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14. ABSTRACT
This essay builds on Mearsheimer's description of U.S. grand strategy that led to the decisions to invade Iraq and Afghanistan. Global dominance, which uses unilateral action, is inherently flawed as it fails to respect the rule of self-determination and cultural geography as described by Collins and Kaplan. Offshore balancing respects the limits to the amount of physical geography that American technology and power can overcome and more adequately takes into account the tetra-decagonal complexity of cultural geography by working multilaterally through alliances and positioning U.S. forces over the horizon. Friedberg's maritime denial and distant blockade are offered as offshore balancing options.

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TITLE:
**THE UNITED STATES AS AN OFFSHORE BALANCER:
HOW THE LIMITS TO THE AMOUNT OF GEOGRAPHY THAT TECHNOLOGY
CAN OVERCOME SHOULD INFORM AMERICA'S GRAND STRATEGY**


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Executive Summary

Title: The United States as an Offshore Balancer: How the Limits to the Amount of Geography That Technology Can Overcome Should Inform America's Grand Strategy

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Thesis: Offshore balancing, as John Mearsheimer defines it, should be the grand strategy of the United States. It would have more efficiently and effectively protected U.S. interests in the Middle East after 9/11 and would more effectively protect U.S. interests across the globe in the future.

Discussion: On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda (AQ) successfully attacked symbolic U.S. landmarks at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The 9/11 attacks resulted in the tragic loss of more than 3,000 people. The attacks eventually led to U.S. responses in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Effective terrorism uses violence as an effective form of theater. This theatric violence presents a threat to U.S. national security that is eye-catching, but not existential. The threat of terrorism should inform American strategy, not provide its basis. The strategic roads to OEF and OIF inflated the threat of terrorism to make terrorism appear to be an existential threat to U.S. national security and to justify a strategy that John Mearsheimer has described as one of "global dominance." Global dominance, a term Mearsheimer coined to describe the mindset that led to the invasion of Iraq, is an inept strategy with inherent flaws. During OEF and OIF, American strategists assumed more American power and technological capability than actually existed. The combination of enormous confidence in American military and ideological power and the decision to treat terrorism as an existential threat led to the belief that a grand strategy of global dominance was both possible and necessary. It was not possible, because neither American combat power nor American ideas can overcome geography entirely. It was not necessary, because terrorism does not pose an existential threat to the United States and global dominance exacerbates its threat rather than reduces it. Looking at the Asia and Indo-Pacific, the United States should consider a variety of offshore balancing options to contain the hegemon of the region, China.

Conclusion: The insertion of democracy through direct intervention under a strategy of global dominance is inherently flawed and doomed to fail. A strategy that mirrors Mearsheimer's offshore balancing will be more effective and efficient in furthering the national interests of the United States.

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PREFACE

I would like to thank Dr. Douglas Streusand and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College for taking me on an unexpected but professionally enriching educational experience. Dr. Streusand's breadth and depth of knowledge in international relations, geopolitics, and history was an especial treat. His guidance helped add to my personal journey to make sense of the post-9/11 world we live in as American citizens and members of the military. Robert Kaplan's writings are forms of art that traverse thousands of years of history and as many miles in a way that is high thinking but consumable to an average Joe like me. John Mearsheimer's *Imperial By Design* brought me back to a reality Dr. Upendra Acharya of Gonzaga University School of Law shared with me in 2004-05. If a hegemon's strategy violates the rule of self-determination, it will more than likely fail.

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On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda (AQ) successfully attacked symbolic U.S. landmarks at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The 9/11 attacks resulted in the tragic loss of more than 3,000 people.¹ The attacks eventually led to U.S. responses in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Effective terrorism uses violence as a form of theater. In *Terror in the Mind of God*, Mark Juergensmeyer suggests that terrorism is “performance violence” and is intended to impact the actions and perceptions of “[t]hose who witness the violence.”² This theatric violence presents a threat to U.S. national security that is eye-catching, but not existential. The threat of terrorism should inform American strategy, not provide its basis.

The strategic roads to OEF and OIF used “threat inflation of the highest order” to make terrorism appear to be an existential threat to U.S. national security and to justify a strategy that John Mearsheimer has described as one of “global dominance.”³ Global dominance, a term Mearsheimer coined to describe the mindset that led to the invasion of Iraq, is an inept strategy with inherent flaws. Offensive in nature, its goals are to ensure that the United States is the most powerful state in the international system and seeks global transformation by overthrowing regimes and the installing democracies in their place.⁴ In hopes of achieving these ends, American strategists during OEF and OIF assumed more American power and technological capability than actually existed. The combination of enormous confidence in American military and ideological power and the decision to treat terrorism as an existential threat led to the belief that a grand strategy of global dominance was both possible and necessary. It was not possible, because neither American combat power nor American ideas can overcome geography entirely. It was not necessary, because terrorism does not pose an existential threat to the United States and global dominance exacerbates its threat rather than reduces it.

The United States should embrace offshore balancing, as Mearsheimer defines it, as its grand strategy because it respects the limits to the amount of physical geography that technology can overcome and more adequately accounts for the complexity of cultural geography. Offshore balancing's goal is to ensure that no country dominates a hemisphere like the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. Defensive in nature, its method puts much of the human and economic cost of implementation on local allies and positions U.S. forces over the horizon.⁵ U.S. forces intervene when an overt regional aggressor starts to overpower a U.S. ally and repel the aggressor to reset the original boundaries to something that resembles the *status quo ante*. Offshore balancing would have more efficiently and effectively protected U.S. interests in the Middle East after 9/11 and would more effectively protect U.S. interests across the globe in the future. Because there was not a meaningful offshore option with which to address the threats of AQ and the Taliban in Afghanistan, U.S. intervention there did not contravene the general framework of offshore balancing. The intervention in Iraq, and the willful disregard of geographic obstacles, implied the strategy of global dominance. Offshore balancing reflects the limitations that geography places on American power.

