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Although the Marine Corps is not a private business it can learn from some best practices that are established in competing markets. Private businesses remain competitive though innovation by finding better ways to produce products or provide services. Innovation requires that an organization stop its "business as usual" habit patterns and focus on constructive reorganization. This study provides one method of cultural change and explains how that framework can be applied retroactively to a historical case study. By incorporating existing business practices, the Marine Corps can learn to better foster innovation within its organization

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
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Executive Summary

Title: Fostering Innovation: A Case Study of General Scharnhorst and The Beatty/Ulrich Change Model

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Thesis: The Prussian military reforms following the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 should be used as a case study in military reform by the U.S. military. In 1806 Prussia was an established and mature army, but suffered from stagnation in training and doctrine that led ultimately to defeat. By overlaying the Beatty/Ulrich Change Model on to the Prussian Military Reforms one can see that General von Scharnhorst changed the culture of his organization to foster innovation. Although the U.S. Military has not suffered such a significant defeat as the Prussians a careful examination of the reforms implemented by General Scharnhorst and understanding of the Change Model provide a framework for the Marine Corps to foster innovation within its own organization.

Discussion: Beatty/Ulrich developed a strategy to foster cultural change within mature organizations. By reforming through restructuring, bureaucracy bashing, employee involvement, and continuous improvement one can affect the culture of a business to foster innovation. The Prussian military reforms following the battles of Jena and Auerstädt served to push reform from the outside. General von Scharnhorst instituted aggressive reforms within Prussia resulting in a framework that closely mirrors the framework Beatty/Ulrich developed. The Commandant of the Marine Corps consistently calls for innovation within the Corps but this is a hard task to accomplish in an organization that is not always organized to foster it. The Beatty/Ulrich model provides one method of reform, and the Marine Corps should turn to private businesses successful models for instituting change resulting in innovation.

Conclusion: Although the Marine Corps is not a private business it can learn from some best practices that are established in competing markets. Private businesses remain competitive through innovation by finding better ways to produce products or provide services. Innovation requires that an organization stop its “business as usual” habit patterns and focus on constructive reorganization. This study provides one method of cultural change and explains how that framework can be applied retroactively to a historical case study. By incorporating existing business practices, the Marine Corps can learn to better foster innovation within its organization.

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PART 1: Introduction

Every business organization has cultural aspects that shape morale, decision-making, cohesion, and effectiveness. Understanding what culture is, how to change culture, and how to change organizations are an important part of leading a business through entrepreneurship to maturity. Throughout time, private businesses engage in capitalist enterprises to generate revenue. The desire for more revenue and market share drive private businesses to innovate in all manners from the products they supply to the types of services they provide.

The inherent problem with bureaucratic organizations is that they are resistant to change. This resistance holds true for the United States Marine Corps. With respect to the Marine Corps, it finds itself at a crossroads of sorts. On one hand, if the Corps is indeed in an interwar period it should strive to innovate for any future conflicts. As outlined in the *Marine Corps Operating Concept* (Sept 2016), General Robert B. Neller states, “we must recognize the challenges of the future and develop an operational approach to fight and win. . . . We need to change where it makes sense, adapt as quickly as possible, and constantly innovate to stay ahead of our adversaries.”¹ General Neller challenged his Marines to question the underlying assumptions of their organization and published the *Operating Concept* to begin the discussion about what is wrong and what can they, as Marines, can do to fix it. Within the Department of Defense the emphasis for innovation classically relies on new technology and how it can be tactically applied to future wars. Less emphasis is placed on innovations in training or force structure.² However, these two areas may provide the best returns on investment if the Commandant truly seeks to foster an organization stays ahead of adversaries. Identifying the need for innovation in his organization is not enough. General Neller should explore how the business world fosters

innovation to provide a framework for his organization to work from. This paper seeks to determine if reform models that private businesses utilize can be applied to military reform.

Throughout the history of the Prussian military, one significant event in 1806 forced reform upon its army. The battles of Jena and Auerstädt ended in the pursuit and destruction of the Prussian army. Prussia prided itself on a belief in its own martial prowess to such an extent that these defeats appeared to herald the end of Prussian dominance in Europe and an end to its great-power status. The restrictions placed upon Prussia with the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 is an example of how reform within a military can become forced issues from outside a nation's boundaries. The treaty carried stipulations that in theory made it impossible for the Prussian people to threaten their neighbors with military action. However, in a relatively short time Prussia returned to war. Within seven years, Prussia would field an army against French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte; by 1815 the Prussians would see the French Army fleeing the battle of Waterloo.

