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*United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**TITLE: ROMANIA – A KEY ACTOR FOR THE FUTURE SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR: MAJOR CLAUDIU PIPER

AY 15-16

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Jonathan F. Phillips, PhD
Approved: [Signature]
Date: 5 April 2006

Oral Defense Committee Member: ERIC Y. SHIBUYA, PhD
Approved: [Signature]
Date: 5 April 2006

Executive Summary

Title: Romania – A Key Actor for the Future Security Environment in Southeast Europe.

Author: Major Claudiu Piper, Romanian Army.

Thesis: Based on its historical background and current events in the area, Romania will maintain a strong commitment to democratic values and will play a key role in ensuring the stability of the security environment in Southeast Europe. In a fragile and still divided European construction, Romania, in partnership with the United States, will assume a leading role in development and stability of this region. For this endeavor, it will use all the elements of its national power to overcome many political, military, and economic challenges in the near future.

Discussion: Since the fall of “Iron Curtain,” Southeast Europe and Balkans, known as the “powder keg of Europe,” have chosen the Western path of reconstruction and development. However, while almost every Eastern European state envisioned the fulfillment of its needs for security and stability through joining NATO and the European Union, each faced certain challenges this path posed to this new European construct. In this respect, one should consider the threat of a revived Russian expansionism and a potential transfer of conflict from the Middle East to Europe, in conjunction with both local and regional economic fragilities displayed through the transition to capitalism. Additionally, there are revived internal and regional historical issues and a significantly popular perception of double standards imposed by the Western European countries in the accession process. The last two decades demonstrated all of these symptoms in every East European country, which approached them in a more or less similar manner, while the domestic results emphasized both their differences and similarities. This study will focus on the Romanian approach and its results so far. Therefore, the analysis will examine Romania’s internal development in conjunction with its foreign policy, trying to recommend internal and external actions required to make Romania a credible security provider in the region.

Conclusion: Recognizing the errors made in its evolution since 1989, leveraging the successes obtained so far, and maintaining a balanced approach on the international stage, Romania will play a key role in maintaining the stability and social-economic development in Southeastern Europe by using all its elements of national power and enhancing its strategic partnership with NATO and the United States.

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Preface

As a Romanian officer studying at USMC Command and Staff College in Quantico, Virginia, I am obviously interested in current and future status of Romania, as well as in its connection with the United States. Therefore, the topic of this paper came naturally, reflecting my interest. However, addressing this topic it was a challenge because I had to write down on paper my perception in such a manner that the audience may understand its cultural nuances. Thus, in order to make it relevant for the reader, I chose to begin my research with the historical approach on Eastern Europe, divided into two major periods: the Cold War era and post Cold War era. While the region is presented more broadly, involving aspects related to the topic, the approach on Romania is more specific and detailed, focusing on its uniqueness, culture and relationships with the international environment. Considering that the historical perspective provides a good understanding of the current status within the region and also a potential pattern for the future, the analysis of these aspects follows the same pattern as the historical narrative, mirroring the region and Romania. The main discussion analyzes the Romanian perspective on the matter, its intended actions and their potential rate of success, based on its current capability and development potential. Furthermore, the analysis includes the United States involvement into the region and how this involvement, if correctly applied, may leverage both Romanian and American interests. The intention of this paper is also to provide the Marines with a better understanding about Romania and its potential in the actual context within Eastern Europe, since some of them are expected to deploy in that region.

Hoping the reader will find this research interesting and useful, I would like to express my gratitude for Dr. Jonathan Phillips, whose guidance and assistance helped me throughout my entire endeavor. Furthermore, I would like to acknowledge the support of my faculty advisors, LTC Jeffrey Vandaveer and Dr. Mathew Flynn, who constantly provided me with good advices and guidance in understanding my audience and sizing my approach accordingly. Additionally, I would like to acknowledge the efforts of the entire Marine Corps University (MCU), CSC faculty and staff, Language Communication Skills Center (LCSC), and Gray Research Center (GRC) to provide all the students with good tools for research and critical thinking. Last, but not least, I would like to thank all my fellows of CSC, in particular those of CG 16, for their support and assistance for my effort.

I. Introduction.

For centuries, millennia even, Southeastern Europe was one of the most conflicted areas of the world. This could be explained by the strategic position of the region, situated between Western Europe and Asia, at the crossroads of many great empires and powers, whose interests and influence expanded and conflicted one with each other. Additionally, several populations disputed this relatively small space, driven either by ethnic and religious precepts, or by lately discovered national identities. Known all around the world as “the powder keg of Europe” this area is, after all, the starting point of the “Great War,” which launched Europe in the first of the two horrible conflicts shaking the planet, while the second one started not very far away.

After the end of World War II, the “Iron Curtain” drew Eastern Europe completely into the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, shaping its destiny for a half of a century. While the end of the Cold War brought the hope of a new beginning for the states within the region, the reality proved to be more challenging. With wounds of the communist era still bleeding, the scars of the past reemerged, resulting in new conflicts and inducing the idea of a never ending struggle for a better life, as the former Yugoslavia has demonstrated.¹

However, the fall of the Soviet Union opened the Western doors for the countries from the socialist block, most of them searching for cover under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s security umbrella, trying also to achieve the appealing economic prosperity offered by the European Union (EU). Therefore, the struggle for social improvement translated into a race to join both NATO and the EU, with all the applicants having to deal with many challenges in this endeavor, since they had to adapt their social mentality to the newly emerged capitalist-based economy. Furthermore, the admission process was difficult, imposing the prior fulfillment of many conditions, some of them contradicting the national views and traditional approaches; moreover, the admission waves, besides portraying differences in development of each country, increased the popular feelings that the East was just an “emerging market” for the West, and that the Easterners are “second hand European citizens.”²

Currently, the security environment poses even more challenges for the region, which has to face the revival of the Russian expansionism and a huge wave of immigrants from the Middle East. The big picture of those challenges displays, on one hand, several frozen conflicts around the Black Sea, carefully maintained by Russia for future exploits, combined with a Europe dependant on Russian energy supplies; on the other hand, Turkey’s contradictory position

towards European values, combined with the spread of Islamic extremism and current conflict in Syria, challenges the European sense of unity, shaking its Eastern region even more. While the East becomes more and more reluctant to embrace the European construct, the strategic partnership with the United States in conjunction with the security provided by NATO remained the only viable option for most of the East European countries.

