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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Breaking the Barrier Between Operations and Intelligence

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: Breaking the Barrier Between Operations and Intelligence

Author: Major Joshua A. Bullard, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The current training pipeline for operations and intelligence officers has created an inherent disconnect and lack of operations and intelligence integration during ground combat operations at the tactical level.

Discussion: To research the effects of operations' and intelligence's segregated training pipelines on operations and intelligence integration, I first needed to determine if there is a barrier between operations and intelligence. To accomplish this, I reached out to former battalion and regimental Ground Combat Element commanders to get their perspective on operations and intelligence integration within their units. Additionally, I conducted a review of forty staff evaluations conducted by the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG). These evaluations were conducted on a combination of battalion, regimental, and Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SP-MAGTF) staffs. Finally, I developed a quiz that covered basic operations and intelligence concepts and administered it to a mixture of operations and intelligence officers. The premise of the quiz was to determine the understanding each occupational field had for the other compared to their understanding of their own.

Next, I needed to determine whether current training supported operation and intelligence integration. To accomplish this, I reviewed the number of hours of intelligence training that operations officers received in their formal schools. For this review, I looked at the following schools: Officer Candidate School, The Basic School, Infantry Officer Course, Expeditionary Warfare School, Command and Staff College, and the Tactical MAGTF Integration Course. Then, I conducted a review of the Intelligence Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual to identify any T&R tasks that specify for intelligence to integrate with operations. Since both formal training and on the job training are based on T&R tasks, by examining the tasks, I could identify training required for intelligence to integrate with operations.

Conclusion: There is a lack of operations and intelligence integration occurring within the Ground Combat Element (GCE). This lack of integration is aided by the separate and distinct training pipelines for the operations and intelligence officers. By creating more touch points earlier in their formal education, creating more opportunities to conduct force on force execution, and adding integration performance steps to the training and readiness manual, you enhance the ability of operations and intelligence officers to integrate. Finally, I recommend that this study be furthered by researching the impact that the disparity in rank between the operations and intelligence officer at the battalion and regimental level has on operations and intelligence integration.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Introduction

> *Operations and Intelligence. "Two sides of the same coin. Intelligence not tied to decision-making lacks value. Operations planned or decisions made without consideration for the weather, the enemy, the terrain, or the human environment creates risk. That risk can be measured in lost opportunities, failed missions, actions without meaningful impact, or even the lives of Marines. The synergy gained when operations and intelligence are tightly nested provides a decisive advantage to the MAGTF and each of its elements. As our technological dominance over future opponents erodes, it is our tightly integrated operations and intelligence efforts that will preserve our qualitative edge."*
>
> - MCISRE Plan 2015-2020[1]

"Intelligence drives operations," is a maxim that Marines use to describe the relationship between operations and intelligence. However, nothing in the Marine Corps doctrine or training adequately describes the intricacies of how this relationship is supposed to work. Joint Publication 2.0, *Joint Intelligence,* states that "intelligence should be synchronized with operations."[2] In Mark Miller's paper, *The Integration of Operations and Intelligence Getting Information to the Warfighter,* he distinguishes the difference between synchronization and integration. The term synchronized insinuates that operations and intelligence are two separate processes conducted at the same time. Synchronization perpetuates an environment where operations and intelligence act as separate and distinct disciplines working to achieve the same goal. Instead of synchronizing efforts, operations and intelligence should strive to integrate.[3] Integration is defined by *Webster* as the process to "make whole or complete by adding or bringing together parts."[4] The integration of operations and intelligence brings together two individual sections and fuses them together as a single team working together toward the same goal. To achieve this goal it is essential to conduct integrated training. However, the Marine Corps training construct does not support this. The current training pipeline for operations and intelligence officers has created an inherent disconnect and lack of operations and intelligence integration during ground combat operations at the tactical level.

For the purposes of this discussion, operations and intelligence integration will be defined as a symbiotic relationship between operations and intelligence resulting in a shared understanding of tactics and tactical considerations for both friendly and adversarial capabilities, collection capabilities and employment, and intelligence processes and capabilities that aids in planning and decision-making. In application, operations and intelligence integration at the tactical level is characterized by the following:

1. Shared understanding of friendly and adversary decision points
2. Operations has understanding of all collection capabilities and has ensured all assets are tasked and employed correctly
3. Intelligence has an understanding of all friendly units and capabilities and has analyzed the effects of weather and terrain on these units
4. Intelligence has an understanding of tactics and tactical tenants, and operations have an understanding of the adversary's capabilities. Adversarial courses of action (COA) are developed with coordination between the operations and intelligence section.
5. Adversarial COAs and centers of gravity are integrated into the development of friendly COAs
6. Operations and intelligence are working together to support the commander's decision-making process

This paper will focus on operations and intelligence integration within the Marine Corps' Ground Combat Element. The study of operations and intelligence integration was conducted in two parts. First, by evaluating whether or not integration is being conducted at the battalion and regimental level. This was accomplished by reviewing the perspectives of battalion and regimental commanders on the integration of their operations and intelligence officers. Then, by conducting an examination the 2014 - 2016 formal staff evaluations from the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG) battle staff training program. Second, a thorough review of the Marine Corps' training program was conducted. This examination focused on the formal schools and training and readiness manuals for intelligence officers. Lastly, to compare the results of the current training pipeline, a quiz with combined basic operations and

intelligence questions was provided to operations and intelligence students at the captain and major level to compare how well they understand each other's fields.

As the Director of Intelligence for the MCTOG, from 2013 - 2016, I was in a unique position to conduct staff evaluations on most of the regiments and battalions in the Marine Corps. During these evaluations, the lack of operations and intelligence integration emerged as a noticeable trend. Intelligence officers across the Marine Corps lacked a basic understanding of tactics and tactical tenants. This lack of knowledge caused them to produce analysis and COAs that were of little to no value to the commander. Operations officers lacked knowledge of intelligence processes and capabilities, limiting their ability to integrate collections and intelligence with operations. The current training pipeline for operations and intelligence officers has created an inherent disconnect and lack of operations and intelligence integration during ground combat operations at the tactical level.

