

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 05/08/2016		2. REPORT TYPE MASTERS OF MILITARY STUDIES		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2015-JUN 2016	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE COMPARISONS OF MILITARY GOVERNANCE: THE EXAMPLES OF JAPAN AND GERMANY IN THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR II, LENDING INSIGHTS FOR TODAY'S WARFIGHTER				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) DAGHER, KATHLEEN R. LCDR, USN				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The notion of military governance would seem to be inconsistent with the civilian control of the military that lies at the heart of the American system of government. Ironically, the foundations for the political and economic success of Japan and Germany following their defeats in World War II came about largely because of post war military governance. These initiatives so thoroughly addressed every aspect of society that they transformed hierarchical, almost feudal systems into free market, democratic economic and political forces. Through military leadership, devoid of political leanings, civil rights					
15. SUBJECT TERMS MILITARY GOVERNANCE, OCCUPATION, JAPAN, GERMANY					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			USMC Command and Staff College
UNCLASS	UNCLASS	UNCLASS	UU	33	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

1. REPORT DATE. Full publication date, including day, month, if available. Must cite at least the year and be Year 2000 compliant, e.g. 30-06-1998; xx-06-1998; xx-xx-1998.

2. REPORT TYPE. State the type of report, such as final, technical, interim, memorandum, master's thesis, progress, quarterly, research, special, group study, etc.

3. DATE COVERED. Indicate the time during which the work was performed and the report was written, e.g., Jun 1997 - Jun 1998; 1-10 Jun 1996; May - Nov 1998; Nov 1998.

4. TITLE. Enter title and subtitle with volume number and part number, if applicable. On classified documents, enter the title classification in parentheses.

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER. Enter all contract numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. F33315-86-C-5169.

5b. GRANT NUMBER. Enter all grant numbers as they appear in the report. e.g. AFOSR-82-1234.

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER. Enter all program element numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 61101A.

5e. TASK NUMBER. Enter all task numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 05; RF0330201; T4112.

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER. Enter all work unit numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 001; AFAPL30480105.

6. AUTHOR(S). Enter name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. The form of entry is the last name, first name, middle initial, and additional qualifiers separated by commas, e.g. Smith, Richard, J, Jr.

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). Self-explanatory.

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER. Enter all unique alphanumeric report numbers assigned by the performing organization, e.g. BRL-1234; AFWL-TR-85-4017-Vol-21-PT-2.

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). Enter the name and address of the organization(s) financially responsible for and monitoring the work.

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S). Enter, if available, e.g. BRL, ARDEC, NADC.

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S). Enter report number as assigned by the sponsoring/monitoring agency, if available, e.g. BRL-TR-829; -215.

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT. Use agency-mandated availability statements to indicate the public availability or distribution limitations of the report. If additional limitations/ restrictions or special markings are indicated, follow agency authorization procedures, e.g. RD/FRD, PROPIN, ITAR, etc. Include copyright information.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES. Enter information not included elsewhere such as: prepared in cooperation with; translation of; report supersedes; old edition number, etc.

14. ABSTRACT. A brief (approximately 200 words) factual summary of the most significant information.

15. SUBJECT TERMS. Key words or phrases identifying major concepts in the report.

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. Enter security classification in accordance with security classification regulations, e.g. U, C, S, etc. If this form contains classified information, stamp classification level on the top and bottom of this page.

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT. This block must be completed to assign a distribution limitation to the abstract. Enter UU (Unclassified Unlimited) or SAR (Same as Report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited.

United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:
**COMPARISONS OF MILITARY GOVERNANCE: THE EXAMPLES OF
JAPAN AND GERMANY IN THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR II,
LENDING INSIGHTS FOR TODAY'S WARFIGHTER**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:
LCDR KATHLEEN R. DAGHER

AY 15-16

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member:

CHARLES D. MCKENNA, Ph.D.

Approved: Charles D. McKenna

Date: 6 MAY 2016

Oral Defense Committee Member:

Charles R. Gordon

Approved: Charles R. Gordon

Date: 6 MAY 2016

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

Executive Summary

Title: Comparisons of Military Governance: The Examples of Japan and Germany in the Aftermath of World War II, Lending Insights for Today's Warfighters

Author: Lieutenant Commander Kathleen R. Dagher, United States Navy

Thesis Given the recent difficulties associated with, and opposition to possibly failed occupations and stabilization efforts, the examples of successes in post WWII Japan and Germany may offer useful insights regarding possible future efforts.

Discussion: The notion of military governance would seem to be inconsistent with the civilian control of the military that lies at the heart of the American system of government. Ironically, the foundations for the political and economic success of Japan and Germany following their defeats in World War II came about largely because of post war military governance. These initiatives so thoroughly addressed every aspect of society that they transformed hierarchical, almost feudal systems into free market, democratic economic and political forces. Through military leadership, devoid of political leanings, civil rights, equality, education, women's suffrage and many more forward thinking movements were included in the post war reconstruction of Japan and Germany.

Conclusion: The inability of civil administrations to accept the possibility of temporary military governance post conflict makes effective transition more difficult, and even may risk the possibility of failure of the overall effort. There will always be an urgent humanitarian need after military engagement, security will be required, infrastructure will need to be provided, basic services have to be supplied, economies must be able to provide for their people and governments must be legitimate in order to transition back to civil authority. There is a generational requirement for commitment but there is now a capability deficit in the military and a strategic failure to recognize the recurring condition.

