

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 01-05-2017		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) SEP 2016 - APR 2017	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Balancing the Scales: Doctrine, Conventional Forces, and Winning in a Complex World				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A	
6. AUTHOR(S) Cleary, James R. Major, USA				5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A	
				5e. TASK NUMBER N/A	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street, Quantico VA, 22134-5068				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan caused the Army to focus on irregular warfare to the detriment of traditional warfighting skills and abilities. To counteract this trend, the Army developed the doctrine of Unified Land Operations as a way to acknowledge the reality of the current operating environment. As the United States re-focuses on traditional and emerging near-peer threats, the doctrine of Unified Land Operations provides the conventional forces of the United States Army the chance to succeed across the range of military operations.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Unified Land Operations, ULO; combined arms maneuver, CAM; wide area security, WAS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 36	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON USMC Command and Staff College
a. REPORT Unclass	b. ABSTRACT Unclass	c. THIS PAGE Unclass			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

*United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Balancing the Scales: Doctrine, Conventional Forces, and Winning in a Complex World

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**Major James R. Cleary
United States Army**

AY 16-17

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Francis Marlo

Approved: 

Date: 28 April 2017

Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Paul Gelpi

Approved: 

Date: 28 April 2017

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

Executive Summary

Title: Balancing the Scales: Doctrine, Conventional Forces, and Winning in a Complex World

Author: Major James R. Cleary, United States Army

Thesis: In order to win in the complex operating environment of the twenty first century, the conventional forces of the United States Army must seek balance in their ability to fight both traditional and irregular wars. The Army's focus on the core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security, its current training methodology, and demonstrated scalability have postured the Army to achieve relative advantage without having to specialize in one form of warfare.

Discussion: The search for a comprehensive doctrine for the United States Army took a tremendous leap forward in 2011 with the adoption of Unified Land Operations as the Army's central operating tenant. Within the framework of unified land operations, the Army identified two core competencies that reflect the current complex operating environment. Both combined arms maneuver and wide area security provides the necessary doctrinal, training, and operational foundation enabling the Army to succeed across the range of military operations. The Army has demonstrated the validity of this model during recent combat operations in Iraq and deployments to Eastern Europe. As the Army continues to recover from over a decade of combat and stability operations, the Army and political leaders must not succumb to the temptation of focusing on one aspect of warfare over another. To win in the current operating environment, balance in doctrine and force structure is required.

Conclusion: With recent congressional discussions about growing the Army and the need to reemphasize combined arms maneuver in response to perceived threats, senior leaders may find the urge to disregard wide area security and the lessons of the last sixteen years difficult to ignore. Despite the looming threat of Russian resurgence and Chinese parity, the US Army must maintain a balanced approach to warfighting that includes both combined arms maneuver and wide area security. While special operations forces focus on the irregular aspects of warfare the conventional forces cannot afford to ignore wide area security in favor of the Cold War paradigm. The complexity of the modern operating environment necessitates a balanced force that is able to compliment other elements of military power such as special operations while retaining the ability to slide up or down the range of military operations, as contingencies require. Fortunately, the solution to this challenge already exists within the Army's concept of Unified Land Operations. In fact, the Army has successfully utilized this model for the past five years, and with continued refinement, it can continue to maintain dominance without sacrificing capability in any style of conflict.

Table of Contents

	Page
REPORT OF DOCUMENTATION PAGE.....	1
DISCLAIMER.....	2
PREFACE.....	5
INTRODUCTION.....	6
TERMS AND CONCEPTS DEFINED.....	7
THE CURRENT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT.....	10
FUTURE THREATS.....	11
DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.....	14
TRAINING TO DOMINATE ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.....	17
SCALABILITY AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES.....	19
CONCLUSIONS.....	23
APPENDIX: LIST OF ACRONYMS.....	26
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	32

Preface

My time at Command and Staff College has been both rewarding and enlightening leading me to become, what I hope, is a better professional military officer. Part of the enriching experience has been the discussions surrounding the nature of war, doctrine, and how militaries adapt to their experiences on the battlefield and to technological improvements. A significant portion of this paper is the result of required readings and the dialog between students and faculty during small group sessions. These enriching and, at times, enervating discussions have shown me how little I actually know about the nature of war and the development of doctrine that seeks to provide a framework for how the military thinks it should conduct operations.

