

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 03-05-2016		2. REPORT TYPE Master's of Military Studies		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) SEP 2015 - APR 2016	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Strategic Dissent: How a Culture of Dissent is Destroying Military Professionalism				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A	
6. AUTHOR(S) Cooley, Jody, L, Major, USMC				5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A	
				5e. TASK NUMBER N/A	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) Dr. Lynn Tesser, Ph.D.	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT Samuel Huntington's institutional theory of objective control best describes an idealized version of American civil-military relationship, with an obedient and apolitical officer corps. Current trends in strategic officers' behavior, however, illustrate that dissention and disobedience are becoming more accepted among the officer corps. Civilian leaders are freely acquiescing more power and influence to the military concerning budgets, equipment, and foreign policy matters. The combination of disobedience and the greater power and influence makes institutional theory less applicable to America's					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Professionalism, Dissent, Civil-Military Relationship, Institution Theory, Concordance Theory, Agency Theory					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 29	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON USMC Command and Staff College
a. REPORT Unclass	b. ABSTRACT Unclass	c. THIS PAGE Unclass			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

1. REPORT DATE. Full publication date, including day, month, if available. Must cite at least the year and be Year 2000 compliant, e.g. 30-06-1998; xx-06-1998; xx-xx-1998.

2. REPORT TYPE. State the type of report, such as final, technical, interim, memorandum, master's thesis, progress, quarterly, research, special, group study, etc.

3. DATE COVERED. Indicate the time during which the work was performed and the report was written, e.g., Jun 1997 - Jun 1998; 1-10 Jun 1996; May - Nov 1998; Nov 1998.

4. TITLE. Enter title and subtitle with volume number and part number, if applicable. On classified documents, enter the title classification in parentheses.

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER. Enter all contract numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. F33315-86-C-5169.

5b. GRANT NUMBER. Enter all grant numbers as they appear in the report. e.g. AFOSR-82-1234.

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER. Enter all program element numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 61101A.

5e. TASK NUMBER. Enter all task numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 05; RF0330201; T4112.

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER. Enter all work unit numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 001; AFAPL30480105.

6. AUTHOR(S). Enter name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. The form of entry is the last name, first name, middle initial, and additional qualifiers separated by commas, e.g. Smith, Richard, J, Jr.

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). Self-explanatory.

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER. Enter all unique alphanumeric report numbers assigned by the performing organization, e.g. BRL-1234; AFWL-TR-85-4017-Vol-21-PT-2.

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). Enter the name and address of the organization(s) financially responsible for and monitoring the work.

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S). Enter, if available, e.g. BRL, ARDEC, NADC.

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S). Enter report number as assigned by the sponsoring/monitoring agency, if available, e.g. BRL-TR-829; -215.

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT. Use agency-mandated availability statements to indicate the public availability or distribution limitations of the report. If additional limitations/ restrictions or special markings are indicated, follow agency authorization procedures, e.g. RD/FRD, PROPIN, ITAR, etc. Include copyright information.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES. Enter information not included elsewhere such as: prepared in cooperation with; translation of; report supersedes; old edition number, etc.

14. ABSTRACT. A brief (approximately 200 words) factual summary of the most significant information.

15. SUBJECT TERMS. Key words or phrases identifying major concepts in the report.

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. Enter security classification in accordance with security classification regulations, e.g. U, C, S, etc. If this form contains classified information, stamp classification level on the top and bottom of this page.

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT. This block must be completed to assign a distribution limitation to the abstract. Enter UU (Unclassified Unlimited) or SAR (Same as Report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited.

*United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Strategic Dissent:

How a Culture of Dissent is Destroying Military Professionalism

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Major Jody L. Cooley
United States Marine Corps

AY 15-16

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Lynn M. Tesser, Ph.D.

Approved: 

Date: 4-26-16

Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Bradford A. Wineman, Ph.D.

Approved: 

Date: 4/26/16

Executive Summary

Title: Huntington's Objective Control is Dead: How a Culture of Dissent is Destroying Military Professionalism

Author: Major Jody L. Cooley, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The military has gained an excessive and dangerous amount of influence in the civilian arena, and in order to regain its supremacy the civilian masters have to abandon the notion of artificial barriers, discourage public military dissent, and encourage an enmeshment between the military and its civilian leaders in order to incorporate the whole of government into the military's strategic and operational planning.

Discussion: Samuel Huntington's institutional theory of objective control best describes an idealized version of American civil-military relationship, with an obedient and apolitical officer corps. Current trends in strategic officers' behavior, however, illustrate that dissention and disobedience are becoming more accepted among the officer corps. Civilian leaders are freely acquiescing more power and influence to the military concerning budgets, equipment, and foreign policy matters. The combination of disobedience and the greater power and influence makes institutional theory less applicable to America's civil-military relationship.

Conclusion: Institutional theory of objective control is thus no longer a viable option for American civil-military relations. The Constitution divides the control of the military between the Executive branch and the Legislative branch. This constitutional system of checks and balance places the military in a position to leverage its desires against the politically divided executive and legislature. As the military has become more politically savvy and as America expects the military to be more involved internationally, the military has gained excessive influence outside of the traditional military realm.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

Table of Contents

Title Page:	i
Executive Summary	ii
Disclaimer	III
Table Of Contents	IV
Preface.....	V
Introduction.....	1
Civil-Military Relations Theories	3
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY	3
AGENCY THEORY.....	5
CONCORDANCE THEORY	8
Case Studies	12
FEMALE INTEGRATION INTO COMBAT OCCUPATIONS	12
THE BUDGET CONTROL ACT OF 2011	16
FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS.....	22
Conclusions.....	25
Recommendations.....	28
Bibliography	37

Preface

At the beginning of this project, and before I read Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, I was extremely concerned with the supposed gap between American and its military. As I got deeper into my research, I realized that the discomfort I was feeling about America's civil-military relationship had less to do with the civilians and more to do with the military. Despite the longstanding belief that Huntington's objective control is the ideal civil-military relationship, I question whether the military has ever lived up to Huntington's high standards for obedience and professionalism. Moreover, I question whether America's highly politicized civil-military relationship, its gargantuan military industrial complex, and its decentralized basing and military manufacturing system can be controlled within Huntington's theory of objective control.

Throughout the long process many people have assisted me, but no one's support has been more important than the support of my beautiful wife and daughter. They have taken many mommy-daughter days so daddy can work, and I am looking forward to rejoining them on their weekend trips.

Additionally, the Grey Research Library's staff and the Command and Staff College's faculty have provided critical support throughout my work. Specifically, I would like to thank the ladies in the Leadership Communication Skills Center, and my mentors at the college. First, to the ladies in the LCSC, they are so much more than an extra set of eyes to help proof read. They have helped me through every step of the process. Lastly, I would like to thank Professors Lynn Tesser and Bradford Wineman for their mentorship and expertise.

Introduction

“War is too important to be left to the generals.”

~ Georges Clemenceau¹

“Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judgments, whether a war out to be commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a great principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power of enacting laws.

~ James Madison’s papers²

The Founding Fathers feared those three fundamental elements of the tyranny of the standing army--controlling the military, commanding the military, and funding the military. They understood that armies were required to protect the new liberal democracy, but they were also concerned that total control of the military was too much power for one branch of the government. To protect the new nation, the Founding Fathers distributed power between the legislative and the executive branches, and balanced the strength of the federal army with state militias. The executive wields the sword as the commander and chief, but the legislative holds the purse strings to ensure the soldiers and president did not pose a threat to the nation.

From these constitutional origins, Samuel Huntington outlined the dominant civil-military relations theory, institutional theory, in his 1957 book *The Soldier and the State*. The theory is predicated on an extremely professional, apolitical officer corps, whose professionalism and education enable them to understand that they serve at the will of their civilian master. Without a professional officer corps, no amount of structural or congressional oversight is possible;³ however, as the military becomes more politically conservative, savvy, and involved it has manipulated its divided civilian masters in order to maintain its share of power. Since institutional theory’s introduction in 1957, other scholars have attempted to describe the civil-military relationship. Peter Feaver’s agency theory focuses on civil-military interactions and relations, and attempts to determine if the military is actually ‘working’ as the civilians intended.

