

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE					Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.						
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 05/09/2017		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis			3. DATES COVERED (From - To) SEP 2016 - MAY 2017	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE RISE OF CHINA: THE PURSUIT OF REGIONAL HEGEMONY AND ECONOMIC STABILITY				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A		
				5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A		
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A		
6. AUTHOR(S) Cayere, Christopher, J., Major, USMC				5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A		
				5e. TASK NUMBER N/A		
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.						
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES						
14. ABSTRACT China's economy has grown by roughly 10% per year over the last thirty years. Over the last twenty years China has also increased its spending upon its military. This has led to the speculation that China is headed towards an attempt at a global hegemony. However, a review of facts and history shows that China is actually heading towards a regional hegemony.						
15. SUBJECT TERMS China, Economy, Hegemony, Expansion, Deng Xiaoping, Expansion						
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON	
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			USMC Command and Staff College	
Unclass	Unclass	Unclass	UU	24	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)	

*United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES


TITLE:
THE RISE OF CHINA: THE PURSUIT OF REGIONAL HEGEMONY AND ECONOMIC
STABILITY

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:
Major Christopher J. Cayere, USMC


AY 16-17

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Christopher Yung, PhD

Approved: 

Date: 5/9/2017

Oral Defense Committee Member: Doug Streusand, PhD

Approved: 

Date: 5/9/2017

Executive Summary

Title: The Rise of China: The Pursuit of Regional Hegemony and Economic Stability

Author: Christopher J. Cayere, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: China's ultimate purpose is to ensure its economic prosperity and consequently ensure the survival of the Chinese Communist Party. In order to accomplish this, China will create a regional hegemony under the guise of promoting regional security. This will provide security for China, stability for the CCP, and prosperity for the Chinese people.

Discussion: China has had a steady rise within its economic and military growth since 1978. 1978 marks the year that Deng Xiaoping instituted reforms that would open up China's economy. The opening of China's economy led to an increase in globalization. This in turn led to an increase in Chinese citizens living, working, or studying abroad. These factors caused China to increase its military capability and capacity. This increase occurred to protect China's economic interests as well as its citizens abroad. The expansion of China's military and global connections has caused many to believe China is attempting to challenge the United States as a global hegemon.

Conclusion: China is not attempting to create a global hegemony. China's actions are in fact pointing towards a regional hegemony. Their international actions are a direct benefit to the United States. These actions will alleviate the United States responsibility around the globe to interact. However, the United States must balance this expansion with not being pushed out of the Asiatic region.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSION EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE
INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE
VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY
OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD
INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY
PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my mentor, Dr. Christopher Yung, for his time and effort in assisting me with this thesis. Without his guidance and expertise this thesis would not have been possible. I will be forever grateful of his contribution in my pursuit of a Master's Degree in Military Studies.

I would also like to thank my wife, Gina, for her endless encouragement in this endeavor. My wife has been by my side through this whole process and without her support I do not think I would have made it across the finish line.

Table of Contents

	Page
DISCLAIMER	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
INTRODUCTION	1
THESIS	2
ORGANIZATION	2
ECONOMIC BACKGROUND	2
MILITARY BACKGROUND.....	4
ECONOMIC GROWTH.....	6
ECONOMIC INCREASE IN TRADE	9
A STRONG MILITARY PROTECTS THE ECONOMY	12
WHY CHINA’S OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS DON’T SUPPORT GLOBAL HEGEMONY	15
CONCLUSION	22
BIBLIOGRAPHY	28

Introduction

Over the last 30 years China has risen significantly as a global power. The rise in power began with a steadily growing economy which fueled an expansion of China's military. China's gross domestic product (GDP) is currently the second highest in the world with the United States being number one. The expanding economy has also led to an increase in trade. Regionally, China enmeshed economically with the South East Asian nations. Globally, China has expanded its trade to regions like Africa and South America. However, its most substantial trade partner is the United States. A rising economy has allowed China to increase its defense budget and its military capability. For the last two decades China has been modernizing its military and increasing its power projection capability. It has expanded its military reach to the Indian Ocean, Africa, and South America. Its island building and territorial claims in the South China Sea infringe upon other Asian countries' sovereign rights. These factors, in conjunction with a growing military, make it appear as if China is making an aggressive power play within the region. This raises the question of China's grand strategy and what a possible aggressive strategy might entail. The aggressive strategy implies that China is slowly acquiring economic and military power in order to shift the balance of the current unipolar world order to its advantage. China disputes the "aggressive power play theory" put forward by other countries, particularly commentators within the United States, and states that the Chinese are merely providing for regional security and peace. The contradiction between China's apparent expansion and its claim that it is merely motivated by regional security distorts a clear interpretation of China's actual goals. Also confusing the interpretation is the lack of transparency on the part of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In order to properly determine

its strategy, this thesis paper assesses what matters most to the CCP historically, growing the Chinese economy, and how the Chinese have tended to promote that objective.

Thesis

China's ultimate purpose is to ensure its economic prosperity and consequently ensure the survival of the Chinese Communist Party. In order to accomplish this, China will create a regional hegemony under the guise of promoting regional security. This will provide security for China, stability for the CCP, and prosperity for the Chinese people.

Organization

In order to analyze why China is re-creating a regional hegemony, this thesis will analyze China's historic behavior and identify as key to Chinese strategic behavior the paramount importance of the Chinese economy. Next it will examine its economic and military advances in recent decades. From this data, the necessary information will be extrapolated to show that China is attempting to establish a regional hegemony. The analysis will show why a regional hegemony is important and a global hegemony is counter-productive. This will demonstrate that China is more worried about protecting its regime than expanding its territory and/or replacing the United States as the global hegemon. Its policy objectives are best accomplished by action designed to foster regional dominance and by eventually expelling the United States from the region rather than usurping the United States position and attaining a position of global hegemony. It will also provide an opinion as to the policy implications for the United States with respect to the region.

