

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 04/22/2016	2. REPORT TYPE Master's of Military Studies	3. DATES COVERED (From - To) SEP 2015 - APR 2016
--------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Emerging India-Japan Security Relationship	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A
	5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A

6. AUTHOR(S) Khatri, Ajit, Major, Indian Army	5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A
	5e. TASK NUMBER N/A
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) Dr. Douglas Streusand
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
This research paper identifies the potential areas for collaboration that India and Japan can leverage to strengthen their security relationship. In the past few years, India has looked to expand its strategic vision. It is now willing to accept a greater role on the world stage and more noticeably in Asia. Tokyo, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's administration also seems to take slow and steady steps to make few amendments to the Japan's pacifist constitution. The Abe administration eased its long-standing ban on Japan's arms trade and is looking to take more active role in the security affairs in the Asia-Pacific region.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
India-Japan, security relationship, JMSDF, China's military modernization, Chinese ADIZ, Asia-Pacific

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			USMC Command and Staff College
Unclass	Unclass	Unclass	UU	26	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

The United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES


TITLE: The Emerging India-Japan Security Relationship

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR: Major Ajit Khatri, Indian Army


AY 15-16

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Douglas Streusand

Approved: 

Date: 13 April 2016

Oral Defense Committee Member: ERIC Y. SHIBUYA, PHD

Approved: 

Date: 13 April 2016

Executive Summary

Title: The Emerging India-Japan Security Relationship.

Author: Major Ajit Khatri, Indian Army.

Thesis: India and Japan have not taken full advantage of their security relationship. Their bilateral initiatives have been largely symbolic. In order to realize the full potential of the defense ties, both countries need to take a number of steps. India and Japan should sign a logistics support agreement (LSA), expand the transfer of defense equipment and technology; elevate the level and scope of joint exercises, and increase intelligence sharing and cooperation in cyber security and military operations other than war.

Discussion: The India-Japan relationship has a strong historic basis. Both countries share democratic values and a compelling interest in a peaceful and stable Asia. The rapidly evolving security environment in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region has contributed to the strengthening of India-Japan security relationship and the relationship has evolved into a Special Strategic and Global Partnership. China's rapid military modernization and assertive behavior have created doubts among its neighbors about its intentions. India and Japan both perceive the recent aggressive maneuvers by China as a threat to the peace and stability in the region. They also share a number of other non-traditional common security challenges such as piracy, international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and trafficking of drugs. Consequently, the two countries have taken a number of initiatives to enhance their security relationship. Visits by senior leaders and diplomats, exchange of military officers for training, negotiations for the sale of the Japanese Utility Seaplane Mark-2 (US-2), and the Indian Navy and Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force participation in the in the joint maritime exercises such as Malabar are some of the indicators of burgeoning India-Japan defense ties. The United States, Japan's close ally and India's strategic partner has acted as a catalyst in enhancing the India-Japan security relationship. The improvement in security ties, has thus far, added little to actual capabilities. However, with strong political commitments, both sides can make the relationship more valuable. This paper provides a few recommendations to strengthen the India-Japan defense ties.

Conclusion: The dangerous and volatile geopolitical environment in the Asia-Pacific makes a close strategic partnership between India and Japan a great asset to both states. Concrete improvements in defense cooperation will help make the tight connections a reality.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

List of figures

	Page
Figure 1. Recent security related issues around Japan.....	3
Figure 2. ADIZ declared by China November 2013	4
Figure 3. China’s dashed-line claims	4
Figure 4. Chinese land reclamation activities South China Sea (SCS)	5
Figure 5. India-China disputed border	6
Figure 6. The String of Pearls	7
Figure 7. Ranges of North Korean ballistic missiles	8
Figure 8. Operational concept of BMD	16

Table of Contents

	Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	ii
DISCLAIMER.....	iii
LIST of FIGURES.....	iv
PREFACE	vi
INTRODUCTION	1
BACKGROUND.....	2
SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING INDIA and JAPAN	3
ONGOING SECURITY INITIATIVES	8
RECOMMENDATIONS for STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE TIES.....	11
POLICY LEVEL RECOMMENDATIONS	11
INCREASE TRANSFER of DEFENSE EQUIPMENT and TECHNOLOGY	12
CYBERSECURITY	18
JOINT TRAINING and EXERCISES.....	19
ENHANCED COOPERATION in MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW).....	23
INTELLIGENCE SHARING	24
CHALLENGES FACING INDIA-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP	24
CONCLUSION.....	26
NOTES.....	27
BIBLIOGRAPHY	33

Preface

The main purpose of this paper is to give recommendations for strengthening the India-Japan security relationship. I endeavored to identify the important areas for security engagement, which if exploited, will add impetus to the burgeoning India-Japan defense ties. The paper also explains how the enhanced defense trade and cooperation will have a direct impact on the defense industry of both the countries. The paper will find relevance among the defense officials of India and Japan as well as those who monitor developments in the Asia-Pacific.

I am very grateful to my mentor, Dr. Douglas Streusand for providing me with the valuable guidance and assistance while carrying out the research and organizing my paper. His guidance broadened my horizon for exploring different areas of defense cooperation between India and Japan. I am also thankful to Professor GVC Naidu, Center for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi for providing me with the insight on the various aspects India-Japan strategic relationship.

I would also like to thank Leadership Communication Skills Center for their guidance through classroom instruction as well as one-to-one assistance during the writing stage. I appreciate the support of the Gray Research Center reference librarians, whose assistance during my research stage helped me save valuable time and provided access to the relevant database. Finally, I would like to thank Major Yoshi Nishida, my colleague from the Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces, who enlightened me on the various aspects of Japanese Self Defense Force and the Japanese Ministry of Defense.

Respectfully

Ajit Khatri

Major, Indian Army

Introduction

India and Japan, the world's largest and Asia's wealthiest democracies respectively have converging strategic interests.¹ They share similar values and have a common interest in the peace, stability, and prosperity of Asia and the world.² The shared democratic values and the peaceful development are the anchors of bilateral relationship that is unencumbered by any kind of historical baggage.³ Over the past decade, leaders of both the countries have been paying a great deal of attention to strengthen their connection. Recent visits by the senior leaders and diplomats are an indication of the growing India-Japan bilateral ties.⁴ In September 2014, newly elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi chose Japan as the destination for his first state visit outside India's immediate neighborhood. Prime Minister Modi and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe elevated the status of India-Japan relationship to a Special Strategic and Global Partnership.⁵

In view of their growing commitment to the world affairs and the common security threats faced by them, New Delhi and Tokyo have taken a number of initiatives to strengthen their defense ties. These initiatives, however, have been largely symbolic. In order to realize the full potential of their security relationship, both sides will need to create opportunities that will help in making their security relationship an enduring one. The signing of an agreement similar to the logistics support agreement (LSA), expansion in the transfer of defense equipment and technology, elevating the level and scope of joint exercises, and increased intelligence sharing and cooperation in cyber security and military operations other than war (MOOTW) are some of the steps that can add much-needed value to the India-Japan security relationship.

After providing a brief background of the India-Japan historical ties, the paper describes the security challenges facing India and Japan. The paper then lists out the significant

security engagements between the two countries. Finally, the paper presents recommendations for strengthening the security relationship.

Background

India's historical connections with Japan dates back to around sixth century AD when Buddhism made inroads into Japan from India via China and the Korean Peninsula.⁶ The victory of Japan, a "nonwhite power" over Russia, a "white power" in 1904-05 inspired a number of freedom fighters in India to overthrow the British rule by taking direct action against them.⁷ During the 1919 Paris peace conference, the Japanese delegation tried relentlessly to get an amendment passed for the establishment of racial equality among all the nations.⁸ Indians had been facing racial discrimination from the British during the British Raj.⁹ Opposition to the Western racism led to a sense of connection between the people of both countries. Many Indians saw Japan as an Asian country capable of fighting and defeating the white supremacy. Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, a prominent Indian freedom fighter sought Japanese help to raise the Indian National Army to liberate India from the British rule.¹⁰

Many Japanese still remember Indian Justice Radha Binod Pal for his judgment in favor of Japanese defendants at the Tokyo war crime tribunal.¹¹ Because of the concerns over the terms that imposed limitations on the sovereignty and national independence of Japan, India refused to attend the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951. After the restoration of Japan's sovereignty in 1952, India signed a separate Peace Treaty with Japan and waived all its reparation claims against Japan.¹² However, the reality of Cold War politics constrained the diplomatic relations between India and Japan. During the Cold War, Japan did not extend its security relationships beyond the security alliance it formed with the United States. After gaining independence, India followed an independent and non-aligned foreign policy and had no inclination to work with the

US allies. However, the end of Cold War, the convergence of national strategic interests, and the assertive behavior of rising China have led to the strengthening of the strategic relationship between the two countries.

Security challenges facing Japan and India

India and Japan confront a number of common security challenges. Recent Chinese efforts to alter the status quo in Asia by forcefully asserting their territorial claims have stimulated the security connections between India and Japan. There are widespread regional concerns about Chinese hegemonic aspirations in Asia.¹³ China's rapid military modernization has increased its military superiority over Japan and India. Fig. 1 shows some of the recent security-related issues around Japan.




Figure 1: Recent Security Related Issues around Japan.¹⁴

China's assertion of its claim to the Senkaku Islands has raised tensions between Japan and China.¹⁵ The PLA Navy (PLAN) and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) have been expanding their activities around Japan.¹⁶ In August 2013, Chinese warships participated in a joint Russia-China exercise and circumnavigated Japan for the first time.¹⁷ In November 2013, China

established its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the part of the ECS that overlapped with Japanese and South Korean ADIZ, which raised serious concerns in Japan.¹⁸ Fig. 2 shows the extent of ADIZ declared by China in November 2013.




Figure 2: ADIZ declared by China, November 2013.

Figure 3: China's dashed-line claims¹⁹

China also claims almost ninety percent of the SCS. It is proclaiming the maritime territory based on the ancient Chinese maps and represents the boundary of its claims by Nine-dashed line.²⁰ The Chinese claims based on their dashed-line theory have been inconsistent with the international law of the sea.²¹ Figure 3 shows the comparison of China's dashed-line claims made in 1947 and 2009. To assert these claims, China is building artificial islands by carrying out land reclamation activities.²² Figure 4 shows the extent of land reclamation activities carried out by China on Fiery Cross Reef in the SCS. Since most of the Japanese crude oil imports and sea trade pass through the SCS, these Chinese claims are a serious cause of concern for

Japan.²³ The development and testing of anti-satellite weapons by China has raised concerns about the vulnerability of space-based assets.²⁴ As a result, Japan is looking to strengthen its defense capabilities, and Prime Minister Abe has managed to get approval from the cabinet “concerning reinterpretation of the pacifist constitution, allowing Japan to redefine its right to collective self-defense.”²⁵



Airbus Defence and Space imagery shows the extent of China's reclamation at Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea from 8 August 2014 to 8 January 2015. Since November 2014, dredgers have continued to remove material from the seafloor to generate new terrain and have joined the extant structure to the new land being created.

