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
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
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Executive Summary

Title: The United States Army's Need for a Permanent Stability Division

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Thesis: For the US Army to be proficient in stability operations, it must develop a stability division that incorporates whole of government capabilities, to meet the unique demands during phase 4 operations.

Discussion: Stability operations have occurred throughout every major combat operation since the end of the Cold War. During Vietnam the United States military stood up Civilian Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) in order to advance the Vietnamese security elements. During the war in Afghanistan the US military, along with NATO, created NATO Training Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A) to establish local security in the villages that were plagued by the Taliban. In Iraq the US military established Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) to create an Iraqi military and security force, which was capable of maintain local security for the Iraqi government. In the wake of these major combat operations the Army has adapted incrementally to embracing stability operations by incorporating stability as a core principle in Unified Land Operations.

The United States Army demands that all organizations be proficient in Unified Land Operations, which consist of offense, defense, stability, and defense support to civil authority operations. The task for stability operations are significantly different than that of offensive and defensive operations. Establishing civil control, civil security, and essential services are just a few tasks for stability operations, which are drastically different than the task of offense and defense. It is not sound for the US Army to expect a standard brigade combat team to be proficient in stability tasks, as they are not task organized or manned to meet this challenge.

Conclusion: With the new construct of Unified Land Operations, it is imperative the US Army adapt its force to meet the growing challenges of stability operations by creating a stability division. The US Army must approve the creation of a stability division that is organized to meet the specific task outlined for stability operations in Unified Land Operations. The stability division will also provide an enhanced capability that meets the COCOMs requirements during phase 0. The Army's human resource management must adjust DA PAM 600-3 to reflect the new requirements and conduct a centralized board to select individuals for the stability division. The Army must also educate the force on the task and purpose of the stability division, so leaders will know how to employ the stability division appropriately. The growing complexity of warfare requires the Army to adapt its structure in order to meet the challenges of stability operations.

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THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Preface

The intent of this paper is to highlight the challenges the US Army has met while conducting stability operations and how the US Army needs to institutionalize stability operations in order to prevent similar outcomes, such as Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The individuals who served as advisors inspired this paper to be written, as they were the ones who overcame the US Army's inability to adapt. These individuals took, arguably, the most complex task, advising, and adapted to the challenges. The US Army continues to organize itself around standard infantry doctrine, even though the Army has spent more time conducting stability operations throughout the world. It is the intent of this paper to articulate a proposed stability structure that is organized to meet the daunting tasks of stability operations.

Leaders, such as General Ray Odierno, General Stanley McCrystal and General David Petraeus, have also inspired me to create this paper. These individuals had the foresight and appreciation for the complexity of stability operations. It was these very leaders who developed the foundation for NTM-A and MNSTC-I, which provided the solution to stability operations in the Afghanistan and Iraq. These leaders and their ability to adapt to the contemporary has inspired the proposed stability division in this paper. These leaders have provided the US Army with a template in which to address the complexities of stability operations.

I would also like to thank my wife, Amber, my son, Gavin, and my daughter, Katherine, for allowing me the flexibility and support, which has provided me the ability to write this paper. If it were not for my loving family, I would not have been able to accomplish so much in the Army. They are a great sounding board and an inspirational support team, to whom I owe great deal. They are a true representation of the Army family team that drives me every day.

Introduction

The United States Army requires all units to be proficient in Unified Land Operations, which consist of offense, defense, stability, and defense to civil authority operations. The US Army must be able to conduct offensive and defensive operations in the land domain but it must also perform stability operations. These tasks are not the same across functions and requires the Army to reexamine its structure to accomplish the mission of stability operations. For the US Army to be proficient in stability operations, it must develop a stability division that incorporates whole of government capabilities, to meet the unique demands during phase 4 operations. The stability division will also provide an enhanced capability to the COCOMs during phase 0 operations.

Stability operations is not a new concept for the US Army. During Vietnam the US Army stood up advisory corps and employed Special Forces to train local security forces.¹ During the 1980s and 1990s, US special operations forces were training military forces in Central America to combat communist guerillas and drug cartels.² These historical examples focused primarily at the local level for security operations and failed to address many ministerial and operational issues that come with stability operations. This paper will not address the complex issues that surrounded each of these events; however, it will consider the past in order to develop a long term strategy for the Army, which goes beyond the tactical level of stability operations.

The concept of an organization that conducts stability operations is not new either. Several experts, most notably Scott Wuestner and John Nagl, have proposed the idea of an advisory corps or units that are task organized to meet the challenges of stability operations. Wuestner proposed the concept of a Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) and Nagl

presented the idea of an advisory corps.³ Both are similar in nature to the stability division presented in this paper, however these concepts fail to address or merely gloss over the following: the exact makeup of the organization, the use of non-doctrinal terms, human resource management, and overcoming the parochial mindset of senior leaders. Also, when Weustner and Nagl created their concepts, Unified Land Operations did not exist. One of the primary issues during their time was the failure to incorporate stability operations into the core competencies of the US Army. This was overcome by the introduction of Unified Land Operations, which now considers stability operations of equal importance to offense and defense.⁴ This paper takes the concepts proposed by both Wuestner and Nagl, and advances them further into an operational concept that could be implemented by the US Army.