Economic Background

The strategic roots of China's economic strategy begin with Confucius. At its most basic, the teachings of Confucius say that peace and harmony within the state are paramount, but these

teachings also promote the preservation of the state. Since the Emperor is the “Son of Heaven” and has dominion of all under heaven, these teachings do not differentiate between internal and external politics. Since the ruler is charged with upholding this principal, the preservation of the state is the responsibility of the ruler. Therefore, the ruler must do what is necessary to protect the sovereignty of China, whether it be an internal or external threat.¹ This will tie into the notion of China’s “active-defense” and desire for a regional hegemony.

Confucius also promoted the importance of economic prosperity. Confucius stated that the chief principle to a happy population is economic prosperity. If economic prosperity is equally distributed, the people will be happy.² Confucius noted that a state’s first responsibility is the economic prosperity of its citizens. This put a premium on commercial and financial policies. If that meant that military policy, the ability to make war, and defense acquisition had to take a back seat to commercial policy, then so be it. Broadly speaking these philosophies tie the history of China into the CCP’s current values of government, sovereignty, and economy.

These philosophies are important to recognize as they show a lineage of the importance of economic prosperity in China. However, this paper will focus on the reforms over the last thirty years. The reforms of the last thirty years are different than the original teachings of Mao Zedong. Mao called for an economic program that divorced itself from Western capitalism, and the teachings stated that prosperity and economic justice in the developing world can only be realized through socialism.³ This perspective was largely rejected by Deng Xiaoping when he assumed power in the late 1970s. The current economic reforms began with Deng Xiaoping. Upon taking control of the CCP Deng Xiaoping introduced the four modernizations. These modernizations focused upon the economic areas of industry, agriculture, science and

technology, and defense. Enmeshed throughout all of these areas was the overlying importance of prosperity.⁴

The four modernizations were aimed at developing China's economy and bringing it into the modern era. The development was a three step process that used economic conditions as the point of transition to the next step. The first step required China to double its Gross National Product (GNP) and solve the problem of food and clothing. The second step required China to reach a GNP of one trillion USD with a per capita income of \$800 to \$1,000 USD. Currently, China is in the third and final step. The achievement of the third step is to become a developed country with a high income economy, thus completing their modernization.⁵ On discussing Deng Xiaoping's modernizations, Senior Colonel Peng Guangqian states, "On the strategic focal points of development, he made it clear that we should pay attention to economic development at all times, and wholeheartedly work on the four modernizations."⁶ Deng Xiaoping set in motion the importance of economic prosperity within China. As will be shown, these policies led to China's economic growth over the last 30 years and how its policies have in general been in support of its economy.

China's economic reform began with the gradual opening of China's economy and a movement away from socialism. Barry Naughton discusses this in his book, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993. Initially, China relaxed the rules of creating a business, essentially allowing entry into the economy by entrepreneurs. Another divergence from China's previous economic system was the introduction of flexible prices which stimulated the fundamental economic principle of supply and demand. This led to the realization that profitability is the best indicator of market performance, which is a divergence from socialism. Socialism requires a planned economy; with the planning being completed by the government.

These reforms were in opposition to the planned economy. This in turn led to China opening up its economy even further, based upon the result of profitability, and establishing economic sectors. Some sectors were allowed to operate outside of the plan, while the others remained within the plans parameters. This model of reform is known as the “dual track reform.”⁷

This “dual track reform” system separates domestic policy and the economy. According to Naughton, the CCP has transitioned away from this policy. “In the 1990s, however, after a decade of sustained growth, foreign trade and investment have become sufficiently large relative to the rest of the Chinese economy and thus it is no longer possible to keep domestic and foreign economic policy separate.”⁸ This is due to the initial reforms. Those reforms created opportunity within China. China quickly transitioned from a majority agrarian society to a majority industrialized society. The profitability of a more open economy has caused China to link domestic and economic policy, open its doors to foreign investors, and expand its influence in the world economy.⁹

Military Background

China is a self-proclaimed peaceful nation. The need for a military within China is the defense of China. The Chinese have called this concept an “active defense”. The “active defense” strategy means that China does not attack until it is attacked. This occurs at the strategic level of warfare. However, at the operational level of warfare, China can take the offensive. Offensive action is justified if it is in defense of Chinese strategy¹⁰. This means that if a nation perceives another nation to be a threat it can take action before the belligerent has a chance to act¹¹. The implication is that the Chinese have reserved for themselves the right to pre-empt an enemy if that enemy is perceived to be on the verge of attacking China either physically or ideologically. This is important because it demonstrates the need for a military to defend the

nation. Not only must the military defend the nation, but it must also defend its citizens and interests abroad. For China, these interests are tied to its economy.

War is a holistic enterprise.¹² Wars cost money. In order to achieve total victory in war, a nation must not go bankrupt. Russia went bankrupt at the end of The Cold War. The United States did not. This was due to the fact that the Russian economy was fragile and the United States accelerated this decline through an arms race. As this argument will show, China is too far behind the United States militarily to enter into an arms race. At the beginning of The Cold War, Russia and the United States were at least comparable militarily. This will demonstrate that creating a global hegemony is not in China's best interests. The prosperity of the Chinese people, the stability of the CCP, and the security of China do not align with challenging the current global hegemon. China will profit most with the United States spending its "blood and treasure" on a global hegemony. The Chinese have no need to spend that much money on the globe when all it requires is domination of the Asia-Pacific region.