After discussing geographical considerations from the perspectives of Robert Kaplan and John Collins, this essay first describes Mearsheimer's concepts of offshore balancing and global dominance then uses OEF and OIF to illustrate the benefits and pitfalls of each strategic concept. The strategists who considered global dominance realistic ignored significant aspects of physical and cultural geography. America's strategic decision-makers ignored these aspects based on erroneous assumptions as to what technology could accomplish and how the indigenous populations of Iraq and Afghanistan would react to U.S. military action and presence. The discussion will then focus on offshore balancing and offer options for U.S. strategy in the Asia

and Indo-Pacific.⁶ Offshore balancing's use of local and regional alliances is superior to a global dominance form of direct intervention because it more adequately accounts for the limits to the amount of physical geography that technology can overcome and respects the tetra-decagonal complexity of cultural geography.

John Collins describes geography as a science that includes more than the mere study of rock and mineral sediments. His broader definition of geography "deals with the Earth and its life; especially the description of the land, sea, air, and the distribution plant and animal life."⁷ The types of geography most relevant to military planning are *physical* and *cultural*. *Physical* geography deals with spatial relationships that have visible, often immutable characteristics and addresses the size, shape, and contours of land and internal and external waters. These characteristics, along with means of transportation, or lines of communication, determine maneuverability and, as Collins suggests "the relative security or vulnerability of key points within any piece of militarily important property."⁸ Collins continues, stating that *cultural* geography takes into account relations "among, racial, ethnic, tribal, and religious groups," in addition to militarily significant characteristics such as "native intelligence, languages, dialects, literacy, customs, and beliefs."⁹

Turning to the geography of Iraqi history, Robert Kaplan makes the case that Iraq's *physical* geography has always invited instability and conflict. Kaplan suggests in *The Revenge of Geography* that "only the most suffocating of tyrannies could stave off the utter disintegration to which this frontier region was prone."¹⁰ "Mesopotamia cuts across one of history's bloodiest migration routes."¹¹ As civilization built up around the Tigris and Euphrates, the absence of geographic barriers, similar to the deserts and Nile River enjoyed by Egypt, left an open frontier for barbarian raiders to exploit. This human traffic, consisting of migrations and invasions, and

conflict contributed to a heterogeneous population that has always been prone to faction. Since antiquity, tyrannies have sought to stave off internal disintegration “thus we have Tiglath-pileser (twelfth-eleventh centuries B.C.), Ashurnasirpal II (ninth century B.C.), Sennacherib (eighth-seventh centuries B.C.), and others, famous for their cruelty, megalomania and mass deportations carried out in their name.” In fairness, Kaplan qualifies this discussion as one of “historical and geographical tendencies.” Kaplan is not a geographic determinist; he does not consider representative government in Iraq impossible, merely enormously difficult.¹²

Kaplan’s depiction of Mesopotamia illustrates how *physical* geography shapes *cultural* geography. The British attempt to create a state in one of the most weakly governed areas in the Ottoman Empire, grappled with “another case of a vague geographical expression—a loose assemblage of tribes, sects, and ethnicities further divided by the Turks into the *Vilayets* of Kurdish Mosul, Sunni Baghdad, and Shiite Basra, going from north to south.”¹³ The British wanted to connect Kurdistan’s oil fields that theoretically existed in the north with the Persian Gulf in the south. Britain’s endeavors after the fall of Turkish rule in the region created what Kaplan calls “a “witches’ brew” of Kurdish separatism, Shiite tribalism, and Sunni assertiveness.”¹⁴ He also suggests that the influence of physical and cultural geographical factors formed “a pattern that culminated in the rule of Saddam Hussein.”¹⁵ It was “a tyranny which the moment it was toppled, led to several years of bloodcurdling anarchy with atrocities that had an ancient aura.”¹⁶ The 2003 American invasion of Iraq affected the entire Arab world.¹⁷ Kaplan proffers that the pervasive effect of the invasion was due to “Iraq’s vast oil reserves (the second largest in the world behind Saudi Arabia); its large population of over 31 million; its geographical position at the juncture of the Sunni and Shiite worlds; its equidistance between

Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia; and its historical and political significance as the former capital of the Abbasid Dynasty.”¹⁸

U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that global dominance is an inept strategy that is costly and ineffective. Although there were no obvious offshore options for Afghanistan, a strategy of offshore balancing that relied less on U.S. intervention and more heavily on regionally local and multilateral action would have been less costly, been more sustainable in the long-term, and had a less deleterious effect on U.S. perception and credibility in the international community. “U.S. strategy has shifted throughout its brief history, starting with offshore balancing, shifting to selective engagement, and most recently reaching a costly and ineffective strategy of global dominance at present.¹⁹ For the reasons discussed below, the United States should return to a strategy of offshore balancing to further its global interests.”²⁰

As a leading contemporary realist, Mearsheimer suggests, and this essay supports, that the best strategy for the United States is “one of offshore balancing. The goal of offshore balancing is to make sure that no country dominates a geographic region the way that the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere.”²¹ Offshore balancing calls for preventing regional hegemony by aligning with other regional powers against them. “The best way to achieve that end is to rely on local powers to counter aspiring regional hegemony and otherwise keep U.S. military forces over the horizon. But if that proves impossible, American troops come from offshore to help do the job, and then leave once the potential hegemon is checked.”²²

Mearsheimer postulates that many of America’s current problems are the result of a change in grand strategy after the Cold War. Starting with the Clinton administration and continuing through the Bush administration, the United States embraced a flawed strategy of

global dominance “which was doomed not just to fail, but likely to backfire in dangerous ways if it relied too heavily on military force to achieve its ambitious agenda.”²³

Global dominance has two broad objectives: maintaining American primacy, which means making sure that the United States remains the most powerful state in the international system; and spreading democracy across the globe, in effect, making the world in America’s image. The underlying belief is that new liberal democracies will be peacefully inclined and pro-American, so the more the better.²⁴

Mearsheimer points out “an important disagreement among global dominators about how to best achieve their strategy’s goals. On the one side are neoconservatives, who believe that the United States can rely heavily on armed force to dominate and transform the globe.”²⁵ “They also generally dislike being tied to allies and international institutions and view them ‘as forums where the Lilliputians tie down Gulliver.’ Conversely, liberal imperialists believe in the use of force but also believe that it must be used multilaterally, as will be discussed below, with allies and international institutions.”²⁶

