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As the United States continued to expand it residually pushed the Native American population further west. The U.S. Army was forced to act as an ameliorating force between the local population and the Indians. Generals James Carleton and George Crook each implemented a suitable application of an operational and tactical counter-guerrilla program against the Apache and Navajo Indians in the American southwest, based on the education, experience, and limited forms of doctrine that were available at the time. Generals Carleton and Crook ended much of the conflict by countering Indian raiding and conflict in the American southwest by using self-generated Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs).

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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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
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
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## Executive Summary

**Title:** 19<sup>th</sup> Century Irregular Warfare in the American Southwest: A Study of Generals James H. Carleton and George R. Crook.

**Author:** Major Michael Brabender, United States Army

**Thesis:** Generals James Carleton and George Crook each implemented a suitable application of an operational and tactical counter-guerrilla program against the Apache and Navajo Indians in the American southwest, based on the education, experience, and limited forms of doctrine that were available at the time.

**Discussion:** As the United States continued to expand it residually pushed the Native American population further west. Although early 19<sup>th</sup> century Americans believed this was a viable solution to the *Indian Problem*, it was only temporary and would be relegated through military force and mild attempts at peace. As the government's policy wavered between westward progress and social demands, the U.S. Army was forced to appease the local population while protecting the Indians. Acting as the ameliorating force between conflicting policy demands, the Indians, and the incoming settlers, Army commanders maintained a large amount of freedom to influence situational consequences.

During the U.S. Civil War, General James Carleton tamed the Mescalero Apache and Navajo Indians with unrelenting force. His actions succeeded in moving the Indians onto the Bosque Redondo reservation, but he failed to implement adequate measures to sustain a productive life and incorporate the Indians into American society. Carleton's experiment at the Bosque Redondo continued to deplete the demoralized Indians, leading to a backlash from the American government and society. Although his approach to solving the Indian problem provided the quick results of near total capitulation, his subsequent inability to care for or indoctrinate the Indians into American society were viewed as a failure.

General George Crook used a different approach during his campaign against the Apache in Arizona. Having great respect for the fighting abilities of his opponents, General Crook tailored his tactics into a highly effective counter-guerrilla campaign. Using Apache scouts as trusted auxiliary forces, he attacked the enemy's psychological means to resist by using their own warriors against them. He perfected the art of logistical preparations for battle in the rugged terrain through the meticulous use of pack mules. General Crook energized and motivated his soldiers to relentlessly track and pursue their opponents, often in the winter under the worst conditions. After showing the might of his Army he turned his leadership and compassion on to the Indians, by becoming their "best friend" and personally attending to their regeneration and indoctrination programs; albeit, they also included basic changes in their way of life.

**Conclusion:** Ultimately, a true measurement of success in extinguishing the *Indian Problem* in the southwest would be unattainable, due to the ever-changing demands, influence, and limited support of the U.S. government toward a holistic and effective solution. However, Generals Carleton and Crook ended much of the conflict by countering Indian raiding and conflict in the American southwest by using self-generated Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) against their opponents.

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## *Preface*

The period of western expansion provided a great challenge to the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19 century American government. As settlers encroached on the native population conflict became evermore present. Ultimately, the U.S. Army became the mediators in this ongoing struggle. Unlike today, the execution of strategic policy was often placed into the hands of an autonomous military commander with little to no command and control from the nation's military and political leadership. The unconstrained nature of this time period provides an excellent venue to examine the leadership qualities, decisions, and varying outcomes of two Army leaders during the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century Indian Wars of the Southwest. The appropriate lessons portrayed from early American history can be applied to the recent U.S. military experiences suppressing insurgencies, as the cultural needs and aspects of the tribal population where our military operates and need to know become ever so important in the past and now in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The historical remnants of the once great Indian nations and their isolated descendants has been inescapable to me while growing up on the prairies of western Minnesota. The Upper Sioux Agency Indian reservation was nearby, which offered a mild preservation of a distant culture. Growing up I would hear stories of armed Indians walking up to my grandmother's farm demanding food and sugar. The city that I grew up in houses the historical marker for Camp Release, where the last of the Indians surrendered in the Great Sioux Uprising of 1862. I uncovered evidence of the once great nation by finding several Indian arrowheads while hunting for Lake Superior Agates with my father.

This paper will compare the operational approach utilized by two Army generals, James Carleton and George Crook, during the American Indian Wars and will analyze their approaches, decisions and outcomes, for use in today's challenging operational environment. This writing is

not intended to be an operational history of events, but a study in which lessons of respective military practices and techniques can be extracted and emphasized. Some lessons may be pertinent to today, other may not. Although a holistic view of the broader conflict will be examined in research, this paper will focus on two different campaigns in the American southwest, the factors that influenced them, the irrevocable approaches and decisions made by the two leaders, and the respective ensuing results.

I would like to acknowledge the assistance and steady mentorship of Dr. Donald Bitter, who has provide me with a wealth of knowledge, support, and guidance as my mentor for this project. A profound thank you to my beautiful and loving wife Tanya, son Donovan, and daughter Kaylee for your continuous encouragement. I could never have accomplished this task without the personal sacrifice that you have so graciously shown to me.

## INTRODUCTION

The American military establishment is often perplexed with the employment of forces to nullify a numerically inferior opponent. Although history has provided the U.S. military with a great deal of “small wars” from which assessments and improvements can be attained, its doctrine, tactics, and innovation often fail to capture these valuable lessons. This paper will examine and compare the *Diplomatic*, *Military*, and *Economic* actions and operations used by U.S. Army General James Carleton, in his campaign against the Navajo and Mescalero Apache in New Mexico from 1862-63, and General George Crook’s campaign against the Apache in Arizona from 1871-75 and 1882-85, to suppress the perceived threat of the Apache and Navajo people in the American Southwest during and immediately following the U.S. Civil War. Generals James Carleton and George Crook each implemented a suitable application of an operational and tactical counter-guerrilla program against the Apache and Navajo Indians in the American southwest, based on the education, experience, and limited forms of doctrine that were available at the time.

Generals Carleton and Crook ended much of the conflict by countering Indian raiding and conflict in the American southwest by using self-generated Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) against their opponents. Their goals aimed at dealing with the aggression between whites and Indians, coined the *Indian Problem*, by concentrating Indians onto reservations and transforming them into American society. Ultimately, a true measurement of success in extinguishing the Indian Problem in the southwest would be problematic, due to the local population’s unrealistic expectations, ever-changing demands and influence, cultural values of the time, and the limited support of the U.S. government toward a holistic and effective solution.

The clash of cultures experienced between the advanced Europeans and savage Native Americans, as portrayed and believed by 19<sup>th</sup> century American society, was far more devastating and costly to both parties than necessary. The U.S. Army acted as the ameliorating force of the unsettled western frontier/borderland territories, enforcing vague national policies with little guidance outside of their own intuition and personal tenets. The Navajo and Apache peoples, having perfected the art of small wars tactics and techniques through centuries of intertribal conflicts, engaged in irregular warfare that the numerically and technologically superior Army was unprepared to counter.

History has shown that counterinsurgency operations are more easily forgotten than goals successfully attained. Historian Andrew Birtle defines counterinsurgency, in his book *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*, as “all of the political, economic, social, and military actions taken by the government for the suppression of insurgent, resistance, and revolutionary movements.”<sup>1</sup> This definition, used throughout this paper, highlights the necessity of all factions of a government to work in sync with one another to guarantee the highest probability of success in extinguishing an insurgency. The definition of small wars, as employed by the Navajo and Apache to include guerrilla warfare at the tactical level, involves the tactics of surprise, ambush, and mobility to maximize the impact of an inferior force against a superior enemy.<sup>2</sup> During counterinsurgency and counter-guerrilla operations, insurgents often overcome a technologically superior force due to their knowledge of the terrain, advantages in mobility, and abilities to evade the more sophisticated force. Although the conditions experienced against the Apache and Navajo people in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century were unique to the time, there are lessons that can be extracted from this period in American history to benefit the military professional of today. Both General Carleton and General Crook provide a

slightly different approach to subduing the conflict experienced between the flood of European settlers and the warrior culture of the Indians in the American southwest.

## **BACKGROUND**

The centuries-long incessant clash between European settlers and Native Americans, commonly known as the Indian Problem, influenced every aspect of America's growth and posterity as a young nation. With the discovery of North America in the late 15<sup>th</sup> century a contest of wills and survival ensued between the two groups until just before the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. After Britain won the French and Indian War in 1763, Indians were continually pushed west of the Ohio River. That frontier seemed to offer a limited solution to a seemingly never-ending problem between the two cultures. After the United States won its independence from Great Britain its western limit was pushed to the Mississippi River, further advancing the question on how to deal with the Indian Problem. With Army reports indicating that the area west of the Mississippi River was unsuitable for white inhabitants, a workable solution surfaced. President Andrew Jackson, an avid Indian fighter against the Creek Indians of Alabama and Mississippi, organized what society at the time believe to be the final solution by moving a large majority of the Indians east of the Mississippi River to a designated Indian Territory west of the river.<sup>3</sup> Again, this solution was accepted by society in the interest of peace and longevity between the two cultures. However, this failed to address the true problem as the American population continued to grow and spill further into the western frontier.

