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*United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**The Marine Logistics Group: How Can It Be Structured and Organized to Succeed in Both
Combat and Garrison?**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR: Major George D. Camia


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Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Bradford A. Wineman

Approved: 

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Oral Defense Committee Member: Lt. John O. Fuglestad

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Executive Summary

Title: The Marine Logistics Group: How Can It Be Structured and Organized to Succeed in Both Combat and Garrison?

Author: Major George Camia, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The Marine Logistics Group needs to define the capacity of smaller units such as combat logistics companies or detachments, return the Direct Support Combat Logistics Regiment back to Division, and, most importantly, focus on sizing the MLG appropriately by using the equipment-to-maintainer ratio to determine the correct number of personnel to meet future requirements.

Discussion: Since its inception in 1944, the MLG has undergone eleven reorganizations. The Supply Service Depot began as an organic part of a division that it directly supported. The most recent notable organizational change was the transition from the Force Service Support Group (FSSG) to its current form as the MLG. Operation Iraqi Freedom provided the catalyst for change because the previous organization did not work in a deployed environment. Unfortunately, this reorganization did not clearly define the capacity of smaller standard units within the MLG (i.e., standard combat logistics company, supply section, maintenance contact team, or maintenance section). The MLG still does not have a clear definition for the capacity within smaller units. This lack of common unit capacity measurement standards means the requirements of additional MLG units do not directly correlate with future growth or expansion. This study seeks, above all, to examine other options for determining and meeting future Marine Corps requirements for the capacity of smaller units.

Conclusion: Defining small units' capacity within the MLG and returning the DS CLR back to Division will assist the Logistics Combat Element (LCE) and improve its responsiveness. Until this process is complete, the MLG will continue to shift and change structure without resolving problems related to staffing, equipment, or facilities.

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Preface

I chose this topic based on my personal observations within the Marine Logistics Group (MLG). After serving two tours in the MLG, I saw that out of all of the Marine Air Ground Task Force's elements, the MLG consistently goes through the process of developing, filling, or seeking approval for a manning document. Through basic research, I have found that the units in the MLG do not have any metrics to measure the capacity of smaller units. This makes it difficult for MLG planners to accurately forecast the capacity of the units being provided to requesting units. In addition, the history of the MLG started in Division, so returning the Direct Support Combat Logistics Regiment (DS CLR) would possibly improve logistics support.

I would like to thank the Marines from Second Marine Logistics Group, the Gray Research Center, and the Marines I interviewed who provided some insight into the issue at hand. This research paper provides an alternative to the MLG's complex problems to promote discussion and illuminate a solution to position the MLG for future success.

Introduction

Since its inception in 1944, the Marine Logistics Group (MLG) has undergone eleven reorganizations. The Supply Service Depot began as an organic part of a division that it directly supported. The most recent notable organizational change was the transition from the Force Service Support Group (FSSG) to its current form as the MLG. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) provided the catalyst for change because the previous organization lacked organizational control and capacity management in that it was not sufficiently responsive in a deployed environment. Unfortunately, the reorganization did not clearly define standard unit capacity within the MLG (i.e., standard Combat Logistics Company, supply section, maintenance contact team, or maintenance section). Unlike the infantry, the MLG does not have a clearly defined capacity of smaller units. This lack of small unit metrics means that the ancillary requirements of additional MLG units do not directly correlate with growth or expansion. For example, a brief from the Logistics Modernization Task Force, dated 30 November 2009, shows a growth of 2,127 Marines¹ (see Figure 1). Although it includes a few designated MLG units, such as the Marine Expeditionary Unit Combat Logistics Battalion (MEU CLB), and mentions combat logistics companies, the brief does not provide the capacity of smaller units such as logistics company, and the growth shows Marines versus a capability associated with a unit. The lack of defined capacity makes the MLG responsible for determining its actual capacity for a given mission with an internal manning document. There is no planning document that assists planners in determining the actual capacity of smaller units, which in turn affects the MLG's ability to provide estimates of supportability.

A manning document requires specific individual Marines, rather than a traditional table of organization. In addition, the manning document does not address capacity or equipment;

another message directs units to redistribute their equipment to Marines or ad hoc units without providing any replacements. As new requirements are submitted, manning documents continually circulate Marines from the MEU CLB and Redeployment and Retrograde in support of Reset and Reconstitution Operations Group (R4OG) groups. However, the Marine Corps could more efficiently and sustainably address these requirements by clearly defining and developing MLG units by capacity and capability.

The MLG is not currently structured to fulfill future operating requirements. The Marine Corps requires logistics support to a distributable force across a presently contested battle space. The MLG can address this requirement by defining small unit capacity, such as a combat logistics company or detachment; return the DS CLR back to division, such as the WWII Division Service Regiment as models; and, most importantly, focusing on sizing the MLG appropriately with an equipment to maintainer ratio to provide it with the correct personnel to meet future requirements.

History of the Marine Logistics Group

The Second Marine Logistics Group (Second MLG) began on 1 August 1944, in Oahu, Hawaii, with an original structure that largely resembles today's Second MLG. The Eighth Supply Depot served as the shore party organization and managed eight companies, including Headquarters, General Supply, Engineering, Eighth Ammunition, Signal, Ordnance, Transportation, and Military Police.² Elements of the Eighth Supply Depot participated in the Battle of Iwo Jima, providing critical support to the amphibious operation. On 1 June 1945, the Eighth Supply Depot was redesignated as the Eighth Service Regiment and conducted occupation duty; the regiment came under the operational control of the Second Marine Division,

conducting logistical operations until the Eighth Service Regiment was later disbanded and relocated to Camp Lejeune in August 1946.

The Second Combat Service Group continued to evolve and change throughout the late 1940s. The Division Service Regiment spent most of its time within the Second Marine Division until 1957, when the Marine Corps Organization and Composition Board made the following recommendations:

The present Division Service [Regiment] has been re-designated as a Service [Battalion]. It has been reorganized to provide for a more flexible employment in support of tactical operations. The present division shore party function has been incorporated in this battalion. The Service [Battalion] has been organized to provide centralized logistic support to all division units or to provide companies or detachments for support of detached elements of the division.

The battalion consists of H&S Co, 3 Light Support Companies, a Medium Support Company and 2 Landing Support Companies. It is a considerably smaller organization than the present Service [Regiment] and Shore Party [Battalion] which it replaces. Its total strength is approximately 74 officers and 1,402 enlisted men.³

The downsizing of the Marine Corps required reducing the Service Regiment to a Service Battalion to ensure that the division would receive centralized logistics through the division service element (see Figure 2).

In 1965, logistics advocates continued to struggle with forming a professional logistics organization. This drive to form a professional and responsive fighting organization led to the creation of the Force Troop Concept. From this concept, logistics advocates created the Force Service Regiment⁴ (See Figure 3). The Force Troop Concept served as a reservoir of troops that allowed the commanding general of Fleet Marine Force Atlantic to access specialty Marines to assist in sustaining his combat forces. According to Vietnam War after-action reports, most Fleet Marine Force units were still unsatisfied with the level of logistic support they received in

theater. Because the Force Service Regiment still failed to provide sufficient support, on 30 June 1978, the Second FSSG was established.⁵ The Second FSSG, another attempt at reorganization to meet requirements, also fell short because it did not address the issues of personnel or unit capacity. Colonel Paul E. Wilson, a former regimental commander, identifies some of the Second FSSG's specific problems:

There is, however, a major roadblock in achieving even better results. In the simplest of terms it is over commitment. The new organization is supposed to handle the requirement of fielding a full blown FSSG, two Logistic Support Groups or four Logistic Support Units—or any combination of the latter two—at any one time. With shortfalls in personnel and skills, that is an overly optimistic goal. Despite this, in the past eighteen months the [Second] FSSG has on many occasions had as many as seven logistic support organizations in being at the same time. The net effect on both equipment and personnel is as might be expected: devastating. Some specially trained personnel take one deployment after another.⁶

Even at the Force Service Support Regiment's inception, shortfalls in both numbers of personnel and in skills have caused problems for both equipment and staffing. The reorganization failed to address both of these issues.

In August 1990, Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait resulted in the largest buildup of US forces since WWII.⁷ Instrumental to this movement was the Marine FSSG. This buildup required the Second FSSG to bolster the numbers of First FSSG and divide its forces into a General Support Command and a Direct Support Command.⁸ According to Marine Corps Tactical Publication 3-40B:

General support is support which is given to the supported unit as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. Units assigned a general support relationship are positioned and have priorities established by their parent unit. Direct support is a support relationship requiring a unit to support another specific unit and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported unit's request for assistance.⁹

This concept of direct support and general support is not new; rather, the concept has been associated with FSSG and MLG for decades, as the 1988 book *2d FSSG Doctrinal Thought* describes.¹⁰ In fact, after Operation Desert Storm, a personnel survey found that the FSSGs should be restructured along the lines of general and direct support organizations.¹¹

Restructuring the First Force Service Support Group

From the lessons learned in Desert Storm, many logistical planners in the Marine Corps continued to rethink the functionally aligned units into task-organized units (see Figure 4). Lieutenant Colonel Melissa D. Mihocko, a field historian for the Marine Corps History Division, said that the First MLG applied the lessons learned from Desert Storm, including that the First FSSG should provide direct support and that the Second FSSG should provide general support under the concept of the Marine Logistics Command.¹² Before OIF, Brigadier General Edward G. Usher, the First FSSG Command General, and his staff reorganized the functional battalions into a task-organized battalion bolstered with some Army units.¹³ The Army provided the Sixth Motor Transport Battalion from the Army Reserve and the 716th Military Police Battalion from Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The First FSSG also required augmentation of the reserves from the Fourth FSSG because the FSSG concept in garrison was not designed to support a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) with enough distribution or ability to move the division around. Simply put, the First FSSG did not have enough lift to support its distribution requirements. In addition, the Marine Logistics Command was established to focus solely on operational logistics and was supposed to serve as the interface between the Marine Corps and the Army 377th Theater Support Command. This meant that the Marine Logistics Command was responsible for bulk sustainment requirements such as ammunition, fuel, and water and for pushing these items to tactical support areas throughout Iraq. Once again, the Second FSSG transformed from eight

functional battalions to a functionally aligned Marine Logistics Command totaling 4,500 Marines and Sailors that made up almost two-thirds of an entire FSSG. Ultimately, the lack of a doctrine on which to base the newly formed organization was a challenge to the Marines and Sailors of the Marine Logistics Command (see Figure 5).