As the United States military finds itself in the calm between proverbial storms, the struggle to make sense of the recent past and the way forward leads to a certain amount of, what I consider, professional angst. The desire to forego counterinsurgency and stability operations in the face of an increased potential for traditional warfare has potentially set the conditions for a dangerous backslide as seen in the post-Vietnam War era. Unlike the 1970s and 1980s, the environment the US Army operates in today contains a multitude of state and non-state actors that pose multiple, distinct challenges to the United States all across the range of military operations. This is opposed to the monolithic adversary that posed a single threat manifested in differing ways but driven by the same general ideology. Unlike in decades past, the Army has learned from its experiences and developed a doctrine that accounts for the complex world it operates in today. Like any doctrine, Unified Land Operations is not perfect and requires continual refinement, but to forsake it completely for the sake of expediency or past predilection is to condemn the organization to repeat the mistakes of the past.

I would like to thank the students of my conference group and, in particular, my military and civilian faculty advisors. Without your knowledge and forbearance, my eyes would remain closed to my everlasting detriment. Finally, I wish to thank my wife and son for their continued love, support, and tolerance.

Introduction

With headlines full of dire warnings about Russia's military resurgence and subsequent adventurism, the continuing war against ISIL in Iraq, the ongoing conflict in Syria, and debates surrounding the United States military's preparedness, it is not difficult understand the challenging landscape confronting the uniformed service chiefs.¹ As the United States continues to face an operating environment that is "chaotic, ambiguous, and complex," the requirement to field a balanced force is vital if the US Army is to maintain tactical dominance over potential adversaries.² The dilemma facing policy makers and military leaders alike revolves around the development of a military force resourced and trained appropriately for current and future threats. Beyond the debate surrounding the present operating environment and threats, the perceived loss of the Army's traditional warfighting capability continues to gain traction in the news and engenders discussion amongst both political and military leadership.³

The Army's concerns about preparedness for major combat operations, has generated debate both within and outside the service recently. While the Army's actual level of readiness for major combat operations is up for deliberation, what the country's leaders are sure about is that the current operating environment presents the United States with violent conflicts extending along the entire range of military operations (ROMO). These challenges, fueled by technology and globalization have tested and will continue to test every element of the United

States' national power.⁴ In order to win in the complex operating environment of the twenty-first century, the conventional forces of the United States Army must seek balance in their ability to fight both traditional and irregular wars without weighting one style of war over another.⁵ The Army's focus on combined arms maneuver and wide area security, its training methodology, and its scalability allow it to achieve relative advantage without risking the dangers of over committing to either traditional or irregular warfare. While there is not a strong sentiment among the Army's leaders to ignore irregular warfare, recent comments by the Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Mark A. Milley has made it clear that there are concerns focused on the organization's ability to wage a traditional war.⁶ With GEN Milley's comments recognizing that only one-third of brigade combat teams are prepared to "fight tonight," questions about readiness and the future abound.⁷ Fortunately, the Army has a response for these questions, but before discussing answers that lie in doctrine and current operations, it is necessary to summarize some basic concepts that frame this paper's argument while establishing the terminology used to address the subject of a balanced force.

Terms and Concepts Defined

Any discussion involving the current operating environment is bound to involve a multitude of terms that have specific meaning, but taken in a broad context generally describe similar phenomena. For instance, unconventional warfare, asymmetric warfare, guerrilla warfare, and other such terms serve to describe violent, political conflicts that lack the linear characteristics commonly attributed to conventional war, such as uniforms and front lines. In an effort to minimize confusion and to simplify the concepts of warfighting, joint doctrine utilizes distinct terms to denote two styles of war. While useful for clarification, the division of

war into separate categories is problematic in a theoretical sense as it creates an artificial divide between what is fundamentally a human activity simply carried out through diverse means.⁸ This delineation, when allowed to meander along its logical path reinforces the idea that the two styles of war require a force, or forces focused on a particular method.⁹ Despite the logic of this thought process, matching one style of warfare to a particular type of force, or weighting one style of war over another runs counter to the very nature of war and could potentially undermine an army's preparedness to fight the war confronting it.