Using the *Organizational Life-Cycle* proposed by Richard W. Beatty and David O. Ulrich, one sees that organizations evolve through a life-cycle like learning cycles observed in humans. At each stage of growth there are challenges that require a new way of thinking or behavior to proceed forward. These challenges drive a constant process of questioning within the organization about what is "right." The authors also posit that competing organizations reach a level of uniformity across technological realms, so it is incumbent to distinguish themselves by increasing their capacity for change.³ The need to manage change is imperative in all organizations. Without change, organizations run the risk of becoming stagnant, their members assuming what worked once will work every time.⁴ To effectively manage the change required from competition, mature organizations must move away from security and stability and instead

focus on speed, simplicity, and an empowered workforce. Failure to manage change will result in decline and possible death of the organization. Viewing the reforms of Prussia through the Beatty/Ulrich model, is it possible to find systems of private business reform that can be applicable to military reform?

Frederick III, Prussia's King, tasked General Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst with managing the change required following his adopted country's decline. His reform-oriented posture focused on required military reform and culture change. Although this example dates from over two hundred years ago, von Scharnhorst used a similar framework for culture change as displayed by Beatty/Ulrich in their Renewal Cycle. By restructuring, bureaucracy bashing, employee involvement, and continuous improvement, he drove reform and cultural change in his military.

Although von Scharnhorst's strategies are historical and therefore perhaps of antiquarian value, the Marine Corps can use them as case studies in implementing reform measures following a significant loss. However, these are not the only lessons one can learn from von Scharnhorst. By careful examination of the reforms he implemented, one can gain an appreciation of the changes possibly required in today's U.S. military before suffering the stagnation and survival/shakeout that leads to ultimate decline.⁵ To reach this conclusion, this paper will provide a comprehensive analysis of the Beatty/Ulrich Change Model while overlaying the model on the historical reforms of Prussia. Even though the five steps of renewal from Beatty/Ulrich were not published until 1991, von Scharnhorst was remarkable in the fact that the steps he undertook to affect cultural change closely mirrored the framework of the Change Model. It must be acknowledged that the Prussian Military Reforms in 1807 resulted from a significant military loss. Because of this it may be easy to discount these reforms as a

case study because the United States and its military have not suffered such a catastrophic defeat. However, by focusing on the fact that General Scharnhorst's reforms resulted in identifying potential innovators and clearing the way for them to propose ways to innovate we can begin to understand how it may be applied to the U.S. military. The specific purpose of this paper is to identify how the Marine Corps should reform its culture to foster innovation, and the first step in that process is incorporating successful business models like the Beatty/Ulrich Renewal Cycle.

PART II. The Cycle

In 1991 Richard W. Beatty and David O. Ulrich published their article entitled, "Re-Energizing the Mature Organization" in *Organizational Dynamics*. Their paper provides a framework explaining why some organizations ultimately succeed and some fail, followed by the steps a failing organization should take to reenergize itself, resulting in culture change. "The challenge for the mature organization – which has based its success on security and stability – is to meet a changing environment, and to respond to changes in a manner that will revitalize its structure and its competitive edge."⁶ For-profit capitalist businesses operate in a competitive market based on free-market capitalism. The competition is the key to innovation. Innovation will drive advances in technology and processes, making organizations more efficient, which save both time and money. It becomes imperative for businesses to change internally for growth externally once one applies competition.⁷ The article further states that traditional competition results in balance that makes it difficult for organizations to separate themselves based solely on "technology, product, or price."⁸ Traditional competition leaves little room for businesses to gain an advantage over each other. To remain competitive and retain market share, an internal

capacity for change must be fostered; “[t]hat is, to change faster on the inside than the organization is changing on the outside.”⁹ Although ostensibly written to help managers understand business cycles and competition, the Organizational Life Cycle, can be applied directly to military organizations seeking to reform their cultures.

Within the framework of the Beatty/Ulrich Organizational Life Cycle, there are four milestones. These are entrepreneurial, growth, maturity, and decline.¹⁰ The entrepreneurial milestone focuses on distinction and growth of new products and markets. Here a business or individual identifies an idea for a product or service that can be provided which previously did not exist (or existed only on a limited basis). The individual attempts to identify a niche for access to the existing markets. Identifying the niche is the change challenge within this milestone.¹¹ A simple way to understand the niche challenge is to imagine a small business serving local markets with a specific machine or service that competitors have not yet identified. Managers who effectively develop ideas into value for customers overcome the niche challenge and proceed onto the next milestone of growth.¹²

The proliferation of businesses characterizes the growth milestone.¹³ More firms will enter a market, providing similar products/services with the result of a survival/shakeout change challenge. Small firms band together to form large firms and businesses that cannot compete will fail.¹⁴ Due to the similarity of products entering a market, businesses must adjust existing processes to compete. Modifying the existing processes often takes the form of establishing standard operating procedures (SOPs), which allow businesses to operate faster and retain market share.¹⁵

Evidence of SOPs and overcoming niche and shakeout challenges leads to the third milestone of maturity. The maturity stage presents the most difficult change challenge because it

relies on renewal.¹⁶ The existence of established norms or SOPs led to past successes and managers will often rely on them again and again. However, SOPs may lead to complacency and create inertia which inhibits challenges that often lead to future success. The renewal challenge requires businesses to identify further means to meet customer needs, “to build internal organizational processes that meet external customer requirements.”¹⁷ Failure to change leads to decline of the organization.