Finally, Rebecca Schiff's concordance theory envisions a civil-military relationship that "encourages cooperation and involvement among the military, the political institutions, and the society at large."⁴

The question of whether America's civilian leadership is losing control of the military has been a topic for debate since the 1990s. Unlike other countries, America does not fear a military coup. The absence of a coup, however, is not an example of a positive civil-military relationship. Fundamentally, the American civil-military relationship has not changed since the nation's founding – civilians have as much control over the military as the military allows it to have – but today's military is much more politically influential than the Founding Fathers' army. America's military used to be a small force that was manned, trained, and equipped to defend the homeland. Other than the Navy, the military was not able to project power internationally. Since the end of the World War II, however, the military has become a major element of American foreign policy. Only the officer corps' sense of duty has allowed this normal civil-military relationship to prosper, but a culture of dissent in the military regarding what the military considers ineffective civilian leadership and policy is threatening to destroy the officer corps' professionalism. This paper will analyze three contemporary examples - the policy to allow women to serve in ground combat occupations, the sequestration debate, and the strategy to defeat the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) - which will highlight all aspects of civilian control. The case studies will demonstrate that the military has gained an excessive and dangerous amount of influence in the political arena, and in order to regain its supremacy the civilian masters have to abandon institutional theory's objective control, discourage public dissent by its military officers, and encourage an enmeshment between the military and its civilian leaders in

order to incorporate the whole of government into the military's strategic and operational planning.

Civil-Military Relations Theories

Even though civilian control over the military is not America's highest priority, it is a major concern throughout the world. Many scholars have attempted to define the proper relationship, and most recognize the juxtaposition between having a military strong enough to protect the nation, but not strong enough to pose a threat to the government. There are many theories, but this paper will focus on three: theory, agency theory, and concordance theory.

Institutional Theory

Samuel Huntington's institutional theory was the first modern civil-military relations theory, described in *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. The theory outlines a professional officer corps that is completely obedient to its civilian leaders. Above all else, the officer corps must recognize its subservient position in the relationship, and the two distinct spheres of influence, the military and the political. Three variables shape institutional theory's civil-military relationship. First is an "external threat, which he [Huntington] called a functional imperative; second and third being the two components of what he called the societal imperative...the legal-institutional [constitutional] framework...[and] ideology."⁵ His framework, specifically his definition of ideology, allows civilian control vis-à-vis two types of control: (1) subjective control, which allows the civilians to control most of the power and attempts to make the military in a mirror image of the population, and (2) objective control. Huntington prefers objective control because it allows the military to maintain the most combat power by relying on a professional officer corps that will not threaten its civilian controllers.⁶ Elliot Cohen provides one of the best analogies for objective control. He writes,

Officers are professionals, much like highly trained surgeons: the statesman is the in the position of a patient requiring urgent care. He may freely decided whether or not to have an operation, he may choose one doctor over another, and he may even make a decision among different surgical options, although that is more rare. He may not, or at least ought not supervise the surgical procedure, select the doctor's scalpel, or rearrange the operating room to his liking...The result should be a limited degree of civilian control over military matters. To ask too many questions...is inappropriate and downright dangerous.⁷

The surgeon analogy illustrates the importance of an extremely professional officer corps that will do no harm to its civilian patients. Absent any tangible barriers in the civil-military relationship, only an extremely competent and professional officer corps can live up to these high standards.

Huntington's definition of the officer corps is one reason why his theory has such appeal within the military. Huntington identifies three main concepts that define professionalism. First is expertise; a professional must have "specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor...only acquired by prolonged education and expertise."⁸ According to Huntington, professional knowledge must include "history and some knowledge of that history is essential to professional competence," and have a "dimension in breadth which is lacking in a normal trade."⁹ Second among Huntington's concepts of professionalism is responsibility. The professional's responsibility is as a "practicing expert, working in a social context, and performing a service...The performance of the essential service is not regulated by the normal expectations of financial rewards... thus [responsibility] becomes a moral unit positing certain values and ideals which guide its members in their dealing with laymen."¹⁰ Huntington's last concept is "corporateness"¹¹, defined as the "collective sense [that the officer corps] has its origins in the lengthy discipline and training necessary for professional competence...[which] thus becomes a criterion of professional status, publically distinguishing the professional man

from the layman.”¹² In Huntington’s theory, professional officers who have strong beliefs in the Constitution, and who are expert managers of violence are essential for positive civil-military relations.

Huntington’s theory continues to influence the military and civilian leaders in the highest echelons of the Department of Defense. Former Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Robert Gates defined the modern duties for a professional officer in a 2008 *Parameters* article titled “Reflections on Leadership.” He based these duties on his historical understanding of General George Marshall and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s relationship during World War II. The former SecDef believes, “Officers must always: 1) provide blunt and candid advice always, 2) keep disagreement private, [and] 3) implement faithfully decisions that go against you.”¹³ Concerning the second and third point, the SecDef is adamant that a professional officer makes “no overtures to friendly congressional committee chairmen, no leaks to sympathetic reporters, no ghostwritten editorials in newspapers, and no coalition building with advocacy groups.”¹⁴ Unquestionably, the SecDef’s definition reflects Huntingtonian ideals of obedience and professionalism. Unfortunately, officers who are not keeping disagreements private or faithfully implementing policies are destroying his and Huntington’s definition of a professional officer.

Agency Theory

Understanding the ideal civil-military relationship is one aspect, but assessing the quality of the relationship is another. To explain the current power dynamics in American civil-military relations, Peter Feaver introduced agency theory. He developed his theory in an attempt to solve institutional theory’s failure to predict the outcome of the Cold War, and he readily admits that “the model addresses civil-military relations in a democracy, where the military conceives of itself as an agent of the civilian; crucial to that conception is a recognition of the civilians’ right

to sanction, and hence an explicit commitment to submit to sanctions.”¹⁵ The theory describes the actors as ‘principals’ or ‘agents’, identifies the type of oversight, and determines whether the agents ‘work’ or ‘shirk’. Agency theory does not describe an ideal relationship in terms of objective or subjective control. Instead, it evaluates the relationship based on the actual interaction between the military and its government.

According to Feaver's model, the principal actors represent the civilian leadership, and have the responsibility to provide oversight of the military. As the principals, they choose to monitor the military intrusively or un-intrusively depending on the political climate and the principals’ personal inclinations. Feaver writes, "When threat is high, there is a large electoral payoff for devoting attention to defense policy; consequently, when the threat is low, there is a premium on concentrating on domestic policy."¹⁶ Once the principle determines a course of action it orders the agents to execute, and accomplish the task.

Agency theory's subordinate actor, the agent, is the military. The military decides whether to work or shirk depending on the principal’s course of action, the course of action’s divergence from the military’s preferred action, the likelihood the principals will notice the shirking, and the likelihood they will hold the military accountable.¹⁷ Feaver defines work as “when [the agent] does what the civilian asked for, how the civilian asked for it, with do diligence and skill, and in such a way as to reinforce the civilian's superior role in making the decisions and drawing the lines of any delegation.”¹⁸ Shirking occurs when “the military, whether through laziness, insolence, or preventable incompetence, does not do what the civilian has requested, or not in the way the civilian wanted, or in such a way as to undermine the ability of the civilian to make future decisions.”¹⁹ According to the former SecDef’s and institutional

theory's definition of a professional officer, shirking is completely incompatible with a professional officer corps.

Based on these definitions of principals and agents and working versus shirking, agency theory identifies four patterns for civil-military interactions: "(1) civilians monitor intrusively, the military works; (2) civilians monitor intrusively, the military shirks; (3) civilians monitor un-intrusively, the military works; and (4) civilians monitor un-intrusively, the military shirks."²⁰ Feaver's civilian monitoring system is analogous to Huntington's methods of control, objective versus subjective control. According to Feaver's model of behavior, un-intrusive civilian monitoring represents objective control, and intrusive civilian monitoring represents subjective control. The agent's decision to shirk or work is completely independent of the monitoring system; instead the agent's decision is based on the probability that the principal will catch the agent and punish it. Some examples of shirking are foot-dragging or slow rolling, leaking information to the press, and working political allies to countermine policy. In other words, shirking is exactly the behavior that Secretary Gates describes as unprofessional. No matter how noble the cause, every instance of unpunished shirking undermines civilian control of the military, and erodes professionalism because it undermines the civilians' superior role in relationship.