Table of Contents

	Page
DISCLAIMER	ii
PREFACE	iii
Introduction	1
Unconditional Surrender	1
Agreements	2
The Beginning of Occupation	3
Germany	3
Morgenthau Plan	3
Japan	4
Maslow's Law	5
The Humanitarian Crisis in Japan	5
The Crisis of Germany	6
Setting the Stage for Governance	7
Securing Germany	7
Dismantling Japan	8
Military Governance	9
The US Zone	10
The SCAP	14
Institutionalizing Democracies	17
Insights for the Warfighter	20
CONCLUSIONS	22
BIBLIOGRAPHY	25
Annex A	26
Annex B	27

The notion of military governance would seem to be inconsistent with the civilian control of the military that lies at the heart of the American system of government. Ironically, the foundations for the political and economic success of Japan and Germany following their defeats in World War II came about largely because of post war military governance. These initiatives so thoroughly addressed every aspect of society that they transformed hierarchical, almost feudal systems into free market, democratic economic and political forces. Through military leadership, devoid of political leanings, civil rights, equality, education, women's suffrage and many more forward thinking movements were included in the post war reconstruction of Japan and Germany. Given the recent difficulties associated with, and opposition to possibly failed occupations and stabilization efforts, the examples of successes in post WWII Japan and Germany may offer useful insights regarding possible future efforts.

Unconditional Surrender

Setting the stage for the occupation of both Japan and Germany was the unconditional surrender of each of the states followed by societal restructuring and the liberation of their conquered territories. In January of 1943 the US and Britain came together in Casablanca and declared that the only acceptable end to the war in Europe would be the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany.¹ In 1945, at Yalta, the Allied powers further called for the denazification of Germany, demilitarization, disarmament, reparations, a controlled economy and punishment for war crimes. All of this was further

¹ James Dobbins, Andrew Rathmell, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, and John G. McGinn, "Japan," *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publications, 2005), pg 2.

reemphasized at Potsdam in July of 1945, but also included allied occupation areas, new state borders, economics, governance and displaced people.² Germany was to be split into four zones. The British, the French and The United States would occupy three zones in Western Germany while the Soviet Union would be responsible for what was defined territorially as East Germany. The former capital of Germany, Berlin, located in what would become East Germany, would itself be divided into four zones of occupation, one each for the victorious powers. The Office of the Military Government, United States (OMGUS), would govern the United States zone.³

Agreements

The Potsdam Conference also put forth the parameters of an unconditional surrender by Japan. The United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union (at a later date), all agreed to the terms of the surrender;

“a purge of the leadership that had advocated global conquest; an Allied occupation until a new order was established and Japan’s war-making power was destroyed; the disbandment of Japan’s empire; military disarmament; prosecution of war criminals; establishment of freedom of speech, religion, thought, and respect for basic human rights; and reduction of economic capacity to prevent rearmament.”⁴

After the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, as well as the extensive Pacific Campaign, the Allies agreed the United States would take the lead in the occupation of mainland Japan. Two oversight councils were established, the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) and the Far Eastern Commission. On September 2, 1945 General MacArthur and

² Dobbins,, pg 3.

³ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944–1946: Army Historical Series*, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975, pg. 75.

⁴ Dobbins, pg 25 as cited from: DOS, *Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress*, Far Eastern Series 17, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Pub. 267, 1946), pg. 53–55.

Admiral Nimitz accepted the surrender of Emperor Hirohito on the deck of the *USS Missouri* for the official surrender of Japan.⁵ General MacArthur was appointed the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) and began the occupation with little collaboration with outside entities.

The Beginning of the Occupations

Germany

In Germany there was a great deal of contention among the Allied Forces as to what to do with a defeated Germany. France and the Soviet Union wanted to strip Germany of ever being a sovereign nation again.⁶ While leaders in President Roosevelt's cabinet, such as Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, wanted to deindustrialize Germany and penalize the population, even to the extent of reduction in caloric intake for the entirety of the citizenry.⁷ The US military stated its objective for Germany through the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067: "The Office of the Military Government, United States (OMGUS) will be a stern, all-powerful military administration of a conquered country, based on its unconditional surrender, impressing the Germans with their military defeat and the futility of any further aggression."⁸ This directive, heavily influenced by the Morgenthau plan, set the stage for continued silent retribution directed toward the German people as a whole. Caloric intake for the average German ranged from 750-1000 calories based on food allowances. This was a direct result of the German economy's

⁵ John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, (New York, NY: Norton, 1999), pg. 55.

⁶ Dobbins, pg 6.

⁷ John Dietrich, *Morgenthau Plan : Soviet Influence on American Foreign Policy*, (New York, NY, USA: Algora Publishing, 2002), Pg. 3.

⁸ Ziemke, pg. 104.

inability to produce food supplies to feed their population and the United States government's stance of limiting food aid. Of note, the allotted food amount per inmate per day in concentration camps was 1000 calories.⁹ Although counter to the official policy, many ground commanders recognized the depravity in penalizing the average citizen for the actions of their government and remediated these shortages as much as possible. An example of this can be seen in the spring of 1946, with officers from the Land Detachment.

