

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 04/29/2016	2. REPORT TYPE Master's of Military Studies	3. DATES COVERED (From - To) SEP 2015 - APR 2016
--	---	--

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Connecting the Dots: Rethinking How to Build Capacity in Partner Nations to Combat Foreign Fighter Flow	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A
	5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A

6. AUTHOR(S) Keisling, Steven, M, Major, USMC	5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A
	5e. TASK NUMBER N/A
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A
--	--

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) MMS Mentor's Name
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
Foreign fighter flow has increased dramatically since the inception of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) conflict. ISIS employs over 25,000 foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria, and has deployed fighters to over nineteen countries to conduct terrorist acts. This presents a clear national security issue for the United States, and an even more immediately pressing issue for its allies and partner nations. In order to combat foreign fighter flow, the United States must relook at how it builds partners who can successfully interdict trans-regional foreign fighter threats.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
ISIS; Foreign fighter; SOF

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			USMC Command and Staff College
Unclass	Unclass	Unclass	UU	42	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

United States Marine Corps

Command and Staff College

Marine Corps University

2076 South Street

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE: Connecting the Dots: Rethinking How to Build Capacity in Partner Nations to

Combat Foreign Fighter Flow

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR: Major Steven Keisling

AY 15-16

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Professor Michael Lewis

Approved: 

Date: 29 April 2016

Oral Defense Committee Member: DR. CHARLES D. MCKENNA

Approved: 

Date: 29 APRIL 2016

*United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE: Connecting the Dots: Rethinking How to Build Capacity in Partner Nations to

Combat Foreign Fighter Flow

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR: Major Steven Keisling

AY 15-16

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Professor Michael Lewis

Approved: _____

Date: _____

Oral Defense Committee Member: _____

Approved: _____

Date: _____

Executive Summary

Title: Connecting the Dots: Rethinking How to Build Capacity in Partner Nations to Combat Foreign Fighter Flow

Author: Major Steven Keisling, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: In order to combat foreign fighter flow, the United States must relook at how it builds partners who can successfully interdict trans-regional foreign fighter threats.

Discussion: Foreign Fighters participating in armed conflict is not a new phenomenon. Examples of foreigners engaging in overseas struggles have been recorded extensively throughout history, to include the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet – Afghan War, the Bosnian conflicts of the 1990s,¹ and most recently in Iraq and Syria. Although it is not a new occurrence, it has grown significantly in scale since the inception of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) conflict. Since 2014, foreign fighter flow through Iraq and Syria, North Africa, Europe, and Southeast Asia has dramatically increased. ISIS currently employs over 25,000 foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria, and has deployed fighters to over nineteen countries to conduct terrorist acts. This increase in foreign fighters presents a clear national security issue for the United States, and an even more immediately pressing issue for its allies and partner nations.

Foreign fighter flow is a symptom of a larger cause that goes beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, this work will address how the United States can indirectly combat foreign fighter flow by leveraging existing structures such as the Global Special Operations Force (SOF) network, the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF), to build capacity of partner nation forces affected by foreign fighters. This approach is in line with the most current National Security Strategy, which heavily emphasizes developing partners through security cooperation. While the United States is very capable of unilaterally interdicting foreign fighter flow, that is not a lasting and viable course of action. Partner nations who are affected by foreign fighters must be part of the solution in order to create a durable resolution to the issue.

Conclusion: The GSN and JIATF constructs are powerful examples of how the United States has established interconnected forces to deal with regional conflicts against cross-boundary threats. Both of these organizations have great strengths that can complement one another and provide responsive solutions to foreign fighter flow. SOF have established habitual relationships with partner nations in over eighty countries, are globally connected, and are experts at building partner capacity. The JIATF has proven to be a tremendously successful task organization tool for bringing the military, IA, and partner nations together to solve problems. All of these strengths are ingredients that can lead to solutions for combatting foreign fighter flow, and can be combined for mission success. Evolving their coordination and connectivity from regional to trans-regional would allow for horizontal communication and rapid responsiveness.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

Table of Contents

	Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	ii
DISCLAIMER	iii
PREFACE	vi
Introduction.....	1
Foreign Fighter Flow Background.....	2
The Threat.....	7
The Threat is Not Being Addressed Effectively	9
Solutions: What Has Worked Well in the Past?	11
The Global SOF Network	11
The Joint Interagency Task Force.....	14
Using the GSN and JIATF Strengths to Complement One Another	17
What might the combined strengths of the GSN and the JIATF look like?	20
Why Would the Host Nation Buy in to a Trans-Regional GSN/JIATF?.....	23
Why Would United States Interagency Organization Buy in to a GSN/JIATF Construct?	24
What Would Combining Strengths of the GSN/JIATF Achieve?	25
Conclusion	26
CITATIONS AND ENDNOTES.....	29
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	31

Illustrations

	Page
Figure 1. 2014 Depiction of Foreign Fighter Flow Globally Feeding Iraq/Syria Conflict.....	8
Figure 2. Open Source Depiction of GSN Deployment Locations (2012-2013).....	12
Figure 3. Map Depicting ISIS Expansion through Middle East and North Africa.....	24

Preface

The intent of this paper is to address the complex challenges presented by foreign fighter flow, and to identify potential solutions to the problem. I was inspired to write about this topic because it is an issue that my colleagues in the SOF community are struggling to deal with. I have had many conversations with my deployed peers about how foreign fighters are beginning to significantly affect their partner forces, and they are frustrated that they are not able to do anything about it. I wanted this paper to reflect upon viable options that were realistic, rather than focusing on changing legal authorities or structures that are difficult for a commander to influence. My vision was to examine the issue, and see if there was a way for commanders to leverage existing structures to deal with foreign fighters.

Leaders, such as General Stanley McCrystal and Admiral William McRaven, have also inspired me to create this paper. These individuals are among the rare leaders who understand the complex evolution of the enemy, and have made positive strides in addressing it. These men have exemplified critical thinking, and are known for enabling their subordinates to innovate and create change.

I would also like to thank my wife, Jessica, and my daughter, Addie, for allowing me the flexibility and support, which has provided me the ability to write this paper. If it were not for my loving family, I would not have been able to accomplish so much in the Marine Corps. I am nothing without their support.

