

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 18-05-2016		2. REPORT TYPE Master's of Military Studies		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) SEP 2015 - APR 2016	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Russian Expansionism: NATO Viability and the U.S. Response				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Esposito, Luke T., Major, USMC				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) Dr. R.L. DiNardo	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT Russian expansionism has historical precedent and President Vladimir Putin is continuing that trend today. Since his election in 2000, Russia has invaded the sovereign territories of Georgia and Ukraine, annexed the Crimea, and is currently countering US policy through its involvement with the Assad regime in Syria. NATO and the US have done very little to counter Russia's expansionist actions which began in 2008 and the viability of the treaty alliance is at stake. Putin's next move has the potential to invalidate NATO if the member nations led by the United States are not fully prepared.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Russia, NATO, United States, Europe, Expansion, Annexation, Georgia, Ukraine, Syria					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			USMC Command and Staff College
Unclass	Unclass	Unclass	UU	27	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

1. REPORT DATE. Full publication date, including day, month, if available. Must cite at least the year and be Year 2000 compliant, e.g. 30-06-1998; xx-06-1998; xx-xx-1998.

2. REPORT TYPE. State the type of report, such as final, technical, interim, memorandum, master's thesis, progress, quarterly, research, special, group study, etc.

3. DATE COVERED. Indicate the time during which the work was performed and the report was written, e.g., Jun 1997 - Jun 1998; 1-10 Jun 1996; May - Nov 1998; Nov 1998.

4. TITLE. Enter title and subtitle with volume number and part number, if applicable. On classified documents, enter the title classification in parentheses.

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER. Enter all contract numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. F33315-86-C-5169.

5b. GRANT NUMBER. Enter all grant numbers as they appear in the report. e.g. AFOSR-82-1234.

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER. Enter all program element numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 61101A.

5e. TASK NUMBER. Enter all task numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 05; RF0330201; T4112.

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER. Enter all work unit numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 001; AFAPL30480105.

6. AUTHOR(S). Enter name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. The form of entry is the last name, first name, middle initial, and additional qualifiers separated by commas, e.g. Smith, Richard, J, Jr.

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). Self-explanatory.

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER. Enter all unique alphanumeric report numbers assigned by the performing organization, e.g. BRL-1234; AFWL-TR-85-4017-Vol-21-PT-2.

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). Enter the name and address of the organization(s) financially responsible for and monitoring the work.

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S). Enter, if available, e.g. BRL, ARDEC, NADC.

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S). Enter report number as assigned by the sponsoring/monitoring agency, if available, e.g. BRL-TR-829; -215.

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT. Use agency-mandated availability statements to indicate the public availability or distribution limitations of the report. If additional limitations/ restrictions or special markings are indicated, follow agency authorization procedures, e.g. RD/FRD, PROPIN, ITAR, etc. Include copyright information.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES. Enter information not included elsewhere such as: prepared in cooperation with; translation of; report supersedes; old edition number, etc.

14. ABSTRACT. A brief (approximately 200 words) factual summary of the most significant information.

15. SUBJECT TERMS. Key words or phrases identifying major concepts in the report.

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. Enter security classification in accordance with security classification regulations, e.g. U, C, S, etc. If this form contains classified information, stamp classification level on the top and bottom of this page.

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT. This block must be completed to assign a distribution limitation to the abstract. Enter UU (Unclassified Unlimited) or SAR (Same as Report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited.

United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

RUSSIAN EXPANSIONISM: NATO VIABILITY AND THE U.S. RESPONSE

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES


AUTHOR: MAJOR LUKE T. ESPOSITO

AY 15-16

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member:


Dr. R.L. DiNardo

Professor, Marine Corps University

Approved: 

Date: 11 April 2016

Oral Defense Committee Member:

Approved: 

Date: 11 April 2016

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

Executive Summary

Title: Russian Expansionism: NATO Viability and the U.S. Response

Author: Major Luke T. Esposito, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: Unless the US and NATO make a strong effort to prevent future Russian expansionist actions using all elements of national power, we will enter another Cold War with a far greater potential to turn hot than the Cold War that ended in 1991.

Discussion: The US missed an opportunity to avoid a resurgence of Russian expansionism by attempting to extend NATO's reach into many of the former Soviet States. Vladimir Putin's Russia is now on a path away from a democratically based society and towards a (fascist) great power role that will counter US policy at every opportunity. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Russia has demonstrated that it is not ready to conduct itself in a manner reflective of a society based on the ideals of freedom and the will of the people. The government has tightened its control over the population to include media, politics, and the economy. They have conducted brutal crackdowns against their own citizens through two "wars" in Chechnya and have invaded foreign sovereign territories of both Georgia and Ukraine. Vladimir Putin has designed a system in which he has been able to remain in power and will likely continue to do so for the foreseeable future. NATO and the US have demonstrated a significant lack of resolve in countering Russia's moves. NATO's conventional military status in Europe lacks funding and many of the member nations do not meet their treaty-mandated defense spending percentages. The lack of a strong response either in Georgia or in Ukraine has only given Putin a reason to continue his behavior. Predictions of what his next moves may be and what the US and NATO should do about it are based on previous actions, a study of the leader and his mentality, and the geopolitical boundaries that have influenced Russian expansion throughout history.

Conclusion: In 2016, Russia added the United States to its official list of national threats and shows no signs of changing its course away from aggressiveness and defiance towards NATO and the West. The US should avoid the temptation to think that Russia's "cooperation" in The War on Terror means that it is changing its goals of returning to a Great Power status. Viewing the actions of the Russian Federation holistically paints a stark picture of what is to come if allowed to continue along its path. A strong resistance from the United States and NATO is likely the only thing that will prevent the trend from continuing. All elements of national power must be used in a forceful and coordinated fashion. Diplomacy must be used to convince others of the reality of the threat. NATO member nations must meet their defense spending requirements and help the US to buildup conventional and armored forces in Europe as a deterrent against further Russian expansion. Out-of-the box thinking must be used to counter the Russian lead on the "information battlefield" of today. Sanctions must be strengthened and expanded. Russia's next move should not take the US or NATO by surprise as it seems to have done since 2008. There is ample evidence that indicates a need to be better prepared and failure to act should not be an option.