By applying Beatty/Ulrich’s model to the military, one will notice striking similarities. The entrepreneurial stage and niche identification challenge should be viewed as capabilities or weapons that the military can exploit. Military leaders identify a tactic, organizational framework, or weapon system to incorporate into their units that will help them achieve parity or surpass other militaries’ capabilities. The growth stage should be viewed as a military force that experiences new success using the identified niche. The maturity stage is where many armed forces find themselves. Technology and organizational makeup parity emerges across competitors; now leaders must identify additional capabilities to meet the government’s needs. Examining the Prussian military in 1806, one sees a mature organization that failed to renew within itself. The failure to renew resulted from acceptance and over-reliance on SOPs and practices that have always seemed to result in success. The SOPs become institutionalized in vision, value, and mission; in mature organizations a shared mindset may hamper the ability to change. This is what occurred in 1806. The Prussian military institutionalized a shared mindset to such a serious degree that it was unable to quickly adapt to external developments. This led to stagnation and decline.

To prevent decline, Beatty/Ulrich stress the need for renewal and outline specific leadership and work activities which reenergize an organization that finds itself in the decline

stage. The first step of *restructuring* begins with a downsizing of the workforce.¹⁸ Leaders must recognize that unit may have become “fat” by not managing performance at all levels and the release of underperforming individuals can save an organization significant amounts of money while initiating renewal.¹⁹

The second step of renewal is *bureaucracy bashing*. Following restructuring, the number of people available to accomplish tasks decreases while the amount of work to be accomplished remains constant.²⁰ It now becomes imperative that leaders streamline the amount of work that employees are expected to accomplish. Getting rid of unnecessary reports, policies, procedures, and meetings will allow the remaining works to focus on the right kind of work.²¹ During this step, many managers face the uncomfortable challenge of declining corporate loyalty. Leaders must learn to replace corporate loyalty with another means of employee attachment.²² Loyalty should be replaced with opportunity. In this case the opportunity to provide inputs into the company as well as opportunity for advancement that did not exist in the mature organization. Limiting the amount of frivolous work managers might expect employees to accomplish and increasing opportunity from success yields a higher-quality product, speed, and simplicity that previously did not exist.²³

The third step of renewal is *employee empowerment*. Now that employees can focus on increasing productivity through streamlined processes in an environment built on opportunity, managers are in a position to empower them. Traditionally, bureaucracies empower top managers but renewal requires workers to provide input or the process will not be long lasting.²⁴ “Power and authority in a renewing organization should come from relationships, trust, and expertise”²⁵; empowerment is a shift from expert-driven problem solving to a system where all workers are involved in improvement to increase competitive advantage.

The fourth step of renewal is *continuous improvement*. This step involves the systematic adherence of the first three steps into the long-term processes of the company. Employee involvement should not be tied to any one person but is part of the whole system. Continuous improvement must be focused on error detection and error prevention through modeling and debriefs. Errors must be taken out of work procedures to allow processes to be streamlined and executed faster.²⁶

The fifth step of renewal is *cultural change*. Fundamentally, cultural change shows that the way workers think about their work has shifted. The task for employees is defining the right work to do, finding ways to improve that work, and detecting errors that limit success. The culture of the organization changed from the top down with a new emphasis on renewal, creating speed and tempo within continuous improvement.²⁷

Scharnhorst instinctively knew that to fundamentally change how an organization conducts itself, he would need to change the culture of the organization. Obviously in 1806, Scharnhorst was not blessed with modern business theory about how to impact lasting change, but he was blessed with an education that allowed him to possess a broad base of knowledge. This base allowed him to recognize that the military revolution occurring in Europe would leave Prussia behind if the country did not change to meet the new demands of warfare.²⁸ While the French Revolution would start from the bottom in the masses of the people, the Prussian revolution began with the top and worked its way down.²⁹ By studying Scharnhorst and his reform movements, it is possible to see how he developed a framework for fostering innovation reminiscent of the Beatty/Ulrich model almost two hundred years beforehand.

Part III: Prussian Beginnings

On 14 October 1806, the forces of France and Prussia battled at Jena and Auerstädt. Emperor Napoleon operated with numerical superiority and command of the high ground at Jena, destroying Prince Hohenlohe's corps. A few miles north of Auerstädt, the French defeated a force of Prussians twice their size. With these two defeats, the Prussian army crumbled under a rapid French pursuit. This pursuit would carry the French to overrun all of Prussia within three weeks. France forced Prussia to sign the Treaty of Tilsit on 9 July 1807.