Introduction

Foreign Fighters participating in armed conflict is not a new phenomenon. Examples of foreigners engaging in overseas struggles have been recorded extensively throughout history, to include the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet – Afghan War, the Bosnian conflicts of the 1990's,¹ and most recently in Iraq and Syria. A foreign fighter is “an individual who leaves his or her country of origin or habitual residence to join a non-state armed group in an armed conflict abroad and who is primarily motivated by ideology, religion, or kinship.”² Foreign fighter flow has become an emerging issue in global security affairs. Although it is not a new occurrence, it has grown significantly in scale since the inception of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) conflict. Since 2014, foreign fighter flow through Iraq and Syria, North Africa, Europe, and Southeast Asia has dramatically increased. This uptick in foreign fighters presents a clear national security issue for the United States, and an even more immediately pressing issue for its allies and partner nations.

Many theories propose how to combat foreign fighter flow, most of which have to do with defeating the extremist Jihadi narrative. While this is clearly a necessary aspect to address, the national security community has presented little in the way of tangible solutions that prevent foreign fighters from being able to take up arms against the United States and its partner nations. In order to combat the issue, the United States must relook at how it builds partners who can successfully interdict trans-regional foreign fighter threats.

Though there may be many unseen successes thwarting foreign fighter flow, the problem has still shown continued growth. The foreign fighter threat is exceptionally dangerous because it is not regionally contained, and the Department of Defense (DoD) is built mainly to deal with regional issues. The inability of the United States and its partners to effectively quell foreign

fighter flow shows that the enemy has figured out a way to exploit a major gap in the United States' capabilities: Trans-regional coordination. Foreign fighter flow is not only trans-regional, but it is also trans-jurisdictional, crossing the responsibilities of military, law enforcement, the intelligence community, and partner nations. The widespread nature of the threat makes it difficult for one entity of the national security apparatus to take charge. As of 2015, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concluded that only a small fraction of foreign fighters attempting to breach America's borders have actually been interdicted.³ If this problem persists, it can grow in magnitude and complexity, creating a sizeable issue for the United States homeland.

Foreign fighter flow is a symptom of a larger cause that goes beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, this work will address how the United States can indirectly combat foreign fighter flow by leveraging existing structures such as the Global Special Operations Force (SOF) network, the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF), to build capacity of partner nation forces affected by foreign fighters. This approach is in line with the most current National Security Strategy, which heavily emphasizes developing partners through security cooperation. While the United States is very capable of unilaterally interdicting foreign fighter flow, that is not a lasting and viable course of action. Partner nations who are affected by foreign fighters must be part of the solution in order to create a durable resolution to the issue.

Foreign Fighter Flow Background

For decades, foreigners have travelled abroad to fight or train with Jihadist groups, and often have the intention of returning home to conduct terrorist activities. In 2002, Jose Padilla was arrested in Chicago for allegedly planning a dirty bomb attack after being trained in an Afghan Al Qaida training camp two years earlier. In 2009, Faisal Shazad travelled overseas to

train with the Pakistani Taliban, and was arrested for attempting to employ a car bomb in New York City.⁴ During the Soviet-Afghan war, Osama bin Laden was an Arab foreign fighter supporting the Afghan Mujahedeen cause. Going the other way, foreign fighters such as John Walker Lindh have travelled overseas to take up arms directly against the United States military.

Despite the fact that foreign fighters have been a problem for some time, it is no longer an uncommon or episodic issue. In the past, this type of problem was much more manageable because the amount of foreign fighters affecting American interests was relatively small. However, it has reached an unprecedented scale over the last three years as thousands of foreign fighters have poured into regions where America has partnerships and significant investments. The conflict in Iraq and Syria, which gave birth to ISIS, has spurred a movement of foreign fighters previously unheard of in the modern world. The United States Department of Homeland Security estimates that ISIS employs over 25,000 foreign fighters, who represent populations from at least nineteen countries.⁵ Of this enormous population of fighters, many have returned to their homelands to conduct terrorist activities, while others metastasize to other nations in order to expand ISIS' ability to globally recruit and conduct violent attacks. On the other side of the spectrum, many of these men simply become disenchanted with the ISIS cause and want to return to normal life.⁶

The contemporary foreign fighter flow issue traces its roots to the Syrian Civil War, which began in March, 2011. This rapidly escalating conflict created the conditions for foreign Jihadi fighters to exploit. They saw violence committed against Sunni Muslims by Bashar al-Assad's regime, which prompted them to defend their sect, which they saw as being unjustly targeted. The following year introduced the first sightings of foreign fighters. As the war progressed, many different rebel factions formed to combat Assad's forces. These factions

represented diverse populations, including defectors from Assad's army, members of religious and nationalist factions, and foreign Sunni Muslims who wanted to get involved.

In 2013, foreign fighters began flowing in from various countries to get into the fight. In another unprecedented move, the Sunni rebels began documenting the Assad regime's violent atrocities on social media, effectively showing the world an unfiltered ground truth of what was happening in the war. This prompted many influential Sunni clerics to call on Muslims around the world to join the fight in Syria. This opened the flood gates of foreigners, as an estimated 5,000 foreign fighters arrived by the summer. By the end of the year, the Syrian rebel cause gained so much traction that the number swelled to 8,500.⁷

During this time, another group saw an opportunity to exploit the situation in Syria – The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The ISI was birthed from Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which was heavily engaged in combatting coalition forces participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In 2006, AQI's leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in a coalition airstrike. Shortly thereafter, the group evolved into ISI, and declared its leader to be Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Al Baghdadi desired to move ISI in a new direction, prompting ideological differences between him and al Qaeda leadership. Al Baghdadi set his primary goal as the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate – a cause which would eventually attract thousands of foreign fighters. During its initial years, the fledgling terrorist organization was having difficulties and was significantly degraded by coalition forces and the Anbar Awakening. However, when American forces withdrew from Iraq, ISI was able to regain strength and exploit the plight of the disenfranchised Iraqi Sunni population. It quickly began conducting frequent and complex attacks on Iraqi government forces and created a rapidly deteriorating security situation for the new Iraqi government.⁸

In 2013, al-Baghdadi rebranded his organization as The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, which eventually came to be known as ISIS. He made attempts to merge with al Qaeda's Syrian branch, but was rebuffed by al Qaeda's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, due to various ideological and methodological differences. This created a rift between the groups, but ISIS was still able to grow into Syria and start claiming territory along the way. With ISIS gaining physical territory and claiming victories over conquered cities, it created a movement with a seemingly winning cause, and foreign fighters started to see the group as appealing.