The different factors making up the substance of China's strategic thought make it difficult to determine China's ultimate objective. The United States, being a global hegemony, has a strategic objective of maintaining the status quo. China is currently not a global nor regional hegemony. From the United States perspective, China's actions, primarily its consistent military build-up, point towards becoming a hegemon. There is debate about whether or not this hegemon will be regional or global, but this thesis will show that China desires regional hegemony. From the Chinese perspective, China's strategic actions are designed in order to defend the sovereignty of China. This sovereignty is defined as being able to defend its claim to territory (either at sea or on land), its internal and external economic interests, and its citizens at home and abroad. These two perspectives present a dichotomy in China's motives. This is why

it is necessary to not only understand China's actions, but to also understand its philosophical history in order to determine its ultimate strategy.

Economic Growth

The CCP came into power in 1949. There is much regard for the centennial anniversary of their coming to power. Along with this regard is an economic goal which further legitimizes the CCP within China. According to the World Bank, China began market reforms in 1978, which coincides with Deng Xiaopings rule. This change moved China from a centrally-planned economy to a market based economy. These changes resulted in the fastest growth in world history with China's GDP rising roughly 10% per year for over thirty years.¹³

When China instituted its economic reform in 1978, its GDP was 148 billion U.S. dollars (USD). The World Bank reports China's GDP at 11 trillion USD in 2015 (see Figure 1). The United States had a GDP of 18 trillion USD. In the same year the United States had the number one GDP in the world with China having the number two GDP. Since 1978, the United States has had a rise in their GDP that ranges around 5% per year. Whereas China's rise has increased by around 10% per year¹⁴. This growth includes the global economic crisis of 2008. This places China on a path to supersede the United States as the largest economy by 2030.¹⁵

These GDP's represent the total economic strength of the country; it does not represent the average individual wealth of the Chinese population. China is still declaring itself a developing country, which alludes back to Deng Xiaopings three step process. This is due to China's massive population and the disparity between GDP and population. China has a population of 1.3 billion people. This equates to a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of 7,900 USD. This is in stark contrast to a United States population of 321.5 million people and a GNI per capita of 55,980 USD (see Figure 2)¹⁶. These numbers reflect the lack of a middle class

in China. The income inequality within China is vast. This is what makes China a developing country. However, China's goal is to be a high income economy. The definition of a high income economy by the World Bank is a GNI of 12,476 USD or more¹⁷. So not only is China seven times lower per capita GNI than the United States, but it is also a considerable amount away from its economic goal.

Figure 1: United States and China GDP Growth¹⁸





Figure 2: Chinese and United States GNI per Capita Growth

GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)

World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.

License: [Open](#)



In an opinion article published on China.org, an official Chinese government site, John Ross^{1 19} states that China will achieve a GNI representative of a high income economy before 2030. He goes on to assert that this growth will not only benefit the middle class of China, but it will benefit the world as well. He also presents the idea that these goals are realistic and moderate.²⁰ His argument states that China is trying to grow their middle class and strengthen

¹ John Ross is “the first non-Chinese citizen to be appointed to a full time post at a leading Think Tank in China - Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China.”

its economy internally. Ross's article presents to the citizens of China the idea that this is an easily attainable goal. John Ross' article being published on a CCP supervised website, under the auspices of the State Council Information Office and the China International Publishing Group in Beijing, reaffirms the notion that the CCP view a burgeoning economy with a flourishing middle class as the number one priority and within grasp of today's generations.

This economic growth is reinforced by the reforms being undertaken by Xi Jinping. He is currently instituting checks on political power such as the "*cage of regulations* that ensures cadres 'dare not, cannot and do not want to' be corrupt."²¹ Throughout his tenure he has led the charge against corrupt individuals, no matter where they fall within the ranks.²² This is recognition of an economy that is continuing to modernize. Also, it demonstrates that Xi Jinping recognizes the importance of maintaining the trust and confidence of the Chinese citizenry. This provides stability for the CCP.

Economic Increase in Trade

China's economic growth has naturally required an increase and expansion of trade. The relevant regions this thesis will focus on are North America, South America, Africa, and South East Asia. Within North America China has become the United States largest trading partner and vice versa. Within South America China has been exporting manufacturing capabilities and importing primary products or commodities. China's trade with Africa is motivated by the necessity for oil. China's trade in South East Asia increases its economic interdependence and authority within the region. Authority is gained through China using the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to promote economic growth. The next few paragraphs will point out the details of these trade regions.

According to data from 2015 China is the United States' largest goods trading partner, with the United States having an overall trade deficit. However, the United States has a trade surplus with China in the realm of services.²³ The United States is the second largest import trade partner of China, but it should be noted that the difference between first and second in this case is miniscule.²⁴² The dependence upon the trade relationships between the United States and China demonstrates how intertwined the economies of China and the United States have become. It also provides insight as to why China would want to dominate regionally but not globally. As a regionally dominant country, China would be able to exert its influence upon the Asian market and not have the concern of a greater power, such as the United States, superseding its influence. As a globally dominant country, China would not be able to match the United States power projection and would significantly reduce its economic growth, making its goals unachievable.

China has also created a strong trade relationship with South America. This trade relationship primarily involves the exportation of construction services, and the importation of commodities. China's construction companies have benefited from the rapidly growing economy and are now expanding their reach to countries within South America. China's development and growing economy have required resources from outside their borders. Some of these resources are being imported from South America. One of these resources is petroleum.²⁵ This is important to point out because it shows China's growing economy has allowed its businesses to expand its reach, and it shows its reliance on other regions for resources.