The speculative benefits of global dominance were impossible to achieve. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of why global dominance does not work.²⁷ “Much of the reasoning that suggested global dominance could succeed came from prominent figures such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld wanted to use the post-9/11 wars as a proving ground for ‘his transformation theory—that high-tech weapons could compensate for numbers of troops’.”²⁸ Rumsfeld and others believed that military transformation would make the political transformation of the Middle East possible. Global dominance was more than a strategy, it was his reality. This line of thinking incorrectly assumed away the massive amount of work required to create stability after an American intervention. Politicians often avoid strategies that involve putting boots on the ground because the decision to put boots on the ground invariably carries the political demand to predict the future with an “exit strategy.” Such discussion accompanied the

decisions to put boots on the ground in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Leon Wieseltier makes the point that “[t]he doctrine of ‘exit strategy’ fundamentally misunderstands the nature of war and, more generally, the nature of historical actions. In the name of caution, it denies the contingency of human affairs. For the knowledge of the end is not given to us at the beginning.”²⁹

The political movements of the U.S. in the period between the 1991 and 2003 of Iraq provide context for the logic that led to the decision to invade in 2003 and the global dominance strategy that was used. Many neoconservative “Iraq Hawks” wanted to overthrow Saddam and carried a sense of bitterness, moral outrage, and embarrassment from the conclusion of the U.S. liberation of Kuwait in 1991. For people in this camp, the U.S. policy of containment with no-fly zones and U.N. sanctions was insufficient. The battle with Saddam and terrorism was a fight of good against evil.³⁰

William Kristol and Robert Kagan, prominent neoconservative authors, started the Project for a New American Century in 1997 and crafted one of several documents that advocated for an invasion of Iraq. In 1998, the members of this organization called for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in a letter to President Clinton. They stressed that Saddam had the means to deliver chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The signatories included several future Bush administration officials: Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Zalmay Khalilzad (who would be an ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and then the United Nations), to name a few.³¹

The Project for a New American Century sought to overthrow Saddam “not only as a realist measure to protect the United States from a potential terrorist with weapons of mass destruction, but also an offensive measure to realign politics in the entire Middle East.”³² The

establishment of democracy in Iraq would transform the civilization of the region. It would end the dominance of obscurantist Islam and corrupt dictators.³³ Humanitarian motives won the plan support from liberal interventionists who bristled at Saddam's repeated crimes against humanity at the expense of the Kurds and Shiites.³⁴

On the trail for the presidential campaign in 2000, George W. Bush portrayed himself as a prudent realist, criticizing the humanitarian interventions of the Clinton Administration. Bush also suggested that Europe should have provided the military forces to stop the actions of Slobodan Milosevic in Bosnia and Kosovo.³⁵ Under the influence of neoconservative³⁶ appointees in his administration, he reversed his course after the 9/11 attacks. Combining Wilsonian idealism with enormous confidence in American power, America's new strategy called for intervention abroad to achieve peace and security through the installation of democratic governments.³⁷ Combs defines neoconservatives as "aggressive idealists" who "were conservative in that they supported a major buildup of American military power and its use in the pursuit of national security interests, but they differed from most conservatives by being more willing to use military force to spread American ideals abroad."³⁸ Armed with the faulty assumption that the indigenous population in Iraqi territory would view America as a liberator, neoconservative Iraq Hawks promoted the strategy, described by Mearsheimer as global dominance. The strategy involved an invasion of Iraq with low troop numbers and an end state of toppling Saddam Hussein's regime.

The events of 9/11 created an opportunity for those that wished to invade. One of Rumsfeld's aides made notes of his reactions to the attack. "Judge whether good enough to hit S.H [Hussein] at same time. Not only UBL [Usama bin Laden]. Go massive. Sweep it all up. Things related and not."³⁹ The Bush Administration deferred actions toward Iraq while the

United States started the hunt for UBL in Afghanistan, but the invasion to overthrow Saddam was coming. On September 17, 2001, President Bush issued a secret directive for a military review of its plans to invade Iraq.⁴⁰

David Frum and Richard Perle's work in *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror*, provides a snapshot in time that captures the perceptions of Saddam's Iraq, the threat of terrorism, and the benefits of spreading democracy that many neoconservatives had in this period. Saddam was a monster that should have been destroyed in 1991. The CIA's calculations in the months that followed the conclusion of the Gulf War were incorrect, and a coup led "by one of Saddam's Sunni henchmen" did not lead to a successful uprising.⁴¹ "Saddam had survived; therefore we had lost. And over the next eight years the people of the region would see us lose again and again."⁴² Iraq Hawks viewed terrorism as an existential threat. "For us, terrorism remains the great evil of our time, and the war against evil, our generation's great cause.... There is no middle way for Americans: It is victory or holocaust."⁴³ Neoconservatives believed that spreading democracy could eventually bring peace and a better way of life to the Middle East. "Nobody thinks that it will be fast or easy to bring democracy to the Middle East. The democratizers understand the obstacles better than their critics. They have devoted whole lifetimes to studying them. But they perceive something that the people who dismiss the democratizers fail to see: the poisonous cultural effect of tyranny."⁴⁴ If post-Saddam Iraq was successful, it would serve as an example and an alternative form of governance for other nations in the Middle East.⁴⁵

Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz treated Afghanistan like a sideshow to the perceived threat in Iraq. At a gathering at Camp David on September 15, Wolfowitz appeared to understand how physical geography limited the projection of U.S. power and argued against the insertion of

100,000 American troops due to the very challenging Afghan terrain. He also made the point that troops would more effectively operate in an invasion of Iraq.⁴⁶ Informed by the Russian experience in Afghanistan in the 1980s and motivated to invade Iraq with regular military troops, the administration let the CIA take the lead in the fight against AQ and the Taliban.