In January, 2014, ISIS seized the Iraqi cities of Ramadi and Fallujah, which proved to be a seminal moment. ISIS easily bested the Iraqi security forces and utilized social media to broadcast its large, heavily armed convoys moving with complete freedom through the iconic cities. Shortly after, ISIS took Mosul and several other smaller towns throughout Iraq. All the while, ISIS continued to heavily publish its successes on social media and the internet. These rousing, well-documented successes spurred high levels of interest among radical Muslims throughout the world, effectively increasing foreign fighter flow from all over the globe.⁹

With ISIS gaining large amounts of territory in Iraq and Syria, it further shocked the world by declaring the establishment of a caliphate in its seized areas. The caliphate is an Islamic State which serves as the governing body over all Muslim believers.¹⁰ This was a significant move, and pushed ISIS into a position to eclipse al Qaeda in terms of notoriety. While ISIS and al Qaeda are very different organizations with many different goals, the caliphate was something that they had in common. The establishment of an Islamic State was always a goal of Osama bin Laden, but he did not think that he would see it in his lifetime.¹¹ The fact that al-Baghdadi boldly established the caliphate put ISIS in its own category of terrorist organization, and attracted the attention of foreign fighters throughout the world.

Going along with the establishment of the caliphate, al-Baghdadi declared himself to be the caliph – the successor of Muhammad the Prophet. In the eyes of his followers, this effectively made him the leader of the Muslim world. ISIS declared that all Muslims must pledge their allegiance to the caliphate or be labeled as apostates. Despite moderate Muslim opposition to these developments, extremists all over the world heavily bought into ISIS' established caliphate. Essentially, they were offering a society where radical Muslims could live and practice their definition of the truest form of Islam. Radical Islamists viewed it as historic, and came in droves to be a part of it. Within months of the announcement, the number of foreign fighters working for ISIS grew to an estimated 15,000.¹²

ISIS exploited its foreign fighter appeal by ramping up its social media and web-based advertising campaign. Its message broadened to reach not just foreign fighters, but also Muslim families. ISIS wanted men to bring their entire households to live in the Islamic State, and started offering social services such as schooling and municipal services.¹³

Although ISIS was appealing to a broader audience, its true demographic was violent extremists.¹⁴ The organization released graphic videos of its soldiers murdering unbelievers or enemy combatants in grotesque ways such as beheadings, crucifixion, and burning them alive. These videos not only provided the desired shock factor, but they were also extremely well-produced. Foreign fighters continued to pour in to support the newly established caliphate.

In 2014, ISIS began to expand its brand, no longer wanting to be limited to Iraq and Syria. The organization declared provinces throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and recently Southeast Asia. It advertised that foreign fighters are to wage Jihad in these areas if they are not able to get to Iraq or Syria. Additionally, various Islamic insurgent and terrorist organizations have devoted their allegiance to ISIS, further expanding its reach.

The Threat

By 2014, the number of foreign fighters employed by ISIS swelled to over 20,000 (See figure 1). As of September, 2015, ISIS recruited over 25,000 foreign fighters to operate in Iraq and Syria, and employs thousands more throughout the rest of the world. ISIS' vast amount of foreign fighters equips them with the ability to present significant threats to the United States and its partner nations. The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) outlined three overarching threats that the foreign fighter flow poses: 1) Foreign fighters provide a feeding function for the manpower that ISIS requires to expand its operations against the Western world; 2) Those fighters returning from the battlefield are trained and battle-hardened, and often show the proclivity to conduct terrorist attacks in their homelands and to form terrorist groups; and 3) Those fighters who do not return home can engage in proxy attacks by recruiting and radicalizing terrorists through the internet.¹⁵

As long as foreign fighters are able to move freely into Iraq and Syria, ISIS will be able to sustain its fight indefinitely. With constant fresh recruits showing up and being trained, America could find itself in a strategic stalemate until the conflict becomes fiscally unsustainable for the United States government. Conversely, if the fighters are able to leave the Middle East and commit terrorist acts in other countries, the fighters will become too hard to track. This will cause the United States and its partner nations to continually increase spending on manpower and resources to confront an ever-growing problem. Additionally, the conflict will continue to cause regional instability, and will bleed the United States treasury over time. As of November, 2015, the United States is spending approximately 9 million dollars per day on the ISIS conflict,¹⁶ and

that is with minimal troop commitment. With the national deficit exceeding 18 trillion dollars,¹⁷ a sustained conflict with ISIS presents a gross fiscal threat.




Figure 1: 2014 Depiction of Foreign Fighter Flow Globally Feeding Iraq/Syria Conflict¹⁸

With regards to ISIS fighters returning to their homelands to conduct terrorist attacks and recruit networks, a nightmare scenario could quickly ensue. If these men and women

are able to flow undetected, they will be extremely difficult to track once they have arrived. The fact that they have been hardened by battle and have tested their resolve to fight makes them distinctively dangerous when compared to radicalized individuals who have no experience with insurgency or terrorism.

These threats present issues from all angles, as they highlight the fact that ISIS has produced combat tested terrorists who can conduct attacks both directly and indirectly. They have published online guides laying out how to travel to combat zones without arousing suspicion, even giving instructions to extremists on no-fly lists for land and sea travel. Essentially, they have created a wealth of options for foreigners to get involved in conflict both abroad and at home.¹⁹

The Threat is Not Being Addressed Effectively

Though there may be many unseen successes in thwarting foreign fighter flow, the problem has still shown continued growth. The fact that the DoD is built to mainly deal with regional issues makes the trans-regional foreign fighter threat a difficult problem. Further exacerbating the issue is that foreign fighter flow is also trans-jurisdictional, crossing the responsibilities of military, law enforcement, the intelligence community, and partner nations.

From the military perspective, General Joseph Dunford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), recently addressed this issue. He stated his concern that the current system of combatant commands has nothing in place to deal with trans-regional issues. The lowest level of official coordination between the combatant commands lies with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This burdensome bureaucratic structure significantly hinders any ability to carry out time-sensitive operations, which trans-regional issues often require. If a foreign fighter is able to secure travel to another country, operational units must be able to coordinate interdiction

quickly, as their time window can be limited to the enemy's travel time. With such barriers in place between regions, the United States will not be able to effectively deal with this evolving threat.²⁰

As the foreign fighter flow problem festers, it is highly likely that it will become too large to contain in the near future. As it stands, the American law enforcement, diplomatic corps, and intelligence communities are stretched extremely thin.²¹ This is clearly manifested in how American law enforcement has to adjust to deal with foreign fighters attempting to cross American borders in order to conduct terrorist attacks. In 2015, the Department of Justice (DOJ), led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had to address over one thousand terrorist related cases, many of which are linked to foreigners. The Bureau had to pull hundreds of people from their regular duties, such as investigation of white collar and organized crime to surge to the National Security side, which has taxed manpower significantly.²²

In addition to the CJCS, other national and international leaders have taken notice of the threat presented by foreign fighter flow. President Barack Obama voiced the need for more international cooperation and stressed that more capacity is needed to deal with the problem.²³ Rep. Michael McCaul, the House Homeland Security Committee Chairman observes, "The threat is increasing, not decreasing."²⁴ United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban noted his concern at a foreign fighter summit when he stated, "The world is witnessing a dramatic evolution in the nature of the terrorist threat."²⁵ As can be seen, there is no shortage of concerned rhetoric.