As an integrated part of this environment, Romania has had to confront these challenges, for most of its history. Fighting many times for its land and own existence, pushed into the communist construct after WWII, but developing a national approach on socialism, Romania experienced the bloodiest transition to democracy of all the East European states. For the Romanians, the post Cold War era was inexorably tied to the desire for Western liberal democracy, experienced in some ways during the interwar period; therefore, partnership with the US and aspirations to join NATO and the EU came naturally and unquestionably for the vast majority of Romanians. Although their perspectives on capitalism and democracy were not always correct, somehow justified by their latest experiences, Romanians made tremendous efforts, at all levels, to achieve their desired goals. Even if the post communist period was compared with the American “Wild West,” due to the rapidity of and the urge for social and economic changes, the common goal to achieve security and prosperity through Western means enabled the unity of Romanian society and balanced its internal and external approach.

This paper will argue that, based on its historical background and current events in the area, Romania will maintain the path of a strong commitment for democratic values and will play a key role for ensuring the stability of the security environment within the area. In a fragile and still divided European construct, which will have to face many political, military, and economic challenges in the near future, Romania has the opportunity to assume a leading role in the development and stability of this region. To succeed, Romania must maintain focus on both its internal development and external credibility, bolstering the partnership with the United States and its full NATO membership, while using all the elements of its national power to bring the area at a common denominator. At the same time, the research will analyze the American involvement and its dynamics, and how this may impact the Romanian endeavor. Thus, this approach will help both Romania and the United States to leverage their cooperation and provide a stable security environment within the region, which will benefit all.

II. The historical perspective on Eastern Europe.

Although most people in Europe sought the end of WWII as a relief after several years of conflict and destruction, some of them were to see the worst. While the end of the war brought to light the radical split between the former allies that won it, the small players did not have to wait too long before seeing this split affecting them. Thus, the long process to establish peace was just splitting spheres of influence between newly emerged super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, which became more and more distant in envisioning the future. From this perspective, definitely the most affected by the peace process were the countries from Eastern Europe, which fell under the Soviet influence and, therefore, were forced to adopt the communist ideology, despite their culture and traditions. Most of them, if not all, experienced feelings of “injustice,” “sell-out,” and “abandonment” from the West, which grew over the years; thus, the current perception of their citizens being treated as “second class Europeans,” is not only supported by current events across Europe and other historical or national biases, but it is also rooted in the failure of West defending them against “the red plague,” by tacitly agreeing upon establishing “The Iron Curtain” after WWII (Appendix A).³

Implementing communism within their neighborhood was not at all an easy task for the Soviets. Their ideology faced opposition in all countries, but the exhausted people after the war, the presence of the Red Army, and imposing leaders educated in Moscow were helpful tools for their success. Additionally, the Yalta Conference left no hope for the East European countries in their attempt to embrace the Western values, since the West did not significantly oppose Stalin’s demands.⁴ Although the West tends to see the region as a “block,” it was Soviet terror that kept these countries together on the communist road, instead of the communist ideology. This artificial construct, claimed by the Soviets as being the will of the nations to counter the Western imperialism, in a pathetic and false display of non-interference with national self-determination, was kept in place using force and terror. Therefore, at least in the incipient phases, each country experienced social and intellectual cleansing and the rise of “the new man,” dedicated to the communist ideals and obedient to the “leading voice” from Moscow.⁵ However, with the rise of a new generation to power, the communist ideology was easier to maintain, despite some national approaches, tolerated by Moscow as long as they kept a general socialist line.⁶

Envisioning Eastern Europe during the Cold War, the Western thinker should understand that Soviet expansion had three levels of implementing communism. First level is represented by

countries and regions embedded into the Soviet Union, such as Ukraine and Moldova.⁷ Since these regions were parts of the Soviet Union, the regime was extremely brutal and Moscow's rules more drastic. The ethnic and political cleansing was on Soviet daily agenda, with millions of people deported to Siberia and Soviet Gulag.⁸ The second level is represented by the main group of Eastern Europe countries, where the Soviet Union installed puppet leaders, able and willing to implement the "Soviet recipe" at the national level. The third level, maybe the most relaxed one, is represented by Yugoslavia, where Tito implemented its own rule, uniting the various regions under his fist.⁹ Despite the split between Tito and Stalin, somehow foreseeable considering their personalities, there are some similarities between their countries, which shaped the Eastern Europe's recent history. Not only that Tito borrowed the Soviet model to create Yugoslavia, cutting small pieces from each region and gluing them to another one, but he applied the same control method, displacing people in the attempt to weaken old national ties.¹⁰ Therefore, the legacy for today's world is a chain of frozen conflicts all around Russia and a dissolved Yugoslavia after a bloody inter ethnic and religious conflict, threatening to reemerge.¹¹

Ethnicity and religion also shaped the evolution of the Eastern Europe under communist rule (Appendix B). For instance, the shape of communist pattern was quite different in Poland, where there is a Catholic majority, than in the Eastern Orthodox Bulgaria. Therefore, for a Western reader the Cold War may present a blurred picture of some countries, like Bulgaria, which did not express a visible resistance, based on the fraternal feeling of common Slavic and Orthodox traditions; on the contrary, the Catholic and Protestant Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland were more visible in expressing their opposition for the Soviet "Iron Fist."¹² For almost the entire period, Yugoslavia and its puzzle of ethnicities and religions was an exception in this respect. Furthermore, as the most liberal communist country, Yugoslavia was the most appealing country for the West, which saw it as a potential Trojan horse in the Communist camp. As if the Soviets were to consider it as a channel to deceive the West, we do not know and there is no proof in this respect, but we may consider this scenario, as Yugoslavia's obscure position from then reverberates today, when Serbia plays the game at both ends.¹³

The Warsaw Pact was also an artificial construct under the Soviet umbrella to counter the West and NATO (Appendix C). The mutual assistance in case of conflict was more of a Soviet shield against a Western aggression, while ensuring the existence of enough manpower to defend "the Mother Land". Although the Soviet military assistance for all the "friendly countries" was

considerable, Moscow sought to maintain a balance of force and, thus, its superiority, in case of “mutiny.” Therefore, the treaty was a powerful tool for Moscow to smother potential uprisings against Soviet rule, such as in Poland in 1968. In time, some of the communist countries developed their own military capabilities, mostly based on the Soviet concepts and technology, but they maintained their military power at the level where the Soviets would not be alarmed. As a proof of its artificiality, once the communist era ended for this region, the treaty became obsolete and disappeared by itself, without any opposition from its members, which sought another security option in NATO.