Following agency theory's framework, United States Military Academy professor Don Snider developed an ethical philosophy for military dissent. Snider outlines the progression from shirking to dissent in his monograph "Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professional." He describes modern officers as "social trustees" in the service of the country, and that professional military "ethics should evolve to accommodate future forms of military dissent."²¹ Historically, America's civil-military relations and the ethics of professional officers

was not necessary because the military was extremely small in comparison to today's force. The officer corps was small enough that "a set of unwritten but largely understood rules of behavior in the civil-military relationship" governed the officer.²² As America's foreign policy strategy became more dependent on its military, congressional leaders sought advice from the strategic officers concerning matters outside the traditional military analysis of "the implication of alternative courses of action from the military point of view."²³ Due to the increased role of strategic officers, Snider outlines the acceptable range of dissent from requests for reassignments to providing public information, congressional visits, scholarly papers, congressional testimony, or resignation based on the risk to the nation.²⁴ Snider's ethics based framework fits perfectly within Feaver's agency theory, but he admits that the officer corps' professionalism may be the price of dissent. America needs a new approach to its civil-military relationship because the military's current culture of dissent is incompatible with Huntington's definition of professionalism and obedience.

Concordance Theory

The new approach has to accommodate for the military's political involvement, and attempt to get the most out of this involvement instead of discouraging it. Ideally the military would not have any political involvement but, in the contemporary American political environment, that is not realistic. Instead of working behind the scenes and in the shadows, the military and the civilian leadership have to become more enmeshed in order to leverage the whole of government approach to solving problem. Rebecca Schiff's concordance theory attempts to provide a framework for this eventuality. As stated above, concordance theory encourages cooperation and involvement. This cooperation and involvement also addresses the unequal dialogue that Cohen suggests exists in today's civil-military relationship. Structurally,

concordance theory identifies three players in the civil-military relationship, and four relationship indicators. The players are 1) the political leadership, 2) the military, and 3) the citizenry; and the four indicators are 1) the composition of the Officer Corps, 2) the political decision making process, 3) the recruitment method, and 4) the military style.²⁵ Including the citizenry into the civil-military relationship is an essential new development because as fewer Americans see military service as a viable career option, the American citizen's decision to serve will play a larger role in the civil-military relationship.

According to Schiff, there is no difference in the officer corps for a system based on concordance theory and an officer corps for a system based on institutional theory. Both systems require a professional officer corps that recognizes its subservient role in the civil-military relationship. The officer corps is "distinguished from the rank-and-file soldier, and, as leaders of the armed forces, the officer corps can provide not only the critical links between the citizenry and the military but also between the military and the government."²⁶ Since there is no change in the officer corps at the strategic level, concordance theory will be as acceptable to today's officer corps as institutional theory; moreover, the relationship between the civilian leadership and the military will not change. Concordance theory embraces America's status quo, and encourages greater cooperation and involvement for the good of the nation. The two actors are already politically enmeshed, but concordance theory eliminates the artificial barrier between the civilian leadership and the military's strategic officers.

With regard to the political decision making process, Schiff mentions the military-industrial complex, and the fact that the citizenry have to be convinced that the "collusion between the military and the industry" is justified by an external threat, and that that collusion will not jeopardize the domestic economy.²⁷ Schiff does not mention decisions to use the

military, but as America becomes more militaristic those policy decisions will become more important. Beyond the political decision to use military force, the military has to be successful in its missions. If the military continues to struggle to accomplish its missions, it will become more difficult for the military to entice the citizenry to volunteer.

The theory's third indicator is recruitment method. In an all-volunteer force, which concordance theory classifies as voluntary-persuasive recruiting based on beliefs,²⁸ the political decision making process and the military culture will be the two biggest factors affecting America's citizenry; furthermore, "persuasive recruitment implies an agreement among the political leadership, the military, and the citizenry over the requirements and composition of the armed forces."²⁹ In this context, Charles Moskos's comments about service are enlightening. For decades Moskos has studied America's citizen soldiers and in a 2002 article in *Public Interest* wrote: "Despite all the flag waving [after the September 11th terrorist attacks], it seems likely that recruitment will remain a problem for America's all-volunteer force, and that privileged young Americans will continue to shun service."³⁰ By expanding the definition, the citizenry becomes a resource that the military must correctly adapt to and message in order to entice the population to enlist. It also expands the civil-military relationship from the traditional interaction between the military and its controllers into a three-way negotiation between the military, the civilian controllers, and the citizenry.

The final indicator of concordance theory is the military style. According to Schiff, military style "refers to the external manifestations of the military and the inner mental constructions: what it looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it...Military style deals directly with the human and cultural elements of the armed forces."³¹ America's approval ratings for the military are at an all time high, but the military style needs to remain a

culture that enough of the citizenry want to assimilate to. The culture does not need to be a mirror image of the larger American culture. Military culture only needs to be persuasive to a portion of American society, and acceptable to the rest.

Rebecca Schiff is not the only theorist to see American dependence on institutional theory's objective control as incorrect. In *Supreme Command*, Eliot Cohen argues for more civilian involvement in all aspects of military, especially during war when politicians have a tendency to withdraw from the military domain. To counter this phenomenon, he introduces the "unequal dialogue."³² The dialogue is essential, with the military leader offering their best advice regardless of the political environment. Cohen acknowledges that the dialogue will be contentious and heated at times, but the free flow of information is essential to successful military operations. Military leaders cannot be yes-men; neither can they only offer a list of courses of action for the executive to choose from. The dialogue is just that, a conversation between the managers of violence and the commander and chief. In a positive civil-military relationship, the dialogue can only be unequal. The military leader is the expert manager of violence, but the president is in complete control of the actions from the beginning, to the end, and at every step along the way. Cohen acknowledges that neither total separation nor complete enmeshment is ideal, but he also believes that the relationship needs to be more than civilian decisions regarding when to start and end conflicts. As much as Huntingtonians would like to believe the opposite, the aforementioned patient-surgeon analogy describes a flawed civil-military relationship, and America has succeeded in war in spite of objective control, not because of it.³³ On the most likely modern battlefield, which is dedicated to counter-insurgency and stability operations, military goals at the lowest levels must be intertwined with, and inseparable from political objectives. Political leaders have to be willing to expend the political capital to

honestly debate political objectives, political and military strategies, and military tactics. If a military campaign is worth the lives of American servicemen and women then it is worth losing the political capital and possibly an election to fully debate all aspects of war.

Case Studies

The case studies continue the research into civil-military conflicts, and illustrate officers' attempts to maintain an artificial and unsustainable barrier between the civilian leadership and the military. These efforts are destroying Huntington's definition of a professional officer. From the end of World War II to 1997, there have been 71 conflicts between civilian leadership and the military in America. Prior to the end of the Cold War in 1989, presidents almost exclusively favored civilian control. Since the end of the Cold War, however, presidents have favored the military's opinion in 7 of the 12 conflicts.³⁴ The three case studies examined in this paper –the debate concerning fully integrating women into ground combat military occupations, the debate surrounding the Budget Control Act of 2011, and America's strategy to defeat the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL)– will demonstrate how deeply institutional theory's objective control is ingrained into American civil-military relations. Moreover, the case studies will demonstrate how the military's strategic and intentional application of dissent excessively influences civilian control over the military. Since the end of the Cold War America's military has exerted more influence in America's domestic and foreign affairs, and as a result congressional leaders need to become more involved in all aspects of the civil-military relations.

Female Integration into Combat Occupations

The first case study examines the Marine Corps' response to fully integrating women into ground combat occupations. While the other services have largely accepted the civilian authority in this issue, the Marine Corps is committed to a campaign of slow rolling, and appealing to friendly congressional leadership in an effort to stop integration. For the most part, the Marine

Corps has stayed away from directly attacking women on perceived stereotypical gender differences. Instead, the Marine Corps contends that the changes will adversely affect the Marine Corps' ability to win battles, and be America's 911 force in readiness. The real challenge to fully integrating women in combat occupations is not about cohesion, strength, or combat effectiveness. It is about the Marine Corps resisting all civilian efforts to redefine its corporateness or military style.

The Marine Corps' dissent highlights women's ability to move and shoot as well as men on the battlefield. The Marine Corps spent \$36-million to study gender integration's effect on its combat effectiveness based on its *Expeditionary Force 21* construct, which envisions a force conducting an opposed amphibious assault with at least two mechanized battalion landing teams.³⁵ The Marine Corps' Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force Experimental Assessment Report (GCEITF-EAR) concluded, "The female Marine integrated into the closed MOS units demonstrated that they are capable of performing the physically demanding tasks, but not necessarily at level as their male counterparts...[and] the cumulative differences can lead to a substantial effects on the unit, and the unit's ability to accomplish the mission."³⁶ The two areas GCEITF-EAR highlighted, however, are inflated and overstated.