As stated by the UN Secretary-General, America and its partners are witnessing the evolution of a new problem that will arguably endure as long as terrorist organizations exist. The era of regionally contained threats is over, and the United States needs to adapt to address it. The

stove-piped, vertical communications and bureaucratic lethargy must be overcome and replaced with horizontal and responsive communications. Units who are dealing with foreign fighter flow must be unburdened by the current structure and given the ability to respond appropriately to the issue.

Solutions: What Has Worked Well in the Past?

With the threat identified and the stakes outlined, one might wonder how foreign fighter flow can be addressed. Short of actually destroying the newly-formed caliphate or effectively defeating the extremist narrative, how can the United States respond to the growing foreign fighter flow threat? Further, how can the United States work with its partners to develop host nation capability to deal with the issue? The first step in finding a solution is to look at where the United States has succeeded in dealing with international, networked enemy organizations. Powerful examples of this can be found in the Global SOF Network (GSN), and the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) models.

The Global SOF Network

The GSN has been an evolving concept within United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) for over a decade. The idea was conceived to address the complexities and uncertainties of the global environment. Recognizing that the world was becoming more interconnected than ever before, USSOCOM set out to develop a force that could be constantly connected and persistently forward. USSOCOM's seminal document, *SOCOM 2020* describes the GSN as, "globally networked, innovative, low-cost, and small footprint approaches to achieve our nation's security objectives."²⁶ What this means is that small SOF elements are perpetually deployed furthering United States interests through partner nation forces, and are

regionally aligned and connected (See figure 2). Among other things, this provides SOF tremendous placement and access throughout the world, and allows it to constantly shape American security interests through partners in an effort to manage conflicts before they spiral out of control. In addition to shaping, the GSN also postures SOF for crisis response, as USSOCOM forces are forward deployed to nearly every contested region in the world.



Figure 2: Open source depiction of GSN deployment locations (2012-2013)²⁷

Prior to the attacks of 11 September, 2001, SOF was somewhat of a misunderstood entity to much of the military. SOF personnel were often conducting isolated missions and were not well integrated with other elements of the national security apparatus. The GSN changed that in the sense that SOF are now not only a better-understood entity to the DoD at large, but they are also vastly connected to IA, conventional forces, and partner nation forces. The GSN has given the DoD and interagency partners the ability to directly communicate with SOF in any given region where SOF is employed.

An example of this connectivity can be found with how SOF currently interacts with conventional military units. If a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) arrives into the United States

Pacific Command area of operations with the task of conducting operations in Indonesia, it can directly contact Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC) through a liaison designed for exactly that purpose. SOCPAC can put the MEU in direct contact with SOF teams operating in Indonesia. Essentially, this creates a flat, horizontal communication capability where the MEU can develop Indonesian social atmospherics, glean valuable information about the operating environment, or even coordinate operations. This communication and coordination template can be overlaid throughout any region where SOF operates, which averages over eighty countries on any given day.

Another factor that makes the GSN more effective is that SOF have more manpower than ever before. Since the 11 September, 2001 attacks, SOF have grown significantly in size and capability. United States Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs have shown a steady increase in size over the years, and the formulation of Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command added a 2,700 person contribution to USSOCOM. This increased capacity has allowed SOF to be persistently engaged with partners in contested regions world-wide.

This manpower growth put an unprecedented number of SOF with capacity-building capability and regional expertise on the ground throughout most of the world. All SOF bring core capability such as direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and irregular warfare. In addition, certain SOF bring unique enhanced capabilities such as maritime interdiction, air operations, language capability, and enhanced regional expertise.

Perhaps the linchpin in the GSN capability is that SOF understand how to develop these capabilities into partner forces. This ability puts SOF at the forefront of the National Security Strategy, which heavily emphasizes building partner capacity to strengthen allied nations' abilities to deal with regional threats and to better secure America's interests.

There are, however, issues with the GSN that prevent it from dealing with trans-regional threats. When reading SOCOM 2020, it would appear that the GSN was not actually intended to deal with trans-regional threats, but rather to focus merely on regional issues. Despite that intent, the GSN has actually become one of the DOD's most viable capabilities to deal with trans-regional threats. The GSN enables SOF to be persistently forward, interconnected, and engaged with partner nations.

The GSN's task organization is the missing ingredient that keeps it from being able to effectively stem foreign fighter flow. As stated before, although the GSN is globally linked, it has primarily been used to deal with regional conflict. However, the multi-continental nature of the foreign fighter threat has created an opportunity for the GSN to reach its full potential and truly utilize its global connection capability.

Foreign fighter flow is a unique threat that requires the holistic integration of SOF and the IA communities. Due to the fact that foreign fighter flow is a multi-jurisdictional threat, spanning the spectrum of law enforcement, military, and the intelligence communities, it is imperative that the GSN integrate these elements into its operating concept. Without the ability to tap into these IA entities, the GSN will be nothing more than a one-dimensional, military-only solution.

The Joint Interagency Task Force

Collaboration between government entities has historically been problematic. There have been numerous national security reports that address the problems of interagency coordination, most of which make recommendations for better integration between the agencies.²⁸ Many of those recommendations have been heeded, as significant advancements in coordination have occurred, particularly since the 11 September, 2001 terrorist attacks. Organizations such as the

Department of Homeland Security, the National Counterterrorism Center, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, have all brought greater synergy amongst the IA world.²⁹ The military and IA organizations have also been working together quite extensively in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which has often created positive relationships, and has made IA and the military more symbiotic. Despite these advances in collaboration, the military and IA entities often still need to be task-organized to create a synergistic, solution-oriented force that can coalesce around a problem.

A successful case of combining the efforts of military and IA organizations for regional success is the JIATF. A JIATF is a multi-service, multi-agency task force that is organized around a particular problem. It integrates all of the relevant agencies that can be leveraged to accomplish a mission. When a JIATF is formed, it essentially creates a forcing function to put multiple players with normally divergent interests on the same agenda. This is ideal for a problem such as foreign fighter flow.