Operations officers' initial MOS training is Infantry Officer Course (IOC), which focuses on the skill sets to become a platoon commander. From that point on, they receive no other formal education on being an operations officer except for the Tactical MAGTF Integration Course (TMIC) conducted by the MCTOG. Battalion and regimental intelligence officers come from varied and specialized backgrounds. Initial MOS training for intelligence is broken down into four distinct disciplines: Ground Intelligence, Air Intelligence, Human Intelligence, and Signals Intelligence. Each of these disciplines is very specialized and has little to no integration with operations. The one exception is ground intelligence. Ground Intelligence Officers attend IOC with their operations counterparts; however, the focus for them is to become a scout sniper platoon commander, not on the integration of operations and intelligence. These four disciplines

all come back together around the Captain level (timing varies) at the MAGTF Intelligence Officer Course (MIOC). MIOC is a requirement to become a battalion/regimental intelligence officer. Intelligence officers are also required to attend TMIC. TMIC is the only place within the Marine Corps where operations and intelligence officers are trained together.

One of TMIC's core principles is the focus on operations and intelligence integration, but during this course, the students are separated into individual courses. Even though divided into individualized courses, the operations and intelligence students do have shared classes and work together in a three-week practical exercise. While TMIC is a step in the right direction, it is unable to teach both the intelligence and operations officer their core responsibilities and integration at the same time.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To study the effects of operations' and intelligence's segregated training pipelines on operations and intelligence integration, I first needed to determine if there is a barrier between operations and intelligence. To accomplish this, I reached out to former battalion and regimental Ground Combat Element (GCE) commanders to get their perspective on operations and intelligence integration within their units. Additionally, I conducted a review of forty staff evaluations conducted by the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG). These evaluations were performed on a combination of battalion, regimental, and Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SP-MAGTF) staffs. Finally, I developed a quiz that covered basic operations and intelligence concepts and administered it to a mixture of operations and intelligence officers. The premise of the quiz was to determine the understanding each occupational field had for the other compared to their understanding of their own.

Next, I needed to determine whether current training supported operation and intelligence integration. To accomplish this, I reviewed the number of hours of intelligence training that operations officers received in their formal schools. For this review, I looked at the following schools: Officer Candidate School, The Basic School, Infantry Officer Course, Expeditionary Warfare School, Command and Staff College, and the Tactical MAGTF Integration Course. Then, I conducted a review of the Intelligence Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual to identify any T&R tasks that specify for intelligence to integrate with operations. Since both formal training and on the job training are based on T&R tasks, by examining the tasks, I could identify training required for intelligence to integrate with operations.

Analysis of Competing Hypothesis is a tool that I used to give some analytical structure to my argument on whether or not there is a lack of operations and intelligence integration.

Below is an example with weighted values for the facts that the research would uncover. I used this as a simple tool to help generate observable facts that would help prove or disprove my overall hypothesis that there is a lack of operations and intelligence integration within the GCE at the battalion and regimental level. It also helped with categorizing my facts and generating more specific hypotheses.

Figure 1.

	Commander's Perspective (wt 2)	Formal Evaluations (wt 2)	General OCCFLD Understanding (wt 1)	Total
Successful Integration	X			2
Lack of Integration		X	X	3

For the commander's perspective, my goal was to receive the perspective of at least five previous commanders. I had hypothesized that the majority (close to seventy-five percent)of the commanders would indicate that they had observed barriers to operations and intelligence integration. I further hypothesized that they would identify intelligence's lack of tactical understanding as a key contributor. If at least fifty percent or more of the commanders indicated that they had observed a barrier between operations and intelligence, then I would score that as a failure to integrate.

For the next evaluation category, I used forty formal staff evaluations conducted by MCTOG. Part of the review would be to determine if there was a failure to integrate operations and intelligence; the second part would be to identify any trends that hindered integration. I had hypothesized that over fifty percent of the evaluations would be failing. To categorize the evaluations, the following metric was applied: if less than seventy-five percent of the evaluations were passing, then that would be an indicator of a lack of integration.

The last evaluation category would come from an integrated operations and intelligence quiz given to both operations and intelligence officers. I had hypothesized that the each group (operations and intelligence) would score around eighty percent on the questions related to their occupational field and around fifty percent on the questions that were relating to their counterparts' occupational field. For the results to demonstrate successful integration, both test groups would need to score higher than eighty percent on their questions, and no more than a twenty percent difference in their score on the questions outside of their field.

I used the review of the formal training and T&R manual to determine how training effects integration. I had hypothesized that there would be a lack of intelligence training provided to operations officers in their formal training. If their formal training time that was focused on intelligence was less than ten percent of their overall training, then I considered it a barrier to integration. For the intelligence T&R review, I had hypothesized that there would not be a T&R task that directly called for or inferred for integration with operations. Out of the total number of T&R tasks, if there are five percent or higher that called for or inferred integration with operations that would not be considered a barrier.

CHAPTER ONE – COMMANDER'S PERSPECTIVES

Operations and intelligence integration is done with the ultimate goal of supporting the commander's decision-making process. So in trying to determine if there is an issue with operations and intelligence integration, one must start by getting the commander's perspective. In order to gain the commander's perspective, I reached out to former battalion and regimental level Ground Combat Element (GCE) commanders. My intent was to get the perspective of at least eight former commanders to help determine whether or not there was an issue with integration within the GCE. I was only able to get the perspectives of three former commanders, which are not enough to make a conclusive determination based on this metric alone. However, the information I did collect is still relevant in understanding the issues related to operations and intelligence integration. The perspectives provided were done so with the understanding that it would not be attributable.

To help frame the conversation, I provided each commander with the below attributes.[5] These were developed by the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group to describe the attributes that a good intelligence Marine should possess.

> 1. **Critical thinkers** –They have a disciplined thought process to minimize the bias, distortion, and inaccuracy that is inherent to all thinking. They analyze facts, generate and organize ideas, defend opinions, make comparisons, draw inferences, evaluate arguments, and solve problems.
> 2. **Communicators** – They are dedicated to conveying their assessments to the staff. With articulation, assertiveness, and credibility, ITIs continually integrate with the staff to ensure their counterparts welcome, trust, and use the intelligence provided.
> 3. **Tacticians**– With comprehensive knowledge of doctrinal USMC operations and adversary tactics; they evaluate the current situation and relevancy of doctrinal concepts in order to help define the problem, evaluate the effects of the battlespace on friendly and adversary operations, determine adversary courses of action, and support the development of the friendly scheme of maneuver.
> 4. **Technical experts**– With resourcefulness and comprehensive knowledge of doctrinal intelligence operations; ITIs leverage the capabilities of the nine intelligence disciplines to reduce the commander's uncertainty across the range of operations and in every operational environment.
> 5. **Forward thinkers** – With a bias for action, ITIs anticipate and plan for future events in order to help the staff understand their operational environment and help

> focus future operations. They anticipate and remain ahead of the enemy allowing friendly forces to gain and maintain the initiative.

