

**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

*Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188*

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.  
**PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 01/30/2017	<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Master's Thesis	<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> SEP 2016-FEB 2017
--	--	--

<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Militarization in Southeast Asia and Implications for the United States	<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b> N/A
	<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b> N/A
	<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b> N/A

<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Bartos, Frank, CIV	<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b> N/A
	<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b> N/A
	<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b> N/A

<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068	<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b> N/A
--	--

<b>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>	<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>
	<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b> N/A

**12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**  
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.

**13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

**14. ABSTRACT**  
Over ten years of rising defense expenditures led to improved Southeast Asian military capabilities, but complex security challenges and an evolving global political climate increases the prospect for diverse foreign and defense relationships. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea, domestic threats, and a desire to reap the economic benefits of maintaining an indigenous military industry serve as key drivers for defense spending. Sustained US regional engagement is vital to avoid an irreversible vacuum of influence that China and Russia would seek to exploit.

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**  
Southeast Asia; Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN; defense spending; foreign policy; defense policy; military modernization; The Philippines; Vietnam; Malaysia; China; South China Sea

<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
<b>a. REPORT</b>	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b>	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b>			USMC Command and Staff College
Unclass	Unclass	Unclass	UU	35	<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)</b> (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

United States Marine Corps  
Command and Staff College  
Marine Corps University  
2076 South Street  
Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

---

---

**TITLE:**

**Militarization in Southeast Asia and Implications for the United States**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**AUTHOR:**

**Frank Bartos**

AY 16-17

---

---

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Eric Y. Shibusawa, PhD

Approved: [Signature]

Date: 1/30/17

Oral Defense Committee Member: [Signature]

Approved: [Signature]

Date: 1/30/17

Jill Goldenziel PhD  
1/30/17

## DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

*Table of Contents*

	Page
ILLUSTRATIONS AND FIGURES .....	i
PREFACE .....	ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	iii
INTRODUCTION .....	1
WHAT DRIVES DEFENSE SPENDING AND ARMS PROCUREMENT? .....	2
NOT QUITE A REGIONAL ARMS RACE...BUT DON'T FINISH LAST .....	6
HOW POLITICAL WINDS CAN SHIFT .....	8
CASE STUDIES:	
THE PHILIPPINES .....	10
VIETNAM .....	14
MALAYSIA .....	18
RECOMMENDATIONS .....	22
CONCLUSION.....	23
ENDNOTES .....	25
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	30

*Illustrations and Figures*

	Page
Map. South China Sea Disputes.....	4
Figure 1. The Philippines: 10 Year Defense Spending.....	14
Figure 2. Vietnam: 10 Year Defense Spending .....	18
Figure 3. Malaysia: 10 Year Defense Spending .....	22

## *Preface*

My interest in this topic originated from academic curiosity aimed at better understanding the military dynamics of a region unfamiliar to me, and expanded to examine broader implications of regional trends that the United States must effectively manage to remain relevant in Southeast Asia. While some may argue that Washington should disengage from certain parts of the world, discounting an increasing trend of defense expenditures when roughly \$5.3 trillion in annual trade transits the South China Sea is difficult to ignore.

I am grateful for the opportunity to attend Marine Corps Command and Staff College. As a civilian in a PME environment, the professionalism, work ethic, deep knowledge and experience of the faculty and fellow student body has enriched my experience in a way that no civilian institution could. I would like to thank all of my colleagues and faculty in Conference Group 1 for making seminar truly enjoyable, and my MMS mentor, Dr. Eric Shibuya, whose expertise and mentorship made the MMS process a very smooth experience. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank my family, particularly my wife Haleigh, who always encourages me to challenge myself and who tirelessly goes out of her way for our family. I couldn't have completed this program without her support. Rowan, Jonah, and I are truly lucky.

## Executive Summary

**Title:** Militarization in Southeast Asia and Implications for the United States

**Author:** Frank Bartos

**Thesis:** Over ten years of rising defense expenditures led to improvements to ASEAN military capabilities, but complex security challenges and an evolving global political climate increases the prospect of diverse foreign and defense relationships.

**Discussion:** This paper is organized into three sections. Section one examines regional trends focused on drivers behind defense spending, whether the region is experiencing an “arms race,” shifting politics impacting defense policies, and emerging military modernization. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea, domestic threats, and a desire to reap the economic benefits of maintaining an indigenous military industrial capability serve as key drivers for defense spending. ASEAN members are not quite embroiled in an arms race, but trends reflect more than traditional modernization given varied threat perceptions. ASEAN members employ a hedging foreign policy strategy, allowing them to preserve relations with both the United States and China, but also providing them with the flexibility to lean more toward one power if doing so serves in their interest.

Section two analyzes three country specific case studies to better support the judgments made in section one. The Philippines (traditional US ally), Vietnam (historical US and Chinese foe), and Malaysia (fully embracing hedging) provide a representative snapshot of ASEAN states with differing approaches to security policy, and states considering a variety of options on how to manage their relationships with the United States, China, and other regional powers. These states also have territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Section three outlines a number of recommendations the new US administration should undertake to address regional perceptions. The Trump Administration does not need to preserve specific Obama Administration “rebalance” policies, but it should not disengage from the region over questions regarding the utility of US alliances. Nurturing defense ties with regional allies, conducting freedom of navigation operations, and promoting peaceful resolutions to territorial disputes should be expanded. Encouraging ASEAN to undertake a unified position on the South China Sea would also strengthen its position in engaging with China as Beijing’s strategy has been to interact bilaterally to exert its power.

**Conclusion:** Modest improvements to ASEAN military capabilities alone will not address the region’s security challenges, and China’s continued military expansion in the South China Sea and rising ASEAN member confidence from arms purchases intended to counter Beijing’s power projection increases the possibility for miscalculation. The hedging foreign policy approach present in Southeast Asia coupled with China’s increased military assertiveness and ASEAN uncertainty regarding the new US administration’s Asia policies is creating opportunities for ASEAN states to shift traditional relationships to include other external powers such as Russia and India. The United States must stay engaged with ASEAN members to avoid an irreversible vacuum of influence that China and Russia would seek to exploit.

Annual defense spending in the Asia Pacific region increased from about \$274 billion to \$436 billion between 2006-2015 amid ongoing security concerns such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS).<sup>1</sup> This paper analyzes the broader implications rising defense spending by Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries will have on the region and for the United States. The analysis is further supplemented by exploring military modernization and foreign policy trends in three ASEAN countries--the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia--because these countries all have territorial disputes in the SCS and offer representative case studies of the various security challenges in the region. The Philippines represents a traditional US ally, Vietnam displays a historic foe of the United States and China, and Malaysia demonstrates how a country fully embraces a hedging foreign policy. Over ten years of rising defense expenditures led to improvements to ASEAN military capabilities, but complex security challenges and an evolving global political climate increases the prospect of diverse foreign and defense relationships. Motivations and threat perceptions vary among ASEAN members, and these states must approach their foreign and security policy from a position of disadvantage given the inferiority of their militaries to larger regional powers such as China, Japan, and South Korea.

Most ASEAN countries employ a hedging foreign policy strategy where they are preserving security cooperation with the United States as a deterrent against China, while also seeking economic trade opportunities and cordial diplomatic ties with Beijing. The perception of US disengagement from the region could push some states closer into China's sphere of influence, a trend that was already materializing at the end of the Obama administration and that could be exacerbated with the uncertainty of the Trump administration's approach toward Southeast Asia. The Obama administration's Asia "pivot" or "rebalance" initiated an expansive

foreign policy approach in the broader Asia Pacific region. This paper does not identify Obama administration policies that President Trump should maintain, but it discusses implications stemming from the increased militarization of the Southeast Asian region on ASEAN members. As political winds shift, some ASEAN countries may move away from Washington in response to a less reliable United States and as China continues to exude its regional influence. Perceived US disengagement from the region could also allow Russia, India, and European states to fill the void as Moscow probably seeks to expand economic relationships to offset Western sanctions over Ukraine, and Delhi and the EU aim to develop their military sales industries.<sup>2</sup>

This paper analyzes drivers behind regional defense spending, shifting politics that can impact arms procurement and defense policy, and recent and emerging military modernization efforts in Southeast Asia. Domestic and international threat perceptions influence ASEAN military modernization, along with economic benefits of maintaining a stable indigenous defense industry. Persistent engagement by the United States and China, coupled with secondary powers such as Russia and India, influences ASEAN defense relationships. Individual case studies on the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia offer a representative snapshot of ASEAN states considering a variety of options on how to manage their relationships with the United States, China, and other regional powers.