American society held a wide spectrum of goals on how to handle the Indian problem, with the ideologies being generally split between the more civilized society in the east and those actually living amongst the Indians in the west. Eastern thought generally maintained that Indians should be indoctrinated into productive American citizens by teaching them how to farm

and adapt to Christianity, i.e. a cultural change. Western settlers, on the other hand, were much more aggressive in their approach to the Indian problem. Often having to defend themselves from Indian raiding and deadly aggression, western settlers routinely turned to retribution as the solution no matter what federal government policies were. General William Tecumseh Sherman, wrote of the ensuing struggle of Army operations involving the Indians:

There are two classes of people, one demanding the utter extinction of the Indians, and the other full of love for their conversion to civilization and Christianity. Unfortunately, the Army stands between them and gets the cuff from both sides. If the Army killed too many Indians, humanitarians cried butchery, but if it killed too few, frontiersmen scorned the troops as cowards.<sup>4</sup>

Following the wake of the Santee War in August 1862, where Sioux Indians murdered innocent civilians due to the government's inability to supply them promised treaty goods, tensions rose and trust in the Indians ability to remain peaceful dropped precipitously midst the western settlers. Further west on 29 November 1864, a U.S. volunteer force, comprised of both militia and civilians from Colorado led by Colonel John Chivington, marched onto a peaceful Cheyenne Indian village and murdered everyone in sight, mostly women and children. While this malicious act contradicted U.S. policy, Colonel Chivington was never prosecuted or brought to justice.<sup>5</sup> The Santee War and Sand Creek incidents highlight the problem laid before the U.S. government, and essentially passed down to the U.S. Army. It was hard to impose order since the Army was just one player in this incessant clash of cultures.

A convergence of influences, both physical and ideological, greatly affected the United States' ability to apply a holistic policy toward the countless tribes spread across the western frontier. Americans continued to pour into the west through the Oregon Trail and Santa Fe Trail by way of horse and wagon, while later the Transcontinental Railroad split the prairie in two. It was clear to the Indians that their way of life was threatened, as the great buffalo herds began to

dwindle, settlement and mining occurred, and Army posts and towns sprang up.<sup>6</sup> A small yet increasing portion of American society at the time were influenced by the belief of *Social Darwinism*, or the idea that certain races of mankind were inferior to others and were destined for extinction.<sup>7</sup>

## **U.S. Expansion**

America has had a longstanding initiative to subdue the perceived dangers imposed by the American Indian. At the birth of the United States, Americans were uncertain about having a standing army of regular soldiers. Many preferred the idea of building an army when necessary through the hasty mobilization of volunteer citizens energized through the states instead of the federal government. As conflict between Americans and Indian tribes throughout the Appalachian Mountains and beyond intensified, the argument for a larger standing Army intensified. Little did anyone know that this army of regulars, volunteers, and militia would be employed against the American Indian civilization until just before the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>8</sup>

During the early part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the notion of *Manifest Destiny* and expansion west of the Mississippi quickly engulfed the nation. The result of the Mexican-American War yielded America the vast expanse of land from Texas to Southern California.<sup>9</sup> The multinational dispute of the Oregon territory boundary was settled in 1846, establishing the United States' Northwest Territory. Mexico finally recognized the Rio Grande as its northern border, and the peace settlement of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in February 1848, bestowed California, present day Arizona and New Mexico, and parts of Utah, Nevada, and Colorado to the United States. In December 1853 the Gadsden Purchase expanded the southern borders of Arizona and New Mexico. Therefore, within a relatively short number of years, the United States grew by an

astounding one million square miles, all of which encompassed a large population of American Indians.<sup>10</sup>

The Army's burden of protecting the nation's interests as it expanded westward rose significantly after America defeated Mexico in 1848. Its principle duty was to protect American citizens and major travel routes from frontier Indian attacks, in addition to the tasks of mapping, surveying, and exploring the expansive terrain. The Army was also instrumental in the cultivating tasks of constructing, and performing other duties assigned by the government to help civilize the uncharted territories. At the conclusion of the Mexican-American War the estimated U.S. population west of the Mississippi River was just over four hundred thousand. The discovery of gold in California's American River in 1848, beckoned a mass migration to the western territory.<sup>11</sup> Taming Indians wasn't the Army's only problem set as it was often called upon to congeal civil unrest; it also enforced federal authority, for example expeditions to Utah against the Mormons was just one of many others. To highlight the implications of this incident, the young Captain James Carleton, disgusted and unnerved that these savage acts were performed by whites against whites, stated during his investigation of the massacre "they are the complete ulcer upon the body politic... It must have excision, complete and thorough extirpation, before we can every hope for safety or tranquility."<sup>12</sup>

At the onset of the U.S. Civil War the western frontier changed drastically. Settlers, miners, and entrepreneurs flooded the west to escape the realities of war with the added vestige of striking gold or farming their own land. At the same time a large majority of the experienced Army regulars were pulled from the western front to fight in the rebel states in the east.<sup>13</sup> This left a large void of influence in the western plains as Indians reclaimed their once besieged territory. This void was often filled with inexperienced volunteer and militia soldiers.

Confederate and U.S. Army forces later moved into the region to spread their influence, procure goods, and conduct offensive operations to further the war effort.

Following the completion of the Civil War, the Army was further reduced, although its mission sets were multiplied. On July 15, 1870 Congress cut the maximum number of enlisted troops in the Army to thirty thousand. The Army was slashed further again, in 1874 as congress authorized a total of only twenty five thousand enlisted soldiers. These continued reductions in military funding occurred when the missions of southern reconstruction and commitments associated with western expansion were in full force. Reconstruction, for example, placed a large number of troops into places such as Texas immediately following the Civil War and Kentucky, and Louisiana a few years later. The wounded nation was floundering in its attempts to reconsolidate and revive, and the Army was the only institution large enough to help implement its increasing federal directives. In 1867 nearly forty percent of the Army was employed in the previously fractioned southern states performing reconstruction. The force required for reconstruction would slowly taper off, but would still encompass over fifteen percent of the Army as late as 1876.<sup>14</sup>

Although the military's engagement with the indigenous tribes and their irregular forms of warfare have been present since the birth of the nation, the Army placed a much greater emphasis on conventional forms of warfare in its limited training and education opportunities. The French inspiration of Napoleonic tactics and the study of engineering greatly influenced the Army during the shaping of the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), more commonly known as West Point. The prominent West Point professor Dennis Mahan, who taught the senior capstone engineering and tactics courses, stressed the tenants of Napoleonic grand tactics and the importance of engineering to every student from the 1830s through 1871. Napoleonic grand

tactics, or the pursuit for a decisive conventional battle, would be a stark departure from the irregular tactics needed to stop the Indians on the western front. The Civil War reinforced many of Mahan's teachings, with the added caveat of employing total war to attack the will of your enemy to achieve victory, as exemplified by General Sherman's march through the rebel south in 1864-65. Aside from those who attended West Point, military training was primarily experienced through on-the-job training for both officers and enlisted.<sup>15</sup>

The explicit use of standardized military doctrine, as portrayed and understood by today's military professional, was not present in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Although many interpret this lack of doctrine as a total void, there were a number of influential sources that attempted to fulfill transcendence of information and experience along generations and departments of the Army. Andrew Birtle reasons that these *informal* sources of information were ever-present in societal norms, customs, and experience that was distributed through published writings, oral letters, and traditions amongst soldiers. Primary examples of widely circulated 19<sup>th</sup> century doctrine would include Mahan's *An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard Out-Post*, Emmerich Vattel's *The Law of Nations*, Baron Jomini's *The Art of War*, and Henry Halleck's *International Law*.<sup>16</sup> Although these publications were widely present, their interpretation and emphasis valued by the 19<sup>th</sup> century military professional was varied and spontaneous amongst the fractured and understaffed Army. It is next to impossible to understand the true emphasis placed on preparations for the irregular warfare being waged in the west, vice the omnipotent engineering curriculum being taught at West Point.

### **Guerrilla Fighters of the Southwest**

“We have before us the tiger of the human species.”<sup>17</sup>

-Brigadier General George Crook

Although identified as separate nations, the Navajo and Apache share many commonalities. Both the Navajo and Apache people originated from the Athapascan subgroup of southwestern Canada. As late arrivals to the desert southwest, they relied upon hunting and gathering, supplemented by the raiding of other tribes that were more sedentary. Although the Navajo and Apache share a common ancestry and language, location and time have ensured that each tribe has evolved into separate entities. The Navajo people developed into an agrarian and sedentary lifestyle, whereas the Apache continued their nomadic one.<sup>18</sup>

Warfare was viewed and employed much differently by Indians than that of the U.S. Army. Indigenous people across North America incorporated warfare into their culture and ethics as a means of existence for centuries, whereas the U.S. waged war as a means to an end. The nomadic Apache employed warfare with continuous raiding to make up for a lack of resources to hunt and gather for sustainment. The Navajo, being more sedentary, saw warfare as a means to acquire wealth and advance interests within their society. With the introduction of the horse onto North America in the 16<sup>th</sup> century from the Spanish via Mexico, Native American tribes quickly adapted to a warrior culture inculcating war as an existential means of survival and hierarchy within the tribe. Using smaller ponies that could sustain on grass and forage, Indians held the advantage over the U.S. military's faster and more powerful horses that required hay and grain to be supplied from a wagon.<sup>19</sup> Young men were groomed for war their entire childhood and yearned for the day to prove themselves as a proven warrior, the means could vary by tribe.<sup>20</sup> These inspiring warriors perfected the art of warfare by using horses, bows, and firearms. The experienced Indian fighter, U.S. Army Colonel Richard Dodge, stated "an Indian might grasp as many as ten arrows in his left hand and get rid of all ten before the first struck its target, each capable of inflicting a death wound at twenty or thirty yards." Although firearms

eventually became the weapon of choice, Indians continued to inflict heavy casualties with the proven bows and clubs.<sup>21</sup>