Table of Contents

	Page
DISCLAIMER	ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	iii
PREFACE.....	v
INTRODUCTION.....	1
SECTION 1: 1991 TO THE PRESENT	3
SECTION 2: THE US AND NATO’S ROLE.....	9
SECTION 3: THE FUTURE	13
SECTION 4: RECOMMENDATIONS.....	17
CONCLUSION.....	22
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	27

Preface

My decision to study Putin's Russia was based on a strong belief that the United States and NATO are on a road towards future conflict with the resurgent power. The appeasement that the US and its allies have shown towards Russia's aggressive actions both within its own country and beyond their borders appears to mirror that of the pre-WWII policies towards Nazi Germany. Many of the same tactics that Hitler used also appear in Russian strategy such as the protection of ethnic Russians who live abroad justifying two major invasions of foreign sovereign territory. The failure of NATO and the UN to take decisive action to counter Russia's moves indicates that Putin's will is stronger than that of the organizations that were designed specifically to stop actions exactly like his. The failure of US military leaders to begin re-structuring our force to handle a return to conventional conflict is also worrisome. The Marine Corps outlook in particular, outlined in *Expeditionary Force 21*, states that large-scale conventional engagements are the least likely type of conflict to occur in the next decade.¹ This may be true, but our failure to prepare for the possibility is a weakness that Russia will be aware of and may try to take advantage of. We should be prepared.

INTRODUCTION

In August of 2008, Russian military forces conducted the largest incursion of European sovereign territory since the lead-up to WWII. On orders from the Kremlin, an entire Russian armored division, initially led by 150 tanks, moved through the Roki tunnel into the Georgian province of South Ossetia. A paratrooper battalion and other Special Forces units were also inserted into Georgian territory as part of the initial operations.² Over 300 Russian combat aircraft took part, in addition to a task force from Russia's Black Sea fleet that implemented a blockade of the Georgian coastline.³ Eventually, an estimated 60,000 troops participated in the conflict.⁴ Chechen and North Ossetian (Russian) irregular fighters also entered Georgia.⁵ Georgian government internet and communications services were shut down just prior to the invasion essentially cutting the small nation off from the outside world and allowing Russia to control the flow of information both in and out. This massive cyber attack was highly effective and allowed the Russians to dominate the storyline that the international community received of the events that were unfolding. Follow-on reserve elements of an air assault division were soon being airlifted into the Georgian city of Tskhinvali indicating a well-planned and robust operation.⁶

Russian forces did not only operate in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but also were inserted deep into Georgian territory and occupied key towns, military bases, as well as the Black Sea port of Poti.⁷ In the meantime, Russian forces escorted South Ossetian militias into Georgian villages where they proceeded to conduct blatant killings, kidnappings, and other atrocities that by all accounts can be considered ethnic cleansing.⁸ The Russians used cluster bombs on the town of Ruisi and on a market in the town of Gori that killed multiple civilians.⁹ All in all, the events occurring throughout the week of official hostilities that

followed the invasion should have been a major wakeup call to the United States and its allies; this appears not to have been the case.

Before and since the invasion of the former Soviet state of Georgia, Russia has demonstrated to the US and to the world that its path towards a democratically oriented nation based on the rule of law, as many hoped would be possible after the end of the Cold War, is a far cry from reality. The situation that the West is faced with today is one that reflects a resurgent Russian expansionism led by a former Soviet KGB operative turned modern-day Russian nationalist. Since 1999 when then President Yeltsin appointed him to be his successor, Vladimir Putin has managed to remain in power as the President, then the Prime Minister, and again as the President.

Since the beginning of Putin's period of national influence, the Russian Federation has conducted a decade of combat operations in Chechnya that killed an estimated 10% of the Chechen population, a majority of them civilians.¹⁰ They have effectively established direct control over the so-called Russian political system by creating and manipulating puppet political parties.¹¹ Putin has instituted a system of repression where dissenters are eliminated, as was the former Federal Security Officer Alexander Litvinenko who died from poisoning while enjoying political asylum in London.¹² Russia invaded Georgia and now occupies the Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It has conducted economic blackmail throughout the region using energy resources as a means to keep others in line and it has invaded Ukraine, annexed Crimea, and to this day is actively destabilizing that nation which now will likely never achieve its goal of becoming a member of NATO. Finally, the Russian military is currently conducting combat operations in Syria in support of a dictator that has slaughtered thousands of his own people in a Civil War that began in 2011. Even after years of growing aggressiveness, blatant

violations of international law, UN charters and other binding agreements, and major increases in military spending, the US and its allies have done little to push back against Putin's actions. Germany and France have made major arms sales to the Russians,¹³ the US has refused to provide Ukraine with the heavy weapons that it has requested,¹⁴ and the UN continues to maintain a voting member of the Security Council that has now shown a pattern of aggressively invading sovereign nations, exactly what that organization was designed to prevent.

This paper will be organized in four sections that will cover 1) Russian post-Cold War history from 1991 to the present, 2) the role that the US and NATO have played throughout that same time period, 3) some plausible speculations regarding the future of Russian expansionism and 4) recommended actions the US and NATO should take at this point. Ultimately, unless the US and NATO make a strong effort to prevent future Russian expansionist actions using all elements of available power, they will be forced to adopt another strategy of containment that will result in new Cold War. The difference between this cold war and the last however, will be the much greater potential for this one to turn hot compared to the Cold War that ended in 1991.

SECTION 1

RUSSIA: 1991 TO THE PRESENT

Soon after Putin took control in 1999, things began to change in the Russian Federation and it was evident that Putin was not content with Russia merely existing as just another member nation of the US-led world community. This belief became obvious when Russian forces invaded the former Soviet Republic of Georgia in 2008. From that point on, Putin, who now managed the country from the position of Prime Minister, began to exert Russian influence in an ever more forceful and open manner. In 2012, Putin re-gained the Presidency and, a year later,

invaded Ukraine and proceeded to annex Crimea. Since 2013, Russia has moved beyond its direct periphery and is now attempting to expand its influence in Syria and the Middle East. The actions taken in Georgia, Ukraine, and now Syria demonstrate Russia's resurgent growth as well as its willingness to expand its influence when unchecked by NATO or the West.