Joint Publication 1, the document that establishes joint doctrine for the United States armed forces, defines the term traditional [conventional] warfare as being “characterized as a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states.”¹⁰ This style of war, fought with massive firepower generally involves large-scale destruction and loss of life. The Second World War is the most common example of traditional warfare in the modern age. Conversely, the same publication defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).”¹¹ The most common example of irregular warfare in recent times is the struggle for Iraq and Afghanistan, although the Vietnam War served as the United States' primary example of this style of war until 2001. Because the ways of fighting differ, the two styles receive separate classification, yet the goal of each remains the same: the use of force to achieve a political objective or endstate.

This distinction between styles does not stop at types of war. The United States Army divides its forces along the same lines when it comes to capabilities. The conventional forces of the United States are designed for traditional warfare: linear organizations comprised of tanks, infantry, artillery, supported by a robust logistical tail that enables the United States to

dominate during sustained, large-scale combat operations. Special operations forces, composed of highly motivated volunteers, emphasize personnel, specialized skill sets, and advanced training over hardware. Designed to operate independently at all three levels of war, special operations forces are considered ideally suited, and thus the first choice, for irregular conflicts.¹²

Based on the United States' classification of these two styles of warfare it is easy to see how the delineation between those forces that conduct a particular type of warfare has evolved. The distinction fits neatly into the US military's desire to classify war in broad categories, thereby creating an image in which the styles of war are matched with a particular force, either conventional or special operations. This categorization, while convenient and simple, contributes to the mindset that the different styles of warfare are indicative of separate natures requiring a division of labor that does not necessarily account for the transition zone between the styles of war.¹³ An alternate way to look at these forces, without separating them into distinct entities is to view them as the two pans of a scale with the range of military operations as the beam. As the scale tips toward traditional war, conventional forces are in the lead. If the scale tilts more toward irregular warfare, special operations are in front. Regardless of which way the scale is weighted, both components have an important role in supporting one another and the national security strategy of the United States. This view, that the nature of war remains the same with only the means differing, forms a more holistic image of modern conflict and encourages balance as decision makers form responses to the challenges of modern conflict.

The Current Operating Environment

Within the current operating environment (OE), the United States faces a host of security challenges that require the use every component of national power. The rapid growth

of technology and social media contribute to an OE that is difficult to navigate, even in the best of times. The Army's recognition of this environment has helped to shape the operating concepts that reinforce the idea of balance in an effort to face traditional and irregular threats, now and in the immediate future.

According to the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the current operating environment is composed of "Diverse enemies [that] will employ traditional, unconventional, and hybrid strategies to threaten U.S. security and vital interests. Threats may emanate from nation states or nonstate actors such as transnational terrorists, insurgents, and criminal organizations."¹⁴ This short statement describes in general terms many of the actors and threats the United States faces daily and will continue to face for the foreseeable future. In addition to the broad definition provided above, the Army's operating concept goes on to describe five characteristics that fundamentally shape the OE: increased velocity and momentum of human interaction and events, potential for overmatch, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, spread of advanced cyberspace and counter-space capabilities, and demographics and operations among populations, in cities, and in complex terrain.¹⁵ These five characteristics represent the environments and potential means by which the above-mentioned actors pursue their political objectives. Additionally, like war itself, each characteristic can reside anywhere along the spectrum of conflict with actors increasing or decreasing the amount of violence based on the political situation. By recognizing these facets of the OE in its operating concept, the Army gives tacit acknowledgment to the fact that the future OE is defined not by an easily prepared for monolithic threat, but by a multitude of complex adversaries and environments requiring a flexible approach to both training and operations in order to achieve mission success. The complexity of the current OE is especially apparent as the United States

faces a challenge it has not experienced since the 1980s, the threat of adversaries whose conventional forces approach parity with the US military.