“ In Bremen, the detachment's officers in charge of fisheries sent the first two trawlers out on 19 July with dust coal in their bunkers (which gave them a top speed of six knots, two knots less than the speed of an average fish). Two months later, twenty-one trawlers were operating out of Wesermuende with good coal and twenty-nine more were being reconditioned.”¹⁰

Even with these localized efforts, starvation and malnutrition became a reality for many Germans directly after the war.¹¹

Japan

Unlike the politically segmented puzzle that Germany had become, Japan remained intact and had an American visionary at the helm. Although the population of the United States had demonized the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese people as a whole, Japan remained a distant and alien place for the American people and their political representatives. Europe's plight was real, was tangible. Japan's conversion to democracy was too far and too foreign to occupy a prominent place in the collective mind of the American people. This lack of understanding and distance gave MacArthur the

⁹ Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991*, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), pg. 236.

¹⁰ Ziemke, pg 397.

¹¹ Dobbins, pg 7.

latitude to implement democratization and communication exactly as he thought it ought to be. He had full executive and legislative control of Japan. As SCAP, MacArthur's main objectives were to demilitarize and democratize Japan through political, military, communication, economic and social reforms.¹² Yet, like Germany the immediacy of addressing the post hostility humanitarian crisis became the prime concern in the aftermath of unconditional surrender.

Maslow's Law

The occupation policies for both Germany and Japan mandated demilitarization and democratization. However, one staggering component hindered both efforts: basic human needs. Post conflict, the Allies found that both countries had a large percentage of displaced people and homeless people due to the war. Once the fragile states surrendered, the basic systems that were in place, such as food distribution, collapsed. Food distribution systems were at critical or nonexistent levels. Heating during the winter was not available; shelter and clothing were in short supply. In order for the Allied powers to meet the mission of democratization and demilitarization they needed to have a public alive to support it.¹³

The Humanitarian Crisis of Japan

Although no foreign troops had set foot on the mainland of Japan, its infrastructure had been destroyed in the US fire-bombings and nuclear attacks. Approximately four percent of the country's population had been killed and up to 89% of

¹² Charles Willoughby, *Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, Vol. I*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pg. 10

¹³ Dower, pg. 65.

urban residents were homeless in 66 of the major cities that had been bombed. A quarter of the entire industrial capability of Japan was destroyed and their ports and shipping areas no longer existed.¹⁴ There were approximately 123,000 Japanese orphans, 30,000 prisoners of war and over three million civilians displaced throughout Asia.¹⁵ Like Germany, the order for Japan was to feed them only to the level that prevented unrest, but MacArthur fought this pragmatically. Taking supplies and money already in place for drawn down forces, the SCAP was able to redistribute \$250,000,000 to help stave off hunger and build towards democratization.¹⁶

The Crisis of Germany

Germany's humanitarian crisis affected almost the entirety of the population. Millions of people had been displaced from throughout Europe and Northern Africa to concentration camps or to act as forced labor in German factories. After the surrender there was precious little available to sustain them, which left these displaced people with no tangible means of support. Further compounding the crisis was the complete collapse of the German economy, followed by severe weather destroying crops and freezing an unsheltered populace.¹⁷ The Germans themselves were now facing stark conditions of food shortages, security concerns and a lack of basic lodging.¹⁸ The Morgenthau Plan further hindered the ability of Germany to provide for itself. This plan assumed the German infrastructure should be able to provide for itself agriculturally, which was

¹⁴ Dower pg. 66-74.

¹⁵ Dobbins, pg. 27.

¹⁶ Dobbins, pg 34.

¹⁷ Dietrich, pg 103.

¹⁸ Dobbins, pg 5.

grossly incorrect and hindered the distribution of relief supplies by allied forces.¹⁹

General Lucius Clay, Governor of the US Zone, immediately recognized this deficit and organized his military governance teams to combat the immediate humanitarian need while building local infrastructure to support recovery. Clay penned the speech entitled, “Restatement of Policy in Germany,” that Secretary of State Byrnes delivered in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946. In that speech Byrnes urged the US and its allies to move away from the punitive measures of the Morgenthau Plan and begin the economic reconstruction of the state.²⁰

Setting the stage for governance

Along with addressing the immediate needs of the population, security was the priority for the Allied powers in both states. Ensuring the safety of the American forces and the security of the communities was paramount in setting the stage for military and then civil governance. Surprisingly, in both countries there was little civil unrest and both occupations were almost devoid of resistance.

Securing Germany

As the administration transitioned to occupation in Germany the efficacy of American capabilities were severely impacted by the public’s demand at home for the return of US forces. The initial plan had called for 404, 500 troops to occupy Germany

¹⁹ Ziemke, pg. 106.

²⁰ Curtis Franklin, Jr., *Southern Partnership: James F. Byrnes, Lucius Clay, and American Policy in Germany, 1945-1947*. Order No. 9833244, University of South Carolina. 1998.

with a reduction of 34,500 after one year.²¹ With political acquiescence to public demand for the return of troops, the number actually committed to occupation duty fell to 290,000. This significantly degraded the capability of the OMGUS to complete its mission, in particular with regard to security forces. As a result, Major General Ernest N. Harmon lobbied Secretary of State Marshall and General Eisenhower for the creation of a constabulary. They approved the creation of the unit and subsequently appointed General Harmon as commander. The constabulary was to be a reserve force consisting of 38,000 Americans acting in small units as policing and quick reaction components capable of responding to possible civil uprisings.²² The force was meant to provide an intermediate step while the German security force was being recreated. The great civil unrest forecasted in Germany did not occur and the force was used largely as peacekeepers, assisting in the management of displaced populations from Poland and Jewish communities in Eastern Germany.²³

Dismantling Japan

Security, disarmament and demobilization were at the forefront of MacArthur's concerns about the reconstruction of Japan. He had originally estimated that he would need 200,000 men to secure and occupy the mainland, a figure considered woefully inadequate by the political establishment in the United States.²⁴ Yet the complete and unconditional surrender of the Japanese was unprecedented. The circumstances of Japanese surrender continued to confound the occupying forces. At the request of the

²¹ Dobbins, pg 9.

