessed: January 5, 2016,  
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- <sup>97</sup> *Jane's World Navies*. “China – Navy.” <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/WorldNavies/Display/1322663> accessed: December 31, 2015.
- <sup>98</sup> *Jane's World Navies*. “China – Navy.” <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/WorldNavies/Display/1322663> accessed: December 31, 2015.  
ONI, *The PLA Navy*, 16.
- Jane's World Navies*. “U.S. Navy.” <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/WorldNavies/Display/1322789> accessed: December 31, 2015.
- <sup>99</sup> ONI, *The PLA Navy*, 16.
- <sup>100</sup> ONI, *The PLA Navy*, 16.
- <sup>101</sup> *Jane's World Navies*. “China – Navy.” <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/WorldNavies/Display/1322663> accessed: December 31, 2015.
- <sup>102</sup> ONI, *The PLA Navy*, 19, 13.
- <sup>103</sup> *Jane's World Navies*. “China – Navy.” <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/WorldNavies/Display/1322663> accessed: December 31, 2015.

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- <sup>104</sup> ONI, *The PLA Navy*, 19.
- <sup>105</sup> ONI, *The PLA Navy*, 13.
- <sup>106</sup> ONI, *The PLA Navy*, 12, 15.
- <sup>107</sup> ONI, *The PLA Navy*, 20.
- <sup>108</sup> ONI, *The PLA Navy*, 21.
- <sup>109</sup> ONI, *The PLA Navy*, 41.
- <sup>110</sup> ONI, *The PLA Navy*, 22.
- <sup>111</sup> ONI, *The PLA Navy*, 21.
- <sup>112</sup> ONI, *The PLA Navy*, 22.
- <sup>113</sup> ONI, *The PLA Navy*, 21.
- <sup>114</sup> Holmes and Yoshihara, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 30.
- <sup>115</sup> Holmes and Yoshihara, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 28-30. Liu may also be addressed as a General.
- <sup>116</sup> Holmes and Yoshihara, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 30-31.
- <sup>117</sup> Holmes and Yoshihara, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 30.
- <sup>118</sup> Holmes and Yoshihara, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 32-33, 35.
- <sup>119</sup> Holmes and Yoshihara, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 28-29.
- <sup>120</sup> Bernard D. Cole, *The Great Wall at Sea*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 176.
- <sup>121</sup> Cole, *The Great Wall at Sea*, 176.
- <sup>122</sup> Cole, *The Great Wall at Sea*, 177.
- <sup>123</sup> Haddick, *Fire on the Water*, 82.
- <sup>124</sup> Haddick, *Fire on the Water*, 83-84.
- “near seas” – ONI, *The PLA Navy*, 5.
- <sup>125</sup> ONI, *The PLA Navy*, 5-6.
- <sup>126</sup> Jane’s reports that China has or is building at least eight *Fuchi* class resupply ships. This class has been used as part of China’s anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. *Jane’s World Navies*. “China – Navy.” <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/WorldNavies/Display/1322663> accessed: December 31, 2015.
- <sup>127</sup> Chinese Ministry of National Defense, *China’s Military Strategy*, (Beijing, China: The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2015. Published by the U.S. Naval Institute), <http://news.usni.org/2015/05/26/document-chinas-military-strategy>
- <sup>128</sup> Chinese Ministry of National Defense, *China’s Military Strategy*.
- <sup>129</sup> Chinese Ministry of National Defense, *China’s Military Strategy*.
- <sup>130</sup> Chinese Ministry of National Defense, *China’s Military Strategy*.
- <sup>131</sup> Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 47.
- <sup>132</sup> Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 47.
- <sup>133</sup> Though both the Chinese Military Strategy and this paper’s subsequent analysis use the term SLOC, Ian Speller (p. 124) quotes Geoffrey Till as describing them as a poor intellectual concept. This is because, though geography may cause ships to follow certain routes, there are no physical lines of transportation at sea. Rather it is the ships themselves, following these “lines of travel” on “a wide common” to quote Mahan (p. 24), that Speller sees as the objects to be “protected” or “attacked”.
- <sup>134</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, iii.
- <sup>135</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC, 2015).

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- <sup>136</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC, 2015).
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- <sup>138</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC, 2015), 12-13.
- <sup>139</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC, 2015), 17.
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- <sup>141</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC, 2015), 24.
- <sup>142</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, iii.
- <sup>143</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 2.
- <sup>144</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 2.
- <sup>145</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 2.
- <sup>146</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 2.
- <sup>147</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 2.
- <sup>148</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 3.
- <sup>149</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 3.
- <sup>150</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 3.
- <sup>151</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 3.
- <sup>152</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 3.
- <sup>153</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 4.
- <sup>154</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 6.
- <sup>155</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 6.
- <sup>156</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 3.
- <sup>157</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 8.
- <sup>158</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 8.
- <sup>159</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 11.
- <sup>160</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 11-12.
- <sup>161</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 19.
- <sup>162</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 19-21.
- <sup>163</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 21.
- <sup>164</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 22-26.
- <sup>165</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 22.
- <sup>166</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 27.
- <sup>167</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 31-32.
- <sup>168</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 33-36.
- <sup>169</sup> Chief of Naval Operations, *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*, Version 1.0, (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, January, 2016), 5, [http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/cno\\_stg.pdf](http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/cno_stg.pdf)
- <sup>170</sup> CNO, *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*, 2016, 2.
- <sup>171</sup> CNO, *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*, 2016, 3-5.
- <sup>172</sup> CNO, *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*, 2016, 4.

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- <sup>173</sup> CNO, *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*, 2016, 7-9.
- <sup>174</sup> CNO, *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*, 2016, 9.
- <sup>175</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC, 2015), 15.
- <sup>176</sup> “CIA World Factbook” accessed: January 5, 2016,  
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2108rank.html#ch>
- Till, *Seapower*, 8.
- <sup>177</sup> Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2015, 6.
- <sup>178</sup> Chinese Ministry of National Defense, *China’s Military Strategy*, preface.
- <sup>179</sup> *Jane’s World Navies*. “China – Navy.” <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/WorldNavies/Display/1322663> accessed: December 31, 2015.
- <sup>180</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 34.
- <sup>181</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 32.
- <sup>182</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC, 2015), 2.
- <sup>183</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 11.
- <sup>184</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 35-36.
- <sup>185</sup> Jordan Lee Greene, “An Assessment of the U.S.-Chinese Reconnaissance-Strike Competition,” (master’s thesis, Georgetown University, 2010), 20,  
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