Having implemented lessons learned from OIF, the MLG became a permanent organization with MARADMIN 335-06, redesignating the FSSG to the MLG. The change organized the units to differentiate between Direct Support Regiment and General Support Regiment battalions. The Head Quarters Regiment would assume Command and Control capabilities going forward, and the Dental and Engineer Support Battalions would become standalone battalions.

Upon examination, the Combat Service Support concepts in both Desert Storm and OIF shared some similarities; each required two FSSGs to support I Marine Expeditionary Force effectively, the FSSG needed to be reorganized for both missions, and the MLG had not yet grown to meet the requirements with which the Marine Corps tasked it. The Marine Corps needs to define small unit capacity within the MLG to ensure forecasting accuracy regarding whether it has the right-sized unit to meet future requirements for the Marine Corps.

Lack of Defined Capacity

From 2008 to 2012, the Marine Corps pushed to expand from 182,000 to 202,000 Marines. Interestingly, the Logistics Combat Element (LCE) did not grow based on a unit; rather, it grew out of uncompensated requirements.¹⁴ OIF revealed problems with the implementation of the Direct Support Combat Logistics Battalion, which grew from 370 Marines and Sailors to 800 Marines and Sailors. In fact, the growth of the battalion often caused more problems for the units because many of the augmentations to the Direct Combat Logistics

Battalion came internally from the MLG. According to the Marine Corps Lessons Learned Life Cycle, for Marines deployed in Iraq:

[A] major limiting factor in the reorganization has been the number of Marines available to fill the standing CLRs and CLBs. The table of organization (T/O) for a typical CLB is approximately 350 personnel, 32 which is far short of the 700 to 1,100 personnel required for the task organized CLBs operating in Iraq. Requirements for manning the task organized MLG to be deployed are reflected in a “manning document,” which is a combination of the table of organization and additional capability sets required to support the in-theater mission of a particular unit. To meet the manning document requirement for a deploying battalion, the MLG must transfer elements or personnel from other battalions and other MLGs into the deploying battalion. This causes many personnel movements across the MLGs and impacts unit cohesion.¹⁵

Eight years after this statement, the MLG is still dealing with these very same issues. The MLG, in its current form, is not structured for success because at the time it failed to define smaller units’ capacity and capabilities. During this period logistics support did not increase for new units such as the 1st Battalion Ninth Marines in the Second Marine Division. The Quad MLG 202K presentation on the subject did not clearly highlight the capacity of the units that were grown. If the MLG had a metric to define the capacity of smaller units, the MLG could easily show why the growth was required to support infantry battalions.

Since 2008, the equipment-to-maintainer ratio has continually been a work in progress for the Marine Corps.¹⁶ This can be challenging because each occupational field sponsor must forecast and justify its proposed number. This difficulty means that the Marine Corps is still working on the planning of the equipment-to-maintainer ratio computation. A validated equipment-to-maintainer ratio would justify the MLG’s growth. Overall, it would assist the Marine Corps in asking Congress for additional force structure for the LCE.

On 29 August 2008, Northrup Grumman Mission Systems prepared an analysis of the Air Combat Element Combat Logistics Companies assigned to the respective air stations. The study

analyzed both garrison and wartime requirements and determined accurate estimates from data captured during deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. The following are the study's findings:

The five CLCs have no mission statement. There is no standard/uniform CLC T/O&E. The CLCs have a garrison orientation. There is an inability on the part of the CLCs to conduct maneuver in order to support a deployed ACE in the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) battle space. CLCs lack organic equipment, including a sufficient ground transportation capability. There is a need to validate necessary CLC skill sets. The CLCs have no functional staff to conduct planning and integration with the supported units (e.g., MWSS, MWSG, Marine Air Control Group (MACG), and Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) units).

It is not clear whether the Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group (A/DACG) and Helicopter Support Team (HST) functions, which currently reside within the MLG at the CLR (FWD), should reside in the CLCs. It is not clear whether the Class V (ground) ammunition handling function, which currently resides with the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) Ammunition Supply Point (ASP), should be a CLC function. There are no standing habitual command relationships for planning and execution between supporting (i.e., CLC) and supported (especially, the MWSG) units. There is no priority of support of the CLC from its parent organization, the CLR (GS).¹⁷

As a result of the ACE study, Deputy Commandant Installations and Logistics (DC I&L) decided to make the Combat Logistics Company a permanent structure complete with mission statements and table of equipment.¹⁸ They are now designed to essential tasks for the Marine Corps air station it supports. However, there is no metric to measure capacity, which would be beneficial for the MLG and the unit it supports.

Lack of Defined Capacity Means Ad Hoc Units

In April 2012, the R4OG established itself at Camp Leatherneck, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. This ad hoc unit was sourced globally from multiple units because the MLG did not contain a unit capable of retrograde operations for the forces established in Afghanistan. The Marine Corps's logistical footprint was enormous. The Marines of the R4OG were both active and reserve with additional Navy personnel (see Figure 6). Second Maintenance Battalion was

tasked with supporting this ad hoc unit; it had to receive, house, and prepare predeployment training for the unit and arrange its flight to Afghanistan. Regardless of whether the Marine Corps Logistics Command was in theater, the R4OG facilitated the turn-in, sorting, packaging, prepping, and shipping of equipment back to the United States. In its short existence, it was able to win Logistics Unit of the Year for 2012 and 2013, a testament to the Marines and Sailors of that command. The lack of a defined capacity would have greatly informed the logistics planners on the correct size the R4OG actually required.

Examining the Current Structure

The MLG is now a task-organized unit. The MLG has elements organized into either direct support or general support units. Starting with the Headquarters Regiment, it comprises the following units: Communication, Food Service, Headquarters, and Service Companies; and CLBs 22, 24, and 26. CLBs provide general support to the MEUs corresponding with their double-digit numbers. Headquarters Regiment also serves as the command element of the MLG (see Figure 7).

CLR 2 serves as the direct support unit to Second Marine Division. CLB 2 is aligned with the Second Marine Regiment; CLB 6 is aligned with the Sixth Marine Regiment; CLB 8 is aligned with the Eighth Marine Regiment; and the Second Transportation Battalion serves as general support to the MEF. The Second Transportation Support Battalion contains landing support specialists in addition to heavy equipment transportation, such as medium tactical vehicle replacement and Logistics Vehicle System Replacement.

CLR 25 is a general support regiment. Supply Battalion operates the Supply Management Unit, the Ammunition Supply Point, and the Medical Logistics Company, all of which support II MEF. The Maintenance Battalion provides second- and third-echelon maintenance support to all

II MEF Forces. In addition, two combat logistics companies are located at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point and Beaufort, respectively, and provide aerial port of embarkation and debarkation and additional airfield duties.

Dental Battalion and Medical Battalion are both stand-alone battalions, commanded by Navy Captains, that provide dental and medical support in garrison to the respective dental and medical clinics located at Camp Lejeune/New River and Cherry Point. During deployments and exercises, both battalions provide commensurate dental and medical support up to Role 2 care. Finally, Eighth Engineer Support Battalion provides vertical and horizontal construction to II MEF. The Engineer Support Battalion also has the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) capability, nested in EOD Company.

Even with the MLG's reorganization, it does not include the capacity of units. The MLG continues to face many staffing issues, such as keeping track of Marines as they are shifted from one unit to another, and the lack of structure necessary to create depth for Marines and their parent commands in developing training plans. Ultimately, not by design, the lack of a defined capacity of smaller units causes the MLG to source Marines to absorb the brunt of the workforce issues by obligating them to go on multiple deployments while allowing little or no time for personal or professional development during their time in the MLG. Currently Combat Development & Integration is conducting a study on equipment-to-maintainer ratio as well as defining the logistics unit employment to give the MLG a clearly defined capacity.

Direct Support Combat Logistics Regiment

As it currently stands, the MLG maintains both the DS CLR and the General Support Combat Logistics Support Regiment. Maintaining both elements under the umbrella of the MLG

has some clear benefits: unity of command and, more importantly, the ability for the General Support Combat Logistics Regiment (GS CLR) to use the MLG's resources.