One might think that this would also describe an Embassy Country Team. A Country Team is an IA team that includes the local leaders of all Embassy sections, as well as the leaders of each United States government agency in a given overseas post. They formulate the mission strategic plan that outlines how the American government interacts with the host nation.³⁰ While a Country Team may have the right agencies to deal with foreign fighter flow, it is not dedicated solely to the problem. A Country Team has a myriad of other issues to deal with, detracting from the overall effectiveness of dealing with the ever-growing foreign fighter flow threat.

The JIATF construct is nothing new to the United States. It has been utilized successfully many times, most notably by JIATF-South, based out of Key West, Florida. JIATF-South has been deemed the “gold standard” of interagency coordination.³¹ It has been in existence since the

1980's, and has evolved over the years to address evolving drug trafficking problems in the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of responsibility.³² JIATF-South is composed of all four military branches, nine government agencies, and eleven partner nations, and has successfully demonstrated how to function as a team.

In a sense, JIATF-South began by dealing with an issue similar to foreign fighter flow. The nature of the JIATF-South problem set was that it was a non-traditional threat that presented a clear threat to United States National Security, but in a different way than any other threat in the nation's recent history. This unique threat spurred legislative action to organize the DOD and IA into task forces with requisite authorities to accomplish their mission. Due to JIATF-South's skillful integration of DOD, partner nations, and IA entities, it has been tremendously successful in its mission to counter the narcotics problem. A small example of its success can be found in measuring cocaine seizures. In 2009, JIATF South seized 220 metric tons of cocaine. As a scale comparison, all other elements of the United States government combined seized 40 metric tons of cocaine that same year.

A shining example of how JIATF-South has successfully integrated military and IA entities was outlined in a 2011 study by the Institute for National Strategic Studies:

When JIATF-South's detection and monitoring operations have progressed to the point where it is clear that a law enforcement action will take place, tactical control of the detection and monitoring asset—usually ships—is handed over to law enforcement. To illustrate, a U.S. Navy ship is conducting detection and monitoring operations under the tactical control of JIATF-South. After a sorting process by JIATF-South and in cooperation with all of its partners, a suspected vessel is sighted and approached. Using well-recognized procedures for approaching and “visiting” the vessel, the master of the vessel asks questions about the vessel's origin, nationality, cargo, and destination. If there is reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the vessel are trafficking drugs, JIATF-South's mission switches from detection and monitoring to supporting law enforcement. JIATF-South seamlessly turns tactical control of the U.S. Navy ship over to a law enforcement organization, usually a U.S. Coast Guard District. The U.S. Coast Guard, through their law enforcement detachment (LEDET) placed on Navy

vessels, conducts the law enforcement action and determines the disposition of suspected traffickers and seized evidence. While the Navy Commander always retains command of his or her ship, the on-board Coast Guard officer takes control of ship operations. Once law enforcement at sea is complete, the suspected traffickers and evidence are secured onboard the Navy ship by the LEDET. Tactical control of ship operations returns to JIATF–South and the Navy ship resumes its detection and monitoring mission.³³

The above excerpt is an outstanding example of how the military and IA can work together to solve complex jurisdictional issues. Another critical success of JIATF-South is that it is one of the few organizations in the United States government that has successfully coordinated trans-regional operations. On several occasions, JIATF-South has coordinated with United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to interdict narcotics traffickers across operational boundaries.

With regards to foreign fighter flow, this JIATF concept has been partially realized. A foreign fighter JIATF has already been established in the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. However, that JIATF has little to connect to when it tracks a fighter leaving the CENTCOM area. Currently, the JIATF can only pass the information to the receiving Country Team, but that Country Team has many other things to deal with besides foreign fighter flow. Therefore, this illustrates a clear need for an organizational construct that is tasked and equipped to concentrate on foreign fighters.

Using the GSN and JIATF Strengths to Complement One Another

As one can see, the GSN and JIATF concepts have strengths and weaknesses. The JIATF is well organized to deal with an issue requiring military and IA, but can have difficulty connecting with a country team to interdict foreign fighters. Further, newly formed JIATF will not have any habitual relationships with partner nation forces – a vital requirement for placement, access, and trusting partner relationships. The GSN is persistently forward and

engaged with partner nations, but is not necessarily task organized to deal with foreign fighter flow. Combining the strengths of these two constructs can be a step in addressing trans-regional issues while integrating the affected partner nations.

The simplest way to integrate these elements is by task-organizing them into regional JIATFs that are partner-integrated and globally connected to one another, along the lines of the GSN concept. The mission of these JIATF's would be focused on foreign fighter flow. This is where the combination of the JIATF and the GSN can come together to create a holistic, interconnected, and low-footprint capability to address foreign fighter flow. This is a structurally simple solution because both organizations are models with proven track records. This proposal simply evolves them to the next step of global connectivity and interoperability.

It would be an oversimplification to state that the GSN/JIATF construct simply facilitates units talking to each other across different regions. While it is true that the GSN/JIATF could operate unilaterally to interdict foreign fighter flow, there is no sustainment in that course of action. Despite SOF being better manned and equipped than ever before, the reality is that there are too few SOF operators and even fewer IA personnel to address foreign fighter flow alone. The true enabling capability that the GSN/JIATF would bring is that it facilitates the indirect approach by building JIATF functions in partner nations.

This concept would bring a suitable capability to both foreign fighter interdiction and partner capacity building. It goes beyond simply sharing information with partners, as this is a problem that requires action. It is not just SOF action, but a combined effort of SOF, IA entities, and partner nation forces affected by foreign fighters. The United States National Security Strategy places a high level of emphasis on enabling partner nations. If the United States truly wants to counter foreign fighter flow, then it has to build this type of capacity in its partners. If

this does not occur, the United States may well find itself continuing to solve other countries' problems on its own.

There are many reasons why prolonged unilateral action is an untenable solution, some of which include fiscal concerns, partner nation sovereignty, and the ability to operate in local territory. Regarding fiscal issues, unilateral action is an expensive prospect. Combatting foreign fighter flow is a long-term commitment. It will be a significant problem as long as ISIS continues to operate, and will remain a prevalent issue as many other terrorist organizations infiltrate into countries across the world. Dedicating primarily United States military, IA, and associated logistical assets to foreign fighter flow would continue to drain the national treasury. With America being over 19 trillion dollars in debt, a partner-oriented solution needs to be a primary consideration.

