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Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the defense and security cooperation between India and the US has grown significantly. This advancement in cooperation has resulted in signing of many overarching agreements and establishment of institutional frameworks. The military to military cooperation, counter terrorism and intelligence cooperation and bilateral defense trade are the major pillars of the defense and security cooperation, which have grown substantially in last two decades. However, many challenges exist which hinders the realization of full potential of this cooperation. Both countries would benefit from overcoming these challenges and continuing to enhance these connections and should explore all opportunities to do so.

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AUTHOR:

BIPIN
MAJOR, INDIAN ARMY

AY 16-17

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Douglas E. Streusand

Approved: 

Date: 6 April 2017

Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Lynn M. Tesser

Approved: 

Date: 6 April 2017

Oral Defense Committee Member: Lt Col Kevin Glathar

Approved: 

Date: 6 April 2017

Executive Summary

Title: Indo-US Defense and Security Cooperation.

Author: Major Bipin, Indian Army.

Thesis: Defense and security cooperation between India and the US has become a central element of the national security policy of both countries. Military-to-military cooperation, counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation, and defense trade have grown substantially. Many challenges that hinder realization of the full potential of this cooperation exist, however. Both countries would benefit from overcoming these challenges and continuing to enhance these connections and should explore all opportunities to do so.

Discussion: Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the defense and security cooperation between India and the US has grown significantly. This advancement in cooperation has resulted in signing of many overarching agreements and establishment of institutional frameworks. The military to military cooperation, counter terrorism and intelligence cooperation and bilateral defense trade are the major pillars of the defense and security cooperation. These three areas have been explored in the paper. The existing cooperation in that area, challenges hindering these cooperation, and recommendations to overcome these challenges have been discussed in detail.

Conclusion: Defense and security cooperation between India and the US has grown significantly in last two decades. Due to the converging security and strategic interest, there exists a huge opportunity for both countries to take the cooperation to its next level. To do so, the two countries need to overcome the existing challenges.

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Preface

The Indo-US relationship is witnessing a golden era at present. The growing interaction between both countries on the bilateral and multilateral levels has been very encouraging. This growing engagement has been possible due to a better understanding of each other's values, culture, and ambitions. I believe that the defense and security cooperation has played a pivotal role in fomenting the bilateral relationship. Today, India conducts maximum number of joint exercises with the United States as compared to any other country. India and the United States have also come closer on the issue of growing terrorism in the world. At the same time, India has shown a gradual shift towards the United States Defense market for meeting its defense import requirements. I envision a great future in the defense and security cooperation between both countries, which will have a positive impact on the security and interest of both countries. I have made an endeavor to identify some of most glaring challenges in this field and the recommendations to overcome those to realize the full potential of this cooperation.

I would like to pay my gratitude to Dr. Douglas E. Streusand, my mentor for this research work. He has been a great pillar of support and guidance for me throughout the complete period. I would also like to thank Lt Col Kevin Glathar, my military faculty advisor for reading my drafts and providing constructive feedbacks. The LCSC faculty also played a very important role in reading and editing my drafts. I would also take this opportunity to pay my heartfelt gratitude to Mrs Anuragi Singh, my wife and Miss Advita Singh, my daughter for being so supportive in my research work. I am hopeful that this research work will provide an insight into the defense and security cooperation between India and the United States.

INTRODUCTION

Mutual distrust and suspicion have clouded the relationship between the oldest democracy (the United States) and the largest democracy (India). Historically, while the US and India have shared the ethos of justice and liberty, the relationship did not become amiable until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since 1991, the bilateral relationship has become one of the most important strategic partnerships of the 21st Century. The convergence of strategic interests has prompted both countries to cooperate. Both countries aspire for global peace, prosperity, and stability. The Indo-US relationship ranges from economic relations, diplomatic relations to the defense and security cooperation.

During the Cold War era, India and the United States had divergent views on security issues. This divergence was mainly due to India's nascent and evolving post-independence foreign policy, the growing dependence of India on Soviet Union, and the US-Pakistan relationship. However, post 1991, both countries gradually began to appreciate that they shared a common concern for global security, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Defense and security cooperation between India and the United States has become a central element of the national security policy of both countries. Military-to-military cooperation, counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation, and defense trade have grown substantially. However, many challenges continue to hinder the realization of this cooperation. Both countries are likely to benefit from overcoming these challenges and continuing to enhance these connections by exploring all opportunities to do so.

BACKGROUND

India became independent on 15 August 1947. Anti-colonial sentiments played a crucial role in shaping up the foreign policy of India. Being suspicious of the intentions of all the major Western powers especially English speaking countries, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, conceptualized and advocated the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) in 1961, which was not appreciated by the United States. However, the United States assisted India during 1962 Sino-India War.¹ The United States-Pakistan ties began to strengthen when Pakistan joined Baghdad Pact in 1955. Pakistan used US made arms and equipment in the 1965 War against India, which made India distrust the United States and its intention even though the United States cut off arm supplies to Pakistan after the war began. The relationship was further deteriorated by India's inclination towards the Soviet Union, particularly after the signing of "Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation" in 1971. During the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, the United States deployed an aircraft carrier in the Bay of Bengal to warn India against taking drastic action against Pakistan.² India conducted its nuclear tests in 1974 and deferred signing the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty Agreement, which widened the rift between both the countries. India continued to advocate NAM and its inclination toward Soviet Union increased further.