The terrain, climate, and vegetation of the American southwest is very inhospitable and unforgiving. The annual rainfall ranges from 20 inches to less than four, with the majority of precipitation occurring during a short six week period in the summer. The vegetation changes abruptly depending on terrain, with a mixture of evergreen and juniper trees in the west to desert shrub, cactus, and mesquite trees sprinkled everywhere in between.<sup>22</sup>

Captain Charles King, while pursuing the Tonto Apache under Crook, described the unforgiving terrain of the American southwest:

From northwest to southeast run great parallel ranges of sterile mountains, like waves of the stormiest sea – only that the farther you get into the northeastern and northern sections of the territory the more abrupt, jagged and precipitous they become: the more tumultuous is the upheaval, and from broad valleys lying deep and sheltered between, you come upon narrow tortuous canyons, so deep, so narrow, that while it seems possible to hurl your hat across the widest of the lot, you look down into depths unfathomable, and by winding, goat trails and hours of dizzy climbing and sliding, sometimes on all fours, you manage to cross.<sup>23</sup>

### ***Apacheria***

Encompassing the extensive region from the Colorado River to the Rio Grande of western Texas and from the Grand Canyon to the northern state of Sonora and Chihuahua in Mexico, this rocky and desolate place, called Apacheria, was home to the Apache people. The term Apache is believed to have originated from either the Yuma word for fighting men or the Zuni word for enemy. The Apache consisted of six regionally aligned, yet overlapping, subtribes: the Western Apache, Coyotero, White Mountain, Cibuecue, San Carlos, and Tonto bands. A more classic understanding of Apache classification breaks the six tribes into two overarching groups: the Western Apache located in central and eastern Arizona, and the Chiricahua's claiming southern Arizona, New Mexico, and the Mexican states of Sonora and Chihuahua.

Within these boundaries lie the linguistically different Yavapai, O'odham and Hualapai nations, arrayed on the western regions of Apacheria.<sup>24</sup>



Figure 1. Map of Apacheria showing the predominant locations of Apache tribes.

Warfare and raiding were essential elements of the Apache way of life. Hispanic Mexico and the Apache had been warring for over 200 years before the first U.S. engagement with the Apache. The Apache relied on horses for movement, but preferred to fight on foot to maximize use of the terrain. Since the Spanish forbade gunpowder weapons to be used by the Indians, the tribe traded horses for guns from northern prairie tribes. The treacherous and arid terrain of Apacheria maintained limited resources of sustainment for the Apache. Their historical answer to this ongoing issue was through the well-developed execution of raids. Since Mexico was the nearest form of wealth, surplus, and economy, the Apache ruthlessly targeted the northern states of Sonora and Chihuahua. In the 1780s, Mexico responded to the raiding by rewarding the Apache to settle near Spanish towns with continued rations of food and supplies as long as the raiding would cease. The program was moderately successful since it enticed an acceptable

number of Apache to settle into its civilized ways, and reduced warring by dividing the tribe and reducing the number of raiding members. However, in the 1820s when Mexico gained its independence from Spanish rule, the new government not only stopped the rations it also reduced the northern frontier garrisons from 34 to 29. Additionally, bounties were placed on retrieving Apache scalps and civilian privateers made a living hunting the renegade Indians.<sup>25</sup>

The Apache joined forces with the U.S. during its fight against Mexico in 1846, but it didn't take long before the two forces would turn against each other due to Apache raiding, and overreaction by the U.S. military. For example, in February 1861, U.S. Army Lieutenant George Bascom attempted to apprehend the Apache leader Cochise due to an Indian raid that captured a young boy named Felix Ward, who was half Apache, along with some livestock from a local homestead. Cochise was an ally of the U.S. and held a formidable contract with the government to supply wood to the Butterfield Overland Mail station at Apache Pass. Lacking any form of evidence to blame Cochise, let alone incarcerate him, Lieutenant Bascom captured five of his fellow tribesmen and family members. Cochise then captured hostages of his own, and when he refused to return them Lieutenant Bascom decided to hang the captured Apache, which included Cochise' brother and two nephews.<sup>26</sup> Ultimately, this act changed the course of history between the U.S. and Apache as Lieutenant Bascom's obstinate approach to the situation initiated a decades-long war with the Apache.

### ***Navajo Nation***<sup>27</sup>

The Navajo people lived in the mountainous desert area encompassing the present day confluence of New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and Utah. The Navajo referred to themselves as *Dineh*, or the people. The heartland of the Navajo people resided in the picturesque location of Canyon de Chelly, or Dine Bikeyah as the Navajo called it, located in the far northeast corner of

Arizona. Immediately following their migration from western Canada and breaking away from their ancestral Apache forbearers, the Navajo gradually adjusted to a sedentary lifestyle. Continuous contact with the Pueblo people enticed this change to an agriculture based culture. Adapting the Pueblo's customs of weaving, pottery making, and agriculture, the Navajo perfected the art of grazing animals and growing adequate food supplies for yearlong subsistence.




Figure 2. Map of forts, tribes, and battles in Arizona and New Mexico 1860-1890.

The Navajo, like the Apache, also relied on raiding and limited warfare as a means of supplementing their pastoral lifestyle. The first ever documented raid by a Native American on horseback was executed by a Navajo in the vicinity of Santa Fe in 1659, in a raid for more horses. Navajo raiders also raided against the Spanish and subsequent Mexican establishments alongside the Apache. Yet, as their animal herds began to grow they became less dependent on raiding and war since they had created a nearly self-sustaining means of production. The Navajo were often forced into war as Mexican slave traders attempted to capture and sell their people. Due to this aggression the Navajo would retaliate against the Mexican people, which then resulted in clashes with the Mexican Army. This perpetual cycle of violence with the Mexicans

would force them to leave their established lands and return to a life of raiding and hunting until it was safe to return.

The issues with the Mexicans were quickly transferred to the Americans. During the Mexican-American War, Colonel Alexander W. Doniphan and his Missouri volunteers initiated a campaign against the Navajo due to their incessant raiding. Colonel Doniphan started these hostilities unprovoked by the Navajo, but they eluded his capture in the difficult terrain. Although undefeated, the Navajo signed a treaty of peace with the Americans in 1846 and another in 1849. Problems persisted as Navajo continued to raid, and a dispute erupted with the U.S. Army over Navajo pastureland just north of Fort Defiance as soldiers randomly shot Indian horses. To make matters worse, on September 1861, a friendly horse race between the Navajo and U.S. soldiers turned ugly after an Indian claimed that soldiers cut his horse's bridle rein. After the soldiers refused to race again, the Navajo rioted and the soldiers initiated a volley of artillery which killed 12 Indians.

### **James H. Carleton<sup>28</sup>**

General James Carleton holds a unique position in American military history by assuming the joint duties of protecting Union interests against the Confederates and waging a vicious and victorious war against both the Navajo and Mescalero Apaches in New Mexico Territory during the U.S. Civil War. Under the auspice of war, General Carleton placed the vast territory west of Texas under military control from 1862 to 1867, adjudicated by none other than himself. His aggressive style of leadership would win unprecedented accolades from superiors for his success against the Native American populations within his grasp. It also proved to be his undoing, as subsequent generations have viewed his policies in a very negative manner.

General Carleton's early military career proved to be driven by his personal merits and drive to succeed. In an expedient call to arms over a border dispute with Great Britain in 1838, the 25 year old James Carleton was commissioned as a First Lieutenant in the Maine volunteer rifles. Although the disagreement, known as the Aroostook War, was settled by diplomatic means, Carleton's performance in the effort helped secure a commission in the regular army as a Second Lieutenant in the First Dragoons in October of 1839. After a short assignment at the School of Cavalry Practice at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, he was sent to Indian Territory. Assigned to Fort Gibson in early 1841, Carleton enforced the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts and patrolled the border between the United States and Indian Territory. He was then transferred to Fort Leavenworth where he was exposed to the horrors being waged by warring tribes on the plains. Carleton participated in two expeditions in 1844 and 1845, where he chronicled the ravage affairs unleashed by the fighting tribes in a New York magazine called the *Spirit of the Times*. Carleton's firsthand accounts detailed the death and destruction unleashed by the American Indian reinforced his believe that there were limited or few solutions to dealing with them.

As with many of the Army officers in the mid-nineteenth century, Carleton saw his first taste of battle in the Mexican-American War in 1846. Marching his cavalry company from Fort Leavenworth south to accompany Brigadier General John Wool's command, Carleton was instrumental in the battle of Buena Vista. In February 1847 a much larger Mexican Army met the outnumbered American Army commanded by Major General Zachary Taylor at Buena Vista. Carleton maneuvered his regular dragoons into a breach in the American line to help ward off the Mexican advance.

After the war with Mexico, the territory held by the United States greatly increased along with its responsibility to pacify it. Carleton participated in this challenge as the Army led numerous campaigns against Indian tribes that stood in the way of this new expansion. In 1851 he served under the New Mexico Territory department commander Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Sumner, where he would spend the next five years trying to make sense of the conflicting policies and entities of the newly procured Southwest Territory. Carleton thus experienced a never ending period of war and peace in the area.