First, I asked the commanders if they agreed with these attributes, and if they had any that they would add or subtract. Next, I asked them to rank their top three attributes. I used this to help me understand what that commander thought was the most important attribute in his intelligence officer. I had hypothesized that the majority of the commanders would state that their intelligence officer lacked an understanding of tactics and operational concepts that prevented them from effectively communicating and integrating with the operations officer. Based on this hypothesis, I expected to see "tacticians" and "communicators" in the top three of each commander. Because of my small data set, I was not able to establish a trend; however, all three commanders selected communicator in their top three with an emphasis on the ability to be assertive. All three commanders agreed with the attributes and did not offer to add or subtract any from the list.

Next, I tried to determine if they had issues with operations and intelligence integration, and what factors caused or alleviated it. Two of the three commanders stated that they had integration issues. The first commander stated that the intelligence officer lacked a breadth of experience to provide any real value. Additionally, they were not able to understand and anticipate the needs of the commander.[6] The second commander stated that their intelligence officer lacked confidence and was not able to provide the commander with the type of information he required. This commander wanted the intelligence officer to be an "opposing tension that could identify blind spots." He also expected his intelligence officer to be able to enable fires and "talk targeting together" with the operations officer.[7] The third commander did not have any integration issues and attributed this to his intelligence officer's previous billet as a platoon commander.[8]

The next item I tried to determine was whether operations and intelligence integration should be personality driven, trained by the unit and the commander, or be part of the formal training process. One commander thought that it was more personality driven and that the intelligence and operations officers should mentor each other. He also thought that ground intelligence officers that had previous infantry experience as platoon commanders were key.[9] The second commander stated that it is the commander's responsibility to train the intelligence and operations officers. He stated that it works best when units are left to train by themselves and can conduct collective training.[10] The third commander stated that all intelligence personnel should receive formal education, but that the education is an aid for the commander to be able to train the unit.[11]

While there were no clearly delineated trends identified, these perspectives highlight that there are many issues that can affect integration. One of the key takeaways that commanders agreed upon was the importance of the commander's role in integration. Whether formal training or force of personality can establish a foundation for integration, it does not alleviate the commander's responsibility to ensure that it is being trained to and executed.

CHAPTER TWO – FORMAL EVALUATIONS

The Marine Corps established an evaluation program to ensure that Marines are properly trained and prepared for the rigors of combat. The evaluation system is divided into two parts, formal and informal evaluations. These evaluations feed into and form the foundation of the commander's assessment of their unit. They are also used to evaluate a Marine's proficiency in his or her job. Informal evaluations are part of unit's basic training plan and are usually conducted and evaluated by the unit itself. Formal evaluations are generally service level events, that are scenario driven, and evaluated by outside personnel.[12]

Marine Corps Order 3502.7A, *MARINE CORPS GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT OPERATIONS AND TACTICS PROGRAM,* directs the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG) to establish a Battle Staff Training Program (BSTP). The BSTP provides subject matter experts to support unit training. The training provided by the BSTP was designed to be a continuation of individual and lower level collective tasks. The BSTP focused its efforts on Ground Combat Element companies, battalions, regiments, and at times, Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Tasks Forces (SP-MAGTF).[13] The BSTP would provide academic training packages and subject matter expertise during staff planning and execution of service level training events. A pivotal role during the execution of the BSTP event would be to provide the commander with an evaluation of the staff's planning and execution to aid the commander in making his assessment of the unit's readiness. To accomplish this evaluation, the BSTP would utilize the unit's mission essential tasks to develop the evaluation checklist based on the 7000 (battalion) to 9000 (SP-MAGTF) level collective tasks and associated event components.

During 2014-2016, the BSTP conducted forty staff evaluations that covered battalions, regiments, and SP-MAGTFs. During the regimental and SP-MAGTF evaluations, the tasks and event components to be evaluated were decided upon by the evaluating unit in coordination with

the MCTOG evaluation team. For the battalion evaluations, which composed the majority of this study (eighty-five percent), operations and intelligence integration was evaluated on the following two event components:

1. INF-C2-7003 Establish a Command Post (CP)
    * Event component number 5 – Establish an Intelligence Operations Center

2. INF C2 7010 Execute Command and Control (C2)
    * Event component number 3 – Track Decision Points Commander's Critical Information Requirements

These two event components were selected because they highlight key areas that require operations and intelligence to integrate. Evaluators assessed the ability of the unit's intelligence operations center to conduct the six functions of intelligence, and integrate these functions into the combat operations center to help reduce uncertainty and aid the commander in decision-making. They also assessed the ability of the operations and intelligence officers to identify and track decision points in the form of commander's critical information requirements. By identifying these decision points and anticipating when and where they are expected to appear on the battlefield, they can focus and prioritize collections. Additionally, this aids the commander in their decision-making, allowing them to make decisions faster, creating tempo and momentum.

During the forty evaluations conducted, there was a total of one hundred and forty-four individual event components assessed. Out of the assessed event components, only eighty-two were assessed as passing. At fifty-seven percent, this passing percentage falls short of the established expected value of seventy-five percent passing. These results point to a lack of operations and intelligence integration.

After reviewing the staff evaluations and after action reports, four major trends were identified: inadequate priority intelligence requirements (PIR) development, poor decision point

identification and tracking, lack of "so what" factor in intelligence updates, and a lack of PIRs tied to collections planning. The common theme behind the identified trends revolved around decision points and aiding the commander's decision-making process. The two objectives of intelligence are to reduce uncertainty and aid in force protection through counter intelligence.[14] Intelligence reduces uncertainty to aid the commander in his decision-making. Uncertainty is reduced by identifying gaps in information, prioritizing the gaps, and collecting on them. Intelligence also helps to identify key decision points, both for the commander and the adversary. During execution, the intelligence section helps track these decision points and provide relevant updates to the commander, enabling him to make decisions faster than the adversary.