Because of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, India lost its most reliable partner. In addition, the sudden surge in oil prices because of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait had an adverse impact on the Indian economy, eventually leading to economic reforms in the country. It paved the way for more outward looking foreign policy towards the Western countries. Due to this change in India's foreign policy, India-US relations gradually improved. India participated in

small-scale arms trade with the United States from 1986-1988.³ India also provided military logistical support for the 1990 Gulf War.⁴ The bilateral naval exercise “Exercise MALABAR” started in 1992. In 1995, the United States and India signed the Agreed Minute on Defense Relations, providing for military-to-military exercises between the countries. This also resulted in the formation of Defense Policy Group (DPG) to oversee all the aspects related to defense and security cooperation. However, India’s 1998 nuclear tests resulted in US sanctions on India. The relationship took an optimistic turn on the visit of Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the then Prime Minister of India to the United States that led to signing of the "Vision Document" in the year 2000, which provided a roadmap for future relations.⁵ That same year, Bill Clinton became the first American president to visit India in twenty-two years, which marked a further shift in the Indo-US ties. Post 9/11, the United States became increasingly concerned with the sources and impact of terrorism. India was already suffering from the menace of terrorism since 1980s. On one hand, this improved the relationship between both the countries. On the other hand, it brought the United States closer to Pakistan as the major ally against the War on Terror in Afghanistan. However, a breakthrough came when the two countries announced the “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership” NSSP initiative in 2004, which involved progress through a series of reciprocal steps by both the countries in various fields.⁶

The dialogue on the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership produced frameworks of cooperation in critical areas such as space, civil nuclear energy, and high technology transfer. This partnership paved the way for the initiation of the 2005 US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which meant the US recognition of India as a de facto nuclear-weapon state. The significant impact of this agreement was the opportunity to engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation internationally without surrendering India’s nuclear weapons, as would be ordinarily

required under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).⁷ This agreement is considered as the critical step that paved the way for a stronger relationship between the two countries. This agreement played a decisive role in assuring the Indian government and public that the United States was committed to improving the bilateral relationship. This agreement also set the path for exploring the defense and security cooperation between both the countries by the signing of the 2005 Defense Framework Agreement.

In response to changing geopolitical circumstances, India and the US replaced the Agreed Minutes with a new Ten-Year Defense Framework Agreement in 2005. This agreement enhanced defense and security cooperation by increasing joint exercises and operations and expanding defense trade and technical cooperation. This agreement also resulted in the formation of Defense Procurement and Production Group and establishment of the Defense Joint Working Group as a subordinate to already existing DPG to perform a midyear review of work overseen by the DPG and its subgroups.⁸ This new level of defense cooperation improved the overall relationship between India and the US.

The growth of this relationship coincides with the China's growing aggressive activities in the South China Sea. This enhanced cooperation facilitated coordination of Indian and American responses to China's aggressive activities in the South China Sea. The strategic interests of both the countries converged in the Indo-Pacific region. There was regular exchange of high profile visits on both the sides. President Obama became the first US president to visit India twice in his presidential term and the first US President as the Chief guest in India's Republic Day Parade in January 2015. These positive interactions assisted in renewing of the Ten-Year Defense framework agreement in 2015.

After the 2014 elections, Mr Narendra Modi as the Prime Minister of India has laid lot of emphasis on improving the relationship between both countries. Since May 2014, he has already met eight times with President Obama, which clearly indicates his commitment to improve the relationship.⁹ These confidence-building measures, along with an enhanced bilateral relationship, resulted in renewal of the Ten-Year Defense framework agreement in 2015. This agreement reiterated the points mentioned in the previous Ten-Year agreement. It resulted in formation of the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) group, which will work toward resolving process issues impeding cooperation and the alignment of systems, increasing the flow of technology and investment, developing capabilities and partnership in co-development and co-production, and intensifying cooperation in research and development.¹⁰ In June 2016, the United States recognized India as the Major Defense Partner, which gives India all the privileges, enjoyed by any of the closed allies of the US.¹¹ Due to all the above mentioned agreements or initiatives, today India and the US conduct more bilateral military exercises with each other than any other country. The United States is the largest defense exporter to India. Even though challenges remain in the defense and security cooperation, there has been lot of positive evidence in enhancement of this relationship in the recent years. There exists a huge potential in military to military cooperation, counterterrorism and internal security cooperation, and defense trade, which need to be explored.

Military to Military Cooperation

Existing cooperation

The US-India military to military cooperation is one of the major pillars of the defense and security cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation stems out of the fact that

both the countries want to establish peace in the Indo-Pacific region. India is likely to play an important role in the United States' Rebalance to Asia. China's claim in the South China Sea and growing adventurism in other parts of the region has been a catalyst in bringing India and the US together, as both countries support freedom of navigation and overflight in international waters. Hence, both the countries have realized the importance of having intense military to military cooperation. Bilateral and multilateral joint exercises, dialogue mechanisms, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and non-combatant evacuation (NEO) operations, multinational operations, and exchange of military students for training are the various components of the US-India military to military cooperation. There has been an unprecedented growth in these fields in last two decades. However, challenges persist that need to be overcome to take this cooperation to the next higher level.

Today India conducts maximum number of joint exercises with the United States as compared to any other country in the world. As per the CRS report of 2012, both the countries are engaged in more than 50 formal events annually.¹² Most of the exercises are conducted between both the navies. Moreover, regular exercises are conducted in the air and land domain as well.

The two countries conduct one large scale war-game exercise known as "MALABAR" along with multiple smaller exercises such as "HABU NAG", "SPITTING COBRA", and "SALVEX".¹³ The Indian Navy (IN) and the United States Navy (USN) have regularly conducted MALABAR since 1992. Since 2007, MALABAR has been held alternatively off India and in the Western Pacific. In 2007, Australia, Singapore, and Japan also participated in the exercise, which created a protest by China on the intent of this exercise.¹⁴ The 20th edition of MALABAR was conducted from 14 June to 17 June 2016 in the Western Pacific. Japan also

participated in this exercise. The primary aim of this exercise is to increase interoperability amongst all participant countries' navies and develop common understanding of procedures for Maritime Security Operations.¹⁵ HABU NAG is an amphibious table-top exercise, SPITTING COBRA is an explosive ordnance demolition exercise, and SALVEX is a salvage exercise.¹⁶ The IN took part in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in 2014 for the first time.

In the air domain, "COPE INDIA" is the major exercise conducted between Indian Air Force (IAF) and the US Air Force (USAF) since 2003. In the 2004 edition of COPE INDIA, USAF pilots were highly impressed by the proficiency and innovation of IAF.¹⁷ The regular exchange helped the IAF to understand the superior technical characteristics of the USAF's equipment, which resulted in purchase of US C-17 and C-130J aircraft by the IAF in the subsequent years. In addition to this, since 2008, India has participated in annual multilateral "Red Flag Nellis" air to air combat exercise hosted by the United States.¹⁸ Red Flag exercise 2016 concluded in May 2016 in Alaska.