### **What Drives Defense Spending and Arms Procurement?**


China's growing military assertiveness regarding territorial disputes, domestic security, ASEAN economic prosperity, and a desire to expand technological and domestic industrial capabilities through military production drove the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia to increase their defense spending over the last 10 years. Each of these countries has a maritime territorial dispute with China (some overlapping amongst each other), and the Philippines and

Vietnam had “warlike” confrontations with China regarding these disputes.<sup>3</sup> China claims over 90 percent of the South China Sea which it justifies based on initial discovery dating as far back to the 2nd century BC.<sup>4</sup> In 2012, a Philippine warship attempted to interdict Chinese fishing boats off the Scarborough Shoal, and Chinese surveillance ships subsequently responded by blocking the Filipinos from arresting the fisherman.<sup>5</sup> Vietnam also claims the Spratly and Parcel Islands, and in 1988 lost three ships in an armed confrontation with the Chinese navy.<sup>6</sup> Malaysia claims a number of islets in the southern Spratly Islands, having occupied five since 2009, but is less confrontational with China regarding the regional dispute given that its claims are much further south than other claimants.<sup>7</sup> In 2013, the Philippines filed for arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to challenge China’s claims. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled that China’s claims had “no legal basis, but Beijing rejected the ruling and the PCA has no enforcement mechanism.”<sup>8</sup>

China is increasingly more assertive in enforcing its claims in the SCS through the development of military installations on a number of islands.<sup>9</sup> China reclaimed more than 2,900 acres since 2013, and is now transitioning to infrastructure development.<sup>10</sup> Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam have also reclaimed islands and developed infrastructure but are unable to compete with China’s resources. Malaysia reclaimed a total of about 70 acres, the Philippines, 14 acres; and Vietnam, 80 acres.<sup>11</sup> China’s infrastructure development includes the construction of airfields and deep water ports, expanding Beijing’s ability to project power and sustain operations in the SCS.<sup>12</sup> China’s development of installations is expected to continue, and ASEAN countries will continue to view Beijing’s efforts as destabilizing. Southeast Asia’s inability to compete with China’s military resources creates opportunities for Washington to

enhance bilateral security relationships, while China will seek to engage Southeast Asian states bilaterally to drive wedges among claimants.<sup>13</sup>

### South China Sea Disputes



Source: Voice of America.<sup>14</sup>

Domestic security and counterterrorism (CT) capabilities have long been concerns in Southeast Asia and CT capabilities were greatly enhanced under the Bush administration as Washington became increasingly focused on global terrorist networks after 9/11.<sup>15</sup> The United States encouraged the development of CT capabilities and provided law enforcement and special

operations forces training, to include Indonesia and the Philippines.<sup>16</sup> Although the terrorist threat receives less attention since SCS disputes have flared up in recent years, some ASEAN states list domestic security--which can also include separatist groups not listed on US terrorist lists--as the primary focus in their national security strategies. The Philippines remains concerned with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front terrorist groups, along with the Maoist New People's Army.<sup>17</sup> Malaysia is increasingly concerned with ISIL's influence in the region and piracy involving Philippine based groups such as ASG and Royal Sulu Sultanate Army.<sup>18</sup> While some ASEAN security threats may align with US CT concerns creating opportunities for cooperation with the United States, others will not, and ASEAN governments will be resistant to US efforts to shift that focus.

Indigenous domestic production is often an overlooked driver in defense modernization that can provide a boost to the local economy and develop technological expertise that could reduce future foreign acquisitions. Domestic production also provides "security of supply" as argued by Richard Bitzinger, because countries worry about losing a reliable source of arms that could stem from actions such as embargos or sanctions.<sup>19</sup> Although creating a comprehensive arms production capability requires significant financial and technological resources, economic growth from as far back as the 1990s provided a few ASEAN members the ability to initiate some domestic arms production.<sup>20</sup> The design of advanced combat aircraft or missile defense systems is not feasible for ASEAN countries, but complementary and less technologically advanced equipment such as ammunition, small patrol ships, and armored vehicles is achievable.<sup>21</sup> Most ASEAN states produce at least some level of small arms, to include the Philippines and Vietnam, but the most industrially capable countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.<sup>22</sup> Nonetheless, even these states are constrained in their ability to innovate, as

their industries rely heavily on licensing of foreign designs or producing within consortiums where they are given access to technology through offsets.<sup>23</sup> Consequently, the most effective utility of domestic industry in the near term will involve maintenance, overhaul, and in some cases the possible upgrade of existing systems. If rising defense spending trends continue, ASEAN countries will continue to seek offsets when considering arms contracts from the United States and elsewhere to enhance their domestic industry, but for the time being, Southeast Asia will predominantly remain a buyer's market.

### **Not Quite a Regional Arms Race...But Don't Finish Last**

A number of observers describe the increased defense spending and arms acquisition in Southeast Asia as an "arms race."<sup>24</sup> While tensions in the SCS probably will continue, and the potential for military conflict should not be ignored, the arms race depiction of ASEAN states competing against an adversary is overstated. The classic perception of an arms race resembles the US-Soviet nuclear build up during the Cold War or Great Britain and Germany's "dreadnought" naval build up ahead of World War I, and involves relative military parity among rival actors. ASEAN defense spending trends are more reflective of broad modernization, but that could trigger a military competition of sorts where ASEAN states seek to avoid being the weakest regional power susceptible to aggression. Richard Bitzinger describes ASEAN trends as an "arms dynamic" that falls short of a traditional arms race but represents more than regular military modernization.<sup>25</sup> He argues that Southeast Asian states do not have "mutually adversarial relationships" among each other, and while their defense procurement is largely in response to China, the trends do not reflect an attempt to keep up with Chinese military modernization.<sup>26</sup> Koh Swee Lean Collin reinforces Bitzinger's argument further that Southeast Asian countries are modernizing to keep up with regional trends tied to economic growth and not

because of animosity.<sup>27</sup> Collin also rejects the notion that Southeast Asian states seek to compete militarily with China as Beijing spends more on defense than all ASEAN members combined.<sup>28</sup> Even if ASEAN countries maintain close defense ties with Washington in the near-term, simple geography demonstrates why these countries seek to establish some form of deterrence by improving their militaries because the US military footprint seen as a counterbalance to China in the region is unlikely to be viewed as enduring. China and ASEAN members with territorial disputes would both prefer to resolve disputes peacefully, but Beijing's actions in the SCS<sup>29</sup> and persistent ASEAN arms purchases increase the possibility of a miscalculation that could escalate into military conflict.

Evolving ASEAN member threat perceptions over the last 10 years have caused many states to divert resources from their traditionally large armies to emerging navies and air forces. This trend is aimed at rebalancing militaries to foster joint capabilities, and is largely attributed to China's military rise, but also reflects broader concerns with maritime security and disaster response given the region's geographic landscape. Arms purchases are focused on surface warships, submarines, transport aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, anti-ship missiles, Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, and fighter aircraft. These types of platforms were prioritized given that regional economic growth provided the resources to undertake expensive acquisitions. Nonetheless, internal security threats and the economic benefits of indigenous production sustained some land force modernization, such as armored personnel carriers. Trends in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia highlight some similarities and differences in managing their security interests through defense modernization. These states also illustrate a spectrum of varying approaches to foreign and defense policies and means to undertake and manage increased defense spending over several years.