The terms of the treaty were crushing to the Prussian state. France forced Prussia to pay reparations to the French, forced it to support a large army of occupation, and lost approximately half of its land and population. Following the Treaty of Tilsit, Frederick William III summoned Scharnhorst to task him with rebuilding the ruined army as the chairman of the Military Reorganization Commission. It was in this capacity that von Scharnhorst began enacting the steps, as outlined later by Beatty/Ulrich, to reenergize and renew the Prussian military. The reforms of von Scharnhorst were not just related to the military, but encompassed reforms within the whole nation. Because the link between civil considerations and military considerations was so strong in Prussia, "military reforms, therefore, had to proceed hand-in-hand with reforms of the body politic. Feudal privileges and serfdom had to be liquidated, and military service had to become, in theory at least, truly universal."³⁰ In effect, von Scharnhorst was not tasked with simply reforming the military but changing the entire culture of the state.

Fortunately, von Scharnhorst was reform minded early in his career, and organizations that he began would bear fruit following the implementation of the treaty provisions. Von Scharnhorst was originally a citizen of Hanover and not of Prussian birth. At seventeen he enrolled in a military academy run by Count Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst zu Schaumburg-Lippe-

Buckeburg. For four years, von Scharnhorst studied under Count Friedrich and his learning encompassed the concept of *bildung*.³¹ *Bildung* can be translated as “culture” and during the classical age it meant the “perfectibility of the individual’s character and intellect through education.”³² The focus of an education through *bildung* was a key principle of two organizations that von Scharnhorst founded; the *Militarische Gesellschaft* (military society), and a military school that became the forerunner to the *Kriegsakademie*. Scharnhorst established a reputation as a highly capable fighting officer in 1793 during battles against France. This reputation led to an offer for colonelcy from Prussia and he joined that force in 1801 to serve as the director of the military school in Berlin.³³

The French Revolution offered a new framework for ensuring that thousands of men would be available to fight a nation’s battles. Scharnhorst’s dedication as a student of Emperor Napoleon’s campaigns, combined with first-hand knowledge of Prussia’s faltering in 1806, left him with two lessons learned. First, the Prussian military system as it stood required another leader cast in the likeness of Frederick the Great to find success, which was unlikely to occur. Second, the army must develop a way to cultivate leaders in the absence of a brilliant general. His answer to these lessons was reform within the staff system for specialized military education, and cultivating the best and brightest officers who displayed a habit of independent action.³⁴

Restructuring.

Following the Treaty of Tilsit, the Convention of Paris limited the Prussian Army to 42,000 soldiers while prohibiting militias and reserve formations.³⁵ The requirements to limit the size of the army and the downsizing of the Prussian economy resulted in an expulsion of many serving officers. In 1806, Prussia maintained 142 general officers; by 1809 the nation expelled 17 and 86 were honorably retired, leaving only 22 retained on active duty. Of field-grade officers

in 1806, 885 were listed on army rolls. By 1809, Prussia expelled 50, dismissed 584, and 185 were retained on active duty. Among the company-grade officers, 6000 appeared on the 1806 rolls; by 1809 only 1,584 remained on active duty.³⁶

Per Beatty/Ulrich's Organizational Lifecycle, the officer purge between 1806 and 1809 was crucial. The first stage of reenergizing a mature organization following its decline is restructuring. Restructuring provides a two-fold benefit. First, it allows an organization to become "lean and mean" while acknowledging the organization became "fat" by failing to manage personnel. Second, it allows one to retain the personnel who agree with the requirement for change. When tasked with leading the Military Reorganization Committee, von Scharnhorst would have been forced to purge the officer corps even without the size limits imposed by Emperor Napoleon. This purge would have been required to dismiss the officers who found promotion only from aristocratic birth. The nature of maintaining an aristocratic officer-corps reform itself would have been difficult. What von Scharnhorst proposed was a criterion for rank based on character and intellect, not seniority or birth.³⁷ Following the defeats of 1806, many nobles felt the failure could be attributed to bad luck and faulty leadership, not a cultural problem within the county.³⁸ By placing the blame for Prussia's defeat at a specific individual's feet, it was possible to explain the removal of a few incompetents while maintaining a station of privilege within the social structure. Scharnhorst felt that the losses of Jena and Auerstadt would be the best fulcrum to reform the army in which educational qualifications would be crucial to selection of leadership positions.³⁹ Many of the officers retained through the purge were students of von Scharnhorst at the Berlin Institute or members of the *Militarische Gesellschaft*. Many others demonstrated through the campaign of 1806 that they were trustworthy and calm under fire. These remaining officers would be those von Scharnhorst would build the reformed army

around. The new military General von Scharnhorst proposed would develop an elite army from the remnants of a Frederician-style conscript army.⁴⁰

Bureaucracy Bashing.