On the land domain, the Indian Army (IA) has been conducting EX YUDH ABHYAS with the US Army since 2004. The aim of this exercise is to increase interoperability and cooperation between both the armies.¹⁹ The 2016 edition was conducted in India as a Brigade Headquarters based Command Post exercise.²⁰ Indian Special Forces and US Special Forces have been conducting EX VAJRA PRAHAR since 2004, which focusses on advanced rifle marksmanship, combat marksmanship, close-quarters combat, helicopter insertion, medical evacuation, combined mission planning, and scenario-based missions.²¹ Since 2006, a company level exercise EX SHATRUJEET is being conducted between IA and US Marine Corps focusing on amphibious doctrine.²²

In addition to the bilateral and multilateral joint exercises, various dialogue mechanisms have also been established between both the militaries viz., Defense Policy Group (DPG), Defense Joint Working Group (DJWG), Defenses Procurement and Production Group (DPPG), Senior Technology Security Group (STSG), Joint Technical Group (JTG), Military Cooperation Group (MCG), and Service-to-Service Steering Groups (ESGs).²³ In addition, India and the US signed a Maritime security cooperation agreement in 2006. Both countries initiated maritime dialogue in 2016. There has been a significant increase in exchange of visits by senior officers of both the militaries. This dialogue mechanisms provide a platform for all the stakeholders to put forth their observations and assist in expediting the process, and has a very positive effect on the defense and security cooperation between both the countries.

The coordination of both the navies in HADR and NEO started after support of the IN to the USN after 9/11 attacks. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the IN escorted 24 US-flagged high-value vessels through the Strait of Malacca under Operation Sagittarius.²⁴ This support paved the way for working together during HADR operations after 2004 Tsunami disaster, which increased the navy-to-navy cooperation. Recognizing that the combined efforts of the US and India significantly enhanced the world's response to the Tsunami, both countries launched US-India Disaster Relief Initiative (DRI) in 2005.²⁵ In 2006, IN launched Operation Sukoon to evacuate Indian Nationals from Lebanon and even assisted in evacuation of foreign nationals also including the US citizens.²⁶ IN and USN cooperated with each other in HADR during 2007 Cyclone Sidr (affecting Bangladesh) and 2008 Cyclone Nargis (affecting Myanmar).²⁷ In 2015, during the Yemen crisis, the Indian Armed Forces evacuated 4640 Indian citizens along with 960 foreign nationals of 41 countries including the United States.²⁸ The IA and US Army also

coordinated with each other during the Nepal Earthquake in 2015. Both countries have cooperated with each other on various levels during such natural or man-made calamities.

The Indian government has been very careful in participating in any sort of multinational operations. The Indian government has always supported UN-led operations, which is evident from the fact that India is one of the largest contributors to UN Peacekeeping Forces deployed across the globe. The IN has played a very important role in the Gulf of Aden since 2008 by patrolling the area for counter piracy operations. Though India is not part of US led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), it has worked in close coordination with CMF in the Gulf of Aden. India has also been instrumental in increasing coordination in counter piracy operations with CMF and other maritime forces by conceptualizing the Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) in 2008. The USN has appreciated the efforts of IN in successful conduct of counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, Somalia, and Indian Ocean. However, India has not shown keen interest in conducting joint operations with the US. In a March 2016 press conference, Defense Minister of India, Manmohan Parrikar noted that there are policy limitations on India's willingness to do more than exercise between both countries, saying that "India has never taken part in any joint patrol; the question of joint patrol does not arise."²⁹ Though India has always shied away from any formal alliance with the US, Indian Armed forces are conducting operations in many part of the world in close coordination with the US Armed forces.

The training exchange program is one of the most important components of military to military cooperation between both countries. There has been a gradual increase in the exchange program. The United States imparts training to selected Indian military students in various schools of instruction through International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. On an average, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has been spending \$1.3million for this

purpose, which has seen a modest rise over the past five years, with approximately \$33,000 more requested for fiscal year 2017 than was appropriated in fiscal year 2013. Similarly, the US military students attend courses in India that are catered by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Government of India. In addition to individual training, many sub unit level trainings are also being conducted on both the sides. These cross-exchange training programs have helped to broaden and strengthen the interoperability between both militaries. During President Obama's 2015 visit to India, the US-India Knowledge Partnership in Defense Studies was initiated, which was focused on increasing greater linkages in the field of professional military education.³⁰

Challenges

It is a well-known fact now that the military to military cooperation between both countries has increased significantly in last two decades. However, there still exist a lot of opportunities, which have not yet been explored due to challenges existing on both sides.

First, India has always championed the thought process of strategic autonomy. India will never like to be part of some alliance or as a junior partner to a superpower. Hence, any engagement with the United States is always looked upon with suspicion. Indian domestic politics plays an important role in this aspect. Many diplomats in India question the relationship as the United States' interference in India's sovereignty. India has always advocated the path of NAM. Hence, India has always been reluctant in being a part of any multinational operations. This approach has held back any increase in military to military cooperation.

Second, Bureaucratic Challenges have hindered the growth of military to military cooperation. In India, the military to military cooperation is looked after by the Ministry of

Defense (MoD) in collaboration with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Most of the decision makers are civilians holding very important appointments, who lack clear appreciation of this cooperation. There is minimal representation of Armed Forces. Hence, the complete decision making process is very slow. Because of this peculiar reason, at many a times joint exercises or training exchange programs have been cancelled at the last moment. This slow decision making process may be very annoying to many policy makers in the United States. The United States wants India to be more proactive, which is very difficult with the existing bureaucratic setup.

Third, India is very cautious in its relationship with China. Though India has shown considerable growth in all fields in last two decades, it is still relatively weak as compared to China. Sino-India relationship has always been unpredictable. Hence, India does not want to send a negative signal to Beijing by excessive collaboration with the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. Indian policy makers are also mindful of the fact that in future the relationship between China and the United States may improve, which may then push India to a side.

Fourth, there is a lack of common vision for the future of this cooperation. Though military to military cooperation has been on increase, a common end state has never been thought of. Till the time a clear end state is not defined, it is very difficult for the cooperation to grow in a consistent direction. Therefore, the cooperation till now has been on case to case basis. If it is amenable to the individual interest of each countries, only then they go ahead with this cooperation.

Fifth, while there has been an increase in dialogue mechanism at the higher level in military to military cooperation, there are very few mechanisms existing at the operational and

tactical level. Due to this, the relationship between both the militaries have not improved that much. Both militaries have certain peculiar capabilities, which can be exploited by the other. There has not been very healthy progress in the training exchange program between both the countries.