Host nation sovereignty is a paramount consideration that the GSN/JIATF is ideally suited to deal with. Given the fact that foreign fighters are operating in over nineteen countries, it would prove unrealistic to advocate for the United States to establish unilateral bases of operations in so many locations. Such a construct could present a picture of large-scale sovereignty violations, and it is unlikely that the international community would approve. It is important to realize that America's partner nations make the decision as to whether or not United States personnel can operate in their homeland. With that reality in mind, it is in America's interest to have small footprints working through partners.

In terms of having the ability to interdict foreign fighters overseas, partner forces are a vital for realizing success. When operating in a host nation, no one knows the terrain better than the partner force. Given the complexities of tracking and interdicting foreign fighters, American personnel need the local expertise offered by their partners. Not only do partners have

unprecedented placement and access, but they also have deep regional context that outsiders can only hope to understand. If the United States wants to successfully combat foreign fighter flow, its host nation forces must take the lead.

What might the combined strengths of the GSN and the JIATF look like?

The structure of a GSN/JIATF could take on many different forms due to several variables. Elements such as the maturity of the relationship with a partner nation, the capabilities of the partner forces, and aligned partner interests would all play major roles in how the GSN/JIATF is structured. The concept is not so much about the potential shape and size, but rather about who is involved. There are certain factors that must be present to make the organization successful: United States military forces, civilian intelligence and law enforcement, and partner nation agencies including military and civilian organizations with interests in counterterrorism and foreign fighter flow. Foreign fighter flow crosses the jurisdiction of all of these organizations, creating the need for them to all work together to coordinate against trans-regional threats.

Ideally, there would be a small regional umbrella JIATF that exists to facilitate trans-regional coordination, and would be connected to the umbrella organizations in other regions. Underneath this umbrella organization, sub-units of SOF and IA teams will be embedded in countries that are affected by foreign fighter flow. These sub-units will be tasked with building interdiction capability and information fusion with a host nation civilian-military team. When the umbrella organization receives information about inbound foreign fighters from one of their adjacent regions, they can coordinate with the sub-unit for appropriate action with their partner force. Likewise, if the sub-unit receives information about outbound foreign fighters, they would

relay that to the umbrella organization, which will coordinate interdiction with the receiving region.

North Africa can be used to paint a clearer picture of what this could look like. As an example, assume that Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya are all being affected by foreign fighters. The leadership of each respective country has determined that this is a significant enough problem that they allow United States forces to support them. With interests now aligned, the United States can establish a small regional JIATF focused exclusively on foreign fighter flow to serve as the coordinating umbrella organization. Concurrently, SOF teams from the GSN will be augmented by United States civilian law enforcement and intelligence personnel to start working with Algerian, Tunisian, and Libyan forces respectively. They will be tasked with building civilian-military teams for foreign fighter interdiction – potentially similar in function to the United States National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).

As capacity building operations are ongoing, the North Africa JIATF receives information from another foreign fighter JIATF located in Jordan. The Jordan JIATF reports that they have credible information that legitimate foreign fighters are leaving Syria and are heading to Algeria to link up with ISIS elements and carry out attacks. The JIATF will pass this to the SOF/IA team working with the Algerians, and they will begin planning for appropriate action. This may include interdiction, monitoring, surveillance, or a host of other options. After action has been taken, the SOF/IA team could pass the resulting information back to the JIATF, which will then analyze and disseminate it for all of the regional forces and other JIATFs to see.

The above example is somewhat utopian as it glossed over several potential pitfalls that might occur in reality. First, information sharing will be a significant obstacle to overcome. With military, intelligence, law enforcement, and foreign partners involved, one can easily see how

problems will arise. Each of these organizations has their own information sharing protocols that are self-interested. If a foreign fighter GSN/JIATF concept were to become a reality, American units would first need to find a way to share information among its own ranks; then figure out how to share it with their partner nation leadership and partner forces. Compartmented information will be a major hindrance at best, and might frustrate or destroy partner relationships at worst. If successful trans-regional coordination is to occur, JIATFs and GSN elements must have revised information sharing procedures, and will need to find a way to work from data systems that are common to all. Trans-regional operations inherently involve a diverse, multinational, multiservice population which will be potentially embedded in unfriendly nations. Attempts have been made through the years to make information sharing easier, but this new operational environment should accelerate the impetus for solutions to this problem.

Second, partner nation sovereignty would quickly become an issue if United States SOF/IA teams are crossing lines of acting unilaterally in too many instances. The desired end state for these teams should be to develop partner civilian-military teams that can eventually coordinate their own operations. Ideally, the JIATF would work itself into a position where it merely facilitates trans-regional coordination. If United States forces are operating too extensively, then the “small footprint” aspect of this concept is negated.

Third, this example assumes that the partner nations actually allow entire SOF/IA teams to operate in their countries. This may work in certain locations, but other areas might only allow one person representing the United States to serve as an advisor. This aspect is why the GSN/JIATF could take on so many different forms. The host nation is the ultimate authority regarding how this structure looks. Given that reality, the United States should do its utmost to convince the partner nation that a full enabling capability is in the partner’s best interest.

Why Would the Host Nation Buy in to a Trans-Regional GSN/JIATF?

SOF have been meaningfully engaged in over eighty countries for well over a decade, and the IA community is often firmly entrenched wherever SOF is operating. SOF have been developing partner capacity through many different venues, such as theater security cooperation or train and equip programs. Likewise, the IA community has been building partner capacity with its respective foreign counterparts, although not at the same scale as SOF.

The partner nations of the United States that are affected by foreign fighters are dealing with an unprecedented threat. Although not as dramatic as the 11 September, 2001 attacks, many partner nations are starting to be inundated by foreign fighters (See figure 3), which can slowly erode their ability to maintain stability. In the Philippines, foreign fighters are bolstering the Abu Sayyaf Group and spreading the ISIS brand. In North Africa, existing insurgencies augmented by foreign fighters pledged allegiance to ISIS and have bolstered anti-government groups. Many similar situations are beginning to appear in Europe as well, most recently evidenced by the 2015 ISIS-sponsored terrorist attacks in Paris.




Figure 3: Map depicting ISIS expansion through the Middle East and North Africa³⁴

One of the primary considerations for building effective partner capacity is for America and its partners to have aligned interests.³⁵ These violent events, spurred by foreign fighter flow, have produced a metastasizing emergency for America's partner nations. This has potential to create the conditions for successful alignment between partner nations and the United States. Foreign fighters invading the sovereignty of America's partners can certainly present an opportunity for partners to welcome United States support, as it is within *their* national interest to counter the threat.