© CNES 2015, Distribution Airbus DS / IHS: 1560498

Figure 4: Chinese land reclamation activities South China Sea.²⁶

India faces similar threats from China. India and China have long-standing territorial disputes with China. China is occupying 38,000 square kilometers of Indian Territory in Aksai Chin in Jammu and Kashmir and it claims 90,000 square kilometers in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Pakistan complicated the situation further by ceding 5180 square kilometers of territory from Pakistan occupied Kashmir to China in 1963.²⁷ China's heightened activities and development of infrastructure in Tibet Autonomous Region are a cause of concern for the Indian policy makers.²⁸ Frequent incursions by PLA troops into the Indian Territory have kept India uncertain about the Chinese intentions and exposed India's vulnerabilities.²⁹ Figure 5 shows the territorial disputes between India and China.




Figure 5: India-China border Disputes.³⁰

China is investing heavily in developing a number of ports such as in the littoral states of the IOR to gain berthing and access facilities for Chinese vessels. Indian military officials perceive it as a Chinese military initiative, also called as ‘strings of pearls’ strategy, to encircle India.³¹ Figure 6 shows Chinese-built ports that form part of China’s strings of pearls. The PLAN is also increasing its footprints in the Indian Ocean by conducting submarine visits to countries like Pakistan and Sri Lanka.³²




Figure 6: String of Pearls

The North Korean nuclear and missile program also poses a grave threat to security and stability in the region.³³ The threat posed by a nuclear North Korea, which has been involved in the proliferation of missile and nuclear technology, is a geopolitical reality that is a serious cause

of concern for not only Japan and India, but for the entire world.³⁴ Figure 7 depicts approximate ranges of North Korean ballistic missiles. The North Korea's recently conducted nuclear tests (claimed to be a thermonuclear device by Pyongyang) and long-range rocket launch over Okinawa have grave ramifications for the security of Japan. These provocative actions by North Korea present a challenge to the peace and security in the Asia-Pacific.³⁵




Figure 7: Ranges of North Korean Ballistic Missiles.³⁶

Both India and Japan face a number of non-traditional security challenges such as piracy, international terrorism, smuggling of weapons, and trafficking of drugs. Mumbai terror attacks in 2008 highlighted India's vulnerability to maritime terrorism.³⁷ Cyber-attacks in the form of cyber espionage and cyber terrorism have also emerged as a major threat to their security. The growing number of cyber-attacks is a cause of serious concern for the government of both the countries as a large number of these attacks are targeting the security establishments and business firms.³⁸

Ongoing security initiatives.

In the light of common strategic interests and security concerns, India and Japan are deepening their bilateral ties with particular emphasis on the maritime security.³⁹ Both countries have taken a number of initiatives for enhancing the security relationship. The great shift in the relationship began when Japanese Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro visited India in 2000, and the bilateral relations have improved since then.⁴⁰ In October 2008, the Indian and Japanese Prime Ministers signed a joint security declaration and “decided to create a comprehensive framework for the enhancement of security cooperation between the two countries.”⁴¹ As per the declaration, nine elements were included in security cooperation.⁴² This was a significant step in the evolving Indo-Japanese security relationship.⁴³ Since then, the two countries have established a number of mechanisms for cooperation in the field of defense and maritime security. A few prominent ones are regular meetings of defense ministers, consultation between the National Security Advisors, annual Subcabinet/Senior Officials 2+2 dialogue, maritime security dialogues, and participation in annual bilateral and multilateral naval exercises.⁴⁴ There is an ongoing exchange of military officers between the JSDF and the Indian armed forces for education in defense institutes such as Staff College and National Defense College.

The Indian Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) have participated in a number of joint bilateral and multilateral exercises like Malabar and Rim of Pacific (RIMPAC). The Indian and Japanese Coast Guards have been conducting joint exercises since the year 2000 to develop capabilities for coordinated response to maritime security challenges like piracy, drugs trafficking, and other unlawful activities.⁴⁵ The bilateral ties have particularly started flourishing under the strong nationalist leadership of Mr. Modi and Mr. Abe. During Prime Minister Abe’s visit to India in December 2015, the two countries signed the

Agreement concerning the transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation and protection of classified military information.⁴⁶ The two leaders also announced Japan's participation as a stable guest in the Indo-U.S. Malabar naval exercises.⁴⁷

In April 2014, the Abe administration formally eased its nearly half-century long ban on Japanese arms trade.⁴⁸ Since then, talks over India's purchase of Japanese Utility Seaplane Mark 2 (US-2) amphibious aircraft have been fast-tracked.⁴⁹ India and Japan also established a Joint Working Group (JWG) for working out the modalities for the cooperation on the US-2 amphibian aircraft.⁵⁰ The JWG is also exploring the possibility of joint production of the aircraft in India.⁵¹ An agreement to manufacture the amphibian aircraft in India will give the Indian defense industry an access to Japanese state of the art technology.⁵² The deal, if successful, will add value to the Indo-Japan security relationship since "Japan has not entered into such a deep security relationship with countries other than the United States and Australia."⁵³

The United States has played a predominant role in improving Indo-Japanese defense ties. The burgeoning Indo-U.S. security relationship and the United States' acknowledgment of India as a long-term security partner have facilitated the strengthening of Indo-Japanese security relationship.⁵⁴ In April 2007, the United States, India, and Japan participated in a trilateral naval exercise together for the first time in the western Pacific. In August 2007, Japan, Australia, and Singapore participated in the annual Indo-U.S. Malabar naval exercise and transformed it into a large-scale multilateral exercise. Although Indian policy makers in New Delhi generally understand the role of the United States for acting as a facilitator in the improvement of Indo-Japanese relations, they "tend to place significant emphasis on the independent nature of India-Japan relationship."⁵⁵

Recommendations for strengthening the security relationship

The initiatives for improving defense ties have as yet produced only limited results. There is an ample scope for exploring various areas for defense engagements to take the security relationship to the next level. The subsequent paragraphs present a series of recommendations for the strengthening of India-Japan defense ties.

Policy level recommendations.

At the policy level, the signing of an agreement similar to the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) can become an important step towards the strengthening of defense relationship between India and Japan. The LSA would require both India and Japan to provide berthing space, fuel, and other kind of logistics support to each other's fighter jets and naval warships. Depending on the terms of the LSA, the support regarding weapons facilities could involve non-offensive military equipment. This support would be on reciprocal basis and would involve cashless transaction.⁵⁶ The LSA will help in improving the cooperation between the Indian and the Japanese forces during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions, peacekeeping operations, and joint exercises. The framing of legal guidelines that are mutually agreeable to both sides will be the first step towards the realization of the LSA.⁵⁷ With the Indian Navy looking to expand its role beyond the IOR, India will need to establish logistics support mechanisms with security partners such as the United States and Japan. The Modi government has already opened talks with the United States for an LSA, which is a strategic shift from the previous United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government's stance of opposing any such agreement.⁵⁸ Japan, will benefit immensely from signing the LSA. India can fulfill the logistics requirements of JMSDF from naval bases like Indian Naval Ship (INS) Jarawa in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and INS Venduruthy near Kochi. The agreement would have strategic and

defense benefits. It would mitigate the capabilities gaps and logistics shortfalls faced by the Indian Navy and the JMSDF while dealing with regional contingencies.

Increase transfer of defense equipment and technology. Another important means for strengthening the India-Japan Strategic partnership could be through increased transfer of defense equipment and technology, co-development, and co-production of sophisticated defense equipment and technologies. Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Modi signed the Agreement concerning the transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology during the visit of former to India in December 2015. The signing of this path-breaking agreement has created tremendous scope for collaboration on defense-related projects.⁵⁹ India's defense industrial base is still in a nascent stage. With 'Make in India' drive, India is looking for partners who can agree to the transfer of defense technology along with the sales of defense hardware.

The increase in defense trade will invigorate the Japanese defense industry, which is looking for global expansion since the easing of restrictions on Japanese arms trade by the Abe government. India, which is one of the biggest importers of defense hardware, can become a lucrative market for the Japanese defense industry.⁶⁰ Export of defense hardware to India will not only reduce the per unit cost of manufacturing the military equipment and weapons systems, but it will also allow Japanese defense industry to compete at the global level. India will gain tremendously by getting access to high-end defense technology from Japan.⁶¹ The Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD) is also inclined towards joint development programs. The defense ministries of the two countries should identify the projects offering the greater mutual benefit. Some of the important defense projects where Japan can collaborate with India for joint development and production are the Utility Seaplane Mark 2 (US-2) amphibian aircraft,

submarines, minesweepers, submarine rescue vehicles, ballistic missile defense, main battle tanks (MBTs), and robots for defense application.

The defense deal regarding the sale of Japanese manufactured US-2 rescue amphibian to India is already in the final stages of negotiation.⁶² The completion of the deal, with an agreement for giving license for manufacturing of the amphibian aircraft in India, will be the first concrete step towards adding value to the defense relationship. It would be the first sale of a finished product developed by the Japanese defense industry, since the Japanese government's ban on the export of defense-related products.⁶³ In addition to giving a boost to the Indian Navy's maritime surveillance and search and rescue capabilities, the deal will pave the way for the expansion of defense engagement between India and Japan. The deal will help Japan expand its defense industry, and allow its major defense firms to retain talent to develop military technology that is vital for the defense of Japan.⁶⁴

Another important area of cooperation can be in the field of submarines. The Indian Navy has an aging submarine fleet and it is currently working on projects to update its submarine fleet. With the increase in activities of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi has decided to strengthen its naval power by building submarines in India under the Project 75 India. The Indian government had shown interest in Japan's non-nuclear Soryu-class submarines for the Project 75 India and sent a proposal to the Japanese government for construction of six ultra-quiet submarines in a joint venture with the Indian shipyards.⁶⁵ The Soryu-class submarines developed by Japan are among the most advanced diesel-electric submarines in the world. Australia is also negotiating with Japan to replace its Collins-class submarines with Soryu-class ultra-quiet submarines.⁶⁶ Induction of these stealth submarines will not only give a tremendous boost to the Indian naval capabilities but also enhance the interoperability between the Indian

Navy and the JMSDF. Since the project is a key part of the 'Make in India' campaign, it will also help to strengthen the India-Japan strategic partnership. However, for the realization of such projects, both sides will need to deal with complicated issues like the technology prerequisites, project timeframes, and economic practicability.⁶⁷

Minesweepers and submarine rescue vehicles can become another two important areas of collaboration for Indian and Japanese defense industry. Japanese technology in these two fields is among the best in the world and Japan is renowned for its expertise in sea clearance. Japan also operates one of the largest minesweeping fleets in the world, and the JMSDF had participated in minesweeping operations during the Korean War and the Gulf War of 1991.⁶⁸ The Indian Navy currently operates six to seven vintage Soviet-era minesweepers against a total requirement of twenty-four minesweepers. To make up for the critical shortfall, the Defense Acquisition Council (DAC) has awarded the \$5 billion contract for building twelve mine countermeasure vessels (MCMVs) to India's state-owned Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL). According to the terms of the contract, GSL will construct these MCMVs in collaboration with the foreign firms.⁶⁹ The Japanese defense firms that have the requisite expertise should grab this opportunity and submit their bids for the contract. If the Japanese firms succeed in getting the contract, then the Indian defense industry will gain access to state of the art Japanese technology used in the construction of minesweepers. The Japanese defense industry will gain immensely by emerging as a competitor at the international level. Overall, it will be a win-win situation for both Indian and Japanese defense firms.