The need for China to import resources from other regions highlights the issue of China needing to protect its citizens abroad. As will be presented, China's Navy is growing an out of

² The difference between first and second for exports was \$184 billion USD. The difference between first and second for imports was \$2 billion USD.

area operational capability. This capability is an attempt to protect economic interests and citizens abroad. An example of the necessity for this capability arose in 2011. China had to evacuate more than 35,000 citizens from Libya prior to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization military actions. This demonstrated to the CCP that it needed to fulfill its rhetoric of protecting Chinese citizens abroad.²⁶ Military growth is in support of Chinese interests abroad, not an attempt to create a global hegemony.

Of the resources China imports, the primary is oil. China is currently the second largest importer of crude oil worldwide, and by 2030 it is projected to be the first. The first largest importer of crude oil is the United States. This is a very similar scenario to GDP. China is also currently transitioning from coal based energy platforms to crude oil based energy platforms.²⁷ This will increase the requirement for crude oil from other regions such as Africa and the Middle East. China's trade routes with Africa and the Middle East are vital to its economic growth based upon its reliance on oil. The primary method of transporting this commodity for China is by sea. This requires an increase of capability in their Navy and Air Force. It will be shown in this thesis that China is growing its military capability in order to protect its interests abroad. This will be discussed further in the next section.

Finally, China has further enmeshed its trade within Asia while simultaneously creating an economic institution to compete with The World Bank. The enmeshment is defined by China's actions to enter and develop strong economic partnerships. These economic partnerships have occurred on two levels. The first of which is that China has become further involved within the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).²⁸ Finally China has enmeshed its trade within Asia as a whole.²⁹ And then there is the AIIB which is a counter to the United States backed World Bank. The purpose of both banks is to provide loans to help

develop under-developed countries. The difference in the AIIB is that it is focused primarily in the Asia-Pacific region and will give China a greater degree of influence over economic institutions than it enjoys with the World Bank. Of its member states, 77 percent are claimed to be regional, meaning within the Asia-Pacific region.³⁰ This is noteworthy due to the fact that China has created a primarily regional banking system that has a similar vision to the World Bank. The regional bank and regional trade display a willingness by China to support the region, and to gradually push the World Bank, and subsequently the United States, out. This would allow China to be the dominant economy and power within the region. This would allow China to ensure that their economic interests are protected and ensured.

Now to answer the question of why this economic growth and trade is significant. As has been discussed, a strong economy is reliant upon trade. When Deng Xiaping introduced the four modernizations, a large part of it was opening up the doors to trade. Trade must be protected. In order to have a stable growing economy a country must have a military capable of protecting its trade routes. Currently, the majority of China's trade flows through the South China Sea (SCS). The total amount of trade flowing through this area annually is \$5.3 trillion USD. This is 30 percent of global maritime trade.³¹ China's trade routes for their primary imports and exports are via the sea. Secondary is via land. This further reinforces the necessity of a strong military in order to protect the lines of communication (LOC). More importantly, it requires a strong navy and air force in order to protect the sea lines of communication (SLOC) and its citizens overseas.

A Strong Military Protects the Economy

China has increased its defense spending by roughly 10% per year over the last decade.³² Economic growth is a primary motivation. This defense budget increase is in support of a steadily increasing military capability. China has also been increasing its military presence

within the South China Sea. This is evidenced through news reports, United States Government reports, and allied reports as well. This increase in capability appears to be for the purposes of competing with the United States. As will be discussed, it is also to protect its interests and citizens abroad and to provide for the security of China. This falls in line with protecting the prosperity of the Chinese people and the security of China.

China's steadily increasing military capability has been occurring over approximately the last 20 years. According to the Defense Department's report to congress in 2016 China has improved across the spectrum of military operations. This report states that the growing military capability is in line with President Xi Jinping's China Dream, which is the "great renewal of the Chinese Nation."³³ The China Dream "includes a commitment to developing military power commensurate with China's resurgent status as a great power."³⁴ China recognizes that its current economic rise is not sustainable without a military capable of protecting citizens and interests abroad, territorial claims, and national sovereignty.

China's military capability expansion is mainly evident through the advances within the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). China has been steadily working towards building a modern Navy. "China continues its gradual shift from 'near sea' defense to 'far seas' protection... with multi-mission, long-range, sustainable naval platforms that have robust self-defense capabilities." This is also evident through its fielding of an aircraft carrier.³⁵ The PLAAF has expanded to the point where it is the largest air force in Asia. It is the third largest in the world. They are continuing to build their fleet of fourth generation aircraft and are pursuing fifth generation technology.³⁶

In the National Institute for Defense Studies Report of 2016, Japan has also stated that the PLAN "has changed its strategy from "coastal defense and inshore defense" to "offshore

defense” and later to a combination of “offshore defense and open seas defense (protection).”

The NIDS report also notices that China is moving into the Indian Ocean in order to protect its citizens and SLOCs.³⁷ This shift in strategic missions is paralleled by the PLAAF. The PLAAF now has a broader strategic mission of conducting both offensive and defensive operations simultaneously. This is a shift from their traditional territorial air defense.³⁸ These shifts in missions demonstrate China’s desire to have a military that can protect its interests not only within the region of Asia but outside of the region as well.