²² George F. Hofmann, 2007, *Cold War Mounted Warriors: U.S. Constabulary in Occupied Germany*, Armor 116 (5), pg. 28.

²³ Hofman, pg. 27.

²⁴ Willoughby, pg. 49.

Japanese government, their War and Navy Departments established Demobilization Units and began a rapid effort to demilitarize the country. Under this construct, the Japanese demobilization of seven million service members may have been the fastest in history. Eleven reception centers were established throughout Japan and each processed service members out the Navy and War components as quickly and effectively as possible and returned them to their homes.²⁵ By October 15, 1945 the entire Army and Navy had been disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated.²⁶ At this time, the number of U.S. Forces had increased to an occupying force 354,675 troops.

Military Governance

There was strong resistance within the Truman administration and by General Eisenhower for the military to exercise governance in occupied Germany. General MacArthur was on the other side of the spectrum, embracing the idea of occupation fully. The accepted approach throughout the higher echelons of government was for civilian control and oversight.²⁷ The Army, however, had prepared for this mission extensively. Wishing not to repeat past failures of the Mexican American War and WWI the Army looked forward and began to plan a Civil Affairs (CA) school. In the spring of 1942 the School of Military Governance was established in Charlottesville, Virginia.²⁸ The Army's plan to produce the most effective CA soldiers was to draw from the cross section of society the wartime draft created. This strategy allowed the CA teams to be

²⁵ Willoughby, pg. 126.

²⁶ Dobbins, pg. 34.

²⁷ Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *United States Army In World War II, Special Studies, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, Center of Military History (Washington D.C. 2004), pg 4.

²⁸ Coles, pg. 9.

composed of people with commensurate experience in the civilian sector. Examples of this were teachers, policemen, engineers, economists and many other needed specialists that could address the full range of governance.

The US Zone

In the immediate aftermath of the German surrender it was clear that military governance was not the priority under General Eisenhower or his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter Smith. The priority was for the military to secure the area and return home. The belief was that governance was solely a civilian function. There were, however, pioneers who had forecasted the need for military governance of civil society in the defeated nation and lobbied strongly for the political and military leadership necessary to make it a reality. General Clay, as Deputy Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, was the most effective advocate for the cause. He was able to persuade Secretary of War Stimson to be a supporter of the concept, and, with that ally, to impress upon the rest of the leadership the importance of immediate military governance.

The Potsdam Conference had delineated the American Zone in Germany and after much arbitration with the Soviets and massive amounts of movement of displaced persons, on July 10, 1945 the US Army began static operations in zone.²⁹ The European Civil Affairs Detachments (ECAD) were normally composed of one officer and five to six enlisted. These teams were to be distributed throughout the American zone to any area with a population of 5,000 or greater.³⁰ Subsequently, 419 detachments were requested to meet this requirement but ultimately only 269 were allotted. The ECAD

²⁹ Ziemke, pg 308.

³⁰ Memo, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, G-5, for Chief of Staff, Subj: PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR MG ACTIVITIES, in U.S. Forces European Theater SGS 200.3.

detachments were responsible for all facets of civil governance and administration. At the local level they oversaw governmental affairs, public safety, education, public health, security, economics, public welfare, resources, industry, commerce, agriculture, the judiciary, utilities, communications, fiscal, supply, waste and transportation.³¹ The teams were dispersed in the five U.S. Military Governance zones: Land Bavaria, Land Hesse, Land Wurttemberg-Baden, the Bremen Enclave and the U.S. sector of Berlin. Each area, less Berlin, would have a land component (similar to state), a regional component (county) and a local (city, urban and rural) component. Of the existing 269 teams there would be 4 dedicated to the Land components, 12 regional components, 44 urban components, and 209 rural components.³² These detachments proved to be extremely effective in rebuilding critical infrastructure and setting the stage for future industrial gains.

JCS 1067 put forth five major principles for the role of the military in Germany: “dissolution of the Nazi party; demilitarization; controls over communications, press, propaganda, and education; reparation for those countries wanting it; and decentralization of the German governmental structure (without a decision either way on partitioning the country).”³³ As Deputy Military Governor in 1946, General Clay administered dissolution of the Nazi party, demilitarization, and communication controls in haste. He did, however, realize difficulties in the complete dissolution of government. This tactic led to a gap in the state’s ability to conduct budgetary oversight, production, exports and imports as well as provide for its people. Also, it removed those from office with the

³¹ Ziemke, pg. 70.

³² Ziemke, pg. 310.

³³ Ziemke, pg 104.

requisite knowledge to perform government tasks. As a result General Clay immediately started to rebuild government at a local, then regional and subsequently state level.³⁴ He also fervently disagreed with JCS 1067 provision to, “meet the needs of the occupying forces and to ensure the production and maintenance of goods and service required to prevent disease and unrest.”³⁵ General Clay realized that only limited increases in capabilities for the German system to provide for itself could lead to disastrous results. Therefore, as now Military Governor of the US Zone, he put every possible resource into rebuilding the foundations to the German economy to enable it to provide for its people. His first major areas of concentration were reconstructing the coal industry, agriculture, and factory production.