First, the paper will look at some historical examples of stability operations. Second, the paper will evaluate the change in Army doctrine to Unified Land Operations and its impact to the force. Third, the paper will provide recommendations utilizing the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis of stability operations, specifically focusing on Organization, Training, Leadership, and Personnel. Fourth, the paper will discuss other stability forces and considerations.

US Army's Brief History of Stability Operations

Traditionally, stability operations were a special operation force's mission, while GPF focused on conventional warfare. This mentality by the US Army was shaped by historical drivers such as WWII and the Cold War. The US Army determined that warfare must address the threat of massive armies, such as Germany's during WWII or the Soviet Union's during the Cold War. So the US Army adopted the principles of concentrated mass, mobility, and advances in technology.⁵ Yet, stability operations occurred during these same periods of time. It is

estimated that the US Army has been involved in hundreds of stability type operations, primarily executed by Special Forces, and less than 12 major combat operations since its inception in the 1700s.⁶ History caused the US Army to view future warfare in the context of either large conventional warfare or stability operations, but the two are not separated from each other.

Prior to and during WWII the US Army was focused on defeating the German forces and not on the reconstruction of Germany post war. The idea of rebuilding a nation was not the mission of the US Army prior to the war, nor did the US Army want to be involved in nation building, so the Army tailored its force to winning wars. Once the Allies defeated Nazi Germany, they had an obligation to assist the German government in stabilizing its country. The US Army spent several years post-WWII conducting stability operations in Germany, even though it was not the primary mission of the service.

During the Cold War the US Army was involved in numerous stability operations from Central America to Vietnam. The United States operations in Central America were left primarily to Special Forces, while the operations in the Vietnam began with special operations but shifted to conventional forces as the conflict intensified. William Meara highlights the work that special operations conducted in Central America. They were essential in providing stability to the region during the height of the Cold War.⁷ Even with this knowledge the US Army continued to treat stability operations as a secondary mission not worthy of significant training or resources applied to the conventional Army.

It was not until the Afghanistan and Iraq wars that the division between stability and offensive/defensive operations came to a head. US Army leadership performed extremely well during the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq; however these individuals failed to adapt quickly to stability operations once they occupied the countries. While the failures post-invasion go beyond

the scope of this paper, it is important to know that the US Army failed to embrace stability operations post-invasion.

In 2011 the Rand Corporation conducted a study on security force assistance operations in Afghanistan and concluded security force assistance was not a primary function in Afghanistan until 2009, seven years since the beginning of the war.⁸ This was not due to funding, but more to a lack of emphasis on stability for the country by the politicians and commanders immediately after occupying the country. The study determined that in order to conduct stability operations leaders must be able to perform duties in security, political, economic, and social sectors, which meant the Army needed a different type of organization than it traditionally used.

The theater command at the time created the NATO Training Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A) in order to develop an Afghan security force that maintain security in the country.⁹ This unique organization was not doctrinal, which meant it lacked personnel, resources, and doctrine; however it was able to overcome these hurdles and created a structure to meet the new requirements of stability operations. NTM-A is the prime example of a stability force structure that created the necessary conditions to transition; however its lack of institutionalization means NTM-A will not remain beyond Afghanistan.

After years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Army changed its mindset from one in which stability operations was a secondary mission, to one where the entire US Army would embrace stability operations as a core function. The outcome from in-depth analysis was Unified Land Operations for the US Army.¹⁰

Unified Land Operations

Under Unified Land Operations, the US Army conducts offense, defense, stability and defense to civil authority operations. The Army demands that all units be proficient in Unified Land Operations; however our most recent wars have demonstrated the necessity to divide the force in order to meet the demands of offense/defense and stability operations. Looking toward future conflicts, our nation is asking the United States Army to expand its role into stability operations during phase 0 and phase 4, while also improving its offense and defense capabilities. The Army must evaluate its current force structure in order to determine if it is capable of accomplishing Unified Land Operations through the range of military operations.

Published in 2012, Unified Land Operations was an adaptation of the US Army's Full Spectrum Operations, which was the first time stability operations was introduced as a doctrinal mission.¹¹ Full Spectrum Operations came about after the collapse of the Soviet Union during the late 1990s, which influenced how the US Army was going to structure itself for the future fight. The Army envisioned a modular force that was focused on offensive and defensive operations with the capability of executing the range of military operations. The Army believed that as long as an organization had the capability to defeat a near-peer adversary and the ability to adapt to the environment, then the same force could execute stability operations.¹²

Under Unified Land Operations, offensive operations are meant to defeat or destroy enemy forces through four key tasks: movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit.¹³ Defensive operations are designed to create conditions to regain the initiative with a focus on three main tasks; area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde.¹⁴ Both the offense and defense tasks are centered around maneuver units, the Brigade Combat Team (BCT), which uses military force in order to exert their will on the opponent. These tasks require formations of tanks,

infantry soldiers, and artillery to achieve the desired outcome of defeating or destroying enemy forces; however when considering stability operations these same capabilities might not apply.