Submarine rescue vehicle is another piece of equipment that has recently gained importance in the eyes of the Indian Navy. Recently, the Indian Navy experienced a number of accidents in its aging submarine fleet. The biggest setback was the blast and subsequent sinking

of the submarine *INS Sindhurakshak*, leading to the loss of eighteen precious lives. However, the Indian Navy has not had a Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicles (DSRV) since 1988, the year it decommissioned the lone DSRV it had procured in 1971.⁷⁰ In October 2015, the Indian DAC also extended the Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for the procurement of two DSRVs for the Indian Navy.⁷¹ The JMSDF is presently operating two DSRVs manufactured by Kawasaki Heavy Industries of Japan.⁷² Acquisition of the DSRVs for the Indian Navy from the Japanese firms will further strengthen the defense relationship by broadening the scope of engagement for the defense-related sales.

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is also one of the key areas for defense cooperation between India and Japan. Both the countries face similar nature of ballistic missile threat from countries in their neighborhood.⁷³ The proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies between North Korea and Pakistan has heightened the security threats for both Japan and India. Japan has invested heavily in the BMD and deployed a multi-tier system (Aegis and Patriot PAC-3), co-developed with the United States, to deal with the rising ballistic missile threat from North Korea.⁷⁴ Figure 8 shows the operational concept of BMD. India's Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) is developing a two-tier BMD system, and it has conducted a series of successful tests of the BMD system.⁷⁵ Collaboration in the field of BMD has been one of the areas identified for strengthening defense relationship between India and the United States.⁷⁶ Japan manufactures a number of critical components of the BMD system co-developed by the United States and Japan. Hence, India's cooperation in the field of BMD would actually "mean a trilateral US-India-Japan strategic cooperation that would have its impact on larger security environment."⁷⁷




Figure 8: Operational Concept of BMD.⁷⁸

Japan has also launched a number of Information Gathering Satellites (IGS) as part of its layered ballistic missile defense. These IGS have a primary mission of providing early warning of impending hostile missile launches and they carry synthetic aperture radar (SAR) for observing targets in dark or inclement weather.⁷⁹ Japan has a highly organized and well-established system of early warning and response to the missile launches that has evolved over time in response to the North Korean missile launches.⁸⁰ To develop such an effective and sophisticated BMD system, India will need to establish a constellation of IGS and communication satellites that are resistant to jamming and are able to evade the anti-satellite weapons of the adversaries. Recently, India has launched a number of surveillance and communication satellites to bolster its defense capabilities.⁸¹ However, it will be prudent for India to collaborate with Japan, which has much more advanced technology in the field of IGS. It

will not only speed up India's BMD system deployment but also add a lot of substance to the strategic partnership between India and Japan.

Co-development and co-production of the main battle tank (MBT) is another important area of collaboration between India and Japan. Both the countries have their active indigenous tank development programs (India's *Arjun MBT* and Japan's *Type 10 MBT*⁸²). The unit cost of these programs have been extremely high because of the small numbers purchased. The Arjun tank is suitable for deployment in India's western sector; however, owing to its weight and size it is unsuitable for deployment in high-altitude plateau regions bordering China, which has limited infrastructure. Hence, there is a scope for India and Japan to collaborate in the co-development and co-production of lighter and smaller tanks such as Type 10 MBT, which will find utility in the Indian Army as well as the JMSDF. Indian Army will be able to employ these lighter and smaller tanks in plateau regions in the northern and the eastern sectors to counter the Chinese aggression.⁸³ The overall production cost for these tanks will reduce considerably because of increase in the quantities. Such a collaboration can form the basis for future cooperation in the co-development and co-production of platforms such as amphibious armored vehicles (AAVs)⁸⁴/ amphibious combat vehicles (ACVs).

Military robots can be another field for enhancing the India-Japan defense cooperation. Japan is a renowned global leader in the field of robotics, and it has been employing robots in various fields ranging from industrial manufacturing to household works.⁸⁵ In the security arena, India has been employing robots for the handling of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), but these robots are of very basic nature and their numbers are very limited. The Indian security forces mostly rely on metal detectors and dogs for detection of IEDs and rely on Bomb Disposal (BD) squads for their disposal. The security forces have also sustained casualties while handling

of IEDs planted by the anti-national elements. The BD experts can employ robots for tasks such as detection, inspection, and to disarm IEDs by staying at a safe distance from them.⁸⁶

Surveillance is another important area for employment of robots during counter-terrorist operations. Specially designed robots and drones can greatly enhance the overall situational awareness of the security forces by acting as a platform for mounting of surveillance sensors.⁸⁷

Robots can also play a great role during HADR missions and search and rescue operations.⁸⁸

Collaboration in the field of robotics in the form of technology transfer through 'make in India' drive will help to enhance the capabilities of Indian security forces. On the other hand, it will provide Japanese companies a huge market for investment in India and help in reducing the cost of otherwise expensive Japanese robots. Overall, it will not only add value to the security relationship and but also give a boost to the economic relationship.

Cybersecurity. With increasing vulnerabilities in the cyber realms, cyber security can become another important area of cooperation between India and Japan. China is employing its extensive cyber capabilities in an offensive manner in the form of cyber attacks and cyber espionage to gain strategic advantage against its competitors. The United States, India, and Japan have been the main targets of these cyber attacks. These countries have their own mechanisms to deal with their vulnerabilities in the field of cyberspace. Japan follows a whole of government approach while responding to cyber-attacks. It has established a Cyber Defense Group under the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication, and Computers) to deal with cyber threats.⁸⁹ The Indian government unveiled its National Cyber Security Policy in 2013 and it has hastened the process of raising a new joint Cyber command to deal with the cyber threats.⁹⁰ However, presently the cooperation in the field of cyber security between India and Japan is limited to the policy level discussions and selection of projects for future implementation.⁹¹

India has a vast pool of talent in the Information Technology sector whereas Japan is one of the leaders in the field of sophisticated and state of the art cyber technologies including the designing of supercomputers. India and Japan can set up a Joint Cyber Defense Working Group to deepen the cooperation in the field of cyber security. This joint working group should aim to promote cyber policy discussions, sharing of cyber information, joint exercises incorporating cyber-attack response and cooperation in the training of personnel. Japan and the United States had set up a “Cyber Defense Policy Working Group”⁹² in October 2013, whereas India and Japan engage with each other through India-Japan Cyber Dialogues.⁹³ The cooperation in the field of cyber security can also take the form of a trilateral cooperation with the United States, India, and Japan working together to deal with this new form of warfare unleashed by countries like China and North Korea.

Joint training and exercises. Another important means of strengthening the defense ties is through joint exercises and joint training of defense personnel. Presently, India and Japan jointly participate in a limited number of maritime exercises like Malabar and Japan India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX). India generally remains cautious while engaging in security cooperation activity with the United States and Japan, and remains wary of provoking China. However, because of China’s recent aggressive maneuvers in the region and the rapid expansion of their influence and footprints in the IOR, the Indian government is much more willing to pursue a stronger defense cooperation with the United States and Japan.⁹⁴ The expansion in the scope and level of joint exercises conducted between the militaries of India and Japan will go a long way in enhancing the security cooperation. The number of joint exercises should increase, and in addition, to the maritime exercises, the army, and the air force should start engaging through joint exercises.

Presently, the cooperation between the Indian Army and the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) is limited to expert exchanges in the field of peacekeeping operations, HADR, and counter-terrorism.⁹⁵ India has the second largest standing army in Asia. The Indian Army is highly experienced in conventional operations, counter-insurgency as well as peacekeeping operations. India has all kinds of terrain, varying from deserts to thick jungles and coastal areas to high altitude terrain, for conducting training and exercises. Japan has a shortage of training and exercise areas, whereas India has adequate ranges for the conduct of training and exercises.⁹⁶ With the strengthening defense ties, there will be a scope of carrying out joint exercises involving the combined forces of two countries in India's western deserts. India also has world-class, specialized training schools for high altitude warfare training, jungle warfare training, and counter-insurgency training where personnel of JGSDF can train jointly with Indian army personnel and diversify their skills.

The JGSDF regularly conducts amphibious assault exercises and practice defense of island territories. They have gained a high degree of proficiency in the conduct of amphibious operations by participating in a number of amphibious exercises with the United States Marines.⁹⁷ The troops of Indian amphibious brigades and their Japanese counterparts can learn from each other's experiences, and hone their skills and drills through the conduct of joint amphibious exercises. India and Japan have a number of island territories, and therefore, both need to have a strong amphibious force to deal with any kind of contingency. The Andaman and Nicobar islands, the home to India's first joint services command, are ideally suited for the conduct of amphibious exercises. Beginning with the conduct of small company level exercises, both sides should gradually raise the level of these exercises to battalion and brigade level. These joint amphibious exercises will not only enhance the interoperability between the forces of two

countries but will also help in strengthening the defense relationship by diversifying the scope for future defense cooperation.

The interaction between Indian Air Force (IAF) and Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) also needs particular attention. Presently, the JASDF and the IAF participate in a number of exercises with other countries and multilateral exercises like Red Flag⁹⁸ but do not engage with each other in any bilateral exercise. During the summit meeting between Prime Minister Modi and his Japanese counterpart in December 2015, both the leaders appreciated the decision to hold “the inaugural Air Staff Talks in 2016 with the view to enhancing the service cooperation and functional level Exchanges.”⁹⁹ With the strengthening of the defense ties, the initial air staff talks and official exchanges of test pilots and air transport squadrons between the IAF and JASDF¹⁰⁰ could pave the way for the conduct of full-fledged bilateral exercises. Moreover, the JASDF has been actively involved in scrambles against Chinese and Russian aircraft¹⁰¹ and has a robust and highly developed response system for dealing with intrusions by the alien aircraft. Both the IAF and the JASDF can further develop their skills and response system by carrying out joint training and exercises. The JASDF can gain by utilizing the firing ranges in India, where the IAF conducts its firing practices.¹⁰² The bilateral air force exercise between the IAF and JASDF can further develop into trilateral or multilateral exercises involving countries such as the United States, Australia, South Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam.