The CIA understood the cultural geography of Afghanistan and “knew the tribes, ethnic groups, leaders, culture, and languages,” along with who could and could not be trusted as an ally in the coalition to push out the Taliban.⁴⁷ The CIA’s covert teams arrived in Afghanistan in late September. The Marine Corps arrived in October and played a significant role in Task Force 58 (TF 58). TF 58 consisted “of a small headquarters, elements of the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units, Seabees from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 and several countries in the Coalition.”⁴⁸ For forty days, TF 58 conducted operations from Forward Operating Base (FOB) Rhino. The operations included interdicting Taliban operatives, facilitating operations for Special Forces, and handling detainees.⁴⁹ The task force made its mark in the Marine Corps’s amphibious history. To get TF 58 into place at FOB Rhino, the Marines conducted the longest amphibious raid in Marine Corps history and “launched from the USS *Peleliu* in the North Arabian Sea, flew through Pakistani airspace to Rhino a distance over 450 miles.”⁵⁰ Working with Special Forces groups and indigenous allies, the U.S. teams swiftly defeated the Taliban from north to south, starting in Mazar-e-Sharif, moving through Kabul, and finally taking Kandahar on December 7. In just a matter of months, 110 CIA officers, 316 Special Forces operators, TF 58, and indigenous allies such as the Northern Alliance and Pashtun expelled the Taliban regime.⁵¹

Despite the success of Phase III in Afghanistan, U.S. strategy started to unravel in Phase IV. The administration made the assumption that once the U.S. defeated the Taliban and AQ,

Afghanistan would be copacetic. The President opposed the use of troops for national building and peacekeeping. As a result, no planning occurred for Phase IV.⁵² UBL, members of AQ, and members of the Taliban led a retreat into Tora Bora located in the eastern mountains on the Pakistani border. The limits to the amount of physical geography that technology can overcome were revealed during this battle. Special Forces and allies took control of the mountains and pushed AQ into the cave network started by the mujahedeen in the 1980s. The U.S. pounded the cave network with powerful penetrating bombs to no avail. The ultimate goal of capturing UBL was not realized and he escaped into Pakistan.⁵³

Despite the failure to kill or capture UBL, the U.S. venture in Afghanistan was considered a success in the early months of 2002. Mearsheimer recollects, in his use of Afghanistan and Iraq as examples of global dominance strategy, that “it seemed that the United States had found a blueprint for winning wars in the developing world quickly and decisively, thus eliminating the need for a protracted occupation, [and]... [i]t looked like the neoconservatives had been vindicated.... And with this hubris firmly in place, America attacked Iraq on March 19, 2003.”⁵⁴ Armed with what appeared to be a successful intervention in Afghanistan, the neoconservative Iraq Hawks carried a global dominance strategy forward to Iraq. This arrogance led global dominators to believe that the U.S. could install democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously and had a deleterious effect on operations in Afghanistan. As Dick Camp recollects in *Boots on the Ground* “Unfortunately, after defeating the al-Qaeda and Taliban forces, the United States took its eye off the ball...Iraq became the focus of attention. The veteran CIA and Special Forces teams were pulled to refit and prepare for the invasion of Iraq. Afghanistan was put on the back burner. As a result, the Taliban and al-Qaeda was able to refit, regroup and return from sanctuaries in Pakistan, Syria, and Iran.”⁵⁵ The

strategy's use of shock and awe during the invasion of Iraq would demonstrate technology's ability to overcome *physical* geography in Phase III (Dominate), but also show its limits in Phase IV with the fallout from the administration's lack of planning for *cultural* geography. The importance of culture was assumed away based on the erroneous assumptions that the U.S. experience in Afghanistan had created a strategic blueprint, and the invading force would be received as liberators, negating the need for a large troop presence over an extended period of time.⁵⁶ Rumsfeld carried forward the wrong lesson from Afghanistan into the invasion in Iraq, assuming that speed and technological prowess would be enough to win the war and the peace.⁵⁷

Over the months and years that followed the 9/11 attack, Rumsfeld made the case that speed and low troop numbers could overcome Iraq's *physical* geography, and, to his credit, shock and awe was successful through Phase III in Iraq. Rumsfeld silenced dissent among the Joint Chiefs of Staff and within the ranks of the generals involved with planning the invasion of Iraq. He famously battled with Army General Eric Shinseki over how to transform the U.S. military. As Frank Gibney of the Los Angeles Times put it in 2004 "To the new Defense Secretary transformation meant greater reliance on technology, not troops to achieve goals; to Shinseki, it meant more intensified training, featuring highly mobile medium light brigades of mechanized infantry capable a variety of missions."⁵⁸ The battle over whether technology or the U.S. fighting man was the key to successful transformation played out over the next several months. Despite the cultural issues that revealed themselves in Phase IV that the services identified prior to the invasion, Rumsfeld's vision prevailed with technological innovation at the center of the transformation movement. President Bush approved the plan for shock and awe, and on March 19, 2003, ground troops from an invading force of 145,000 would advance ahead of an air bombardment directly to Baghdad without pausing.⁵⁹ As a tactical matter, the plan was

a success. “By April 14, U.S. troops were in Baghdad and the war was over—or so the civilians in the Pentagon thought.”⁶⁰ Rumsfeld immediately began to gloat, touting the success of his military transformation:

“General Franks did manage to get, we believe, tactical surprise and he got it by starting the conflict not with a long multi-week air war that destroyed the infrastructure and had the risk of killing innocent men, women and children, but he started with a ground war. Second, he went in with a very brief air war that was very precise, had minimal collateral damage, we believe, and he preceded the ground war with a number of special operators moving in and securing key areas.”⁶¹

Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith’s work supported Rumsfeld’s belief in low troop numbers and the success of shock and awe. Feith played a key role in manipulating data to show that a connection existed between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda (AQ), despite criticism from the intelligence community.⁶² Feith minimized the need to plan for Phase IV. He believed and preached that coalition troops would be welcomed as liberators and that the Iraqis would quickly set up a new, democratic government. A lengthy occupation and reconstruction process would be unnecessary. After several months and with minimal United States presence, democracy would be successfully installed.⁶³ Feith’s assumption allowed the administration to ignore the *cultural* geography that would overwhelm the American invaders during Phase IV.

Collins notes “[i]t is worth remembering that human factors often may be more cogent than physical geography.”⁶⁴ At the end of January 2003, Lieutenant General Richard Cody, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, ordered the Army War College to complete a study of what to expect in Iraq during Phase IV. The Strategic Studies Institute listed 135 tasks that were necessary for Iraq to become a viable state. It warned that the longer the United States remained in Iraq, the greater the chances would be that violent resistance would occur. “The possibility of the United States winning the war and losing the peace in Iraq is real and serious.” The report made it abundantly clear that the “real challenges would begin once

hostilities were over.”⁶⁵ General Shinseki vocalized similar concerns during his testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee on February 25, 2003. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) asked General Shinseki for an estimate of the troop numbers that would be required to occupy Iraq successfully. Shinseki replied,

“Something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers, are probably, you know, a figure that would be required.... We’re talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that’s fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant amount of ground-force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment, to ensure that all people are fed, that water is distributed, all the normal responsibilities that go along with administering a situation like this.”⁶⁶

General Shinseki’s post-hostility concerns became a reality.