Last, the US-Pakistan relationship has always been detrimental to the military to military cooperation between India and the United States. Till the Cold War era, the United States was largely in favor of Pakistan against India in any sort of conflict between India and Pakistan. After 9/11 attack, due to the obvious geographical advantages, the United States chose Pakistan as the coalition partner for the war against terror. Pakistan is actively engaged in a proxy war against India since last two decades. The United States has given Pakistan a substantial amount of aid in terms of finances and military equipment. This relationship has always been a sore point for Indian policymakers, who in turn have been very cautious in enhancing any sort of military to military cooperation with the United States.

Recommendations

The United States and India need to work in unison and overcome the challenges that have stemmed the pace and direction of military to military cooperation. The United States need to have patience in this relationship. This will assure the Indian political hierarchy that the United States does not have any intention in interfering with the sovereignty of India; and there is no threat to India's strategic autonomy by engaging in this relationship. More confidence building measures must be initiated between both countries.

The Indian government should allow more senior military officials to take the lead in this area of defense and security cooperation. They should allow military leaders to engage in

strategic dialogue with their US counterparts at the Military Cooperation Group and Executive Steering Groups. At the same time, both countries' leadership should formulate a common strategic vision, which will serve as the end state of military to military cooperation between both countries.

Both the governments should initiate the process of cross attachment of its military personnel. Many countries (especially NATO) have their military personnel posted in staff at various levels in the United States and vice versa. This allows them to learn from each other's best practices; and it enhances the interoperability between both militaries. As a modest start, both countries can authorize posting of their instructors to each other's training establishments. Furthermore, the Indian Staff officers can be posted to United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and US Staff officers can be posted to Headquarters Integrated Defense Staff (IDS) in India. This will pave the way for higher interoperability between both militaries in future.

India needs to be more proactive in this cooperation. Increasing engagement with the United States doesn't imply that the relationship between India and China will deteriorate. Since, the United States and India have converging strategic interest in IOR and SCS, they need to augment this interest with enhanced engagements in these areas. Hence, India needs to play its part in this relationship. At the same time, the United States needs to be more specific about its policies and intentions toward China. All three countries can have a healthy relationship without annoying any one of them.

Since both countries have a plethora of resources and potential, they will be playing a greater role in HADR, NEO, and counter piracy in future. Both countries need to develop joint

doctrine for these unforeseen eventualities, as it will assist in seamless integration of their resources and forces during such calamities. This will further assist in greater cooperation between both militaries.

The scope of exercises being conducted between both countries at present should be enhanced from the status of bilateral to multilateral. The MALABAR exercise is case in point in this regard. This will allow the nations with common ideologies and principals to come together and participate in the exercises, which will act as a significant deterrence against any country who intends to adopt any aggressive posture against these ideologies and principals.

Military to military cooperation is the most important aspect of the defense and security cooperation between the United States and India. It has grown at a considerable pace in last two decades. However, this cooperation has not yet reached its pinnacle because of the abovementioned challenges. Hence, both countries need to engage more intensely with each other and the abovementioned recommendations will go a long way to overcome these challenges and help in taking this cooperation to the next level.

Counter Terrorism and Intelligence Cooperation

Existing Cooperation

Indo-US counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation has become one of the major focus areas of the defense and security cooperation between both the countries. Both countries share common values of peace, justice, and liberty. They have been subjected to the menace of terrorism at regular intervals. A common understanding of the problem has brought both countries together. This cooperation has been strengthened by intensified interaction at the

diplomatic as well as the tactical level. Both countries have established many institutional mechanisms and agreements to enhance sharing of best practices, leveraging each other's strength, increased interoperability. Despite these agreements, this cooperation has always faced certain challenges, which needs to be overcome to fully realize the potential of this cooperation in entirety.

India has been facing terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir since early 1990s. India is also facing insurgency in the North-Eastern States since independence and Naxalism in the Eastern and the Central States since the late 1960s. Pakistan is the main sponsor of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The United States and India first engaged in Counter Terrorism (CT) cooperation during the 1980s when Indian intelligence personnel received training in dealing with hostage situations and aviation security.³¹ The United States also assisted in a limited manner during Sikh insurgency in Punjab in India in 1980s. However, the two countries did not have a shared understanding of terrorism until early 1990s. Islamist terrorists began targeting US citizens and interests shortly after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, which includes bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993, US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and on the USS *Cole* in 2000.³² In 2000, both countries established a Counter Terrorism Joint Working Group, in which both the sides agreed to share experience, exchange information, and coordinate approaches and action in countering domestic as well as international terrorism.³³

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States is arguably the most important event that shaped the current Indo-US counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation. This incident made terrorism the primary security threat perceived by the Americans and their government. For the first time in its history, the United States felt vulnerable to Islamic terrorism. The United States launched a Global war on Terrorism (GWOT) to target Al Qaida in Afghanistan. The Indian

government offered intelligence on terrorist networks, over-flight rights, refueling and repair of the US military aircraft, port facilities in Mumbai and Cochin for the US naval vessels, and search-and-rescue missions.³⁴ However, the United States chose Pakistan as its main ally due to its geo-strategic position. This came as a negative signal to the growing counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation between India and the United States, as the United States' main ally in the GWOT was the perpetrator of terrorism in India since 1990s. Though, this dissent was short lived.