Another important area of exploitation for strengthening the security relationship is the counter-terrorism and anti-hijacking training. The Indian National Security Guards (NSG) is the elite force for anti-terrorist and anti-hijacking operations and has a lot of practical experience in the conduct of such operations. Confronting terrorism has been one of the issues of concern for Japanese Self Defense Force and the Japanese National Police Agency. Incidents such as the

hijacking of the Japanese Airlines jet by the Japanese Red Army in 1977¹⁰³, Tokyo subway gas attacks¹⁰⁴, and kidnapping of four Japanese geologists¹⁰⁵ have highlighted the need for a highly trained force that can respond to such acts of terrorism. The Japanese National Police Agency had raised Special Assault Teams (SAT) to deal with such kind of contingencies.¹⁰⁶ The Japanese SATs can train with their counterparts in the NSG and gain from the practical experiences that the NSG has in dealing with terrorism, through the conduct of successful counter-terrorism operations like the Black Tornado.¹⁰⁷ Joint training and exercises by the Indian Special Forces and the Japanese Special Forces Group can be another important step to enhance interoperability and strengthen the defense ties.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) warfare is also an important area for the conduct of joint training and exercises. Both India, as well as Japan, have been victims of CBRN accidents/attacks.¹⁰⁸ In the light of evolving CBRN threats from state and non-state actors, both India and Japan are trying to enhance their capabilities to deal with such attacks. Since the military will generally be the first responders to the CBRN attacks/ accidents, there is a need to develop their CBRN warfare capabilities through the conduct of CBRN training and exercises. The JGSDF participates in CBRN exercises with the United States military and it has gained practical experience because of the events like 1995 Tokyo sarin gas attacks and 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster.¹⁰⁹ Indian military can learn from their Japanese counterparts through conduct of joint training and bilateral CBRN exercises. The Indian Army and JGSDF should establish a bilateral CBRN Defense Working Group. The joint CBRN training will help the Indian Army and JGSDF to respond jointly to any such crises throughout the world.

Enhanced cooperation in military operations other than war (MOOTW). There are other areas like the MOOTW, that include operations such as HADR, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), and anti-piracy operations where the level of engagement between the Indian armed forces and the JSDF should increase substantially. The Asia-Pacific and the IOR are highly prone to natural disasters like earthquakes, tsunami, and floods that present a threat to the stability in the region.¹¹⁰ The JSDF and the Indian armed forces are among the primary and most capable agencies for the conduct of HADR missions. Joint training and exercise for HADR operations will enhance the interoperability between the armed forces of the two countries. Indian armed force recently conducted NEO in war-torn countries like Yemen (India's fourth NEO in less than a year), which won them accolades internationally.¹¹¹ Japan participated in few NEO exercises but JSDF has limited real-world NEO experience.¹¹² By conducting NEO exercises, both JSDF and the Indian armed forces can enhance their interoperability, capability, and readiness level to respond to the contingencies requiring NEO.

Both India and Japan actively participate in international peacekeeping operations and provide troops for UNPKO. India is among one of the largest contributors of troops in UNPKO and has extensive experience in the conduct of peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement operations.¹¹³ Japan's SDF personnel started participating in the UNPKO after the ratification of International Peacekeeping Law in 1992.¹¹⁴ Both India and Japan have pressed for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reforms and both are claimants to the permanent membership of the UNSC.¹¹⁵ By cooperating further in the international peacekeeping activities and the UNPKO and by supporting each other's candidature both sides can strengthen their case for the permanent membership of UNSC. Furthermore, the Indian Navy and the JMSDF should continue

to enhance their engagement in anti-piracy operations as well as countering drug and weapons smuggling. The Indian Navy, which has a formidable presence in the IOR, can provide escorts to the Japanese merchant ships and tankers and act as a security provider.

Intelligence sharing. Intelligence sharing is another area that is of immense importance for strengthening the security relationship. The intelligence community collects intelligence through means like Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), and signal intelligence (SIGINT).¹¹⁶ The scope of intelligence and information sharing can vary from the military activities of common adversaries to the intelligence related to terrorist activities, illegal weapons/drugs smuggling, and human trafficking etc. However, for the effective information and intelligence sharing between various intelligence agencies of India and Japan, both sides will have to overcome the existing obstacles by setting up formalized mechanisms. An effective intelligence/information sharing network between India and Japan will not only help in dealing with conventional and non-conventional threats, will also act as a confidence-building measure, and strengthen the security relationship.

Challenges facing Indo-Japan security relationship.

There are a number of challenges facing the India-Japan defense relationship. One of the biggest is the Japan's pacifist constitution. In accordance with the Article 9 of the Constitution, Japan has been maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and has relied mainly on the Japan-U.S. security alliance for its defense. Even after the easing of restrictions on the arms sales, there has not been much growth in the defense commerce of the Japanese defense industry. It may be due to the lack of experience of Japanese defense firms in dealing with foreign governments, as well as due to the high cost of Japanese inventory. Another challenge is the issue of transferring

Japanese defense technology to India. In spite of India's assurance to Japan regarding the non-sharing of such technology with any other country, there has been very limited progress on the high technology trade in the defense sector. A successful conclusion of the ongoing US-2 seaplane deal can provide the breakthrough in overcoming this challenge.

China, which is one of the main reasons for the strengthening of India-Japan defense relationship, will also present a challenge to the evolving defense ties. China carries historical baggage in its relationship with Japan as well as India. China will see any attempts by India and Japan to strengthen their security relationship as towards itself. The negative reactions of the Chinese government, as well as the Chinese media to the growing Indo-Japan defense ties, are evident during any high-level defense engagement between India and Japan such as joint naval exercises. The security dilemma with China has also been a limiting factor to India and Japan's trilateral security engagement with the United States since China perceives any such move as a containment policy targeted towards itself.

India's pursuit of strategic autonomy will be another challenge to the strengthening of the bilateral Indo-Japan security relationship. Ashley J. Tellis also pointed out "that Indian security managers believe that the best insurance against assertive Chinese power lies not in participating in any evolving anti-China alliance but rather in emerging as a strong and independent power center on China's periphery."¹¹⁷ Indian think tanks, although aware of the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance would like to pursue an independent defense relationship with Japan. The challenge for both India and Japan is to find their own reasons for developing an enduring security partnership that does not rely solely on their relationship with the United States or on the Chinese threat.

Conclusion.

India and Japan share universal values and have a common strategic interest in peaceful and stable Asia.¹¹⁸ Both the countries do not want Chinese hegemony in Asia. The security relationship between India and Japan has developed recently because of the improved Indo-U.S. strategic partnership. Under the leadership of Mr. Modi and Mr. Abe, the recent engagements have been very positive with both sides striving to build up a stronger and enduring security relationship. However, both sides are yet to realize the full potential of their security relationship. The future of the Indo-Japanese security relationship depends on the political will of both countries. In order to deepen their defense ties, both sides will have to explore new areas for engagement and overcome the hurdles to their relationship. It is beyond doubt that a strong India-Japan security relationship will help in maintaining a stable Asian power equilibrium and multipolar Asia by balancing assertive China.

- ¹Ankit Panda, "India and Japan Come Together," *The Diplomat*, October 01, 2012, <http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/india-and-japan-come-together/>; Thitinan Pongsudhirak, "Japan and India are Asia's democratic polestars," *Nikkei Asian Review*, January 28, 2016, <http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160128-SHATTERED-HOPES/Viewpoints/Thitinan-Pongsudhirak-Japan-and-India-are-Asia-s-democratic-polestars?page=1>; <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>.
- ² Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014* (Tokyo, September 2014), 283, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/e-book/2014/SWF_Window.html.
- ³ Embassy of India, *Ambassador Ronen Sen's remarks at a luncheon meeting of the Japan Society in New York* (Washington, DC: Embassy of India, February 15, 2008), https://www.indianembassy.org/archives_details.php?nid=1047.
- ⁴ Japan-India Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html>.
- ⁵ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "Tokyo Declaration for India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership," (September 01, 2014), <http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/23965/Tokyo+Declaration+for+India++Japan+Special+Strategic+and+Global+Partnership>.
- ⁶ Swami P Saxena, Neha Kapoor, "Official Development Assistance to India with special reference to Japan," *BVIMSR's Journal of Mangement Research*, Vol. 5, Issue-2, October 2013, 134-135; Michio Morishima, *Why has Japan succeeded?: Western technology and Japanese ethos* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 40; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-India Relations (Basic Data)," December 28, 2015, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html>.
- ⁷ Aftab Seth, *If an Elephant Loses Weight, It is Still an Elephant*, (Keio University Press, 2005), 40.
- ⁸ David P. Forsythe, *Encyclopedia of Human Rights* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 302.
- ⁹ Suhas Chakma, "Setting the Record Straight," *Racism Against Indigenous People*, eds. Suhas Chakma and Marianne Jensen (New Delhi and Denmark: AITPN & IWGIA, 2001), 11.
- ¹⁰ A. Mani and P. Ramasamy, "Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army: A Southeast Asian Perspective" The paper was presented at the Seminar on 'The forgotten Army in a World War: Subhas Bose's INA and Asia's Independence' organized by the Institute of the Southeast Asian Studies Institute (ISEAS), Singapore AND THE India Club on 13 August 2006, http://www.apu.ac.jp/rcaps/uploads/fckeditor/publications/journal/RJAPS_V22_Mani_Ramasamy.pdf; David Brewster, "The India-Japan Security Relationship: An Enduring Security Partnership?" *Asian Security*, vol. 6, no 2, 2010, 102, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14799851003756550>; Arpita Mathur, "India-Japan Relations: Drivers, Trends, and Prospects," *RSIS Monograph No.23*, 2012: 7, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2000/01/Monograph23.pdf>.
- ¹¹ Brewster, "An Enduring Security Partnership?" *Asian Security*, 2010: 102; Mathur, "India-Japan Relations: Drivers, Trends, and Prospects," *RSIS Monograph*, 10; Embassy of India, *Ambassador Ronen Sen's remarks*, February 15, 2008.
- ¹² K.R. Narayanan, *Image and Insight* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1987),255.
- ¹³ John Lee, "Nonmilitary Approach to Countering Chinese Coercion: A Code of Practice for the Asia-Pacific," *Maritime Strategy Series*, September 2014, 13, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_Maritime3_Lee_0.pdf.
- ¹⁴ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2015* (Tokyo, 2015), http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2015/DOJ2015_Digest_part1_web.pdf.
- ¹⁵ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014* (Tokyo, September 2014), 42, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/e-book/2014/SWF_Window.html.
- ¹⁶ Satoru Nagao, "India as the key for the Japan-U.S. Alliance," *The Rebalance within Asia: The Evolution of Japan India Relations* (Washington DC: Wilson Centre, October 2014), 18, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA_140905_Rebalance%20Within%20Asia%20rpt.pdf; Ken Jimbo, "The Japan-China Feud in the East China Sea: A Better Scheme for Status-Quo Management?" (Washington