A review of the *Combat Logistics Battalion 2 After-Action Report for Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force Africa* revealed staffing issues that required Combat Logistics Battalion 2 to work with the Marine Logistics Group G-1 in creating a manning document. In addition, CLB 2 highlighted issues associated with the use of the Automated Message Handling System to register shortfalls officially. This additional step would delay responses regarding sourcing Marines and Sailors,¹⁹ causing additional staffing issues and habitual relationship problems. For example, the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) created its own manning document (see Table 1) and equipment density list. The LCE for the SPMAGTF was sourced internally from Second MLG. Having the DS CLR within the MLG provides some benefits, but other elements within the MAGTF have their own Combat Service Support (CSS) elements. Having a defined capacity of logistics unit can assist and expedite the forming of the CSS element.

The Air Combat Element with Its Own Combat Service Support Element

The Marine Wing Support Squadrons (MWSSs) are organic and important elements of the Air Combat Element (ACE). According to the *Marine Corps Reference Publication*, the MWSS has the following responsibilities, "An MWSS provides all essential aviation ground support requirements to a designated ACE component and to all supporting or attached MACG elements. It will normally function as an integral unit which is structured to operate as a MAG subordinate unit. Each MWSS functions as an integral unit of the ACE."²⁰ The MWSS provides all essential ground support requirements to aid designated fixed or rotary wing squadrons. The support squadrons are organized to provide motor transport, engineering services, and

organizational maintenance (motor transport and engineering) for Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) units. The MWSS is structured to provide deployable elements in support of the garrison or are deployed with the MAW. In essence, the MWSS provide logistics support beyond the internal support that a rotary or fixed wing squadron can provide (Figure 8). A review of the MWSS's capabilities shows striking similarities with the Direct Support Combat Logistics Battalion. If the MWSS concept is successful, it could provide a model for many of the CLB's capabilities. This pushes more toward a direct support concept across the MLG whereas, currently, the MLG CLBs are all multifunctional. The Marine Special Operations Command has also adopted support battalions aligned with the battalions they support with positive results.

Marine Raider Support Group

The Marine Raider Support Group is another example of logistics support directly aligned with the unit it supports:

The Marine Raider Support Group trains, equips, structures, and provides specially qualified Marine forces, including operational logistics, intelligence, multipurpose canines, Firepower Control Teams and communications support in order to sustain worldwide special operations missions as directed by Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (COMMARFORSOC).²¹

The Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) has its own support group that does not receive direct support from the MLG (See Figure 9). Nevertheless, this newly created unit is exercising the concept of organic logistics support within an organization.

MARSOC's unique mission set enables it to provide specialty capabilities. Given that MARSOC is under Special Operations Command, one may argue that the concept of a dedicated logistics support unit within an organization is an integral part of the organization. In fact, the US Army

has also recently realigned its combat service support directly with its maneuver brigades with great results.

Combat Service Support Brigade

The United States Army has enhanced the direct support relationship by attaching a Combat Service Support Brigade (CSSB) to each Brigade Combat Team (BCT). Each BCT is supported by the CSSB attached directly to it. The Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) acts as the conduit for all logistical support for the BCT. This arrangement ensures that the responsiveness and habitual relationships forged and grown in garrison will continue to exist in war (See Figure 10).

The BSB is tailored to the unit to which it is attached. This concept allows the Army to scale the BSB to meet any mission requirement. In addition, it acts as the conduit for the BCT to the Theatre Sustainment Command, which in theory provides seamless combat service support to the maneuver units the BCT supports. In fact, the task organization of an Army Infantry Combat Brigade is similar in size and capability to a Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team. In 2003–2004, the Army changed its organizational structure.²² Personnel expressed great reservation regarding the changes recommended by the Anetion Corporation, which conducted the Army's modularity study. One of the recommendations regarding Combat Support Battalion modularity was as follows:

Such modularity was intended to allow for prompt task-organizing and deployment of these assets in accompanying BCTs and UEx staffs on expeditionary missions. While modular and standardized, each of these types of support brigades were to be designed with flexible structures that would enable them to absorb additional assets if the situation demanded.²³

In essence, the Brigade Service Support Battalion (BSSB) is a scalable unit designed to be sized to meet the requirements of the Brigade, depending on the location. The BSSB is an example of a unit the Army has defined and allows to grow or contract depending on mission requirements. The US Army has embraced a direct support relationship model with positive results. The habitual relationship and trust developed in the Army is a product of the Army copying the previous direct support model the Marine Corps had in the past.

Challenges for MLG Marines

The Marine Expeditionary Unit Combat Logistics Battalion continually deals with issues that have consistently affected the unit's personnel readiness. According to the current Manpower Officer for the Second Marine Logistics Group, shortfalls exist within certain Marine Occupational Specialties (MOS).²⁴ As of November 2016, the MOSs include Landing Support Specialist 0481, Engineer Equipment Operator 1345, Combat Engineer 1371, Precision Armorer 2112 (NMOS), Electronics Maintenance Technician 2891, Supply Administrator 3043, Automotive Maintenance Technician 3521, Vehicle Recovery Operator 3536 (NMOS), and Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear 5711. These MOSs are currently in high demand at the MLG level, and if the MLG is not structured appropriately, the problem of high-demand MOSs will continue to be a problem. To address this issue, the MLG uses manning documents and conducts manning meetings to discuss specific MOSs for priority units such as the Special Purpose MAGTF, deploying units, and any personnel taskers the Marine Expeditionary Force deems as a priority requirement for force generation or sustainment (Figure 11). Manpower and Reserve Affairs Section Major Dave Nasca said that "the staffing goal for the MLG is aimed for 90 percent."²⁵

Nasca, the Manpower Information Quality Assurance and Advocacy Assistant Officer in Charge, used a Bulk Fuelers shortage as an example to demonstrate how the automated system calculates the number of Marines that each MOS requires. The Bulk Fuelers shortage, explained Nasca, is a training pipeline issue because the automated system's Manpower Management (MM) used miscalculated the number of Bulk Fuelers necessary to meet operational requirements. Unfortunately, the MM did not identify the improper data and calculation mistake until the Bulk Fueler population was dangerously below 60 percent in terms of staffing goals. Although the correction to the automated system has addressed the issue, the recovery of the Bulk Fueler population will take time because the Bulk Fuelers have to increase the force to reach healthy levels slowly over the next year or two.²⁶ This will obviously affect the monitor's ability to achieve the staffing goal of 90 percent, and the MLG will have to shuffle the current population of Marines into the MEU CLB, creating a ripple effect throughout the MLG. MLG Manpower will either have to assign duty temporarily or transfer Marines from one unit to another. This will create manpower issues internal to the MLG that are not visible to the Marine Corps HQ.

CLB 24 Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Hafer and Sergeant Major Mark Shawhan state that the current personnel sourcing model does not enable MEU CLBs to train and build a unit for deployment effectively. Considering this, numerous training requirements exist at both the individual and unit levels that must be fulfilled before Change of Operational Control (CHOP) begins training the MEU mission sets. Hafer and Shawhan believe that MEU CLBs should stabilize a minimum of six months before CHOP, which would enable the unit to meet all individual and unit training requirements and, in turn, allow the unit to focus on its mission of providing tactical logistics to the MEU and supported units above their organic

capabilities during all predeployment training periods.²⁷ All of Hafer and Shawhan's recommendations are sound; however, the current II MEF Order states that Embarkation-180 is when personnel will be stabilized. Compounding this issue is that the MEU command element also requests augmentation prior to employment, and this is from the same pool of personnel that the MEU CLBs pull from. The MLG's structure does not support the MEU command element tax as well as the CLBs. According to the II MEF Standard Operating Procedures, stabilization occurs at E-180 day. Until the Headquarters Marine Corps changes the policy with regard to staffing the MEU, the MLG must use the stabilization guidance published in the Marine Corps Order 3120.9 C, Headquarters Marine Corps policy for the MEU.

Shawhan also notes Headquarters Marine Corps personnel considerations. Although many Marine Corps units face these issues, units such as MEU CLBs are staffed over their Table of Organization, yet only have a depth of as little as two or three Marines in specific military occupational specialties that cannot source from or substitute with any other MOS. Regarding Headquarters Marine Corps Special Duty Screening Team (HSST) screenings, special duty assignment selections degrade the continuity of units, specifically those associated with leadership billets, when Marines are pulled from a MEU CLB during forming and predeployment training:

Promotion Selections / Forced Moves for Marines that are selected for promotion, specifically SNCOs in key billets, requires significant manpower efforts to find replacements on short notice. Whereas this is great for the individual, it degrades unit readiness and continuity. Every effort should be made to allow these Marines to remain and deploy with the unit unless it is detrimental to the individual Marine's career progression or the Marine Corps as a whole. There are medical issues whereas this is unavoidable; having to replace personnel for medical reasons negatively impacts continuity and readiness.

Temporary assignment of Marines to a MEU CLB in a TAD status hurts manpower tracking for all units involved, both the MEU CLB and the parent command. EAS Dates

are another issue. Often, Marines are assigned to MEU CLBs that do not have the required time left on contract to execute the upcoming deployment. This is mitigated by reenlistments, but often has to occur across Fiscal Years which is often difficult to accomplish.²⁸

Other units in the Marine Corps also contend with these issues, but for smaller units such as a MEU CLB, these considerations as a whole jeopardize unit cohesiveness and stability. When amphibious shipping constraints necessitate resizing the MEU CLBs, the CLBs do not have company commander leadership, and the lean staff should not have additional personnel movements during MEU workups. Because of this, the MEU CLBs must utilize Marine Corps Order 3120.9 C to stabilize their force.