Now that von Scharnhorst had a staff that was agreeable to reform, selecting specific individuals to remain in service following the massive downsizing of the army in the restructuring stage. He was free to begin working on the next stage of reenergizing a mature organization, Bureaucracy Bashing. In this stage, unnecessary reports, meetings, and work approvals are realized for what they are; a source of activity that creates a backlog in the functioning of the organization. This stage begins when workers identify the impediments to their jobs and then take steps to remove them because they consume energy and build frustration. These processes need to be examined and replaced when applicable.

General von Scharnhorst viewed the disaster at Jena not as just a military defeat but a final verdict against Prussian society that consistently placed the needs of the aristocracy above the requirement for the security of the state. He identified that, if the Prussian state was to regain its independence, the needs of the monarchy, state, and people would need to be refocused and aligned. He viewed the French model of a nation at arms as the missing link. Through the Military Reorganization Commission, he emphasized a Prussian law of universal conscription. He believed all citizens of Prussia should maintain an interest in seeing to the sovereignty of the nation.

Within the bureaucracy bashing stage, Scharnhorst realized that the old ways of doing things would need to be changed if he was to realize his goal of universal conscription. This would require systemic change within the culture of Prussia that could not be encompassed through the piecemeal change of the Military Reorganization Commission. Working with First

Minster Heinrich Friedrich Karl von und zum Stein, he advocated two changes alien to Prussian absolutism. In October 1807, Stein issued the Edict of Emancipation, effectively abolishing serfdom and making full citizens of all the King's subjects.⁴¹ This edict would be the first example of the alliance of government and the people.⁴² First Minister Stein stipulated to the King that national conscription could not be achieved without a corresponding relief of serfdom to fill the ranks of the new military. Stein did not stop with abolishing serfdom to empower the citizens of Prussia. He transformed the semi-feudal Prussia in modern ways but granted self-government to towns, and allowed elections for town councils which replaced royal appointees.⁴³ Stein argued that it would be the first steps in creating a state of citizens united in freedom that would be able to limit French domination.⁴⁴ Then, on 3 August 1808 Scharnhorst published new articles of war that protected the rights of the individual soldier, altering the onetime system of corporal punishment. In Frederician age, army punishment included brutal discipline for even minor infractions. To induce Prussian citizens to become agreeable to broader laws of conscription, a new military-justice system would need to be in place that enhanced the newfound respect for the common man with the abolition of serfdom.⁴⁵

By removing the more brutal elements of corporal punishment, the Prussians also fulfilled another element of the bureaucracy-bashing stage; they replaced expectations of loyalty with expectations of opportunity. Loyalty to commanders and to the King now would be based on recognition of individual citizens' rights. By codifying the rules for punishment and discipline, the soldier subject to those rules began to understand his fundamental rights. The soldier understood what was acceptable and that failure to meet expectations would result in impartial and standardized discipline. Commanders were also held accountable for understanding

the basic rights of their soldiers and together an understanding developed that responsibility for each member flows up and down the chain of command.⁴⁶

Anyone brought into the new professional officer corps would earn his rank based on character and intellect. From August 1808, selection of citizens to officer positions would be made open to all who possessed the “knowledge and education in peacetime. . . . and in war outstanding bravery and military judgement.”⁴⁷ All citizens, with the right qualifications, would be given the opportunity to develop their talents and selections to commission would no longer be based on birth or seniority. Prospective officers were now expected to pass a competitive written examination and would enter the army as officer candidates. Upon proving themselves, they were commissioned subject to royal approval and agreement from the officers in their regiment.⁴⁸ Opening the officer corps to anyone with the right qualifications was an example of replacing loyalty with opportunity.

Scharnhorst realized that increasing opportunity throughout the officer and enlisted ranks would not be achievable through the publishing of the new article of war alone. He went on to institute a new type of military academy acting as the pinnacle of reform within the army education system. The school was known as the Military School for Officers, later the War Academy, and was in Berlin. The new institution would incorporate the artillery and engineer schools and be open to limited numbers of applicants. Prospective students could take the entrance exam that was open to all citizens, and each class would be limited to fifty officers. The school’s central mission was the educate the students for duty as general staff officers and adjutants. Yet the Military School for Officers would not remove the cadet schools that were previously used for officer procurement. Scharnhorst found that the latter schools would not be ideal institutions for the reform movement’s goals of promotion through ability. He found that

cadet schools regularly admitted boys as young as twelve⁴⁹ and that most senior officers insisted that, rather than by cultivation by schooling, officers could be made merely through regimental service. The regimental-service idea was in keeping with the era --the military officer was expected to learn his craft through apprenticeship and experience like other craftsmen.⁵⁰ Cadets within these schools regularly responded with hostility to anything resembling “book soldiering”⁵¹ and the schools functioned as holding pens for the cadets providing neither military education or training. To reform the Prussian military and officer corps a new school would need to be developed.