Why Would United States Interagency Organization Buy in to a GSN/JIATF Construct?

Foreign fighter flow is just one example of a problem set that requires the military and IA to work together. The trans-regional nature of the threat spans multiple jurisdictional disciplines, such as law enforcement and intelligence. Since foreign fighters automatically cross into

numerous realms of responsibility, the military and IA are inherently forced into shared responsibility. All entities within the military and IA have complementary capabilities that must be brought together in order to solve this problem.

The National Security Strategy does not solely revolve around the military. The organizations within the IA are very much a part of the plan, and need to continue working with the military in combatting pressing issues like foreign fighter flow. The military and IA have proven that they can work well together on many occasions, and have shown tremendous success. Examples such as JIATF-South, the CIA and United States Special Forces in Afghanistan, and many others, show how effective the military and IA can be when they work together.

What Would Combining Strengths of the GSN/JIATF Achieve?

The GSN/JIATF would create an environment consisting of less organizational friction, horizontal communications, and a lasting solution. It could be the first step in achieving a globally linked, partner enabled construct that can successfully address trans-national threats. Taking known, existing structures and simply evolving them into more interconnected entities would provide less friction than attempting to develop some sort of complete reorganization of the DOD.

Allowing more horizontal communications would allow for rapid responsiveness, which is vital due to the time-sensitive nature of trans-regional threats. This minimizes burdensome bureaucracy that hinders operations. The alternative for horizontal connectivity between regions is a better alternative to adding some sort of larger command that oversees all of the combatant commands. Such a construct would be lethargic, less responsive, and might potentially make the military too powerful.

Finally, developing partner capacity to deal with foreign fighter flow will provide a lasting capability and more sustainable solution. Leveraging specialties that only partners can provide, such as local expertise, placement, and access, will be absolutely vital in successful interdiction of foreign fighters. Additionally, the United States can bolster international relations by assisting partner nations who are affected by foreign fighters, significantly aiding in overseas diplomacy.

Conclusion

Although foreign fighter flow is not a new phenomenon, it has reached an unprecedented level over the past three years. While it is true that multiple successes have occurred in stemming the flow of foreign fighters, it is still a massive problem. With 25,000 foreign fighters operating in Iraq and Syria, and ISIS moving fighters into at least nineteen countries, the problem is clearly growing. Not only is it a problem for the security of the United States, but also for its allies and partner nations.

There is no easy solution for combatting foreign fighter flow. It is a symptom of a larger problem that goes beyond the scope of this work. However, failing to take action against this symptom could potentially create a new disease. Although some elements of the American national security apparatus have worked to combat the issue, it has continued to grow. The problem has now grown so large that resolutions can be difficult to grasp, but there are certainties that can be identified: the military and IA need to coalesce around the problem, and partner nations need to be involved. The fact that foreign fighter flow crosses the jurisdictions of the military, intelligence, and law enforcement communities places an imperative on a military – IA solution. To ignore that fact would lead to bureaucratic infighting and conflicting agendas, which would prevent mission success. Regarding partner nation involvement, a successful military – IA relationship means nothing if their interests are not aligned with their sovereign

partners. The partner nation placement and access, as well as their regional expertise are vital in successful foreign fighter interdiction.

As stated by the CJCS, combatant commands are not designed to address trans-regional threats. This is a gap that the enemy is exploiting with foreign fighter flow, and has much to do with the ease in which terrorists can attain freedom of movement. Developing the capability for interdicting trans-regional threats with partner nation forces may seem to be a daunting task. The simplest way to begin solving the problem is to look at what has previously been done successfully in a regional context. The GSN and JIATF constructs are powerful examples of how the United States has established interconnected forces to deal with regional conflicts against cross-boundary threats. Both of these organizations have great strengths that can complement one another and provide responsive solutions to foreign fighter flow. The GSN has established unprecedented placement and access in over eighty countries. SOF have established habitual relationships with partner nations, are globally connected, and are experts at building partner capacity. The JIATF has proven to be a tremendously successful task organization tool for bringing the military, IA, and partner nations together to solve problems. All of these strengths are ingredients that can lead to solutions for combatting foreign fighter flow, and can be combined for mission success. Evolving their coordination and connectivity from regional to trans-regional would allow for horizontal communication and rapid responsiveness.

This work does not advocate for some sort of legal overhaul of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to get the military and the IA in step. Rather, it argues that there is a clear need for combined efforts as foreign fighter flow becomes a larger problem. These combined efforts need to evolve from a traditionally regional focus into a trans-regional one. In the end, the military and IA need to be task-organized to work together on something as complex as trans-regional foreign fighter

flow. Conflicting agendas and cultural differences caused by stove-piped structures are not conducive for integrating to solve problems. Putting all of the relevant entities on the same agenda through task organization creates a forcing function and will enable a more holistic partner development capability.

¹ Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, *Foreign Fighters Under International Law*. 2014. <http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/publications/Briefings%20and%20In%20breifs/Foreign%20Fighters%20Under%20International%20Law%20Briefing%20no7.pdf>.

² Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, *Foreign Fighters Under International Law*. 2014. <http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/publications/Briefings%20and%20In%20breifs/Foreign%20Fighters%20Under%20International%20Law%20Briefing%20no7.pdf>.

³ United States Homeland Security Committee, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel*, 2015. <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf>.

⁴ United States Homeland Security Committee, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel*, 2015. <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf>.

⁵ “Combatting the ISIS Foreign Fighter Pipeline: A Global Approach,” Lisa Curtis, Luke Coffey, David Inserra, Daniel Kochis, *The Heritage Foundation*, January 6, 2016, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/01/combating-the-isis-foreign-fighter-pipeline-a-global-approach>.

⁶ United States Homeland Security Committee, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel*, 2015. <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf>.

⁷ United States Homeland Security Committee, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel*, 2015. <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf>.

⁸ United States Homeland Security Committee, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel*, 2015. <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf>.

⁹ United States Homeland Security Committee, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel*, 2015. <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf>.

¹⁰ Vick, Karl, *What is the Caliphate?* Time Magazine, 2014, <http://time.com/2942239/what-is-the-caliphate/>.

¹¹ United States Homeland Security Committee, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel*, 2015. <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf>.

¹² United States Homeland Security Committee, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel*, 2015. <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf>.

¹³ United States Homeland Security Committee, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel*, 2015. <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf>.