Defeating terrorism and violent religious extremism was one of the key interests for both countries as outlined in the 2005 India-US Ten Year Defense Framework Agreement.³⁵ This initiated the process of increased cooperation in this area. The 2008 Mumbai attacks executed by Lashker-e-Taiba (LeT) killed 166 innocent people including eight US citizens.³⁶ The CIA and FBI assisted Indian investigation agencies in the process. The FBI reported having unprecedented access to evidence and intelligence following the incident, interviewing seventy individuals, including the only surviving attacker, Ajmal Kasab.³⁷ The United States declared the LeT as a terrorist organization after this incident. However, there was some reluctance on the part of the US Government to provide the Indian investigating agencies with access to one of the mastermind of the incident, David Headley (Washington based, Pakistani origin). In 2010, Indian investigating agencies could investigate him via video-link from his US prison cell.³⁸ This was one of the most important cooperation in this field, which increased the confidence of the Indian Government on the commitments of the United States in combatting terrorism. This resulted in the formation of Indo-US Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative in 2010.³⁹

The 2010 Indo-US Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative was signed to revitalize collaboration in the field of counterterrorism, information sharing, and capacity building. In

2010, President Obama inaugurated the Homeland Security Dialogue between both the countries.⁴⁰ This initiated the process of increased interaction between investigating agencies on both sides. Indian investigating agencies have utilized the superior forensic capabilities of the US investigating agencies at regular intervals. The FBI's Quantico laboratory has hosted numerous visits by senior Indian forensics experts and the agency regularly shares best-practices with senior Indian law enforcement officials.⁴¹ At the same time, Indian Police and other internal security forces have also benefitted from the US Department of State's Antiterrorism assistance (ATA) program. Under ATA, courses ranging from bomb blast investigation, critical incident management, and tactical commanders training to cyber investigations and forensics have been conducted regularly.⁴² Since 2010, there has been a close collaboration between both countries to share intelligence.

In 2011, India and the United States became charter members of newly formed Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF).⁴³ The aim of the forum is to deal with the menace of terrorism at the global level. The United States has supported the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism that India proposed at the United Nations (UN) in 1996. Due to certain differences between the members of the UN, it is not yet signed. During 2015 President Obama's visit, the Joint Strategic Vision emphasized combatting global terrorism and piracy.⁴⁴ The signing of the 2015 Ten Year Defense Framework Agreement further reinforced this commitment, which identified defeating terrorism and violent extremism as a key strategic interest for both countries.⁴⁵ They issued a Joint declaration on combatting terrorism in September 2015, in which the United States condemned the terrorist attacks in Gurdaspur, Punjab and Udhampur, Jammu and Kashmir; and also requested Pakistan to expedite the process of bringing the perpetrators of 2008 Mumbai attack to justice.⁴⁶ This was one of the rare

occasions when the United States directly condemned Pakistan for engaging in proxy war on the Indian soil. The counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation has also become one of the major subjects for deliberation in the Indo-US Strategic and Commercial Dialogue. The Strategic and Commercial dialogue was initiated in 2015. The second meeting of the ministers of both countries for the Strategic and Commercial Dialogue, in which both sides reaffirmed their commitment to combat global terrorism was concluded on 31 August 2016 in New Delhi.⁴⁷ The counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation between both countries have seen a significant progress in last decade. This has been possible due to enhanced institutional mechanisms and agreements between both countries. However, this cooperation has also been adversely affected by many challenges.

Challenges

First, the divergence in threat perception by both countries is one of the biggest challenges to this cooperation. For India, the main source of terrorism has been from Pakistan. The terrorist groups like Al-Qaida and ISIS have not yet conducted any terrorist actions in India. Hence, India sees Pakistan as the biggest enemy for its counter terrorism strategy. On the other end, Al-Qaida and ISIS has been the biggest source of terrorism against American citizens and the US government. This divergence pertaining to the identification of the problem hinders both the nations from understanding terrorism from each other's perspective. Hence, there is no common end state for this cooperation.

Second, the growing dependence of the United States on Pakistan for GWOT has undermined the growing relations between India and the US. The Indian politicians and the public are always skeptical about the intentions of the United States. This also makes it very

hard for the Indian government to convince its Parliament and public about enhancing counter terrorism and intelligence cooperation with the United States. The 2008 Mumbai attack is a case in point, in which India feels that the United States has not put adequate pressure on Pakistan to hand over the masterminds to India.

Third, the Indian Constitution allocates responsibility for law and order to the states, meaning that nationwide internal security initiatives require buy-in by all 29 states governments.⁴⁸ There is no federal agency comparable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Though Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) deals with the internal security at the central government's level, they cannot implement any central law or procedure without taking all the states in their confidence. This results in a very slow process. At the same time, there is negligible interoperability between counter terrorism forces of states. This arrangement makes it very difficult for the US counterparts to interact with them on this cooperation. India does not have a central counter terrorism authority with legal powers. After the 2008 Mumbai attack, the Indian government has proposed formation of the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) on the lines of the United States in 2008. The NCTC will be operating under Intelligence Bureau (IB) of India, which will have the authority of conducting counter terrorist operations and collecting intelligence.⁴⁹ However, this has not been passed till now because of the stiff opposition from the states. The state government see this move as an interference in the autonomy of states and thus an attack on the federal structure of the country. Hence, at present India lacks a solid counter terrorism strategy at central level and legal authority to enmesh all the states together in countering this menace.

Fourth, India suffers from terrorism and insurgency at the same time, which further compounds its internal security situation. On the Northern front, India is facing terrorism. In the central belt, it is facing Naxalism and in the North-Eastern states, it is facing insurgency. The procedures adopted in countering terrorism, Naxalism, and insurgency differ significantly. Hence, it is very difficult to work out a single strategy for dealing with all these problems, which makes it difficult for both countries to work towards a common strategy.

Fifth, the internal security forces include police in India. The states maintain police force, which in turn possess very modest capabilities. Their investigating prowess and forensic capabilities are always questionable. This ill-equipped force is not capable of dealing with the internal security situation in the country. India does not have a central training institution for all these forces, which further compound this situation.

Last, the Indian policy makers are always very cautious in sharing intelligence. Since both sides have not yet been able to develop the level of comfort and confidence between them, hence there is always fear of endangering their intelligence assets. This lack of confidence has a direct relation with lack of transparency in the United States' commitment in dealing with the terrorism which India is facing. Though these challenges have undermined the counter terrorism and intelligence cooperation between both countries, there is a need to look ahead to further strengthen this cooperation.

Recommendations

The 2008 Mumbai attack was due to the lack of coordination in the intelligence collection and operations, aggravated by the absence of any sort of effective central apparatus. Hence, India needs to develop a strong counter terrorism strategy and a central counter terrorism agency,

which would be capable to coordinate the actions of all the agencies and key players in counter terrorism. The United States can play an important role in this process. Though the internal situation in both countries is different, India can still learn from the best practices, which are observed by the NCTC and other agencies of the United States.