## **How Political Winds Can Shift**

The United States cannot assume that ASEAN states concerned about China's rising power will always be receptive to Washington's overtures. The nature of a hedging foreign policy strategy leaves open the potential for shifting bilateral relationships. Hedging aims to diversify relationships to prepare for future uncertainty and seeks to avoid being dominated by a great power while at the same time not antagonizing it.<sup>30</sup> Conversely, balancing involves aligning with the weaker of two large powers and bandwagoning is aligning with the stronger or the power with momentum. China will always retain regional influence given its geographic proximity and Southeast Asian states recognize that the United States may not always remain a regional power broker. Nonetheless, a hedging strategy also demonstrates a need to cooperate with another great power as ASEAN countries realize their inability to counterbalance China's influence alone. Evelyn Goh takes this approach further by claiming ASEAN countries are employing an "omni-enmeshment" strategy where they seek to "envelop states in a web of sustained exchanges and relationships, with the long-term aim of integration."<sup>31</sup> Goh claims Southeast Asian states are open to engage with numerous powers because they fear an unstable system of competition between the great powers.<sup>32</sup> Therefore, omni-enmeshment also includes entangling the great powers amongst each other to avoid conflict. A senior Malaysian policy advisor characterized this approach by saying, "what we really want to do is help the 'elephants' get to a point where their interests are so intertwined that it would be too costly for them to fight."<sup>33</sup> Given that hedging provides flexibility in managing relations, Washington must contend with the possibility that an ASEAN state could learn further toward bandwagoning or balancing if it perceives a shift in Washington's or Beijing's power, and omni-enmeshment were to break down over a US-China conflict.

ASEAN states recognize that they have the most to lose in a regional armed conflict. Therefore, they will remain open to engagement with other powers. Russia increased its interest in Southeast Asia as it likely seeks new avenues to shore up its economy following Western sanctions over Moscow's annexation of Crimea in 2014.<sup>34</sup> Vietnam already has longstanding defense ties to Moscow, and during a January 2017 port visit by Russian warships to the Philippines, the Russian ambassador in Manila indicated Moscow's desire to supply the country with weapons which President Duterte welcomed warmly.<sup>35</sup> Russia avoids being vocal on SCS disputes given that China and Vietnam are two of Moscow's largest Asia Pacific arms buyers.<sup>36</sup> Russia may seek to exploit Southeast Asian defense spending increases by expanding arms sales in the region, particularly if ASEAN governments such as the Philippines become frustrated with US bureaucratic procedures or restrictions of arms sales.<sup>37</sup> India, a traditional Chinese rival, is also increasingly concerned with China's military modernization and is expanding defense ties with Vietnam through sales and military training, especially given its familiarity with Russian made hardware.<sup>38</sup> Finally, European industry is playing a more prominent role in the region through arms sales as well. However, most European governments are wary of inserting themselves into regional issues such as the SCS to preserve economic interests with Beijing.<sup>39</sup>

China seeks to exploit fissures between ASEAN states and Washington. In 2016, Philippine President Duterte lashed out against the United States in response to criticism from Washington over human rights abuses as part of his ongoing "war on drugs." US congressional leaders vowed to block the sale of assault rifles and Duterte threatened to expel US forces from the country.<sup>40</sup> A US Justice Department money-laundering investigation of Malaysian government officials angered Prime Minister Razak last fall.<sup>41</sup> Malaysia signed a defense agreement with China in November, which included the purchase of four warships, and Razak

commented on Malaysia's tension with Washington noting, "we believe it is incumbent upon larger countries to treat smaller ones fairly" and added Malaysia was "increasing mutual trust" with China regarding the SCS.<sup>42</sup> Beijing relaxed fishing restrictions on the Philippines near the Scarborough Shoal and also offered informal trade deals to Manila.<sup>43</sup> Although Philippine and Malaysian officials have sought to mend ties with the United States, Russia and China could attempt to increase their influence at Washington's expense. The Philippine public remains very pro-American, preserving rapprochement opportunities from Washington, but as a Singaporean diplomat commented in reaction to recent regional tension with the United States, "China is using its economic leverage, its geographic position and its lack of interest in human rights to try and change the balance of influence in a region where the vagaries of American politics are now on stark display."<sup>44</sup> The following three sections of this paper will further explore the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia to evaluate how their policies, defense spending, and military capabilities will shape their relationships with regional and external powers. These countries provide a broad representation of how many ASEAN states approach their foreign and defense policies.

### **The Philippines:**

The Philippines remains in a formal alliance with the United States, but growing tension stemming from Washington's criticism of President Duterte's human rights record and the warming of relations with China is straining the alliance. Internal defense, disaster relief and SCS disputes remain the primary security challenges for Manila. The ASG and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, coupled with a sporadic insurgency from the Maoist rebels of the New People's Army, largely occupy the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).<sup>45</sup> The Philippines faces nearly 20 typhoons a year and is situated in the Ring of Fire geologic fault lines, which will continue to

require rescue and disaster relief capabilities.<sup>46</sup> Up until President Duterte assumed office in June 2016, the Philippines was explicit in support of a visible US military presence in the Asia Pacific region. Despite Duterte's efforts at rapprochement with Beijing, territorial disputes will continue to influence Manila's defense policy.<sup>47</sup> Closer ties with China may offer short term political gains, but regarding SCS disputes, the Philippine public overwhelmingly (90%) tends to view the issue as a "very big problem," according to a 2013 Pew research poll.<sup>48</sup> Despite indicating a willingness to work with the new US administration, the unpredictability of President Duterte's perception of the US-Philippine alliance will factor into potential defense cooperation with Washington. Additionally, China and Russia will seek to exploit Duterte's willingness to overtly challenge Washington, particularly if the Trump administration is less interested in Southeast Asia.


The Philippines increased defense spending from about \$2.6 billion in 2006 to \$3.8 billion in 2016 (see figure 1).<sup>49</sup> In 2010, then President Benigno Aquino embarked on a multi-year plan to increase defense spending from early 2000 levels.<sup>50</sup> The plan focused on protecting the territorial integrity of the state, offsetting foreign defense challenges and protecting maritime interests by modernizing surface, sub-surface and air warfare capabilities.<sup>51</sup> Aquino was posturing the AFP to project power outside Philippine borders at a time when bilateral relations with China were in decline over the Spratly Islands.<sup>52</sup> President Duterte in his first budget proposal last fall continued the trend of prioritizing defense spending, but was critical of past defense procurement programs, such as FA-50 aircraft, that he judges to provide little support to domestic security challenges.<sup>53</sup> Budget Secretary Benjamin Diokno highlighted crime, illegal drugs, terrorism, and domestic insurgency as the focus areas of the current defense budget.<sup>54</sup> While domestic security will always be a major priority in the Philippines, Duterte's perceived

disregard for broader military modernization could inhibit the AFP from building on recent improvements under Aquino and would stunt the development of modest out-of-area capabilities.

The Philippine Army (PA) accounts for the majority of defense spending given the domestic threats facing the country. Ground mobility is traditionally a PA shortfall as it maintains about 50 battalions in Mindanao for counter insurgency (COIN) operations.<sup>55</sup> Since 2010, the procurement of M113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), utility vehicles, and the reconfiguration of some APCs to infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) has been the PA's priority.<sup>56</sup> Additionally, the Philippines accepted 30 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles ambulances from the US in 2015.<sup>57</sup> Along with long term US training to small unit ground formations, these platforms are expanding the PA's security while maneuvering in rural environments for COIN operations.

Coordinating air support for kinetic strikes and transport is also a challenge given the Philippines' aging aircraft, a lack of spare parts, and high attrition.<sup>58</sup> In 2015, the Philippine Air Force (PAF) procured three Airbus C295 transports and in 2016 received two surplus C-130 transport aircraft from the United States.<sup>59</sup> Also in 2015, the PAF acquired eight AW109 light attack helicopters and as of August 2016, is considering additional attack helicopters of an unspecified airframe.<sup>60</sup> Rotary wing platforms will boost close air support capabilities to army and marine units conducting COIN operations. Transport aircraft are providing new options for domestic and international humanitarian relief efforts, in addition to expanding the AFP's ability to supply ground forces in country. However, the small inventory of platforms, particularly maritime patrol aircraft, limits the AFP's ability to project power outside its borders absent outside assistance.