Headquarters Regiment attempted to address some these issues at the regimental level by writing a MEU Regimental Unit Standard Operational Procedure to address the staffing issues that direct the MLG G-1 to conduct sourcing conferences for personnel.²⁹ The lack of a defined capacity of units is causing second- and third-order effects to the MLG, the MEU CLB, and the affected Marines. Clearly defining capacity will allow the MLG to apply analysis to personnel requirements and provide metrics that give the MLG staff the ability to see if the task is assigned to the appropriate unit or if the requirement is smaller or greater.

Despite the MLG's reorganization, the MLG G-1 still hosts staffing meetings to discuss shortages within the MLG, the personnel taskers that come down internally from the MLG for deploying units, and MEF tasking that the MLG must support. This forces the MLG to shuffle Marines and Sailors across the group/MEF to meet requirements. Sometimes when this happens, the Marines are not given permanent changes of assignment but are placed on temporary assigned duty, which in turn causes HQ Marine Corps to lose track of the reassigned Marines. A Marine might be sent to fill a billet with a maintenance battalion but ultimately end up in a MEU

CLB deploying within weeks. When HQ Marine Corps reviews the staffing goals, the monitor would be completely unaware that the Marine is not at the assigned unit but at a completely different unit. HQ Marine Corps does not see the shuffle behind the scenes, which only creates visibility problems for the unit. In an interview with personnel at the Marine Corps Combat Development command, I learned that DC I&L is currently working on defining the equipment-to-maintainer ratio as well as the logistics unit of employment metrics; this will help the MLG with fluid staffing requirements.

Proposed Solutions

Proposed Solution: Defining Combat Service Support Organizations Capacity

The MLG needs to define smaller units that directly translate into capabilities. For example, the MLG can define what capacity a maintenance contact team brings to a unit. Defining the smallest and largest units' capacities will add fidelity to the organization and capacity to the LCE. Defining units by capability and capacity will assist in scaling the MEB/SPMAGTF appropriately. It will provide guidance to the MLG planners and give a better understanding of smaller units' capabilities and capacity. The LCE should use its respective subject matter experts to define the capacity of smaller units with an equipment-to-maintainer ratio to add fidelity to the organization. For example, a maintenance team should consist of two Marines and their T/O equipment (i.e., toolbox). A maintenance contact team should consist of at least two Marines with the ability to recover an asset from the field. A maintenance section should consist of ten to twelve mechanics with a recovery asset, maintenance shelter, and administration tent with a Maintenance Management Marine and Staff Non-Commissioned Officer. A Maintenance Detachment should consist of at least two maintenance sections with an officer in charge (See Figure 7). The equipment to maintainer ratio would help the MLG define

its capacity and allow it to refine smaller units to understand the capacity rather than having requesting units to ask for a specific Marine with a specific MOS. Occupational field sponsors can also see how technology may enhance capabilities and analyze if there are additional demands placed on deploying units' infrastructure when new equipment is fielded. In addition, in the event of downsizing the MLG, planners can effectively articulate what capabilities and capacity will be lost if organizational structure is lost. Lastly, the MLG needs to understand that defining capacity has its limitations in that the planning factors should be used as a guide, and numerous variables may ultimately affect capacity.

Proposed Return of the Direct Support Combat Logistics Regiment to Division

Placing the DS CLR and respective CLBs back in Division and infantry regiments would provide logistics advocacy, effect habitual relationships, and build the esprit de corps desirable for units. Moreover, like the Army Combat Service Support Brigade Battalion, the Direct Support Combat Logistics Battalion would serve as the base combat logistics unit. The MLG could more accurately scale the LCE to what the mission required, whether it involves a maintenance team to an entire shock trauma platoon. Each CLB would align with a Combat Logistics Company, which would serve as the organic lift beyond the scope of the Infantry Battalion's internal logistics capability. Tying this Combat Service Support Company to an infantry battalion would also serve as the LCE's marker in that if the Marine Corps adds additional infantry battalions, it also requires a commensurate Combat Logistics Company. Defining the capacity of smaller units would add fidelity to the manning document in that the commander would know if the correct-sized element is being sourced for the requirement.

The added benefit of aligning the DS CLR with Division would allow the MLG to focus on general support. Placing the CLR within Division would be a responsive, cohesive logistics

element embedded within Division to which the MLG could attach defined units such as a shock trauma platoon, maintenance section, and intermediate supply sections. The GS CLR and Headquarters Regiment would provide scalable units to the DS CLR to meet mission requirements. The MLG could utilize an approved equipment-to-maintainer ratio and subject matter experts to refine the capacity of teams, sections, platoons, companies, and detachments and provide a unit to the CLR that could absorb, use, and employ such units according to capacity and capabilities.

Returning the DS CLR to Division will assist in creating habitual relationships. Attaching the combat logistics element to Division as an equal regimental commander under the Ground Combat Element (GCE) will allow the Marines and Sailors within the CLR to develop these habitual relationships by directly aligning the CLB with its respective infantry regiment. The outcome would be to expose the Marines and Sailors of the respective LCEs to the first-to-fight mindset. In addition, placing the DS CLR in Division would provide the MLG with the framework to scale the units to fit the changing mission requirements of the GCE. The only new elements would be the attachments; the leadership and structure would remain relatively the same. Much like the Eighth Service Regiment from WWII, the MLG should embrace the past and combine technology to provide a ready and responsive force. The LCE must be redesigned to meet future requirements. This will meet the intent of the Marine Corps Operating Concept and provide the GCE commander with a capable and ready LCE. The Marine Corps already does this with the Aviation Combat Element and the MWSS Squadrons.

Additional Recommended Changes

The Marine Corps needs to develop the MLG's structure so that the MLG can maintain a current task-organized unit capable of directly supporting the GCE at a moment's notice. This

will assist in maintaining unit integrity without minimizing the use of manning documents or reducing units of any one MOS. Building the force structure will require MOS and task-organized units to use Occupational Field Sponsors to assist in proposing a structure and MOS requirement of the MLG across the Marine Corps Enterprise.

Much like the Eighth Service Regiment of the past, the DS CLR return to Division would serve as the structure on which to build, whereas the Marine Corps could scale the logistics support element to each mission's requirement (see Figure 13). In addition, the DS CLR/CLB will also serve as the command and control of logistics. The MLG has always been able to task-organize and is still task-organizing despite its new structure. Headquarters Regiment would maintain its structure; CLR 25 would maintain Maintenance and Supply Battalion, Eighth Engineer Support Battalion, Second Transportation Support Battalion; and Medical Battalion and Dental Battalion would remain stand-alone battalions that still report directly to the MLG's commanding general (see Figure 14). The MLG's mission should change to a general support mission. The MLG can task-organize with units versus creating manning documents, providing requesting units with a well-defined logistics support unit that is ready to deploy.

Finally, the LCE should use force-shaping models and other tools to add science to force planning for the MLG. These programs have not been fully utilized. Creating units of performance and effectiveness will provide tangible benefits. Using these tools can assist in shaping and ensuring that the LCE is constantly evaluating its structure to ensure its relevancy and effectiveness. While defining unit building blocks is arguably difficult, defining MLG units is difficult but necessary to ensure success for the LCE.

Conclusion

From its start as the Eighth Field Depot to the present day, the MLG has assisted in sustaining the force in every climate and place. Some of its practices, such as attaching a direct support regiment to Division, are effective for divisional support. Reorganizing the MLG will not fix the MLG's inherent staffing deficiencies because the MLG was not fully designed to support a MEF. The structure has already failed because it is not deployable as a unit, and manning documents and internal personnel movement will not make it deployable. Even after a flurry of activity, the MLG would still deploy with deficiencies regardless of reorganization and may require augmentation from another MLG or service. Returning the DS CLR to Division will provide the logistics command and control, increase efficiencies and allow Division to develop the required trust and habitual relationships, and receive the added benefit of prioritization. This realignment will also serve as the backbone to which the MLG may attach scalable, defined logistics units to tailor the CLB to fit the requirements. Marine Corps Installations and Logistics Advocacy must work with subject-matter experts to define the equipment-to-maintainer ratio, which will assist in clearly defining smaller logistics units' capacity, such as maintenance sections, and allow the MLG to respond with the appropriately sized unit. The Total Force Structure Process (MCO 5311.1E) must be used to define units, capabilities, workforce, and equipment. Doing so will ensure that the Marine Corps reviews the structure and validates the requirements. This will also assist in accurately making the case to Congress to increase force structure to ensure that the MLG is just as ready to be "first to fight" as the Marine Corps Division and to be the nation's "force in readiness" for the twenty-first century.