Putin began his work by acquiring power at home. According to Marcel Van Herpen, the new economic well being among many Russians that longed for the glory days only needed the help of some strong nationalist propaganda pushed by the political elites to create the perfect storm.¹⁵ Putin filled this requirement and fully seized upon this sentiment. Among many other initiatives, Putin had Tsar Nicholas II, a brutal autocrat to say the least, canonized as a saint in the Russian Orthodox Church in 2000, a very symbolic action. Putin closed the KGB archives that had only recently been opened for public scrutiny and began to reinstitute the old "pomp and glory" of the Soviet era, using his own newfound wealth and prestige to promote his message. He did all of this to foster nationalism that would keep the people's minds off the fact that in Russia "there exists no independent judiciary...democratic freedoms have become a farce, political parties are created by the Kremlin, elections are stolen, the police are not considered as a security force but as a threat by the population, and journalists and human rights activists are regularly murdered."¹⁶

Russia's actions in Chechnya from 1999 to 2009 demonstrate how nationalism was used in order to allow for a brutal repression of the breakaway Russian province in the Caucasus. Van Herpen lays out some very substantial facts indicating that Russian intelligence services were responsible for the apartment bombings that took place within Russia in 1999, which the government then blamed on Chechen "terrorist" actions and used as justification to begin combat operations.¹⁷ The conduct of Russian operations in Chechnya is chilling and in no way reflects

the actions of a nation that respects human rights, international law, or the rules of war. Civilians were blatantly slaughtered throughout the conflict through the use of aerial bombardments with unguided weapons, firebombs, and intentional targeting of civilian areas. Contract soldiers were also hired to carry out torture, looting, and summary executions. While Russian conduct in the Chechnya War was not necessarily expansionist per se, it did help to lay the groundwork for future ventures as well as shore up the control of and support from the population through nationalist and xenophobic feelings.

In addition to the war in Chechnya, Russia began to exert aggressive influence over former Soviet states that it now wished to return to its sphere of influence. In a telling act that would foreshadow future tactics, Russia passed a new law in 2002 that defined how new subjects, to include countries that did not share Russian borders, would be brought into the Russian Federation.¹⁸ The union state of Belarus and Russia that had been initiated in 1996 was taken to a new level in 2003 when Putin proposed a full merger of the two nations, an apparent attempt at annexation that was turned down by Belarus.¹⁹ Economic pressures were applied in the form of both the availability of cheap, subsidized energy, and through the creation of economic partnerships. The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) was created in 1996 and included Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Between 2000 and 2006 Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan joined bringing the total members to six nations with Russia in the lead. In 2010, the original three members upgraded to a Customs Union that created a single economic market.²⁰ It was this Customs Union that Russia wanted to use to lure countries like Ukraine into its net. An additional agreement known as the Common Economic Space came into being in 2012, and is yet another example of Russian attempts to grow political influence through the use of economic means.

Putin has spearheaded other attempts at reasserting Russian influence such as the establishment of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which he created in 2002.²¹ This group, which now has seven member nations and has been referred to as a “mini Warsaw Pact,” was created from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which came into being soon after the fall of the Soviet Union. It is notable that the word “independent” has been removed from the title.

In 2008, the Russian invasion of Georgia signaled a shift from relatively passive Russian attempts to expand power and influence, to outright aggression and force. The creative and extremely well planned manner in which this operation was conducted was, however, portrayed to the West as spontaneous, un-planned, and defensive, something that is far from the truth. While the conflict itself dates back to the 1991 South Ossetian declaration of independence from Georgia and follow-on ceasefires and peacekeeping operations, the change in strategy to one of force can arguably be traced to the year 2000, when Putin assumed the presidency.²² Over the following eight years, Russia began shaping the battlefield so to speak, by drastically increasing the number of Russian security personnel in the region, distributing Russian passports to thousands of South Ossetians, and developing military plans for invasion.²³

It is important to note that the timing of the Georgian invasion coincided with the commencement of the Olympic games in China. While the festivities in Beijing were delighting the rest of the world, Russian forces were conducting an invasion of a sovereign nation’s territory and nobody seemed to be the wiser. After the Russian invasion took place and Georgian forces were overwhelmingly defeated, Russia was able to declare South Ossetia and Abkhazia as formal Russian Protectorates, where thousands of Russian forces remain to this day.²⁴ Georgian hopes of NATO membership had effectively been crushed, their military had

suffered a humiliating defeat, and Russia had formally taken large chunks of Georgian sovereign territory as its own.

While reactions to Russia's demonstration of forceful expansion will be discussed in Section 2 of this paper, the deciphered "Putin Doctrine," as outlined by Lilia Shevtsova, could now be articulated with ample evidence of its existence. She states that Putin sees Russia as "a special 'state civilization' based on a return to 'traditional values' and 'sealed' by traditional religions...(with) a return to an archaic, militant, fundamentalist autocracy clearly poised against the world's liberal democracies." She also declares Putin's establishment of the Eurasian Union in 2011 as a key economic and security-based measure to give the Kremlin "its own galaxy by unifying post-Soviet space." She continues that the Putin Doctrine "lies not only in rejecting the West but also in containing it – in the sense both of thwarting liberal-democratic norms within Russia and of thwarting Western political interests in the wider world." This is an ironic reversal of roles from the Cold War. The final part of the doctrine involves "defending" Russian-speaking minorities in other countries as demonstrated in Georgia.²⁵

In 2014 Russia once again evoked their self-proclaimed doctrinal responsibility to protect ethnic Russians living outside of their borders, this time in Ukraine. With some basic investigation however, it can be determined that this justification is invalid for a few reasons: 1) Ukraine is geopolitically important to Russia and they want it back, 2) Russians see the Ukraine as a key part of their culture, history, and existence, and 3) Russia has repeatedly ignored real discrimination against ethnic Russians in countries such as Turkmenistan.²⁶ Russia used energy-related blackmail in 2006, 2008, and 2009 to attempt to keep Ukraine in line and inside Russia's sphere of influence.²⁷ Putin himself even stated that failure to join the Eurasian Union would result in "de-industrialization" of portions of Ukraine's economy, a very obvious threat.²⁸