While ECAD continued their efforts of rebuilding, the rest of the traditional Army forces focused on security and enabling the United States Government (USG) policy, derived from Potsdam. The goal of the occupation was total, complete denazification of Germany, reparations for all impacted states and peoples, control of the banking system, the economy and its resources, restructuring of all government infrastructure, control of all media, redistribution of land and valuables, and punitive measures. The depth of these efforts impacted the whole of society. Every adult was scrutinized for Nazi affiliation, every education system was overhauled, medical institutions were revised, Fire Marshalls were relieved. Every sector of society was denazified, and every outlet of information reflected the views of the occupying forces.

In 1945 the Allied powers created the Nuremberg Tribunal, calling for the trials of 24 key members of the Nazi party. Of the 24 accused, 21 were tried, 10 were sentenced

³⁴ Dobbins, pg 17.

³⁵ JCS Directive 1067, as quoted in Dobbins, pg. 17.

to death by hanging and 8 were given life sentences.³⁶ The pressure for punitive measures in Germany was so severe that not just key government officials and military leaders were targeted. Indeed, every echelon of society was scrutinized for possible judicial action. In March 1946 the military government (or whoever passed or proclaimed the law) put into practice the Liberation of National Socialism and Demilitarization Law. This law asserted that all persons over the age of 18 in the US zone would be reviewed for affiliation with the Nazi party, and if affiliated, would be subject to judicial action.³⁷ As a result, 3,623,112 people were found to be complicit in Nazi crimes, some of whom paid fines and were considered denazified. Of the over three million reviewed, 887,252 individuals were actually tried and 117,523 were convicted.³⁸

While the denazification of Germany continued, the political pressure to pursue the civilianization of the occupying government's role also continued. In the spring of 1946 the Army Forces in Europe G-5 began transferring some authorities to their civilian counterparts in OMGUS. This transfer was difficult, as many of the civilians were temporary and lacked both the language skills needed to execute the mission as well as basic infrastructure support such as logistics capabilities. The military stayed on to support in strength, experience and capabilities and LTG Clay remained a guiding force on the development of the emerging state of West Germany.

The issue of the economy became more staggering as time went on. The shared currency of the Reichsmark from 1945 to 1948 crippled the ability of the Western allied forces to establish a solid economic base. The Soviet's ability to print the shared

³⁶ Dobbins, pg.13.

³⁷ Ziemke, pg, 430.

³⁸ Dobbins, pg.14.

currency at will caused devaluation and inflation. The Allies controlled the Central Bank of Germany, and thanks in large part to the foundations laid by Ludwig Erhard, the lead economist and an advocate for progressive economic theories and strict application in Western Germany, in 1948 the Deutschmark was able to replace the failing Reichsmark.³⁹ This divergence of currency allowed for Western Germany to control the currency and its economic indicators. Supported by the implementation of the Economic Recovery Act of 1948, also known as the Marshall Plan, the Soviet Union and the West made a decisive and consequential break between the economic ties of Eastern and Western Germany.

The Marshall Plan built upon the foundations of what had been implemented during General Clay's time. Billions of dollars of aid and development had already been spent throughout Europe and in Germany to reinvigorate the economy and reestablish coal output and factory production (see Annex A). The Marshall plan cemented the government's pivot away from Morgenthau's thinking and the JCS Directive 1067 and towards the strengthening of Western Germany as a counter to Soviet domination in Europe. The plan also acted as a bridge for the end of OMGUS in 1949 and a transition to the Federal Republic of Germany, ensuring support for a solid economic base.

The SCAP

Japan's occupation varied greatly from that of Germany. To most people in the United States Germany was a known entity, sharing lineage, language, religion, culture and history. Japan was truly a foreign entity, speaking and looking differently than most Americans at that time. Despite this sense of being so different, maybe even because of

³⁹ Norbert Walter, 1986, *Europe: Time for Germany to Remember Ludwig Erhard*, Wall Street Journal, Dec 24, pg. 1.

it, the occupation of Japan seemed less punitive than that of Germany. Ironically, this lack of oversight, and the accompanying indifference and distance from Washington gave General MacArthur free reign to control and construct the Japanese government, economy and social infrastructure in ways consistent with his own vision of a reconstructed Japan. The government was left largely intact with encouragement to embrace democratic power. The military governance team established economic initiatives, ensured education, promoted women's rights and many more tenets of American ideology in order to enable the existing government to continue to function, albeit with a democratic and free market approach. Military Governance teams were sent to each of the states and prefectures to guide the existing government on implementing the pronouncements made by the SCAP and the Diet. Sixth Army and Eighth Army divided responsibility for administration of the mainland with Sixth taking the South and Eighth taking the North (see Annex B).⁴⁰ The Sixth Army stayed until 1946 when the Eighth Army assumed the role of military governance. Spreading throughout continental Japan, military governance teams concentrated on areas of civil engineering, resource utilization, medicine, legal systems, industrial infrastructure and reform, translator services, and transportation.⁴¹ In the interests of both security and economic development, the express purpose was to reconstruct Japan to be a productive global contributor while avoiding degrading existing government infrastructure.