202K Impact to the LCE

Logistics Modernization Transition Task Force LPV3

Mike Resnick
30 Nov 2009

Logistics Modernization Marine Logistics Group



202K Impact to LCE

- ✓ Achieved 202K LCE Structure Growth – 2127 Marines
 - ✓ 9 Intel
 - ✓ 246 MP
 - ✓ 91 EOD
 - ✓ 580 DS
 - ✓ 436 MEU CLB
 - ✓ 81 DO Maint
 - ✓ 436 GS
 - ✓ 248 Comm
- Remaining Planned 202K LCE Structure Growth – 515 Marines
 - 218 CLC
 - 180 Bridge Co
 - 117 Maintainers (MAGTF TE Review)

CMC Approved 202k Plan

FY07 - 184k Inf Bn x 2 S/10 HQ Recon Plt x 2 MP Co x 2 (GCE) Counter Btry Plt x 1 ANGLICO Plt x1 CEB Co x1 FRS Plus Up (H1) MCRC (400) TECOM (600)	FY08 - 189k Inf Bn Arty Btry x 1 Recon Plt x 2 CEB Co x 1 MP Co x 2, 1 Plt-4k Truck Co x 2 (1-4k RCT) ANGLICO Plt x 2 Intel Enablers Intel Bn Plus up 3d RadBn Plus up EOD (4 Teams) Civil Affairs Planners Civil Affairs Dets HMLA (AvPlan) VMU FRS/H1 OT Plus Up MACG HQ Dets x 2 MASS Dets CLB(-) (Rgt) MCRC (200) TECOM (325) TBS / OCS (168) MCTAG HQ (42)	FY09 - 194k Arty Btry x 1 Counter Btry Plt x 1 CEB HQ Co CEB Supt Co MP Co x 2 CLB (Rgt) Augments CLB (MEU) x 2 Rad Bn Plus Up IntelBn Plus Up Info Ops EOD (5 Teams) HMLA (AvPlan) HMLA (#8) MACS ATC Det MWCS Det TECOM (325) Gunners (6)	FY10 - 199k Rgt HQ 24/7 Arty Btry x 1 AAV/EFV Co x 2 Counter Btry Plt x 1 Inf Bn & MLG Maintainers (DO) CLR Augments MLG Comm MACS ATC Det MWCS Det JSF FRS/OT (FY10) MTACS Dets Gunners (5)	FY11 - 202k Tank Co x 2 CLC Bridge Co x 2 HMLA (#9) HMLA x 2 VMFA x 2 FAO/RAO JSF FRS/OT (FY11 & FY12) Inf Bn 100% MCTAG (605 – 29 Palms)
				FY12 - 202k TBS / OCS (-100 Returned) Recon (90) JTAC (200) UAS Tier II (VMU x 3) MWSG-17 (93) 3d Ech Maintainers (117) Guam Base Spt (68) Camp Mujuk (32)

Logistics Modernization
Excellence in logistics. supporting excellence in warfighting

Other Impacts to the LCE

- ✓ MLG Reorganization
- ✓ Mission Statements
- ✓ MCCs for MLG Bns
- ✓ Medical Battalion Capability Enhancement Effort
- ✓ MAGTF TE Review

- ❑ Increase staffing precedence level of LCE - UNDERWAY
- ❑ Operational Reserve Working Group – UNDERWAY
- ❑ Capabilities Assessment Review (202k re-look) – UNDERWAY

- ❑ Review composition of MEU CLB and MEB CLR - FUTURE
- ❑ Mirror like units across the AC MLGs – FUTURE

Figure 1. Logistics Modernization PowerPoint Presentation, dated 30 November 2009.




Figure 2. This is the original post-WWII service battalion. The delineation between light- and medium-support companies and the landing-support company are resident within Division.




Figure 3. Force troops concept circa 1965.




Figure 4. First FSSG organization before Operation Iraqi Freedom.




Figure 5. Task organization for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Note the Table of Organization size of more than 14,000 Marines, Sailors, and Soldiers.




Figure 6. R4OG Task Organization. This nonstandard unit consists of elements of the MLG and the reserves. One could argue that the lack of capacity makes it difficult to ascertain if this force is large enough to meet retrograde operation requirements.




Figure 7. Notional Maintenance Detachment Organization. With an equipment-to-maintainer ratio and defined maintenance detachment, this can quickly translate into a capability with a defined capacity. Currently it is based off anecdotal experience with no real science behind the unit's actual capability.




Figure 8. First MLG Lay Down to include Crisis Response MEB in Kuwait. Note the creation of two CLBs from the Supply and Maintenance Battalion.




Figure 9. Third MAW organization chart. Note that each MAG has its own MWSS.




Figure 10. MARSOC has its own support battalions in general support of the Raider Regiment. Each support battalion is aligned with a Raider Battalion.





Figure 11. The Army Brigade Combat Team with its support battalion organization chart.

2d Marine Logistics Group (FY 17)



7 OCT 2016

Figure 12. Current Second MLG staffing as of January 2017.




Figure 13. Proposed organization chart for Second Marine Division with the Direct Support Combat Logistics Regiment located within Division.




Figure 14. Proposed Second MLG organic chart without the Direct Support Combat Logistics Regiment. The MLG should still use the equipment-to-maintainer ratio to increase the MLG as necessary. Note that to provide distribution support, the Second TSB is still within the MLG.



202K Impact to the LCE

**Mike Resnick, LPV3
I&L, HQMC
1 Apr 2008**



Agenda



- **CMC Approved 202K Build - Update**
 - MP Reorganization
 - FY08 DS CLB / FY 09 DS CLB Augment Distribution
- **202K Build – Impact to MLGs**
- **202K Build – Impact to Logistics Occ Fields**
- **Supporting Actions**
 - WESTPAC Alignment Plan
 - MAGTF TE Review
 - Uncompensated Review Board



CMC Approved 202K Build



FY07 - 184k

Inf Bn x 2
5/10 HQ
Recon Plt x 2
MP Co x 2 (GCE)
Counter Btry Plt x 1
ANGLICO Plt x1
CEB Co x 1
FRS Plus Up (H1)
MCRC (400)
TECOM (600)

FY08 - 189k

Inf Bn
Arty Btry x 1
Recon Plt x 2
CEB Co x 1
MP Reorganization
Truck Co x 2 (1-4k RCT)
ANGLICO Plt x 2
Intel Enablers
Intel Bn Plus up
3d RadBn Plus up
EOD (4 Teams)
Civil Affairs Planners
Civil Affairs Dets
HMH (ATS)
VMU
FRS/H1 OT Plus Up
MACG HQ Dets x 2
MASS Dets
CLB(-) (Rgt)
MCRC (200)
TECOM (325)
TBS / OCS (168)
MCTAG HQ (42)

FY09 - 194k

Arty Btry x 1
Counter Btry Plt x1
CEB HQ Co
CEB Supt Co
MP Reorganization
DS CLB Augments
CLB (MEU) x 2
Rad Bn Plus Up
IntelBn Plus Up
Info Ops
EOD (5 Teams)
HMLA (ATS)
HMLA (#8)
MACS ATC Det
MWCS Det
TECOM
Gunnery

FY10 - 199k

Rgt HQ 24/7
Arty Btry x 1
AAV/EFV Co x 2
Counter Btry Plt x1
Inf Bn & MLG
Maintainers (DO)
CLR Augments
MLG Comm
MACS ATC Det
MWCS Det
JSF FRS/OT (FY10)
MTACS Dets
Gunnery

FY11 - 202k


Tank Co x 2
CLC
Bridge Co x 2
HMLA (#9)
HMH x 2
VMFA x 2
FAO/RAO
JSF FRS/OT (FY11 & FY12)
Inf Bn 100%
MCTAG (605 – 29 Palms)

FY12 - 202k

TBS / OCS (-100
Returned to field
MCTAG)



MP Reorganization



- 202K plus-up supports increased, mirrored MP capability across the MAGTF
- MAGTF MP Co structure: 6/167
- 202K enables MLG MP Co to grow from 5/137 to 6/167
- Additional MP structure (14 Marines) mapped in support of each MEU CLB



FY08/09 DS CLB / Augment Distribution



1st MLG HQ	2
7TH ESB	68
CLR 1	141
CLR 15	34
CLR 17	31
TOTAL	276

2nd MLG HQ	4
8TH ESB	61
CLR 2	169
CLR 25	50
CLR 27	18
TOTAL	302

FY08/09 DS CLB / Augments = 579



202K Impact to MLGs



1st MLG

EOD Teams (4)
CLB (-)
DS CLB Augments
CLB (MEU) Structure
DO MLG Maintainers
CLR Augments
MLG Comm
Bridge Co

2nd MLG

EOD Teams (4)
CLB (-)
DS CLB Augments
CLB (MEU) Structure
DO MLG Maintainers
CLR Augments
MLG Comm

3rd MLG

EOD Teams (1)
DO MLG
Maintainers
MLG Comm
CLC
Bridge Co



202K Impact to Logistics Occ Fields



- **202K Build is FY07 through FY 12**
- **Capabilities Based**
- **Logistics Occ Fields throughout Build Plan**
- **Sample Snapshots of Occ Flds 04XX, 13XX, 21Xx, 28XX, 30Xx and 35Xx to follow**
 - Across the MAGTF
 - Across the MLGs
- **Data per 1 Mar 2008 TFSMS Pull**



202K 04XX Growth



	<u>2007</u>	<u>2012</u>	<u>Growth</u>
GCE	856	890	34
ACE	772	906	134
LCE	1667	1828	161
CE	439	554	115
SE	<u>562</u>	<u>591</u>	<u>29</u>
Total	4296	4769	473