-
- DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, November 19, 2013), 1, http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/outreach/Jimbo_Commentary_111913.pdf.
- ¹⁷ Satoru Nagao, "India as the key for the Japan-U.S. Alliance," *The Rebalance within Asia: The Evolution of Japan India Relations* (Washington DC: Wilson Centre, October 2014), 18, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA_140905_Rebalance%20Within%20Asia%20rpt.pdf.
- ¹⁸ Jun Osawa, "China's ADIZ over the East China Sea: A Great Wall in the Sky"? *Brookings*, 17 December 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/17-china-air-defense-identification-zone-osawa>.
- ¹⁹ *Jane's Defence Weekly*, "South China Sea: Footprints in the Sand," February 12, 2015, <https://janesh-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1736093>.
- ²⁰ Melda Malek, "A Legal Assessment of China's Historic Claims in the South China Sea," *Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs* 5, no. 1 (2013): 28-36. <http://search.proquest.com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/1350978889?accountid=14746>.
- ²¹ *Jane's Defence Weekly*, "US State Dept plays down report critical of China's SCS claim," December 16, 2014, <https://janesh-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1731583>.
- ²² *Jane's Defence Weekly*, "US Philippines express concern at Chinese land reclamation in South China Sea," January 29, 2015, <https://janesh-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1734953>.
- ²³ Leszek Buszynski and Christopher B. Roberts, eds., *The South China Sea Maritime Dispute: Political, Legal, and Regional Perspectives* (New York, Routledge, 2015), 17.
- ²⁴ Evan Osnos, "Beijing Confirms Missile Test on Satellite." *McClatchy - Tribune Business News*, Jan 24, 2007. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/462867647?accountid=14746>.
- ²⁵ Basu, "India-Japan Security Cooperation," *Asian Strategic Review 2015*, ed. Muni and Chadha, 270.
- ²⁶ *Janes Defense Weekly*, "US, Philippines express concerns at Chinese land reclamation in South China Sea," January 29, 2015, <https://janesh-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1734953>.
- ²⁷ Rajshree Jetly, "India and China: Emerging Dynamics and Regional Security Perspective," *Perspective on South Asian Security* edited by Shanthie Marie D'Souza and Rajshree Jetly (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2013), 44; Katherine Richards, "China-India: An Analysis of the Himalayan territorial Dispute" (Asia Pacific Strategy Papers, Australian Defense College, February 2015), 4-5, <http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Richards%20final%20IPSD%20paper.pdf>; Tshering Topgay, *Charting the Tibet Issue in the Sino-Indian Border Dispute* China Report May 2011 47: 120.
- ²⁸ Jetly, "India and China: Emerging Dynamics," *Perspective on South Asian Security* eds. D'Souza and Jetly, 42-44.
- ²⁹ "Chellaney Brahma, "PLA Aborts Narendra Modi's China Reset." *Mint*, Oct 06, 2014. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1586126650?accountid=14746>.
- ³⁰ <http://iasips.in/ir-india-china/>.
- ³¹ DeSilva-Ranasinghe, Sergei. "String of Pearls - Evaluating China's Indian Ocean Strategy." *Jane's Intelligence Review* 25, no. 3 (Mar 01, 2013), <http://search.proquest.com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/1287854711?accountid=14746>; Shannon Tiezzi, "The Maritime Silk Road vs. The String of Pearls," *The Diplomat* (Japan), 13 February 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/the-maritime-silk-road-vs-the-string-of-pearls/>; In 2005 a team of Booz Allen consultants, in a report for the Pentagon, coined the term 'string of pearls' to describe China's attempts to gain a strategic foothold in the Indian Ocean.
- ³² Abhijit Singh, "Deciphering China's Submarine Deployments in the Indian Ocean Region," (New Delhi: Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies Analyses, July 8, 2015), http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/DecipheringChinasSubmarineDeploymentsintheIndianOceanRegion_asingh_080715; Harsh V. Pant, "China's Naval Expansion in the Indian Ocean and India-China Rivalry," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* vol 8, issue 18, no. 4, May 3, 2010.
- ³³ Basu, "India-Japan Security Cooperation," *Asian Strategic Review 2015*, ed. Muni and Chadha, 271.
- ³⁴ Arms Control Association, *Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: North Korea*, October 2015, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/northkoreaprofile>; Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014*, 17-18.
- ³⁵ Reiji Yoshida and Ayako Mie, "North Korea defies U.N. by firing long range rockets over Okinawa," *The Japan Times*, February 7, 2016, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/07/national/north-korea-fires-rocket-seen-covert-missile-test-japan-condemns-launch/#.VsE7iflrLWI>; Reiji Yoshida and Mizuho Aoki, "Japan Slams North

-
- Korean 'H-Bomb' Test," *McClatchy - Tribune Business News*, Jan 07, 2016, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1754113554?accountid=14746>.
- ³⁶ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014*, 24.
- ³⁷ Angel Rabasa, Robert D. Blackwill, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, C. Christine Fair, Brian A. Jackson, Brian Michael Jenkins, Seth G. Jones, Nathaniel Shestak and Ashley J. Tellis, "The Lessons of Mumbai" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP249.html.
- ³⁸ Marsh and McLennan, *Cybercrime in Asia: A Changing Regulatory Environment*, 6-8, http://asia.marsh.com/Portals/59/Documents/Cybercrime%20in%20Asia%20-%20A%20Changing%20Regulatory%20Environment_EN.pdf.
- ³⁹ Franz-Stefan Gady, "India and Japan Continue to Deepen Their Defense Ties," *The Diplomat*, Apr 01, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/india-and-japan-continue-to-deepen-their-defense-ties/>.
- ⁴⁰ Brewster, "The India-Japan Security Relationship" *Asian Security*, 97.
- ⁴¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Japan, "Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India," October 22, 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pmv0810/joint_d.html.
- ⁴² MOFA of Japan, "Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation," October 22, 2008.
- ⁴³ Brewster, "The India-Japan Security Relationship" *Asian Security*, 96.
- ⁴⁴ Rajeev Sharma, "India-Japan Ties Poised for Advance as Both Nations Eye China," *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, vol.8, issue 36, no. 2, September 6, 2010, <http://japanfocus.org/-Rajeev-Sharma/3406/article.html>.
- ⁴⁵ Basu, "India-Japan Security Cooperation," *Asian Strategic Review 2015*, ed. Muni and Chadha, 274-275.
- ⁴⁶ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "List of documents exchanged during the visit of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan in New Delhi" (December 12, 2015), http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26177/List_of_documents_exchanged_during_the_visit_of_Prime_Minister_Shinzo_Abe_of_Japan_to_India_in_New_Delhi_December_12_2015.
- ⁴⁷ Gabriele Parussini, "India, Japan Strengthen Ties with Industrial, Military Agreements," *The Wall Street Journal*, December 13, 2015.
- ⁴⁸ Heigo Sato, *Japan's Arms Export and Defense Production Policy* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015), http://csis.org/files/publication/150331_Sato_JapanArmsExport.pdf;
- ⁴⁹ Kyodo, "Japan expected to reach deal with India on defense-related equipment exports," *The Japan Times*, November 28, 2015, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/11/28/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-expected-to-reach-deal-with-india-on-defense-related-equipment-exports/#.VohnbxUrLWJ>.
- ⁵⁰ Ajai Shukla, "Shinmawya US-2 seaplane could be showpiece of defense partnership," *Business Standard*, January 25, 2014, http://www.business-standard.com/article/printer-friendly-version?article_id=114012401116_1.
- ⁵¹ Sanjeev Miglani, India close to buying Japan-made military aircraft in \$1.65 bln deal," *Reuters*, January 28, 2014, <http://in.reuters.com/article/india-japan-idINDEEAOR07S20140128>.
- ⁵² Basu, "India-Japan Security Cooperation," *Asian Strategic Review 2015*, ed. Muni and Chadha, 275.
- ⁵³ Satoro Nagao, "Japan-India Military Partnership: India is the New Hope for Asia," *CLAWS Journal* (Winter 2013): 57, http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1589692164_SatoruNagao.pdf.
- ⁵⁴ Basu, "India-Japan Security Cooperation," *Asian Strategic Review 2015*, ed. Muni and Chadha, 274.
- ⁵⁵ Brewster, "The India-Japan Security Relationship" *Asian Security*, 108.
- ⁵⁶ Sameer Suryakant Patil, "Explaining the India-US Logistics Support Agreement," *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, February 28, 2008, http://www.ipcs.org/print_article-details.php?recNo=2516.
- ⁵⁷ Saroj Bishoyi, "Logistic Support Agreement: A Closer Look at the Impact on India-U.S. Strategic Relationship," *Journal of Defense Studies*, vol. 7, no. 1, January 2013, 151-172, http://www.idsa.in/system/files/jds_7_1_SarojBishoyi.pdf.
- ⁵⁸ Pranab Dhal Samanta, "India and US to discuss giving access to each other's military bases and ports," *The Times of India*, December 21, 2015, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-and-US-to-discuss-giving-access-to-each-others-military-bases-and-ports/articleshow/50262223.cms>.
- ⁵⁹ MEA, Gol, "List of documents exchanged during the visit of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan in New Delhi" (December 12, 2015), <http://mea.gov.in/bilateral->

[documents.htm?dtl/26177/List of documents exchanged during the visit of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan to India in New Delhi December 12 2015](http://documents.htm?dtl/26177/List_of_documents_exchanged_during_the_visit_of_Prime_Minister_Shinzo_Abe_of_Japan_to_India_in_New_Delhi_December_12_2015).

⁶⁰ Franz-Stefan Gady, "How Japan Plans to Conquer the Global Arms Market," *The Diplomat*, May 15, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/how-japan-plans-to-conquer-the-global-arms-market/>.

⁶¹ Basu, "India-Japan Security Cooperation," *Asian Strategic Review 2015*, ed. Muni and Chadha, 280.

⁶² Titli Basu, "Make in India and the Expanding Scope for India-Japan Defense Cooperation," (New Delhi: Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies Analyses, December 29, 2015), http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/make-in-india-scope-for-india-japan-defence-cooperation_tbasu_291215.

⁶³ Rajaram Panda, "Towards a New Asian Security Architecture? India and Japan," (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, June 2013), 4, <http://www.ipcs.org/issue-brief/china/towards-a-new-asian-security-architecture-india-and-japan-223.html>.

⁶⁴ Panda, "Towards a New Asian Security Architecture," 4.

⁶⁵ Rahul Bedi, "India asks Japan to offer Soryu submarines for Project 75-I requirement," *IHS Janes Defense Weekly*, 29 January 2015, <http://www.janes.com/article/48448/india-asks-japan-to-offer-soryu-subs-for-project-75i-requirement>; Rajat Pandit, "India Asks Japan if it's Interested in Rs 50,000-Crore Submarine Project: Politics and Nation," *The Economic Times (Online)*, Jan 30, 2015, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1648966993?accountid=14746>.

⁶⁶ "India Considering Addition of Japan's Soryu-Class Submarines," *Progressive Digital Media Defense (Incl, Airforce, Army, Navy and Homeland Security) News*, Feb 02, 2015, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1653120593?accountid=14746>; Pandit, "India Asks Japan if it's Interested in Rs 50,000-Crore Submarine Project Politics and Nation," *The Economic Times (Online)*, Jan 30, 2015.