The end of the Cold War and Western victory by late 1980s came naturally, but not smoothly for the entire region. One after another, the communist regimes fell apart, the process ranging from the “velvet revolutions,” as in German Democratic Republic and Poland, to the “bloody downfalls” of the leaders, as in Romania. Despite the different forms of change the old regimes, the main flow was the same for everybody: an overwhelming popular desire to embrace the Western values. Regarding the “Big Red Evil,” it also fell apart, without any initial violence and allowing its former republics to declare their independence, but its legacy proven to be disastrous, since several conflicts flourished soon after on its former territory.¹⁴

In fact, the Communist legacy was disastrous all across the Eastern Europe. Without the Warsaw Pact, all the countries experienced a vacuum of security, both at the national and regional level, which allowed the emergence and development of transnational criminality. Moreover, the centralized economy, once the pillar of the socialist system, narrowed very quickly under the pressure of the Western capitalist markets, which entered in force throughout the region, without allowing much time to transition; therefore, with everything “on sale,” the rush for freedom brought a rapid growth of the private sector, but so did it at the expense of the large part of the population, since most of the people lacked the knowledge about capitalist mechanisms and laws. Seizing opportunities, the new entrepreneurs exploited the lack of legislation and popular enthusiasm; thus, the social split emerged as natural, newly enriched people often taking advantage on the context, while the common people felt insecure in this new, unknown, and scary world for them. The new order demanded adaptability, but the communist mentality inoculated for a half of century made the adaptation difficult and pushed for side ideas, such as ethnic nationalism, revival of some old historical issues, and misinterpreting democracy.

From there to a bloody conflict it was just a step, which some countries avoided and others experienced, as the former Yugoslavia has shown us (Appendix D).

The role that the West played after the Cold War was crucial for the future of the region. Without the Soviet construct, the region was deemed to crash even rapidly, if not helped from outside. Regardless of how it was perceived, ranging from “Imperialism” to “Salvation Army,” the Western intervention maintained afloat this part of the world.¹⁵ The transition to democracy was to be difficult and painful, since the purpose was to bring these countries as close as possible to the Western standards after experiencing many years a different design; obviously, errors were to be made in the process, given the diversity of countries, cultures, and mentalities, but the “safety rope” launched from the West reassured those countries about the commitment for rescue them from the disaster. While the West played its cards well, Eastern Europe understood that liberal democracy remained the only viable solution for its future. Finally, it seems like George Kennan was right and his ideas about containment and failing communist system succeeded, even if his estimates were a little bit too short. Now, for the West remained the question when the East will become really democratic, while the East rhetorically asked: What took you so long?¹⁶

III. The historical perspective on Romania.

As we mentioned before, all Eastern Europe experienced difficult times throughout history, and Romania was not an exception. Situated at the crossroads of empires, its fate was to resist aggressions and conquests, and this shaped the mindset of Romanians. Keeping their ancestral land against the wolfish desires of its great neighbors was the main concern since the beginning, and ways of doing so ranged from diplomacy to war, no matter where the threat came from. Divided into three main provinces, whose inhabitants shared language and traditions, Romania had dreamed for long time of becoming one country, but many attempts in this respect failed due to its powerful neighbors, as it occurred at the beginning of seventeen century.¹⁷ However, all the failures were lessons learned for the next attempts, without affecting Romania’s steadfastness in this direction. Therefore, the dreams of unity and independence came true in the second half of the nineteen century, starting with 1859 when Romania became a state, in the Wesphalian concept, as we define them today.¹⁸

The Western reader may think that this process was merely a union of these provinces, but the reality was more complex than that. In the aftermath of the Crimean War, the 1859 union of Wallachia and Moldavia into one country, recognized since 1862 as Romania, was an exquisite example of Romanian resolution for self determination, since it was not the intent of Great Powers, especially Russia and the Ottoman Empire, to support such a thing. However, the union was possible after both provinces voted for the same leader, forcing the Great Powers to accept an outcome they failed to foresee (Appendix E).¹⁹ Having made its first step forward, Romania slowly accomplished the remaining objectives, adopting a monarchic rule in 1866, gaining its independence in 1877, and reuniting all of its historical territories in 1918 in the aftermath of World War I (Appendix F).²⁰

WWI was a turning point for Romania, not only because its outcome allowed the accomplishment of the Romanian modern state envisioned for centuries, but also because the West acknowledged for the first time the emergence of a Romanian entity, with major implications within the area. First of all, despite the German roots of its monarchy, Romania joined the Entente Powers after two years of neutrality as an expression for rationality in pursuing its goals. Furthermore, after the October Revolution, the late 1917 Russian withdrawal from the war complicated the regional context, leaving Romania alone, almost entirely occupied, and fighting for survival on the Eastern front, but still maintaining a credible pressure on the Central Powers. Thus, the capacity to reenter the conflict in late 1918 ensured Romania a place at the winners' table, and also the position to negotiate and impose its demands.²¹ Finally, the Romanians played a key role in defeating the 1919 Bela Kun's Communist revolution in Hungary, surprising the West, but enlarging the rift and bitterness between them and the Hungarians and the Soviets.²²

As we know today, the peace after the "war to end all wars" was not destined to last and only two decades later war was on again.²³ The balance of power shifted again and the revisionist approaches gained more ground, contesting the Trianon and Paris rules. Consequently, the 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and its secret protocol reorganized the order in Eastern Europe, affecting Romania and its short period of prosperity.²⁴ Forced to cede large portion of its territory to the Soviet Union in the East and North, to Bulgaria in the South, and to Hungary in the Northwest, Romania found itself again in a turning point, having to decide which side to take in the war (Appendix G).

Once again forced out of neutrality, Romania joined the Axis, hoping to regain its Eastern territories first and to find a settlement for the remaining ones thereafter. Thus, Romania contributed significantly to Operation “Barbarossa,” advanced eastward and regained its lost territories. However, many historians and strategists consider that advancing beyond its former borders deep into the Soviet territory, in support of German forces, was a huge error for the Romanian Army. Instead, a limited Romanian offensive to retake its lost territory would have been accepted by the Nazis, so dependant on the Romanian oil, and it would have diminished the Soviet reprisals thereafter. However, one may argue that the decision made was the only option to retake the other lost territories if the Axis was meant to win the war, and therefore, it was a necessary step to take. Additionally, Romania sought to regain its treasure, sent to Moscow during WWI and still unreturned.²⁵

The most controversial moment in Romanian history during WWII occurred in late August 1944, when Romania decided to switch sides and join Allied efforts to defeat Nazi Germany, thus shortening the war in Europe by a half of year.²⁶ Considered by the West to be a royal coup, the event was assumed soon after by the Romanian Communist Party (PCR), which sought it as the front door to enter legality, gain power, and turn Romania on the Communist path.²⁷ Moreover, with the Red Army advancing deep into Romania and the Communist Party leading on the political stage, Romania entered de facto into the Soviet sphere of influence before the war was over (Appendix H).