202K LCE 04XX Growth



<u>MOS</u>	<u>MLG-1</u>	<u>MLG-2</u>	<u>MLG-3</u>	<u>MOS Growth</u>
0402	16	15	3	34
0411	8	6	3	17
0430	1	1	0	2
0431	10	7	3	20
0451	0	0	0	0
0481	40	34	5	79
0491	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>9</u>
Total	79	68	14	161



202K 13XX Growth



	<u>2007</u>	<u>2012</u>	<u>Growth</u>
GCE	1672	1933	261
ACE	1426	1453	27
LCE	3348	3843	495
CE	192	272	80
SE	<u>523</u>	<u>546</u>	<u>23</u>
Total	7161	8047	886



202K LCE 13XX Growth



MOS	<u>MLG-1</u>	<u>MLG-2</u>	<u>MLG-3</u>	MOS <u>Growth</u>
1302	8	4	3	15
1310	1	2	1	4
1316	13	10	6	29
1341	17	18	15	50
1345	36	31	11	78
1349	2	3	2	7
1361	0	0	0	0
1371	115	50	64	229
1390	0	0	0	0
1391	<u>26</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>83</u>
Total	218	144	133	495



202K 21XX Growth



	<u>2007</u>	<u>2012</u>	<u>MOS Growth</u>
GCE	1542	1785	243
ACE	293	315	22
LCE	1079	1199	120
CE	163	277	114
SE	<u>550</u>	<u>571</u>	<u>21</u>
Total	3627	4147	520



202K LCE 21XX Growth



MOS	<u>MLG-1</u>	<u>MLG-2</u>	<u>MLG-3</u>	<u>Total Growth</u>
2102	0	0	0	0
2110	0	0	0	0
2111	13	9	1	23
2112	0	5	1	6
2120	0	1	0	1
2125	0	0	0	0
2131	5	6	0	11
2141	12	12	0	24
2146	5	5	0	10
2147	7	7	0	14
2149	0	0	0	0
2161	2	2	0	4
2171	11	11	4	26
2181	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	56	58	6	120

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202K 28XX Growth



	<u>2007</u>	<u>2012</u>	<u>Growth</u>
GCE	954	1034	80
ACE	480	607	127
LCE	870	932	62
CE	835	882	47
SE	<u>324</u>	<u>598</u>	<u>274</u>
Total	3520	4053	533



202K LCE 28XX Growth



MOS	MLG-1	MLG-2	MLG-3	Total Growth
2802	0	0	0	0
2805	0	0	0	0
2821	2	2	2	6
2822	0	0	0	0
2823	0	0	0	0
2826	0	0	0	0
2827	0	0	0	0
2831	0	0	0	0
2834	1	1	1	3
2844	1	1	0	2
2846	14	12	0	26
2847	10	10	0	20
2848	0	0	0	0
2862	1	0	-1	0
2871	2	1	0	3
2874	0	0	0	0
2881	0	0	0	0
2887	0	0	0	0
2891	0	0	1	1
Total	31	27	3	61

* MLG-4 strength increases by 1¹⁵



202K 30XX Growth



	<u>2007</u>	<u>2012</u>	<u>Growth</u>
GCE	1162	1205	43
ACE	869	881	12
LCE	2792	2996	204
CE	463	567	104
SE	<u>1279</u>	<u>1285</u>	<u>6</u>
Total	6565	6934	369



202K 35XX Growth



	<u>2007</u>	<u>2012</u>	<u>Growth</u>
GCE	3193	4155	962
ACE	1241	1646	405
LCE	4668	5206	538
CE	787	425	-362
SE	<u>1031</u>	<u>991</u>	<u>-40</u>
Total	10920	12423	1503



202K LCE 30XX Growth



MOS	<u>MLG-1</u>	<u>MLG-2</u>	<u>MLG-3</u>	<u>Total Growth</u>
3002	3	4	2	9
3006	6	5	0	11
3010	0	1	0	1
3043	38	42	18	98
3044	0	0	-9	-9
3051	39	39	11	89
3052	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>6</u>
Total	89	94	22	205



202K LCE 35XX Growth



<u>MOS</u>	<u>MLG-1</u>	<u>MLG-2</u>	<u>MLG-3</u>	<u>Total Growth</u>
3510	1	2	2	5
3521	57	63	30	150
3522	11	29	16	56
3524	2	2	1	5
3529	7	7	6	20
3531	47	76	8	131
3533	74	111	2	187
3534	0	0	0	0
3536	5	5	2	12
3537	<u>15</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>32</u>
Total	219	308	71	598



Supporting Actions



WESTPAC ALIGNMENT PLAN

- CD&I, DOTMLPF WG and MFP worked analysis/comparison of three plans to posture forces in the MFP AO for CMC:
 - AIP
 - WAP Nov 2006
 - WAP 202K
- CMC: 202K Build remains as-is
- CMC: WAP Nov 2006 remains the plan
- Impact: Requests for additional structure/funding ISO of WAP 202K are no longer on the table

MAGTF TE REVIEW

- CMC directed TE Review across each element of the MAGTF
- Purpose:
 - Validate warfighting reqmts
 - Establish new baseline for full spectrum combat readiness, equipment rest/reconstitution, and resource competition
- LCE recommendations:
 - Long haul transportation
 - Recovery/maintenance
 - Protected mobility
 - Expeditionary power generation
 - Tactical communications
- Status: CD&I assessment

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Supporting Actions



Uncompensated Review Board

- **CD&I directed IOT conduct a formal review of requests for structure**
 - Requests must include recommended force structure compensation IOT propose a zero-sum-gain adjustment to CMC current 202K USMC
- **Working DC I&L requests:**
 - Contracting Marines/Officers
 - Food Service Specialists
 - MAGTF TE Review “maintainers”
 - Distribution Marines
 - MLG TOE Recoms: CLB SGTMAJs, 1stSGTs, CO CMDRS, Info Mgmt, Electricians, Gunners, Air Officers, Engr Line Company
 - MCLC ...
 - Bases / Stations ...
- **Intent is to provide all requests to DC I&L for enterprise decision**
- **POC : Mike Resnick LPV3**
- **Coord Instns:**
 - Separate correspondence
 - Request for structure due to LPV3 - 15 April
 - LPV3 package requests for DC I&L – 18 April
 - DC I&L requests for structure to DC CDI – 1 May

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Questions?

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Figure 15. Brief from LPV3, I&L to all MLGs. Note that the 202K impact has listed MOSs but does not list a capability associated with the quantity of Marines listed (i.e., the capacity and capability of the units to which these Marines will be attached).

Table 1. SPMAGTF Crisis Response circa 2014.

MAGTF ELEMENT	SECTION	BILLET	GRADE
LCE	HQ	FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ANALYST	E5
LCE	CRF CO	EMBARKER	E4
LCE	CLB DET	LCE OIC	O3
LCE	CLB DET	LCE DET SNCOIC	E7-E8
LCE	CLB DET	DLC TEAM SNOIC	E7
LCE	CLB DET	DLC SUP CHF	E6
LCE	CLB DET	DLC CLERK	E4
LCE	CLB DET	DLC SUP CLRK	E5
LCE	CLB DET	SUPPLY WHS CLK	E3
LCE	CLB DET	FWD DIST CHF	E4
LCE	CLB DET	FWD DIST CLRK	E3
LCE	CLB DET	FWD P3 NCO	E4
LCE	CLB DET	FWD P3 CLRK	E3
LCE	CLB DET	INT SUPPLY WHS CHF	E6
LCE	CLB DET	SUPPLY ADMIN NCO	E5
LCE	CLB DET	SUPPLY ADMIN	E4
LCE	CLB DET	INT SUPPLY WHS NCO	E4
LCE	CLB DET	AMMUNITION TECHNICIAN	E6
LCE	CLB DET	AMMUNITION TECHNICIAN	E5
LCE	CLB DET	AMMUNITION TECHNICIAN	E3-E5
LCE	CLB DET	AMMUNITION TECHNICIAN	E3-E5
LCE	CLB DET	POSTAL CLRK	E5
LCE	CLB DET	POSTAL CLRK	E2
LCE	CLB DET	LANDING SUPPORT DET SNCOIC	E7
LCE	CLB DET	LANDING SUPPORT CHF	E6
LCE	CLB DET	LANDING SUPPORT / SPOKE 1 DET LEADER	E5
LCE	CLB DET	LANDING SUPPORT / SPOKE 2 DET LEADER	E5
LCE	CLB DET	LANDING SUPPORT SPECIALIST	E5
LCE	CLB DET	LANDING SUPPORT SPECIALIST	E5
LCE	CLB DET	LANDING SUPPORT SPECIALIST	E4
LCE	CLB DET	LANDING SUPPORT SPECIALIST	E4
LCE	CLB DET	LANDING SUPPORT SPECIALIST	E4
LCE	CLB DET	LANDING SUPPORT SPECIALIST	E4
LCE	CLB DET	EOD TECHNICIAN	E6
LCE	CLB DET	EOD TECHNICIAN	E5