Carleton's invaluable experience in New Mexico Territory made a lasting impression on the way he would wage war against Indians. His first battle against Indians in the Southwest came in 1854, when aggressions between Jicarilla Apaches, Utes, and settlers elevated to conflict. This was also his first battle beside the famous mountain explorer Christopher "Kit" Carson, who is known for his role as one "agent" of Manifest Destiny. Carleton and Carson used a force of regular soldiers against the Jicarilla Apaches, ultimately resulting in their surrender and incarceration onto a reservation a year later. Yet, congress failed to ratify the treaty with the Jicarilla people, which led to increased hostilities and distrust in the future. From this Carleton learned, or believed, that the Indians would only submit to a life of reservation under an armed force. However, there was a systemic void in federal Indian policy that would have to be dealt with in another way to achieve tangible results.

After a short tour to Philadelphia to assist with the Delafield Commission's report on the Crimean War, Captain and Brevet Major Carleton was assigned to Fort Tejon California in 1858. His military duties were to protect the people of California from the Indians along with the overland mail route and the regulation of commerce between Utah and California. Shortly after his arrival to the west coast Carleton was ordered to investigate what was known as the *Mountain*

*Meadows Massacre*, which was the alleged slaughter of roughly 115 Arkansas settlers by Mormons and Indians. Carleton's description of the scene, a year after the attack, would prove to be one of the most gruesome events of human conflict that he had ever experienced. His findings would uphold the year-long accusations held that the massacre was perpetrated by the Mormon community with evidence that their leader, Brigham Young, ordered the attack. Carleton's experience with the lawlessness of the Mormons brought the realization that only military force would solve the "Mormon Problem." The perceived use of force supports a thread seen in Carleton: to use relentless military might to subdue his opponents, and then to maintain order and stability.

### **George R. Crook<sup>29</sup>**

In times of war General George Crook was a ruthless leader against the Indians, yet in times of peace he was one of their most loyal advocates. He was applauded and criticized, by both his superiors and peers alike, for his different tactics and viewpoints in Indian affairs. Based on his lifelong association with implementing Indian policy, General Crook displayed a sincere respect for his worthy opponents, i.e., the various American Indian tribes he fought.

If not for sheer luck, the under-educated George Crook would not have become an Army officer. Ohio congressman Robert P. Schenk nominated the nineteen year old Crook for the United States Military Academy based on a sole non-impressive interview; he also lacked the normal good marks of a high caliber student. His time at West Point reflected his high school standings, as he remained on the bottom of his class throughout his time at the academy. Yet, what he lacked in overall standing he made up for in his personal conduct with very few demerits in his four years there.

Now a Second Lieutenant, George Crook was assigned to the Pacific Coast where he experienced his first encounters with Native Americans in 1852. His early encounters with the warring tribes of the Pacific coast shaped his understanding of the dynamics of Indian cultures. The California gold prospectors soon began to flood the western coast with settlements and clashes between the whites and Indians became more prevalent. On multiple occasions, Crook saw how Indians were unjustly treated and often erroneously killed by white settlers. These slayings helped ignite a war between the two cultures and soldiers like Crook, who understood that whites were often in the wrong but were called upon to battle the Indians.

Crook acquired combat and diplomatic experience during his dealings with the Rogue River and Pitt River tribes. In 1858, he was able to establish his ability to adorn diplomacy over violence to achieve his desired end state as he brokered a peace deal with the Rouge River tribe. Instead of invading a village to rout out suspected murderers, Crook negotiated with the tribal leaders and secured the suspects without incident. Crook impressed his soldiers by aggressive leadership through leading from the front. Crook's campaign against the Rouge River tribe resulted in his taking of an arrow wound in his right hip during battle, with the arrowhead remaining embedded in him for the rest of his life.

After the onset of the Civil War, Crook served on the eastern front to pursue the confederates as a Colonel in the 36th Ohio Volunteer Infantry Regiment. He served in the mountainous terrain of West Virginia performing a similar function to that which he performed on the Pacific coast: analyzing terrain and chasing rouge bands of marauders exploiting the spoils of war. After several successful operations, Crook was promoted to Brigadier General of Volunteers. He later served in the campaigns of South Mountain, Antietam, Chickamauga, McMinnville, and Farmington. After being appointed the Commander of the Army of West

Virginia, he was promoted to Major General of volunteers in October 1864. In February 1865, he was captured by the Confederates but was exchanged just one month later and returned to service to command the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac in operations leading to Appomattox and the end of the Civil War. In addition to being a Major General of volunteers, General Crook earned regular army brevets to Major General.

### **CARLETON'S CAMPAIGN IN NEW MEXICO**

During the U.S. Civil War, General James Carleton tamed the Mescalero Apache and Navajo Indians with unrelenting force. With an end state of moving all Indians in New Mexico Territory onto Carleton's recently created Bosque Redondo reservation, his orders to subordinates were clear: be ruthless, persistent and do not negotiate with the enemy. His actions ensured and/or succeeded in moving the Indians onto the Bosque Redondo reservation, but he failed in provide adequate conditions for their livelihood. Carleton's experiment at the Bosque Redondo continued to deplete the demoralized Indians, leading to a backlash from the American government and mainstream society. Although his approach to solving the Indian problem provided the quick result of nearly full capitulation, his subsequent inability to care for or incorporate the Indians into American society were viewed as a disappointment and utter failure.

With the onset of the American Civil War in 1861, Carleton was given a commission as a Brigadier General in the California volunteers. Within a short period of time Carleton was now in command of over two thousand soldiers with the mission to march and defend the New Mexico Territory from the Confederates. His unit moved with the anticipation of meeting some three thousand Texas volunteers commanded by Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley. When Carleton's column arrived at New Mexico in August 1862, the Confederates were already withdrawing from the area. Although the likelihood of a major Civil War campaign was very

low, the Indians in New Mexico Territory were provoked by the intruding armies.<sup>30</sup> As General Carleton assumed command of the 9th Military Department of New Mexico in September 1862, he envisioned a state of law and perfection that could not be attained without his personal involvement in all aspects of territorial life.

General Carleton made two drastic changes in the New Mexico district immediately following his handover with his predecessor, Colonel Edward R. S. Canby. Carleton decided to confine the Navajos onto the Bosque Redondo reservation instead of along the Little Colorado River, as suggested by Colonel Canby and his staff. Latter recommendations would have placed them in an area near the Little Colorado River, or present day Four Corner where New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and Colorado join together, seen as home to the Navajo people. The Bosque Redondo reservation site was known to Carleton since he had surveyed, described, and believed it as the perfect location eight years prior for a reservation. The second change that Carleton made was the implementation of his astute imperative to apply devastating force to remove all doubt that the Indians either had to capitulate or die.<sup>31</sup> General Carleton summed up his concept of movement by stating, “the troops must be kept after the Indians, not in big bodies, with military noises and smokes, and the gleam of arms by day, and fires, and talk, and comfortable sleeps by night, but in small parties moving stealthily to their haunts and lying patiently in wait for them: or by following their tracks day after day with a fixedness of purpose that never gives up.”<sup>32</sup>

### **Mescalero Campaign<sup>33</sup>**

General Carleton wasted no time searching for and crushing Indians in his newly procured territory. With Colonel “Kit” Carson as his tactical commander and an increased number of volunteers from California, New Mexico, and Colorado, General Carleton went after

the Mescalero Apaches. He instructed Colonel Carson to “make war upon the Mescalero and to kill all men of that tribe, whenever and wherever you can find them.” His instructions also gave Colonel Carson “no power to make peace.” General Carleton was not going to continue making treaties of peace just so they could be broken, stating that “If we kill some of their men in fair, open war, they will be apt to remember that it is better to remain at peace than to be at war.” In September 1862, Colonel Carson led the ensuing and demoralizing attacks against the Mescalero people, burning their homes, villages, crops, and food stores in addition to the men, women, and children casualties’ occurring in battle. General Carleton’s change in tactics produced quick results, with the movement of over five hundred Mescalero Apaches onto the Bosque Redondo. Using Archer Jones’ construct of strategy, explained in Appendix D, Carleton’s Mescalero campaign used a logistical-raiding approach to force the Indians to his terms of surrender. Ultimately this both destroyed their means of livelihood and broke their will to continue fighting.

### **Navajo Campaign<sup>34</sup>**

Colonel Carson was subsequently released into western New Mexico to battle the Navajos in the fall of 1863. Again, virtually everything that belonged to the Navajo was destroyed or burned, to include the destruction of their fruit trees and other means of the long term necessities of life. Colonel Carson eventually marched his soldiers through the sacred Navajo Canyon de Chelly, where a large number of Navajo surrendered. Since the Navajo had adapted to a more sedentary means of life, the logistics-raid approach (Appx D) attacked the heart of the Navajo’s livelihood and smashed their will to resist. Instituting a winter campaign also focused on the logistical destruction of essential items and exploited this ultimate weakness of the Navajo. Carleton forced the captives to march to the Bosque Redondo reservation, where they would be housed next to their longtime enemies, the Mescalero Apache. Later coined the

“Long Walk”, the Navajos were subjugated to protect their livestock from white settlers in addition to the bitter cold and hunger experienced along the route. By March 1864, over six thousand Navajo had turned themselves in and walked over three hundred miles to the forsaken Bosque Redondo reservation, many dying during the trek.