In 2013 Russia offered Ukraine a \$15 billion loan and massive discounts on Russian natural gas in exchange for withdrawal from economic negotiations with the European Union. When Ukrainian President Yanukovich agreed to the deal and withdrew from the EU relationship that was nearly official, massive protests led to his fleeing to Russia. As violent clashes continued throughout Eastern and Southern Ukraine, the ethnic Russians in Crimea, likely with Russian aid, declared a referendum demanding national autonomy while seeking assistance from Russia.²⁹ Putin immediately mounted an obviously well planned operation that rapidly moved forces into Crimea, occupied key terrain, and established control of the region. The entire operation took roughly three weeks and demonstrated many of the lessons learned from the Georgian invasion in 2008. This time only about 10,000 Russian troops were used and they were augmented with special police personnel that appeared in Crimea with no rank or military insignia of any kind on their uniforms. Local militias were also a key part of the takeover and their training and coordination was very evident, based on the speed and efficiency with which they carried out their efforts. Ukrainian television channels were shut down, Ukrainian journalists were abducted, a blockade of the border and a shutdown of the airport took place, public harassment and intimidation was rampant, and a massive propaganda campaign fed the local population whatever the Kremlin wished them to hear.³⁰

One can see a trend in Russian behavior when assessing their actions and tactics from the late nineties until today. Vladimir Putin seems to be the common thread that ties things together, and his willingness to take aggressive action in the face of NATO and the world speaks to his cunning and nerve. Russian long-term planning is evident as well by the well thought out invasions of both Georgia and Ukraine, both of which violated multiple treaties and international

laws. Putin's actions in Syria today likely have the same, well-planned intentions that may or may not be easy for the US or NATO to decipher until it is too late.

SECTION 2

THE US AND NATO'S ROLE SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The obvious question for the US and NATO over the past decade has been "what is Russia up to?" Have their actions in Georgia and Ukraine been merely the defense of ethnic Russians as they claim, or are their objectives far greater? It can be argued that after at least ten years of overt signals to the West, the answer is the latter.

According to Graeme Herd and John Kriendler, NATO's enlargement over the years has had very little to do with military considerations and has been almost entirely based on politics.³¹ This is evident in the *London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance* that was published in 1990, even before the Soviet Union fell. In this statement, NATO informs the world of its intention to begin to concentrate on the political aspects of the alliance defined in article 2 of the NATO Charter.³² It appears that they have done just that over the past 25 years and, in the process, largely forgotten about the primary purpose of the organization: defense. Today, NATO has grown from twelve member nations to a cumbersome twenty-eight. The shift towards development of the political side of the organization has gone too far and standards for admission and continued membership have dropped. Military readiness amongst the alliance is at an all time low and the mission has changed dramatically. Worse still, the alliance has failed to demonstrate much willingness to exert strong influence over the past decade by allowing Russia to invade, occupy, and even annex sovereign national territory just outside the borders of the alliance. Arguably, the UN can be said to be the primary organization responsible for an

appropriate response but neither NATO nor the UN took forceful action. If these problems are not corrected firmly and rapidly, another Cold War will likely begin with a much greater potential of turning into a hot war in today's world.

NATO enlargement has been controversial but nonetheless has taken place. While there have definitely been positive results from the inclusion of additional nations in the alliance, the long-term negative effects may now be overshadowing those benefits. Madjid Tavana and Aidan O'Connor discuss the dissenting opinion regarding NATO expansion, which express fears of diluting the security capacity of the alliance as well as adding financial risk to the organization.³³ While these opinions have been the minority, it appears that they may have been closer to reality than what member majorities decided upon. The Article 10 "open-door policy" that NATO has promoted may have outlived its usefulness and potentially even grown to be too "open". Article 10 itself states that member states may invite other European nations to join the alliance as long as they "contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area."³⁴ With so many members, it becomes more difficult to enforce standards particularly regarding the requirement for a minimum of 2% of GDP dedicated to annual defense spending. This is reflected by the fact that France and the UK were the only two European NATO members that met this requirement in 2012.³⁵ Consensus decision-making, something NATO has adhered to since its creation, also becomes far more difficult with more members, particularly if large-scale war becomes a real possibility again.

The overemphasis on the political nature of the alliance in recent years has led to neglect of the defensive aspect of the agreement and seriously risks the strategic legitimacy of the organization as a whole. While this trend can be understood when analyzing the post-Cold War peace that has existed in Europe and the potentially false sense of security that came along with

it, it does not change the fact that politics seems to have far too much to do with NATO decision-making today. An example of this openness can be seen by the failure of Macedonia to obtain membership status in 2012 solely based on a rejection from Greece regarding that country's name.³⁶ If membership decisions were being made on a strategic defense basis, small issues such as the name of a country would not be a valid reason to deny membership. A comment made by President Obama in 2012 to then Russian President Medvedev also demonstrates how new member states have been treated as purely political assets. In this case, a microphone caught Obama discussing with the Russian leader the topic of future changes to missile shield assets in Poland and it turned out to be the first the Poles had heard anything about his intentions.³⁷ Other aspects of NATO politics also detract from the strategic legitimacy of the alliance. The fact that both Georgia and Ukraine were members of the Partnership for Peace initiative shows just how political programs such as this one have become. Granted, only full members receive article 5 benefits of protection, but the lack of significant NATO action after both country's sovereign territories were violated by Russia is very telling.

Even with sufficient signals from Russia regarding its new and aggressive, expansionist tendencies, NATO has failed to improve its military readiness in Europe. Beginning in 2007, when Russia withdrew from the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, it has continued to provide signals as to its intentions: Russia conducted large-scale denial of service attacks on Estonia in the spring of 2007 after it had been a member of NATO already for three years;³⁸ it invaded Georgia in 2008 and continues to occupy Georgian territory; it used oil and gas as economic weapons to manipulate markets and control governments both in the former Soviet sphere as well as in Europe, it conducted a highly sophisticated invasion, occupation, and annexation of the Crimea and continue to provide support to separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine;

and today, it is conducting continuous operations within Syria that are providing yet another opportunity for Russian forces to gain combat experience and hone their skills as their military continues to grow. Even with all of these indicators, leading nations in NATO such as the UK and the Netherlands “cannot independently field corps-sized or even division-sized formations as they did just a few years ago.”³⁹ This blatant disregard for reality demonstrates how ineffective NATO is today when it comes to military readiness. Even the United States has dramatically reduced its conventional force levels in Europe, despite being the backbone of NATO existence and by providing approximately 73% of NATO defense spending.⁴⁰ If these trends continue, Europe and NATO will not be more than a brief consideration for Putin as he continues to fulfill his expansionist goals.