There were to be no military governors as there were in Germany. The military governance teams were to act as advisors and observers for their prefectures and regions.

⁴⁰ Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1989, pg. 46.

⁴¹ Willoughby, pg 64-69.

The military governance teams falling under the Eighth Army would consist of 46 prefecture teams and 8 regional teams. The teams consisted of “10 officers, 10 civilians, 45 enlisted men and 120-200 Japanese civilians”.⁴² These teams were responsible for ensuring the execution of political, judicial, societal and economic reform within their areas and reporting the progress back up to SCAP headquarters, but the Japanese remained the face of their areas while coordinating with American advisors.

Punitive measures were also taken during the occupation of Japan. The Tokyo War Crimes trials lasted three years and found all 24 defendants guilty of war crimes. Seven were hanged while the others all received life sentences. Unlike Germany the entirety of the society was not put on trial, but a total of 4200 military members were convicted of war crimes. A further 210,000 political and economic leaders were removed from prominent roles within Japan. This represented .29% of the population while 2.5% of the population had been removed from similar positions in Germany.⁴³

During this time General MacArthur also put in place a grand information campaign, using the emperor as his representative. MacArthur and his staff ensured clear communication to every level of the Japanese government. This standard and effective communication was essential as laws were implemented to decentralize police, change education, address human rights and allow all citizens equal rights.⁴⁴ Even though the Japanese government was carrying out tasks, every aspect of governance was touched by the SCAP.

⁴² Sandler, pg 279.

⁴³ Dobbins, pg 39-42

⁴⁴ Sandler, pg 279-281.

Reinvigorating the economy was one of the largest undertakings for the SCAP and the military governance teams. Along with the seemingly constant uproar from labor parties, the feudal system known as the Oyabukobun (literally translating to father child relationship, this was a feudal system dating back thousands of years in Japan and institutionalized a surf to lord type relationship), proved to be almost impossible to work around. This tribe like system had been in place for thousands of years and little could be done to dismantle it. Many initiatives and laws against feudal rights, granting land reform and labor rights worked to degrade the power of this prominent system.

The next mountain to climb was the “Zaibatsu,” an oligarchy that controlled the Japanese economy. These leaders largely supported the war effort and restricted a free market. The zaibatsu’s existence was a legacy of the previous system and limited progress. As a result, a necessary removal of 1,898-business executives ensued.⁴⁵

The Japanese economy did not suffer greatly but still needed natural resources in order to gain momentum. In 1949 in an effort to boost the economy, the United States introduced the Dodge plan under the occupation. The plan introduced balancing the budget, limiting government intervention, budget stabilization and economic independence. These plans were too progressive for the fragile state of the recovering Japanese economy. This initiative imposed unrealistic economic burdens on society as the Japanese economy lacked the resources to fill the demands to support social infrastructure.⁴⁶ It was not until the Korean War and the material demands placed on Japan by the United States that the true benefits of the occupation were realized and the Japanese economy demonstrated its strength.

⁴⁵ Dobbins. pg 47-51.

⁴⁶ Dower, pg 1027.

Institutionalizing Democracies

In restructuring each of the occupied countries the allies went to great lengths to ensure these powers were severely hindered in their ability to wage war. The democratization of their societies as a whole included the introduction of not only new judicial branches but also new constitutions. Germany and Japan were different in a myriad of ways. Consequently, the approach to their reconstruction had to take those differences into account. The plan for Japan was singular in execution while Germany's approach was multifaceted and disjointed due to disparate points of view among the Allies.

The Basic Law for Germany was written shortly after occupation began, serving as the statutory framework for the Federal Republic. The Allied powers retained control, but started empowering political entities at the local and county levels. In 1946, governors were elected at the state level and a Council of Ministers was established within the United States Zone.⁴⁷ OMGUS was quick to use these elected officials as a legitimate means to carry out the administrative duties of local governance, while keeping a close eye on any conversion back to Nazism, which did not occur. France and Britain were slower and more hesitant in giving back power to the Germans but eventually did. On May 23, 1949 the Basic Law took effect across the Federal Republic of Germany and was to act in the place of a constitution until Germany was reunified. This charter severely limited Germany's military capability, by forbidding any military action other than self-defense, but set the framework for a legitimate government capable

⁴⁷ Dobbins, pg. 16.

of its own security. In 1949, Konrad Adenauer was elected Chancellor and the governmental process was turned over to the Western German people.

The approach to the Japanese constitution was different from that of Germany. It did limit the role of the military and Japan's ability to raise forces and conduct military operations. The democratization mandated by the new constitution was designed not to control the population but to liberate it. General MacArthur struggled with leaving the existing governmental powers in place or completely dismantling the system as was being done in Germany. After meeting the emperor and receiving a great deal of guidance from his Japan advisors, MacArthur decided the emperor was not much of a threat. Rather, as a symbol he could be used to demonstrate continuity, as well as a figure who could influence the people in positive ways. The emperor was left in place and the Diet (the equivalent for parliament) remained. Six main tenets were included in the constitution: (1) wide suffrage, (2) an executive branch, (3) a fully representative legislature with budgetary authority, (4) civil rights for all, (5) free and fair local electoral processes, (6) the ability to create amendments for the constitution.⁴⁸ Freedom to participate in all electoral processes was granted to the whole of society, pulling away from the previous, limiting feudal system. The economy was opened and previously existing oligarchies were disbanded to create a free market. Women were granted the right to vote and encouraged to fully participate in the democratic process. In a time when party affiliation was creating tensions in the US, MacArthur insisted all parties be