Stability operations are not focused on defeating or defending against an adversary, but are designed to create a safe environment that promotes the development of host nation governance.¹⁵ The key tasks of stability operations consist of establishing civil security, establishing civil control, restoring essential services, supporting governance, and supporting economic and infrastructure development. These tasks are different than a standard conventional Army fight, which highlights the need for the Army to adapt in order to meet the change in requirements.

Current Army Structure

This attitude toward major combat operations was reflected in the new BCT concept that came about in the early 2000s. The newly constructed BCTs focused much of their limited training time on offense and defensive operations even though stability operations was a part of Full Spectrum and Unified Land Operations. In order to accomplish this the US Army structured itself into three types of BCTs, Infantry, Stryker, and Armor, that conduct combined arms maneuver through decisive action to support Unified Land Operations.¹⁶

It is clear that the primary responsibilities of the BCTs are the conduct of offensive and defensive operations. The Infantry BCT's (IBCT) responsibility is to destroy or capture enemy forces in complex terrain, such as urban areas or dense jungles.¹⁷ A Stryker BCT (SBCT) is a medium size mounted force responsible for destroying or capturing enemy forces in most terrain.¹⁸ The Armor BCT's (ABCT) primary role is to conduct overwhelming offensive

operations against an enemy force to defeat them.¹⁹ None of these forces have a primary mission that incorporates stability operations. They are focused on offensive and defensive operations.

It is not until chapter 8 of FM 3-96 that the US Army describes how the BCT must be prepared to transition to stability operations, which goes on to recognize the BCT's lack of organic capabilities to execute all aspects of stability operations.²⁰ The following excerpt from FM 3-96 summarizes the US Army's stance on BCT support to stability operations. "The BCT lacks the organic capability to stabilize an assigned area of operation independently. The BCT's central role in operations focused on stability is to establish and maintain unity of effort towards achieving the political objectives of the operation."²¹ This statement highlights the Army's recognition of the lack of necessary enablers, such as military trainers and advisors, the BCT organically has in its structure. The standard BCT does not require Soldiers to advise senior foreign officers, nor does it require the average infantry Soldier to serve as a police advisor, yet the US Army is doing this more and more.

DOTMLPF Analysis of Stability Operations

The Department of Defense (DOD) utilizes the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) process when evaluating changes to the military services. The process allows the DOD to examine the proposed change by breaking it down into foundational categories. This paper will use the DOTMLPF process in order to evaluate the Army's structure for stability operations.

The first category, Doctrine, is the process of reviewing current doctrine to determine if alterations are required for the proposed change. Organization, is the process of considering the necessary changes to organizations in order to achieve the proposed change. During the review

of training, updates are made to the training process to reflect the new change to the service. Materials, is the process of looking at the necessary pieces of equipment to accomplish the proposed change. If the current inventory lacks the material then a process for purchasing or developing the materials begins. Leadership, is the process of considering the necessary changes to Professional Military Education (PME) in order to educate the force on the proposed change. Personnel, is the process of providing recommended changes to personnel and personnel management systems in order to meet the demands of the proposed change. Facilities, is the process of considering the current facilities and determines the changes required to meet the proposed changes. This could involve the reallocation of current facilities or the construction of new facilities.²²

There is no need to review all of the elements of DOTMLPF for stability operations because the US Army has already addressed Doctrine, Materials, and Facilities for stability operations. The US Army recently drafted new doctrine, FM 3-07 Stability, which provides the foundation for an organization to execute stability operations.²³ Under material and facilities, the stability division would not require additional material or facilities not already in the US Army inventory. The paper will utilize the remaining elements, Organization, Training, Leadership, and Personnel, of DOTMLPF to analyze the Army's ability to execute stability operations.

DOTMLPF-Organization

The stability division will execute a more complex mission and require a different organization than a standard infantry division. The stability division will not be organized around traditional functions such as cavalry, armor, or infantry, but training academies and security advisor teams. By institutionalizing the stability division Army will prevent a lag in creating the capability during the most critical part of combat, transitioning to stability

operations. Also, the institutionalization of a stability division will mitigate the initial storming phase that occurs during the creation of an organization, which will allow the US Army to more efficiently transition to stability operations.