Both the United States report and the Japanese report show that China is building a more capable and further reaching military. They both also allude to the fact that China is doing this in response to its burgeoning trade and need to protect its interests abroad (trade and citizens).³⁹ Another interesting fact to pull from this information is the shift in strategy to expand its capability beyond its sovereign territory. This demonstrates an interest in controlling things beyond China, but it does not mean that China wants to control all things globally.

At the end of 2015, China reorganized its military structure. This reorganization created a theater joint operation command system.⁴⁰ This model looks like the United States current joint model, complete with geographic combatant commanders. What needs to be noted is that China’s combatant commanders are focused on regions within China, not the globe. This is an interesting point to draw out. One of the three tenets of this change is that the primary responsibility of the PLA is to defend CCP rule. This means that all military staffs have a political commissar in order to ensure decision making aligns with CCP dictates.⁴¹ The restructuring of the Chinese military is not just a move to an efficient model, but it is also a move to keep the peace at home. In other words, the strategy of the restructure is not an attempt at global power, it is also an attempt to maintain stability within the country.


Why China's Out of Area Operations Don't Support Global Hegemony

China's primary focus of its military expansion has been regional. China has increased its presence in the South China Sea, referenced as the nine-dash line (see Figure 3). There is also an ongoing dispute over the Senkaku/Diayou Islands within the East China Sea. This dispute is not necessarily all tied to economics, but it is important because it shows China's resolve to be in control of the region to at least the first island chain (see Figure 4). There has also been contested expansion into the Indian Ocean. The movement into the Indian Ocean is beyond China's territorial claims and multiple island chains on China's Eastern borders. Expansion into the South and East China Seas frames the situation for China's out of area operations in the Indian Ocean. Also, China has introduced the 'One Belt, One Road' initiative which also points deceptively towards the desire for a global hegemony.

This section will discuss China's out of area operations and its implication towards a global hegemony. It will show how China's actions are more consistent with creating a regional hegemony. This argument will be built by discussing the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the 'One Belt, One Road' initiative, and China's increasing military capability in support of this expansion. What will be evident throughout this discussion is that a regional hegemony supports China's efforts to provide security for China, stability for the CCP, and prosperity for the Chinese people better than a sprint for the finish push for global supremacy ever will. It will show that China's military advancements support a regional dominance and not a global dominance. A regional hegemony supports China and falls in line with its "active defense" strategy.

Within the Spratly Island chain in the South China Sea, China has engaged in island building as well as the placement of military structures upon those islands. This is reported by the U.S. Department of Defense, “China will be able to use its reclaimed features as persistent civil-military bases to enhance its presence in the South China Sea significantly and enhance China’s ability to control the features and nearby maritime space.”⁴² The report goes on to show that China is building berthing areas, ports, airfields and resupply facilities upon these islands in the South China Sea. “This would improve China’s ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or third parties, widen the range of capabilities available to China, and reduce the time required to deploy them.”⁴³ This is in line with the analysis that China is primarily focused regionally. China has a vital economic interest to the trade that flows through the South China Sea.

Figure 3: The Nine Dash Line Territorial Expansion Into the South China Sea⁴⁴



What is also noteworthy in this report is that China is focused on the first island chain. The first island chain deepens China's territorial claim within South East Asia. It strengthens China regionally, not globally. There is a large geographic impediment to China using this as a global strategy. Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, The Philippines, and Indonesia stand in the way of China using this as a base for global expansion. This territorial claim gives China a strong foothold to influence and potentially control the region, not maneuver past it.

The first island chain ties into China's actions within the East China Sea as well. China has long been in contest with Japan over the rights to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands within the East China Sea. This contest is over the administrative rights to an economic exclusion zone (EEZ). "Another Chinese basic marine law is the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the

Continental Shelf, which was adopted by the National People's Congress in 1998. This law is designed to guarantee China's exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction over its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf, and to safeguard China's national maritime rights and interests." Basically, this law extends China's sovereign territory out to 200 nautical miles.⁴⁵ This contrasts with the current international standard of 12 nautical miles for sovereignty. But it does not contrast with China's goal for regional dominance.

The importance of China's expansion into the South China Sea and its infringement upon the East China Sea is two-fold. First it expands China's territorial claims and, by China's definition, sovereign rights. Both the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the nine-dash line territorial claim expand China's rights out to the first island chain. This gives China a strategic advantage in controlling the region. As will be explained further, this supports the economy and prosperity of China and the stability of the CCP by extending its defensive perimeter and giving it greater control over the region.

Figure 4: The First Island Chain⁴⁶



China has also expanded into the Indian Ocean. This expansion is not based upon territorial claims. This expansion is explained best from concepts associated with naval strategy. As has already been shown, a vast majority of China's trade transits through the Indian Ocean to reach China. The majority of this trade is oil. It is necessary for China to expand its naval operations into the Indian Ocean in order to protect its SLOCs.

China's current naval strategy is based upon the teachings of Alfred Thayer Mahan.⁴⁷ Mahan was the visionary who is considered to be the founder of naval strategy for the United States Navy. Liu Huaqing is considered the father of the Chinese Navy or "China's Mahan."⁴⁸ Liu studied and utilized the teachings of Mahan because the ideas were successful for the United States, and they would accelerate the capability and capacity of China's Navy. Mahan discussed the importance of 'pearls' within out of area operations. These 'pearls' were sea bases in which

a ship could refit and replenish. With respect to China and the Indian Ocean, this has become known as a ‘string of pearls.’⁴⁹ This is in line with three of the four capabilities Liu stated the Chinese navy required. These three capabilities are the ability to seize limited sea control in certain areas for a certain period of time, the ability to effectively defend China’s sea lanes, and the ability to fight outside of China’s claimed maritime areas.⁵⁰ These capabilities are well suited to defend SLOCs.