As a result of increased SCS tensions in 2012, the Philippines announced it was seeking maritime security cooperation with its allies.<sup>61</sup> The Philippines consists of over 7,000 islands and the Philippine Navy (PN) struggles to patrol all of its territories given the lack of naval platforms.<sup>62</sup> Light frigates, corvettes, multi-purpose attack craft, and replenishment ships are the PN's priority.<sup>63</sup> In February 2016, the Philippines released a tender for two new frigates with anti-air, anti-surface, and electronic warfare capabilities to be delivered within four years, with South Korea being selected to build the platforms in September 2016.<sup>64</sup> The PN has acquired three US Coast Guard Cutters since 2011, the third as recently as July 2016, and plans to upgrade its Korean built Po Hang-class corvette.<sup>65</sup> The PN was able to implement some of its largest modernization plans since 2012, but the maritime character of the Philippines' geography will continue to make it very difficult for Manila to defend its territories. President Duterte may be content with the AFP focusing on domestic threats for the time being, particularly if maritime disputes with China in the SCS wane. However, military planners will want to maintain various military options by preserving a broad modernization path given the unpredictability of the evolving political environment. The Philippines demonstrates how a close US ally can shift its focus amid changing domestic political winds, shown by Duterte's receptiveness to China's economic overtures. Conversely, Vietnam highlights how a traditional ally of China is forging new ties with the United States to counterbalance Beijing's pressure on SCS issues, despite the complicated history between Washington and Hanoi.

**Figure 1****Vietnam:**

Unlike the Philippines, Vietnam does not face much of a domestic terrorist threat and political unrest is minimal as there is little public opposition to the government. Vietnam's military was traditionally land centric, heavily relying on conscription to support the national sentiment of, "an army from the people and for the people,"<sup>66</sup> which stemmed from the legacy of defending against foreign invaders. Hanoi has slowly shifted its modernization focus away from a land centric military approach toward naval and air power to address concerns in the SCS.<sup>67</sup> Relations with most of its neighbors are positive but competing claims in the SCS continue to stress relations with China, creating new avenues of cooperation, especially with Washington. In May 2016, the United States lifted an arms embargo on Vietnam that had been in place since 1975.<sup>68</sup> Vietnam has followed China's lead in reclaiming and fortifying a number of Spratly

islands.<sup>69</sup> Vietnam's continued warming of relations with the United States allows it to diversify its arms purchases and leverage American regional power that is well received by the Vietnamese public. A 2015 Pew poll found that 76 percent of Vietnamese saw the United States favorably compared to only 20 percent for China.<sup>70</sup> Vietnam was quiet in response to the July PCA ruling, probably to avoid antagonizing China. Hanoi takes the most aggressive stance among ASEAN states regarding SCS disputes, and will seek to leverage external assistance to strengthen Vietnam's ability to defend its claims.

Vietnam's official defense budget is a state secret, but public figures show an increase from almost \$2.2 billion in 2006 to about 4.6 billion in 2016 (see figure 2), and is projected to grow to about \$6 billion by 2020.<sup>71</sup> While economic indicators suggest sustained increases in defense expenditures is attainable, integrating new platforms and developing modern doctrine will probably take many years. Vietnam's economy depends on resources in the SCS, therefore, Hanoi recognizes the necessity of improving and integrating air and naval assets.<sup>72</sup> Between 2011-2015, Vietnam became the world's 8<sup>th</sup> largest importer of weapons, an increase from 43<sup>rd</sup> between 2006-2010.<sup>73</sup> Vietnam retains a long history of procuring Russian arms and continues to develop defense relationships with India and the United States. Vietnam's military modernization started at a much lower position than some of its ASEAN neighbors given its antiquated equipment, and will require a shift away from a solely land-centric defensive force to a more balanced one incorporating combined arms.<sup>74</sup> However, as Vietnam considers defense procurement from the United States, Hanoi will need to carefully balance its inventory of new platforms because integrating Russian and western systems has traditionally been difficult.


Given that Vietnam has had some of the more aggressive interactions with China in the SCS, the Vietnam People's Army Navy (VPAN) benefited the most from increased defense

expenditures over the last 10 years as the economy grew and regional SCS disputes intensified. The VPAN procured five Russian Kilo-class submarines between 2009-2016 and expects a sixth in 2017.<sup>75</sup> The VPAN also acquired two Gepard-class frigates in 2011 and plans to procure another two in 2017, all of which will include modern anti-submarine warfare capabilities.<sup>76</sup> Vietnam purchased two Molniya-class patrol craft from Russia in 2015, which included the licensing agreement to build an additional six platforms. The Molniya-class ships include Klub ship-to-shore missiles, providing Vietnam the ability to target Chinese facilities in the SCS.<sup>77</sup> Vietnam perceives that missile systems provide the most effective deterrent against China, and in 2016 Hanoi negotiated with India to purchase the BrahMos anti-ship cruise missile despite Beijing's objections.<sup>78</sup> India also provided a \$500 million line of credit to Vietnam for Indian defense platforms in September 2016, with about \$99 million earmarked for the production of an undisclosed number of patrol ships for the Vietnamese coast guard, which plays a growing role in patrolling the SCS.<sup>79</sup>

The Vietnamese Air Force also experienced sizable investment given the complementing impact air power can have on maritime operations. However, the high costs associated with advanced combat aircraft led to modernization moving slowly. Vietnam acquired Su-30 aircraft between 2003-2016, but also retains an obsolete inventory of Mig-21s and Su-22s.<sup>80</sup> Hanoi is considering replacing its Mig-21s with French Rafales, Swedish Gripens, or US F-16s.<sup>81</sup> Air transport capabilities make up a similar mix of modern and old platforms. Vietnam improved its inventory with the 2013 purchase of three C295 aircraft but still relies on old An-2 and An-26 aircraft that experience major maintenance challenges.<sup>82</sup> The 2014 acquisition of six DHC-6 maritime patrol aircraft from Canada improved maritime surveillance and search and rescue capabilities.<sup>83</sup> However, aging Mi-variant helicopters and a lack of ISR platforms need to be

addressed to better monitor SCS activity.<sup>84</sup> Satellite imagery in November 2016 indicated that Vietnam extended a runway on Spratly Island and added new hangers capable of accommodating most of the air force's inventory.<sup>85</sup>

Although the Vietnam People's Army (VPA) is still the largest Vietnamese service, its size was reduced as the government recognized the absence of a neighboring land force threat and emerging security concerns in the SCS.<sup>86</sup> Hanoi projects that the most likely military scenario with China will take place at sea or involve air power and small ground force operations, and not resemble Beijing's 1979 ground invasion of the Vietnamese homeland.<sup>87</sup> Nonetheless, the VPA retains political clout and is expected to contribute to domestic tasks including socio-economic development and natural disaster response.<sup>88</sup> VPA leaders were able to secure some modernization funds following years of neglect. The VPA is primarily concerned with modernizing its aging armor, IFVs, APCs, and small arms.<sup>89</sup> The army will continue to play an important role in preserving its historical legacy of protecting the homeland, but the VPA's near term relevance in dealing with Hanoi's security challenges will continue to wane. As a result, maritime, air, and missile procurement will continue to dominate defense spending moving forward. While Vietnam continues to challenge China and the Philippines edges closer to Beijing, Malaysia fully embraces a hedging strategy by falling somewhere in between.

**Figure 2****Malaysia:**

Malaysia's focus is ensuring security in its territorial waters, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the SCS, terrorism, and responding to natural disasters.<sup>90</sup> Kuala Lumpur (KL) has territorial disputes with all five of its neighbors but with the exception of occasional naval skirmishes, most disputes remain in diplomatic channels.<sup>91</sup> China's claims in the SCS include parts of Malaysian oil and natural gas fields, but not specific features.<sup>92</sup> China is Malaysia's largest trading partner, tempering Malaysia's rhetoric on SCS issues, but KL continues to voice concerns regarding Beijing's military expansion near Malaysia's claims.<sup>93</sup> The influence of ISIL in Malaysia is of increasing concern following reports of Malaysian citizens joining the group.<sup>94</sup> Additionally, Malaysia contends with other insurgent groups such as the Filipino Royal Sulu Sultanate Army and the ASG, particularly regarding piracy.<sup>95</sup> US-Malaysian relations soured in

the fall of 2016 due to ongoing US corruption charges of Prime Minister Razak's government.<sup>96</sup>

The United States has been a major arms provider to Malaysia, but like many of its ASEAN neighbors, Malaysia fields a mix of Western, Russian and domestically produced platforms.

Russia seeks to expand its arms sales to KL, but tensions regarding the 2014 downing of a Malaysian Airlines flight over Ukraine by ethnic-Russian rebels complicates that prospect.<sup>97</sup>

Malaysia will remain focused on protecting its economic interests and will tread carefully in managing its relationships with Washington, Beijing, and other regional powers.