The NATO Summit of 2012 continued the trend of ineffectiveness and naiveté by declaring the alliance’s desire to pursue a “true strategic partnership” with Russia despite the multiple incursions listed above.⁴¹ Granted, Russia had not yet invaded Ukraine by this time but apparently one incursion of foreign sovereign territory was not enough. Even after the second of such incursions had occurred, the NATO summit in 2014 made the extremely weak and non-aggressive pledge that member nations that were not contributing their required share of defense spending or force modernization, would do their best to fix that shortcoming within the next 10 years.⁴² This decade of presumed peace sounds very similar to the estimates made by the British prior to the outbreak of WWII for which they were ill prepared. Regardless, it certainly does not reflect a sense of urgency or of serious concern for the threat that Russia obviously poses.

The current status of NATO today is not that of a strong alliance that can effectively carry out the collective defense required of it should a member nation’s sovereignty be violated. Its post-Cold War transition to peace keeping and expansion has caused it to become far too

political of an organization. Even though it has been effective at modernizing and westernizing many new member nations, it has neglected its defensive requirements and has allowed its force to become hollow through lack of maintenance of standards and admittance of too many members. The lack of an effective NATO response after Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 demonstrate the above-mentioned problems. The additional lack of a rapid and robust rebuilding of military forces in Europe to counter Russian aggression does nothing but give Putin *Carte blanche* to continue on his current course.

SECTION 3

FUTURE RUSSIAN EXPANSION

When assessing the possible future actions of Putin's Russia, one might start by listening to the words of Putin himself from a speech given in 2009: "When we say great, a great country, a great state – certainly size matters.... When there is no size, there is no influence, no meaning."⁴³ This certainly suggests that expansion was still on his mind after taking territory from Georgia in 2008 and was an accurate predictor of what was to come in Ukraine a few years later. Based on these and other recent Russian actions combined with knowledge of their leader's history and mentality, it is reasonable to expect further attempts to "grow" the state and return it to a great power status. Exactly how this will occur is obviously the question of the day that will be analyzed in this section. Current trends are luckily very overt and, with an eye on history as well as indications and warnings of future intentions such as the National Security Strategy, can be translated into at least some general predictions regarding what the future holds.

Rebuilding Russia's great power status seems to be Putin's main objective and can only be done by changing the system that exists today. Russia's foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, was

very clear about this fact when he stated in 2014 that “the world order is being restructured... [and] the West has to accept it.”⁴⁴ Trends suggest that these changes will be attempted through increased Russian influence both in its own region and around the world. The large military buildup that has begun will only continue and the training opportunities that have occurred in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria suggest the development of a highly proficient and dangerous force despite its relatively recent rebuilding. Securing domestic support and control will be a continued requirement in Russia that will only further increase the need to seek more sources of conflict in order to bolster nationalist sentiments at home. Developing a network of allies will also be important for Russia moving forward. This section will analyze trends and suggest which main behaviors are likely to continue in the future. It will also look at possible scenarios and geographic locations in which Putin’s behaviors may manifest themselves in expansionist actions in Europe and around the globe.

Perhaps the most prominent behavior that we can expect to see will be a countering force to any democratic movements that the US and NATO are promoting. Shevtsova argues that “instead of trying to join the Western civilization, Russia is now striving to become its antithesis.”⁴⁵ Ironically, some even refer to Russia’s strategy as one of containment, an obvious mirror image of what the US sought during the Cold War. NATO is the most obvious entity that Russia will strive to contain as stated in Putin’s 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) which declares: “Further expansion of the (NATO) alliance...[is] a threat to national security.”⁴⁶ The same document also discusses US opposition to recent Russian actions and outlines Russian resistance to US efforts in the “political, economic, military, and informational” areas.⁴⁷ This reference to the US use of “DIME” shows a clear understanding of just how American strategy works.

Restoring Russian influence and control in the traditional and cultural sphere of influence is another major theme that Russia will pursue. Russia's NSS very specifically refers to the goal of ensuring security in Russia's "sphere of culture" as well protecting against "external expansion of ideologies and values" that are counter to Russian tradition.⁴⁸ The sphere of culture can be interpreted as former Soviet states as well as many of the adjoining regions that may have adopted Russian ways or Russian peoples. In both Georgia and Ukraine, Russia claimed to be coming to the aid of ethnic Russian speakers that were experiencing oppression and this tactic will likely be used again. Based on Georgian and Ukrainian scenarios, the lengthy preparation time required for Russian intelligence agencies to disperse passports and inject agents into the population and government is something that may provide early indications of coming actions. The downside of course is that these efforts may have already begun in many areas that are considered possible for future expansion. Of note, Estonia and Latvia, both NATO member countries, have even more ethnic Russians living amongst them than Georgia or Ukraine did, coming in at 25% and 27% respectively.⁴⁹

Reacquisition of strategically important territory is another important trend that must be considered. The Crimea, despite already having been a treaty confirmed location for Russia's Black Sea Fleet, is nevertheless now a piece of territory that will guarantee Russian access to the Black Sea and therefore the Mediterranean Sea and the adjoining regions. Russian bases along Syria's Mediterranean coast are also in the process of being secured through Russian assistance in the Syrian Civil War. The Baltic States, in addition to their high percentages of ethnic Russian populations, also exist in another vital area that would guarantee Russia extended access to the Baltic Sea. An invasion of the Baltics would continue a trend of testing NATO's resolve. An invasion of the Baltic states, however, would be a true test of whether or not NATO can or

would live up to its Article 5 requirements. It would behoove Putin to take this action relatively soon in light of the current poor state of military readiness of NATO forces in the region. This fact was recently confirmed by a RAND Corporation war game that showed Russian forces reaching the capitals of each nation within three days of crossing the border.⁵⁰ Russia's current drawdown of its forces in Syria may be an indicator that a reconsolidation of forces is taking place for a future operation.