The GCEITF-EAR proves that fully integrated units are the 5-20 percent slower conducting a movement to contact than traditional units.³⁷ Upon closer examination, however, the percentages are misleading. The GCEITF-EAR measured how long it takes an all-male control squad and an integrated squad to move 1000-meters from an assembly area to an attack position in order to reinforce another squad that is pinned down by enemy fire. It takes the control squad an average of 8.07 minutes to negotiate the 1000-meters, and the integrated squad an average of 8.49 minutes. According to the researchers this is a "statistically significant

difference,”³⁸ which jeopardizes the pinned down squad, and allows the enemy to fire “3 to 4 more well-aimed shots on Marines while waiting for reinforcements from an integrated squad.”³⁹ It is highly unlikely that 40 seconds and 3 to 4 more well-aimed shots will be the decisive factor in any battle. Furthermore, the GCEITF-EAR appears to associate the term “pinned down” with the squad’s complete inability to defend itself. This an unrealistic definition because time and again in Afghanistan and Iraq, despite overwhelming odds, pinned down squad were able to leverage indirect fire and aviation assets to turn the tide in battle. The GCEITF-EAR’s assessment and the Marine Corps insistence to maintain the status quo segregation based on the 42 seconds difference is incorrect.

The second justification the Marine Corps provides to maintain gender segregation is the difference in combat marksmanship. The GCEITF-EAR data indicates that male Marines are 33 to 46 percent more accurate firing infantry squad weapons than female Marines. The data seems to support the Marine Corps’ assertion for segregation, but the difference in firing ability is most likely a phenomenon that reflects the Marine Corps cultural biases towards female Marines. Traditional thinking in the Marine Corps is that female Marines cannot shoot as well as male Marines. Female Marines’ proficiency during boot camp rifle qualification reinforces the Marine Corps bias despite the fact that marksmanship is gender-neutral. In fact, collegiate shooting is “one of the few collegiate sports where men and women regularly compete against one another—and women are often winning.”⁴⁰ Anecdotally, Lieutenant Colonel Kate Germano proved the Marine Corps’ stereotype incorrect. Over the course of a year, as the commander of 4th Battalion, Recruit Training Regiment at Parris Island, Lieutenant Colonel Germano improved her recruits’ rifle range qualification rates to 95 percent, the same qualification rate as the male recruits. Before Lieutenant Colonel Germano took command “the failure rate of female recruits

at the rifle range was about three times higher than that of their male counterparts...[and she said], 'The thinking was girls can't shoot, so why bother.'"⁴¹ The issue regarding females' shooting ability is a small example of how fully integrating women in combat occupations threatens the Marine Corps' culture and corporateness by challenging its long held customs and beliefs.

Gender integration contradicts the Marine Corps' parochial corporateness, or military style. All of the reasons the Marine Corps provided to keep men and women segregated are training problems. Weak Marines and soldiers have always been problems, and the problems are fixed with training. The Marine Corps, however, chose to spend its money to determine why women should remain restricted from serving in combat occupations instead of determining how to mitigate biological differences with adequate training programs. Undeniably, the Marine Corps believes that its civilian leadership is attempting to remake the military in order to advance a liberal ideology just like when Congress ordered the military to end racial segregation, and 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell.'⁴² During the years of racial integration, leadership played a critical role in the successful integration, and leadership will overcome the obstacles involved in gender integration as well. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps has not set the proper example with regard to gender integration. Despite Lieutenant Colonel Germano's ability to improve her Marines' combat effectiveness the Commanding General at Parris Island Recruit Depot relieved her of command for fostering a hostile command climate. If the Marine Corps was serious about the threat that integrating women poses to combat occupations it would encourage the cultural changes Lieutenant Colonel Germano was able to accomplish while commanding the 4th Battalion at Parris Island; instead, the Marine Corps indicated it does not desire any change in the status quo between its male and female Marines. The Marine Corps' behavior is indicative of

an institution that is struggling with its civilian leadership over its identity and its corporateness. The Marine Corps is desperately fighting its civilian leadership over the right to define itself and its mission, and looked for any evidence to support a return to institutional theory's objective control during the GCEITF-EAR study. Had the Marine Corps and its civilian leaders embraced concordance theory's approach to civil-military relations they could have saved tremendous amounts of time and effort. Now, the Marine Corps is moving on to its another phase of foot dragging by collecting more fitness data to determine new gender neutral physical fitness test standards. Ultimately, the civilian leaders within the Department of Defense chose to implement gender integration despite the Marine Corps' foot dragging and propaganda campaign. This case study demonstrates that, at times, the principals can overcome the agents' influence and diversionary tactics to enforce righteous policy decisions, but the next two case studies demonstrate the principals' failures.

The Budget Control Act of 2011

The most powerful tool that Congress has to exert its control over the military is through the defense budget. In Article I, Section 8, the Constitution provides Congress the power "To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years."⁴³ In recent years because of the Congressional Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, also known as sequestration, Congress has attempted to regain an element of accountability and control of the defense budget. The debate surrounding the BCA of 2011 illustrates how much political power and influence the military has, and how willing Congress is to acquiesce to the military's desires. Congress did not enact the BCA of 2011 to reign in the military. The BCA was a bi-partisan compromise that automatically cut spending by \$2.1 trillion dollars over ten years, and extended the government's ability to borrow money as the national

debt approached the debt ceiling.⁴⁴ Even though sequestration was not purposefully designed to attack the military's power and influence, the military's public dissention and 'shirking' its responsibility to provide realistic assessments for the budget cuts dominated much of the political discussion.

The comments from congressional leaders demonstrate how firmly institutional theory's objective control is entrenched into the civilian's psyche. During hearings for The Defense Strategic Choices and Management Review, Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, told Admiral Winnefeld, "I have always felt like what we would expect of our military leaders is, you tell us the threats that we have, you set a strategy to meet those threats and then how much it is going to cost to do that, then we have to somehow come up with the money, instead of, this is how much money we have and then how do we devise a strategy to fit the amount of money."⁴⁵ The Chairman's comments are dangerous for America's future national and financial future because the Chairman is willing to acquiesce budget control over to the military's threat assessment. The same military that is fundamentally trained to over assesses every adversary, and hedge against all risks. A military that has no check on its purchasing power will quickly become too expensive.

The Chairman's comments illuminate two important details about his ideal civil-military relationship. First, the Chairman believes that the appropriate civil-military relationship is institutional theory's objective control. In his opinion, the military determines the nation's strategic objectives, and Congress's only responsibility is to provide funding and stay out of the military's way while it achieves the objectives. Second, the Chairman's comment reflects the national perception that the military has the best knowledge to develop American strategy for foreign affairs, and that the military is the American institution that is best postured to achieve its

objectives. The Chairman's views demonstrate America's trends towards militarism, and the belief that America's military power is essential to its national security. The Founding Fathers saw a large standing army, like the one America has today, as tool for tyranny. Today, however, America defines its exceptionalism by not just its military power, but also its overwhelming military prowess. Leaders at the highest levels of government use those sentiments as justifications for objective control of the military, which allows the military to gain more influence in American policy.

In addition to the comments from congressional leaders, official statements from office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reinforce institutional theory's objective control. Secretary of Defense Panetta stated that the across the board defense cuts would be "a disaster for national security", and cuts "would blow the bottom out of the defense strategic guidance released earlier this year."⁴⁶ Besides the Pentagon's official statement, the Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of State Admiral Winnefeld provided testimony before the House Armed Forces Committee concerning Department of Defense's Strategic Review and Management study for the BCA of 2011. Deputy Secretary Carter testified that if "sequestration-level cuts must be implemented in the mean time, drastic measures that are not strategically or managerially sound are the result" and cuts would result in a loss of "combat power, force structure, readiness, and investment will be necessary in all three of the budget scenarios."⁴⁷ Finally, he summarized the cuts are "not strategic; they are dumb."⁴⁸ Admiral Winnefeld said the effects of sequestration on the current forces would be like "trying to be in a swimming race where you have lead weights on your legs and starting that race when you are already out of breath."⁴⁹ Over and over again, professional officers and civilians within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS referred to the cuts as 'stupid' or

‘dumb.’