Future Threats

Before the fall of communism, the Soviet Union served as the primary threat facing the United States and Europe. This singular threat led to the creation of a force trained and equipped to wage a traditional war in Central Europe. This OE enabled the US Army to establish the doctrine and force structure its conventional forces required in order to focus on traditional warfare against a similarly equipped and trained adversary. The US Army's emphasis on traditional war changed to irregular warfare after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, however recent developments are spurring a shift back toward traditional war. As the United States continues to view the Russian Federation and China's conventional militaries with rising concern, traditional warfighting has again become a pillar of defense strategy.¹⁶ Making traditional war a pillar of defense is not a mistake, but policy makers and leaders must be careful not to emphasize one style of war over war in general.

Since the mid-1990s, the United States has remained primarily concerned about the threat of irregular or asymmetric warfare. The fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent stagnation of the Russian Federation's military forces led the US to largely discount the threat of traditional war and emphasize regional conflicts.¹⁷ This outlook continued throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century until September 11, 2001. Since then, the United States has continued to conduct military operations of varying scale, particularly in the Middle East. The two largest engagements, Iraq and Afghanistan involved substantial use of both conventional and special operations forces working together along the ROMO. Despite some significant

challenges and setbacks, conventional forces were able to evolve from their Cold War, traditional mindset to the conduct of counterinsurgency (COIN) in a relatively short time frame. The shift led to a focus on counterinsurgency to the detriment of traditional warfighting skills. The Army recognized this trend as early as 2007 and has continued to emphasize traditional warfighting skills despite continued commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan. The present challenge is preventing the emphasis on traditional war from monopolizing training time and dollars and potentially damaging the Army's ability to execute tasks related to irregular warfare.¹⁸

Since the mid 2000s, the traditional threat faced by the United States has quietly grown. Both Russia and China have embarked on modernization programs aimed at closing the military gap between the US and themselves.¹⁹ These modernization programs include upgrades to ground, naval, and air forces as well as air defense and strategic nuclear forces.²⁰ In addition to the modernization of equipment and doctrine, both nations have demonstrated an increased willingness to pursue aggressive action in support of strategic objectives. In particular, Russia's actions in Syria have signaled a major shift from the military inactivity of the post-Soviet era to a period of increasing intervention in the "Near Abroad."²¹ Beyond military intervention, "Russia has expressed, and now clearly displayed, its intent to rely more heavily on an integrated strategy of employing military, trans-military, and non-military tools in ways that exploit both bright legal lines and fuzzier conceptual ones."²² In addition to Russia's use of irregular or hybrid warfare mentioned above, the Federation continues to use its conventional forces in a posture of deterrence by increasing troop levels and air defense assets on its western border with Ukraine and Belarus.²³ These movements coincided with the United States'

withdrawal of the last permanently stationed armored brigade combat teams on European soil necessitating the redeployment of rotational BCTs to Europe in an effort to reassure allies.²⁴

Russia is not the only major military power that has begun to increase its levels of aggression back-stopped by conventional military power.²⁵ China's military growth is problematic, as the nation's motives remain unclear. What the United States does know is that China has increasingly built up its military resources in the South China Sea to include a modern Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) that dramatically increases China's ability to deny access to its airspace.²⁶ China's IADS modernization extends area denial beyond its own borders making recent advances of concern, but the People's Liberation Army's modernization does not end with improvements to air defense. In recent years, China has begun to re-organize all branches of the military with a focus on personnel and technology. Doctrinally, the Chinese are working to improve joint operations, amphibious operations, and the ability to conduct military operations other than war.²⁷ These improvements, while not all strictly offensive in nature, raise questions about Chinese motives and intent.