### **Bosque Redondo**

General Carleton believed that explicit violence against the Indians was the clearest means to his desired objectives, the end being the complete relocation of Indians onto the Bosque Redondo reservation where they would be forced to adopt a new way of life. Their prompt capitulation could only be accomplished through these hardened operations of overwhelming force, which would allow for a quick solution to what could have been long drawn out conflicts. Essentially, General Carleton’s tactical operations against the Mescalero Apache and Navajo was very well executed. Yet, due to General Carleton’s numerous accounts of rhetoric against Indians, many historians believe that his goal was that of extermination and the reservation was just a political necessity.<sup>35</sup>

Soon after the large influx of Navajo to the Bosque Redondo, conditions on the reservation quickly deteriorated. Since the Navajo accounted for over 99% of the population, having 8,000 Navajo to only 500 Mescalero Apache, the Navajo were not shy to claim their dominance over the beleaguered resources on the reservation. With the Navajo’s unabated attacks on the Mescalero Apaches, all 500 fled the reservation to the southwest in December of 1865. Due to the limited protection abilities of the Army, Comanche raiders also relentlessly hunted the stagnant Navajo on Bosque Redondo. European diseases swept through the reservation, killing swaths of Indians and weakening many more.

Meanwhile, the maligned efforts of indoctrination into farming and westernization proved futile and was severely criticized by eastern society. After four years of heavy government subsidies with no trend of improvement at Bosque Redondo, General William T. Sherman stated, "I think we could better send them to the Fifth Avenue Hotel to board."<sup>36</sup> Soon afterward General Sherman negotiated a treaty with the Navajo, granting their safe return and a reservation on their sacred homelands. The Navajo would remain relatively peaceful after having experienced the wrath of General Carleton's Army, the Long Walk, and the destitute conditions of life on the Bosque Redondo.

### **CROOK'S CAMPAIGN IN ARIZONA**

General Crook employed a campaign against the Apache in Arizona that was unlike most on the western frontier. His selective breed of soldiering adopted the Indian's ways to force their submission. It was common practice during the time to utilize Indian scouts, but Crook elevated their use and position on his team to that of indispensable colleagues. More so, General Crook constituted trusted Indian auxiliary forces, led by his hand-selected and prepared officers, which provided the main effort of his operations against the Apache in Arizona. His knowledge of the enemy and terrain was unmatched, as proven by his meticulous logistical preparations, training, and readiness for combat in the unforgiving vertical terrain of Arizona and northern Mexico. Crook instilled discipline, respect, and motivation in his troops to accomplish seemingly impossible missions against the Apache. He molded troops into espousing his heartfelt narrative to the enemy; to never promise something you can't deliver, and when you make a promise you must follow through at all cost.<sup>37</sup> Ruthlessly attacking the Apache will to resist, General Crook also drowned them with compassion and affection immediately following their surrender. Years of pursuing, negotiating, and indoctrinating Indians across the American frontier allowed Crook

to appreciate and respect the country's natural enemy. Due to Crook's proven talents as an Indian fighter and recent victory over the Paiutes in the northwest, he was selected to run the Department of Arizona as a Lieutenant Colonel, chosen over 40 other full Colonels in the Army.<sup>38</sup>

Following the decade long war with Cochise and the Apache, carelessly initiated by Lieutenant Bascom in 1861, Indian and white relations in Arizona continued to deteriorate. Setting the spark to what is known as the Camp Grant Massacre, a group of around 500 starving and deprived Aravaipa and Pinal Apache sought assistance from the U.S. Army near Camp Grant, Arizona.<sup>39</sup> The Army accepted responsibility for the Indians and maintained their care under the legality of prisoners of war. However, on 30 April 1871, a makeshift group of 148 Tucson citizens, Mexicans, and O'odham tribal warriors murdered the sleeping Apache in response to previous random Apache aggressions. Reports indicate up to 150 Apache were killed in a short span of only 30 minutes, nearly all of them being women and children since the men were out hunting. Immediately following this horrific incident, the Aravaipa and Pinal Apache fled into hiding in the Tonto Basin area of north central Arizona being rightfully agitated by the slaughter. The Camp Grant Massacre was celebrated by frontiersmen and chastised by eastern society, which prompted President Grant to demand the murderers stand trial. The territorial government issued a trial for 104 of the posse members, in which *none* were found guilty of crimes against the Apache.<sup>40</sup>

Doubtful of President Grant's newfound Peace Policy, Crook waited to initiate his campaign against the Apache until after the humanitarians', Vincent Colyer and Brigadier General Oliver Howard, failed attempt to "mesmerize the Apaches into peace." The government's new Peace Policy stopped the ability to negotiate with Indian tribes as domestic

dependent nations, and aimed to concentrate them onto reservations where religious and civilian groups could begin to convert them into productive American citizens by changing their way of life and values. Essentially, agents from the Indian Bureau would control the Indians on the reservations, and the Army would be limited to pursue those off the reservation still eluding capture and force them onto it. Crook, and many other Army officers, maintained the attitude that military force was imperative to controlling the Indians on the reservations. The military and civilian factions were virtually noncompliant in working to a manageable solution to subdue the voids in the policy's legislation, so the military stepped aside to watch the experiment fail. Surprisingly, Coyler and Howard's efforts brought more than 5,000 Apaches onto the reservation, to include the notorious Cochise. Yet, just as Crook expected, the peace didn't last and within a few months the Apache had digressed to raiding and murdering the local population.<sup>41</sup>

### **Tonto Basin Campaign**

Lieutenant Colonel Crook held a strong personal motivation to subdue the Tonto and Yavapai Apache after a failed attempt to take his life. Through his network of spies in the area, Crook was informed that a group of warriors were going to attempt to assassinate him during a friendly meeting. Immediately after being informed Crook played the scenario to his advantage as he rode to the suspected location with only a small force of pack mules with concealed, yet heavily armed soldiers and auxiliaries. Just as the informant stated, the warriors requested a meeting and triggered the assassination through the act of rolling a smoke. Crook and his team were prepared for this and one of Crook's trusted subordinates tackled the warrior as he pulled his carbine, the bullet just missing Crook. As a full out brawl ensued in the tent a soldier killed the shooter by smashing his head against a rock before a large majority of the warriors escaped.

Crook then pursued the warriors which concluded in a battle with forty Indians.<sup>42</sup> The elongated time to prepare for the Tonto Basin Campaign and incidents like the attempted assassination of Crook help solidify the motivation and purpose needed for a successful campaign.

Having ample time to conceptualize the situation and prepare his offensive, Crook embarked on his highly successful 1872-73 campaign against the Apache on 15 November 1872. Showing his eagerness to move on the Apache and disdain for political contentions, Crook stated:

I had made up my mind to disobey any order I might receive looking to an interference of the plan which I had adopted, feeling sure if I was successful my disobedience of orders would be forgiven. I felt sure of success, for all the time I had been prevented from operating against these Indians I had been hard at work organizing, and getting a good knowledge of my scouts, which I saw was to be my main dependence. Also I had been stopped twice from assuming the offensive, and felt if I was stopped again, I would lose my head anyway.<sup>43</sup>

Having organized his invaluable Apache auxiliaries under his most trusted and groomed subordinates, Crook instilled the importance of continued and ruthless pursuit aimed at breaking the will of the Western Apache. Crook's art of pack transportation ensured an ability to operate for an extended period of time away from logistical nodes while maintaining pressure on the Indians. The Army's logistical nodes were strategically placed around the Mogollon Rim encompassing a large system of natural canyons and depressions. Crook's plan was to utilize a number of converging columns around the Tonto Basin area to channelize the Apache into the natural depression with nowhere to run.<sup>44</sup>

Crook had prepared and engineered his force to prosper in a winter campaign through some of the worst conditions his soldiers would ever endure. He valued a winter campaign to exploit the Indian's reliance on campfires to cook and create warmth due to their limited supply of clothing. Soldiers would have a much easier time tracking the elusive Apache during the winter months. However, the cold and harsh conditions also took its toll on the Army. As Crook

moved his forces from Fort Whipple to Camp Apache, a distance of around 250 miles, they found themselves at an elevation of over 10,000 feet and the temperatures so cold that it was nearly impossible to acquire water to sustain themselves.<sup>45</sup>

Prior to the start of the operation Crook traveled to personally deliver, to every soldier and Apache scout, his clear and relatively simple instructions concerning the Tonto Basin campaign. The first was to make full use of the attached Indian scouts.<sup>46</sup> Crook knew that he could exploit a psychological victory by pursuing Apache with their own warriors. The Apache thought they could easily evade the white man, but knew evading their own trained and tested warriors was an impossible task. The use of scouts also offered an attractive alternative to a life in hiding. Crook had his field commanders extend the offer for captives to convert to scouts immediately after capture. This policy reduced the burden of maintaining prisoners of war as well as increased the size of his actionable force on the battlefield. Crook's second instruction was to give the Apache every opportunity to surrender, and avoid harming women and children if possible.<sup>47</sup> His final instruction was to never leave the enemy's trail and to continue pursuit by any means necessary.<sup>48</sup> Since Crook had properly trained and prepared his forces for the campaign, he spent the majority of his time moving between outpost logistical nodes.<sup>49</sup> This focus allowed Crook to maintain control of the battle at the operational level, allowing the tactical actions and decisions to be made by his trusted subordinates.