While Rumsfeld was promoting the invasion’s success in Washington, the situation in Baghdad was chaos. There were not enough troops to police the city. One Marine Colonel who witnessed what happened said:

“Frantic locals ran up to tell us phones were out, doctors reported hospitals being looted, and that the water was off. They were desperate to know where they should dump the trash, could they use cell phones, or was it OK to drive to their father’s house in Mosul. They approached us to arrest a strange man with a gun lurking in their neighborhood. We were approached by alleged sheiks who demanded to [see] “his Excellency the General” about their tribe’s loyalty to Mr. Bush.... On and on the requests came.”⁶⁷

Looting was rampant. There were insufficient troops to curtail the crime that broke out, and their orders only addressed securing oil fields, taking down the regime, and finding weapons of mass destruction. In the resulting chaos, the United States suffered a long-term loss of credibility.

The Iraqis saw the lack of order and the failure to prevent looting as a sign of weakness and of disrespect to their heritage as criminals allegedly walked away with ancient culturally significant historical items. Rumsfeld reflected in his memoirs that “Iraq and Afghanistan were the first wars of the twenty-first century—the first where operations were reported in real time on blogs, radio, talk radio, and twenty-four hour news channels.”⁶⁸ The truth was difficult to discern and

for many did not matter. The media and officials from around the globe, including figures like U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and French President Jacques Chirac, swarmed like vultures, vilifying the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq. Some even labeled the alleged ransack of the museum hyperbolically as a crime against humanity.⁶⁹ Whether the museum was actually ransacked became a matter of debate. Rumsfeld recounted that when reports from the field began to reach him, American troops had moved in to protect the museum in question, but their actions were halted when they came under sniper and rocket-propelled grenade fire. "The American commander on the ground faced a vexing choice. If his troops engaged further with the enemy forces in the museum, he risked destroying portions of the building, including whatever artifacts were inside."⁷⁰

Regardless of motive or position, everyone seemed to agree that Phase IV became costly as looters damaged massive amounts of infrastructure. James Fallows reported that "something like 10 times as much of the power grid was destroyed in the couple of weeks after the war as was destroyed by U.S. bombing during the war."⁷¹ Rumsfeld makes a point in his memoirs that would seem to concede Mearsheimer's point that intervention within the context of global dominance strategy is inherently flawed and doomed to fail. "I thought the looting being reported was tragic, but I did not fault our troops. Iraq is the size of the state of California. Unfortunately, it would be impossible to gather a force large enough to stop it all."⁷² An insurgency boiled for the next three years until sectarian violence escalated into what some described as a civil war.⁷³ Rumsfeld's plan for quick, clean regime change descended into one of the civil, religious, ideological, or national wars (wars of opinion) that Jomini warned to avoid at all costs. Wars of opinion are "dangerous and deplorable" and "arouse violent passions that make them spiteful, cruel, [and] terrible."⁷⁴

Having reached the rift at the beginning of Phase IV where the cognitive dissonance of reality deviating from the desired end state of the global dominance strategy created a period of strategic denial for those in power, it should be noted that under Mearsheimer's theory Shinseki's troop numbers would likely have fared no better in achieving the strategic ends. While lower troop numbers contributed to chaos in Phase IV, Shinseki's increased troop numbers would have likely provided only short-term relief with limited long-term results. This is because the underlying strategy was inherently flawed. The insertion of democracy through direct intervention as a global dominator violates what Mearsheimer calls "the all-important principle of self-determination, [and] not only generates resentment toward the United States, but also gets us involved in nation building, which invariably leads to no end of trouble."⁷⁵ This is the case whether you invade with 145,000 or several hundred thousand troops.

In November 2006 Robert Gates replaced Rumsfeld. General David Petraeus took over as the commander in Iraq and attempted to start cleaning up the mess through the costly implementation of counterinsurgency doctrine. In an attempt to create stability, American money started funding a 100,000-Sunni militia at a cost of \$30 million per month.⁷⁶ "The relative success of the surge and the Sunni Awakening along with the Status of Forces Agreement President Bush had negotiated with the Iraqi government permitted President Obama to fulfill his promise to wind down the Iraq War without having to admit defeat or leave behind a totally broken country." President Obama withdrew the remaining U.S. combat units in December 2011.⁷⁷ While the story of post-Saddam Iraq is still being written, the invasion and subsequent withdrawal left a Shia-dominant democracy that many Iraqis have seen as illegitimate, corrupt, and incredible. Understanding that the roles of Saudi Arabia and Iran are not equivalent, Iraq is now part of a chaotic, destabilized region in a larger fight with ISIS and proxy forces serving the

Shia interests of Iran and the Sunni interests of Gulf Cooperation Council members: UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait.

The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan should inform strategy with regard to China and reinforce a strategy of offshore balancing. It should be noted that the geographic environments of the two areas are dissimilar. While the Middle East is a landscape, “East Asia is a seascape.”⁷⁸ Mearsheimer’s theory of the stopping power of water illustrates this difference and further demonstrates the inherent flaws of direct intervention within a strategy of global dominance suggesting that “Navies could land on beachheads...but sending a land force inland to permanently occupy a subject population across the seas [is] exceedingly difficult.”⁷⁹ By comparing the benefits and shortcomings of offshore balancing and global dominance, it is clear that the United States should shape its strategy as one of an offshore balancer in the Indo and Asia-Pacific, with a focus on containing China.⁸⁰

Turning to what China looks like as a regional hegemon, some have classified China as an uber-realist, because it has no ideology to spread. China develops a near colonial presence in places like sub-Saharan Africa that have the energy, metals, oil, and minerals it requires to support the Chinese economy and “the rising living standard of roughly a fifth of humanity.”⁸¹ Kaplan articulates that it is also the loss of power and land over the course of a century that motivates China. During the 19th century, China lost “the southern tributaries of Nepal and Burma to Great Britain; Indochina to France; Taiwan and the tributaries of Korea and Sakhalin to Japan; and Mongolia, Amuria, and Ussuria to Russia. In the twentieth century came the Japanese takeovers of the Shandong Peninsula and Manchuria in the heart of China...in addition to the humiliations forced on the Chinese by extraterritoriality agreements [from the West].”⁸²