While the Pentagon leadership was testifying before Congress, its staff was making it clear that it was shirking its responsibility to plan for the BCA’s implementation. It was common knowledge among the Armed Services Committee that the Pentagon was not preparing for budget cuts, and an anonymous staffer commented, "For them [the Pentagon] not to plan for this will make a horrible situation even worse. We are just three months away from these cuts, and we still don't know if they've done any planning."⁵⁰ The Pentagon openly acknowledged its strategy was politically motivated, and it was fearless in its dissent. A Pentagon spokeswoman told the press that "the department is working closely with the Office of Management and Budget, but we have not begun any planning efforts... [because] the automatic cuts are irresponsible."⁵¹ In the same press conference, the spokeswoman admitted that the Pentagon’s shirking was politically motivated. She said, "It is time for Congress to enact a balanced reduction in the deficit and a law halting the entire sequestration."⁵² Throughout all of the Pentagon’s shirking and dissent, the military attempted to portray itself as the responsible voice. This amount of dissent would never have been possible without overwhelming support from the general public. Regardless of the type of control, subjective or objective, or whether the congressional leaders are monitoring intrusively or un-intrusively, if there is no desire to punish shirking and dissent the military will continue to interfere in affairs that are out of its sphere of expertise. To be fair to the Pentagon, the Executive branch was encouraging its dissent, and adding its own spin to the debate.

The Executive branch was just as willing as the military to use threats to national security as a political tool. The White House responded: "No amount of planning can mitigate the significant impact of the sequestration, and emphasized the need for an alternative plan

compromise.”⁵³ All sides --the legislative, the executive, and the military--politicized the debate with scare-tactics and fear mongering in an attempt to achieve their political objects. That is to be expected from the political establishment, but when the politicians allowed the military to take a side in the political debate they violated America’s unique civil-military balance, and institutional theory’s vision of objective control. The fact that in America two different hands hold the sword and purse gives the military a tremendous amount of political influence, especially when the executive and legislative are divided and the politicians actively courting the military’s approval in the political area. This is in fact one of the main criticisms of institutionalism theory’s objective control. S. E. Finer, a British scholar of civil-military relations, predicts that Huntington’s theory will not prevent the professional officer from becoming political, but, in fact, professionalism “push[es] the military towards collision with the civilian authorities.”⁵⁴ In today’s contemporary operating environment, it is virtually impossible to accomplish Huntington’s brand of segregation in civil-military relations and military professionalism America. The battlefields and political solutions are too complicated and convoluted to justify any separation between the military and its nation’s political will.

Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina epitomizes the flaws of Huntington’s institutionalism theory. Lindsey Graham is also a retired Air Force Reserve officer with thirty-three years of service,⁵⁵ and as a former officer he should understand the weight that his comments have on the public’s perception of the threat posed by sequestration. Despite his service, or maybe because of his service, the senator made some of the most inflammatory comments. The senator spoke of the “insidious and devastating blows that these cuts would have”, that the Marine Corps would “have to choose between Paris Island or San Diego” in order to conduct basic training, that the “Joint Base Charleston [an Air Force base in his state] would

be devastated”, and that the Shaw Air Force Base would be a “hollow force.” The senator did not limit his comments to the threat to the American military. He went on to say that he was sure “war with Iran is eminent, and that the air and sea campaign was going to be one from hell.”⁵⁶ Regardless of whether the senator is speaking as a concerned retired officer or as a politician searching for political leverage, his comments demonstrate the impossibility of keeping the military apolitical. Even if it were in the military’s benefit to remain apolitical, which it is not, hawkish comments from all sides will pull the military into the political fray.

Comments from all sides during the BCA 2011 debate demonstrate how politically charged manning, training, and equipping the world’s best military has become in America, and how corrosive these types of political debates are to the military’s professionalism. It is obvious from the congressional testimony that all of the parties involved in the debate are clinging to Huntington’s ideals of objective control, but the process is eroding the very foundations of professionalism that his theory requires. Chairman McKeon repeatedly apologized that the government could not provide the money that the military needed, and expressed his trust in the military’s ability to develop strategy for the country without intervention from the government. As the debate became more divisive, both the Executive and Legislative branches encouraged the Department of Defense’s leadership to become more politically involved. As a result of the civilians’ encouragement, the Department of Defense’s estimates were meant to instill fear in American citizens so that they would in turn pressure their elected leaders to properly fund the military. As it became apparent to the military that its political tactics were not working, the military began a campaign of dissention by shirking its duties to adequately plan for sequestration to further pressure the legislature to repeal the BCA of 2011. In the end, the politicized military estimates and the military’s campaign of dissention allowed the worst effects

of BCA of 2011 to be postponed when Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2012, which offset some of the cuts to defense in 2014 and 2015 by extending the BCA of 2011 by two years.

The second case study demonstrates that neither branch of government has respect for Huntington's apolitical officer. Both branches are eager to pull the military into politics when they believe the military's opinion will favor its political viewpoint. When the branches are politically divided, as they often are, these actions give the military the decisive third voice in order to influence public opinion, representing an extra-constitutional power determining America's domestic and foreign policy, and corrupting Huntington's apolitical, professional officer. While no civil-military relations theory will fix America's divisive political system, concordance theory will require a more collaborative effort leading and employing the military.

Foreign Policy Decisions

The final case study examines America's foreign policy concerning ISIL. Seymour Hersh's article "Military to Military" in the *London Review of Books* discusses the military's influence on American foreign policy. Seymour Hersh is a prolific investigative and political journalist. He has won the Pulitzer for his reporting on the My Lai massacre, two National Magazine awards, and five Polk awards.⁵⁷ Despite his accomplishments, Hersh is criticized for his reliance on anonymous, single sources. This criticism is true for "Military to Military," in which Hersh relies heavily on an anonymous Joint Chief of Staff adviser. But as his editor from the *New Yorker* notes that "the problem is that in the areas in which Hersh reports, especially intelligence, it is usually impossible to get officials to provide revelatory, even classified, information and at the same time announce themselves to the world."⁵⁸ Some of the loudest criticism comes from Max Boot, claiming that, "Sy Hersh is a far-left fantasist and conspiracy

theorist who once every few decades breaks real news." ⁵⁹ Despite the criticism, none of Hersh's reporting has been proven false. His reporting is usually inconvenient for political and military leaders, but it is not wrong. In fact, as the government publically reveals more details about the extremely secretive matters that Hersh reports on his versions become more accurate than the government's initial accounts. ⁶⁰ In spite of the criticism, the story represents a treasonous turn in American civil-military relations. ⁶¹

According to Seymour Hersh's article, the Joint Chiefs fundamentally disagreed with President Obama's strategy in Syria, and his insistence in arming moderate Syrian rebels that will facilitate regime change in Syria. The major concern among the Joint Staff was the president's 'Cold War thinking' was hindering his ability to access potential allies in China and Russia against the common enemy, ISIL. ⁶² Specifically, the Joint Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency Director, Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, believed that based on 'all-source intelligence' the president's current strategy was providing weapons to the ISIS, and that Turkey was a major obstacle to the president's strategy. They believed the president's strategic end-state in Syria was flawed, which led to the belief that "anybody else is better" than Assad. The Joint Chiefs believe the best way to implement the president's intent was not to challenge his policy directly, but to provide "US intelligence to the militaries of other nations, on the understanding that it would be passed on to the Syrian army and used against the common enemy, Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State." ⁶³ Hersh's main, anonymous source justified the Joint Chiefs' actions in the following statement: "We weren't intent on deviating from Obama's stated policies, but sharing our assessments via the military-to-military relationships with other countries could prove productive. It was clear that Assad needed better tactical intelligence and operational advice. The JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] concluded that if those needs were met, the

overall fight against Islamist terrorism would be enhanced. Obama didn't know, but Obama doesn't know what the JCS does in every circumstance and that's true of all presidents."⁶⁴ The acts that Hersh describes in his article are the antithesis of Huntington's definition for professionalism, and illustrate Feaver's concerns regarding 'shirking'.

Worse than the Joint Chiefs' actions, it appears that their strategic coup was successful, and unpunished. Shortly before the article was released, the president stopped calling for Assad's removal, and the United States unanimously voted for the a United Nations Security Council Resolution that called for a political solution but did not expressly call for Assad to step down. The resolution states, "The only sustainable solution to the current crisis in Syria is through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people... including through the establishment of an inclusive transitional governing body with full executive powers, which shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent while ensuring continuity of governmental institutions"⁶⁵ Based on Hersh's article, it appears that America's military has progressed from slow rolling social policies, to leveraging its opinion in an attempt to decide political disputes, and to making its obedience dependent on the quality of strategy. Institutional theory cannot survive in this environment. Civilians have to become involved in all aspects of the use of military force. They cannot be satisfied with beginning and ending hostilities. Concordance theory is only a small shift from institutional theory, and it can flourish from institutional theory's foundation. The civilian leaders have to abandon its notion of institutional theory's objective control. In terms of American foreign policy, it is incorrect to assess the Joint Chiefs' actions based on whether their decisions are the right or wrong strategic course of action. Even if the Joint Chiefs' actions prove to be correct, they are an improper extension beyond the legal and moral boundaries for the American military.