The Indian government needs to introspect the organization and capability of the internal security forces. There is a need for National Level Police training academy, which will cater for all the officers and other ranks of the force. The United States need to use its expertise in this field for the capacity building of the Indian Police forces. Though the training of these forces has increased under ATA program in recent years, it is still far from desired. Hence, there needs to be greater participation by Indian police forces in ATA program. At the same time, the United States can also assist India in equipping its police forces with superior weapons and equipment.

The United States needs to be clear on its stand against terrorism. There is no good or bad terrorism. It is a well-established fact now that Pakistan has been sponsoring terrorism in India for quite some time. Hence, if the United States is committed to eradicating global terrorism, it needs to take a strong stand against Pakistan. This will increase confidence of the Indian government on the United States regarding its commitment towards counter terrorism.

Both countries need to develop a joint strategic vision for the counter terrorism and intelligence cooperation. Till the time, the end state is not clear to both sides, there will not be a significant progress in this field. This will require consistent effort from both sides at all levels. As a confidence building measure, the United States should use its influence to get the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism passed by the UN.

There is a requirement of maintaining a regular exchange between both countries in this field by strictly following the established institutional frameworks. The Home Security Dialogue is a case in point. After its inauguration in 2010, this dialogue has happened only twice in 2011 and 2013. Since then, it has been postponed frequently. Such events lead to an uncongenial atmosphere of distrust between both countries. Hence, both countries should strictly adhere to the timelines of all the established institutional frameworks and agreements.

Despite the existing challenges, there is a huge potential in counter terrorism and intelligence cooperation between both countries to become an important pillar of the defense and security cooperation between both countries. Both countries need to work closely to overcome these challenges and move ahead to achieve their shared dream of a world, which will be free of all sort of terror.

Bilateral Defense Trade

Existing Cooperation

The bilateral defense trade remains the most important pillar of the Indo-US defense and security cooperation between the two countries. Since independence, India has felt threatened from its neighbors on the western as well as eastern front. This threat perception has compelled India to have one of the largest armed forces in the world today. It also motivated Indian government for modernization of its armed forces. Due to its NAM policy, India was eager to achieve a self-sufficiency in the field of defense production. Thus, the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) was formed in 1958 from the amalgamation of the then already functioning Technical Development Establishment (TDEs) of the Indian Army and the

Directorate of Technical Development & Production (DTDP) with the Defense Science Organization (DSO).⁵⁰ However, due to poor technological base and lack of military expenditure, the DRDO has not been able to achieve its aim. This problem compelled India to look for other countries to fulfill its armed forces' weapons and equipment requirements. The Soviet Union was the major defense supplier of India till its dissolution. After 1990, Russia emerged as the biggest defense supplier to India. At the same time, India also increased its interactions with other countries like France, Israel etc.

India participated in small-scale arms trade with the United States from 1986-1988.⁵¹ April 17, 2002 marks the first major weapons deal between the two countries, consisting of 12 radar sets, a remarkable strategic development considering Indian procurement reliance on the Soviets during the Cold War.⁵² Since then, the defense trade between both countries has grown significantly. A table depicting the major defense sale by the United States to India since 2001 is attached as **Appendix A**.

In 2001, the Bush administration lifted sanction on military interactions with India that had been imposed after its 1998 nuclear tests. It then anticipated that India would purchase a large quantity of arms from US suppliers, aiming to increase profits for US firms and ties India closer to the United States in military terms. However, India's arm imports from the United States were initially low, valued at less than \$1 billion from 2001-2004. The 2005 Ten Year Defense Framework agreement gave a boost to the defense trade between both countries. It subsequently grew to \$3 billion between 2005-2008 and to \$11 billion between 2009-2015.⁵³ India signed the End-Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) in 2009, which was one of the main reason for significant increase in the defense trade between both countries. The EUMA and Enhanced End-User Monitoring Agreement (EEUMA) are mandated by the Arms Export

Control Act 22 U.S.C. 2785, which enables the US to supply and sell defense equipment and services.⁵⁴ The EUMA was signed in 2009 after its customization when India insisted that certain provisions of the agreements were to be changed so that timing and location of inspections of operating positions were predetermined, which was one of the key Indian concerns.

In 2011, the US Department of Commerce removed most of the Indian defense organizations from Entity List, which largely eliminated broad licensing restrictions to technology sharing between both countries.⁵⁵ To speed up defense trade between both countries, the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) was instituted in 2012. The DTTI aims to overcome bureaucratic obstacles or inefficient procedures, to shift from the traditional “buyer-seller” dynamic toward a more collaborative approach, explore new areas of technological collaboration from science and technology cooperation through co-development and co-production, and expand US-Indian business ties.⁵⁶ During the President Obama’s January 2015 visit, four pathfinder projects were included in DTTI, which are the next-generation Raven unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), "roll-on, roll-off" intelligence-gathering and reconnaissance modules for C-130J Super Hercules aircraft, mobile electric hybrid power sources and "uniform integrated protection ensemble increment-2 (chemical, biological warfare protection gear for soldiers)".⁵⁷ In addition, both government also set up the Jet Engine Technology Joint Working Group (JETJWG) and the Joint Working Group on Aircraft Carrier Technology Cooperation (JWGACTC).⁵⁸ The DTTI is the centerpiece of the 2015 Ten Year Defense Framework Agreement. It also aligns with Modi administration’s Make in India initiative. The DoD also established the India Rapid Reaction Cell (IRRC) in January 2015 to focus exclusively on advancing the DTTI.⁵⁹

There has been an unprecedented exchange of visits by senior officials of both governments in last two years. These visits have added a momentum to the bilateral defense trade. In April 2016 visit of Mr Ashton Carter, the Defense Secretary of the United States, to India, both sides agreed to initiate two new DTTI pathfinder projects on digital helmet mounted displays and the joint biological tactical detection system. During Prime Minister Modi's visit in June 2016, the United States has designated India as the "Major Defense Partner", which will allow India to access to the technology, weapons, and equipment at par with the United States' allies.⁶⁰ During the Defense Minister Mr Parrikar's visit in August 2016, Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) which was stuck from last ten years was signed. With this agreement, India and United States will be able to avail access to each other's military facilities for various logistical supports during ports calls, joint military exercises, military training, disaster relief operations, humanitarian operations etc.⁶¹ However, despite these significant developments, there exists many challenges which need to be overcome.