As everywhere in the Eastern Europe, the Communist rule in Romania was ruthless, despite its attempts to look democratic and popular. Founded in 1921, the PCR has slowly won the support of the working class, although illegally operated throughout the interwar period, but in postwar Romania has become a cover for Moscow’s agents seizing power. Arriving in the country with the Soviet invasion, they imposed a different approach on Romanian realities, bringing with them the Stalinist methods of implementing the new regime. The inability of the West to act against their expansion plans made possible the electoral fraud in 1946 and the overthrow of monarchic rule one year later, bringing Romania completely into the Stalinist era. Although the political persecutions started earlier, it was only after 1947 when they reached the full scale and maintained this level until 1964. Making room for new leaders, with “healthy origins,” the regime imprisoned almost the entire Romanian intellectual class, with a tremendous fury, verging to the grotesque, in search of revenge for the war against Soviet Union and to stifle

any opposition. The fight to implement communism was total and at all levels, with almost all opponents being severely repressed by the newly Romanian secret police, State Security Department (DSS), shortly named Securitate. Although between 1954 and 1964 the Gheorghiu-Dej regime approached more subtly the persecutions, it remained devoted to Soviet rule and leadership, while implementing large scale collectivization and forcing the establishment of heavy industry.

For Romania, 1965 was a year of change, as Nicolae Ceausescu took the power, against all odds. Relatively young and poorly educated, the new leader showed great ambition, turning Romania into a socialist state and becoming its first (and only) president.²⁸ Additionally, he condemned the Stalinist methods, following the Khrushchev model, but that is the only similarity to the Soviet leader. A convinced nationalist, Ceausescu envisioned Romania as a socialist state, but independent of and having equal rights with the Soviet Union. The best opportunity to express his vision came soon. In 1968, as the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries invaded Czechoslovakia to repress its revolt, Romania refused to join this endeavor, and even more, publicly condemned the invasion through the voice of its leader. It was the moment of glory for Ceausescu, not only because it offered him a good reason to cut ties with the Soviets, but also because he attracted the sympathy of the West that he cunningly exploited for a decade. From the Soviet perspective, Ceausescu's gesture brought Romania near to be invaded itself, and although Romania succeeded in avoiding this outcome, mostly due to the international opinion, the Soviets remained cautious towards Romania thenceforth.

Ceausescu regime was controversial and complicated even for the Romanians, let alone the Western world. The path from Western sympathy to international isolation was not so long, once the world understood he was not willing to rally Romania to Western values. Maintaining its presence in the Warsaw Pact and, generally, in the Communist block, Romania adopted a nationalist policy, emphasizing its Latin roots and forcing national multilateral development, while expanded its ties with other Communist and Communist-friendly countries all over the world. Furthermore, Ceausescu strengthened the DSS, both for maintaining internal control and countering foreign interferences, and also developed connections with controversial leaders, such as Yasser Arafat and Muammar Al Gaddafi, looking for mutual support. His vision about a great socialist Romania led him to implement large projects, such as Danube-Black Sea Canal and People's House, and to attempt to pay Romania's external debt fully, but he failed to understand

that everything was done at the expense of people, whose living conditions went from bad to worse. Moreover, the cult of personality and megalomaniac shows displaying gratitude for his leadership radically dissatisfied the people. Several revolt attempts were brutally repressed by the DSS, which became more efficient and powerful.

The fall of Communism in Eastern Europe was generally peaceful, but unfortunately, it was not the case for Romania. The Communist regime became even more ferocious in its last years and decided not to cede power without fighting all the way. Therefore, once the spark lit, the struggle between loyalist forces and the people became bloody and almost unreal, with televisions all over the world broadcasting the first “live” revolution. The huge wave of violence could not be stopped unless the hydra head fell. Initially escaped, but soon captured by the military, Ceausescu couple was summarily court martialed, convicted, and executed by a firing squad in late December 1989, bringing an era to its end.

As for all of Eastern Europe, the post Communist era was a challenge for Romania, mirroring somehow the struggle for existence of newly formed countries in a postcolonial era. Suddenly awakening from a nightmare, Romania found itself in a vacuum of power, despite the fact that a new entity was formed.²⁹ Generations were raised under the Communism and mentalities cannot change overnight. Therefore, the first couple of years consisted of a dull fight to understand and implement democracy, more or less understood by the people, since the last half of century left deep scars in public mentality. The change needed time, despite the popular hunger for democracy, and errors have been made during the process, sometimes involving violence, as in March and June 1990.³⁰ Moreover, the “opportunity syndrome” and the “rush for the capitalist dream” became issues in the first years after the revolution, leading to an increasing level of corruption, as the country did not have yet the proper legislation to regulate private property, open market, and freedom of speech.³¹

As in most countries within the region, the awakening was sudden and brutal, once the people realized that the fight was still beginning. Getting the Western support throughout the transition, with first free elections held in 1990, and having a new Constitution the next year, Romania reoriented itself towards West. Therefore, as an internal struggle was inherent after transitioning to multi party system, after so many years of single party leadership, there was a political consensus with regards to the future path of the country, foreseen as part of NATO and the European Union (EU). Meanwhile, Romania sought a partnership with the US, the global

pillar standing, not only to ensure its short term security, but to resume its interwar approach and to fulfill Romanians affinity for Western values. Since joining the NATO - EU binomial, supported by the partnership with the US, was the essential aim for Romania's development, this endeavor was supported by a large majority of the population, and made possible the overall efforts to join those organizations, throughout a long and challenging adherence process, while the state was reformed from the ground.

Understanding that integration is a complex and sequential process, Romania adopted a step by step approach. Thus, Romania signed a partnership with the US in 1993, the same year it joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP), as a first phase of NATO accession, playing an active role from this posture. Expanding the previous partnership with the US to the strategic level in 1997 and completing all the accession requirements, Romania became a NATO member in 2004, and joined the EU three years later. Furthermore, having a stable and balanced position within the region, Romania maintained a strong commitment to Western values, constantly improving its relationship with the West. Therefore, the 2011 strategic partnership with the US expanded the bilateral political, military, and economic relations to a higher level, while the 2015 establishment of new NATO command structures in Romania balanced the developments of Russian behavior in Crimea and Ukraine. Additionally, Romania became actively involved in all the international major problems, either military as in Western Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, or political, such as with the current European migration crisis.

To achieve its goals, Romania needed internal stability. The internal challenges aimed to transition from a centralized economy to an open, liberalized one, but the process was difficult, since initially there was an obvious lack of experience in implementing desired objectives. Additionally, the new leadership did not balance rationally the popular desire to privatize almost everything, leading to the premature dismissal of the former economic establishment, a costly mistake considering the long term effects. It was only in early 2000s when the Romanian economy began to see solid improvements, as leadership experience increased and the national legislation became more effective. After joining the EU, Romanian economy continued to grow, overcoming the 2009 global crisis and having good prognosis for the future.

The internal stability implies as well an independent judiciary and a balance between powers. The development of strong democratic institutions was also challenging for Romania, which had to find the way of fighting generalized corruption and to correct institutional abuses,

in order to join the international and European construct. The fight for justice began early, but the results appeared only after 2002, when the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) was established. Moreover, for candidates to Schengen space, the EU implemented a mechanism of control and verification (MCV), meant to ensure the independence of justice, in conjunction with the human rights and the rule of law. Both those institutions bolstered Romania's commitment for an independent judiciary, and moreover, the DNA's results placed Romania in the leading position of fighting corruption within the region, constituting a model for neighbor countries.