Conclusions

There is no denying that the fundamental element of institutional theory, separate spheres of influence, is no longer possible, if it ever was possible. Moreover, military leaders' political dissent is destroying the professional officer and the foundation of objective control. The Marine Corps attempted to influence the decision to fully integrate women into combat occupations with a \$36-million study to scientifically prove that women would degrade the Marine Corps' ability to fight and win the nation's battles. The over 900-page study, effectively stalled the civilians' decision for over a year. Better dialogue and cooperation between the civilians and the military, as concordance theory recommends, would have allowed the Marine Corps to understand that it had no choice in the matter, and allowed the Marine Corps to spend the money on developing plans for integration or equipment to facilitate the integration.

The Marine Corps specifically, and the military in general, has to be a better custodian of the nation's money. Unfortunately, the debate surrounding the Budget Control Act of 2011 demonstrates that the military is concerned with maintaining its share of the budget, which translates into political influence and international combat power. Throughout the entire process all three actors, the military, the legislative, and the executive, leveraged the military assessments to achieve its objectives. Institutional theory's objective control is impossible in this environment, and the nation's leaders have to stop acting as if objective control exists.

Finally, Seymour Hersh's article illustrates a startling development in American civil-military relations. If Hersh's comments are true, the corruption of institutional theory and the erosion of the professional officer corps allowed the military to force the president to either adopt its version foreign policy or acknowledge the president's lack of institutional control over the military.

In all of the case studies, the military's strategic leaders used military expertise and the citizenry's trust in the military as an institution to unduly influence political decisions. Strategic leaders justified their actions based on their assumed responsibility to protect the nation, even if that means being disobedient to its civilian leaders. The strategic leaders' disobedience, however, has the potential to permeate the entire military population, and threaten the chain of command, which is at the foundation of military service. Huntington's definition of a professional officer corps -characterized by expertise, responsibility, corporateness, and obedience- is still the ideal, but in order to protect these qualities the military has to stop practicing the divisive tactics that agency theory endorses. For the sake of the professional officer corps, the only solution is the replacement of instructional theory with concordance theory. Both the civilian and the military leaders have a responsibility to promote a renewed emphasis on military professionalism and obedience.

The civilians must understand that a positive civil-military relationship has to be cultivated, and that they bear some responsibility for maintaining the military's professionalism. First, civilians need to consider the military implication of American policy choices, but they should not weight the military's advice so heavily that it represents a de facto vote or endorsement of a political opinion. Second, they have to be willing to punish the military's slow rolling and press releases, which agency theory allows. America's trust in its professional officer corps has allowed civilian leadership to become lazy, and take the relationship for granted. Civilian leaders must understand that the relationship will not always be congenial. At times, civilians will have to hold military leaders accountable for their actions, and have the moral courage to make decisions that the citizens will judge by their votes.

The military has an equally important responsibility for reestablishing its professionalism. To begin, military leaders have to discourage the politicized dissent that has infected its ranks, and rejuvenate the civilian's superior role in all aspects of the civil-military relationship, and leaders have to hold its members accountable for slow rolling, laziness, and politicized military incompetence that undermine the civilians' ability to make future decisions.

With a rejuvenated professional and obedient officer corps, concordance theory will improve the cooperation and information flow. The hope is that the greater involvement will allow civilians to better understanding the military, develop a holistic approach to foreign policy decisions, and reduce the knowledge gap between the military and the civilians. Both civilian and military leaders have to think in different ways than the heavy and light military courses of action. This old-way-of-thinking has not been successful in the recent conflicts. In order for this new approach to be successful, there needs to be a scalable level of civilian involvement. When conflicts are similar to police actions, civilians should be more involved at the operational and tactical levels of war. For conflicts that are high intensity, major combat operations, civilians should limit their involvement to the strategic and operational levels of war. This will be an uncomfortable and highly contentious relationship, but the added expertise, perspective, and resources will improve America's warfighting capabilities, especially at the lower end of the range of military operations. As the military and civilian leaders become more effective the citizenry will be more compelled to seek military service.

In America's modern political environment, it is impossible to enact a draft, and the citizens are the key to an effective military. The citizenry is the one aspect that institutional theory completely ignores. In Huntington's time, leaders assumed that large portions of America would perform military service in times of need, and enacted a draft when the voluntary-

persuasive recruiting method could not produce enough military power. If America wants to maintain its all-volunteer force through voluntary-persuasive recruiting methods, the military must be successful in all missions. To be successful, the military and civilians need to abandon the artificial barriers of objective control, and attempt to solve complex conflicts against transnational, non-state actors with all elements of national power. If American leaders do not embrace concordance theory it will be more difficult to attract citizens to join a military that is in perpetual conflict with no clear path to victory. Ultimately, it will be the citizens' refusal to serve in an ineffective and disobedient military that will end America's current civil-military relationship. Concordance theory provides a framework that will rejuvenate professional, and military effectiveness.

Recommendations

1. All forms of dissent have to be eliminated from the America civil-military relationship. Civilian and military leaders have to present a unified effort to stop slow rolling, press leaks, overtures to friendly congressmen and congresswomen, and coalition building with advocacy groups. The military should immediately discard its philosophy of dissent, and the civilian leaders should hold strategic leaders publically accountable for their dissention.
2. In an effort to build strong relationships with civilian policy-makers and an alternative to the current professional education system, the military should allow its members to study at prestigious national universities. This has three potential benefits. First, it will broaden officers' experience level, and introduce them to strategic thinking from a civilian perspective; thereby reducing the likelihood of promoting tactical generals. Command and Staff College has a similar system with government agencies, but to complete the whole of government theme military students should become enmeshed with the future government agency mid-level professionals, and legislative and executive branch staffers. College students with whom military officers would study would also benefit while military students will introduce the military perspective before civilians completely develop foreign policy opinions. Lastly, the cooperation and integration at the formative level will potentially allow the civil-military establishment to develop better strategies to address the nation's interest because civilians will have the experience of integrating the whole of government at the operational level.

3. The final recommendation is the most ambitious because it requires changes to U.S. law, and drastic changes to opinions about America's civil-military relationship. The National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff closed the civil-military gap at the strategic level, but there is a widening gap at the tactical and operational levels. With the National Security Council as a template, political advisors (Polads), other government agencies (OGA), and military commands have to be integrated at lower echelons. At the operational and tactical level, commanders are concerned with unity of effort. Civil-military integration will simplify efforts to achieve the elusive unity of effort and unity of command. Currently, U.S. law mandates that unity of command rest in the hands of one person, the President, and the military and OGAs should attempt to achieve unity of effort by fostering positive relationships. Colloquially, the military refers to this command relationship as handshake control or handshake-con. In current operations, handshake control is a command relationship as necessary to the combatant commander as operational control or tactical control. The missions that the U.S. is attempting to accomplish, however, are too important to be left to handshakes and good relationships. Congress needs to change the law to allow the President to delegate certain commander-and-chief responsibilities to representatives from OGAs. Whether the President delegates command to the State Department or another agency, the President should have the ability to delegate operational control to lower levels of government in order to achieve the nation's strategic objectives. The integration will allow coordination to occur prior to a critical event. OGAs and military planners can develop, refine, and synchronize plans for years before they have to implement it in a crisis situation. All of the planning and relationship building will occur over years instead of months or weeks, and allow members of OGAs and the military to matriculate along the parallel career tracts. All this will reduce the tactical and operational civil-military knowledge gaps. In addition to making the whole of government more strategically effective, it may improve Congressional oversight. As more civilian become acquainted with military equipment, tactics, and capabilities they will be a more informed member in the civil-military dialogue, and be able to better monitor the military's shirking.

¹ Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*, (New York: The Free Press, 2002), pp 54.

² James Madison, *The Writings of James Madison, comprising his Public Papers and his Private Correspondence, including his numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed Vol 6*, ed. Gaillard Hunt (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1900). 9 vols. Retrieved January 17, 2016 from the World Wide Web: <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1933>

³ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

⁴ Rebecca Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces and Society*; (Fall 1995, Vol 22, no. 1), pp 12.