Coincident with beginning the Military School for Officers, Scharnhorst issued regulations to establish the chief of staff as a partner in command decisions with the commanding general. Scharnhorst’s school would train officers to be future chiefs of staff and ensure that a highly-educated officer could be paired with an officer who attained rank through birth. Within the old system of officer education, only nobility was selected and many of these officers would be too young or incompetent to effectively lead soldiers in the field. The previous schools were not devoted to follow-on billets but trained officers in older methods of waging war. Von Scharnhorst’s new school, although admitting smaller numbers, would be more inclusive while providing a broader education aimed at making officers better students of history and thinking leaders. The new chief of staff would not be a vice commander -- or a commander of any sort -- but he would be responsible for advising the commander on operational decisions. By attaching a highly trained chief of staff to the commanding general, Scharnhorst ensured that sound advice was given on all occasions. Scharnhorst ensured that bureaucracy would be limited, creating a “command structure combining the man of action with the man of intellect in a highly potent mix.”⁵² The key to Scharnhorst’s decisions to establish his school was that it would not

limit other commissions in officers. He did not expect that all future lieutenants would follow his conduit, but those that did would be rewarded attractive to “rational actors with career ambitions.”⁵³

In 1808, Karl von Stein, serving as the first minister, proposed a plan to coordinate state administration under multiple ministries. Each minister had unmitigated access to the king. The new ministers would replace the pedantic and immovable royal cronies with a responsible and orderly ministerial government.⁵⁴ Minister Stein, although ostensibly working for advancements in the civilian sector, created waves in the military sphere. Scharnhorst required well-organized lines of authority for army orders. The new ministers would remove multiple gatekeepers placed around the king and place authority into a professional’s hands.⁵⁵ Stein’s proposed ministries would be foreign affairs, internal affairs, war, justice, and finance.⁵⁶ Sensing a need to reduce the ineffective Prussian bureaucracy, Stein proposed that the War Ministry be subdivided into two major departments: the *Allgemeine Kriegsdepartement* (General War Department) and the *Militar Okonomiedepartement* (Military Economy Department). The General War Department would be responsible for command and administration of the army, while the Military Economy Department would be responsible for finance and supply. The War Ministry would be responsible for centralizing all matters of dealing with the army and war, and would remove the numerous agencies that characterized the army before the Battle of Jena.

The combination of universal service and the new War Ministry effectively made it impossible to purchase an officers’ commission or to grant a regiment based on nobility within Prussia.⁵⁷ Previously nobility were given regiments to assist them financially. The king prescribed a fixed sum of money to the regimental commander for clothing, feeding, and paying his troops. If the regimental commander spent his money economically the remainder would be

his to keep. This system continued downward to the company level with Captains given lump sums to pay and clothe their men.⁵⁸ The establishment of the Military Economy Department ended this practice. Although this step seems to run counter to the bureaucracy-bashing stage, it in fact streamlined the provisioning of the troops and limited officers from purchasing substandard gear or provisions. With a centralized ministry handling the supply system, regimental commanders were free to focus on leading their men.

Employee Empowerment Stage.

In their work Beatty/Ulrich state that “[b]ureaucracies empower top managers. Bureaucracy busting empowers employees.”⁵⁹ Now that the barriers between the military and the citizens of Prussia were limited in the previous stage, von Scharnhorst was free to begin the next stage of reorganization: Employee Empowerment. During this stage the traditional models of top-down leadership and centralized planning are limited or erased. To fully realize this stage, power and authority should come from the confidence in and relationships between members of the organization. Empowerment flows from minimizing manager-only decisions allowing all employees to collectively work to solve problems in their own way.

In 1812, the Prussian military published its new doctrine the *Reglement*, which stated general rules for war, leaving room for decision-making based on experience and common sense. This idea was opposed to the traditional Frederician model of centralized command held by the commanding general alone. The *Reglement of 1812* proposed a doctrine built on “educated and well-trained officers and men.”⁶⁰ The new doctrine would not only apply to the generals within the army, but all soldiers who served in it. Each officer and staff non-commissioned officer would be trained in light infantry tactics, able to rapidly shift foundations between skirmishing, line, and column, combined with supporting use of artillery and cavalry as

they saw fit to deal with the situation on the ground.⁶¹ Each soldier was now expected to make decisions leading to accomplishing the “mission concept” of superiors rather than waiting to be told to act under higher’s orders.