China's actions are understandable. "Empires are often not sought consciously. Rather, as states become stronger, they develop needs and—counterintuitively—a whole new set of insecurities that lead them to expand in an organic fashion."⁸³ China's growing power, influence, and economic realities make its external shift part of a natural progression. As Kaplan puts it "China is desperate for new energy" consuming "over 10 percent of world oil production and over 20 percent of all the energy consumed on the planet." In hopes of alleviating its fuel demands and its "Malacca dilemma" China started calling the South China Sea (SCS) a "core interest" in 2010, with a belief that the SCS has "proven oil reserves of seven billion barrels, and an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas."⁸⁴

A strategy of global domination in the SCS only adds to weight to the argument that America is an imperial global hegemon. As discussed, unilateral American military intervention has been costly, ineffective, and diminished the international credibility of the U.S. "Offshore balancing offers a strategy that is more financially prudent, requires less risk to American soldiers, and works more effectively to achieve U.S. national interests. Offshore balancing puts an emphasis on "getting other countries to assume the burden of containing an aspiring regional hegemon," and take over the heavy lifting that the United States is responsible for under global dominance."⁸⁵

[T]he human and economic price of checking a powerful adversary can be great, especially if war breaks out. It almost always makes good sense to get other countries to pay as many of the costs as possible while preserving one's own power. The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it themselves, but an America no longer weakened by unnecessary foreign intervention will be far more capable of checking Beijing's ambitions.⁸⁶

"For these reasons, offshore balancing is a wise strategy in the SCS."⁸⁷

“The United States should also rely more heavily on diplomacy and economic statecraft through international forums within UNCLOS or by dealing with multilateral organizations like ASEAN.⁸⁸ By taking the lead in a balancing coalition with states like “India, Japan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam,” the United States can operate with much lower human and economic costs than it could under global dominance and bring in its military might from over the horizon if its allies begin to fail”.⁸⁹

The conflicting claims in the Spratly Islands provided an environment ripe with opportunities for the United States to create alliances. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam “claim the Spratlys *in toto*, the Philippines seek entitlements to most of them, while Brunei and Malaysia covet small segments in the southern sector, although no nation maintains civilian settlements anywhere and none established a continuous military presence until after World War II.”⁹⁰

Many strategic actions in the first island chain could fall under the umbrella of offshore balancing. The options suggested will be in descending levels of aggression. The United States could embrace Aaron Friedberg’s maritime-denial strategy that could escalate to make the sea from China’s territorial waters to the first island chain a no man’s land. Less threatening, Friedberg’s distant blockade could work to prevent Chinese shipping through a few narrow choke points far removed from its territory in places like the Malacca Strait.⁹¹ Both strategic methods suggest a buildup, position, and posture that would allow a timely and effective U.S. response to Chinese aggression should regional allies need assistance.

A maritime-denial strategy would allow the United States to regulate the flow of ships to and from China and allow U.S. and allied forces to take offensive action “sinking Chinese naval vessels and commercial shipping throughout the near seas. Small, fast coastal combatants armed with anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as missiles launched from shore batteries along the first

island chain could help to seal off some of the main approaches to China's coastal waters."⁹² The geography of China's ocean floor can overload sonar systems and conceal submarines through the production of frequent false returns. Friedberg points out that this geographic condition allows submarines to hide. This condition, along with China's inexperience with anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and the presence of Chinese A2/AD on the surface, makes submarines and other undersea warfare assets like mines and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) ideal.⁹³ Friedberg suggests that, with allied A2/AD to counter that of China, the availability of submarines would be decisive in a conflict arising under a maritime-denial strategy. The U.S. Navy currently has 55 nuclear-powered submarines employed around the globe. Over the next few years, Japan is projected to have 22 submarines, South Korea will have 18, and Australia will have 12. Allied forces "might be able to strike targets using air-, sea- and land-launched, long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, fired from the edges of China's A2/AD envelope."⁹⁴ Countries like Japan would be pivotal for basing submarine platforms and mines.

If successful, a maritime denial strategy would deny China energy from the Persian Gulf, and the PRC would be unable to reach offshore supplies of oil and natural gas within its "nine-dash line". "Chinese planners worry about the imposition of a general blockade along the first island chain and the possible loss of access to resources within their own maritime boundaries."⁹⁵ Chinese paranoia over freedom of movement at sea is partially due to the fact that over half of China's GDP comes from imports and exports and 85% of its international trade comes by the sea.⁹⁶ Playing on Chinese fears of encirclement and weakness with ASW, Friedberg's maritime denial strategy would be an effective option for a U.S. offshore balancer.

Taiwan could play a crucial role in a maritime denial strategy. Paul Wolfowitz once called Taiwan "Asia's Berlin," and Kaplan has thought of it as a cork in the bottle of the South

China Sea.⁹⁷ It is located on a choke point in the sea lanes of communication that transport energy to most of the countries in the region. In the nineteenth century, the Taiwan Strait was key to the security of French Indochina, and today, it is key to Japan's present trade routes.⁹⁸ The Deputy Director General of Taiwan's National Security Council, Henry C. K. Liu describes his country's defense strategy in dealing with China as one of survival where Taiwan works to buy time to play a weak hand well. Quoting Sun Tzu in a conversation with Kaplan, Liu said the "greatest strategy is never having to fight."⁹⁹ While Taiwan was initially supportive of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the protracted diversion has had a chilling effect in Taiwanese confidence in a strategic alliance for Taiwan's national defense.¹⁰⁰

Taiwan may be amenable to participating in a maritime denial strategy. It has much reason to be concerned as China has approximately 1,500 land-based missiles aimed at Taiwan's mainland.¹⁰¹ A maritime denial strategy would marry well with the Taiwanese Vice Minister of National Defense's, Andrew Yang, description of Taiwanese policy. "Our mantra is air defense and sea control. There will be no blockades, no amphibious landings to our detriment."¹⁰² Taiwan and China know that only a few pieces of Taiwanese coastline are suitable for an amphibious landing. Taiwan's defense strategy is to ensure that the butcher's bill in blood and treasure is high enough to deter Chinese aggression.