Diplomatic efforts during last twenty five years were essential to ensure Romania's position and stability. Negotiations to join NATO and the EU depended on the regional stability and Romania's capability to negotiate bilateral treaties with all its neighbors was a major requirement successfully fulfilled. Equally important was the stabilization of the West Balkans and the dialogue for an open Black Sea. Furthermore, as a NATO and EU member, Romania is actively involved in extending these organizations eastward, being especially interested in Moldova's situation for historical and ethnic purposes. However, despite such accomplishments, public opinion is that the Romanian diplomacy might have done more, and therefore, the expectations for the future are high in this respect.

While the economy, justice and diplomacy been important parts in the integration process, the main driver for success was the Romanian military, both through internal transformation as a model for other national institutions, and assumed commitment, as a part of Romanian efforts for international endeavors. In the last twenty five years, the Romanian Armed Forces experienced a continued process of transformation and modernization to meet NATO interoperability and capability standards. Significantly downsizing its personnel and abandoning conscription, the military focused on quality over quantity with respect to the human resource. As a part of its international efforts, Romania committed its troops alongside NATO and US led coalitions wherever it was necessary, from Persian Gulf in 1991 to current Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan. These engagements have multiple benefits, such as combat and theater experience for personnel, capability and interoperability increment for its structures, and international trust and recognition for national efforts in this respect.

Although the economic situation did not permit in the past a proper budget allocation for military expenditures, Romania has succeeded so far in fulfilling its military commitment. However, the budget allocation increased constantly the last five years, and for the future it will

maintain this trend, reaching at least two percent of GDP, as required by NATO, in the context of current security environment and its potential threatening evolution. The financial efforts focus primarily on ensuring vital capabilities for self defense, such as the replacement of the fighter fleet, and also on enhancing essential capabilities for the alliance, such as the special forces, military police, CBRN, engineers, and military intelligence, while continuously improving the combined arms strength.

Intelligence is also a stronghold for Romania, since the powerful former DSS was transformed and remodeled in accordance with the new realities. The new Romanian intelligence services, both internal (SRI) and external (SIE) benefited from with their American counterparts, the FBI and CIA, respectively, but also with some other Western similar services, while integrating the relevant experience accumulated in the Communist past.³² Adding to this the military intelligence, also transformed and improved, Romania is able to provide significant support in this field, as it did especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, often acknowledged as such by its allies.³³

As described above, Romania reached a point that allows her to exploit its evolution and position to ensure stability within the region, together with its allies. The success of such endeavors will rely on a continuous improvement of its internal stability and growth, a good assessment of current environment, and a wise use of its strong points, in conjunction with or in support of allied efforts.

IV. The current status across Europe and the Romanian approach.

In order to understand what role Romania could play within the region, it is necessary to understand what Europe is experiencing currently and how the events may evolve. So, how may we characterize today's Europe? In a single word, it is quite simple: crisis. However, the situation is more complex than that and deserves a more detailed approach, following several lines, such as security, politics, economy, and last, but not least, the US involvement.

From the security perspective, the Europe is concerned with the resurrected Russian imperialism, combined with the enormous immigrant flux from the Middle East. The combination raises multiple questions about the current European construct and its future. While both NATO and the EU look forward to an expansion eastward, Russia made its move earlier, in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, consolidating its position to the Black Sea, which became a stake

for regional stability. The historical Soviet policy of relocating Russian population has now paid off in Ukraine. Furthermore, things may evolve the same way in Moldova, which is the hottest topic for Romanians due to historical ties (Appendix I). Currently, Moldova struggles in a political stalemate, seemingly unable to decide its future, and therefore the Russian expansion policy may be even more profitable as it was in Georgia and other former Soviet republics.³⁴ Additionally, Hungary is a weak link for NATO in dealing with Russia, because, recently, there is a close connection between Viktor Orban and Vladimir Putin. Therefore, although this may lead to a “new Cold War,” the proper response for NATO against Russian actions is to consolidate its Eastern flank, across a line comprising the Baltic States, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey.³⁵

Regarding immigrant crisis, besides the accommodation of a large number of people, the security concerns involve the incapacity to verify their background and country of origin, and therefore, there is a high potential for terrorist attacks, like the one in Paris in November 2015. Having this in mind, Europe faces another challenge, involving the migration route and the weakness of some East Europeans borders, especially in Western Balkans. We should remember that not so long ago this region was terribly tormented by ethnic and religious conflicts that are not completely over, and the new situation may add more tension between neighbors within the area, since there is an obvious rift between a Russian-oriented Serbia and the other former Yugoslavian republics, which lean towards Western Europe.³⁶ Going southeast, there is also Turkey’s complicated situation, balancing between Europe and its national concerns, now more than ever, if we consider Syria and all the actors involved there.³⁷

There is another concern that the recent immigrant crisis deepened across Europe. The European construct, which seemed to work after the Cold War ended, has become fragile and shady lately, due to the political disagreement between European countries, especially between East and West. The EU extension eastward incorporated new Eastern democracies, but the political views about the future of Europe differ from region to region, not to mention from country to country, based on interests and cultural mindsets. While everyone agrees upon the necessity of a common approach, each one has a different perspective about this approach. For instance, everyone agrees that Europe must be united in solving the immigrant crisis, but imposing refugee quotas for each country raises questions from the Eastern nations, which disagree with this method, based on economic and cultural reasons. Since the West did not allow

all of them to join the Schengen common space, there are many Eastern voices arguing loudly against what they call “a double standard” applied in European policy, differentiating between East and West. The recent agreement upon UK status within the union made things even worse in that respect, deepening the feeling that, in fact, Europe is not at all equal, but structured on layers, having at one end Germany, France and UK as the leading league, while at the other end the Eastern countries struggle to achieve rights that the West fears to grant them.³⁸

The economy plays a huge role in the European situation, especially after 2009 crisis. In this respect, Greece’s case deepened the Western Europe’s fear of an economic failure, leading to a more circumspect approach on Eastern countries, still seen as an economic liability for the EU. In this context, the main European concern in regards to its economic development is related to the dependence on Russian energy supplies. The recent sanctions imposed on Russia did not affect only the energy field, but also the entire European economy, as much as it affected Russia. This aspect leads to lines of dissension among Europeans, since some of them suspect Germany for trading European common interests in exchange to a better deal with Russia for energy.