The *Reglement of 1812* became the quintessential document relating to employee empowerment. Prior to von Scharnhorst’s reforms, the common soldier was not expected to possess an intellect allowing for free will.⁶² Now the doctrine expected the common soldier to act according to the situation he saw at hand. Through education and training the common soldier could become a leader in his own right. The new Prussian military system leveraged competitive advantage through speed by pushing decision-making to the lowest levels.

Continuous Improvement.

During the Continuous Improvement Stage, the focus needs to be about sustaining the changes the company has made in the previous three stages while working to limit errors in decision making. Many of the steps General von Scharnhorst proposed in his sweeping reforms would work to make the Prussian military a better-thinking and faster army, but without a feedback loop to measure success, none of the changes would make much of a difference. Education became the method von Scharnhorst chose to limit errors in decision-making.

The *Reglement of 1812* envisioned a highly sophisticated tactical system. The infantry became the mainstay of the new doctrine and its tactics required tenacity to apply pressure against enemy forces by a brigade-sized unit of significant depth. This new system placed greater responsibility on company and battalion commanders. Each officer was expected to maintain high standards of training, courage, discipline, and initiative if the army was perform well in battle. The new doctrine could not have been possible without an adherence to continuous improvement at all levels of the army.

On 17 March 1813, Frederick William III gave his “Am Mein Volk” speech in Breslau. During this speech, the king included all people of his realm as one nation and asked for their support going to war with France. The continuous improvement stage seeks to sustain the momentum generated in the first three stages of reform and Frederick’s speech marks the first time that he felt compelled to convey to his citizens why he was asking them to go to war. An appeal for all citizens to see themselves as one nation and rise up to fight for the common defense replaced the reliance in 1806 of “service through discipline.” This appeal, made to both the aristocracy and the recently abolished serfs, was indicative of the reform within Prussia initiated by Scharnhorst.⁶³

Perhaps the greatest example of continuous improvement within the Prussian military came from the success following the death of von Scharnhorst. The General was shot in the leg during the battle of Lützen and died from infection on 28 June 1813. However, the loss of Prussia’s driving reformer did not limit a combined force of allies that defeated Emperor Napoleon at Leipzig in 1813 and the Battle of Waterloo on 18 June 1815. The general staff that von Scharnhorst instituted, the *Reglement of 1812*, and the Third Ministry combined to enable the Prussians in league with Austrian, British, Russian, and Dutch allies to continuously make decisions faster than the French and ultimately led to Emperor Napoleon’s defeat.

Cultural Change.

The final stage of renewal is primarily a result of the other four. To fully realize culture change, an organization must change the way employees view themselves and their work. In this stage, employees realize that their work has meaning, flowing from increased opportunity. In 1813, the Prussian army differed from the army of 1806 due to its increase in morale. In 1806, the standard Prussian soldier was a mercenary or simple conscript fighting for pay or to avoid

corporal punishment. By 1813, the Prussian soldier was led by officers who shared his hardship and was motivated by a hatred of the French. In the 1806, Prussian army officers were given positions directly relating to their birth and social standing. By 1819, over 40% of active officers in the army were commoners by birth. To illustrate the change this had on the officer corps, by 1861 one-third of active officers were non-aristocratic.⁶⁴

Von Scharnhorst accomplished a cultural change within Prussia resulting from a significant loss. From 1806 until his death in 1813, he instituted sweeping reforms that enabled the Prussian military to restructure for capacity, create opportunity through bureaucracy bashing, empower decision makers through involvement, continuously improve on processes, and change the very culture of the Prussian military. Von Scharnhorst designed his programs to create leaders capable of fighting during a new era created in the military revolution begun by the French.⁶⁵ He integrated these new leaders into the army and created a more professional military that was the product of a new culture for continuous improvement.

PART IV: Today's Marine Corps

The Marine Corps of 2017 would benefit from a study of private business practices such as those advocated by Beatty/Ulrich. Although the Corps is not selling a product or providing a service to consumers, it is subject to the need to reenergize its practices. The need to innovate is central to both the *Marine Corps Operating Concept*⁶⁶ and The Commandant's Message to the Force 2017.⁶⁷ However, innovation does not happen in a vacuum or because a higher officer demands that it occurs. If the Marine Corps and the U.S. military at large want to foster innovation, they need to seriously look at what models the private sector uses to reenergize

internally. Beatty/Ulrich provide an example of how one can reform an organization “to change faster on the inside than the organization is changing on the outside.”⁶⁸ At the very heart of the Commandant’s message is the realization that the Marine Corps is fearful of being caught flat-footed in the next military action. By studying the Organizational Life Cycle, one can see the Marine Corps firmly in the maturity phase. The “change challenge” associated with the maturity phase is the requirement for renewal. Renewal should not be viewed as “change for changes sake” but renewal to challenge the established way of how things are done to find instances that can be refined and improved. The Marine Corps finds itself in an environment dominated with “near-peer” and possibly peer adversaries that develop and field weapons that rival the lethality of U.S. systems. Because of the parity of weapons across militaries, the renewal challenge will be found in how various processes are refined to increase tempo and speed of administration, operations, and individual actions.