The stability division must be centered on the core functions of stability operations: Defense Institution Building (DIB), rule of law, judicial process, intelligence, security force training (basic/NCO/officer training courses), advisory teams that partner after initial training, logistics, and maintenance. See figure 1 for a proposed stability division structure. The organization will have an internal capability to conduct standard staff and logistic functions, as well as the partnering capabilities. The stability division must also have the ability to adapt its size and structure, as well as be Joint Task Force capable. It may operate day to day as an Army division but increase to a corps size element with numerous services and agencies a part of the team stability operations. Also, the stability division will require an internal capability to mission command a corps size Joint Task Force element.

Proposed Stability Division Structure




Figure 1: Proposed Stability Division

The organization of the stability division is designed to cover all aspects of developing a force, from initial entry to senior mentors. The stability division would have four core brigades and one support brigade in order to meet the task requirements for stability operations. The core brigades are training academies, DIB/judicial, military/security advisors, and logistics. The stability division also has an internal support capability, represented by a standard division support brigade. These brigades, along with the division staff, serve as the foundation for stability operation during phase 4.

Stability Division Headquarters

The stability division headquarters will serve two purposes. First the headquarters will conduct senior mentorship with partner nations and second the headquarters will execute the functions of a standard division. This exact situation occurred in both Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, where division commanders and staff had to command and control a division, while mentoring senior leaders of the host nation. The staffs in these situations grew tremendously in order to accomplish this task. Examples of this growth can be found in the creation of the Civilian Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) during the Vietnam war, and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) during the Iraq war.²⁴

One area within the stability division headquarters that will require growth and focus is the plans section. The plans section will have to be organized by geographical regions in order to develop plans that specifically address the uniqueness of each command. The plans section will have to be intimately involved in the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) and Combatant Command (COCOM) contingency plans in order to streamline the deployment of the

stability division. This will allow the stability division staff the ability to understand the unique peculiarities of each command prior to deploying in support of major combat operations.

The stability division headquarters must also have the ability to conduct joint operations, which means it requires the communications architecture, and staffing process that incorporate joint enablers. The headquarters will require a significant communications section that can grow in size to accommodate up to a corps size headquarters. This is similar to the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). The MEB, along with many other elements in the Marine Corps, has the capability to composite into a Marine Expeditionary Force when required.²⁵ The stability division may start out as a division forward comprised of a small command element and grow into a corps size command. The mission will dictate what size stability command will deploy during major combat operations. The headquarters will also have staff processes to incorporate joint and interagency enablers. These enablers will most likely not have a permanent billet in the division due to limited personnel in the interagency, which makes it even more critical that the division headquarters constantly plans for these additions during deployment.

Training Academies Brigade

The next major element of the stability division is the training academies brigade (TA BDE). The TA BDE has the task of establishing host nation training academies in order to provide basic institutional standards to the initial entry host nation security force personnel. The TA BDE will have the requirement to establish the following academies; military, security, logistics and maintenance, DIB and judicial, and medical. These academies provide an essential foundation to the host nation, which is crucial to the establishment or advancement of stability operations. Although DOD may not have the overarching responsibility to develop some of these aspects, it is necessary and as history has shown the US military takes on these task during

major combat operations. It is important to understand that these academies will not necessarily train host nations on US doctrine or values, but they will have to sometimes embrace the doctrine and values of the host nation and incorporate this into the training plan.

The first two academies, military and security, may seem similar but are far different in task and purpose. The military academy will have the requirement of training initial entry, officers and NCO on the core values and military doctrine of the host nation. The security academy will focus its training on initial entry and senior leaders for security, or police, operations. The security academy will combine factors from the host nation's core values, host nation laws, and international law. It is critical for both the military and security academies to have set rules of engagement prior to executing training in order to prevent a misunderstanding in cultural values and international law. The stability division can mitigate these issues through effective planning prior to deployment.

The academies will model themselves, in structure only, after the US structures, such as police academies, basic entry training, and Officer Candidate School. The military academy will focus on developing a force to defend the host nation, while the security academy is designed to develop a force that protects the citizens of the host nation. The security academy must factor in a significant interagency aspect, such as the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).²⁶ The ICITAP is just one of many agencies who will provide subject matter experts to train host nation security forces, so the security academy must have a plan to incorporate these additional personnel. The DIB/judicial academy will establish a quasi law school and defense school, which focuses on understanding host nation procedures and laws. The logistics and maintenance academy will create a program that trains individuals on technical trade craft. These individuals will have an understanding of the host nation procurement process,

as well as technical expertise in equipment. The medical academy is designed to create level one medical professionals for the security force similar to US military combat medics. It is not intended to become a medical school.

Once the TA BDE has established an understanding of the host nation values and doctrine, it can develop the initial training plan for the academies. The TA BDE must also create a training plan that is supported by the host nation government and not only driven by US efforts. In the training plan it is important that the academies focus as much time on instilling a professional ethos, as they do on the individual tasks.²⁷ It is critical that the attendees of the academies embrace their professional ethos, because it provides a sense of purpose and investment in their nation. Also, the US officers and NCOs who run these academies must have a grasp of the host nation culture and doctrine in order to train host nation personnel to the standard set by leadership.