Crook's style of leadership generated a large amount of respect from his subordinates and Indian auxiliaries. Crook's aid-de-camp, Captain John Bourke, described this sensation for Crook at the onset of the Tonto Basin campaign:

It was this (Crook's) insensibility to fatigue, coupled with a contempt for danger, or rather with a skill in evading all traps that might be set for him, which won for Crook the admiration of all who served with him: there was no private soldier, no packer, no teamster, who could down the ole man in any work, or outlast him on a march or a climb

over the rugged peaks of Arizona: they knew that, and they also knew that in the hour of danger Crook would be found on the skirmish line, and not in the telegraph office.<sup>50</sup>

Bourke made these comments after they had marched for 26 hours straight hours; as the soldiers grasped for what little sleep they could get that night, Crook snatched his shotgun and spent the next few hours gathering a large number of reed birds for his soldiers' breakfast.<sup>51</sup> Since Crook's tactics were unique to his breed of soldiering, he relied heavily on the intangible aspects of leadership to guarantee success.

Crook's campaign produced quick results, as his faith in Apache auxiliaries and pack transportation placed continuous pressure on the Western Apache. Just a few weeks into the operation on 2 December 1872, Apache scouts led a sneak attack on a Yavapai tribe and produced a decisive victory at the battle of Salt River Canyon.<sup>52</sup> This battle is also known as the Skeleton Cave Massacre, since the Yavapai failed to surrender and were annihilated by bullets bouncing off the walls of the cave.<sup>53</sup> Crook's forces were now able to expunge the elusive Apache from areas they had never been able to dream of pursuing prior to this operation. Pack mule transports and a minimalist ideology allowed Army forces to penetrate deep into unsuspecting Indian safe grounds. Apache scouts were then trusted to exercise their unrivaled skills in tracking the enemy and eluding an ambush. The Battle of Turret Peak, on 27 March 1873, provides another excellent illustration of Crook's model of warfare against the Apache.<sup>54</sup> The soldiers and Apache scouts achieved such surprise that a large majority of the Yavapai and Tonto Apache jumped to their deaths. Crook's forces managed to kill up to 47 enemy Apache, without a single loss of life of their own.<sup>55</sup>

Soon after Turret Peak the Western Apache resistance broke as thousands surrendered over the span of a few months. The Apache Chief Chalipun arrived at Camp Verde, in early April 1873, with over 300 Yavapais to surrender to Crook, stating that he represented 2,300.<sup>56</sup>

Chalipun's speech validates the impressive nature of Crook's campaign, and was transposed by Captain Bourke who witnessed its delivery:

General Crook had too many cartridges of copper. They had never been afraid of the Americans alone, but now that their own people were fighting against them they did not know what to do; they could not go to sleep at night, because they feared to be surrounded before daybreak; they could not hunt-the noise of their guns would attract the troops; they could not cook mescal or anything else, because the flame and smoke would draw down the soldiers; they could not live in the valleys-there were too many soldiers; they had retreated to the mountain tops, thinking to hide in the snow until the soldiers went home, but the scouts found them out and the soldiers followed them. They wanted to make peace, and to be at terms of good-will with the whites.<sup>57</sup>

By the fall of 1873 the Indian Bureau reported that over 6000 Apaches had arrived onto the numerous government reservations under Crook's command.<sup>58</sup> Immediately following Chalipun's surrender, Crook walked in hand with him stating "if he (Chalipun) would promise to live at peace and stop killing people, he (Crook) would be the best friend he ever had."<sup>59</sup> Crook took this maxim to heart, as he continued to ruthlessly pursue those that defied him and care for those that honored this contract. After the nation heard of Lieutenant Colonel Crook's newfound counter-guerrilla operations in Arizona, President Grant promoted him to brigadier general.<sup>60</sup>

Crook's 1872-73 campaign brought relative peace to Arizona for the remainder of the 1870s. This time of peace coincides with Crook's belief that the Indians must first experience a military defeat before peace could be attained. General Crook's leadership style allowed the two very different military cultures to mesh into one, as he was found to be the dominant and credible "chief" of the region and provider for its people. However, the U.S. government placed ideology ahead of trust and rescinded established treaties with the Apache as the entire Apache nation was placed onto the destitute San Carlos Reservation in 1875. The government did this with good intentions, believing they could accelerate acculturation of the Apache at a single location. Naturally, the Apache dismissed this notion and a large number escaped after experiencing the

inhospitable conditions and inherent intertribal warfare at San Carlos.<sup>61</sup> This consolidation was exacerbated by the military's decision to reassign General Crook to command the Department of the Platte as the Apache were being moved to San Carlos.<sup>62</sup>

### **Geronimo's War**

As time progressed the military gradually lost control of the Apache's devotion to life on the reservation, as they resisted the conversion to the white man's way of life. Apache warrior and spiritual leaders regained influence and began advocating alternative options in response to the degraded conditions and cultural indoctrination. These conditions gave rise to the proven warrior and spiritual leader of the Chiricahua Apache, Geronimo, with an ensuing drawn out war and political watershed for the U.S. military as his relatively small band of followers continued to evade capture. Geronimo maintained the belief that life was being wasted on the reservation and the only honorable alternative was to return to the life of an Apache warrior.<sup>63</sup> The skilled warrior held the Apache name Goyahkla, or the "One Who Yawns", and had survived a lifetime of violence and warfare with the Mexicans and neighboring Indian tribes.<sup>64</sup> The Mexicans fought Gayahkla so often that they began to call out "Geronimo" as their battle cry every time they met him in battle, hence the name stuck.<sup>65</sup>

Another noteworthy incident helped question the status quo on San Carlos. On 30 August 1881, an influential spiritual leader who preached Apache resistance to white rule, Nakai'dokli'ni, was taken into custody by soldiers and Apache scouts. That same night the roused followers of the prophet attacked the military encampment near the Cibicu Creek, killing Nakai'dokli'ni and eight soldiers. This incident garnered strategic importance since many of the Apache scouts aiding in the capture of Nakai'dokli'ni joined the attackers and assisted in killing U.S. troops. Three of the Apache scouts were convicted of mutiny and hanged for their actions.

The Cibicu Creek incident remained the only occasion when Indian scouts retaliated against American forces, but the reverberations of this event provided the kindling for increased Apache aggressions in the Department of Arizona.<sup>66</sup>

Realizing the situation in southwest was spiraling out of control, the military reinstated General Crook to command the Department of Arizona in 1882. Crook was quick to reestablish his dominance in the region. He instituted a campaign to hunt Geronimo's hostile band by using his proven counter-guerrilla tactics. Since the Cibicu Creek incident the department had discontinued the use of Apache scouts. Regardless, Apache auxiliaries were Crook's primary means of waging warfare in the region so he quickly assembled five companies with 250 of the "wildest scouts I could get" to track down Geronimo.<sup>67</sup> Crook couldn't believe that the Apache scouts were involved with the Cibicu Creek incident, stating that if the scouts had planned the attack "not one of our soldiers would have gotten away alive."<sup>68</sup> After enlisting his Apache scouts Crook focused on training and preparing for the offensive just as he did a decade earlier, with pack mule logistics and hand-picking his subordinates to lead the operations.

Geronimo and the Chiricahua Apache had fled to their historical refuge in the Mexican Sonora region, making Crook's expedition an international affair. General Crook made a long distance diplomatic pilgrimage into Mexico to secure the authority to conduct cross-border operations. He won quick approval since he was doing a favor for the Mexican government in providing peace and security in a region long harassed by Geronimo's people. Due to the lack of logistical nodes in this operation, Crook packed his column of 350 mules, 193 Apache scouts, and a mere 44 soldiers with 60 days of supply and departed into the mountains of Mexico. Crook's tactics worked again, as he returned on 12 June 1883 with 348 Apache prisoners and the notorious Geronimo.<sup>69</sup>

The peace with Geronimo was short lived. While trying to conform to a life on the reservation, Geronimo became paranoid that he would be arrested by Crook due to an increased crackdown on civil disturbances and domestic violence.<sup>70</sup> Subsequently, he escaped to the Sierra Madre Mountains in May 1885, just two years after initially surrendering to Crook.<sup>71</sup> This time Geronimo fled with a much smaller group, consisting of 35 warriors, 8 boys soon to be warriors, and 101 women and children. It wasn't long before Crook's forces, directed by Chato the Chiricahua scout, hit Geronimo's camp with 78 Apache scouts. Although Geronimo escaped the scouts killed a woman and two boys, and captured 15 other women. The spiritual warrior lost two of his wives and five children in the battle, further eroding his unrealistic dream of reliving the freedoms of his previous life. Geronimo and his limited followers continued this game of cat and mouse, as they were pursued by Crook's soldiers, Chiricahua scouts, and the Mexican Army. The warriors continued to elude capture, but they steadily lost women, children, horses, and valuable supplies.<sup>72</sup>

As the remaining options available to Geronimo and his band had diminished, so he agreed to meet with Crook who gave them the option to surrender unconditionally so their lives would be spared. Crook followed up with the caveat that all of the warriors would be incarcerated for two year on the east coast before returning to the reservation.<sup>73</sup> Crook's increasingly harsh terms of surrender was attributed to the lack of trust he placed on Geronimo, but more importantly comprised the fact that his band of outlaws killed 39 whites in New Mexico, 34 in Arizona, and numerous friendly Apache during their escapade. On 27 March 1886, Geronimo agreed to surrender to General Crook for the second time.<sup>74</sup> Unfortunately, Crook came back empty handed as Geronimo changed his mind and again disappeared into the Sierra Madre.