After identifying gaps in information, intelligence turns these gaps into intelligence requirements.[15] These intelligence requirements are then prioritized, and some are turned into PIRs.[16] PIRs have to meet five criteria: "asks only one question, focuses on specific facts, events or activities concerning the adversary or the battlespace, is tied to mission planning, decision-making, and execution, provides a clear, concise statement of what intelligence is required, contains geographic and time elements to limit the scope of the requirement."[17] When drafting PIRs, it is important that each PIR meets each of the five criteria, and that the information needed is tied to mission success. PIRs are then used to form the basis of the collection plan.[18] When PIRs are not drafted correctly, the ability to collect the information needed to make a decision is endangered. During the evaluations, the trend that was identified is a lack of specificity in the created PIR. The PIRs created were too generalized and did not follow the prescribed format. This generalization hampered the ability to identify decision points and drive the collection plan to collect the required information on the decision points.

During the execution phase of an operation, the intelligence and operations section track decision points within the combat operations center (COC). The key tools used to assist the tracking of decision points are the CCIR list and the decision support template (DST). The CCIR list is a list of both friendly force information requirements and PIRs.[19] CCIRs provide the COC an awareness of information gaps that the commander needs to be answered. The DST is a graphic depiction of when and where key decisions are anticipated to be made on the battlefield. By displaying decision points graphically, staffs can track when and where a decision point is about to be triggered and help prepare the commander to make the best decision in a timely manner, increasing the operational tempo and helping to seize and maintain the initiative over the adversary. The CCIR list and DST are tools created by the staff during the planning process with heavy influence from the intelligence and operations section. The CCIR list is started during the planning process and refined throughout the planning. The DST takes the intelligence derived event template and builds upon it by adding target areas of interests and decision points. The DST is usually initiated during the course of action development step of the planning process, then refined during the course of action wargame. Once the DST is complete, it can then be turned into a decision support matrix (DSM).[20] Trends from the evaluations highlighted that most staffs were not using the DST/DSM during execution as tools that could aid in tracking decision points on the battlefield. Most often, the DST/DSM was either never created, or only used to support the course of action wargame.

Once PIRs are collected, processed, and analyzed, the information is converted into intelligence, and then packaged and produced in a manner that best aids the commander in his decision-making process. The trends from the evaluations highlighted the inability of intelligence officers to analyze the information and produce an intelligence product that was

useful to the commander. Most often, the intelligence section would regurgitate the information without analysis or the "so what" factor that would aid the commander in their decision-making. A key factor that affected intelligence officer's ability to do this is a lack of tactical knowledge. This lack of knowledge prevented intelligence officers from understanding the significance of the information and how it related to the commander's decision-making. It also prevented intelligence officers from being able to communicate the information effectively to the commander.

The last trend that was identified from the evaluations was the inability to connect PIRs to the collection process. Per the MCTP2-10A, *MAGTF Intelligence Collection*, the collection plan begins with the PIRs. The PIRs are prioritized and ranked in order of importance to the commander's decision-making process. Prioritization assists in the tasking and employment of limited collection assets and resources to answer the PIRs.[21] PIRs are then broken down by identifying indicators, specific information requirements for each indicator, and then specific orders or requests to provide to the collectors.[22] This process is facilitated by the use of a collections worksheet. It also ensures that the PIRs drive the collection plan, are broken down to identifiable indicators and that the collectors have a solid understanding of what to collect and report. During the evaluations, most units would develop PIRs, but the PIRs were not used during the development of the collection plan. The collection plans were built around finding and tracking the adversary. This lack of PIR integration resulted in collection plans that did not aid the commander in decision-making. It also caused the limited collection assets and resources to be wasted or used inefficiently. While some units would start the initial collection plan with PIRs, the PIRs would quickly be answered, and new PIRs would not be created. This lack of new PIRs led to collections planning that was not synchronized with maneuver, not prioritized,

and not linked to the commander's decision-making. In some instances, the tasking of collections assets would become so degraded and unfocused, that the collection assets would end the mission early or be reallocated to other units with more focused tasking. The lack of PIR integration into the collection plans highlights a lack of understanding of how collections supports the commander's decision-making.

CHAPTER THREE – INTEGRATED QUIZ

To help test my thesis and provide some quantifiable data to substantiate it, I created an operations and intelligence quiz. The concept of the quiz was to ask questions that focus on basic operational and tactical constructs as well as foundational intelligence concepts and processes to see how well operations and intelligence Marines understood the basics of each other's field. My hypothesis was that operations and intelligence Marines would demonstrate an understanding of their field, but would lack an understanding of the other's field. I had predicted that each would correctly answer approximately eighty percent on the questions relating to their field and sixty percent on questions outside of their field.

The quiz was given to operations and intelligence Marines between the rank of captain and major. It was constructed of fourteen operations focused questions worth a total of thirty-two points and seventeen intelligence focused questions worth a total of twenty-three points. The quiz was taken without the aid of reference or prior preparation. The quiz was administered using Google Forms which kept the identity of the quiz results anonymous. The only identifying information collected was whether the participant was an operations or intelligence Marine.

While this quiz was beneficial in providing quantifiable data for testing my thesis, it does have some drawbacks that cannot be overlooked. First, the population size of the quiz was very limited. Thirteen operations officers and ten intelligence officers took the quiz. While they were able to demonstrate a trend, the population size is too small to provide an accurate representation of all operations and intelligence Marines within the Marine Corps. Secondly, there was no way to account for the Marine's operational background and experience. Marines coming off of an operational tour would likely do better than a Marine coming off of a B-billet that had been removed from their field for an extended period. Lastly, the nature of the information tested is doctrinal and taken directly from key Marine Corps doctrinal publications. Most Marines do not

commit this type of information to memory, but would likely have a general understanding of where to find it in Marine Corps references. The test did not account for them knowing where to find it in Marine Corps references.

To calculate the results of the quiz, the intelligence and operations questions were scored based on a percentage of correct answers out of the total questions asked. The participants were separated into two groups, operations and intelligence. The two group's overall scores were then further divided into operations and intelligence questions. This separation provided four data sets for comparison: intelligence Marines' score on intelligence questions, intelligence Marines' score on operations question, operations Marines' score on intelligence, and operations Marines' score on operations.