Defense Institution Building/Judicial Brigade

The DIB/judicial brigade has the task of partnering with district and ministerial level leadership who are involved in the host nation defense and judicial sector. The brigade will advise on judicial, military/security operations, intelligence, and acquisition at the ministerial level in order to advance the host nations systems and procedures. The DIB/judicial brigade, just like the TA BDE, will factor in host nation culture and values, host nation laws and procedures, and international law. The DIB/judicial brigade is not designed to supplant efforts by Department of State's International Narcotic and Law Enforcement division, but it should complement their effort.²⁸ During operations in Afghanistan and Iraq the Department of State was not able to resource the development of Afghan and Iraqi judicial systems to the fullest extent and DOD was required to fill certain gaps. Many of the district attorneys were partnered

with lawyers from BCTs to work on implementing rule of law. The DIB/judicial brigade would serve this function, which would free the Department of State up to focus on the national level of the host nation.

The DIB/judicial brigade would also provide the bridge between the training academies, and the field advisor teams (elements of the military/security, logistics/maintenance, and medical brigade) on ministerial level issues. These issues would cover legal concerns, prosecution of criminals and terrorists, acquisition processes, medical evacuation, and mentorship to senior military leaders in the host nation. The DIB/judicial brigade would assist the host nation in developing a national security strategy and processes that assist in the execution of the strategy. The DIB/judicial brigade serves as one of the most important functions in stability operations. During the war in Afghanistan the ministerial support by the host nation to the lower level host nation security elements failed in providing logistics, pay, and guidance.²⁹ The failure by the host nation can be attributed to many factors such as culture or a strategy that did not incorporate tactical security to national objectives. Regardless of the factors that created this disconnect, the DIB/judicial brigade will mitigate the disconnect between tactical and ministerial level of the host nation by providing that mentorship at the ministerial level.

Military/Security Advisors Brigade

The military/security advisors brigade will serve as the forward presence of the stability division and provide advisory to the host nation on police (when DOD is assigned the mission), infantry, armor, military police, and artillery operations. This brigade will incorporate the lessons learned from previous conflicts, which outlined ways to improve future advisory missions.³⁰ The training academies would send the graduates to host nation units that are partnered with the military/security advisor brigade. Although Nagl's design proposal for an

advisory command lacked details such as linking DIB to tactical level advisors, his ideas on advising in general would assist in the development of the military/security advisor brigade.³¹

Ultimately, the brigade would have the capability of deploying multiple advisor teams, either military or security, around the operational environment who can serve as senior mentors to the host nation security force.

Logistics Advisors Brigade

The logistics advisors brigade would provide advisors in logistics, maintenance, transportation, and medical to the host nation at all echelons of logistic, from the brigade to the ministry level. The military/security brigade would have logistics personnel embedded into the teams in order to facilitate tactical level supply mentorship to the host nation supply sergeant or battalion logistics officer. The logistics brigade would partner with host nation acquisition elements and provide guidance to the establishment of an effective supply chain. The logistics brigade has to create a plan that encompasses the unique peculiarities of the host nation's supply chain. The establishment of a supply chain that supports the local military and security forces is essential in sustaining a host nation security plan for long term.

Attachments

The stability division will also require additional attachments, which will be dictated by the mission. Utilizing Afghanistan as a model, the stability division could require at least a Stryker BCT and an engineer brigade to assist in stability operations. The Stryker BCT would serve as the security element for the division. The engineer brigade would be essential in partnering because engineer brigades would be able to provide vertical and horizontal construction assets. These two brigades are just a few examples of units that might be necessary

to support the stability division without assigning them directly to the division. This allows the US Army flexibility in its force design, while maintaining a stability force.

DOTMLPF- Training

The Joint Regional Training Center (JRTC), through the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade (ITB), developed a training and certification process for units conducting stability operations. The 162nd ITB would continue to provide this training to the US Army and maintain its current command and support relationship. The stability division would send units to a certification exercise at JRTC that would be managed by the 162nd ITB. The 162nd ITB would provide a non-biased assessment of units from the stability division.

The plans section of the stability division headquarters will participate in planning exercises with the ASCC/COCOMs. This will alleviate friction between the stability division and the ASCC/COCOMs prior to deployment. This will also provide insight and understanding to the ASCC/COCOMs about the requirements of the stability division.

One such point of friction that can be mitigated is the contract and logistical support involved in establishing a host nation security force. The ASCC/COCOMs will have to establish internal protocols that assist the stability division in developing a supply chain for the host nation. This supply chain would most likely reach outside of the host nation, which will be beyond the scope of the stability division and requires assistance from either the ASCC or COCOM. Planning exercises that include the stability division will help ASCC/COCOMs to identify these requirements prior to deployment of forces.