The decision to move Russian forces into Syria shows that direct access to the Mediterranean, particularly the strategically important area of the Eastern Mediterranean, is another objective that Putin takes very seriously. His cooperation with Iran in support of Syria suggests that not only is the terrain important, but he seeks to regain Russian influence in the Middle East in the wake of US withdrawal from the region. In all likelihood, Russia will settle for Syrian basing rights as sufficient territory in this region and will concentrate on political influence as its main form of expansion. Being able to exert influence in the Middle East will allow additional pressure to be applied in the Caucasus and in turn will give Russia the ability to squeeze Turkey from nearly all directions. The Turkish shoot down of a Russian aircraft in 2015 is likely something that Putin will not forget. His wise decision to avoid a rapid and emotional reaction at the time of the incident speaks to his strategic planning abilities that he has demonstrated in both Georgia and Ukraine in the past. Time and thought will be given to the problem and some form of Russian retaliation will occur in dramatic fashion at some point in the future.

The long-term strategic approach that Putin is taking towards Russian re-expansionism cannot be underemphasized. It can be assumed that multiple plans are in the works for operations in many of the areas mentioned above. These plans will continue to be updated and

revised as Putin waits for opportunities to present themselves in the future. Not only does this give time for refinement and improvement of plans, but it also plays to the short attention span of the United States and the West. The long game provides time for the Russian military to continue to rebuild and refit as it continues to grow. One of the areas in which this military presence is being rebuilt is along Russia's northern border in the Arctic. This will likely be the most long-term expansion that Russia pursues and may be the most successful due to the head start that it already has in this area. While the Arctic is something that requires attention and resources, it is likely not a pressing matter for NATO as far as defense and security is concerned. The only caveat to this statement is that if Russia gains more access to the immense resources in the Arctic than it already currently has and uses it to fund its expansion efforts, this will become of vital importance.

SECTION 4

RECOMMENDATIONS

Going forward, the United States and NATO must rethink their strategy regarding how to handle Putin. Past attempts to "reset" relations and to leave gaps ripe for the insertion of Russian influence have only led to an increase in belligerent behavior due to the portrayed weakness from the US. The West must accept the fact that Putin has fully reversed the path that Russia was on in the nineties. There is very little that can be done at this point to steer Russia back towards the democratic ideals and freedoms that Putin has systematically eliminated. The US should work through NATO to utilize all elements of national power to weaken Russia both politically and economically, and to return Europe to a state of military readiness to deter further Russian expansion.

Diplomatically, the United States must actively engage both NATO member nations as well as the European Union as a whole. Member States must be convinced that the threat from Russia is real and timelines for returning to an adequate state of military readiness must be stepped up at a dramatic rate. Full diplomatic pressure must be applied at a level that reflects the urgency of the situation. Russia's entrance into the conflict in Syria only helps to strengthen this argument and should be emphasized as the link that ties the other main threat of the day, terrorism, to the Russian issue. As stated by NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, US Air Force General Phillip Breedlove, Russia and Syria are "weaponizing" migration in an aggressive strategy to destabilize Europe.⁵¹ Prior to Putin's decision to enter that conflict, NATO or EU members may have been able to claim that terrorism gave them more pressing and realistic matters to concern themselves with; now the issues are essentially tied together as one. If the situation allows for it, an example should be made of a member nation that is not meeting its requirements. A temporary revocation of NATO membership may be enough to spur other countries to begin taking the matter seriously. An action as unprecedented as this may be what it takes to gain the support that the US will need to defend against Russian expansion.

Diplomatic pressure should also be applied to European Union member states regarding their reliance on Russian energy exports. The US should provide incentives for EU states to make the required changes to their economies, but this may not be enough. Pressure should be provided when necessary to help influence this process especially in the face of Russian pressures to maintain the status quo. Having accurate intelligence regarding Russia's diplomatic and coercive efforts will be vital in order to know where and when to apply US efforts to counter Russia.

The use of information to influence situational outcomes is unfortunately an area where the US is trailing Russia significantly. Examples of Russian information manipulation are seen in the wars in Chechnya, where they convinced the world that they were fighting “terrorism,” in Georgia where they convincingly made it appear as if Russia had merely come to the aide of those that were being attacked by Georgian forces, in Ukraine where separatists appeared to desperately be fleeing from Ukrainian oppression, and now in Syria where Putin insists that his forces are there to fight ISIS. Even Putin’s most recent announcement that Russian forces are largely pulling out of Syria may be another “information game” in which they say one thing and do another. The US must learn from Russian tactics and begin to better counter their moves and also to apply some of their techniques. NATO and the US can both take a more offensive stance in this area and begin using information more effectively to shape the world’s view and reflect more accurately how Russia operates.

The United States should consider re-opening the US Information Agency that was so effective during the Cold War. The US and Europe’s failure to re-establish such information organizations as this after Putin re-established state control over Russian media is a failure outlined by Edward Lucas in an article for Politico.com. In it he lays out some of the Russian propaganda that has existed over the past fifteen years particularly through the state television channel known as Russia Today. An example of misinformation can be seen through the dissemination of reports that Ukrainians were crucifying ethnic Russia children. He also makes several suggestions of how to counter these messages such as exposing the corruption of Russian leadership through their European counterparts who take part in the same activity, starting a “myth of the month” series to expose Russian designed falsehoods, and also to use a humor campaign to create Russian-language satire that could be broadcast via the Internet.⁵² Without a

robust and well-funded effort to revitalize US and NATO information capabilities, Russia will continue to dominate in this arena and a vital key to success will remain under-utilized.

Together with the other elements of power, US and NATO military might must be built back up and US efforts in particular must be re-focused on the European theater. According to the RAND Corporation, the US Army currently has no heavy armor stationed in Europe, German tank forces have been decreased from a Cold War level of 2,200 down to around 250, and the only remaining UK forces permanently stationed in Germany are going to be withdrawn in 2019.⁵³ This decrease, combined with the previously mentioned failures to adequately provide NATO mandated military funding from a large number of alliance members, adds up to the rapid Russian victory that a RAND Corporation wargame in 2015 found to be nearly guaranteed.