LCE	CLB DET	EOD TECHNICIAN	E5
LCE	CLB DET	EOD TECHNICIAN	E5
LCE	CLB DET	EOD TEAM LEADER	E5-E6
LCE	CLB DET	EOD TECH	E5-E6
LCE	CLB DET	ENG DET SNCOIC / UT CHIEF	E7-E8
LCE	CLB DET	ELECTRICIAN	E4
LCE	CLB DET	ELECTRICIAN	E4
LCE	CLB DET	GENERATOR MECH	E3
LCE	CLB DET	GENERATOR MECH	E3
LCE	CLB DET	GENERATOR MECH	E3
LCE	CLB DET	HE OPERATOR / HE NCOIC	E5
LCE	CLB DET	HE OPERATOR	E5
LCE	CLB DET	HE OPERATOR	E3
LCE	CLB DET	HE MECH	E3
LCE	CLB DET	HE MECH	E3
LCE	CLB DET	REFRIG / AC MECH	E3-E5
LCE	CLB DET	REFRIG / AC MECH	E3-E5
LCE	CLB DET	FIELD MEDICINE TECHNICIAN	E7N
LCE	CLB DET	LABORATORY TECHNICIAN	E4N
LCE	CLB DET	X-RAY TECHNICIAN	E5N
LCE	CLB DET	PREVENTIVE MEDICINE TECHNICIAN	E4N
LCE	CLB DET	MAINTENANCE DET OIC	E8
LCE	CLB DET	SMALL ARMS REPAIRMAN	E5
LCE	CLB DET	SMALL ARMS REPAIRMAN	E4
LCE	CLB DET	SMALL ARMS REPAIRMAN	E3-E5
LCE	CLB DET	PRECISION WEAPONS REPAIRER	E5
LCE	CLB DET	OPTICS TECH NCO	E5
LCE	CLB DET	HE MECH	E5
LCE	CLB DET	MOTOR T MECH NCO	E5
LCE	CLB DET	COMM ELEC SNCOIC / CHIEF	E7
LCE	CLB DET	COMM ELEC NCO	E5
LCE	CLB DET	COMM ELEC	E4
LCE	CLB DET	COMM ELEC	E4
LCE	HQ	COMMANDING OFFICER	O5
LCE	HQ	EXECUTIVE OFFICER	O4
LCE	HQ	SENIOR ENLISTED ADVISOR	E9
LCE	HQ	CHAPLAIN	O3
LCE	HQ	RELIGIOUS PROGRAM SPEC	E3N-E5N
LCE	S-1	ADJUTANT	O2
LCE	S-1	ADMINISTRATION CHIEF	E7
LCE	S-1	ADMINISTRATION NCO	E4

LCE	S-1	ADMINISTRATION CLERK	E3
LCE	S-2	S-2 OFFICER	O-3
LCE	S-2	S-2 CHIEF	E6
LCE	S-2	INTEL ANALYST	E4
LCE	S-2	IMAGERY ANALYST	E5
LCE	S-3	S-3 OPS OFFICER	O4
LCE	S-3	S-3 ALPHA OFFICER	O2
LCE	S-3	FUTURE OPS OFFICER	O3
LCE	S-3	CURRENT OPS OFFICER	O2
LCE	S-3	S-3 OPS CHIEF	E8
LCE	S-3	S-3 / OPS CLERK	E2-E5
LCE	S-3	CBRN NCOIC	E6
LCE	S-3	ENG OPS CHF	E7
LCE	S-3	ENG OPS CLERK	E4
LCE	S-3	ENG OPS CLERK	E4
LCE	S-3	PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER	O2/E7
LCE	S-3	COMBAT CORRESPONDANT	E5
LCE	S-3	BURUNDI TEAM LEADER	O4
LCE	S-3	UGANDA TEAM LEADER	O4
LCE	S-4	S-4 OFFICER	O3
LCE	S-4	S-4A	O2
LCE	S-4	S-4 CHIEF / HAZMAT CHIEF	E7
LCE	S-4	FACILITIES CHIEF	E7
LCE	S-4	MAINT MGT OFF	CWO2
LCE	S-4	MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT CHF	E6
LCE	S-4	MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT CLERK	E4
LCE	S-4	SUPPLY OFFICER	O2
LCE	S-4	SUPPLY CHIEF	E7
LCE	S-4	SUPPLY CLERK	E5
LCE	S-4	SUPPLY CLERK	E3
LCE	S-4	SUPPLY CLERK	E4
LCE	S-4	SUPPLY CLERK	E4
LCE	S-4	SUPPLY WHS CLK	E3-E4
LCE	S-4	SUPPLY WHS CLK	E3-E4
LCE	S-4	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	O3/E7
LCE	S-4	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	E5-E7
LCE	S-4	FISCAL CLERK	E4-E5
LCE	S-4	DISBURSING SPECIALIST	E4
LCE	S-4	AMMUNITION TECHNICIAN	E4
LCE	S-4	EMBARK NCO	E5
LCE	S-4	EMBARK NCO	E4

LCE	S-4	ARMORY CHIEF	E6
LCE	S-4	ARMORER	E4
LCE	S-4	ARMORER	E3
LCE	S-4	FOOD SVC CHF	E7
LCE	S-4	FOOD SERVICE SPECIALIST	E5
LCE	S-4	FOOD SERVICE SPECIALIST	E4
LCE	S-4	FOOD SERVICE SPECIALIST	E4
LCE	S-4	FOOD SERVICE SPECIALIST	E2-E5
LCE	S-6	COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER	O-3
LCE	S-6	COMMUNICATIONS CHIEF	E8
LCE	S-6	RADIO CHIEF	E6
LCE	S-6	FIELD RADIO OPERATOR	E5
LCE	S-6	FIELD RADIO OPERATOR	E5
LCE	S-6	FIELD RADIO OPERATOR	E4
LCE	S-6	FIELD RADIO OPERATOR	E4
LCE	S-6	FIELD RADIO OPERATOR	E4
LCE	S-6	FIELD RADIO OPERATOR	E4
LCE	S-6	FIELD RADIO OPERATOR	E2-E5
LCE	S-6	FIELD RADIO OPERATOR	E2-E5
LCE	S-6	WIREMAN	E5
LCE	S-6	CYBER / RADIO CHIEF	E6-E7
LCE	S-6	CYBER NETWORK TECHNICIAN	E5
LCE	S-6	CYBER NETWORK TECHNICIAN	E4
LCE	S-6	CYBER NETWORK OPERATOR	E3-E4
LCE	S-6	MAINTENANCE CHIEF	E6
LCE	S-6	DATA MAINTENANCE MARINE	E4-E5
LCE	S-6	GROUND RADIO REPAIRER	E3-E4
LCE	S-6	DIGITAL WIDEBAND TECHNICIAN	E5
LCE	S-6	TELEPHONE SYSTEMS / PERSONAL COMPUTER REPAIRMAN	E5
LCE	S-6	GROUND RADIO REPAIRMAN	E4
LCE	MEDICAL	INDEPENDENT DUTY CORPSMAN	E5N-E7N
LCE	MEDICAL	INDEPENDENT DUTY CORPSMAN	E5N-E7N
LCE	MEDICAL	INDEPENDENT DUTY CORPSMAN	E5N-E7N
LCE	MEDICAL	INDEPENDENT DUTY CORPSMAN	E5N-E7N
LCE	MEDICAL	GENERAL SURGEON	O4N
LCE	MEDICAL	GENERAL SURGEON	O3N
LCE	MEDICAL	ANESTHESIOLOGIST	O3N
LCE	MEDICAL	OR TECH	E6N
LCE	MEDICAL	OR TECH	E4N
LCE	MEDICAL	CRITICAL CARE NURSE	O3N

LCE	MEDICAL	EMERGENCY MEDICINE PHYSICIAN	O3N
LCE	MEDICAL	EMERGENCY TRAUMA NURSE	O3N
LCE	MEDICAL	PHYSICIAN ASST	O3N
LCE	MEDICAL	FIELD MEDICINE TECHNICIAN	E5N
LCE	MEDICAL	FIELD MEDICINE TECHNICIAN	E4N
LCE	MEDICAL	FIELD MEDICINE TECHNICIAN	E5N
LCE	MEDICAL	FIELD MEDICINE TECHNICIAN	E4N
LCE	MEDICAL	PREVENTIVE MEDICINE TECHNICIAN	E5N
LCE	H&S	CO CDR / CAMP COMMANDANT	O2
LCE	H&S	CO 1ST SGT	E8
LCE	H&S	CO GYSGT	E7
LCE	H&S	AIR DELIVERY SPECIALIST	E5
LCE	H&S	AIR DELIVERY SPECIALIST	E5
LCE	ENG	ENG CO CDR	O3
LCE	ENG	ENG CO XO	O2
LCE	ENG	ENG CO 1ST SGT	E8
LCE	ENG	COMBAT ENGINEER OPS CHIEF	E7
LCE	ENG	COMBAT ENGINEER	E6
LCE	ENG	COMBAT ENGINEER	E5
LCE	ENG	COMBAT ENGINEER	E5
LCE	ENG	COMBAT ENGINEER	E5
LCE	ENG	COMBAT ENGINEER	E4
LCE	ENG	COMBAT ENGINEER	E4
LCE	ENG	COMBAT ENGINEER	E4
LCE	ENG	COMBAT ENGINEER	E3
LCE	ENG	UTILITIES CHIEF	E7
LCE	ENG	UTILITIES OPS CHF	E7
LCE	ENG	ELECTRICIAN CHF	E6
LCE	ENG	ELECTRICIAN	E5
LCE	ENG	ELECTRICIAN	E3
LCE	ENG	ELECTRICIAN	E3
LCE	ENG	ELEC EQUIP RPR NCO	E5
LCE	ENG	ELEC EQUIP RPR SPECIALIST	E4
LCE	ENG	ELEC EQUIP RPR SPECIALIST	E3
LCE	ENG	REFRIGERATION MECH	E5
LCE	ENG	REFRIGERATION MECH	E4
LCE	ENG	WATER SPT CHF	E5
LCE	ENG	WATER SPT TECH	E4
LCE	ENG	WATER SPT TECH	E4
LCE	ENG	WATER SUPPORT TECHNICIAN	E5
LCE	ENG	WATER SUPPORT TECHNICIAN	E5