The results for the intelligence Marines were more in line with my hypothesis than the operations Marines. Intelligence Marines averaged a score of ninety-eight percent on the intelligence related questions and averaged a score of seventy-nine percent on operations related questions. There was a difference of nineteen percent between their intelligence and operations score. While both scores were higher than my hypothesis, they demonstrate that intelligence Marines have a greater understanding of intelligence processes than they do of operations and tactics. However, the results of the operations Marines were not in line with my hypothesis and showed a surprising result. The operations Marines averaged a score of sixty-five percent on the operation related questions and an average of sixty-four percent on the intelligence related questions. The difference between their intelligence and operations score was one percent. These scores highlighted that the operations Marines did not have a solid understanding of operations and tactics or intelligence. Also surprising, was that the intelligence Marines scored fourteen percent higher than the operational Marines on the operations related questions.

While this quiz produced interesting results that need further exploration, the small number of participants limits the strength of the overall results and calls for further testing. However, the initial results of the quiz bring about two questions that need to be further researched. First, why are the operations Marines' scores fourteen percent lower than the intelligence Marines' scores? One area to explore for this is a possible lack of intermediate training at the senior captain level for operations Marines. The second area in question for further study is the difference between the operations and intelligence understanding for the intelligence Marines. Does this difference stem from a lack of formal training or from a lack of integrated on the job training with operations Marines?

CHAPTER FOUR – FORMAL SCHOOLS REVIEW

According to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication – 1, *Warfighting*, "Marine Corps doctrine today is based principally on warfare by maneuver."[23] One of the core concepts of maneuver warfare is to "orient on the enemy."[24] By orienting on the enemy, maneuver warfare seeks to attack the enemy's system by avoiding the enemy's strengths and identifying vulnerabilities within the system.[25] Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 2-10, *Intelligence Operations,* states that "accurate and timely intelligence is a prerequisite for success in maneuver warfare."[26] It furthers elaborates on intelligence's role in maneuver warfare. "Intelligence provides the knowledge of the enemy and the battlespace that permits the commander to reduce uncertainty, identify opportunities for success, assess risk, outline intent, and make decisions that provide focus, generate speed and tempo, and achieve decisive results."[27] The overall doctrinal concept of maneuver warfare highlights the importance of operations and intelligence integration. Even though the importance of operations and intelligence integration is clearly touted in Marine Corps doctrine, how well is it reinforced in Marine Corps training?

In 1993, the Marine Corps began its first in-depth look at how it trains and conducts intelligence. This evaluation was a direct result of the Congressional review of intelligence successes and failures during DESERT STORM. In the spring of 1993, the Senate Committee on Armed Services ordered the Marine Corps to "submit a roadmap for improving USMC intelligence capabilities."[28] Major General Paul Van Riper, acting as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence, was tasked with providing a response to Congress and fixing intelligence within the Marine Corps. To accomplish this task, Major General Van Riper conducted a study of the Marine Corps intelligence community and identified the following six deficiencies:[29]

1. Inadequate doctrinal foundation
2. Insufficient tactical intelligence support

3. Lack of structure and professional career development for intelligence officers
4. Insufficient joint manning
5. Insufficient language capability
6. Inadequate imagery capability

In response to the identified gaps, Major General Van Riper developed the "Plan for Revitalizing Marine Corps Intelligence."[30] In the plan, he first identified the mission of Marine Corps Intelligence. The mission statement follows: "Provide commanders, at every level, with tailored, timely, mission essential intelligence, and ensure that this intelligence is integrated into the operational planning process."[31] Additionally, the plan established the seven following principles for intelligence:[32]

1. The Focus Is Tactical Intelligence
2. Intelligence Focus Must be Downward
3. Intelligence Must Drive Operations
4. The Intelligence Effort Must be Directed and Managed by a Multi-disciplined Trained and Experienced Intelligence Officer
5. Intelligence Staffs Use Intelligence; Intelligence Organizations Produce Intelligence
6. The Intelligence Product Must be Timely and Tailored to Both the Unit and the Mission
7. The last step in the Intelligence Cycle is Utilization; Not Dissemination

Major General Van Riper also identified the importance that the commander plays in the intelligence process. The commander must have a basic understanding of the intelligence capabilities and processes. The plan as a whole implied that "the operations community must understand the capabilities and limitations of what intelligence can provide."[33] This line of thinking is consistent with Marine Corps doctrine and further highlights the importance of operations and intelligence integration. Additionally, it highlights the need for intelligence training within the operations community.

In 2005, Captain Pyke wrote a paper, *Improving USMC Intelligence Training,* which expanded this concept, examining the need for all officers in the Marine Corps to receive a basic intelligence course, focusing on the core intelligence competencies. His basic premise was that

the 1993 plan addressed the many issues within the intelligence community, but that intelligence integration was lacking based on other staff section's lack of intelligence understanding.[34]

To reach his conclusion, he conducted a thorough study of the formal training pipeline for officers to the degree of exposure to intelligence each officer received. His review of formal training started with Officer Candidate School (OCS) where the majority of all Marines officers (Naval Academy graduates are exempt) are screened and accessed for commissioning. OCS training focuses on evaluating leadership, moral character, and physical qualities required for selection to be a Marine Officer.[35] Next, Captain Pyke focused on the intelligence training conducted by The Basic School (TBS). TBS training prepares all Marine officers for the rigors of the operating forces as a company grade officers along with the warfighting skills needed as a rifle platoon commander.[36] He then focused on the first level of continuing education, Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS). EWS focuses on communication and leadership skills with an emphasis on Marine Air Ground Task Force and amphibious operations. It also prepares Officers for future billets by focusing on core skills they will require in their specific occupational field.[37] Finally, he examined the intelligence training conducted at Command and Staff College (CSC). CSC is an intermediate level school that focuses on the employment of the Marine Air Ground Task Force at the operational level and Joint and Combined service.[38]

Captain Pyke's research found that OCS does not cover intelligence within their program.[39] Out of the 1,500 hours of training received at TBS, only six hours were given to intelligence "like" training.[40] EWS provided the most intelligence related training with thirty-five and a half hours out of 2,016 dedicated to intelligence-related classes. The focus at EWS was on the intelligence preparation of the battlespace process.[41] At CSC, only one and a half hours were dedicated to intelligence within the core curriculum. However, CSC offers an

elective which could allow a student to receive up to twenty-three and a half hours of intelligence related training out of nearly 2,000 hours of instruction.[42]

The data collected by Captain Pyke is dated and required updating. Also, the focus for his data collection was on the intelligence training received by all Marine officers. For the scope of this paper, it has been reduced to the intelligence training received by operations officers within the Ground Combat Element. This narrowing of scope required the addition of the Infantry Officer Course (IOC) and Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group's (MCTOG) Tactical MAGTF Integration Course to the data collected.