## Apache Indoctrination

George Crook believe that the strong arm of military capitulation should be matched by the caring hand of a father. He exhibited this credence time and time again through his continuous career working against and often with the Indians. Captain Bourke explains General Crook's personal views of the inherent abilities of the Native American:

General Crook believe that the American Indian was a human being, gifted with the same god-like apprehension as the white man, and like him inspired by noble impulses, ambition for progress and advancement, but subject to the same infirmities, beset with the same or even greater temptations, struggling under the disadvantages of an inherited ignorance, which had the double effect of making him doubt his own powers in the struggle for the new life and suspicious of the truthfulness and honesty of the advocates of all innovations. The American savage has grown up as a member of a tribe, or rather of a clan within a tribe: all his actions have been made to conform to the opinions of his fellows as enunciated in the clan councils or in those of the tribe.<sup>75</sup>

Unlike a large portion of American society at the time, Crook believe that Indians should be afforded equal freedoms and opportunities. Expressing a true warrior's identity, Crook understood the culture in which the Apache had evolved over several centuries. He sought to win the Apache' loyalty by first limiting their options by expressing his military might before incorporating their newfound trust and confidence into his abilities to protect them. He inherited this opportunity after his successful campaign of 1872-73.

Immediately after the Tonto and Yavapai surrendered in 1873, Crook shifted his focus toward improving their livelihood by promoting economic self-reliance. With the goal of improving the land within the reservation and providing their own means of survival, the Indians dug irrigation ditches that ultimately produced 500,000 lbs of corn and 30,000 lbs of beans in their first year.<sup>76</sup> Crook, having a large distain for corrupt government logistical contractors, insisted that the army purchase a host of supplies from the Apache entrepreneurs. Soon the Apache were steadily supplying firewood, hauling wheat to the mill, and grazing cattle.<sup>77</sup> Many

of these tasks required extra work since the Indian Bureau had not provided the required tools as they had promised.<sup>195</sup> Crook believed that once the Apache saw the crops rise out of the ground, or receive payment for their neatly cut firewood, that peace would forever be instilled in them.<sup>78</sup> A vast array of new opportunities would remove the desire to raid, kill, or capture for the Apache.

Crook's indoctrination program yielded impressive results, yet the Apache were slow to fully accept the drastically different values. The concept that Indians would become civilized after being exposed to the power of capitalism remained unquestioned in the American military and civilian population. Therefore, it was hard to accept the fact that the Apache didn't pursue money and material items in the same vigor as whites. General Crook fell into this trap as well. Although he arguably had the best understanding of the Indian motive and reasoning, he failed to understand that the warrior culture was what drove his Apache scouts to perform and not the equal pay he so eagerly provided them.<sup>79</sup> The Apache believed that a warrior was held above all else.

### **COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS**

The numerous operations carried out in the American southwest by General Carleton and General Crook harbor many similarities and yet hold pointed differences. It is important to note that the final outcome that each leader produced is not the sole test of measurement. Although the campaigns were only a short geographical distance apart from one another, the variables of interaction playing into each complex system cannot truly be measured. These differences include things such as climate, terrain, tribal culture, American societal views, government policy, and regional exploitation of resources to name a few. The most apparent similarity between the two Generals is the belief that the Indians must first experience the destructive power of the

military in order to break their objective of maintaining their traditional tribal ways of life. The largest difference between the two leaders is the fundamental understanding that effort, care, and compassion must accompany capitulation in order to create the necessary condition to initiate a change in their centuries-old tribal culture. Crook understood and displayed this principle, Carleton did not.

Current U.S. doctrine frequently utilizes the basic tenets of Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME) instruments of national power to achieve a desired endstate in any given operation.<sup>80</sup> Using the Diplomatic, Military, and Economic components of this construct the differing TTPs utilized by each commander will be analyzed and compared. Each component of national power will receive different emphasis depending on the national objectives, limitations, and abilities of the operation. In the mid-to-late 19<sup>th</sup> century the military was often viewed as the “agent” for diplomatic and economic objectives. This is partially due to the Army being the largest single studied entity operating on the western frontier. Civilians, in the form of settlers, miners, farmers, governors, shopkeepers, etc., were also important agents for change, and can arguably be credited for ultimately subduing the Indian resistance due to their increased presence in settling the western frontier, but their role was a decentralized on-going endeavor.<sup>81</sup>

### **Diplomatic**

Both Generals applied diplomatic pressures to shape the outcomes of their campaigns. These diplomatic collaborations occurred over multiple venues. Foremost, one must consider the diplomatic interactions that were held between the two major entities, the U.S. military commander and the Indian chief or leader. While Crook prided himself on negotiations with the enemy, Carleton was disinterested in this option. Military departmental commanders were

considered government figureheads that wielded power over their territorial area. General Carleton understood this venue of power and capitalized on the auspice of the Civil War to exert his diplomatic influence amongst the population. General Crook maintained a limited interaction with the local white populace, as he focused his efforts on those under his direct command and also dealing with his tribal foes.

General Carleton gave his subordinate commanders three instructions during their campaign in New Mexico; be ruthless, persistent, and not negotiate with the enemy. Carleton was arrogantly one-sided in terms of diplomacy, in that there were no options other than complete surrender. He didn't believe in peace treaties, since they just prolonged the conflict. Military might was his preferred tool. If widespread submission didn't happen then his commanders would continue to destroy the Indians way of life until they did. His intolerance for negotiation continued with the upper echelons of the U.S. government, as his Bosque Redondo experiment continued to fail.

Crook, on the other hand, allowed his commanders or himself to negotiate with their respected enemy on the field and the reservation. His commanders fully understood that the Apaches must surrender and return to the reservation, but allowed them to slightly negotiate the terms of surrender. This was displayed in the allowance to immediately convert from an Apache warrior to an Apache scout. By doing so the Apaches felt like they held some control, albeit minimal, over the situation and eased acceptance toward a life under Crook's policies. The ultimate goal of Crook's campaigns were based on building an alliance. He understood that it was necessary to win the "hearts and minds" of the people, the core principal of a counterinsurgency strategy.

## **Military**

Military action was the primary means of exerting national power in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century. All other facets supported the military's ability to aggress, capture, and/or kill. Both commanders developed solid plans to leverage their military forces to break the will of the Indians to resist. Carleton achieved his objective with overwhelming results, having quickly brought onto his reservation the entire Mescalero and Navajo populations. Crook's way of war was also extremely successful. Since both were highly effective, the main factor that truly sets the two Generals apart is their application of power and influence with the Indians *after* they surrendered.

Both commanders employed similar tactics to pursue the Indians. General Carleton was adamant that his forces give up the silly conventional tactics of marching linear formations over the countryside in haste of their enemy. He instead implemented the strategy of deploying small raiding parties, designed to destroy the logistical means of the Mescalero and Navajo people. Winter raids were the preferred time to exploit their adversaries' logistical and material weaknesses. Crook employed a similar logistical-raid approach against the Apache in Arizona. Both commanders relied heavily on their trusted subordinates. Carleton exercised the audacity of Kit Carson to wage his near total war destruction in New Mexico, while Crook maintained a posse of selected followers implementing his directives in Arizona. These followers included a large population of Apache ex-warriors.

Although the two commanders utilized similar tactical approaches, the investment in human capital, or the lack thereof, played a large role in the final outcome. General Crook took a bold gamble in placing a large amount of trust and confidence in his Apache scouts. During post-Civil War decades it was common to utilize Indian scouts, but Crook's use of scouts was anything but ordinary. He ensured that they received the respect that an Indian warrior required.

He used scouts in such numbers that they could have annihilated their partner soldiers at any given moment in time. Having lived and respected the Indian's way of life, Crook understood the interworking of their psyche enough to use it to his advantage. To own the ability to allow enemy warriors to join your military force as scouts, immediately after your forces have killed members of their tribe, is an amazing feat. Carleton didn't achieve this level of understanding for his enemy. General Carleton, having been ravaged by his previous experiences of Indian and white conflict, maintained the belief that further investment in the Indian was not necessary. Carleton may have placed his duties to protect Union investments and territory much higher than focusing on the Indian nations that he had just conquered.

### **Economic**

The economic instrument of national power has large influence in military and diplomatic proceedings. General Carleton's involvement in the economic realm was through the safeguarding and exploitation of physical resources in the New Mexico territory to reinforce the Union's efforts in the Civil War. General Carleton saw the Indians as standing in the way of this goal. General Crook's view of economics was much different. Crook viewed his Indian reservations as the main source of revenue and potential for commerce in the region. Since there was a fairly large amount of money being exchanged between the U.S. government and the endless civilian contractors, Crook focused his efforts in reducing corruption and providing economic opportunity to the Indians under his care.

### **CONCLUSION**

In an attempt to achieve U.S. strategic goals, Generals Carleton and Crook each implemented a campaign against their Indian opponents that succeeded in reducing their will to continue evasion of military forces and ending aspects of their traditional ways of life.

Ultimately, a true measurement of success of ending the Indian Problem in the American southwest was unattainable, due to the limited support of the U.S. government toward a holistic and effective solution. The U.S. Army operated as an ameliorating force between the intolerant western settlers and Indians with their traditional values and cultures, with little support from the government and American society. As General Crook observed, the largest obstacle to indoctrinating the natives into the American fold was the western settlers, or the Americans themselves and their values.

Military commanders of the time were given enormous latitude to make decision and implement their own TTPs to prosecute a war. The capacity of the national government to provide direction, oversight, and legitimate policy was crippled by the enormous barriers to effective communication and direction. Aggressive commander like General Carleton and General Crook thrived in this type of environment. Carleton executed an intense campaign against the Mescalero Apache and Navajo Indians during the period of the Civil War. Crook became known as the nation's primer Indian fighter due to his brilliant counter-guerrilla approach to warfare. Their opponents were not easy targets, as their cultures had perfected the art of producing warriors for centuries.