⁶⁷ Basu, "Make in India and the Expanding Scope for India-Japan Defense Cooperation," (New Delhi: IDSA, December 29, 2015).

⁶⁸ Franz-Stefan Gady, "Japan Launches New Warship," *The Diplomat*, October 31, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/japan-launches-new-warship/>; Satoru Nagao, "Japan, the United States, and India as key balancers in Asia," *Strategic Japan Working Paper*, (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015), 10, http://csis.org/files/publication/150331_Nagao_JapanUSIndia.pdf.

⁶⁹ *Janes Defense Weekly*, "India's GSL moves ahead with MCMV programme," September 18, 2015, <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/DefenceIndustryMarkets/Display/1752797>.

⁷⁰ Tomoko Kiyota, "Looming over the horizon: Japan's naval engagement with India," *India's Naval Strategy and Asian Security edited by Anit Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 184.

⁷¹ Rajat Pandit, "Ministry of defense clears military projects worth over Rs 12,000 crore," *The Times of India*, October 29, 2015, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Ministry-of-defence-clears-military-projects-worth-over-Rs-12000-crore/articleshow/49584988.cms>; *Jane's Navy International*, "Force Generation: New boats set to bolster India's submarine service," December 3, 2015, <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/DefenceIndustryMarkets/Display/1757956>.

⁷² *Jane's Navy International*, "World Navies > Japan," December 22, 2015, 23, <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1322704#Auxiliaries>.

⁷³ Naidu, "Ballistic Missile Defense: Perspective on India-Japan Cooperation," *Strategic Analysis*: 170.

⁷⁴ Sharon A. Squassoni, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan*, CRS Report for Congress RL31900 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 28, 2006), 15-16, <https://www.fas.org/spp/crs/nuke/RL31900.pdf>; Ian E. Rinehart, Steven A. Hildreth, and Susan V. Lawrence, *Ballistic Missile Defense in Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition*, CRS Report for Congress R43116 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 3, 2015), 5-6, 10, <https://www.fas.org/spp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf>; Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014* (Tokyo, September 2014), 191-193.

⁷⁵ Frank O' Donnell and Yogesh Joshi, "India's Missile Defense: Is the Game worth the Candle?" *The Diplomat*, August 2, 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/indias-missile-defense-is-the-game-worth-the-candle/1/>.

⁷⁶ <http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2015-Defense-Framework.pdf>.

⁷⁷ Naidu, "Ballistic Missile Defense: Perspective on India-Japan Cooperation," *Strategic Analysis*: 171.

-
- ⁷⁸ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014*, 192.
- ⁷⁹ *Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems*, "Layered defense initiative: Japan," September 30, 2015, <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/DefenceEquipment/Display/1585593>.
- ⁸⁰ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014* (Tokyo, September 2014), 196.
- ⁸¹ Ajey Lele, "GSAT-6: India's second military satellite launched," *Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses Comment* (New Delhi: IDSA, August 31, 2015), http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/GSAT6IndiasSecondMilitarySatelliteLaunched_alele_310815.
- ⁸² *Jane's Defence Industry & Markets Intelligence*, "Land Warfare Platforms: Armoured Fighting Vehicles, Arjun MBT," February 15, 2016, <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1494227>; *Jane's Defence Industry & Markets Intelligence*, "Land Warfare Platforms: Armoured Fighting Vehicles, Mitsubishi Type 10 (TK-X) MBT," February 15, 2016, <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ArmouredFightingVehicles/Display/1494419>.
- ⁸³ Dalip Bhardwaj, "Employment of mechanized forces in Himalayan terrain," *Defense and Security Alert*, accessed on February 15, 2016, <http://www.dsalert.org/land-power-india/542-employment-of-mechanised-forces-in-himalayan-terrain>.
- ⁸⁴ Reuters, "Mitsubishi boasts tech leap with armored amphibious vehicle, eyes exports," *The Japan Times*, June 24, 2015, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/24/business/tech/mitsubishi-boasts-tech-leap-armored-amphibious-vehicle-eyes-exports/#.Vs1tPlrLWJ>.
- ⁸⁵ Headquarters for Japan's Economic Revitalization, *New Robot Strategy: Japan's Robot Strategy*, February 10, 2015, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2015/pdf/0123_01b.pdf.
- ⁸⁶ Julie Carpenter, "Just Doesn't Look Right: Exploring the Impact of Humanoid Robot Integration into Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams," *Robotics: Concepts, Methodology, Tools, and Applications* (Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, 2014), 1356.
- ⁸⁷ United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, *World Robotics 2005* (Geneva: United Nations and International Federation of Robotics, 2005), 328, <https://books.google.com/books?id=4B6Ei1y4WbcC&pg=PA328&dq=use+of+robots+for+surveillance+in+military&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEWia0paYkK3KAhXDmh4KHWrYDy4Q6AEITTAG#v=onepage&q=use%20of%20robots%20or%20surveillance%20in%20military&f=false>.
- ⁸⁸ Robin R. Murphy, *Disaster Robotics* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2014), 1-6.
- ⁸⁹ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014* (Tokyo, September 2014), 199.
- ⁹⁰ Rajat Pandit, "Govt gets cracking on three new tri Services commands," *The Times of India*, Aug 20, 2015, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Govt-gets-cracking-on-three-new-tri-Service-commands/articleshow/48550424.cms>; Department of Communication and Information Technology, *National Cyber Security Policy 2013 (NCSP-2013)* (New Delhi: Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, July 02, 2013), [http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/National%20Cyber%20Security%20Policy%20\(1\).pdf](http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/National%20Cyber%20Security%20Policy%20(1).pdf).
- ⁹¹ Innovation Editors eGov, "India, Japan to Cooperate on Cyber Security and Green ICT," *Enterprise Innovation* (Dec 08, 2014), <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1634340582?accountid=14746>; "India and Japan to Join Hands to Check Cyber Crime," *Express Computer* (May 05, 2015), <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1678517243?accountid=14746>.
- ⁹² Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014* (Tokyo, September 2014), 201.
- ⁹³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "The 1st Meeting of Japan-India Cyber Dialogue," November 5, 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/11/1105_01.html; MEA, GoI, "Fact Sheet: India and Japan, Working Together for Peace and Prosperity," (December 12, 2015), http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26179/Fact_Sheet_India_and_Japan_Working_Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperty.
- ⁹⁴ J. Berkshire Miller, "Japan Makes Three: India, U.S. Trilateralize Malabar Naval Drills," *World Politics Review*, August 11, 2015, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/16427/japan-makes-three-india-u-s-trilateralize-malabar-naval-drills>.
- ⁹⁵ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014* (Tokyo, September 2014), 283-284; MEA, GoI, "Fact Sheet: India and Japan, Working Together for Peace and Prosperity," (December 12, 2015), http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26179/Fact_Sheet_India_and_Japan_Working_Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperty.

-
- ⁹⁶ Vinay Kumar, "Army Modernizing 2 Firing Ranges," *The Hindu*, March 11, 2013, <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-newdelhi/army-modernising-2-firing-ranges/article4495908.ece>.
- ⁹⁷ Justin Goldman, "An Amphibious Capability in Japan's Self Defense Force," *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2013, vol. 66, no. 4 (New Port, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2013), 125-127, <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/6e5b4d1c-136d-4920-a150-5cc265966217/An-Amphibious-Capability-in-Japan-s-Self-Defense-F.aspx>.
- ⁹⁸ Philip Stevens, "Russian Fighters over Nevada- Exercise Red Flag 08-4," *Air Forces Review*, <http://airforcesreview.com/reports/Russian-Fighters-over-Nevada---Exercise-Red-Flag-08-4/>.
- ⁹⁹ MEA, GoI, "Fact Sheet: India and Japan, Working Together for Peace and Prosperity," (December 12, 2015), http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26179/Fact_Sheet_India_and_Japan_Working_Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperty.
- ¹⁰⁰ Basu, "Make in India and the Expanding Scope for India-Japan Defense Cooperation," (New Delhi: IDSA, December 29, 2015).
- ¹⁰¹ Japan Ministry of Defense, "China's activities surrounding Japan's airspace," accessed January 16, 2015, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/ryouku/index.html.
- ¹⁰² Press Trust of India, "IAF all set for first day and night exercise 'Iron Fist'," *The Economic Times*, Feb 19, 2013, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-02-19/news/37179889_1_trainer-aircraft-mi-17v5-iaf.
- ¹⁰³ David M. McElreath, Carl J. Jensen, Michael Wigginton, Daniel Adrian Doss, Robert Nations and Jeff Van Slyke, *Introduction to Homeland Security*, Second edition (New York: CRC Press, Taylor and Francis Group, 2014), 372.
- ¹⁰⁴ Sue Thompson, *Tokyo* (London: New Holland Publishers, 2007), 34.
- ¹⁰⁵ Joshua Sinai, "Terrorism and Uzbekistan: The Threat and the Response," *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspective* ed James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 509.
- ¹⁰⁶ National Police Agency Deputy Commissioner General, "Program of emergency Measures for Public Safety," *Guidelines of Police Policy in Japan*, August 26, 2003, 15-16, <https://www.npa.go.jp/english/seisaku4/20060718.pdf>.
- ¹⁰⁷ Maj Gen Abhay Gupta, *A Year Since 26/11: Op Black Tornado* (New Delhi: Centre for Land and Warfare Studies, Nov 26, 2009), <http://www.claws.in/event-detail.php?eID=254>.
- ¹⁰⁸ Alan Taylor, "Bhopal: The World's Worst Industrial Disaster, 30 Years Later," *The Atlantic*, December 2, 2014, <http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/12/bhopal-the-worlds-worst-industrial-disaster-30-years-later/100864/>; Tomoya Saito, "Tokyo drift?" *CBRNe World*, autumn 2010, http://www.cbrneworld.com/uploads/download_magazines/CBRNe_world_autumn_2010_Tokyo_drift.pdf.
- ¹⁰⁹ Jimmy Norris, "U.S., Japanese Service members train to defend Chemical attacks at Yama Sakura 67," December 10, 2014, http://www.army.mil/article/139716/U_S_Japanese_Service_members_train_to_defeat_chemical_attacks_at_Yama_Sakura_67/.
- ¹¹⁰ Sung Eun Kim, Ho Miu David Li, and Jonghyo Nam, "Overview of Natural Disasters and their Impacts in Asia and the Pacific, 1970 – 2014," Technical paper, Disaster Risk Reduction Section ICT and Disaster Risk Reduction Division ESCAP, March 2015, 6-7, http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Technical%20paper-Overview%20of%20natural%20hazards%20and%20their%20impacts_final.pdf.
- ¹¹¹ Shweta Desai, *Rescuing Our Citizens Better: Lessons from Yemen* (New Delhi: Centre for Land and Warfare Studies, April 21, 2015), <http://www.claws.in/1369/rescuing-our-citizens-better-lessons-from-yemen-shweta-desai.html>.
- ¹¹² Kirk Spitzer, "Japan Looks to Protect Its Own Overseas," *Time*, February 18, 2013, <http://nation.time.com/2013/02/18/japan-looks-to-protect-its-own-overseas/>; Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014* (Tokyo, September 2014), 213-214.
- ¹¹³ United Nations Peacekeeping, UN Mission Summary Contributions by Country, December 31, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2015/dec15_1.pdf.