Malaysia's defense spending over the last 10 years has been less consistent than many of its Southeast Asian counterparts. While Malaysia contributed to the long term increases to regional defense spending, especially in earlier years, KL was also forced to reduce spending at times as its economy slowed due to falling oil prices and decreased demand from China.<sup>98</sup>

Malaysia's spending increased from about \$4.4 billion in 2006 to about 5.3 billion in 2015, but fell back down to about \$4.5 billion in 2016 (see figure 3), and is projected to decrease again in 2017.<sup>99</sup> Nonetheless, defense spending has remained about 1.5 percent of GDP, and the government stresses that previously agreed procurement programs would move forward.<sup>100</sup>

Although KL remains focused on stimulating its economy over defense expenditures in the near term, developments within the SCS, and Malaysia's relationships with the United States and China will shape its willingness to revitalize defense modernization if the Malaysian economy recovers in the coming years.


Spending on the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) is focused on improving air and naval capabilities, largely at the expense of ground forces. This strategy mirrors other ASEAN states as SCS disputes became more visible, and for Malaysia, the threat of piracy on economic activity in the Strait of Malacca continues despite counter piracy efforts significantly lowering attacks since

2011.<sup>101</sup> The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) acquired two French/Spanish Scorpene-class submarines in 2009 and 2010, the first ever submarines fielded by the RMN. The submarine acquisition was considered a political move following Singapore's procurement of submarines in the 1990s, but SCS tensions drastically increased the utility of the platforms.<sup>102</sup> In 2010, the RMN procured six Kedah guided missile corvettes and is currently exploring options to upgrade its two Lekiu-class frigates.<sup>103</sup> To complement the corvettes, Malaysia is currently building six larger and more heavily armed patrol ships fitted with anti-submarine capabilities and improved anti-ship missiles, which RMN leaders claim is crucial for deterrence in the SCS.<sup>104</sup> The Kedah program is part of Malaysia's "Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011–16)," which entails local production of the platform and a number of other smaller support ships.<sup>105</sup>

The Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) maintains capable combat aircraft through its fleet of F-18s and Su-30s, which allowed the RMAF to adjust its doctrine from a solely close air support role to projecting power greater distances in protecting its regional interests.<sup>106</sup> The F-18s were upgraded in 2015 to improve air-to-air and air-to-ground attack capabilities, and the RMAF is in the process of improving its helicopters and transport aircraft.<sup>107</sup> The RMAF fielded 12 new EC725 helicopters in 2014, primarily for logistics and search and rescue operations, and later equipped five of the airframes with machine guns to improve CT capabilities.<sup>108</sup> The RMAF is in the process of fielding a fleet of four A400M transport aircraft, greatly expanding the cargo load and range for humanitarian relief and logistics operations that its aging inventory of C-130s provides.<sup>109</sup>

The Malaysian Army (TDM), which experienced personnel reductions as the MAF shifted its approach away from domestic COIN to a maritime focus, saw little prospect for modernization until 2013. An incursion by the Royal Sulu Sultanate Army in February 2013

demonstrated to MAF leaders that some COIN efforts were still necessary, particularly in eastern Malaysian states.<sup>110</sup> MAF leaders responded by stationing more units in the east, and reconsidered some procurement programs to address asymmetric threats. The TDM is in the process of acquiring 20 mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles from Thailand.<sup>111</sup> In February 2016, Malaysia announced its largest US procurement contract in 20 years for six MD 530G scout attack helicopters that are scheduled for delivery in 2017.<sup>112</sup> The helicopters are expected to be deployed in Malaysia's easternmost state of Sabah, providing attack, ISR and reconnaissance capabilities to the TDM.<sup>113</sup> One of the TDM's more economically important acquisition programs is the domestic production of over 200 armored fighting vehicles that began deliveries in 2014.<sup>114</sup> As the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia continue modernizing their militaries based on their threat perceptions, the Trump administration must develop clear policies to help shape regional relations. The final sections of this paper outline recommendations in this vein and offer concluding trends that highlight implications for the United States.

**Figure 3****Recommendations:**

Post-election comments from Donald Trump implying China needed US permission to develop its SCS features could embolden Beijing to accelerate its military buildup.<sup>115</sup> Additionally, Trump's campaigning of "America First" and his perceived reticence toward preserving some alliances raised concerns in ASEAN capitals. The Trump Administration does not necessarily need to preserve specific Obama Administration "rebalance" policies, but it should not disengage from the region at such a pivotal moment in history. US China policy extends well beyond the scope of SCS and ASEAN relations, but an overaggressive response to Chinese activity, such as attempting a naval blockade, or disengagement from ASEAN could escalate military tensions or create a vacuum of power that China or Russia would seek to exploit. China should be challenged, and a combined effort between Washington and ASEAN is necessary for legitimacy. Nurturing defenses ties with regional allies would further improve

military capabilities and increase defense contracts for US businesses. Expanding freedom of navigation operations, to include entering waters within 12 nautical miles of artificially built-up islands, preserves the customs of international law, while promoting peaceful resolutions to territorial disputes allows Washington to support ASEAN claimants without taking an official mediator role. Encouraging ASEAN to undertake a unified position on SCS would also strengthen its position in engaging with China as Beijing's strategy has been to interact bilaterally to exert its power. US leaders, irrespective of partisan politics, ultimately need to recognize that ASEAN states do not simply follow US lead on security policy, which will require sustained diplomatic, economic, and, military engagement to fully navigate the complexities of regional affairs.

**Conclusion:**

Absent a major economic downturn, defense expenditures in Southeast Asia likely will continue rising as ASEAN states manage the drivers behind their defense policies. Modest improvements to military capabilities alone will not address the region's security challenges. This opens opportunities for ASEAN states to cooperate with multiple powers as they seek to hedge against one power dominance, while promoting the enmeshment of the United States and China to reduce the prospect of regional military conflict. However, China's continued military expansion in the SCS and rising Southeast Asian confidence from arms purchases intended to counter Beijing's power projection increases the possibility for miscalculation. A significant decrease in US-China relations or Washington's disengagement from Southeast Asia could lead to two unfavorable trends for the United States. The first is the development of an actual "arms race" where weaker powers align closer to one another or with US adversaries, and expand militarization in a futile attempt to reach military parity with China further destabilizing the

region. The second is ASEAN states determine they have no other option than to acquiesce to China, decreasing overall cooperation with the United States. Managing Asia Pacific relationships will be a daunting task for the new administration, but disengagement on the premise that regional security concerns are of little interest to the United States would be difficult to reverse because Beijing will eagerly aim to fill any void left by Washington.

## Notes.

- 
- <sup>1</sup> “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, 2016, accessed November 12, 2016, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-world-regional-totals.pdf>.
- <sup>2</sup> Nikolas Gvosdev, "With Putin's ASEAN Outreach, Russia Sets Sights on Southeast Asia," *World Politics Review*, May 24, 2016, accessed November 12, 2016, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/18875/with-putin-s-asean-outreach-russia-sets-sights-on-southeast-asia>.
- <sup>3</sup> Sheldon Simon, "The US Rebalance and Southeast Asia," *ASU Digital Repository*, June 1, 2015, accessed November 11, 2016, [https://repository.asu.edu/attachments/160323/content/AS5503\\_07\\_Simon.pdf](https://repository.asu.edu/attachments/160323/content/AS5503_07_Simon.pdf), p. 587.
- <sup>4</sup> Peter Chalk, "The Eagle Has Landed: The US Rebalance to Southeast Asia," *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, June 2016, accessed November 11, 2016, <https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-eagle-has-landed-the-us-rebalance-to-southeast-asia/Eagle-has-landed.pdf>, p. 15.
- <sup>5</sup> Jason Miks, "China, Philippines in Standoff," *The Diplomat*, April 11, 2012, accessed November 12, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/china-philippines-in-standoff/>.
- <sup>6</sup> "China's Maritime Disputes," *Council on Foreign Relations*, accessed November 12, 2016, [http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/?cid=otr-marketing\\_use-china\\_sea\\_InfoGuide](http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/?cid=otr-marketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide).
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>8</sup> *The Permanent Court of Arbitration*, Press Release: "The South China Sea Arbitration - The Republic of the Philippines V. The People's Republic of China," July 12, 2016, accessed October 21, 2016, <https://pca-cpa.org/en/news/pca-press-release-the-south-china-sea-arbitration-the-republic-of-the-philippines-v-the-peoples-republic-of-china/>.
- <sup>9</sup> Eleanor Keymer, *Jane's Capability Briefings*, "South China Sea disputes: Recent developments and future prospects," October 21, 2016, accessed October 28, 2016, <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1788853>.
- <sup>10</sup> US Department of Defense, *Asia Pacific Maritime Security Strategy*, 2015, accessed November 12, 2016, [http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P\\_Maritime\\_Security\\_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF](http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_Security_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF), p. 16.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>14</sup> "Challenging Beijing in the South China Sea," *Voice of America Blogs*, July 31, 2012, accessed December 28, 2016. <http://blogs.voanews.com/state-department-news/2012/07/31/challenging-beijing-in-the-south-china-sea/>.
- <sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* (Simon), p. 573.
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>17</sup> *Philippines National Security Policy*, Securing the Gains for Democracy, 2011-2016, <http://www.gov.ph/downloads/2011/08aug/NATIONAL-SECURITY-POLICY-2011-2016.pdf>, p.21.
- <sup>18</sup> *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia*, "Malaysia Executive Summary" 2016, <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1305037>; *Jane's World Armies*, "Malaysia – Army" 2016, <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1319265>.
- <sup>19</sup> Richard Bitzinger. 2013, "Revisiting Armaments Production in Southeast Asia: New Dreams, Same Challenges," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, p. 371.
- <sup>20</sup> Reuters, "New Focus on Arms Industry Expansion in Southeast Asia," *The New York Times*, August 12, 2014, accessed December 26, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/business/international/new-focus-on-arms-industry-expansion-in-southeast-asia.html>.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