Both commanders were correct in understanding that they lack the means to subdue the Indians without first using military force. Americans demand that a just solution be applied, since ultimately they must live with the outcome. Since the true goal of the U.S. was to integrate the natives into American society there has to be more thought and effort placed on non-military options. General George Crook understood this notion, just as he understood and respected his enemy who quickly became his friend.

Counterinsurgencies operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century have and will continue to be the bane of easy military victories. Today's American military, with all its technology and power, is often easily countered by small scale ideologically inspired insurgency groups. These groups are exploiting easily procured technology and twisting information to benefit their cause. General Crook earned the trust of his opponent by reducing and then controlling their options. The reality of contemporary counterinsurgency operations conducted in a culturally different environment is that they may take years, or decades to produce results. This requires a resolve that America just doesn't have and it is the one thing that technological superiority can't attain.

## **Appendix A**

### **Definition of Terms**

BIA	Bureau of Indian Affairs
USMA	United States Military Academy
FM	Field Manual
JP	Joint Publication
TTPs	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

**Appendix B**

**General James H. Carleton**



Figure 3: General James H. Carleton




Figure 4: Colonel "Kit" Carson

Appendix C

General George R. Crook




Figure 5: General George Crook



Figure 6: General Crook with his mule, shotgun, and trusted Apache scouts.



Figure 7: Remnants of the Tonto and Yavapai Apache from the battle of Skeleton Cave



Figure 8: Geronimo (right) with his followers after meeting with Crook at Canyon de los Embudos, March 1886.



Figure 9: Geronimo (left center) pictured with Crook at Canyon de los Embudos, March 1886.



Figure 10: Chato the famous Chiricahua scout who pursued Geronimo, 1886.



Figure 11: James Kirker, Irish American, “scalp hunter” (Daguerreotype by Thomas M. Easterly, 1847 Missouri History Museum Archives)

## Appendix D

### “Archer Jones” Strategy Matrix<sup>82</sup>




Figure 12: The Archer Jones’ construct depicted graphically.

The author Archer Jones, in his book *Elements of Military Strategy*, offers a simplistic yet useful construct to analyze any given military strategy. This construct implies that the objective of any military strategy is attrition, hence aimed at depleting the military capabilities of an opponent. Jones’ acknowledges that military attrition is by default connected to political objective by saying, “of course, military strategy usually endeavored to implement political or comparable objectives but sought to attain them indirectly, by depleting the hostile military force sufficiently to gain an ascendancy adequate to attain the war’s political goals.” An armed force can either attack their adversary with combat force, or through a logistically driven strategy. Furthermore, there are two ways of carrying out these two strategies, by using a short term raid or a persistent presence.

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- <sup>1</sup>Andrew Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency operations Doctrine 1860-1941* (Center of Military History, 1998), 3.
- <sup>2</sup>Ibid, 15.
- <sup>3</sup>Andrew Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency operations Doctrine 1860-1941* (Center of Military History, 1998), 74.
- <sup>4</sup>Allan Millett and peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (The Free Press, 1984), 237.
- <sup>5</sup>Peter Cozzens, *The Earth is Weeping: The Epic Story of the Indian Wars for the American West* (Knopf Books, 2016), 26.
- <sup>6</sup>Ibid, 43.
- <sup>7</sup>Bruce Vandervort, *Indian Wars of Mexico, Canada and the United States, 1812-1900* (Routledge Press, 2006), 75.
- <sup>8</sup>Millett and Maslowski, *Common Defense*, Ch. 8.
- <sup>9</sup>Wooster, *Indian Policy*, 11.
- <sup>10</sup>Robert Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865* (University of Nebraska Press, 1967), 3.
- <sup>11</sup>Ibid, 4.
- <sup>12</sup>Robert Wooster, *The American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West 1783-1900* (University of New Mexico Press, 2009), 147.
- <sup>13</sup>Wooster, *Indian Policy*, 14.
- <sup>14</sup>Wooster, *American Military Frontiers*, 86.
- <sup>15</sup>Vandervort, *Indian Wars*, 55.
- <sup>16</sup>Birtle, *Counterinsurgency*, 6.
- <sup>17</sup>George Crook, "The Apache Problem," in *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890: The Struggle for Apacheria*, ed. Peter Cozzens (Stackpole Books, 2001), 602.
- <sup>18</sup>Carl Waldman, *Atlas of the North American Indian* (Checkmark Books, 2000), 37.
- <sup>19</sup>Cozzens, *The Earth is Weeping*, 47.
- <sup>20</sup>Vandervort, *Indian Wars*, 38.
- <sup>21</sup>Vandervort, *Indian Wars*, 44.
- <sup>22</sup>Waldman, *Atlas*, 37.
- <sup>23</sup>Charles King, *Indian Campaigns* (Old Army Press, 1984), 25.
- <sup>24</sup>Cozzens, *Eyewitnesses*, xvi.
- <sup>25</sup>Vandervort, *Indian Wars*, 32.
- <sup>26</sup>Alan Axelrod, *Chronicle of the Indian Wars: From Colonial Times to Wounded Knee* (Prentice Hall, 1993), 183.
- <sup>27</sup>Waldman, *Atlas*, 166.
- <sup>28</sup>Adam Kane, "James H. Carleton," in *Soldiers West: Biographies from the Military Frontier*, ed. Paul Hutton and Durwood Ball (University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 122-143.
- <sup>29</sup>Jerome Green, "George Crook," *Soldiers West: Biographies from the Military Frontier*, ed. Paul Hutton and Durwood Ball (University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 246-266.
- <sup>30</sup>Kane, *James H. Carleton*, 134.
- <sup>31</sup>Ibid
- <sup>32</sup>Wooster, *Military Frontiers*, 167.
- <sup>33</sup>Kane, *James H. Carleton*, 134-136.
- <sup>34</sup>Ibid, 136-137.
- <sup>35</sup>Ibid, 135.
- <sup>36</sup>Robert Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891* (University of Nebraska Press, 1973), 169.
- <sup>37</sup>Vandervort, *Indian Wars*, 203.
- <sup>38</sup>Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 193.

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- <sup>39</sup>Utley, *Indian Frontier*, 139.
- <sup>40</sup>Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 192.
- <sup>41</sup>Ibid, 194.
- <sup>42</sup>Peter Aleshire, *The Fox and the Whirlwind: General George Crook and Geronimo a Paired Biography* (John Wiley and Sons, 2000), 125.
- <sup>43</sup>Ibid, 124.
- <sup>44</sup>John Bourke, *On the Border with Crook* (University of Nebraska Press, 1971), 181.
- <sup>45</sup>Ibid, 177.
- <sup>46</sup>Ibid, 182.
- <sup>47</sup>Aleshire, *The Fox*, 126.
- <sup>48</sup>Bourke, *On the Border*, 182.
- <sup>49</sup>Aleshire, *The Fox*, 126.
- <sup>50</sup>Bourke, *On the Border*, 181.
- <sup>51</sup>Ibid
- <sup>52</sup>Aleshire, *The Fox*, 127.
- <sup>53</sup>Bourke, *On the Border*, 192.
- <sup>54</sup>Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 197.
- <sup>55</sup>Aleshire, *The Fox*, 131.
- <sup>56</sup>Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 197.
- <sup>57</sup>Bourke, *On the Border*, 212.
- <sup>58</sup>Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 198.
- <sup>59</sup>Bourke, *On the Border*, 213.
- <sup>60</sup>Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 198.
- <sup>61</sup>Vandervort, *Indian Wars*, 203.
- <sup>62</sup>Aleshire, *The Fox*, 137.
- <sup>63</sup>Mathew Flynn, *Settle and Conquer: Militarism on the American Frontier, 1607-1890* (McFarland Publishers, 2016), 193.
- <sup>64</sup>Aleshire, *The Fox*, 25.
- <sup>65</sup>Flynn, *Settle and Conquer*, 193.
- <sup>66</sup>Vandervort, *Indian Wars*, 205.
- <sup>67</sup>Robert Utley, *The Indian Frontier of the American West 1846-1890* (University of New Mexico Press, 1984), 197.
- <sup>68</sup>Vandervort, *Indian Wars*, 206.
- <sup>69</sup>Ibid, 207.
- <sup>70</sup>Bourke, *On the Border*, 463.
- <sup>71</sup>Vandervort, *Indian Wars*, 207.
- <sup>72</sup>Aleshire, *The Fox*, 272-276.
- <sup>73</sup>Ibid, 285.
- <sup>74</sup>Bourke, *On the Border*, 467.
- <sup>75</sup>Ibid, 478.
- <sup>76</sup>Ibid, 215.
- <sup>77</sup>Aleshire, *The Fox*, 134.
- <sup>78</sup>Bourke, *On the Border*, 215.
- <sup>79</sup>Vandervort, *Indian Wars*, 76.
- <sup>80</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 3-0 Joint Operations* (U.S. DOD, January 17, 2017), 28.
- <sup>81</sup>Flynn, *Settle and Conquer*, 5.
- <sup>82</sup>Archer Jones, *Elements of Military Strategy: An Historical Approach* (Praeger Publishers, 1996), xii-xxiii.

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excellent perspective into Crook's contributions, both strengths and weaknesses, in the Apache Wars.

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