As an ally and strategic partner for most of the European countries, United States should be and, in fact, is concerned with Europe’s situation. Since the US global interests are closely related to the European security, stability and prosperity, America is actively involved in Europe, not only as NATO’s leading country, but as a political and economic partner with the EU. While the Obama Administration rebalanced the US strategy towards Asia and Pacific, Europe was not left alone, although it felt this way, especially in light of recent Russian actions in Crimea and Ukraine. Therefore, the US most focus more on Europe, helping it to balance the Russian threat, enhancing partner countries defense capabilities, and actively preventing terrorism, as the disturbed Middle East remains a potential exporter of violent conflicts and instability.

This is the environment that Europe, Romania included, must face today. Each country is seeking to overcome the pressure, on its own or intertwining its actions with allies and partners, and Romania is not an exception. As with most of its neighbors, Romania is engaged on both internal and external fronts to ensure its stability, security, and prosperity. Internally, the current status of Romania may be defined as stable, politically and economically, while the trend is positive for the near future. The main focus is to increase economic investments and ensure a competitive market, while the fight against corruption remains a key for success.³⁹ Additionally, as the Romanian ambassador in Germany recently noted, based on its history and mentality,

Romania seems to have something that is missing on the European stage, although it is extremely necessary: interculturalism, which allows the existence of inner tensions that make it very capable of facing ethnic and cultural challenges.⁴⁰

Externally, Romania is concerned with the current stalemate of European construct, while the Russian interests seem to advance westward rapidly. Although the internal stability is necessary, it is not sufficient, as Romania understood well after the Cold War, when it started to pursue European integration, both with NATO and the EU. Today, its position as an active member of both these organizations ensures its security and confidence for prosperity, but it also imposes new responsibilities, which Romania is aware of, taking them seriously. Furthermore, Romania could not envision its commitment for democratic values without a strategic partnership with the United States, the pillar of democracy all over the world. Therefore, Romania has decided to play along its allies and partners for mutual benefits, in terms of security and prosperity. While expressing its concerns about the current European policy, just as a way to balance and improve it, Romania is determined to defend the Eastern flank of Europe, not only by increasing its military expenditures, but also by expanding the military training to incorporate more allied and partner forces, hosting NATO command elements, and allowing the US to place strategic defensive equipment in its territory.⁴¹

In this context, Klaus Iohannis, the President of Romania, released in July 2015 the Romanian National Security Strategy for the next five years, envisioning a “strong Romania in Europe and the world.” Setting out the profile that Romania builds for the future, the document defines national interests and security objectives, evaluates the security environment, assesses threats, risks, and vulnerabilities, and establishes courses of action and ways for achieving national security goals.⁴²

It is no coincidence that Romania’s national security strategy have many similarities with most of the European strategies, and foremost, with the US national security strategy, since the objectives are similar for all of them, keeping proportion, of course. Therefore, by addressing topics such as proper functioning of the state, preserving own citizen security all over the world, defending values and symbols, maintaining and developing collective security, and promoting peace, freedom and democracy, Romania has carefully constructed its strategic credibility, seizing the opportunity to become an important player within the region, while it prepares to

celebrate its Union centenary in 2018, and to assume the chairmanship of the EU Council in 2019.

While the strategy establishes internal and external national security objectives, promoting national interests and setting landmarks of the state efforts, the courses of action sets out seven dimensions of national security, covering topics such as defense, public order, intelligence and counterintelligence, economy and energy, diplomacy, crisis management, and social matters. Without forgetting for a moment the strategic importance of Romania's geographic position, the document approaches the concept of "extended national security," maintaining the vision of an internally stable country, capable of projecting its strengths externally in order to promote stability, security, and democratic values in cooperation with allies and partners.

But regardless how well the strategy appears, the reader should remember that it is just a plan, and actions are needed to transform it into success. Thus, what can Romania actually do to implement this strategy? The answer should follow the Romanian mindset, shaped through history: while being strong and confident at home, Romania will promote a safe environment and good relations with all its neighbors, using in this respect all elements of national power and enhancing the partnership with its allies, especially with the United States. In approaching the security strategy implementation, the best way is to follow the DIME concept, comprising the diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic aspects.

From the diplomatic standpoint, Romania is interested in maintaining a constructive dialogue with all the states within the area. "Good neighboring" is a sine qua non condition for regional security, and therefore, Romania adopted it without reserve, conscious that its diplomacy must act responsibly and resolutely.⁴³ However, to leave the status of an allied border country, Romania focuses primarily on NATO and EU extension eastward, taking active political and diplomatic actions to support Moldova and Ukraine's road map towards European values.⁴⁴ Thus, Romanian diplomacy looks for fulfillment of an older national dream, reuniting with Moldova under the European arch at first and perhaps in fact later. Moreover, Ukraine's integration in NATO and eventually in the EU will increase considerably the strategic value of the Black Sea for the West dealing with Russia. The Western Balkans remains also a concern for Romania, because any instability there will impact the entire continent and beyond it. For this region, Romanian diplomacy considers the full integration within the EU, to include Serbia, as

the best solution for regional and European stability, especially since in these conditions the main migration route from the Middle East would be better controlled. In regards to Hungary, Romania maintains a positive approach, despite some disagreements concerning the European policy and occasionally aggressive Hungarian government's defiance in respect to Transylvania.⁴⁵

Intelligence is also important for Romania's attempt to become regionally relevant. The recent history consecrated its intelligence services as powerful tools for the state, and the tradition remained, although the purpose changed, being now aligned with the Western democratic values. Therefore, the intelligence structures focus internally on preventing terrorism and corruption, in an interagency effort with good results so far. In this respect, the excellent collaboration between the intelligence services and judicial structures in a counter corruption program was extremely well received by the West, which saw it as a great improvement of Romania's democratic status and now considers implementing it all across Eastern Europe.⁴⁶ Furthermore, given its location and current position in international affairs, Romania and its citizen represent a target for violent extremist organizations, but the efficiency of preventing terrorist acts has reduced this threat both domestically and abroad, contributing also to maintaining relatively safe region in this respect.⁴⁷

While the intelligence cooperation with allies and partners proved fruitful for all parties, all sides benefiting it, the external focus of Romanian intelligence manifests itself primarily towards the East, where Russian actions are perceived as threatening for Romania, Europe, and the US. Thus, Romania is taking action, both proactive and passive, to counter the Russian threat. While internally the Russian propaganda is closely watched and countered, externally Romania assumed the leadership of building Ukraine's cyber defense capability, as established after the NATO summit in Wales.⁴⁸

When consider the military, it is important to underline the relevance of military intelligence (MI) and its progress during last decades, along with the entire Romanian military establishment. Viewed as one of the main strengths of Romanian military, the MI, and especially the human intelligence (HUMINT), helped it to evolve, based on a constant presence in multinational operations alongside allied forces. Therefore, there is no surprise that NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence (NATO HCOE) was established in Romania in 2010, acknowledging the valuable contribution of the Romanian professionals in the field.⁴⁹ This

enhances the overall Romanian contribution to the allied efforts to maintain and develop a safe environment and a credible security policy within the alliance and beyond it.