Recent changes in the way the Russian Federation and China utilize military power has ushered in a new round of debate over the United States response to the rising threat of traditional war and the simultaneous threat of irregular conflicts of varied intensity and duration. Fortunately, recent doctrinal updates provide the solution to dealing with these disparate threats. Army leaders have identified flexibility and balance as the keys to success in today's world institutionalizing the two concepts through its doctrine of combined arms maneuver (CAM) and wide area security (WAS).²⁸

Doctrinal Foundations across the Range of Military Operations

In 2011, the United States Army began a comprehensive restructuring of its doctrine in order to consolidate lessons learned over the course of a decade of war and to bring “clarity to doctrine.”²⁹ This restructuring led to the adoption of new terminology and new ways of describing the operating environment. The capstone doctrinal concept that typifies the flexibility of the Army’s conventional forces is unified land operations or ULO. While ULO encompasses the combined efforts of all the elements of national power including joint, interagency, and non-governmental entities, the Army has the specific responsibility to dominate adversaries across the land domain.³⁰ By identifying the core competencies of CAM and WAS, the Army has taken into account the complexity of the modern operating environment. This acknowledgement ensures a balanced doctrine that contributes to the development of a force able to operate with reduced friction across the ROMO while transforming the Army’s historical partiality toward traditional war to a more complete vision of future conflict.

According to the framework of ULO, the Army seeks to “gain and maintain a position of relative advantage,”³¹ across the range of military operations executed as part of two core competencies: combined arms maneuver and wide area security. The Army defines combined arms maneuver as the “application of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces.”³² In other words, CAM is the fighting of traditional war through traditional means. Doctrine defines wide area security as “the application of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure and activities.”³³ With its emphasis on the population vice enemy forces, the concept of WAS clearly encompasses irregular warfare in its various manifestations. Despite the rather clear distinction between the two competencies, doctrine clearly warns about the dangers of favoring one competency over the other. Conditions within

the operating environment and tasks assigned a particular unit are the arbiters of which competency weighs heavier on the scales of war.

The Army's doctrinal admonition against favoring one core competency over another naturally plays into the development of a balanced force that recognizes some fundamental similarities between styles of war. This recognition reflects Clausewitz's observations that "without any inconsistency wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation."³⁴ War, in all the ways fought, continually shifts along the scale of violence and to focus more heavily on one aspect is to ignore this truth. By establishing a conceptual framework that covers the spectrum of conflict and requiring units to maintain basic proficiency in CAM and WAS, Army doctrine ensures its forces have the ability to respond to contingencies regardless of their nature.

The Army's current posture is an example of this balance. In Afghanistan, the Army is conducting COIN and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions, while in South Korea, mechanized and amphibious forces conduct exercises designed to combat a traditional threat.³⁵ While it may be argued the forces conducting these operations trained specifically for these specific missions prior to execution, the fundamentals of CAM and WAS are inherent to both mission sets. Soldiers conducting COIN in Afghanistan are required to understand the basics of fire and maneuver, while those operating in Korea must be prepared to deal with the local populace in a constructive manner. Regardless of the conflict, elements of traditional and irregular warfare will always be present in one form or another, and US forces must be prepared to address this operationally.³⁶

In a 2007 monograph, Colin Gray makes the point that "The U.S. armed forces excel at high- and mid-intensity regular warfare," but struggle when faced with irregular threats despite

a multitude of experience in dealing with insurgencies.³⁷ The reason for this, according to Gray, is the United States military's outlook and approach to war. This approach, comprising large-scale, aggressive offensives and the liberal use of firepower, is clearly representative of traditional war. As the Army began its doctrinal restructuring, doctrine writes acknowledged the Army's propensity for this approach resulting in a deliberate attempt to alter this pattern through the codification of concepts such as ULO and CAM/WAS. The result is a doctrinal foundation that accounts for the fluid nature of war as well as the current operating environment.