¹¹⁴ Dirk Nabers, "How to be Good: Morality in Japan's and Germany's Foreign Policy," *The Ethics of Foreign Policy* eds. David B. Mac Donald, Robert G Patman and Betty Mason-Parker (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2003), 125.

¹¹⁵ Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi, *The US Pivot and Indian Foreign Policy: Asia's Evolving Balance of Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

¹¹⁶ J. Ransom Clark, *Intelligence and National Security: A Reference Handbook* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 26.

¹¹⁷ Ashley J. Tellis, "The Changing Political-Military Environment: South Asia," in *The United States and Asia: Towards a New US Strategy and Force Posture*, edited by Zalmay Khalilzad, David T. Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David Shlapak and Abram N. Shulsky (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), 214, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1315/MR1315.appd.pdf.

¹¹⁸ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014* (Tokyo, September 2014), 283; Universal value: The National Security Strategy (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) stipulates, "Freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law" as universal values.

Bibliography

- Panda Ankit. "India and Japan Come Together." *The Diplomat*, October 01, 2012, <http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/india-and-japan-come-together/>.
- Pongsudhirak Thitinan. "Japan and India are Asia's democratic polestars." *Nikkei Asian Review*, January 28, 2016, <http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160128-SHATTERED-HOPES/Viewpoints/Thitinan-Pongsudhirak-Japan-and-India-are-Asia-s-democratic-polestars?page=1>; <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>.
- Ministry of Defense. *Defense of Japan 2014*. Tokyo, September 2014. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/e-book/2014/_SWF_Window.html.
- Embassy of India. *Ambassador Ronen Sen's remarks at a luncheon meeting of the Japan Society in New York*. Washington, DC: Embassy of India. February 15, 2008. https://www.indianembassy.org/archives_details.php?nid=1047.
- Japan-India Relations. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html>.
- Saxena Swami P., Neha Kapoor. "Official Development Assistance to India with special reference to Japan." *BVIMSR's Journal of Management Research*, Vol. 5, Issue-2, October 2013.
- Morishima Michio. *Why has Japan succeeded?: Western technology and Japanese ethos*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Japan-India Relations (Basic Data)." December 28, 2015. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html>.
- Seth Aftab. *If an Elephant Loses Weight, It is Still an Elephant*. Keio University Press, 2005.
- Forsythe David P. *Encyclopedia of Human Rights*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Johnson Richard L. *Gandhi's Experiments with Truth: Essential Writings by and about Mahatma Gandhi*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006.
- Mani A. and P. Ramasamy, "Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army: A Southeast Asian Perspective." The paper was presented at the Seminar on 'The forgotten Army in a World War: Subhas Bose's INA and Asia's Independence' organized by the Institute of the Southeast Asian Studies Institute (ISEAS), Singapore AND THE India Club on 13 August 2006. http://www.apu.ac.jp/rcaps/uploads/fckeditor/publications/journal/RJAPS_V22_Mani_Ramasamy.pdf.
- Brewster David. "The India-Japan Security Relationship: An Enduring Security Partnership?" *Asian Security*, vol. 6, no 2, 2010. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14799851003756550>.
- Mathur Arpita "India-Japan Relations: Drivers, Trends, and Prospects." *RSIS Monograph No.23*, 2012. <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2000/01/Monograph23.pdf>.
- Narayanan K.R., *Image and Insight*. New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1987.

Basu Titli. "India-Japan Relations: An Enduring Partnership," *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 9, no. 3, Jul 2014. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1701850332?accountid=14746>.

Lee John. "Nonmilitary Approach to Countering Chinese Coercion: A Code of Practice for the Asia-Pacific." *Maritime Strategy Series*, September 2014. http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_Maritime3_Lee_0.pdf.

Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2015*. Tokyo, 2015. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2015/DOJ2015_Digest_part1_web.pdf.

Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014*. Tokyo, September 2014. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/e-book/2014/SWF_Window.html.

Nagao Satoru. "India as the key for the Japan-U.S. Alliance," *The Rebalance within Asia: The Evolution of Japan India Relations*. Washington DC: Wilson Centre, October 2014. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA_140905_Rebalance%20Within%20Asia%20rpt.pdf.

Jimbo Ken. "The Japan-China Feud in the East China Sea: A Better Scheme for Status-Quo Management?" Washington DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, November 19, 2013. http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/outreach/Jimbo_Commentary_111913.pdf.

Nagao Satoru. "India as the key for the Japan-U.S. Alliance." *The Rebalance within Asia: The Evolution of Japan India Relations*. Washington DC: Wilson Centre, October 2014. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA_140905_Rebalance%20Within%20Asia%20rpt.pdf.

Osawa Jun. "China's ADIZ over the East China Sea: A Great Wall in the Sky?" *Brookings*, 17 December 2013. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/17-china-air-defense-identification-zone-osawa>.

Janes Defence Weekly, "US Philippines express concern at Chinese land reclamation in South China Sea." January 29, 2015. <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1734953>.

Buszynski Leszek and Christopher B. Roberts, eds. *The South China Sea Maritime Dispute: Political, Legal, and Regional Perspectives*. New York, Routledge, 2015.

Osnos Evan. "Beijing Confirms Missile Test on Satellite." *McClatchy - Tribune Business News*, Jan 24, 2007. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/462867647?accountid=14746>.

Janes Defence Weekly, "US, Philippines express concerns at Chinese land reclamation in South China Sea." January 29, 2015. <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1734953>.

Jetly Rajshree. "India and China: Emerging Dynamics and Regional Security Perspective." *Perspective on South Asian Security* edited by Shanthie Marie D'Souza and Rajshree Jetly. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2013.

Richards Katherine. "China-India: An Analysis of the Himalayan territorial Dispute." *Asia Pacific Strategy Papers*, Australian Defense College, February 2015. <http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Richards%20final%20IPSD%20paper.pdf>.

Topgay Tshering. *Charting the Tibet Issue in the Sino-Indian Border Dispute* China Report May 2011. <http://iasips.in/ir-india-china/>.

Chellaney Brahma. "PLA Aborts Narendra Modi's China Reset." *Mint*, Oct 06, 2014.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/1586126650?accountid=14746>.

Ranasinghe DeSilva, Sergei. "String of Pearls - Evaluating China's Indian Ocean Strategy." *Jane's Intelligence Review* 25, no. 3 ,Mar 01, 2013.
<http://search.proquest.com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/1287854711?accountid=14746>.

Tiezzi Shannon. "The Maritime Silk Road vs. The String of Pearls." *The Diplomat* (Japan), 13 February 2014.
<http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/the-maritime-silk-road-vs-the-string-of-pearls/>.

Singh Abhijit. "Deciphering China's Submarine Deployments in the Indian Ocean Region." New Delhi: Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies Analyses, July 8, 2015.
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/DecipheringChinasSubmarineDeploymentsintheIndianOceanRegion_asingh_080715.

Pant Harsh V. "China's Naval Expansion in the Indian Ocean and India-China Rivalry." *The Asia-Pacific Journal* vol 8, issue 18, no. 4, May 3, 2010.

Arms Control Association, *Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: North Korea*, October 2015.
<https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/northkoreaprofile>.

Yoshida Reiji and Ayako Mie. "North Korea defies U.N. by firing long range rockets over Okinawa." *The Japan Times*, February 7, 2016. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/07/national/north-korea-fires-rocket-seen-covert-missile-test-japan-condemns-launch/#.VsE7iflrLWI>;

Yoshida Reiji and Mizuho Aoki. "Japan Slams North Korean 'H-Bomb' Test." *McClatchy - Tribune Business News*, Jan 07, 2016. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1754113554?accountid=14746>.

Rabasa Angel, Robert D. Blackwill, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, C. Christine Fair, Brian A. Jackson, Brian Michael Jenkins, Seth G. Jones, Nathaniel Shestak and Ashley J. Tellis. "The Lessons of Mumbai." Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP249.html.

Marsh and McLennan, *Cybercrime in Asia: A Changing Regulatory Environment*.
http://asia.marsh.com/Portals/59/Documents/Cybercrime%20in%20Asia%20-%20A%20Changing%20Regulatory%20Environment_EN.pdf.

Gady Franz-Stefan. "India and Japan Continue to Deepen Their Defense Ties." *The Diplomat*, Apr 01, 2015.
<http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/india-and-japan-continue-to-deepen-their-defense-ties/>.

Sharma Rajeev. "India-Japan Ties Poised for Advance as Both Nations Eye China." *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, vol.8, issue 36, no. 2, September 6, 2010. <http://japanfocus.org/-Rajeev-Sharma/3406/article.html>.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "List of documents exchanged during the visit of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan in New Delhi," December 12, 2015. http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26177/List_of_documents_exchanged_during_the_visit_of_Prime_Minister_Shinzo_Abe_of_Japan_to_India_in_New_Delhi_December_12_2015.

Parussini Gabriele. "India, Japan Strengthen Ties with Industrial, Military Agreements." *The Wall Street Journal*, December 13, 2015.

Sato Heigo. *Japan's Arms Export and Defense Production Policy*. Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015. http://csis.org/files/publication/150331_Sato_JapanArmsExport.pdf.

Kyodo. "Japan expected to reach deal with India on defense-related equipment exports." *The Japan Times*, November 28, 2015. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/11/28/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-expected-to-reach-deal-with-india-on-defense-related-equipment-exports/#.VohnbxUrLWJ>.

Nagao Satoro. "Japan-India Military Partnership: India is the New Hope for Asia." *CLAWS Journal* (Winter 2013). http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1589692164_SatoruNagao.pdf.

Panda Ankit. "Japan-India Maritime Surveillance Aircraft Deal May Come Before the New Year." *The Diplomat*, November 30, 2015. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/japan-india-maritime-surveillance-aircraft-deal-may-come-before-the-new-year/>.

Tatsumi Yuki. "Japan wants to streamline its defense industry." *The Diplomat*, October 2, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/japan-wants-to-streamline-its-defense-industry/>.

<http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/05%20Chapter.pdf>.

Bishoyi Saroj. "Logistic Support Agreement: A Closer Look at the Impact on India-U.S. Strategic Relationship." *Journal of Defense Studies*, vol. 7, no. 1, January 2013. http://www.idsa.in/system/files/jds_7_1_SarojBishoyi.pdf.

Samanta Pranab Dhal. "India and US to discuss giving access to each other's military bases and ports." *The Times of India*, December 21, 2015. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-and-US-to-discuss-giving-access-to-each-others-military-bases-and-ports/articleshow/50262223.cms>.

"India and Japan Hold Defense Dialogue." *Press Information Bureau*, Ministry of Defense, Government of India, March 31, 2015. <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=117830>.