Without being a militarized state, Romania used its military to lead the way towards West, since the military institution was the first to adapt to new realities and support the country's integration. As the main engine for this process, the military understood the need for development and structural transformation, acting accordingly, and therefore, significantly contributing to the overall Romanian efforts in this respect, gaining the trust of the majority of Romanians.⁵⁰ Moreover, the active participation in allied and multinational missions challenged the national capabilities to operate in complex environments, while enhancing the interoperability with partner nations and the experience of military personnel at all levels.

Starting from the idea that it cannot succeed by itself, Romania envisions its security architecture around its military institution, closely linked with NATO and the US military. All the previous efforts made the Romanian military a trustful partner for its allies and a regional stronghold for NATO and the US. Therefore, there is no surprise that NATO installed two new multinational headquarters in Bucharest, one at division level to cover its Southeastern flank – MND-SE, and the other to integrate the forces assigned for this mission – NFIU, while the training facility from Cincu offers great training conditions for allied forces. Additionally, the US chose to locate a key logistics hub at the MK base, and furthermore, to install elements of the European defensive shield in Deveselu.⁵¹ While one may argue that such actions are just a response to the new security developments within the region, which is not entirely false, one may realize that the reasons are more complex than that. While NATO redefines its role and missions for global security, Romania offers not only a perfect location, but also a good environment to support this approach, given Romania's commitment for Western values, in conjunction with a strong will of its military to contribute to greater security efforts.

Thus, besides contributing to international missions, Romania provides specialized units for the NATO Response Force (NRF), while continuously increasing its regular forces strength and actively participating in various regional and allied exercises within the area.⁵² Meanwhile, the partnership with the US military continuously develops, involving all the US military services, whether we are talking about training Romanians officers through the International Military Education Training (IMET) program, or conducting joint exercises and multinational missions. The best example is the Black Sea Rotational Force (BSRF), which increases the

cooperation and interoperability between the Romanian military and the US Marine Corps, but also enables both parties to engage proactively with other countries within the region. Therefore, since its beginning in 2010, the BSRF constantly increased its complexity, engaging in 2015 with more than twenty counties, while this year the number is expected to increase. Additionally, the common Romanian-Hungarian Infantry Battalion is another expression of commitment for regional security, setting an example for further similar actions, as Romania plans to extend this initiative to Turkey, Bulgaria, and Poland, intending to form a regional belt to contain future Russian aggressive actions.

Pursuing regional stability, Romania is involved also in cooperative endeavors, such as the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI) and the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), the latter as the successor to the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe.⁵³ These regional bodies resonate with the Romanian complex approach on security, to include economic matters and their social effects. Since the Communist era and its early legacy demonstrated how erroneous is to leave some aspects aside, Romania views the economy and social matters as relevant elements of a stable environment, both internally and regionally. Since the human need for security is complex and evolving, ranging from physical to emotional, to include economic and social matters, a strong and growing economy will ensure an evolving quality of life, reducing discontents and allowing the allocation of more resources for the growth, prosperity, research, and security, in a cyclical phenomenon. But economic growth is now related to a broad environment, and this makes things even more difficult to accomplish, as we have seen in 2009 global economic crisis. Therefore, while improving national economy remains a priority, an active involvement of all members in these regional bodies is even more important now, and Romania fully contribute to it. For instance, it is noteworthy the Extreme Light Infrastructure – Nuclear Physics (ELI-NP) built near Bucharest, as the largest part of the European laboratory to study physics and investigate possible applications in the future.⁵⁴

Although Romanian economic growth is just a part of the regional equation, more national freedom of action in planning and allocating resources is expected. This will increase the military expenditures for strategic capabilities, such as the Air Force fighter program, and for partnership responsibilities. Moreover, it will improve the life of Romanians and the overall regional situation. A good example concerns the energy sector, not only because it is an important part of the national security strategy for many countries, but it is even more relevant in

this region, where Russia's energy reserves play a threatening role. So, in February 2016, Romania issued its new energy strategy, with the objective of reaching national energy independence, in conjunction with the European policy and international engagements in regards to climate change.⁵⁵

Romania is engaged in promoting regional stability and security through all its elements of national power. However, this challenging engagement needs more than internal popular support and political will, namely regional and international support, from its allies and partners, especially the US and NATO.

V. Conclusions.

Regional involvement is challenging, especially today, because, on one hand, the current European construct is more complicated than ever, and on the other hand, this context allows opportunities for many actors. Therefore, one may rightly ask: what makes Romania right to assume such an endeavor and what are the chances to succeed it? The answer resides the actual context within the region, country's location, its history, and last but not least, in its behavior so far.

Today's Europe is wracked by several challenges, issues involving both internal and external threats, either through an aggressive Russian behavior or a huge wave of immigrants who endanger its internal security and unity.⁵⁶ Within Eastern and Southeastern Europe, these dangers are perceived more acutely, given the proximity of Russia and Middle East, but there is no unified approach on these matters. Thus, while Turkey is caught in the middle between defending its southern borders and pursuing the European path, with an additional complication posed by Russian involvement in Syria, Bulgaria and the Western Balkans countries fight to stop the refugee stream and maintain internal stability. Furthermore, both Hungary and Poland's current leadership adopted straightforward positions against the EU policy regarding the common distribution quotas for those immigrants, with extra concerns from Poland, where the ultraconservative party adopted a more nationalist policy, potentially leading to discontent and instability.⁵⁷ We should not forget also the omnipresent "powder keg" from Western Balkans, where Serbia and Croatia seems on the verge of a "mini Cold War," while Bosnia and Kosovo still faces nationalist challenges. Additionally the non NATO countries, such as Georgia, express their security concerns, let alone Ukraine and Moldova, which may become instability exporters

for their neighbors. Therefore, in the middle of this “perfect storm,” Romania’s moderate approach is appropriate to reach a suitable solution for regional security, because its intention is not to dominate, but to ensure a stable climate through enhanced partnerships, cooperation, and mutual support. Additionally, history supports this approach, since there are no patterns for Romanian intention to dominate the area, while Romania’s nonlinear but predictable evolution during last decades demonstrates its commitment to democratic values and behaviors.