Along with ASCC/COCOM planning exercise, the stability division must conduct training with joint and interagency members. The stability division should send members such

as a team leader in DIB or a planner from division headquarters, to USAID or DOS training. Also, the stability division should conduct exercises with joint and interagency members. Federal funding must be appropriated for joint and interagency partners to participate in these activities, because current funding would not suffice. This will allow both the stability division and interagency members the ability to validate processes and procedures prior to executing stability operations.

DOTMLPF- Leadership

The Army must educate leaders on the task and purpose of the stability division because of the non-traditional structure of the organization. Leaders must understand that the stability division is more than a larger form of a civil affairs brigade. Also, the stability division cannot be viewed as a non-desirable assignment by leaders. On the contrary, only high performing individuals should be sent to the stability division as it requires the most adaptable and intelligent force to execute. Army leaders must understand that the stability division is crucial in completing the mission through all phases of operation. The leaders have an obligation to promote to subordinates and peers, the institutional changes of the US Army.

Army leaders will have to adapt to a unique environment while serving in the stability division because it is a senior leader heavy organization. Sergeants first class and majors would most likely serve as the junior members in the organization, which means these personnel would have to do more basic tasks than previously executed. For example, a major who is assigned to a training team would have to maintain his own truck and equipment, perform duty as a gunner, and serve as a mentor to a partner nation. This may seem trivial, however in a standard brigade combat team a major would not typically conduct such routine maintenance or fill the role of a turret gunner. It is important that Army leaders understand this because the stability division

would demand more from these leaders than any brigade combat team. Not only must these individuals be proficient in their partnering task, but they must be able to perform the duties of a basic infantry Soldier.

Army leaders will also have to change their mentality about operations. Under the stability division construct, the stability division would assume command from the offensive force once entering phase 4. This will be crucial as this transition period will occur during a fragile time in the conflict. The stability division will still require an ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations, as this is inherent in all operations, which must be filled by the attachment of a standard brigade combat team to the division. The attached BCT will serve as base defense, security for mentor teams, quick reaction force and limited offensive operations. It is important to maintain security while transitioning parts of the battlefield quickly from the offensive unit to the stability division, because time and security are crucial to achieving stability in an area. The longer essential services are delayed from being restored, the more likely civil unrest and an insurgency will occur.

DOTMLPF- Personnel

With the introduction of stability division the personnel management system must be updated to reflect the new organization, as well as the Army institution must embrace the stability division. DA PAM 600-3 currently does not have Key Developmental (KD) jobs for the stability division, except for the commander, executive officer, and operations officer billets. These billets should be filled by individuals who have prior experience in these billets, which means they would serve as a commander or operations officer twice. This is contradictory to the current system; however it would put personnel with in-depth experience into one of the most complex assignments. Also, personnel with unique qualities, such as language skills, should be

assigned to the division as these personnel have a capability that is critical to the mission. These same capabilities may not be as critical for a standard BCT.

Also, DA PAM 600-3 must add advisor roles as a broadening assignment that is nominative, which means a board should convene to select the individuals. If these changes are made then individuals, as well as career managers, would consider an assignment to the stability division as prestigious, which would create a push-pull factor for assignments into the division. The individuals will push more willingly and human resources will pull more talented leaders for the assignment, ultimately having the most qualified leaders in the stability division.

Foreign Attaché Officers (FAO) could hold key developmental billets in the division plans section. This would provide additional opportunities to FAOs, while also putting regional experts in the plans section. FAOs would be able to develop plans for the stability division that have a necessary regional detail, which are aligned to the combatant commanders.

Other Stability Forces/Considerations

It is important to understand that the stability division is designed to complement civil affair brigades and not duplicate their effort. One can easily assume that a civil affairs brigade should fill this requirement, however the civil affairs brigades tend to focus at the tactical level. The stability division would provide the operational level support to the theater, while also serving as the command and control for stability operations during major combat operations. It is possible that the current civil affairs brigades could adapt into the stability division, as they currently have senior leaders that understand the complexity of stability operations. Initially, civil affairs officers would be the most likely source for commanding the division and some of the brigades.

The Army has Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) to meet the growing demand from COCOMs during phase 0 operations. These infantry brigades are assigned to a combatant commander in order to perform phase 0 theater security cooperation. The RAF concept has allowed the Army to maintain its combat unit requirements, while filling the void for building partner capacity in foreign countries. The RAFs must eventually turn into, or shift to the stability division concept, which would require a stability unit for each COCOM. The Army should create a stability brigade for each combatant command by transforming a RAF unit into this requirement.