Restructuring.

During von Scharnhorst’s time, the restructuring phase focused on downsizing of the Prussian officer corps. The Marine Corps of today could follow Scharnhorst’s example during its restructuring phase. Although utopian in thought, the author acknowledges that downsizing the force should would also mean downsizing the budget potentially making the Marine Corps irrelevant. Instead of cashiering large numbers of service members the Corps should instead focus on innovating formal training systems and structures that create better educated more responsive Marines.

Bureaucracy Bashing.

Emancipation and the end of corporal punishment began the bureaucracy-bashing stage for Scharnhorst. He correctly realized that he would need both objectives to be met in order to

make universal conscription acceptable to Prussia. During this stage, he also took steps to limit the inept cadet schools and replace them with his Military School for Officers and increase the form and function of the general staff.

The Marine Corps, during its bureaucracy-bashing stage, should not focus on the sweeping social changes that von Scharnhorst contended with, but it should limit its scope to helping Marines identify impediments to their jobs and replacing loyalty with opportunity. This stage should begin from the top of the Marine Corps. General officers need to work to limit the annual training and other reports that lower echelons spend much of their time fulfilling. To some, these requirements put undue strain on the ability of company-grade officers to “know their Marines, and look out for their welfare” and tailor their training to accomplish the mission. To replace loyalty with opportunity, the Marine Corps should explore updating the antiquated promotion system that requires minimum time in grade prior to being considered for the next rank. The Marine Corps should allow commanding officers to decide if their Marines can assume the job of the next rank and then make recommendations if they should be screened for promotion. Overhauling the promotion system could replace loyalty with opportunity, and limiting the amount of annual training and unneeded reports allows Marines to focus on the “right” work of training their Marines.

Employee Involvement.

The capstone of General von Scharnhorst’s employee involvement stage was the publication of the *Reglement of 1812*. The doctrine espoused in this document moved decision making to the lowest levels and allowed officers and non-commissioned officers to make decisions within the greater framework of the mission order. The Marine Corps should borrow from von Scharnhorst during its employee-involvement stage. Often young captains and

lieutenants are stymied in their ability to make decisions on the battlefield. With the advent of persistent overhead coverage and longer-range communications, it is possible for a general officer to tactically move units down to the squad level. If the Marine Corps truly subscribes to maneuver warfare, it needs to create situations that allow junior leaders to make decisions. This begins with schooling and mindset. An emphasis should be placed on “free play” scenarios at all levels of schools and training within the Marine Corps. It also may not be enough to say, “We should read five books a year,” but senior officers should create instances where Marines all read one book together and discuss the ramifications of the operation and how they can learn from it today.⁶⁹

Continuous Improvement.

During von Scharnhorst’s time, the continuous improvement stage was not realized through concrete steps, but through refinement and exploration of the previous three steps. Critical to his thinking was realizing that a reform of the Prussian military would not happen overnight. The Marine Corps of 2017 should follow suit. Today it may not be enough for the Commandant of the Marine Corps to consistently call for innovation and reform. Unfortunately, any changes begun during his tenure may not be realized until far into the future. The Marine Corps should focus on refinement of the first three lessons. Although this paper has given some examples where improvement may be necessary, it should not be taken as an exhaustive list by any means. By empowering the lower levels of leadership to succeed with the means at hand within the framework of the “mission order,” they could realize success over time.

Cultural Change.

As stated earlier, to realize cultural change within an organization, the way employees view themselves and their work needs to change. Although the Marine Corps of today is not

faced with an existential threat like the Prussia of 1806, it must allow Marines to continuously find meaning in their work resulting from increased opportunity throughout the force. By refocusing formal training systems, overhauling promotions, allowing commanders to tailor training to their units, and enabling Marines to contribute to the mission by the means they find necessary, the Marine Corps of 2025 and beyond can realize cultural change.

Private businesses remain relevant in competing markets through their ability to innovate. Beatty/Ulrich supplied one model that businesses can use to foster a culture change that leads to innovation within organizations. Although the Marine Corps is not a private business in the sense that it exists to make profit, it does provide a service to the people of the United States. It is time that the Marine Corps stop its “business as usual” practice and devote itself to wholesale change. This paper provides one method of cultural change and explains how that framework can be applied retroactively to a historical case study. The Marine Corps of 2017 cannot afford to come up short when the nation calls, it is time that it lives up to its task of “being most ready when the nation is least ready.” By incorporating existing business practices, the Marine Corps can achieve that goal.

Endnotes

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