OCS still does not include any intelligence focused training in its 1,583.45 hours of curriculum.[43] TBS only offers a one hour class that provides an introduction to intelligence. However, there are six and a half hours of intelligence "like" classes taught. That totals seven and a half hours out of the 1,911.03 hours of instruction provided.[44] IOC has zero intelligence-related training in its 1,216.6 hours of training.[45] EWS provides forty-three hours of intelligence-related training out of 1,110 hours of education.[46] CSC offers zero classes that focus on intelligence out of its 1,383.5 hours of education. However, CSC has 246 hours of practical exercise where intelligence is conducted to support the planning process. The issue with counting these exercise hours is that only one to two students in each conference group of roughly thirteen students provide the intelligence support. Additionally, the education from this is not standardized as some conference groups do not have intelligence personnel in them and the faculty advisors in the conference groups (excluding two of the sixteen) are not intelligence officers.[47] MCTOG offers twenty-four hours of intelligence related training out of 392.5 hours of total training.[48]

These numbers highlight the lack of intelligence exposure that operations officers receive. Out of the 7,597.1 hours of training that an operations officer receives, only seventy-four and a half deal with intelligence related material. That equals less than one percent of their total training and education. Even at MCTOG, the school that promotes operations and intelligence integration, operations officers only receive six percent of their training on intelligence. This lack of intelligence exposure results in operations officers being forced to learn about intelligence processes and capabilities through on the job training. High operational tempos and competing demands further strain their ability to learn.

CHAPTER FIVE – T&R REVIEW

The Training and Readiness (T&R) Program is the primary tool the Marine Corps uses to conduct standardized training. The T&R program provides training standards and evaluation tools to allow units to plan, conduct, and evaluate unit readiness. The core elements of the T&R Program, mission essential tasks, are developed by subject matter experts in the Marine Corps and are derived from the Marine Corps' Task List. The mission essential tasks are grouped together for different Ground Combat Element (GCE) communities to form mission essential task lists (METL). Each GCE community has its own METL, which are outlined in their specific T&R manual. The intelligence community's T&R manual is the NAVMC 3500.100B titled the *Intelligence Training and Readiness Manual.*[49]

Each GCE T&R manual is further broken down into collective and individual level tasks. Collective tasks are ones that are performed by a team or group. Individual tasks are performed by an individual, and they form the foundation for collective tasks. Figure 2 shows the hierarchy of tasks and their associated level from 1000 to 9000. The 1000 level tasks are considered entry-level individual training, are conducted by formal schools and continued out of the schoolhouse as on the job training. The 2000 level tasks are considered advanced level individual training and can be conducted at advanced schools or as on the job training. The 3000 – 9000 level tasks are considered collective training, and their target group is based on the size of the group conducting the task, ranging from a small group up to full command elements.[50]

Individual Training **Entry-Level Formal School Training (Core Skills)**	**Individual Training** **Skills Progression MOJT, Advanced Level Schools (Core Plus Skills)**	**Collective Training** **Crew/Team**
1000-level	2000-level	3000-level
Collective Training **Squad/Section**	**Collective Training** **Platoon**	**Collective Training** **Company**
4000-level	5000-level	6000-level
Collective Training **Battalion/Squadron**	**Collective Training** **Regiment/Group**	**Collective Training** **Command Element**
7000-level	8000-level	9000-level

Figure 2.[51]

Collective tasks are compromised of three key parts: the condition, the standard, and the event components.[52] The condition provides the environment and tools needed for the task to be conducted. The standard identifies when the tasks have been completed to an acceptable level. The event component is a list of individual tasks that must be completed before the overall collective tasks can be accomplished. Individual tasks are similar to the collective tasks, except they have performance steps in place of event components. Performance steps detail the steps necessary to complete the individual task.

The purpose of reviewing the Intelligence T&R is to identify the linkages between operations and intelligence within the T&R Program. Specifically, to identify any tasks within the intelligence T&R that direct intelligence personnel to coordinate with the operations section. Secondly, to identify any tasks that require intelligence personnel to understand and apply tactics and tactical considerations to aid in friendly or adversary course of action development. Because the Intelligence T&R manual covers the entire intelligence military occupational specialty (MOS), this paper will primarily focus on the 0202/0233 MOS tasks, as these are the tasks required for a GCE battalion and regimental intelligence officer. To gain a thorough

understanding of the 0202/0233 training requires the examination of the collective and individual tasks along with the event components/performance steps of each task.

The regimental and battalion, 7000 and 8000, level collective tasks focus on providing support to a specified function such as targeting, planning, or force protection. The commonality among these tasks is that intelligence is in a supporting role to operations and the commander. For the intelligence section to provide the right support, one can assume that the intelligence section has conducted coordination with the operations section and commander to provide useful and tailored support. However, the events components that detail the required steps needed to carry out each task is missing any steps that highlight coordination, synchronization, or integration between the intelligence section and the operations section. This lack of integration is a critical that keeps the intelligence section from obtaining operational understanding and pertinence. One could argue that coordination and integration is inherent in event components/performance steps that start with "provide" or "disseminate" a certain type of intelligence product. However, generating intelligence without an understanding of the operational context is generating intelligence for intelligence's sake and leads to wasted time and products that do not provide support or aid in decision-making.[53]

Continuing this line of logic, one would expect to see the 1000 and 2000 individual level tasks cover operational considerations, tactics, and integration/coordination. The 1000 and 2000 level tasks are written either as general tasks that support all intelligence MOSs or by specific MOS. For this discussion, the focus will be on the general intelligence tasks and the 0202 MAGTF Intelligence Officer's tasks. The battalion and regimental intelligence officer billets are coded as a 0202 billet. The 1000 and 2000 level tasks for the 0202 have very little operational integration inherent in them, and they totally lack any tasks associated with understanding

tactics, tactical considerations, and adversarial use of tactics. The overarching theme in these tasks is the ability to direct intelligence processes and apply analytical approaches to these processes.