⁵ Mackubin Thomas Owen, *U.S. Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain*, 20.5.

⁶ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations*, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), Chapter 4.

⁷ Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*, (New York: The Free Press, 2002), pp 4-5.

⁸ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations*, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), page 8.

⁹ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations*, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), page 8.

¹⁰ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations*, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), page 9-10.

¹¹ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations*, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), page 10.

¹² Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations*, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), page 10.

¹³ Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, "Reflection on Leadership," *Parameters*, Summer 2008, pp 12.

¹⁴ Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, "Reflection on Leadership," *Parameters*, Summer 2008, pp 11.

¹⁵ Peter Feaver, "Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the souring American Civil-military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, (Spring 1998), footnote 10.

¹⁶ Peter Feaver, "Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the souring American Civil-military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, (Spring 1998), pp 416.

¹⁷ Peter Feaver, "Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the souring American Civil-military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, (Spring 1998), pp 408-410.

¹⁸ Peter Feaver, "Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the souring American Civil-military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, (Spring 1998), pp 409.

¹⁹ Peter Feaver, "Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the souring American Civil-military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, (Spring 1998), pp 409.

²⁰ Mackubin Thomas Owen, *U.S. Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain*, page 29

²¹ Don M. Snider, "Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professional," *The Strategic Studies Institutes Newsletter*. (February 2008) Accessed via Proquest.com.

²² Richard H. Kohn, "Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 2002, Vol LV, No 3. pp 9- 59, pp 26.

²³ Snider classifies 'strategic officers' as those officers who have achieved the rank of colonel or higher, and are groomed for higher responsibility with education through resident professional military education. Don M. Snider, "Dissent" pp17.

²⁴ Don M. Snider, "Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professional," *The Strategic Studies Institutes Newsletter*. (February 2008) pp7, table 1, Accessed via Proquest.com

²⁵ Rebecca Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces and Society*; (Fall 1995, Vol 22, no. 1): pp 7-25. Accessed via ProQuest.com

²⁶ Rebecca Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces and Society*; (Fall 1995, Vol 22, no. 1): pp 14. Accessed via ProQuest.com

²⁷ Rebecca Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces and Society*; (Fall 1995, Vol 22, no. 1): pp 14. Accessed via ProQuest.com

²⁸ Rebecca Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces and Society*; (Fall 1995, Vol 22, no. 1): pp 15. Accessed via ProQuest.com

²⁹ Rebecca Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces and Society*; (Fall 1995, Vol 22, no. 1): pp 15. Accessed via ProQuest.com

³⁰ Charles Moskos, "Reviving the citizen-soldier," *Public Interest*, Spring 2002 pg. 77, accessed via proquest search.

³¹ Rebecca Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces and Society*; (Fall 1995, Vol 22, no. 1): pp 15-16. Accessed via ProQuest.com

³² Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*, (New York: The Free Press, 2002), Chapter 7.

³³ Cohen outlines four case studies, President Lincoln during the American Civil War, Georges Clemenceau during World War I, Winston Churchill during World War II, and David Ben-Gurion during the Israeli War for independence in 1947, which Cohen presents as evidence that Institutional theory's subjective control is the correct template for civil-military relations.

³⁴ In his book, *Civilian Control of the Military*, Michael Desch chronicles the major American civil-military conflicts from the end of World War II to 1997. According to his study, there have been 71 cases where civil and military leaders disagreed about the appropriate management of foreign affairs, military matters, and military policy. Additionally, Desch identified whether the president decided to follow the civilian opinion or the military opinion, whether the civilians and the military came to a compromised, or whether it is unclear which opinion the president chose. The conflicts ranged from the mundane such as budgetary issues to the most critical national concerns, the appropriate control and use of nuclear weapons. Prior to the end of the Cold War in 1989, Desch identifies 3 occasions when the president did not follow the civilian opinion, and 1 instance when the military and civilians compromised in the 59 cases of conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the president has followed the military's advice seven times, and compromised once in the 12 cases of conflict. The significant change among the power distribution represents major challenges for the civil-military relationship. There are experts that refute Desch's process because the method "creates a zero-sum frame of reference for the evaluation – if the military is more influential, then by definition the civilians are less influential." This is a fair assessment, but in the normal interactions the president should adopt the civilian opinion should be adopted closer Cold War are ratio. Moreover, the list does not identify the rightness or wrongness of the particular action, but it definitely illustrates the growing influence the military has especially over the increasing divided legislature and executive.

³⁵ Headquarters United States Marine Corps, *Expeditionary Force 21*, Concept, March 4, 2014. [http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/EF21_Capstone_Concept_12_Mar_2014%20\(signed\).pdf](http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/EF21_Capstone_Concept_12_Mar_2014%20(signed).pdf).

³⁶ Headquarters of the Marine Corps, *Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force Experimental Assessment Report*, August 2015, page ES-1. Accessed at <http://apps.npr.org/documents/document.html?id=2504584-mcotea-loe-3-gceitf-final-report>.

³⁷ The deviation in percentage range is based on the type of squad the GCEITF-EAR evaluated. The GCEITF-EAR evaluated the times for standard infantry squads (0311), machine

gun squads (0331), mortar sections (0341), and anti-tank missile-men (0352). The 5% difference in movement to contact time represents the standard infantry squads, and the movement times increases as squad's crew-served weapon's weight increases. The integrated squad's slowest movement to contact times corresponds to the machinegun squad. A Marine Corps machinegun squad carries the heaviest light infantry weapon system, the M240B machinegun, which adds an additional 28-40 pounds to each member's combat load. This increase in combat load correlates to the 40% increasing movement time in the 7km hike, a change from 86.44 minutes for the control to 117.30 minutes for a high-density integrated squad. Headquarters of the Marine Corps, *Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force Experimental Assessment Report*, August 2015, page 12-13, Table C-2 on page C-10. Accessed at

<http://apps.npr.org/documents/document.html?id=2504584-mcotea-loe-3-gceitf-final-report>.

³⁸ Headquarters of the Marine Corps, *Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force Experimental Assessment Report*, August 2015, Table A-2, page A-10. Accessed at

<http://apps.npr.org/documents/document.html?id=2504584-mcotea-loe-3-gceitf-final-report>.

³⁹ Headquarters of the Marine Corps, *Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force Experimental Assessment Report*, August 2015, pp A-23 Accessed at

<http://apps.npr.org/documents/document.html?id=2504584-mcotea-loe-3-gceitf-final-report>.

⁴⁰ Collegiate Shooting teams, *The Wall Street Journal*, the National Governing Body for U.S. Olympic shooting agree that man and woman are equal with regard to competitive marksmanship. Mark Yost, "Taking Aim at an Old Debate," *The Wall Street Journal*, 23 February 2012,

<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203960804577239540945498130#printMode>.

U.S Shooting, "USA Shooting Viewpoint: Men vs. Women in Competitive Shooting," news release, 28 February 2012, <http://www.usashooting.org/news/2012/2/28/195-usa-shooting-viewpoint--men-vs-women-in-competitive-shooting>.

⁴¹ David Phillips, "Marine Commander's Firing Stirs Debate on Integration of Women in Corps," *The New York Times*, 12 July 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/13/us/marine-commanders-firing-stirs-debate-on-integration-of-women-in-corps.html>.

⁴² Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos studied the lingering effects of racial integration. Janowitz and Moskos contended, "[That] emphasizing educational benefits and the GI Bill for the combat arms, the black problem would take care of itself. As they saw it, "a major outcome [of a civilian educational program] would be the reintroduction of white middle class males into the ground combat forces." Bernard Rostker and Yeh, K.C.. *I Want You! : The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force*. Santa Monica, CA, USA: RAND Corporation, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web.

⁴³ U.S. Constitution. Art. I, § 8, cl. 12-13.

⁴⁴ Carl Hugh, "Long Battle on Debt Ending as Senate Set for Final Vote," *The New York Times*, 01 August 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/us/politics/02fiscal.html>.

⁴⁵ *Initial Conclusions Formed by The Defense Strategic Choices and Management Review: Hearing Before the Committee of Armed Services House of Representatives*, 113 Cong. 1st Session, (9) (Chairman of the Armed Services Committee Howard P. "Buck" Mckeon), http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=fb756e91-328b-481b-8579-6c68b54e50a7.

⁴⁶ Jim Garamone, “Department of Defense Plans for Sequestration”, *GlobalSecurity.org*, 5 December 2012, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2012/12/mil-121205-afps03.htm>.