The dynamic of Taiwan with Chinese history is complex. Guomintang fought valiantly in an epic struggle with Mao and lost, retreating to Taiwan to build a new society.¹⁰³ Because the cow's tongue or "nine-dash line" was a Guomintang concept, it is "adhered to by Chiang Kai-shek's successors in Taiwan."¹⁰⁴ While Washington would have to go through serious deliberations with regard to how much weaponry it would be willing place in Taiwan without "fundamentally damaging its relations with Beijing with which it ha[s] far more equities,"

maritime denial is an option that could significantly change the power dynamic in the Asia and Indo-Pacific.¹⁰⁵

A more cautious offshore balancing option would be Friedberg's distant blockade. Less aggressive than maritime denial, a distant blockade would work to prevent shipping bound for China by denying passage "through a few narrow choke points far removed from its own territory," like the Malacca Strait.¹⁰⁶ Positioned at the southernmost opening of the SCS, most of China's oil imports transit through the Malacca Strait from the Middle East and Africa.¹⁰⁷ This strategy is the least aggressive of those suggested and positions the United States and its allies at a standoff distance outside of the range of Chinese A2/AD. Friedberg points out that even critics of a distant blockade agree that it would be very difficult for China to challenge directly with its military. In addition to being outside of its land-based ballistic missiles, such a blockade would also be either outside or at the limits of the range of Chinese aircraft, submarines and surface vessels.¹⁰⁸ Adding to the viability of a distant blockade for offshore balancing in China, Friedberg suggests that a blockade could "be cloaked in talk of enhancing maritime security and would not require major shifts in force posture or overt participation in planning for attacks on Chinese territory."¹⁰⁹ As Friedberg points out, the downsides to a distant blockade are that it may require additional action to be decisive and may be unattractive to allies along the first island chain or inside of its periphery, as there may be insufficient U.S. force to bring to bear if China acts offensively.¹¹⁰

This is not to say that offshore balancing comes without limits. There are no clear solutions to conflicts like the one in Afghanistan in 2001. There was no offshore balancing solution for that conflict. Offshore balancing does not offer an answer to transnational threats, but it should provide the framework in which the United States addresses them.

As discussed, U.S. strategies of global dominance have been costly failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both experiences provide examples of how technology has the ability to overcome tremendous features of *physical* geography during Phase III actions to dominate an opponent. The United States should avoid invasions and putting boots on the ground, unless it is willing to fully appreciate the *cultural* geography that must be understood to win the peace in Phase IV stability operations. As Rumsfeld's wars have demonstrated, a strategy of global dominance can win the war but lose the peace.

Looking at China, a U.S. strategy of offshore balancing with strategic allies in the Asia and Indo-Pacific that uses Friedberg's maritime denial or distant blockade would be less costly and more effective in the long-term. Whether China will be peaceful or a military and naval aggressor in the Asia and Indo-Pacific is yet to be seen. "The fact remains that China has taken action to occupy islands along the "nine-dash line" in the SCS and has taken measures to deter counter-claimants through a buildup of its physical presence and the use of legal processes. As the United States continues to try to extricate itself from "unnecessary and unwinnable" undertakings of occupation and governance in Iraq and Afghanistan¹¹¹, it should take steps to lead a balancing coalition through an offshore balancing strategy that would only resort to military force by the United States when diplomacy and the military efforts of its allies have failed."¹¹²

¹ History.com Staff, *9/11 Attacks*. <http://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks>, (accessed March 29, 2016).

² Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Comparative Studies in Religion and Society; 13. 3rd ed., rev. and updated. ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003, p. 126-127.

³ John J. Mearsheimer, "Imperial by Design," *The National Interest*, no. 111 (Jan/Feb 2011), p. 22.

⁴ Mearsheimer, "Imperial by Design," 19.

⁵ Mearsheimer, "Imperial by Design," 18.

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- ⁶ Robert D. Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific*. Fir Ed. New York: Random House, 2014, p. xvi. Kaplan describes the South China Sea and Champa as being at the heart of a region that “is part of an organic continuum that is more properly labeled the Indo-Pacific.” This label helps mentally broaden the aperture to understand the interrelation between nations with maritime interests and historical connections spread across the “Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific.”
- ⁷ John M. Collins, *Military Geography for Professionals and the Public*. AUSA Institute of Land Warfare Book. 1 Brassey's ed. Washington D.C.: Brassey's, 1998, p. 3.
- ⁸ Collins, *Military Geography*, 3.
- ⁹ Collins, *Military Geography*, 5.
- ¹⁰ Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography*. Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2013, p. 305.
- ¹¹ Kaplan, *Revenge of Geography*, 38.
- ¹² Kaplan, *Revenge of Geography*, 39-40.
- ¹³ Kaplan, *Revenge of Geography*, 305.
- ¹⁴ Kaplan, *Revenge of Geography*, 305.
- ¹⁵ Kaplan, *Revenge of Geography*, 40.
- ¹⁶ Kaplan, *Revenge of Geography*, 305.
- ¹⁷ Kaplan, *Revenge of Geography*, 304.
- ¹⁸ Kaplan, *Revenge of Geography*, 304.
- ¹⁹ Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 18.
- ²⁰ Peter Tunis, “A Case for US Offshore Balancing in the South China Sea,” (unpublished manuscript, December 7, 2015), Microsoft Word file, p. 8.
- ²¹ Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 18, quoted in Tunis, “Offshore Balancing in the SCS,” 8.
- ²² Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 18.
- ²³ Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 18, also discussed in Tunis, “Offshore Balancing in the SCS,” 9.
- ²⁴ Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 19.
- ²⁵ Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 19.
- ²⁶ Tunis, “Offshore Balancing in the SCS,” 9, quoting Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 19.
- ²⁷ Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 33.
- ²⁸ Tunis, “Offshore Balancing in the SCS,” 10, quoting Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's War: The Arrogance of Power*. Modern War Studies. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2008, p. xiv.
- ²⁹ Leon Wieseltier, *Force Without Force: Saving NATO, Losing Kosovo*, New Republic, Washington April 26 and May 3, 1999, quoted in Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography*. Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2013, p. 15.
- ³⁰ Herspring, *Rumsfeld's War*, 68.
- ³¹ Jerald A. Combs, *The History of American Foreign Policy from 1895*. 4th ed. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2012, p. 448.
- ³² Combs, *Foreign Policy*, 448.
- ³³ Combs, *Foreign Policy*, 448.
- ³⁴ Combs, *Foreign Policy*, 449.
- ³⁵ Combs, *Foreign Policy*, 447.
- ³⁶ Oxford Dictionary Online defines ‘neoconservative’ as “Relating to or denoting a return to a modified form of a traditional viewpoint, in particular a political ideology characterized by an

emphasis on free-market capitalism and an interventionist foreign policy.”