- 
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid, (Bitzinger) "Revisiting Armaments Production in Southeast Asia: New Dreams, Same Challenges," p. 373.
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid p. 383.
- <sup>24</sup> Vaishali Gauba, "Asia Defense Spending: New Arms Race in South China Sea," *CNBC*, May 21, 2015, accessed December 21, 2016, <http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/21/asia-defense-spending-new-arms-race-in-south-china-sea.html>; Elias Groll and Dan De Luce, "China Is Fueling a Submarine Arms Race in the Asia-Pacific," *Foreign Policy*, August 26, 2016, accessed December 21, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/26/china-is-fueling-a-submarine-arms-race-in-the-asia-pacific/>.
- <sup>25</sup> Richard Bitzinger, "A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, April 1, 2010, p. 60.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid, p. 62.
- <sup>27</sup> Koh Swee Lean Collin, "An Arms Race in Southeast Asia?" *The Diplomat*, October 2016, accessed November 11, 2016, <http://magazine.thediplomat.com/#/issues/-KRImKFTShuLPMEv46ah/read>.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>29</sup> "South China Sea: Satellite Photos 'show Weapons' Built on Islands," *BBC News*, December 15, 2016, accessed December 21, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38319253>.
- <sup>30</sup> Hakan Mehmetcik, "If You Are Not Big Enough, Pick a Strategy: Bandwagoning, Balancing, Hedging," *International Association for Political Science Students*, accessed November 11, 2016, <http://www.iapss.org/2015/04/29/if-you-are-not-big-enough-pick-a-strategy-bandwagoning-balancing-hedging/>.
- <sup>31</sup> Evelyn Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," *International Security* 32:3 (Winter, 2007/2008), p. 121.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid, p. 113.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid, p. 123.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid (Gvosdev); Ian Storey, "What Russia's 'Turn to the East' Means for Southeast Asia," *Eurasia Review*, December 9, 2015, accessed December 23, 2016. <http://www.eurasiareview.com/09122015-what-russias-turn-to-the-east-means-for-southeast-asia-analysis/>.
- <sup>35</sup> Reuters, "Rodrigo Duterte Wants Russia to Become the Philippines' Ally and Protector," *Business Insider*, January 6, 2017, accessed January 7, 2017, <http://www.businessinsider.com/r-duterte-hopes-russia-will-become-philippines-ally-and-protector-2017-1>.
- <sup>36</sup> Samuel Charap, "The US and Russia in the Asia-Pacific," *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, June 2, 2016, accessed November 12, 2016, <https://www.iiss.org/en/shangri-la%20voices/blogsections/2016-588c/the-us-and-russia-in-the-asia-pacific-e68a>, p. 15.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid (Gvosdev).
- <sup>38</sup> Rajat Pandi, "Eye on China, India to Train Vietnam Fighter Pilots," *The Times of India*, December 6, 2016, accessed December 26, 2016, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Eye-on-China-India-to-train-Vietnam-fighter-pilots/articleshow/55825101.cms>.
- <sup>39</sup> Janka Oertel and Thomas Paulsen, "Time for Europe to Get Strategic in Its Arms Exports to Asia," *The Diplomat*, December 21, 2014, accessed December 26, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/time-for-europe-to-get-strategic-in-its-arms-exports-to-asia/>.
- <sup>40</sup> Jane Perlez, "Philippines' Deal with China Pokes a Hole in U.S. Strategy," *The New York Times*, November 2, 2016, accessed November 12, 2016, [http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/world/asia/philippines-duterte-south-china-sea.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/world/asia/philippines-duterte-south-china-sea.html?_r=0).
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>42</sup> Joshua Berlinger, "Malaysia, China Reach Defense Deal," *CNN*, November 2, 2016, accessed November 12, 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/02/asia/malaysia-china-agreement/>.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid (Perlez).
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>45</sup> *International Institute for Strategic Studies – The Military Balance*, "Chapter Six: Asia." 2016, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2016.1127567>. p. 284.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid (*Philippines National Security Policy*).

- 
- <sup>47</sup> Ibid ("China's Maritime Disputes"); Ibid ("The South China Sea Arbitration - The Republic of the Philippines V. The People's Republic of China").
- <sup>48</sup> Robert Sutter, "Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability," (Elliot School, George Washington University August 2013). p.17.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database".
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid ("Chapter Six: Asia") p. 284.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid (Chalk), p. 12.
- <sup>52</sup> *Jane's - Defense Budgets*, "Philippines Defense Budget" 2016, <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1327435>.
- <sup>53</sup> Alexis Romero, "Duterte Says Purchase of FA-50 Jets Just a Waste of Money," Philstar.com, June 22, 2016, accessed November 11, 2016, <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/06/22/1595555/duterte-says-purchase-fa-50-jets-just-waste-money>.
- <sup>54</sup> Prashanth Parameswaran. "Philippine Defense Policy Under Duterte: What's in a Budget?," *The Diplomat*, September 8, 2016, accessed November 11, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/philippine-defense-policy-under-duterte-whats-in-a-budget/>.
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>56</sup> *Jane's - World Armies*, "Philippines - Army", <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1319289>.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>58</sup> *Jane's - World Air Forces*, "Philippines - Air Force", <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1319102>.
- <sup>59</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>60</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>61</sup> Jane Chan and Geoffrey Till, *Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences*, (2014), Routledge. p. 148.
- <sup>62</sup> *Jane's - World Navies*, "Philippines - Navy", <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1322748>.
- <sup>63</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>64</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>66</sup> *Jane's - World Armies*, "Vietnam - Army", <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1319330>.
- <sup>67</sup> *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia*, "Vietnam Executive Summary" 2016, <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1305164>.
- <sup>68</sup> David Nakamura, "In Historic Move, U.S. Lifts Embargo on Arms Sales to Vietnam," *Washington Post*, May 23, 2016, accessed December 22, 2016, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/05/23/in-historic-move-u-s-lifts-arms-sales-embargo-to-vietnam/?utm\\_term=.b3eec6d7da42](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/05/23/in-historic-move-u-s-lifts-arms-sales-embargo-to-vietnam/?utm_term=.b3eec6d7da42).
- <sup>69</sup> Zachary Abuza and Nguyen Nhat Anh, "Vietnam's Military Modernization," *The Diplomat*, October 28, 2016, accessed December 22, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/vietnams-military-modernization/>; "In the South China Sea, Vietnam Stands Its Ground," *Stratfor*, accessed December 22, 2016, <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/south-china-sea-vietnam-stands-its-ground>.
- <sup>70</sup> Nicole Gaouette, "Why is the U.S. Arming Vietnam?" *CNN*, May 24, 2016, accessed December 22, 2016. <http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/23/politics/vietnam-arms-embargo-china/index.html>.
- <sup>71</sup> Ibid "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database"; Ibid (Abuzza and Anh).
- <sup>72</sup> *Jane's - World Navies*, "Vietnam," <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1322790>.
- <sup>73</sup> Ibid (Abuzza and Anh).
- <sup>74</sup> *Jane's - Defense Budgets*, "Vietnam Defense Budget", <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1327432>.
- <sup>75</sup> Ibid (Abuzza and Anh).
- <sup>76</sup> Ibid.