The ‘string of pearls’ idea began in 2004 with a Booz Allen Hamilton study.⁵¹ This idea suggests that China will create a network of sea bases throughout the Indian Ocean, thus connecting its operation in the South China Sea to Africa. This model makes sense based upon the fact that China is attempting to protect its SLOCs between China and Africa. However, it does not address the fact that China is unwilling to deploy its forces to bases in foreign countries.

In reality, China has been utilizing commercial ports to refit and replenish its Navy. In order for the ‘string of pearls’ theory to work, China would need to build sufficient military bases within these locations. These locations are strung throughout the Indian Ocean, “If China decided to try to encircle India or dominate the Indian Ocean, Chinese military planners would have to expect a potential conventional military response from India, the largest military power in South Asia.”⁵² This means that China would require a substantial military presence within the Indian Ocean. This buildup would draw international attention, which has not occurred thus far. Therefore, China is not building up its military capability within the Indian Ocean because it would be impossible to do so covertly; it is merely increasing its military activity in order to protect its SLOCs, which are vital to the Chinese economy.

There is also the aspect of the size of the military necessary to maintain this presence in the Indian Ocean. As mentioned before, China would need to anticipate a response from India,

and this response would not be small. China would have to be prepared for a large scale conventional military response. In order to do this, “China would require a much larger navy to conduct such operations, and it would make little strategic sense to station the bulk of that force so far away from Chinese territory. Major combat operations would require logistics and support capabilities that go well beyond what commercial ports could provide.”⁵³ In other words, not only would China have to increase its defense spending, spend money on building military bases further from China, but it would also have to position a large number of its forces away from China. This is economically disadvantageous for China’s goals, it puts at risk high value assets such as navy ships and aircraft, and it doesn’t fall in line with China’s “active defense” strategy.

The next aspect of China’s out of area operations and potential global hegemony is the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative. Although not alluded to in the name, this is a modernized version of the original silk road. This new initiative is a combination of maritime and land domains, “the One Belt, One Road initiative consists of the Silk Road Economic Belt and a New Maritime Silk Road.”⁵⁴ This is a reinvigoration of trade routes. When the silk road was originally recognized, China was a regional hegemon. Now that China has a more focused maritime capability it is only natural that China would add this realm to its trade routes.

This new initiative is another example of China’s expanding globalization in order to support its economy. The ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative is one of enmeshment that further ties China’s economy with the countries it trades with. The plan calls for the three ‘togethers’ which are; mutual benefit, working together for a common interest, and enjoying together the benefits.⁵⁵ The program is funded by the AIIB and is an attempt by China to be the dominant financial institution in the region. This program is intended to strengthen the economy of China and increase the prosperity of its citizens.

There is an argument that the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative is a global power play similar to the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was an economic stimulus package from the United States to Europe following World War II. There is an argument that implies the United States utilized this plan to maintain a dominant influence within the region. The similarity between the two plans is that China’s new initiative is intended to exert power and dominance over other countries both regionally and globally.⁵⁶ Although this is not an impossible theory, it is not likely. In order for China to execute the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative in the same way as the Marshall Plan, it would need to vastly increase the size of its military. It would also need to establish military bases on a global scale in order to enforce its policies and interests. This would be counter-productive to the strengthening of the economy based on how much money this would take to achieve. Realistically, the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative is more likely another attempt to further push the United States out of the region leaving China as the dominant financial institution. The fact that this initiative extends beyond East Asia builds international support and credibility for China’s actions. This would create stability for the CCP and prosperity for the Chinese people.

This increase in globalization has led to an increase in Chinese citizens living and working abroad. “The numbers are staggering, with more than a million Chinese citizens employed around the globe in Chinese investment projects, almost 400,000 Chinese students studying abroad, and over 60 million Chinese tourists going over-seas annually.”⁵⁷ China has not only an interest in protecting its citizen’s over-seas, but it also has an interest in protecting its investments. This is why last year the National People’s Congress (NPC) passed a law allowing Chinese special forces to deploy abroad to conduct counter-terrorism missions if invited by the host nation and/or invited by the United Nations.⁵⁸ These interests are threatened by political

instability, state failure, or international interference in several of its most valued partners.⁵⁹

This is the reason for China's expanding military. China requires a means to protect its people and its investments. A strong military ensures the prosperity of Chinese citizens through protection. This gives stability to the rule of the CCP.

The CCP recognizes the threat of expanding globalization and has thus increased its overseas capability and cooperation with international institutions. This expands the legitimacy of the CCP within China.⁶⁰ This reinforces the expansion of the PLA and its capacity and capability. The PLA has expanded its role in counterpiracy operations, joint noncombatant evacuation operations (such as Yemen), United Nations peacekeeping operations, and weapons of mass destruction disposal.⁶¹ The expansion of this military and its operations does not represent a military attempting to create a global hegemony. Rather it represents a nation that recognizes its dependence on the global market, peace, and stability. China is promoting the prosperity of its citizens abroad and the stability and legitimacy of the CCP through its international cooperation.

Conclusion

This thesis has shown how China's rise in economic prosperity is accompanied by a desire to be a regional hegemon. The attainment of the regional hegemony could coincide with the 100-year anniversary of the CCP, which is also when China hopes to reach the end state for step three of the four modernizations. This will provide security for China, stability for the CCP, and prosperity for the Chinese people.