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/neoconservative.

³⁷ Combs, *Foreign Policy*, 448. Neoconservatives at the time had an extreme position with regard to democracy as a superior form of governance that would best serve American interests abroad. “Citing prominent scholarly literature purporting to prove that democracies historically have never fought one another, they argued that the United States should pursue regime changes in favor of democracy rather than allying with friendly dictators in the name of national security.”

³⁸ Combs, *Foreign Policy*, 447.

³⁹ Combs, *Foreign Policy*, 454. Combs does not identify the specific source of the statement, neither listing a name, nor referencing a document..

⁴⁰ Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 89.

⁴¹ David Frum and Richard Norman Perle. *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror*. 1st ed. ed. New York: Random House, 2003, p. 17.

⁴² Frum and Perle. *An End to Evil*, 17.

⁴³ Frum and Perle. *An End to Evil*, 9.

⁴⁴ Frum and Perle. *An End to Evil*, 160.

⁴⁵ Frum and Perle. *An End to Evil*, 165.

⁴⁶ Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 79.

⁴⁷ Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 80.

⁴⁸ Dick Camp, *Boots on the Ground: The Fight to Liberate Afghanistan from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban 2001-2002*, Zenith Press, 2011, p. 259.

⁴⁹ Camp, *Boots on the Ground*, 272-274.

⁵⁰ Camp, *Boots on the Ground*, 263.

⁵¹ Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 85.

⁵² Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 83-84.

⁵³ Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 86.

⁵⁴ Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 25.

⁵⁵ Camp, *Boots on the Ground*, 3.

⁵⁶ Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, p. III-43. The publication provides a discussion of the six-phase model used in joint military operations and background for the terminology used in this paper.

⁵⁷ Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 25.

⁵⁸ Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 31.

⁵⁹ Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 128.

⁶⁰ Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 129.

⁶¹ Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 129.

⁶² Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 200.

⁶³ Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 200.

⁶⁴ Collins, *Military Geography*, 7.

⁶⁵ Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 115.

⁶⁶ Tom Shanker, “New Strategy Vindicates Ex-Army Chief Shinseki,” NYT (January 12, 2007).

⁶⁷ Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 130.

⁶⁸ Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, p. 474.

⁶⁹ Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, p. 474.

⁷⁰ Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, p. 474.

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- ⁷¹ Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars*, 130.
- ⁷² Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, p. 474.
- ⁷³ The Editors of Britannica, *Iraq War*, <http://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War>, (accessed April 2, 2016).
- ⁷⁴ Antoine Henri Jomini baron de, *The Art of War*. The West Point Military Library. A new ed., Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971, p. 25-26, quoted in John Shy, "Jomini," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton Paperbacks; Princeton Paperbacks. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 170.
- ⁷⁵ Mearsheimer, "Imperial by Design," 31.
- ⁷⁶ Combs, *Foreign Policy*, 465.
- ⁷⁷ Combs, *Foreign Policy*, 470.
- ⁷⁸ Robert D. Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific*. Fir Ed. New York: Random House, 2014, p. 5.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p. 151.
- ⁸⁰ Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron*, xvi. Kaplan uses the historical influence of Hindu Champa on Vietnamese culture to illustrate why the South China Sea is more properly labeled Indo-Pacific, along the lines of the French designation of the region as Indochina.
- ⁸¹ Kaplan, *Revenge of Geography*, 199.
- ⁸² Kaplan, *Revenge of Geography*, 196.
- ⁸³ Kaplan, *Revenge of Geography*, 198.
- ⁸⁴ Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron*, 10.
- ⁸⁵ Tunis, "Offshore Balancing in the SCS," 10, quoting Mearsheimer, "Imperial by Design," 33.
- ⁸⁶ Mearsheimer, "Imperial by Design," 33.
- ⁸⁷ Tunis, "Offshore Balancing in the SCS," 10.
- ⁸⁸ Mearsheimer, "Imperial by Design," 31.
- ⁸⁹ Tunis, "Offshore Balancing in the SCS," 10, quoting Mearsheimer, "Imperial by Design," 33.
- ⁹⁰ Collins, *Military Geography*, 291.
- ⁹¹ Aaron L. Friedberg, *Beyond Air-Sea Battle*, Routledge, (April 2014), p. 105.
- ⁹² Friedberg, *Beyond Air-Sea Battle*, 117.
- ⁹³ Friedberg, *Beyond Air-Sea Battle*, 117.
- ⁹⁴ Friedberg, *Beyond Air-Sea Battle*, 120.
- ⁹⁵ Friedberg, *Beyond Air-Sea Battle*, 122.
- ⁹⁶ Friedberg, *Beyond Air-Sea Battle*, 117.
- ⁹⁷ Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron*, 143.
- ⁹⁸ Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron*, 144.
- ⁹⁹ Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron*, 149.
- ¹⁰⁰ Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron*, 149.
- ¹⁰¹ Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron*, 150.
- ¹⁰² Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron*, 152.
- ¹⁰³ Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron*, 151.
- ¹⁰⁴ Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron*, 140.
- ¹⁰⁵ Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron*, 153.
- ¹⁰⁶ Friedberg, *Beyond Air-Sea Battle*, 105.
- ¹⁰⁷ Friedberg, *Beyond Air-Sea Battle*, 106.
- ¹⁰⁸ Friedberg, *Beyond Air-Sea Battle*, 107.
- ¹⁰⁹ Friedberg, *Beyond Air-Sea Battle*, 114.

¹¹⁰ Friedberg, *Beyond Air-Sea Battle*, 115.

¹¹¹ Mearsheimer, "Imperial by Design," 33.

¹¹² Tunis, "Offshore Balancing in the SCS," 11.

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