¹⁴ United States Homeland Security Committee, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel*, 2015. <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf>.

¹⁵ United States Homeland Security Committee, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel*, 2015. <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf>.

-
- ¹⁶ Rebecca Shabad, U.S. Spending \$9M a Day in ISIS Fight. The Hill, 2015. <http://thehill.com/policy/finance/244725-pentagon-releases-first-cost-breakdown-for-isis-fight>.
- ¹⁷ US Debt Clock, <http://www.usdebtclock.org/>
- ¹⁸ Gene Thorp, Julie Tate and Swati Sharma, The Soufan Group, CIA, *Foreign Fighters Flow to Syria*, International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ISCR), October 11, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreign-fighters-flow-to-syria/2014/10/11/3d2549fa-5195-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_graphic.html.
- ¹⁹ United States Homeland Security Committee, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel*, 2015. <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf>.
- ²⁰ Jim Garamone, *Dunford: Command, Control Must 'Keep Pace' in 21st Century*, U.S. Department of Defense, 2016, <http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/639844/dunford-command-control-must-keep-pace-in-21st-century>.
- ²¹ United States Homeland Security Committee, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel*, 2015. <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf>.
- ²² United States Homeland Security Committee, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel*, 2015. <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf>.
- ²³ United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution Condemning Violent Extremism, Underscoring Need to Prevent Travel, Support for Foreign Terrorist Fighters*, United Nations, 2014. <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11580.doc.htm>.
- ²⁴ Jeff Selden, *Foreign Fighter Flow to Syria, Iraq Unrelenting*, Voice of America, 2016. <http://www.voanews.com/content/flow-of-foreign-fighters-to-syria-iraq-unrelenting/3135549.html>
- ²⁵ United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution Condemning Violent Extremism, Underscoring Need to Prevent Travel, Support for Foreign Terrorist Fighters*, United Nations, 2014. <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11580.doc.htm>.
- ²⁶ United States Special Operations Command, *SOCOM 2020*, 2014. <http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy.pdf>.
- ²⁷ Turse, Nick, *The Startling Size of U.S. Special Forces*, 2013. <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/01/map-startling-size-us-special%20forces>.
- ²⁸ Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Joint Interagency Task Force - South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success*, 2011. ndupress.ndu.edu.
- ²⁹ O'Neil, John, *The Interagency Process - Analysis and Reform Recommendations*, United States Army War College, 2006. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil445.pdf>.
- ³⁰ United States Department of State, *Country Team*, 2016. http://www.state.gov/courses/rs401/page_25.htm.
- ³¹ O'Neil, John, *The Interagency Process - Analysis and Reform Recommendations*, United States Army War College, 2006. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil445.pdf>.
- ³² Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Joint Interagency Task Force - South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success*, 2011, ndupress.ndu.edu.
- ³³ Evan Munsing and Christopher Lamb, *Joint Interagency Task Force South – The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success*. Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2011. <http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo16331/Strategic-Perspectives-5.pdf>.
- ³⁴ Akbar, Jay, *The Terrifying Rise of ISIS*, Daily Mail News, 2015. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2960463/The-terrifying-rise-ISIS-Map-shows-terror-group-s-tentacles-reach-Algeria-Afghanistan.html>.
- ³⁵ Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, Stephanie Young, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Joe Hogler, Christine Leah *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances*, Rand

Corporation, 2013.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/MG1200/MG1253z1/RAND_MG1253z1.pdf.

Bibliography

Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, *Foreign Fighters*

Under International Law. 2014. [http://www.geneva-](http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/publications/Briefings%20and%20In%20breifs/Foreign%20Fighters%20Under%20International%20Law%20Briefing%20no7.pdf)

[academy.ch/docs/publications/Briefings%20and%20In%20breifs/Foreign%20Fighters%20](http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/publications/Briefings%20and%20In%20breifs/Foreign%20Fighters%20Under%20International%20Law%20Briefing%20no7.pdf)

[Under%20International%20Law%20Briefing%20no7.pdf](http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/publications/Briefings%20and%20In%20breifs/Foreign%20Fighters%20Under%20International%20Law%20Briefing%20no7.pdf).

United States Homeland Security Committee, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating*

Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel. September, 2015. [https://homeland.house.gov/wp-](https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf)

[content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf](https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf).

Lisa Curtis, Luke Coffey, David Inserra, Daniel Kochis. “Combating the ISIS Foreign Fighter

Pipeline: A Global Approach,” *The Heritage Foundation*, January 6, 2016,

[http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/01/combating-the-isis-foreign-fighter-](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/01/combating-the-isis-foreign-fighter-pipeline-a-global-approach)

[pipeline-a-global-approach](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/01/combating-the-isis-foreign-fighter-pipeline-a-global-approach).

Rebecca Shabad, “U.S. Spending \$9M a Day in ISIS Fight”. *The Hill*, June 11, 2015.

[http://thehill.com/policy/finance/244725-pentagon-releases-first-cost-breakdown-for-isis-](http://thehill.com/policy/finance/244725-pentagon-releases-first-cost-breakdown-for-isis-fight)

[fight](http://thehill.com/policy/finance/244725-pentagon-releases-first-cost-breakdown-for-isis-fight).

Karl Vick, “What is the Caliphate?” *Time Magazine*, July 1, 2014.

<http://time.com/2942239/what-is-the-caliphate/>.

Jim Garamone, "Dunford: Command, Control Must 'Keep Pace' in 21st Century." *U.S.*

Department of Defense, January 4, 2016. <http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/639844/dunford-command-control-must-keep-pace-in-21st-century>.

United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution Condemning*

Violent Extremism, Underscoring Need to Prevent Travel, Support for Foreign Terrorist Fighters, United Nations, August 15, 2014.

<http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11580.doc.htm>.

Jeff Selden, *Foreign Fighter Flow to Syria, Iraq Unrelenting*, Voice of America, January 8,

2016. <http://www.voanews.com/content/flow-of-foreign-fighters-to-syria-iraq-unrelenting/3135549.html>

United States Special Operations Command, *SOCOM 2020*, 2014.

<http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy.pdf>.

Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Joint Interagency Task Force - South: The Best Known,*

Least Understood Interagency Success, 2011. ndupress.ndu.edu.

O'Neil, John, *The Interagency Process - Analysis and Reform Recommendations*, United States

Army War College, March 15, 2006.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil445.pdf>.

Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, Stephanie Young, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Joe Hogler, Christine Leah *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances*, Rand Corporation, 2013.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/MG1200/MG1253z1/RAND_MG1253z1.pdf.