The thesis has examined Chinese history and how the modernization of its economy has shaped the path it is going down today. These modernizations were begun by Deng Xiaoping and are currently being carried out and updated by Xi Jinping. These reforms have led to

changes in the way China operates both internally and externally. They have led to an increased globalization of the economy. This increased globalization and the expansion of China's interests outside of the Asia-Pacific region has required China to increase its out of area operations with respect to trade and the military. Trade is naturally a part of globalization, and it has significantly opened up China's economy which has led to an increase in Chinese citizens living abroad. The expansion of the military coincides with this in order to protect trade routes and Chinese citizens abroad. It has been shown that this expansion is a direct result from opening up the economy to a more capitalist style system. It has also been shown that China's expansion trends towards the desire of becoming a regional hegemon.

China's expansion is currently a benefit to the United States. China is assisting with peace keeping, humanitarian, and overall transnational security operations throughout the world. This alleviates the United States responsibility to protect within certain regions around the globe and allows it to focus its efforts elsewhere. This is not a bad thing. This is beneficial to the world order. Through the purview of constructivism, this creates a greater bond between nations and is a catalyst for peace. Moving away from the global aperture, this is beneficial to the United States domestically as well. It is beneficial domestically because if the United States is not the only peace keeper in the region, it does not have to spend as much money in the region. This means the money can be spent domestically or in other areas of interest. Also, it places less of a burden on the United States military.

However, if China became a regional hegemon, the United States would no longer be the dominant influence within the region. This would directly influence the trade relations and military/political alliances of the United States within the United States. As discussed earlier, the United States has a heavy reliance on trade within the region. If China were to establish a

regional hegemony in Asia, this would have a direct effect upon the United States economy. This effect is due to the fact that the United States would no longer be the dominant influence within the region.

So what does this all mean? It means that the United States should support China's increase in global activity. It also means that the United States should maintain its presence within Asia. The United States should also present a non-threatening position towards its actions. As discussed above when assessing the "active defense", a threat to strategy justifies an operational offensive. Therefore, the United States should take no action that directly threatens the sovereignty or strategy of the CCP. The United States should work with China to further interweave the interests of the two nations, for a better international standard.

¹ Nadine Godehardt, "The Chinese Meaning of Just War and Its Impact on the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China", *GIGA Working Paper, German Institute of Global and Area Studies*, No. 88, (September 2008): 18.

² Chen Huan-Cheng, "The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School" (PhD thesis, The Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, 1911), 136.

³ Mao Zedong, "The Theory and Practice of Mao," Sam Richards and Paul Saba, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Anti-Revisionism On-Line* (September 1986).
<https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/uk.hightide/mao.htm>

⁴ Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States, *China Under The Four Modernizations*, 97th Cong., 1982, 1-4.
[https://www.jec.senate.gov/reports/97th%20Congress/China%20Under%20the%20Four%20Modernizations%20Part%20I%20\(1130\).pdf](https://www.jec.senate.gov/reports/97th%20Congress/China%20Under%20the%20Four%20Modernizations%20Part%20I%20(1130).pdf).

⁵ Peng Guangqian, "Deng Xiaoping Strategic Thought" in Michael Pillsbury, ed., *Chinese Views of Future Warfare*, NDU Press, Washington, D.C., 1997, pp. 3-9.
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/chinview/chinapt1.html#2>.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Barry Naughton, *Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 9 – 13.

⁸ Barry Naughton, "China's Emergence and Prospects as a Trading Nation." *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (1996): 277. <https://search-proquest-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/217114566?accountid=14746>.

⁹ Ibid, 277-281.

-
- ¹⁰ David Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines’” in Kamphausen & Scobell, eds., *Rightsizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military*, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, (September 2007): 88, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB784.pdf> Online.
- ¹¹ Andrew Scobell, and U.S. Army War College, “China and Strategic Culture” *Strategic Studies Institute*, Carlisle Barracks, PA (2002): 12.
- ¹² Ibid, 32.
- ¹³ World Bank, “China: Overview” 2017, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Justin Yifu Lin, “China’s Economic Development and Cultural Renaissance in the Multipolar Growth World of the 21st Century” Beijing Forum (2011): 3.
- ¹⁶ World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN-US>.
- ¹⁷ World Bank, <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups>.
- ¹⁸ World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/?locations=CN-US>
- ¹⁹ John Ross, Biography, <http://www.johnrosseconomics.com/about.html>.
- ²⁰ John Ross, “‘Moderately prosperous society’ is key goal for China” *State Council Information Office and the China International Publishing Group, Beijing* (November 14, 2012) http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-11/14/content_27108452_2.htm.
- ²¹ Xinhua, “Xi’s Political Economy Renews Modernization Drive,” *China Daily*, Updated March 2, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-03/02/content_28403431.htm.
- ²² Xiang Bo, ed., “Xinhua Insight: ‘Xi political economy’ renews China’s modernization drive” *Xinhua News*, February 28, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2017-02/28/c_136092129.htm.
- ²³ Office of the United States Trade Representative, *The People’s Republic of China*, Executive Office of the President, <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china>.
- ²⁴ Alexander Simoes “China,” *The Observatory of Economic Complexity*, 2017, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/chn/#Trade_Balance.
- ²⁵ Sam Wang, “China and Latin America in 2016,” *Council on Hemispheric Affairs*, (August 16, 2016): 1-2, <http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Sam-Wang-China-LA-Final.pdf>
- ²⁶ Ely Ratner et al., *More Willing and Able: Charting China’s International Activism*, (Washington, D.C.: Center For a New American Security): 16.
- ²⁷ Eleanor Albert, “China Africa,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-africa/p9557>.
- ²⁸ Association of South East Asian Nations, “Organizational Structure,” 2016, <http://asean.org/asean/asean-structure/organisational-structure-2/>.
- ²⁹ Simoes, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/chn/#Trade_Balance.
- ³⁰ Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, “About Us,” 2017, <https://www.aiib.org/en/index.html>.
- ³¹ Max Fisher, “The South China Sea: Explaining the Dispute,” *The New York Times*, July 14, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/world/asia/south-china-sea-dispute-arbitration-explained.html>.
- ³² Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015*, 2016: ii.