As for the success of this venture, there are no guarantees, but there is a strong confidence, based on the premises that Romania will continue on the same path. Make no mistakes, Romania is not an ideal democracy, and it still has to work to improve itself in this respect. Of course mistakes were made so far, and probably will be made in the future, but this is inevitable for a country trying to catch up to Western liberal democracies in such short time. Moreover, some challenges lay ahead, both internal, such as the will of political leadership to follow the ongoing path, and external, namely the nebulous future of the EU, Syrian conflict’s outcome, Russian future moves in Ukraine and Moldova, rising nationalism in Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, and even the near American change of administration. All will test Southeastern Europe’s will to maintain the democratic course and Romania’s capacity and availability to remain actively involved as a regional security provider. However, Romania’s persistence and determination are assets worthy of consideration, and this is why it needs the support of its allies, especially the US, to lead the way and light the path. This support will benefit both sides, since the US and West needs a local and regional engine to drive the entire region down the highway to democracy, while Romania increases its capabilities as a regional security provider, improving also its internal democratic mechanisms.

The Romanian endeavor for security and stability is constantly supported by the West, especially by the US, at all levels and across all domains. Enhancing interoperability and future common engagements where and when needed, the military partnership looks better and better, with the US Marines in the limelight and the BSRF as the main enhancer. But there is more than the US military presence in Romania; the partnership extends to common actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf, within NATO structures and actions, as well as outside them. As is often recognized by the US officials, Romania significantly and constantly contributed to allied efforts for peace, stability and democracy, while its military personnel demonstrated professionalism and competence in training and fighting.

Since the US is already involved in ensuring security globally, sharing the burden with loyal and trustful partners would be a tremendous advantage, politically, economically, and militarily. Therefore, although the American political statements express support and concern for the regional issues, they remain only statements without any action or solution. The US must remain committed to and even increase the current regional involvement in Southeastern Europe in support of Romanian security policy, to enhance the mutual advantages of this partnership and to strengthen the positive perception about its benefits. This involvement could be either direct, through military and economic assistance, or indirect, through diplomatic and political support.

As always, the future is unpredictable, but it can be shaped through will and determination. Remaining committed to democratic principles, Romania will stay resolute and actively involved in support of regional stability and security, alongside its partners and allies, aware that only through partnership and mutual respect will it achieve these goals.

Endnotes

¹ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones 1989-1992, *The Breakup of Yugoslavia 1990-1992*, Online: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/breakup-yugoslavia>; J. Cushman Laurent and Amb. Thomas Melady, "The Seven States of the Former Yugoslavia: An Evaluation," *The Ambassadors Review*, Fall 2011, The Institute of World Politics, Online: http://www.iwp.edu/news_publications/detail/the-seven-states-of-the-former-yugoslavia-an-evaluation; Judy Dempsey, "The Western Balkans Are Becoming Russia's New Playground," *Strategic Europe*, Carnegie Europe, 24 Nov 2014, Online: <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=57301>. The conflict in former Yugoslavia left severe marks and it is not completely over even today.

² Miruna Troncota, "No Second-class EU citizens!," Blog, FutureLab Europe, 24 Feb 2014, Online: <http://www.futurelabeurope.eu/blog/no-second-class-eu-citizens/>; Jan Puhl, Marta Solarz and Christian Neef, "Polish Dissident Adam Michnik: We Are Bastards of Communism'," Interview with Adam Michnik, *Spiegel Online International*, 31 Jul 2013, Online: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/polish-dissident-adam-michnik-on-eastern-europe-after-communism-a-913912-2.html>. Among Eastern Europeans persists a sentiment of being treated by the West as second class citizens.

³ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones 1937-1945, *The Yalta Conference 1945*, Online: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/yalta-conf>.

⁴ Encyclopedia.com, Yalta Conference, Online: http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Yalta_Conference.aspx.

⁵ New World Encyclopedia, Stalinism, Online: <http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Stalinism>; Mark Kramer, "Stalin, Soviet Policy, and the Consolidation of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe, 1944-1953," Online: http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/evnts/media/Stalin_and_Eastern_Europe.pdf; Peter Kenez, "Review of *Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe* by Vladimir Tismaneanu," *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol 83, No.3, The University of Chicago Press, September 2011, pp 719-720, Online, via JSTOR: http://www.jstor.org.lomc.idm.oclc.org/stable/10.1086/660355?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&searchText=Stalinism&searchText=revisited&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3DStalinism%2Bvisited%26amp%3Bacc%3Don%26amp%3Bwc%3Don%26amp%3Bfc%3Doff%26amp%3Bgroup%3Dnone&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. The Soviet regime imposed a Stalinist rule within Eastern Europe after World War II.

⁶ Mark Kramer, "Soviet Bloc," Princeton University Press, Online: http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/p0ns/s6_9143.pdf. For a more detailed approach on post Stalinist Romania, I recommend Claudia Moscovici, *Velvet Totalitarianism: Post Stalinist Romania*, University Press of America, 29 Jul 2009.

⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Moldova, Online: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/md.html>. After WWII, today's Moldova, once part of Romania, was incorporated into Soviet Union under the name of "Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic," regaining its independence in 1991.

⁸ Library of Congress, *Revelations from the Russian Archives: The Gulag*, Online: <https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/gula.html>; Russiapedia, *Of Russian origin: The GULAG*, Online: <http://russiapedia.rt.com/of-russian-origin/the-gulag/>.

⁹ GlobaSecurity.org, *Tito's Yugoslavia*, Online: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/yugo-hist2.htm>. Josip Broz Tito was the leader under whose rule Yugoslavia became a federal state and maintained unity as such.

¹⁰ GlobaSecurity.org, *Tito's Yugoslavia*, Online: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/yugo-hist2.htm>; Infoplease.com, *Josip Broz Tito: Tito's Dictatorship*, Online: <http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/people/tito-josip-broz-tito-dictatorship.html>; Robert Coalson, "How Stalin Created Some of the Post-Soviet World's Worst Ethnic Conflicts," *The Atlantic*, 1 Mar 2013, Online: <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/how-stalin-created-some-of-the-post-soviet-worlds-worst-ethnic-conflicts/273649/>. As Stalin in the Soviet Union, Tito applied the old Latin principle of "Divide et impera," maintaining Yugoslavia united as a newly emerged state by weakening nationalist voices.

¹¹ Encyclopaedia Britannica, *Kosovo Conflict*, Balkan History 1998-1999, Online: <http://www.britannica.com/event/Kosovo-conflict>; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones 1993-2000, *The War in*

Bosnia 1992-1995, Online: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/bosnia>; Robert Bideleux, “Kosovo’s Conflict,” *History Today*, Vol 48, Issue 11 Nov 1998, Online: <http://www.historytoday.com/robert-bideleux/kosovos-conflict>.

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
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Appendix A: Eastern Europe and the Iron Curtain



Appendix B: Religions in Europe



Appendix C: The Warsaw Pact and NATO



Appendix D: Breakup and Conflict in Yugoslavia



Appendix E: Small Union of Romanian Principalities (1859), becoming Romania (1862)



Appendix F: Great Romania with its Provinces (1918)



Appendix H: Romania after WWII (Current Territory)



**Appendix I: Moldova's Ethnic and Separatist Issues
(Transnistria and Gagauzia)**



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