- 
- <sup>77</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>78</sup> Sam LaGrone, "India Set to Sell Super Sonic BrahMos Cruise Missile to Vietnam," *USNI News*, June 1, 2016, accessed December 21, 2016, <https://news.usni.org/2016/06/01/india-set-sell-super-sonic-anti-ship-cruise-missile-vietnam-china-upset>.
- <sup>79</sup> Ibid (Abuzza and Anh).
- <sup>80</sup> *Jane's – World Air Forces*, "Vietnam Air Force", <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1319147>; ibid (Abuzza and Anh)
- <sup>81</sup> Ibid (Abuzza and Anh).
- <sup>82</sup> Ibid "Vietnam Air Force".
- <sup>83</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>84</sup> Ibid (Abuzza and Anh).
- <sup>85</sup> David Brunnstrom, "Vietnam Expanding South China Sea Runway: U.S. Think Tank," *Reuters*, November 18, 2016, accessed December 22, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-vietnam-idUSKBN13C2TH>.
- <sup>86</sup> Ibid (Abuzza and Anh).
- <sup>87</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>88</sup> Ibid ("Vietnam – Army").
- <sup>89</sup> Ibid (Abuzza and Anh).
- <sup>90</sup> *Malaysia Summary of National Defense Policy*, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/157119/Malaysia%20-%20summary%20of%20defence%20policy.pdf>; ibid (Janes, Malaysia – Executive Summary")
- <sup>91</sup> *Jane's – Defense Budgets*, "Malaysia – Defense Budget", <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1327412>.
- <sup>92</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>93</sup> Ralph Jennings, "Why Malaysia Stays Quiet About Its Claims in The South China Sea," *Forbes*, June 2, 2016, accessed December 23, 2016. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/06/02/why-malaysia-stays-quiet-about-its-claims-in-the-disputed-south-china-sea/#2bcf45d1beb9>.
- <sup>94</sup> Ibid ("Malaysia Executive Summary"); Rashanth Parameswaran, "How Serious is the Islamic State Threat in Malaysia?," *The Diplomat*, January 14, 2016, accessed December 23, 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/how-serious-is-the-islamic-state-threat-in-malaysia/>
- <sup>95</sup> Ibid ("Malaysia Executive Summary"); ibid ("Malaysia – Army").
- <sup>96</sup> Jane Perlez, "Leader of Malaysia, Miffed at U.S., Visits China With a Deal in Mind," *New York Times*, October 31, 2016, accessed December 23, 2016; [http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/world/asia/malaysia-china.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/world/asia/malaysia-china.html?_r=0).
- <sup>97</sup> Ibid (Storey).
- <sup>98</sup> Ibid ("Malaysia – Defense Budget").
- <sup>99</sup> Ibid "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database"; Jon Grevatt, "Malaysia Cuts Defence Budget by 12%," *IHS Jane's 360*, October 24, 2016, accessed December 26, 2016. <http://www.janes.com/article/64867/malaysia-cuts-defence-budget-by-12>.
- <sup>100</sup> Prashanth Parameswaran, "What Does Malaysia's New Defense Budget for 2016 Mean?" *The Diplomat*, October 29, 2015, accessed December 23, 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/what-does-malysias-new-defense-budget-for-2016-mean/>.
- <sup>101</sup> Ibid ("Malaysia – Defense Budget").
- <sup>102</sup> *Jane's – World Navies*, "Malaysia – Navy," <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1322724>.
- <sup>103</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>104</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>105</sup> Ibid, (Bitzinger) Revisiting Armaments Production in Southeast Asia: New Dreams, Same Challenges." p. 385.
- <sup>106</sup> *Jane's – World Air Forces*, "Malaysia – Air Force", <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1319075>.

---

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid (“Malaysia – Army”).

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Franz-Stefan Gady, "Biggest US-Malaysia Arms Deal in 20 Years: Kuala Lumpur to Receive New Attack Helicopters," *The Diplomat*, February 2, 2016, accessed December 26, 2016.

<http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/biggest-us-malaysia-arms-deal-in-20-years-kuala-lumpur-to-receive-new-attack-helicopters/>.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid (“Malaysia – Defense Budget”).

<sup>115</sup> Ankit Panda, "Donald Trump Just Gave Chinese Hawks a Great Talking Point on the South China Sea," *The Diplomat*, December 5, 2016, accessed December 27, 2016,

<http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/donald-trump-just-gave-chinese-hawks-a-great-talking-point-on-the-south-china-sea/>.

## Bibliography.

- Abuza, Zachary and Nhat Anh, Nguyen. "Vietnam's Military Modernization," *The Diplomat*, October 28, 2016, accessed December 22, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/vietnams-military-modernization/>
- Berlinger, Joshua. "Malaysia, China Reach Defense Deal," *CNN*, November 2, 2016, accessed November 12, 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/02/asia/malaysia-china-agreement/>.
- Bitzinger, Richard. "A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions" *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, April 1, 2010.
- Bitzinger, Richard. "Revisiting Armaments Production in Southeast Asia: New Dreams, Same Challenges." *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 2013
- Brunnstrom, David. "Vietnam Expanding South China Sea Runway: U.S. Think Tank," *Reuters*, November 18, 2016, accessed December 22, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-vietnam-idUSKBN13C2TH>
- Chalk, Peter. "The Eagle Has Landed: The US Rebalance to Southeast Asia." *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, June 2016, accessed November 11, 2016, <https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-eagle-has-landed-the-us-rebalance-to-southeast-asia/Eagle-has-landed.pdf>
- Chan, Jane and Till, Geoffrey. *Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences*. (2014), Routledge
- Charap, Samuel. "The US and Russia in the Asia-Pacific", *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, June 2, 2016, accessed November 12, 2016, <https://www.iiss.org/en/shangri-la%20voices/blogsections/2016-588c/the-us-and-russia-in-the-asia-pacific-e68a>
- Collin, Koh Swee Lean. "An Arms Race in Southeast Asia?" *The Diplomat*, October 2016, accessed November 11, 2016, <http://magazine.thediplomat.com/#/issues/-KRLmKFTShuLPMEv46ah/read>
- Council on Foreign Relations*. "China's Maritime Disputes," accessed November 12, 2016, [http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/?cid=otr-marketing\\_use-china\\_sea\\_InfoGuide](http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/?cid=otr-marketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide)
- De Luce, Dan and Groll, Elias. "China Is Fueling a Submarine Arms Race in the Asia-Pacific," *Foreign Policy*, August 26, 2016, accessed December 21, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/26/china-is-fueling-a-submarine-arms-race-in-the-asia-pacific/>

Gady, Franz-Stefan. "Biggest US-Malaysia Arms Deal in 20 Years: Kuala Lumpur to Receive New Attack Helicopters," *The Diplomat*, February 2, 2016, accessed December 26, 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/biggest-us-malaysia-arms-deal-in-20-years-kuala-lumpur-to-receive-new-attack-helicopters/>.

Gaouette, Nicole. "Why is the U.S. Arming Vietnam?," *CNN*, May 24, 2016, accessed December 22, 2016. <http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/23/politics/vietnam-arms-embargo-china/index.html>.

Gaub, Vaishali. "Asia Defense Spending: New Arms Race in South China Sea," *CNBC*, May 21, 2015, accessed December 21, 2016, <http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/21/asia-defense-spending-new-arms-race-in-south-china-sea.html>

Goh, Evelyn. "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies" *International Security* (Winter, 2007/2008)

Grevatt, Jon. "Malaysia Cuts Defence Budget by 12%," *IHS Jane's 360*, October 24, 2016, accessed December 26, 2016. <http://www.janes.com/article/64867/malaysia-cuts-defence-budget-by-12>.