While the US appears to be making some moves in the direction suggested above, the degree to which action is being taken is almost purely symbolic in nature. For example, a brigade's worth of armor was moved back into Eastern Europe in the summer of 2015 and, according to the Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, has been spread out between Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland.⁵⁴ The RAND wargame results, which were gleaned from nearly a year of work, suggest that seven brigades, three of which must be heavily armored, combined with fires, airpower, and the required enablers, *might* be enough to stop Russia from reaching the Baltic capitals in less than three days.⁵⁵ With these in-depth analyses available, it is quite easy to interpret the level of dedication the US is providing to such efforts and it appears to be minimal.

If the US eventually does re-establish an effective force in Europe to counter Russia, there may be options for their use to help contain any further Russian expansion. By taking a page out of the Russian playbook, a little known Russian territory between Poland and Lithuania

could serve as a tool to force Russia to return Crimea to Ukraine. The Kaliningrad Oblast, as it is known, is the home of three Russian naval infantry battalions and a short-range ballistic missile battalion.⁵⁶ As these forces would likely be used in a Russian incursion into the Baltic States according to the RAND wargame, occupying and controlling this territory and the military units within it would also decrease Russia's ability to carry out response operations. Even if NATO were to legitimately posture and signal that this may be a realistic course of action, the effect may be meaningful. This option is obviously far from a normal course of action that NATO would resort to, but it will take creative "out of the box" thinking like this to outmaneuver a very smart and cunning Russian adversary.

Economically, the sanctions that were placed on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea are an example of an area in which the US has flexed their muscle, albeit in a limited fashion, to counter Russian actions. Despite the decision to keep sanctions relatively limited, they have had a significant affect on the Russian economy that has been magnified by the worldwide drop in oil prices. According to STRATFOR, "Russia is getting to the point where delays in key projects, along with financial constraints on Russian companies and Western firms doing business in Russia, could cause irreparable harm to the economy in the not-too-distant future."⁵⁷ The US should increase its use of economic sanctions in order to strengthen its position and make up for its lack of conventional preparedness in Europe.

The US should also use its economic power, in conjunction with previously mentioned diplomacy, to halt EU nations such as France and Germany from selling arms to Russia. The ongoing Russian military buildup and modernization will only continue at a faster pace if these external sources of arms continue to flow across its borders. EU nations should also be economically influenced to reduce their dependence on Russian exports, particularly in the oil

and gas sector. Russia has been able to essentially hold many European nations hostage due to their dependence on Russian gas and this played a major role in the lack of any major retribution for Russia's incursion into Ukraine. The less leverage Russia has in the future, the more effective a response can be to future aggression.

The US response to Russian aggression in recent years has largely relied on the "E" in DIME and has not shown a robust use of the rest of the elements of national power. In order to be truly effective against Putin's Russia and prevent further expansionism, all of the tools must be put to use in a coordinated and more assertive fashion. The US must use diplomacy to get its NATO partners and EU nations to pull their weight in the area of defense and economic reliance on Russian energy. NATO and the US must take measures to catch up to a highly successful Russian information apparatus that has shown itself to be dominant. A major military build-up must take place again in Europe to provide force deterrence against Russian aggression. And the somewhat successful use of economic strength must be continued and further strengthened. The US can be successful in containing Russia by using the combined weight of all elements of national power.

CONCLUSION

The seemingly natural expansionist tendencies of the Russian state throughout history are widely documented and are a recurring phenomenon. As an example, some estimates suggest that Russia conquered territory the size of the Netherlands every year for 150 years running in the 16th and 17th centuries.⁵⁸ Based on Russia's actions over the past 8 years, it appears that the trend will continue in this next chapter of Russian history.

US leaders heeded the words of George Kennan after WWII when he said:

It would be useful to the western world to realize that despite all the vicissitudes by which Russia has been afflicted since 1939, the men in the Kremlin have never abandoned their faith in that program of territorial and political expansion, which had once commanded itself so strongly to tsarist diplomatists.⁵⁹

Unfortunately, modern leaders ignored the advice from the same man many decades later when he advised against NATO's further expansion beyond its Cold War borders. Kennan's statement in 1997 in the New York Times that NATO expansion would be "the most fateful error of American foreign policy in the entire post-Cold War era,"⁶⁰ appears to have been extremely accurate. His recommendation was based on several predictions that also appear to have come true today:

Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse affect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the Cold War to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.⁶¹

Had the wise words of Kennan been heeded then, Russia might have continued along its path of democratization and left its empire building tendencies in the past. By not doing so, NATO potentially revived all of the traditional validations for Russian expansion that have been so common throughout their history. Vladimir Putin's rise to power during the same period revived Russian leadership with exactly those nationalistic and militaristic tendencies to which Kennan referred.

The response from NATO and the US to the Russian violation of the sovereignties of both Georgia and Ukraine has been weak and relatively meaningless. This weakness has only given Putin more determination to continue on his path of defiance with more and more assuredness that there will be no repercussions for his actions. His next move is anyone's guess, but one can bet that detailed contingency plans have been developed for many possible openings for future Russian expansion. The Baltic States appear to be a prime target with very little teeth

behind NATO Article 5 protections that are supposed to protect the relatively new members to the alliance. Russia's actions in Syria continue to play out today, as do their tensions with Turkey, another NATO member state. Future expansion into the rest of Ukraine may also be in the works but only time will tell.

The NATO and US must be prepared for Putin to continue on his course. All elements of national power must be used, strengthened, and coordinated in order to have a realistic expectation of stopping further expansion, the possible collapse of NATO, and the commencement of another Cold War.

¹ US Department of Defense, *Expeditionary Force 21 Capstone Concept* (Washington DC, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, March 2014) __.

² Roy Allison, "Russia Resurgent? Moscow's Campaign to 'Coerce Georgia to Peace,'" *International Affairs* 84 no. 6, 1149.

³ Allison, "Russia Resurgent", 1157.

⁴ Marcel H. Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism,* (London, Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 220.

⁵ Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars*, 215.

⁶ Allison, "Russia Resurgent", 1150.

⁷ Allison, "Russia Resurgent", 1158.

⁸ Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars*, 229.