LCE	ENG	GENERATOR MECHANIC	E4
LCE	ENG	GENERATOR MECHANIC	E6
LCE	ENG	GENERATOR MECHANIC	E5
LCE	ENG	GENERATOR MECHANIC	E4
LCE	ENG	HEAVY EQUIPMENT CHIEF	E6
LCE	ENG	HEAVY EQUIPMENT CHIEF	E6
LCE	ENG	HEAVY EQUIPMENT OPERATOR	E5
LCE	ENG	HEAVY EQUIPMENT OPERATOR	E4
LCE	ENG	INT HEAVY EQUIPMENT MECHANIC	E5
LCE	ENG	HEAVY EQUIPMENT MECHANIC	E5
LCE	EOD	EOD	CWO2
LCE	EOD	EOD	E7
LCE	EOD	EOD	E5
LCE	EOD	EOD	E6
LCE	EOD	EOD	E5
LCE	EOD	EOD	E5
LCE	MAINT	MAINT PLT CDR	O3
LCE	MAINT	MT MAINTENANCE CHIEF	E6
LCE	MAINT	MOTOR TRANSPORT MECHANIC	E2-E5
LCE	MAINT	MOTOR TRANSPORT MECHANIC	E4
LCE	MAINT	MOTOR TRANSPORT MECHANIC	E4
LCE	MAINT	INT MOTOR TRANSPORT MECHANIC	E5
LCE	MAINT	INT MOTOR TRANSPORT MECHANIC	E5
LCE	MAINT	INT MOTOR TRANSPORT MECHANIC	E5
LCE	TRANSP	MT CHIEF / SENIOR ENLISTED	E7
LCE	TRANSP	MOTOR TRANSPORT OPERATOR	E5
LCE	TRANSP	MOTOR TRANSPORT OPERATOR	E5
LCE	TRANSP	LANDING SUPPORT NCO	E5
LCE	TRANSP	LANDING SUPPORT NCO	E4
LCE	TRANSP	LANDING SUPPORT NCO	E3
LCE	TRANSP	LANDING SUPPORT NCO	E3
LCE	MEDICAL	INDEPENDENT DUTY CORPSMAN	E6N
LCE	BAS	INDEPENDENT DUTY CORPSMAN	E6N
LCE	CLB DET	LCE OIC	O3
LCE	CLB DET	LCE NCOIC	E8
LCE	CLB DET	LCE CLERK / EMBARKATION SPECIALIST	E3
LCE	CLB DET	OPS NCO	E5
LCE	CLB DET	FIELD MEDICINE TECHNICIAN	E5N
LCE	CLB DET	AMMUNITION TECHNICIAN	E5
LCE	CLB DET	LANDING SPT SPECIALIST	E3
LCE	CLB DET	LANDING SPT SPECIALIST	E4

LCE	CLB DET	AIR DELIVERY SPECIALIST	E5
LCE	CLB DET	AIR DELIVERY SPECIALIST	E5
LCE	CLB DET	AIR DELIVERY SPECIALIST	E5
LCE	CLB DET	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	E5-E7
LCE	CLB DET	DISBURSING CLERK	E5
LCE	CLB DET	FISCAL CLERK	E5
LCE	CLB DET	ENG PLT CDR	O3
LCE	CLB DET	ENG PLT SGT	E7
LCE	CLB DET	COMBAT ENGINEER	E5
LCE	CLB DET	COMBAT ENGINEER	E3
LCE	CLB DET	COMBAT ENGINEER	E3
LCE	CLB DET	COMBAT ENGINEER	E3
LCE	CLB DET	COMBAT ENGINEER	E3
LCE	CLB DET	ELECTRICIAN	E3
LCE	CLB DET	ELECTRICIAN	E5
LCE	CLB DET	ELECTRICIAN	E4
LCE	CLB DET	ELECTRICIAN	E4
LCE	CLB DET	ELECTRICIAN	E3
LCE	CLB DET	ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS REPAIR TECH	E4
LCE	CLB DET	ELEC EQUIP RPR SPECIALIST	E3
LCE	CLB DET	ELEC EQUIP RPR SPECIALIST	E3
LCE	CLB DET	ELEC EQUIP RPR NCO	E5
LCE	CLB DET	WATER SPT TECH	E3
LCE	CLB DET	WATER SPT TECH	E3
LCE	CLB DET	WATER SPT TECH	E4
LCE	CLB DET	WATER SPT TECH	E4
LCE	CLB DET	WATER SPT TECH	E3
LCE	CLB DET	REFRIDGERATION MECH	E4
LCE	CLB DET	REFRIGERATION MECH	E3
LCE	CLB DET	WELDER	E5
LCE	CLB DET	HEAVY EQ OPERATOR	E4
LCE	CLB DET	ENG EQUIP OPR	E4
LCE	CLB DET	ENG EQUIP OPR	E3
LCE	CLB DET	ENG MAINT CHF	E6
LCE	CLB DET	ENG EQUIP MECH	E3
LCE	CLB DET	ENG EQUIP MECHANIC (IMA CAPABLE)	E5
LCE	CLB DET	ENG EQUIP MECHANIC (IMA CAPABLE)	E3
LCE	CLB DET	ENG EQUIP MECH	E4
LCE	CLB DET	WELDER	E5
LCE	CLB DET	INT MT MAINT CHF	E6
LCE	CLB DET	INTERMEDIATE MT MECH	E5

LCE	CLB DET	INT MOTOR TRANSPORT MECHANIC	E4
LCE	CLB DET	MOTOR TRANSPORT MECHANIC	E3
LCE	CLB DET	INTERMEDIATE MT MECH	E4
LCE	CLB DET	INTERMEDIATE MT MECH	E3
LCE	CLB DET	INTERMEDIATE MT MECH	E3
LCE	CLB DET	INTERMEDIATE COMM REPAIRMAN	E4
LCE	CLB DET	INT SMALL ARMS REPAIR	E4
LCE	CLB DET	INT OPTICS REPAIR	E3
LCE	CLB DET	MOTOR TRANSPORT OPERATOR	E5
LCE	CLB DET	MOTOR TRANSPORT OPERATOR	E4
LCE	CLB DET	MOTOR TRANSPORT OPERATOR	E4
LCE	CLB DET	MOTOR TRANSPORT OPERATOR	E3
LCE	CLB DET	MOTOR TRANSPORT OPERATOR	E5
LCE	CLB DET	MOTOR TRANSPORT OPERATOR	E6
LCE	CLB DET	MT WRECKER OPR	E4
LCE	CLB DET	EOD	E6
LCE	CLB DET	EOD	E6
LCE	CLB DET	EOD	E5

Note: This table is a portion of the manning document and does not fit any CLB construct because the LCE was disaggregated into three locations (Spain, Italy, and Romania). The headquarters element was from a standing CLB, and the LCE was augmented with sections from Second MLG. None of the standard units listed in the manning document directly translates into a capability. The document lists 298 Marines and Sailors.

Notes

1. Mike Resnick, e-mail to author and attached LPV 2009 Brief, January 4, 2017.
2. John J. Foster, *History of Eighth Field Depot and Eighth Service Regiment* (USA: Author, 1989), 6–7.
3. “Composition Board Report: Service Elements,” *Marine Corps Gazette* XX, no. XX (July 1957): 20.
4. Frank Beardsley, “Force Troops,” *Leatherneck* 49, no. 12 (December 1965): 20–23.
5. Paul E. Wilson, “Developing a Better Combat Service Support System for the Marine Corps,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 52, no. 1 (January 1978): 40.
6. Ibid.
7. Keith M. Wilkinson, “The Logistics Lessons of the Gulf War: A Snowball in the Desert?” (master’s thesis, 1993), 3.
8. Steven M. Zimmek, *US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: Combat Service Support in Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999), 78.
9. United States Marine Corps, *Tactical-Level Logistics*, Marine Corps Tactical Publication 3-40B, 3–5, 3–6, <http://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/ELECTRONIC-LIBRARY/Electronic-Library-Display/Article/899787/mctp-3-40b/>.
10. W. K. Zitz, ed., *2d FSSG Doctrinal Thought 1988* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988), Chapter 4.
11. Robert T. Forte, ed., *Combat Service Support Operations in South West Asia 1991* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, July 1991), 61.
12. Melissa D. Mihocko, *Marines in Iraq 2003: Combat Service Support during Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2011), 3.
13. Ibid.
14. Resnick, e-mail with the author and attached Quad MLG 1 April 2008 Brief, January 4, 2017.
15. M. E. Dunnard, *Marine Logistics Group Organization and Deployment Cycle in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 30 June 2008), <http://www.tecom.marines.mil/Units/Directorates/MCCLL/Contact-Us/>.

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16. Resnick, e-mail with the author, January 3, 2017.
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