⁴⁸ Ray A., Moore, and Robinson, Donald L. *Partners for Democracy : Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur*, (Cary, NC, USA: Oxford University Press, 2002), pg. 85.

tolerated by the SCAP, to include a communist party.⁴⁹ Other laws were also changed: access to education with a western like curriculum, decentralization of the police force, and the introduction of human rights. With this progress also came limitations, the largest being Article 9 of the newly ratified constitution. Article 9 forbade the Japanese from ever creating a land, air or sea military capability and firmly cemented this restriction in the constitution.⁵⁰ The role for any forces created would be that of self-defense. This enabled the Japanese and the Germans to defend themselves but prohibited the conduct of any operations outside of their territory.

Insights for the Warfighter

Limited Wars and Protracted Obligations

The cost of total war is now far too great for even the most powerful nations seriously to consider waging it. The world's nuclear powers wield the capability to destroy whole populations without actual combat. Consequently, wars are no longer fought between great powers. Instead they are limited to proxy, regional, or non-state actor conflicts. An example of this is the ongoing struggle in Syria, being destabilized by internal grievances, with the situation exacerbated by the involvement of a variety of state and non-state actors. This type of conflict contains a great deal of ambiguity, as there are no clear winners or losers and thereby no defeated populations.

The lack of clear-cut winners and losers in such a struggle can have serious consequences for the affected populations. Although the kinetic portion of such a conflict may be shorter today than it was in WWII, the reconstruction will most certainly be longer. Governments often do not surrender, leaving the affected population in a sort of

⁴⁹ Sandler, pg. 259.

⁵⁰ Dower, pg 142-142.

limbo as it relates to stability and reconstruction. In these situations, military forces almost inevitably are drawn into nation building activities. As seen in Japan and Germany, these stabilization efforts require the training and capabilities to analyze and develop plans in order to meet the unique societal demands of the affected state.

The Professional Soldier In Reconstruction

WWII allowed the military to draw from every sector of society. Stabilization efforts were made possible by skills found within the draftees. Using the professional capabilities such as city managers, public health officers, farmers, teachers and many other skills allowed for greater efficacy in the execution of reconstruction efforts. With the abolition of the Universal Draft in 1973, the military lost many of the professional skills found among citizen soldiers. The lack of professional diversity, as well as the large divestiture from CA units, left the military with limited capability to perform stability operations. As demonstrated by reconstruction efforts in Japan, Germany, Iraq and Afghanistan, it is necessary for the military to be skilled at fighting battles but also to be trained and equipped to assist with reconstruction once the fighting ends.

The Politics of Stabilization Efforts

As demonstrated by the immediacy of the demands to “bring our boys home” post conflict in WWII and the strong political desire to meet those demands, it is clear that America has never had an appetite for long engagements or a desire for imperialism. The appeal for short and neat campaigns has increased with abbreviated battles dominated by technological advances. The minimization of casualties within a professional force has allowed the American populace to distance itself from the physical cost of war. Therefore, a long-term economic commitment to the stabilization of a distant country or a

region is even less palatable today than it might have been earlier in American history. Yet as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, stability and security are necessary factors to ensure that future conflicts cause the loss of fewer lives and less treasure. Consequently, as demonstrated by General MacArthur and General Clay, it is incumbent upon military leadership to effectively represent the necessity of political, economic and military backing of stabilization efforts in order to reduce the likelihood of future conflicts.

Conclusion

The United States and its Allies were able to transform an essentially feudal system with little basis in democracy, and a totalitarian regime, into productive economic powerhouses in a few short years. The punitive measures originally pursued were short lived, due in large part to the growing threat of the Soviet Union, but also to the commitment of the military leaders in charge of the conduct of the two reconstruction efforts. In a time when many wanted vengeance it was those who were most directly impacted by the horrors of war who showed the most restraint and kindness. Through his visionary leadership in Germany, General Clay worked to sway the political leaders to see beyond a need for retribution and to do not only what was in their best interest, but what was right. General MacArthur, through his singular and self-assured plans, transformed a feudalistic society into a free market democratic nation that would become one of the world's economic giants. Both men pulled from the military and civilian expertise of their staffs to create the necessary teams to accomplish their respective missions. So why does this seem difficult today?

One possible explanation may be found in the changing character of war. The idea of state-to-state engagements has been largely deterred by the threat of nuclear

weapons. This has changed the world's methods of engagement. Unconditional surrender and occupation are no longer the ways wars are fought. Rarely is it the entirety of the population that is involved. Rather, the focus is on an ideology, a government or an extremist segment. By international standards, occupation is not an acceptable strategy for resolution of conflict. Nation building is outdated terminology; developed nations intervene and stabilize with an intent to rebuild rather than reconstruct.

During WWII, the Army was the lead agent for military governance and post conflict stabilization. At this time the Army relied heavily on civilian education and experiences to create the right capability sets to meet the civil infrastructure demands of each area. After the end of the universal draft, the military lost capabilities that had been brought in by the civilian draftees, such as teaching, public works, banking, farming, and city management. After the Vietnam War, Civil Affairs missions were relegated to mostly reserve components, limiting funding and training.