Gady Franz-Stefan. "How Japan Plans to Conquer the Global Arms Market." *The Diplomat*, May 15, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/how-japan-plans-to-conquer-the-global-arms-market/>.

Basu Titli. "Make in India and the Expanding Scope for India-Japan Defense Cooperation." New Delhi: Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies Analyses, December 29, 2015. http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/make-in-india-scope-for-india-japan-defence-cooperation_tbasu_291215.

Panda Rajaram. "Towards a New Asian Security Architecture? India and Japan." New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, June 2013. <http://www.ipcs.org/issue-brief/china/towards-a-new-asian-security-architecture-india-and-japan-223.html>.

Bedi Rahul. "India asks Japan to offer Soryu submarines for Project 75-I requirement." *IHS Janes Defense Weekly*, 29 January 2015. <http://www.janes.com/article/48448/india-asks-japan-to-offer-soryu-subs-for-project-75i-requirement>.

Pandit Rajat. "India Asks Japan if it's Interested in Rs 50,000-Crore Submarine Project: Politics and Nation." *The Economic Times (Online)*, Jan 30, 2015. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1648966993?accountid=14746>.

"India Considering Addition of Japan's Soryu-Class Submarines." *Progressive Digital Media Defense (Incl, Airforce, Army, Navy and Homeland Security) News*, Feb 02, 2015. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1653120593?accountid=14746>.

Nagao Satoru. "Japan, the United States, and India as key balancers in Asia, *Strategic Japan Working Paper*. Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015. http://csis.org/files/publication/150331_Nagao_JapanUSIndia.pdf.

Janes Defense Weekly, "India's GSL moves ahead with MCMV programme." September 18, 2015. <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/DefenceIndustryMarkets/Display/1752797>.

Kiyota Tomoko. "Looming over the horizon: Japan's naval engagement with India." *India's Naval Strategy and Asian Security* edited by Anit Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan. New York: Routledge, 2016.

Pandit Rajat. "Ministry of defense clears military projects worth over Rs 12,000 crore." *The Times of India*, October 29, 2015. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Ministry-of-defence-clears-military-projects-worth-over-Rs-12000-crore/articleshow/49584988.cms>.

Jane's Navy International. "Force Generation: New boats set to bolster India's submarine service." December 3, 2015. <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/DefenceIndustryMarkets/Display/1757956>.

Jane's Navy International. "World Navies > Japan," December 22, 2015. <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1322704#Auxiliaries>.

Squassoni Sharon A. *Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan*, CRS Report for Congress RL31900. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 28, 2006. <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31900.pdf>.

Rinehart Ian E., Steven A. Hildreth, and Susan V. Lawrence. *Ballistic Missile Defense in Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition*, CRS Report for Congress R43116. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 3, 2015. <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf>.

Donnell Frank O' and Yogesh Joshi. "India's Missile Defense: Is the Game worth the Candle?" *The Diplomat*, August 2, 2013. <http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/indias-missile-defense-is-the-game-worth-the-candle/1/>.
<http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2015-Defense-Framework.pdf>.

Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems. "Layered defense initiative: Japan." September 30, 2015. <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/DefenceEquipment/Display/1585593>.

Lele Aje. "GSAT-6: India's second military satellite launched." *Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses Comment*. New Delhi: IDSA, August 31, 2015. http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/GSAT6IndiasSecondMilitarySatelliteLaunched_alele_310815.

Jane's Defence Industry & Markets Intelligence. "Land Warfare Platforms: Armoured Fighting Vehicles, Arjun MBT." February 15, 2016. <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1494227>.

Jane's Defence Industry & Markets Intelligence. "Land Warfare Platforms: Armoured Fighting Vehicles, Mitsubishi Type 10 (TK-X) MBT. February 15, 2016. <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ArmouredFightingVehicles/Display/1494419>.

Bhardwaj Dalip. "Employment of mechanized forces in Himalayan terrain." *Defense and Security Alert*, accessed on February 15, 2016. <http://www.dsalert.org/land-power-india/542-employment-of-mechanised-forces-in-himalayan-terrain>.

Reuters, "Mitsubishi boasts tech leap with armored amphibious vehicle, eyes exports." *The Japan Times*, June 24, 2015. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/24/business/tech/mitsubishi-boasts-tech-leap-armored-amphibious-vehicle-eyes-exports/#.Vs1tPrlWJ>.

Headquarters for Japan's Economic Revitalization, *New Robot Strategy: Japan's Robot Strategy*, February 10, 2015. http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2015/pdf/0123_01b.pdf.

Carpenter Julie. "Just Doesn't Look Right: Exploring the Impact of Humanoid Robot Integration into Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams." *Robotics: Concepts, Methodology, Tools, and Applications*. Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, 2014.

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. *World Robotics 2005*. Geneva: United Nations and International Federation of Robotics, 2005.

<https://books.google.com/books?id=4B6Ei1y4WbcC&pg=PA328&dq=use+of+robots+for+surveillance+in+military&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwia0paYkK3KAhXDmh4KHWRyDy4Q6AEITTAG#v=onepage&q=use%20of%20robots%20or%20surveillance%20in%20military&f=false>.

Murphy Robin R., *Disaster Robotics*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2014.

Pandit Rajat. "Govt gets cracking on three new tri Services commands." *The Times of India*, Aug 20, 2015. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Govt-gets-cracking-on-three-new-tri-Service-commands/articleshow/48550424.cms>.

Department of Communication and Information Technology. *National Cyber Security Policy 2013 (NCSP-2013)* (New Delhi: Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, July 02, 2013). [http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/National%20Cyber%20Security%20Policy%20\(1\).pdf](http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/National%20Cyber%20Security%20Policy%20(1).pdf).

Innovation Editors eGov. "India, Japan to Cooperate on Cyber Security and Green ICT." *Enterprise Innovation*, Dec 08, 2014. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1634340582?accountid=14746>.

"India and Japan to Join Hands to Check Cyber Crime." *Express Computer*, May 05, 2015. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1678517243?accountid=14746>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "The 1st Meeting of Japan-India Cyber Dialogue." November 5, 2012. http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/11/1105_01.html.

Miller J. Berkshire. "Japan Makes Three: India, U.S. Trilateralize Malabar Naval Drills." *World Politics Review*, August 11, 2015. <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/16427/japan-makes-three-india-u-s-trilateralize-malabar-naval-drills>.

Kumar Vinay. "Army Modernizing 2 Firing Ranges." *The Hindu*, March 11, 2013. <http://www.thehindu.com/today-s-paper/tp-national/tp-newdelhi/army-modernising-2-firing-ranges/article4495908.ece>.

Goldman Justin. "An Amphibious Capability in Japan's Self Defense Force." *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2013, vol. 66, no. 4. New Port, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2013. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/6e5b4d1c-136d-4920-a150-5cc265966217/An-Amphibious-Capability-in-Japan-s-Self-Defense-F.aspx>.

Stevens Philip. "Russian Fighters over Nevada- Exercise Red Flag 08-4." *Air Forces Review*. <http://airforcesreview.com/reports/Russian-Fighters-over-Nevada---Exercise-Red-Flag-08-4/>.

Japan Ministry of Defense. "China's activities surrounding Japan's airspace." accessed January 16, 2015. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/ryouku/index.html.

Malek, Melda. "A Legal Assessment of China's Historic Claims in the South China Sea." *Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs* 5, no. 1 (2013): 28-36. <http://search.proquest.com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/1350978889?accountid=14746>.

Press Trust of India. "IAF all set for first day and night exercise 'Iron Fist'." *The Economic Times*, Feb 19, 2013. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-02-19/news/37179889_1_trainer-aircraft-mi-17v5-iaf.

McElreath David M., Carl J. Jensen, Michael Wigginton, Daniel Adrian Doss, Robert Nations and Jeff Van Slyke. *Introduction to Homeland Security*, Second edition. New York: CRC Press, Taylor and Francis Group, 2014. Thompson Sue, *Tokyo*. London: New Holland Publishers, 2007.

Sinai Joshua. "Terrorism and Uzbekistan: The Threat and the Response." *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspective* ed James J. F. Forest. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.

National Police Agency Deputy Commissioner General. "Program of emergency Measures for Public Safety." *Guidelines of Police Policy in Japan*, August 26, 2003. <https://www.npa.go.jp/english/seisaku4/20060718.pdf>.

Gupta Abhay. *A Year Since 26/11: Op Black Tornado*. New Delhi: Centre for Land and Warfare Studies, Nov 26, 2009. <http://www.claws.in/event-detail.php?eID=254>.

Taylor Alan. "Bhopal: The World's Worst Industrial Disaster, 30 Years Later." *The Atlantic*, December 2, 2014. <http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/12/bhopal-the-worlds-worst-industrial-disaster-30-years-later/100864/>.

Saito Tomoya "Tokyo drift?" *CBRNe World*, autumn 2010. http://www.cbrneworld.com/uploads/download_magazines/CBRNe_world_autumn_2010_Tokyo_drift.pdf.

Norris Jimmy. "U.S., Japanese Service members train to defend Chemical attacks at Yama Sakura 67." December 10, 2014. http://www.army.mil/article/139716/U_S_Japanese_Service_members_train_to_defeat_chemical_attacks_at_Yama_Sakura_67/.

Kim Sung Eun, Ho Miu David Li, and Jonghyo Nam. "Overview of Natural Disasters and their Impacts in Asia and the Pacific, 1970 – 2014." Technical paper, Disaster Risk Reduction Section ICT and Disaster Risk Reduction Division ESCAP, March 2015. http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Technical%20paper-Overview%20of%20natural%20hazards%20and%20their%20impacts_final.pdf.

Desai Shweta. *Rescuing Our Citizens Better: Lessons from Yemen*. New Delhi: Centre for Land and Warfare Studies, April 21, 2015. <http://www.claws.in/1369/rescuing-our-citizens-better-lessons-from-yemen-shweta-desai.html>.

Spitzer Kirk. "Japan Looks to Protect Its Own Overseas." *Time*, February 18, 2013, <http://nation.time.com/2013/02/18/japan-looks-to-protect-its-own-overseas/>.

United Nations Peacekeeping, UN Mission Summary Contributions by Country, December 31, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2015/dec15_1.pdf.

Dirk Nabers. "How to be Good: Morality in Japan's and Germany's Foreign Policy." *The Ethics of Foreign Policy* eds. David B. Mac Donald, Robert G Patman and Betty Mason-Parker. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2003.

Pant Harsh V. and Yogesh Joshi. *The US Pivot and Indian Foreign Policy: Asia's Evolving Balance of Power*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Clark J. Ransom. *Intelligence and National Security: A Reference Handbook*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.

Tellis Ashley J. "The Changing Political-Military Environment: South Asia." in *The United States and Asia: Towards a New US Strategy and Force Posture*, edited by Zalmay Khalilzad, David T. Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David Shlapak and Abram N. Shulsky. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1315/MR1315.appd.pdf.