The above-mentioned argument notwithstanding, it remains clear that conventional forces primarily exist to engage in traditional warfare as demonstrated by their organization and capabilities. This fact in no way obviates the need to train in other aspects of war, so balance in training and resourcing is required at all levels of command. Training for combined arms maneuver is a complex task that involves preparation to face both regular and irregular forces in complex terrain, with access to sophisticated weapons and technology.³⁸ The realization that the nation faces adversaries possessing capabilities spanning the range of military operations provides the impetus for the Army to conduct training that reflects the shifting scales of violence.

Training to Dominate across the Range of Military Operations

With the doctrinal foundations for warfighting laid down, the challenge for leaders seeking to train a flexible force is to determine the right balance of combined arms maneuver and wide area security. Through its Mission Essential Task List and Combat Training Center rotations, the Army has established a training methodology that enables commanders to identify

the correct balance of CAM/WAS necessary to carry out an assigned mission and the ability to test a unit's preparedness in a tough and realistic training exercise.

The Army's training methodology begins with the Department of the Army mandated Mission Essential Task List (METL). The METL is a list identifying the primary tasks a particular type of unit (i.e. field artillery, infantry) trains to demonstrate proficiency in.³⁹ Each METL contains individual Mission Essential Tasks (METs) that are further divided into sub-tasks corresponding to individual and collective tasks that soldiers seek to master in order to become proficient in the MET as a whole. This hierarchical system is designed to train individuals on the basic skills required for the unit to be successful, and then conduct training at higher and higher echelons until reaching the corps level of operations. As designed, the Mission Essential Task List enables commanders at all levels to identify critical skill sets while fine-tuning the allocation of precious time and fiscal resources. The process of identifying, resourcing, planning, and executing training is arduous, but necessary for the conventional forces in order to ensure that units are properly manned, trained, and equipped for the missions assigned to them. One glance at the METL of a Stryker Brigade Combat Team will show tasks such as conduct an attack (the epitome of traditional warfare), but by drilling down to the battalion level one can also find tasks such as train foreign security forces and provide humanitarian support.⁴⁰ This provides commanders and training officers the ability to select tasks that mirror the assignment a particular unit is given, thus an armored brigade combat team deploying to Poland would focus on CAM related tasks while an infantry brigade combat team in Africa would focus on WAS tasks such as security cooperation.

The validity of the Army's training methodology as well as the conventional force's ability to conduct operations across the range of military operations is tested and validated

during Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations. Rotations at the National Training Center in California and the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana provide conventional and special operations forces the ability to train in a realistic environment featuring a dedicated opposing force. The scenarios focus primarily on traditional, decisive actions contests however elements of WAS and strategic level operations such as Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) test conventional force commanders and soldiers' ability to respond to a rapidly changing environment in real time. CTC rotational designs are flexible and built with the input of commanders at all levels ensuring that the training replicates the situations BCTs are most likely to face. The ability to participate in training exercises that involve complex physical and human terrain, an enemy focused on decisively defeating its opponent, and structured to mimic real-world conflicts allows units to execute specific METs in a way no other nation is able to replicate. The end-result of this unique training opportunity is a conventional unit that is flexible and scalable in its ability to respond to contingencies across the range of military operations.

The doctrinal foundation and training methodology of the Army's conventional forces is instrumental in the creation and maintenance of powerful units able to dominate across the range of military operations. Beyond the traditional role of sustained land combat, conventional forces have the ability to contribute to the irregular conflicts in which the military increasingly finds itself operating.⁴¹ As addressed previously, traditional warfare and irregular warfare are not fundamentally different in nature.⁴² The difference between the two is in the ways and means used to fight the conflict. Conventional forces, with proper levels of resourcing and training, are capable of assisting SOF and other governmental agencies during irregular warfare operations. Recently, the Army has demonstrated this ability through its deployment of task

organized, conventional forces in support of special operations forces in the Middle East and Europe.

Scalability and Conventional Forces

One oft-forgotten capability of conventional forces in irregular warfare is the ability to task-organize into groups designed for a specific mission or purpose. These groups range in size from a military police squad conducting law enforcement training to battalions of artillery supporting a host nation offensive. This scalability, a fundamental by-product of the Army's doctrine and training constructs, is crucial for conventional support to special operations and force projection as demonstrated in both Iraq and Eastern Europe.