Gvosdev, Nikolas. "With Putin's ASEAN Outreach, Russia Sets Sights on Southeast Asia," *World Politics Review*, May 24, 2016, accessed November 12, 2016 <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/18875/with-putin-s-asean-outreach-russia-sets-sights-on-southeast-asia>

*International Institute for Strategic Studies – The Military Balance*, "Chapter Six: Asia." 2016, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2016.1127567>

"In the South China Sea, Vietnam Stands Its Ground," *Stratfor*, accessed December 22, 2016, <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/south-china-sea-vietnam-stands-its-ground>.

*Jane's - Defense Budgets*, "Philippines Defense Budget" 2016, <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1327435>

*Jane's – Defense Budgets*, "Malaysia – Defense Budget" 2016, <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1327412>

*Jane's – Defense Budgets*, "Vietnam Defense Budget" 2016, <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1327432>

*Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia*. "Malaysia Executive Summary" 2016, <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1305037>

*Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia*, "Vietnam Executive Summary" 2016, <https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1305164>

*Jane's – World Air Forces*, "Malaysia – Air Force," <https://janes-ih-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1319075>

*Jane's – World Air Forces*, "Philippines – Air Force," <https://janes-ih-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1319102>

*Jane's – World Air Forces*, "Vietnam Air Force," <https://janes-ih-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1319147>

*Jane's – World Armies*. "Malaysia – Army," 2016, <https://janes-ih-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1319265>

*Jane's – World Armies*, "Philippines – Army," <https://janes-ih-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1319289>

*Jane's – World Armies*, "Vietnam – Army," <https://janes-ih-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1319330>

*Jane's – World Navies*, "Malaysia – Navy," <https://janes-ih-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1322724>

*Jane's – World Navies*, "Philippines – Navy," <https://janes-ih-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1322748>

*Jane's – World Navies*, "Vietnam," <https://janes-ih-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1322790>

Jennings, Ralph. "Why Malaysia Stays Quiet About Its Claims in The South China Sea," *Forbes*, June 2, 2016, accessed December 23, 2016, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/06/02/why-malaysia-stays-quiet-about-its-claims-in-the-disputed-south-china-sea/#2bcf45d1beb9>

Keymer, Eleanor. *Jane's Capability Briefings*, "South China Sea disputes: Recent developments and future prospects", October 21, 2016, accessed October 28, 2016, <https://janes-ih-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1788853>

LaGrone, Sam. "India Set to Sell Super Sonic BrahMos Cruise Missile to Vietnam," *USNI News*, June 1, 2016, accessed December 21, 2016, <https://news.usni.org/2016/06/01/india-set-sell-super-sonic-anti-ship-cruise-missile-vietnam-china-upset>.

*Malaysia Summary of National Defense Policy*, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/157119/Malaysia%20-%20summary%20of%20defence%20policy.pdf>

- Miks, Jason. "China, Philippines in Standoff," *The Diplomat*, April 11, 2012, accessed November 12, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/china-philippines-in-standoff/>
- Mehmetcik, Hakan. "If You Are Not Big Enough, Pick a Strategy: Bandwagoning, Balancing, Hedging," *International Association for Political Science Students*, accessed November 11, 2016, <http://www.iapss.org/2015/04/29/if-you-are-not-big-enough-pick-a-strategy-bandwagoning-balancing-hedging/>
- Nakamura, David. "In Historic Move, U.S. Lifts Embargo on Arms Sales to Vietnam," *Washington Post*, May 23, 2016, accessed December 22, 2016, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/05/23/in-historic-move-u-s-lifts-arms-sales-embargo-to-vietnam/?utm\\_term=.b3eec6d7da42](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/05/23/in-historic-move-u-s-lifts-arms-sales-embargo-to-vietnam/?utm_term=.b3eec6d7da42).
- Oertel, Janka and Paulsen, Thomas. "Time for Europe to Get Strategic in Its Arms Exports to Asia," *The Diplomat*, December 21, 2014, accessed December 26, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/time-for-europe-to-get-strategic-in-its-arms-exports-to-asia/>.
- Panda, Ankit. "Donald Trump Just Gave Chinese Hawks a Great Talking Point on the South China Sea," *The Diplomat*, December 5, 2016, accessed December 27, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/donald-trump-just-gave-chinese-hawks-a-great-talking-point-on-the-south-china-sea/>.
- Pandi, Rajat. "Eye on China, India to Train Vietnam Fighter Pilots," *The Times of India*, December 6, 2016, accessed December 26, 2016, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Eye-on-China-India-to-train-Vietnam-fighter-pilots/articleshow/55825101.cms>
- Parameswaran, Rashanth. "How Serious is the Islamic State Threat in Malaysia?" *The Diplomat*, January 14, 2016, accessed December 23, 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/how-serious-is-the-islamic-state-threat-in-malaysia/>
- Parameswaran, Prashanth. "Philippine Defense Policy Under Duterte: What's in a Budget?," *The Diplomat*, September 8, 2016, accessed November 11, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/philippine-defense-policy-under-duterte-whats-in-a-budget/>.
- Parameswaran, Prashanth. "What Does Malaysia's New Defense Budget for 2016 Mean?" *The Diplomat*, October 29, 2015, accessed December 23, 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/what-does-malysias-new-defense-budget-for-2016-mean/>
- Perlez, Jane. "Leader of Malaysia, Miffed at U.S., Visits China With a Deal in Mind," *New York Times*, October 31, 2016, accessed December 23, 2016; [http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/world/asia/malaysia-china.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/world/asia/malaysia-china.html?_r=0).

- Perlez, Jane. "Philippines' Deal with China Pokes a Hole in U.S. Strategy," *The New York Times*, November 2, 2016, accessed November 12, 2016, [http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/world/asia/philippines-duterte-south-china-sea.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/world/asia/philippines-duterte-south-china-sea.html?_r=0)
- Philippines National Security Policy, Securing the Gains for Democracy, 2011-2016*, <http://www.gov.ph/downloads/2011/08aug/NATIONAL-SECURITY-POLICY-2011-2016.pdf>
- Reuters. "New Focus on Arms Industry Expansion in Southeast Asia," *The New York Times*, August 12, 2014, accessed December 26, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/business/international/new-focus-on-arms-industry-expansion-in-southeast-asia.html>.
- Reuters. "Rodrigo Duterte Wants Russia to Become the Philippines' Ally and Protector." *Business Insider*. January 6, 2017, accessed January 7, 2017. <http://www.businessinsider.com/r-duterte-hopes-russia-will-become-philippines-ally-and-protector-2017-1>.
- Romero, Alexis. "Duterte Says Purchase of FA-50 Jets Just a Waste of Money," Philstar.com, June 22, 2016, accessed November 11, 2016, <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/06/22/1595555/duterte-says-purchase-fa-50-jets-just-waste-money>.
- Simon, Sheldon. "The US Rebalance and Southeast Asia." ASU Digital Repository, June 1, 2015, accessed November 11, 2016. [https://repository.asu.edu/attachments/160323/content/AS5503\\_07\\_Simon.pdf](https://repository.asu.edu/attachments/160323/content/AS5503_07_Simon.pdf)
- "South China Sea: Satellite Photos 'show Weapons' Built on Islands," *BBC News*, December 15, 2016, accessed December 21, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38319253>.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2016* <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-world-regional-totals.pdf>
- Storey, Ian. "What Russia's 'Turn to the East' Means for Southeast Asia," *Eurasia Review*, December 9, 2015, accessed December 23, 2016. <http://www.eurasiareview.com/09122015-what-russias-turn-to-the-east-means-for-southeast-asia-analysis/>
- Sutter, Robert. "Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability" (Elliot School, George Washington University August 2013)
- The Permanent Court of Arbitration*. "The South China Sea Arbitration - The Republic of the Philippines V. The People's Republic of China", July 12, 2016, accessed October 21, 2016,

<https://pca-cpa.org/en/news/pca-press-release-the-south-china-sea-arbitration-the-republic-of-the-philippines-v-the-peoples-republic-of-china/>.

US Department of Defense. *Asia Pacific Maritime Security Strategy*, 2015, accessed November 12, 2016,  
[http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P\\_Maritime\\_Security\\_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF](http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_Security_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF)

*Voice of America Blogs*. "Challenging Beijing in the South China Sea," July 31, 2012, accessed December 28, 2016.  
<http://blogs.voanews.com/statedepartmentnews/2012/07/31/challenging-beijing-in-the-south-china-sea/>.