The 0202-DIRT-2001 task, *Direct the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) in Support of Operations*, comes the closest to achieving operational integration and understanding tactics in the conduct of its performance steps. Performance steps four through eight imply that there is coordination with operations, but does not specifically direct it. Performance step four, *Identify Employment Considerations Specific to the Operating Unit*, implies that there is an understanding of the unit's organic and attached capabilities. This understanding is vital to accurately analyze the effects of the weather and terrain on friendly operations and to conduct an accurate relative combat power assessment. To achieve an accurate analysis, there must be close coordination with the intelligence section and the operations section. Performance step five, *Evaluate the Adversary*, vaguely hints at the need to apply tactical considerations. To evaluate the adversary's course of action (COA), the intelligence section will consider all possible courses of action available to the adversary. This consideration is typically done by evaluating and adversary's ability to defend, retrograde, attack, withdraw, or delay.[54] While this provides some context to the adversary's action, it does little to inform decision makers on the details of the adversary's COA needed for detailed planning and decision-making. This lack of detailed understanding leads to the development of a vague and highly generalized likely and most dangerous COAs that are lacking any detail or predictive value. When comparing this type of COA to a friendly COA that is broken up into multiple phases, parts, steps, and then refined by the actions of each warfighting section during these phases, parts, and steps, leads to a disparity in the assessment of the adversary. If there was an

understanding of adversarial tactics that was coordinated with operations, then performance step six, *Identify Threats to the Operating Unit*, would be more effective and better assist decision makers in the development of friendly COAs. Performance step eight, *Refine Decision Points with the Operations Section*, also requires detailed coordination and integration with operations. Operations must have an understanding of the adversary and the event template produced by intelligence to understand the adversary and the adversary's decision points.[55] Intelligence must have a solid understanding of tactics and the friendly course of action to assist operations in determining friendly decision points and target areas of interest.[56]

On 20 January 2016, Marine Corps Order 3502.7, *Marine Corps Ground Element Operations and Tactics Training Program (OTTP)*, was signed. The OTTP requires that all regimental and battalion intelligence officers receive the 0233, Intelligence and Tactics Instructor (ITI) MOS. The OTTP thus requires the review of the 0233 tasks to broaden our understanding of the 0202 tasks. ITIs are created by attending the Tactical MAGTF Integration Course taught by the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Training Group (MCTOG). MCTOG was created to train the GCE's intelligence and operations officers and chiefs to integrate operations and intelligence in both conventional and irregular warfare.[57] To accomplish this mission, MCTOG generated specific T&R tasks for the 0233 that were included in June 2016 Intelligence Training and Readiness Manual. Out of the thirteen 0233 tasks, all but two were deemed necessary for 0202s and were integrated into the 0202 required tasks. The two exceptions were the 0200-GEN-2010 task and the 0233-ITI-2001 task. Task 0200-GEN-2010, *Support the development of tactics to counter adversarial threats*, is the only task in the T&R manual that directly ties to tactics and the understanding of tactical employment.[58]

The 0203 MOS is the one exception to the lack of operations and intelligence integration related tasks within the Intelligence Training and Readiness Manual. The 0203 is the required MOS for ground intelligence officers. Ground intelligence officers serve as the scout sniper platoon commanders for the infantry battalions within the GCE. They can also serve as the assistant intelligence officer within the battalion. In Jun 2016, the Intelligence T&R Manual was rewritten to include new tasks for the 0203. The 0203 now has the same tasks as the 0302 infantry officer.[59]

The MOS training progression for the 0203 starts with the Infantry Officer Course. This course is an MOS producing course that produces the 0302 MOS. Ground intelligence officers attend this course to gain a better understanding of platoon level tactics that will prepare them to be a scout sniper platoon commander. From there, the 0203 then attends the Ground Intelligence Officers Course. This course focuses on basic intelligence processes that enable the 0203 to have a baseline understanding of intelligence and how ground reconnaissance feeds into the process. The last course the 0203 attends is the Scout Sniper Platoon Commander Course. This course prepares the 0203 to train, plan, and execute ground reconnaissance operations. Since ground reconnaissance operations are integrated into ground operations, it is inherent for the 0203 to have and maintain the same individual skills as the 0302.[60]

While the 0203 receives the same basic level training as the 0302, it is not a guarantee that the 0203 will become a battalion or regimental intelligence officer. The battalion and regimental intelligence officer's positions are coded as 0202, MAGTF Intelligence Officer, billets. Four intelligence officer billets feed into the 0202 MOS at the captain level: 0203 Ground Intelligence, 0204 Human Intelligence, 0206 Signals Intelligence, and 0207 Air Intelligence. Once these four MOS reach the level of captain, they attend the MAGTF

Intelligence Officer Course (MIOC) to become 0202s. MIOC also accepts captains that have been laterally moved from other MOSs into the intelligence MOS. These captains have no prior intelligence training except for the training that they receive at MIOC. This organizational structure leads to only one of the five potential sources for 0202s to have any operational and tactical training.[61]

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

There is a lack of operations and intelligence integration occurring within the Ground Combat Element (GCE). I have reached this conclusion by comparing the results of my research to the expected values that I had established in my research design. The first category for my analysis was based on former commanders' perspectives of operations and integration within their units. As stated in chapter one, the data for this category was inconclusive due to limited data collection. I recommend that there be further study on this in the future. The second category for my analysis was based on formal staff evaluations conducted by the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG). After reviewing the forty evaluations, it was determined that eighty-two out of one hundred and forty-four event codes evaluated were passing (fifty-seven percent). This outcome is below the established expected value of seventy-five percent, indicating that there is a potential lack of integration. The last category was based on the results of an integrated operations and intelligence quiz. This category was not cut and dry due to the mixed results. The intelligence officers averaged ninety-eight percent on the intelligence related questions, and seventy-nine percent on the operations related questions. Based on my expected value, this portion was barely above the percentage point that would indicate no barriers to integration. However, the operations officers averaged sixty-five percent on the intelligence questions, and sixty-five percent on the operations related questions. Based on the stated expected values, this indicates that the operations officers failed both portions and would indicate a barrier to integration. Since operations failed both sections and the intelligence officers barely passed the operations section, I concluded that the overall results presented themselves as a barrier to integration.