-
- ³³ “2014 Two Sessions,” *China Daily*, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014npcandcppcc/2014-03/05/content_17324203.htm.
- ³⁴ OSD Annual Report to Congress: 41.
- ³⁵ Ibid, 25-28.
- ³⁶ Ibid, 30-31.
- ³⁷ NIDS China Security Report 2016, *The Expanding Scope of PLA Activities and the PLA Strategy*, National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, (2016): v.
- ³⁸ NIDS, 22.
- ³⁹ Annual Report to Congress, 6. NIDS, 7.
- ⁴⁰ Ken Allen, Dennis Blasko, and John Corbett, “The PLA’s New Organizational Structure: What is Known, Unknown and Speculation”, *China Brief*, Vol. 16, Issue 3, February 2016, Jamestown Foundation, pp. 1-11. <https://jamestown.org/program/the-plas-new-organizational-structure-what-is-known-unknown-and-speculation-part-1/>.
- ⁴¹ Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow. 2016. "China's Goldwater-Nichols?: Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms." *Joint Force Quarterly : JFQ* (82): 68-75. <https://search-proquest-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/1809936687?accountid=14746>.
- ⁴² Annual Report to Congress: 7.
- ⁴³ Ibid, 13-20.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid, 10.
- ⁴⁵ Caroline Rose and Victor Teo. “The United States between China and Japan,” Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013: 383.
- ⁴⁶ The Economist, *Who rules the Waves?*” October 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/international/21674648-china-no-longer-accepts-america-should-be-asia-pacifics-dominant-naval-power-who-rules>.
- ⁴⁷ Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Red Star Over the Pacific,” Naval Institute Press, 2011: 4, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/usmcu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=729210>.
- ⁴⁸ <http://cimsec.org/father-modern-chinese-navy-liu-huaqing/13291>
- ⁴⁹ James R. Holmes, “China’s ‘String of Pearls’: Naval Rivalry or Entente in the Indian Ocean?” *World Politics Review*, March 1st, 2016, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/18085/china-s-string-of-pearls-naval-rivalry-or-entente-in-the-indian-ocean>
- ⁵⁰ Daniel Hartnett, “The Father of the Modern Chinese Navy – Liu Huaqing,” *Center for International Maritime Security*, (October 8, 2014) <http://cimsec.org/father-modern-chinese-navy-liu-huaqing/13291>
- ⁵¹ Christopher Yung and Ross Rustici, “‘Not an Idea We Have to Shun’: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century,” *Institute for National Strategic Studies*, Washington D.C. (October 2014): 14.
- ⁵² Not an Idea We Have To Shun, 33.
- ⁵³ Not an Idea We Have To Shun, 37.
- ⁵⁴ Michael Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative,” *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 47 (July 14, 2015): 2.
- ⁵⁵ Swaine, 6.
- ⁵⁶ Swaine, 10.
- ⁵⁷ Ely Ratner, et al, “More Willing and Able: Charting China’s International Security Activism,” *Center for a New American Security* (May 2015): 10.

⁵⁸ Mathieu Duchâtel, “Terror Overseas: understanding China’s evolving counter-terror strategy,” *The European Union*, (October 26th, 2016), http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/terror_overseas_understanding_chinas_evolutionary_counter_terror_strategy7160.

⁵⁹ Ely Ratner, Ely “The Emergent Security Threats Reshaping China's Rise,” *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 34, no. 1, (2011): 32.

⁶⁰ More Willing and Able, 30.

⁶¹ Ibid, 30.

Bibliography

Finkelstein, David. "China's National Military Strategy: An Overview of the 'Military Strategic Guidelines'" Edited by Kamphausen & Scobell. *Rightsizing the People's Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China's Military*. Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle Barracks, PA, September 2007. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB784.pdf> Online.

Guangqian, Peng. "Deng Xiaoping Strategic Thought" Edited by Michael Pillsbury. *Chinese Views of Future Warfare*. NDU Press: Washington, D.C., 1997.
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/chinview/chinapt1.html#2>.

Japanese NIDS China Security Report 2016. *The Expanding Scope of PLA Activities and the PLA Strategy*, National Institute for Defense Studies: Japan, 2016.

Naughton, Barry. *Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Ratner, Ely, Elbridge Colby, Andrew Erickson, Zachary Hosford, and Alexander Sullivan. *More Willing and Able: Charting China's International Activism*. Washington, D.C.: Center For a New American Security, 2015.

Scobell, Andrew and U.S. Army War College, "China and Strategic Culture" *Strategic Studies Institute*: Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2002.

US Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States. *China Under The Four Modernization*. 97th Cong., 1982.
[https://www.jec.senate.gov/reports/97th%20Congress/China%20Under%20the%20Four%20Modernizations%20Part%20I%20\(1130\).pdf](https://www.jec.senate.gov/reports/97th%20Congress/China%20Under%20the%20Four%20Modernizations%20Part%20I%20(1130).pdf).

US Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2015*. Washington, D.C.: 2016.

Yung, Christopher and Ross Rustici. "'Not an Idea We Have to Shun': Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century". Institute for National Strategic Studies: Washington D.C., October 2014.