The concept of a regionally aligned advisory unit is not new. Scott Wuestner presented a similar concept in 2009 with the introduction of the Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Group (TMAAG); “The TMAAG-F is designed to provide TSC activities during the period of Shaping Operations (Phase 0) and would not be a crisis response force.”³² The TMAAG is an excellent concept that should fill the RAF requirement, however the Army would still require a stability division that could serve as a JTF during phase 4 operations. For phase 0 operations the TMAAG could meet the requirements for a combatant commander, but the TMAAG would not have the necessary resources nor the personnel to meet the demands for stability operations during major combat operations. Also, the TMAAG is not doctrinal in terminology, which poses a challenge trying to articulate the concept to Army and political leadership. The stability division would still be maintained by Forces Command under the department of the Army, while the regional stability brigades or TMAAGs would be assigned to the Army Service Component Commands.

Conclusion

Stability operations have continued to challenge the US Army throughout history. During Vietnam the US created CORDS, during Afghanistan the US created NTM-A, and during Iraq the US created MNSTC-I, however the US Army has not created a permanent stability organization that incorporates joint and interagency. The US continues to create ad-hoc units, centered on general purpose forces, to accomplish stability operations without adapting its force to this re-occurring challenge.³³ The US Army must create a stability division that is structured to meet the unique tasks of stability operations, and not continue to utilize standard infantry or armor units to accomplish the task. The stability division will also provide an additional capability that the COCOMs can utilize during phase 0 operations. The US Army must also change its human resource management to align the right personnel into the stability division, while also educating the force on the stability division's roles and responsibilities.

The US Army has an exceptional force that wins the nation's war; however it lacks the ability to stabilize the same region in which it wages these wars. War that only considers dominating or imposing the will of the United States on another nation through pure military might is waning. This is but a segment of warfare and fails to consider all aspects, especially stability operations. The US Army is slowly embracing stability operations as an equal to offensive and defensive operations, which is a paradigm shift from the traditional combat role the US Army has played in the past. The creation of a stability division is critical in meeting the complex environment and requirements the future holds for the US Army.

¹ Dale Andrade, James H. Willbanks, "CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Vietnam for the Future," *Military Review, Special Edition: Counterinsurgency Reader* (October 2006), 9-23. "on 9 May 1967, National Security Action Memorandum 362, "Responsibility for U.S. Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development)," established Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS. The new system unambiguously placed the military in charge of pacification... With the new organization, almost all pacification programs eventually came under CORDS. From USAID, CORDS took control of "new life development" (the catch-all term for an attempt to improve government

responsiveness to villagers' needs), refugees, National Police, and the Chieu Hoi program (the "Open Arms" campaign to encourage Communist personnel in South Vietnam to defect). The CIA's Rural Development cadre, MACV's civic action and civil affairs, and the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office's field psychological operations also fell under the CORDS aegis. CORDS assumed responsibility for reports, evaluations, and field inspections from all agencies."

² William R. Meara, *Contra Cross :Insurgency and Tyranny in Central America, 1979-1989*, (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006). "Contra Cross takes readers into the world of an American adviser struggling with cultural differences and human rights violations while trying to stay alive in murderous El Salvador (during the Central American wars of the 1980s)."

³ John A. Nagl, "INSTITUTIONALIZING ADAPTATION: It's Time for an Army Advisor Command." *Military Review* 88, no. 5 (Sep/Oct 2008, 2008): 21-26.

<http://search.proquest.com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/225302365?accountid=14746>; Scott Wuestner, *Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm*, (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army, 2009).

⁴ Bill Benson, "Unified Land Operations: The Evolution of Army Doctrine for Success in the 21st Century," *Military Review*, no. 4 (April 2012), 8-11. "Making stability operations equal to offensive and defensive operations represents the most significant and controversial doctrinal evolution of the past 30 years."

⁵ Jennifer M. Taw, *Mission Revolution :The U.S. Military and Stability Operations*, (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 12.

⁶ Jennifer M. Taw, *Mission Revolution :The U.S. Military and Stability Operations*, (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 12.

⁷ William R. Meara, *Contra Cross :Insurgency and Tyranny in Central America, 1979-1989*, (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006).

⁸ Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, and Olga Oliker, *Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts*, Rand Corporation Monograph Series, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), 67-73.

⁹ Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, and Olga Oliker, *Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts*, Rand Corporation Monograph Series, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), 60.

¹⁰ United States Army, *Unified Land Operations, ADRP 3-0*: United States Army, 2012.

¹¹ Bill Benson, "Unified Land Operations: The Evolution of Army Doctrine for Success in the 21st Century," *Military Review*, no. 4 (April 2012), 6-9.

¹² United States Army, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations, FM 7-0*: United States Army, 2008, 1-6. "During the Cold War, Army forces prepared to fight and win against a near-peer competitor. The Army's training focus was on offensive and defensive operations in major combat operations. As recently as 2001, the Army believed that forces trained to conduct the offense and defense in major combat operations could conduct stability and civil support operations just as effectively."

¹³ United States Army, *Offense and Defense, ADRP 3-90*: United States Army, 2012, 3-3.

¹⁴ United States Army, *Offense and Defense, ADRP 3-90*: United States Army, 2012, 4-1-4-3.