⁴⁷ *Initial Conclusions Formed by The Defense Strategic Choices and Management Review: Hearing Before the Committee of Armed Services House of Representatives*, 113 Cong. 1st Session, (4-6) (Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter), http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=fb756e91-328b-481b-8579-6c68b54e50a7.

⁴⁸ *Initial Conclusions Formed by The Defense Strategic Choices and Management Review: Hearing Before the Committee of Armed Services House of Representatives*, 113 Cong. 1st Session, (4-6) (Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter), http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=fb756e91-328b-481b-8579-6c68b54e50a7.

⁴⁹ *Initial Conclusions Formed by The Defense Strategic Choices and Management Review: Hearing Before the Committee of Armed Services House of Representatives*, 113 Cong. 1st Session, (9) (Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James A. “Sandy” Winnefeld, Jr), http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=fb756e91-328b-481b-8579-6c68b54e50a7.

⁵⁰ Leo Shane III, “DOD Not Making Plans for Sequestration Cuts,” *Stars and Stripes* accessed from Military.com, 18 Sept 2012, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/09/18/dod-not-making-plans-for-sequester-cuts.html>.

⁵¹ Leo Shane III, “DOD Not Making Plans for Sequestration Cuts,” *Stars and Stripes* accessed from Military.com, 18 Sept 2012, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/09/18/dod-not-making-plans-for-sequester-cuts.html>.

⁵² Leo Shane III, “DOD Not Making Plans for Sequestration Cuts,” *Stars and Stripes* accessed from Military.com, 18 Sept 2012, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/09/18/dod-not-making-plans-for-sequester-cuts.html>.

⁵³ Leo Shane III, “DOD Not Making Plans for Sequestration Cuts,” *Stars and Stripes* accessed from Military.com, 18 Sept 2012, <http://www.military.com/dailynews/2012/09/18/dod-not-making-plans-for-sequester-cuts.html>.

⁵⁴ S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, (New Jersey: Transaction Publications, 2002), pp 27. Finer identifies three elements, all derived from Huntington’s definition of a professional officer corps, which drives the military to interfering with the civilian control. First, the military’s belief that it is “servant of the state rather than of the government in power.” Second, is the military’s belief that it is the only organization “competent to judge on such matters as size, organization, recruitment, and equipment of the forces.” Lastly, the military refuse to be employed against the nation’s citizens. America is not in jeopardy of the last element because of the *posse comitatus* law and the militarization of the civilian police force; however, the first two elements are everyday occurrences in American civil-military relations.

⁵⁵ “Biography,” Lindsey Graham, <http://www.lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/biography>.

⁵⁶ Jonathan Weisman, “Some Law Makers Look for Way Out of Budget Cuts”, *The New York Times*, 3 June 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/04/us/politics/budget-control-act-military-cuts-raise-concerns.html?_r=0.

⁵⁷ “Seymour Hersh Biography,” *The New Yorker*, (<http://www.newyorker.com/contributors/seymour-m-hersh>) “Interview with Seymour Hersh,” *Democracynow.org*, (<http://www democracynow.org/shows/2015/12/22?autostart=true>)

⁵⁸ Michiko Kakutani, “Controversial Reports Become Accepted Wisdom,” *NyTimes.com*, 28 September 2004, (<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/28/books/controversial-reports-become-accepted-wisdom.html>)

⁵⁹ Max Boot declared: “Sy Hersh is a far-left fantasist and conspiracy theorist who once every few decades breaks real news.” <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/05/sy-hersh-bin-laden-new-yorker-lrb.html>

⁶⁰ Hersh’s major exposes, the My Lia massacre, the CIA’s intelligence gathering operations against anti-war demonstrators in Vietnam, and the Abu Ghraib incident all proved to be accurate as the government relented to public scrutiny and release more information. Prior to “Military to Military”, Hersh wrote an article countering America’s narrative leading to killing of Osama Bin Laden. This story has received the most vociferous criticism.

⁶¹ Recent events in the United Nations Security Council appear to corroborate Hersh’s portions of account. Just before Hersh’s article was published, America agreed to Resolution 2254 (2015) that allowed for a political solution in Syria, which did not include forcefully removing Bashar al-Assad. Instead, the resolution called for a “Syrian-led political process that meets the legitimate aspirations for the Syrian people...including through the establishment of an inclusive transitional government.” United Nations, *United Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015)*, 7588th Meeting on 18 December 2015, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2254.pdf.

⁶² Seymour Hersh, “Military to Military”, *London Review of Books*, Vol. 38 No. 1, January 7, 2016, pp 11-14, <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n01/seymour-m-hersh/military-to-military>.

⁶³ Seymour Hersh, “Military to Military”, *London Review of Books*, Vol. 38 No. 1, January 7, 2016, pp 11-14, <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n01/seymour-m-hersh/military-to-military>.

⁶⁴ Seymour Hersh, “Military to Military”, *London Review of Books*, Vol. 38 No. 1, January 7, 2016, pp 11-14, <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n01/seymour-m-hersh/military-to-military>.

⁶⁵ United Nations, *United Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015)*, 7588th Meeting on 18 December 2015, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2254.pdf.

Bibliography

- Bacevich, Andrew J. *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War*. Updated edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013
- Cohen, Eliot A. *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. New York: The Free Press, 2002.
- Desch, Michael C. *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.
- Finer, S. E. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. New Jersey: Transaction Publications, 2002.

-
- Garamone, Jim "Department of Defense Plans for Sequestration", *GlobalSecurity.org*, 5 December 2012, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2012/12/mil-121205-afps03.htm>.
- Gates, Robert, Secretary of Defense. "Reflection on Leadership." *Parameters*, Summer 2008.
- Gibson, Christopher P. and Don M. Snider, "Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National Security decision Making Process", (*Armed Forces and Society*, Vol 25, No. 2, Winter 1999, page 193-218)
- Headquarters United States Marine Corps, *Expeditionary Force 21*, Concept, March 4, 2014. [http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/EF21_Capstone_Concept_12_Mar_2014%20\(signed\).pdf](http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/EF21_Capstone_Concept_12_Mar_2014%20(signed).pdf).
- Headquarters United States Marine Corps, *Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force Experimental Assessment Report*, August 2015, page ES-1. Accessed at <http://apps.npr.org/documents/document.html?id=2504584-mcotea-loe-3-gceitf-final-report>.
- Hersh, Seymour. "Military to Military." *London Review of Books*, Vol. 38 No. 1, January 7, 2016, pp 11-14. Accessed at <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n01/seymour-m-hersh/military-to-military>.
- Hugh, Carl "Long Battle on Debt Ending as Senate Set for Final Vote," *The New York Times*, 01 August 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/us/politics/02fiscal.html>.
- Huntington, Samuel. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.
- Initial Conclusions Formed* by *The Defense Strategic Choices and Management Review: Hearing Before the Committee of Armed Services House of Representatives*, 113 Cong. 1st Session. http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=fb756e91-328b-481b-8579-6c68b54e50a7.
- Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960.
- Kohn, Richard H. "Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today." *Naval War College Review*, Summer 2002, Vol LV, No 3. pp 9- 59.
- Madison, James *The Writings of James Madison, comprising his Public Papers and his Private Correspondence, including his numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed Vol 6*, ed. Gaillard Hunt. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1900.
- Obradovic, Lana, Dr. *Gender in a Global/Local World : Gender Integration in NATO Military Forces*. Farnham, GB: Ashgate, 2014. ProQuest ebrary.
- Owen, Mackubin Thomas. *U.S. Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain*.
- Rostker, Bernard and Yeh, K.C.. *I Want You! : The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force*. Santa Monica, CA, USA: RAND Corporation, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web.
- Schiff, Rebecca. "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces and Society*; (Fall 1995, Vol 22, no. 1): pp 7-25. Accessed via ProQuest.com
- Shane III, .Leo. "DOD Not Making Plans for Sequestration Cuts," *Stars and Stripes*. accessed from Military.com, 18 Sept 2012, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/09/18/dod-not-making-plans-for-sequester-cuts.html>.

Snider, Don M. "Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professional." *The Strategic Studies Institutes Newsletter*. February 2008. Accessed via Proquest.com.

U.S. Constitution. Art. I, § 8, cl. 12-13.

Weisman, Jonathan. "Some Law Makers Look for Way Out of Budget Cuts." *The New York Times*. 3 June 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/04/us/politics/budget-control-act-military-cuts-raise-concerns.html?_r=0.