⁹ Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars*, 229.

¹⁰ Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars*, 199.

¹¹ Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars*, 93.

¹² Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars*, 181.

¹³ Luca Ratti, "Back to the Future? International Relations Theory and NATO-Russia Relations Since the end of the Cold War," *International Journal* (Spring 2009): 418.

¹⁴ Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars*, 275.

¹⁵ Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars*, 51.

¹⁶ Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars*, 53.

¹⁷ Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars*, 171.

¹⁸ Allison, "Russia Resurgent", 1160.

¹⁹ Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars*, 63.

-
- ²⁰ Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars*, 66.
- ²¹ Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars*, 68.
- ²² Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars*, 207.
- ²³ Allison, "Russia Resurgent", 1147.
- ²⁴ Allison, "Russia Resurgent", 1162.
- ²⁵ Lilia Shevtsova, "The Maidan and Beyond: The Russia Factor," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (July 2014): 75.
- ²⁶ Shevtsova, "The Russia Factor", 77.
- ²⁷ Shevtsova, "The Russia Factor", 75.
- ²⁸ Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars*, 242.
- ²⁹ Anton Bebler, "The Russia Ukraine Conflict Over Crimea," *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, Vol. 15, no. 1, (March 2015): 204.
- ³⁰ " pg. 205
- ³¹ Herd and Kriendler, *21st Century NATO*, 56.
- ³² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accessed December 2015, www.NATO.int.
- ³³ Madjid Tavarna and Aidan O'Connor, "An Integrated Strategic Benchmarking Model for Assessing International Alliances with Application to NATO Membership Enlargement," (2010): 792.
- ³⁴ The North Atlantic Treaty – Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, www.NATO.int.
- ³⁵ *Putin's Wars*, pg. 245
- ³⁶ Herd and Kriendler, *21st Century NATO*, 55.
- ³⁷ *Putin's Wars*, pg. 253
- ³⁸ *Putin's Wars*, pg. 219
- ³⁹ John R. Deni, "NATO's Rebirth: NATO's New Trajectory After the Whales Summit," *Parameters* 44(3), (Autumn 2014): 62.
- ⁴⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization – Indirect Funding of NATO Section, accessed December 2015, www.NATO.int.
- ⁴¹ Herd and Kriendler, *21st Century NATO*, 85.
- ⁴² Deni, "NATO's Rebirth," 63.
- ⁴³ Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars*, 81.
- ⁴⁴ Shevtsova, "The Russia Factor", 79.
- ⁴⁵ Shevtsova, "The Russia Factor", 75.
- ⁴⁶ The Kremlin, *The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation*, (Moscow, December 2015): Point 15.
- ⁴⁷ The Kremlin, *Russian National Security Strategy*, Point 12.
- ⁴⁸ The Kremlin, *Russian National Security Strategy*, Point 82.
- ⁴⁹ Stratfor: 20 Years of Global Intelligence. Analysis Section. <https://www-stratfor-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/analysis>.
- ⁵⁰ David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, *Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics*, RAND Corporation, 2016, 3.
- ⁵¹ "Migrant Crisis: Russia and Syria 'Weaponizing' Migration," BBC, March 2 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35706238>.

⁵² “Russia’s Information Warfare,” Edward Lucas, POLITICO, Nov 6 2014, www.politico.eu/article/russias-information-warfare/.

⁵³ “Reinforcing NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics,” David Shlapak and Michael Johnson, RAND Corporation, 2016, 8.

⁵⁴ “US Sending Tanks and Armor to Europe,” Brad Lendon, CNN, June 23, 2015, www.cnn.com/2015/06/23/politics/us-armor-tanks-europe-russia-ash-carter/.

⁵⁵ Shlapak and Johnson, *Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics*, 1.

⁵⁶ Shlapak and Johnson, *Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics*, 5.

⁵⁷ “Russia Begins to Buckle Under Sanctions Pressure,” STRATFOR Geopolitical Diary, September 16, 2015, <https://www-stratfor-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/geopolitical-diary/russia-begins-buckle-under-sanctions-pressure>.

⁵⁸ Van Herpen, *Putin’s Wars*, 16.

⁵⁹ Van Herpen, *Putin’s Wars*, 281.

⁶⁰ Graeme P. Herd and John Kriendler, *Understanding NATO in the 21st Century: Alliance Strategies, Security and Global Governance* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 89.

⁶¹ Herd and Kriendler, *21st Century NATO*, 89.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Allison, Roy. "Russia resurgent? Moscow's Campaign to 'Coerce Georgia to peace'." *International Affairs* 84 (6) (2008): 1145-71, <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=34828461&site=ehost-live>.
2. Deni, John R. "NATO's new trajectories after the wales summit." *Parameters* 44 (3) (Autumn 2014): 57-65, <http://search.proquest.com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/1628380470?accountid=14746>.
3. Herd, Graeme P. and Kriendler, John. *Understanding NATO in the 21st Century: Alliance Strategies, Security and Global Governance*. Rutledge, New York. 2013.
4. Shlapak, David A. and Michael Johnson. *Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html.
5. Van Herpen, Marcel H. *Putin's wars: The rise of Russia's new imperialism*. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015.
6. US Department of Defense. *Expeditionary Force 21 Capstone Concept*. Washington DC, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, March 2014.
7. Shevtsova, Lilia. The Maidan and Beyond: The Russia Factor. *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 25, no. 3, (July 2014): 74-82.
8. Bebler, Anton. "The Russia Ukraine Conflict Over Crimea." *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* Vol. 15, no. 1, (March 2015): 196-219.
9. Tavana, Madjid and O'Connor, Aidan. "An Integrated Strategic Benchmarking Model for Assessing International Alliances with Application to NATO Membership Enlargement." *Benchmarking: An International Journal* Vol. 17, no. 6, (2010): 791-806.
10. Deni, John R. "NATO's Rebirth: NATO's New Trajectories After the Whales Summit." *Parameters* 44(3), (Autumn 2014): 57-65.
11. The Kremlin. *The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation*. Moscow, 31 December 2015.
12. Ratti, Luca. "Back to the Future? International Relations Theory and NATO-Russia Relations Since the end of the Cold War." *International Journal* (Spring 2009): 399-422.