The segregated training pipelines are a contributing factor to the lack of operations and intelligence integration. My research has shown that operations officers receive 7,597.1 hours of training and education. Out of that number, only seventy-four and a half hours (less than one percent) are focused on intelligence. Additionally, twenty-four of these intelligence focused hours are provided to the operations officer just prior to them assuming their billet. This limited exposure to intelligence processes and capabilities force the operations officers to learn intelligence while on the job. This leads to successful operations and intelligence integration being a matter of personality. Either the personality and capability of the operations officer or the mentorship and influence of the commander force integration to occur or there is no integration. The results from the MCTOG evaluations indicate that this is only happening approximately sixty percent of the time.[62]

Another contributing factor that prevents operations and intelligence integration stems from the absence of training and readiness (T&R) tasks and performance steps that specify for it to occur. The T&R tasks are the primary driver behind unit and formal training. The performance steps within each task are used as an evaluation checklist to ensure the correct and accurate completion of the task. Without this being specifically called out in the performance steps, it is not being evaluated; therefore it does not happen.

Recommendations

In a perfect world, my recommendation would be to combine the operations and intelligence officers' occupational field. The combining of the occupational fields would ensure that all intelligence and operations officers fully understood the needs and capabilities that the other has to offer, and ensure that both the operations and intelligence officers had the required clearances. It would also alter the way that each occupational field looks at a problem set, and

help to ensure that there is operations and intelligence integration when conducting problem-solving. Additionally, it would enhance the intelligence capabilities within the infantry companies and strengthen the company level intelligence cell concept.

After finishing The Basic School, these officers would attend the Infantry Officer Course and Scout Sniper Platoon Commander's Employment Course. Upon completion of these two courses, they would then attend a basic intelligence course that would provide the fundamental principles of intelligence. After the intelligence course, they would be divided into five categories based on their demonstrated aptitudes: infantry platoon/company commander, ground intelligence, air intelligence, human intelligence, and signals intelligence. At the rank of captain, they would all come back together and attend a new course that would be a combination of the MAGTF Intelligence Officer Course and the Tactical MAGTF Integration Course (TMIC). Once complete, these officers could be assigned to either an operations or intelligence billet and would rotate between these billets throughout their career. This plan, however, has many issues that make it impractical and unrealistic. It would cause throughput and capacity issues as it would increase the required training time and class sizes. Additionally, it would create an extended time gap between training and the time that they would join the operating forces. It would also increase the finances required to conduct the extended training. Also, there is a potential to create a divide between those that are selected to be platoon/company commanders and those that go to a specialized intelligence billet.

There are smaller, more realistic steps that the Marine Corps can take to increase operations and intelligence integration. This current lack of integration within the GCE stems from the separate training pipelines for operations and intelligence officers. Operations and intelligence training do not come together until the officers attend TMIC. TMIC is a good start;

however, it is too little too late. While TMIC is able to devote six percent of its academic time to focus on intelligence related topics, this comes too late in the career progression of the operations officer. They have no prior foundational knowledge established to build upon.

By incorporating more intelligence training into their formal education, you begin to build a basic understanding that progresses with each level of their education, providing a solid foundation for understanding. This foundation should start with training at The Basic School. The Basic School should begin with an introduction to the basic collection capabilities found within the Marine Corps. Additionally, it should start developing the foundations for the relationship between maneuver and collections, describing how maneuver can spike/generate collections and how maneuver at times becomes the collector. The next level would take place at Infantry Officer Course. Here, there should be a focus on the Company Level Intelligence Cell highlighting the type of support it can provide and the processes that they use. Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) would then build upon collection capabilities expanding beyond the Marine Corps' capabilities and incorporating National and Theater level capabilities. They would also begin an introductory intelligence course that covered basic intelligence concepts and processes. Finally, Command and Staff College (CSC) could expand upon EWS and introduce more complex ideas such as stability and civil considerations. Collectively, this would build a solid foundation for operations officers so that when they do attend TMIC, the focus could be solely on the integration and proper application of intelligence vice developing a basic understanding of its processes.

The Observe Orient Decide Act (OODA) Loop, developed by Colonel John Boyd, highlights the importance of being able to orient one's self to a problem quickly. The ability to orient stems from one's previous experiences, cognitive biases, and cultural influences. The

faster one can orient themselves, the faster they can decide and act, therefore creating a faster decision cycle than their adversary. One of the key elements to faster orientation is exposure to problem sets.[63] Exposure can be created through reading, studying, and immersion (practical applications or case studies). EWS and CSC could create more immersion opportunities by incorporating more force on force wargaming, or kriegspiels into the curriculum. This immersion would provide more exposures to complex problems, and in turn, provide students with more warfighting repetitions in a consequence free environment. Both organizations are very good at conducting planning exercises and practical applications, but both are lacking in the execution of the plan. During planning exercises, it is harder to identify when there are disconnects between operations and intelligence, but they become easily observable during execution. Highlighting the disconnects between operations and intelligence during execution also makes them more memorable and heightens the learning experience for the students; this creates internal memory cues that will increase the student's abilities to orient faster. Only by executing a plan against an adversary can you truly test your planning. By executing the plan, the student would achieve a far greater learning experience and would increase their ability to orient faster on the battlefield.

By incorporating some small modifications to the current T&R tasks, you can enhance operations and intelligence integration. There needs to be a review of the current intelligence T&R tasks to identify any task that would require operations and intelligence to integrate. Once identified, each task would be reviewed to identify where and when operations and intelligence need to integrate. Next, a perforce step would be created specifying for integration to occur. This would ensure that integration is getting taught in the formal schools and being trained to and evaluated in the operating forces.

The final recommendation is to further this study by researching the impact that the disparity in rank between the operations and intelligence officer at the battalion and regimental level has on operations and intelligence. When collecting the data on commanders' perspectives, I was able to collect the perspective of an Army Colonel who had served as both a battalion and regimental operations officer and had command at both levels. This experience enables him to provide a unique and informed perspective on what he saw as barriers to integration. His data was not included in this study because his officers were not products of the Marine Corps training process. However, there are correlations that can be drawn from his perspective that is still beneficial to the Marine Corps. From his perspective, rank disparity was one of the biggest barriers to integration. This barrier did not come from the differing levels of authority, but from the differing levels of experience. This difference was further exacerbated by differing education levels. Operations officers tended to have a greater level of exposure that allowed them to see a more complete picture. Contrarily, intelligence officers were only "template trained" and struggled to grasp the larger context as well as the operations officer. This difference hampered their ability to integrate. I do not think this is a unique phenomenon to the Army, and that it is a likely barrier to integration within the Marine Corps as well.[64]

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