Challenges

The defense trade between the world's largest exporter of arms, i.e., the US, and one of the largest arms importers, i.e., India, has immense business potential but become complicated by legal, political, strategic, historical and bureaucratic impediments. First, the United States has been negotiating with India on two foundational agreements, which are the Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for Geospatial Cooperation. The United States generally signs these two agreements with any country before committing for technology sharing in defense. These technologies include satellite navigation, secure communications equipment and

synchronized laser guidance systems. CISMOA requires the purchasers to make sure that the defense equipment being purchased are compatible with American systems and the BECA deals with mutual logistical support that enables exchanges of communications and other equipment.⁶² The signing of EUMA was an important step for enhancing defense trade between the two countries. However, both sides have not been able to reach a consensus on the EEUMA. The United States view these agreements as a prerequisite for technology transfer, however, India perceives it as a threat to its sovereignty.

Second, India has been concerned about the licensing system of the United States. Although nuclear tests related sanctions were lifted in 2001 and most of the Indian defense organizations were removed from the Entity list, India wants all the organizations to be removed from the Entity list. The Entity List specifies the license requirements that it imposes on each listed person. Those license requirements are independent of, and in addition to, license requirements imposed elsewhere in the Export Administration Regulation (EAR).⁶³ This procedure has a negative impact on the pace of the trade, which has been one of the biggest concerns of the Indian policymakers. However, the United States correlate this requirement with the signing of the foundational agreements.

Third, the Indian procurement policy has been one of the major obstacles in this field. India faces a conflict between its desire to modernize its armed forces and develop a strong indigenous capability. According to the recent Defense Procurement Procedure (DPP-2016), “the aim of the DPP is to ensure timely procurement of military equipment, systems, and platforms as required by the Armed Forces in terms of performance capabilities and quality standards, through optimum utilization of allocated budgetary resources; while enabling the same, DPP will provide for the highest degree of probity, public accountability, transparency, fair competition

and level-playing field. In addition, self-reliance in defense equipment production and acquisition will be steadfastly pursued as a key aim of the DPP.”⁶⁴ The Indian government has increased the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in defense sector from 26% to 49% (with an exception to FDI of 100%, if it gives Indian armed forces access to modern technology), which prevents many US defense companies to enter Indian market, who wants to protect their Intellectual Property Rights (IPR).⁶⁵ In addition, the offset requirement of the Indian government has also created a hurdle in the defense procurement procedure regularly. The offsets are the compensations that a buyer seeks from the seller for the purchase of goods and/or services. According to the DPP-2016, the offset is 30% for any contracts worth more than \$300 million.⁶⁶

Fourth, Bureaucratic challenges are one of the major obstacles for the bilateral defense trade between India and the US. The US concerns are India’s slow bureaucratic decision-making and its apathy to military engagement. These raise doubts about India’s commitment to the relationship. Moreover, the political and bureaucratic complexity in the organizational structure is another impediment to India’s decision-making in terms of streamlining the procurement procedures. India too has frustrations with the US. India believes that the US is unwilling to transfer high-end technology and the associated know-how. Even after the signing of the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, the US denies transferring of certain technology citing its sensitive nature and the US position is that it is a result of India’s inability to sign the foundational agreements that are prerequisites to any sale and purchase of sophisticated technology.

Last, there has been a very slow progress on the defense co-production and co-development. Lack of flexible regulatory framework has hindered the prospects of co-

production and the US's defense companies remain uncertain regarding sharing of advanced technology because of issues such as IPR. Legal hurdles such as procurement and offset policies have stalled progress in defense co-development and co-production. The Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), which focuses especially on prospects for co-development and joint production of military hardware involves both US and Indian defense industries. However, many obstacles and structural inadequacies exist that prevent the actual fructification of joint initiatives. Due to lack of technological base, India imports 70% of its weapons and equipment.

These challenges have hindered the growth of the defense trade between both countries. Though the United States has emerged as the biggest defense partner of India in recent years, India still engages considerably in defense trade with other countries because of the above-mentioned challenges. To further enhance defense ties, both India and the US should take positive steps to resolve complex policy challenges so that the momentum of the defense trade can be maintained, which will benefit both countries.

Recommendations

The bilateral defense trade between both countries have huge potential, which needs to be explored. The challenges need to be overcome to achieve this aim. First, both countries need to be more flexible on the foundational agreements like CISMOA, BECA, and EEUMA. These agreements are stuck from the beginning of 2000s. LEMOA was finally signed in 2016 with little amendments. The United States need to understand the strategic culture of the India government, which basically revolves around strategic autonomy. At the same time, the Indian policymakers need to take a pragmatic approach on these issues. Though, without signing of

these agreements, India could get some high-end products from the United States; it can be taken to the next level once these agreements are signed.

Second, the United States' Department of Commerce needs to have a holistic approach to Entity List. Since, it has already been fifteen years of lifting the nuclear related sanction on India, there is no reason for some of the Indian Defense organization to be still on the Entity List of the Department of Commerce. Though, the Department of Commerce has been very positive in recent years in granting the licenses to the Indian firms, it adds an inherent delay to the complete process. Hence, there is a need of overhaul of the Entity List of the Department of Commerce.

Third, the Indian procurement procedure needs to be more transparent. DPP-2016 is a very positive move in this direction. Till now, India used to follow the system of L-1 bidders in the tendering process, which means that the contract was given to the firm who meets all the requisite technical specification and has the lowest price. Because of this system, the United States firms were at a disadvantage because of the higher technological capabilities with relative higher cost. Though DPP-2016 gives the government authority to choose for the technologically superior products now, it should become a norm rather than being an exception. At the same time, both the governments need to be more flexible and clear on the issues of IPR and offset policy. In the same way, the Indian government should consider increasing FDI in the defense sector, which will benefit the Indian 'Make in India' campaign as well as the bilateral defense sale.

Fourth, the United States has designated India as a 'Major Defense Partner'. This should allow the United States to share the high end technological product with India. Till now, India

has been asking for superior defense products, but the United States has denied it because of the issue of secrecy and security. This has compelled India to look for other partners like Russia, France, Israel etc. In today's world, India has many options to fulfill its needs. The United States should be mindful of this fact and show more flexibility in providing the state-of-art technology to the Indian defense sector.