¹⁵ United States Army, *Stability, ADRP 3-07*: United States Army, 2012, 2-2.

¹⁶ United States Army, *Brigade Combat Team, FM 3-90.6*: United States Army, 2015, 1-1.

¹⁷ United States Army, *Brigade Combat Team, FM 3-90.6*: United States Army, 2015, 1-1-1-2.

¹⁸ United States Army, *Brigade Combat Team, FM 3-90.6*: United States Army, 2015, 1-6.

¹⁹ United States Army, *Brigade Combat Team, FM 3-90.6*: United States Army, 2015, 1-10.

²⁰ United States Army, *Brigade Combat Team, FM 3-90.6*: United States Army, 2015, 8-1-8-18.

²¹ United States Army, *Brigade Combat Team, FM 3-90.6*: United States Army, 2015, 8-1.

²² United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Guidance For Development And Implementation Of Joint Concepts*. CJCSI 3010.02D (Washington, DC: United States Joint Chiefs of Staff), 2013.

²³ United States Army, *Stability, ADRP 3-07*: United States Army, 2012.

²⁴ Jennifer M. Taw, *Mission Revolution :The U.S. Military and Stability Operations*, (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 14. “a groundbreaking program program that brought civilians and the military together in a single organization in order to address the conflict’s broad span of security, political, and economic requirements”; Andrea R. So, *A Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) Status Report*, Georgetown Institute for the Study of War, (Washington, DC. June, 2008), 1.

<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/reports/MNSTC-I%20Status%20Report.pdf>.

“MNSTC-I formed in 2005 to work with the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior. The command’s overall responsibility was to grow and sustain Iraq’s military forces. Within this framework, its mission fell into four categories: force generation, increasing ISF independence, improving Iraqi institutional capacity, and enhancing ISF professionalism.”

²⁵ Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Expeditionary Force 21*, (March 4, 2014), 23.

http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/MCCDC/EF21/EF21_USMC_Capstone_Concept.pdf.

“Deploy as SPMAGTFs and MEUs for steady-state engagement activities and crisis response, composite forward into a MEB for more significant crises and contingencies, expand the MEB into a MEF to fight major operations and campaigns.”

²⁶ United States Department of Justice, *About ICITAP*, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program fact sheet, (2015), 1. “ICITAP is a law enforcement development organization whose mission is to work with foreign governments to develop effective, professional, and transparent law enforcement capacity that protects human rights, combats corruption, and reduces the threat of trans-national crime and terrorism, in support of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.”

²⁷ Sean McFate, "Raising an Army: Ten Rules," *War on the Rocks*, 2.

<http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/raising-an-army-ten-rules/>. “Instill a professional military ethos. Starting in basic training, imbue respect for the rule of law, human rights, and allegiance to the constitution over religious sect or ethnic group. Liberian recruits spent as much time in the classroom as they did on the rifle range. Cement this through a publically transparent promotion system that shuns cronyism and merits professional values. Soldiers’ incentive structure will eventually transform past abuses and cultural norms.”

²⁸ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *INL Guide to Justice Sector Assistance*: United States Department of State, (2014).

²⁹ Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, and Olga Oliker, *Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts*, Rand Corporation Monograph Series, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), 74-78. “dichotomy between the (Afghan) formal system and the reality is that technocratic assessments of progress in the ministries paint a relatively bright picture—a growing bureaucracy with the appropriate organizations and offices—while units in the field are rarely well supported by national-level systems.”

³⁰ Leslie Adrienne Payne, Jan Osburg. *Leveraging Observations of Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan for Global Operations* (RAND Corporation, 2013). “Security Force Assistance (SFA) is currently the main effort in Afghanistan and will likely play a significant role in U.S. defense policy beyond the Afghan theater. Retaining, collating, and analyzing current SFA efforts will help future Advise and Assist operations reduce the risk of repeating mistakes and improving the chance of success of future efforts across the globe.”

³¹ John A. Nagl, "INSTITUTIONALIZING ADAPTATION: It's Time for an Army Advisor Command." *Military Review* 88, no. 5 (Sep/Oct 2008, 2008): 25.

<http://search.proquest.com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/225302365?accountid=14746>.

³² Scott Wuestner, *Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm*, (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army, 2009), 22-24.

³³ William Rosenau, et al, *United States Marine Corps Advisors: Past, Present, and Future*. Arlington, (VA: CNA Strategic Studies, 2014), 88. "Looking ahead, a key question for the service's senior leadership is whether it wants to embrace advising as a core competency. Our historical analysis has shown that not doing so, and continuing to conduct advising missions in an ad hoc manner, is likely to result in the persistence of the same issues that have been present in the past: inadequate screening and selection of advisors; inadequate predeployment training; and cultural and language issues. Our analysis suggests that, broadly speaking, the ad hoc approach has had costs and consequences with respect to the effectiveness of Marine advisory missions."

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