The argument that the combination of military and governance is problematic has a long history. President Kennedy supported the creation of USAID through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This agency was to fall under the Department of State. Its mission was to work to stabilize regions predisposed to communism or other anti-democratic behaviors. The bulk of nation building activities that had previously fallen to the military were now viewed largely as a diplomatic and developmental function of the State Department and USAID. As seen in WWII these staffs are largely unprepared to carry out missions other than diplomacy and aid to accepting nations. The new strategy largely neglected the necessity of occupation and the implementation of nation building capability after and/or during conflict. To further the support of stabilization and

reconstruction as a civilian capability National Security Presidential Directive 44, December 7, 2005, designated the State Department as the lead agent for reconstruction and stabilization efforts.⁵¹

The continuing prospect for failure remains in the inability of the military and the civil administration to divest themselves from the theoretical debate of division of “military” and “governance,” and to see the reality of the necessity of military governance. There will always be an urgent humanitarian need after military engagement, security will be required, infrastructure will need to be provided, basic services have to be supplied, economies must be able to provide for their people and governments must be legitimate in order to leave after a military conflict. There is a generational requirement for commitment but there is now a capability deficit in the military and a potential strategic failure by not recognizing the recurring condition.

⁵¹ Charles Oleszycki, 2006. *Update on Department of State and Department of Defense Coordination of Reconstruction and Stabilization Assistance*, The Army Lawyer: pg. 22-25.

Bibliography

- Coles, Harry L. and Albert K. Weinberg, *United States Army In World War II, Special Studies, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*. Center of Military History. Washington D.C. 2004.
- Dobbins, James. Andrew Rathmell Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, and John G. McGinn. "Japan," *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*. Santa Monica. CA: RAND Publications. 2005.
- DOS, *Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress*. Far Eastern Series 17. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Pub. 267, 1946.
- Dower, John. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York, NY: Norton. 1999.
- Dietrich, John. *Morgenthau Plan : Soviet Influence on American Foreign Policy*. New York, NY, USA: Algora Publishing, 2002.
- Franklin, Curtis. *Southern Partnership: James F. Byrnes, Lucius Clay, and American Policy in Germany, 1945-1947*. Order No. 9833244. University of South Carolina. 1998.
- Hofmann, George F. 2007. "Cold War Mounted Warriors: U.S. Constabulary in Occupied Germany." *Armor* 116 (5).
- Moore, Ray A. and Robinson, Donald L. *Partners for Democracy : Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur*. Cary, NC. USA: Oxford University Press. 2002.
- Oleszycki, Charles. *Update on Department of State and Department of Defense Coordination of Reconstruction and Stabilization Assistance*, The Army Lawyer: 2006.
- Sandler, Stanley. *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government. 1775-1991*. U.S. Government Printing Office. 2004.
- Schonberger, Howard B. *Aftermath of War*, Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1989.
- Walter, Norbert. 1986, *Europe: Time for Germany to Remember Ludwig Erhard*. Wall Street Journal. Dec 24.

Willoughby, Charles. *Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, Vol. I*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1966.

Ziemke, Earl F. *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944–1946: Army Historical Series*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History. 1975.

Annex A

CRS-10

**Table 1. Germany: U.S. Assistance FY1946-1952
(In Millions of Current Dollars)**

GERMANY	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	TOTAL
Total Economic Grants	195.8	298.3	234.4	810.6	579.4	393.1	90.7	2,602.3
Total Economic Loans	0	0	615.9	447.0	154.0	0	16.9	1,233.8
USAID Predecessor Grants	0	0	0	406.0	290.0	402.5	75.1	1,173.6
USAID Predecessor Loans	0	0	0	200.0	0	0	16.9	216.9
Food Grants	0	0	0	0	0	0	17.5	17.5
GARIOA (grants)	192.7	297.8	232.3	404.6	289.4	-9.4	-1.9	1,405.5
GARIOLA (loans)	0	0	399.0	247.0	154.0	0	0	800.0
UNRRA & Interim Aid (grants)	3.1	0.5	2.1	0	0	0	0	5.7
US Surplus Property (loan)	0	0	216.9	0	0	0	0	216.9
Military Aid Grants	0	0	0	0	0	259.7	202.7	462.4
TOTALS	195.8	298.3	850.3	1,257.6	733.4	652.8	310.3	4,298.5

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Database (Custom Service). Totals may not add due to rounding.

CRS-11

**Table 2. Japan: U.S. Assistance FY1946-1952
(In Millions of Current Dollars)**

JAPAN	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	TOTAL
Total Economic Grants	82.7	291.0	375.4	388.8	283.6	225.1	49.9	1,696.5
Total Economic Loans	24.0	98.3	108.3	112.7	81.8	65.2	13.7	504.0
GARIOA (grants)	82.7	291.0	375.2	388.8	283.5	225.1	48.4	1,694.7
UNRRA & Interim Aid (grant)	0	0	0.2	0	0	0	0	0.2
Food Grants	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	1.5
COG Offset to Grant (loan)	24.0	84.3	108.3	112.7	81.8	65.2	13.7	490.0
U.S. Surplus Property (loan)	0	14.0	0	0	0	0	0	14.0
Military Grants	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	0.1
TOTALS	106.7	389.3	483.7	501.5	365.4	290.3	63.7	2,200.6

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Database (Custom Service). Totals may not add due to rounding.




PLATE NO. 3
 "Blacklist": Concept of Phase II Operations