Fifth, the DTTI and IRRC are a very good initiative. However, they have not been able to yield a significant result till date. Both governments should consider a more focused approach toward these initiatives. To date, the Six pathfinder projects have been identified for co-production and co-development. Both countries need to explore more projects. These projects could be for the rifles (both countries are looking for suitable alternatives) or artillery pieces. The DTTI should be able to convince the Indian government about its capabilities of co-production and co-development. These small projects will be a base for interaction between both countries for development of more complex projects.

These recommendations will go a long way in enhancing the defense trade between both countries and will help in converting the defense relationship from purely defense sale to defense co-development and co-production

Conclusion

In the last two decades, the Indo-US relationship has unfolded as a relationship based on mutual respect for global peace, prosperity, liberty, justice, and stability. President Obama acknowledged the fact that the Indo-US relationship is going to be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century.⁶⁷ Defense and security cooperation has been instrumental in bridging the gap between both countries. There has been unprecedented growth in the areas of

military to military cooperation, counter terrorism and intelligence cooperation, and defense trade between both countries.

Today, India conducts the maximum number of military exercises with the United States as compared to any other country. The military to military cooperation has enhanced the interoperability between armed forces of both countries. At the same time, the existing challenges in the military to military cooperation are – India's perception of its strategic autonomy, bureaucratic challenges, India's cautious approach in the region, the lack of common strategic vision, less interaction at operational and tactical level, and US-Pak relationship. Some of the measures which can mitigate these challenges are – more participation by Indian senior military officials, cross attachment of military personal, proactive approach, joint doctrine for HADR, NEO, and counter piracy, and more multilateral exercises. These recommendations will assist both countries to take this cooperation to the next level.

Both countries have also intensified their cooperation in the field of counter terrorism and intelligence sharing, especially after 2008 Mumbai attack. The existing challenges in counter terrorism and intelligence cooperation are – divergence in threat perception, growing dependence of the United States on Pakistan for GWOT, India's internal security mechanism and complexities, absence of any central counter terrorism agency in India, ill-equipped police forces of India, lack of trust in sharing the intelligence. These challenges can be overcome by – assistance by the United States to India in developing a strong counter terrorism strategy and central counter terrorism agency, in training and equipping the police forces of India, a clear stand of United States on terrorism, developing a joint strategic vision of counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation, and regular dialogues between both countries at the apex and intermediary levels.

Bilateral defense trade has grown significantly from less than \$1 billion in 2001 to \$15 billion in 2015. The challenges which are hindering the growth of the defense trade between both countries are – lack of foundational agreements, strict licensing policy of the United States, India’s complex procurement procedures, bureaucratic challenges, and dismal progress on co-development and co-production. Some of the remedial measures are – more flexibility by both sides on the foundational agreements, liberal licensing policy, more transparency in India’s procurement procedures, India’s access to the United States’ sensitive technologies, and more emphasis on co-production and co-development. These actions will mitigate the challenges faced by both countries in the bilateral defense trade.

The United States and India have a converging strategic interest in the Asia- Pacific region. The highly modernized and capable armed forces of India is in the interest of the United States’ ‘Rebalance to Asia’. Both governments need to pursue the defense and security cooperation with the same vigor and enthusiasm as demonstrated in recent years. This cooperation will become the epitome of a relationship based on mutual respect for one another’s values, aspirations, and cultures, which will motivate other countries to emulate this cooperation.

APPENDIX A**Table I: List of Arms Sale to India**

Weapon Designation	Weapon Description	Nos Ordered	Year of order	Year of deliveries	No delivered	Price
TPE-331	Turboprop	112	1983	1986-2011	112	N/A
LM-2500	Gas Turbine	6	1999	2010-2012	6	N/A
TPQ-37 Firefinder	Arty locating radar	8	2002	2006	8	Part of \$142- 190 million deal
LM-2500	Gas Turbine	4	2003	-	-	-
TPQ-37 Firefinder	Arty locating radar	4	2003	2006-2007	4	Part of \$142- 190 million deal
F404	Turbofan	17	2004	2015	5	\$105 million deal
Austin	AALS	1	2006	2007	1	\$48 million deal
S-61/H-3A Sea King	Transport helicopter	6	2006	2007	6	\$39 million deal
F404	Turbofan	24	2007	-	-	-
C-130J-30 Hercules	Transport aircraft	6	2008	2010-2011	6	\$962 million deal

Weapon Designation	Weapon Description	Nos Ordered	Year of order	Year of deliveries	No delivered	Price
P-8A Poseidon	ASW aircraft	8	2009	2012-2015	8	\$2 billion deal
CBU-97 SFW	Guided bomb	512	2010	2013-2015	450	\$258-311 million deal
RGM-84L Harpoon-2	Anti-ship MI/SSM	20	2010	2013	20	\$170 million deal
C-17A Globemaster-3	Hy Transport aircraft	10	2011	2013-2014	10	\$4.1 billion deal
Mk-54 MAKO	ASW Torpedo	32	2011	2013-2015	32	\$86 million deal
F414	Turbofan	99	2012	-	-	-
RGM-84L Harpoon-2	Anti-ship MI/SSM	21	2012	2014	21	N/A
TPE-331	Turboprop	28	2012	2013-2015	24	N/A
AGM-114L HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	812	2013	-	-	-
FIM-92 Stinger	Portable SAM	245	2013	-	-	-
T-700	Turboshaft	6	2013	-	-	-
C-130J-30 Hercules	Transport aircraft	6	2013	-	-	\$1.1 billion deal

Weapon Designation	Weapon Description	Nos Ordered	Year of order	Year of deliveries	No delivered	Price
F-125	Turbofan	270	2014	-	-	-
AGM-114L HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	542	2014	-	-	-
S-70/UH-60L	Helicopter	16	2014	-	-	\$1 billion deal
P-8A Poseidon	ASW aircraft	4	2015	-	-	-
AH-64D Apache	Combat helicopter	22	2015	-	-	\$1.2-1.4 billion deal
APG-78 Longbow	Combat heli radar	12	2015	-	-	-
C-130J-30 Hercules	Transport aircraft	1	2015	-	-	-
CH-47F Chinook	Transport helicopter	15	2015	-	-	\$1 billion deal
RGM-84L Harpoon-2	Anti-ship MI/SSM	12	2015	-	-	-
M777 howitzers	Artillery Gun	145	2016	-	-	\$750 million deal

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfers Database, 2001-2016.

End Notes

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