In the current OE, the belief that special operations (SO) and conventional forces represent the balance between irregular and traditional war remains firmly entrenched. SO, with their focus on discrete activity, minimal footprint, and language training are the first choice for operations that fall below the level of traditional war on the scale of violence.⁴³ This dual force structure provides policy makers with an array of military options for dealing with conflict, but does not eliminate the supporting role each force provides the other. In traditional war, SO provides reconnaissance, civil affairs support, and military information support operations (MISO) to conventional commanders in order to facilitate the accomplishment of operational and strategic level goals.⁴⁴ Conversely, conventional forces provide support to SO, particularly within areas in which SO forces are vulnerable or lack the inherent capability. Ongoing operations in the Middle East provide a perfect example of task organized, conventional support to special operations outside of traditional war.

As part of the ongoing conflict in Iraq, the US military has combined SO and conventional forces in order to aid Iraqi forces in the battle for their country.⁴⁵ Operation Inherent Resolve and the joint task force that supports it are an example of the utility represented by a mixed force of special operators and conventional capabilities. As of March 2017, US conventional forces and SO are conducting operations in support of Iraqi forces attempting to seize the city of Mosul from its extremist occupiers. In this instance, conventional forces are providing a level of operational support that is beyond the capability of SO to replicate, namely surface-to-surface and precision fires.⁴⁶ By integrating SO and conventional artillery units within the OE, US advisors are able to support their Iraqi counterparts with firepower that is not dependent on aircraft alone. Additionally, conventional forces provide increased logistical support and conduct wide area security tasks such as foreign internal defense and humanitarian assistance. By engaging in these activities, SO is able to focus on advising their counterparts in the Iraqi Army without distractions.

The example of conventional-SO integration and support in Iraq demonstrates how conventional forces can contribute to operations in irregular warfare despite the absence of distinct combined arms maneuver or wide area security tasks. In particular, current operations in Iraq and Syria demonstrate the ability of conventional and SO forces to work together in the transition zone that exists between irregular and traditional war. Furthermore, all around the globe, the United States military engages with allies and partners in operations ranging from humanitarian missions to counter terrorism operations.⁴⁷ Only two of the operations, Iraq and Afghanistan involve sustained combat approaching the level of traditional war. Arguably, outside of these two countries only North Korea represents an immediate threat for the risk of conventional war.⁴⁸ Therefore, the vast preponderance of US military commitments not falling

into the counter-terrorism category generally involves wide area security tasks. This dramatically underscores the need to maintain proficiency in wide area security without compromising the ability to transition to combined arms maneuver as smoothly as possible. The US Army's most recent deployment to Poland and other areas of Eastern Europe is a perfect example of why a scalable force, proficient across both core competencies, has value at present and in the future.

Beginning in April 2014, the US committed military forces to Poland and other Eastern European nations as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve.⁴⁹ As of February 2017, US soldiers are working with security forces in: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. These operations involve the conduct of multi-national, traditional war-style exercises, cross training with NATO allies, and a strong component of foreign internal defense training. Operation Atlantic Resolve serves a two-fold purpose with both purposes distinctly lining up with the Army's two core competencies.

Operation Atlantic Resolve's first priority is as "a demonstration of continued U.S. commitment to collective security through a series of actions designed to reassure NATO allies and partners of America's dedication to enduring peace and stability in the region in light of the Russian intervention in Ukraine."⁵⁰ This purpose is essentially one of deterrence based on the US Army's ability to wage war in conjunction with NATO its allies. It is force projection built on a platform of traditional war, executed by forces grounded in the doctrine of combined arms maneuver. While the Army's two BCTs provide the visible combat power for NATO's deterrence measures, the threat of traditional war with the Russian Federation remains low. Due to the relatively low risk of immediate conflict, US Army Europe has found alternate tasks for its soldiers to accomplish while projecting force in Eastern Europe.

Beyond deterring the Russian Federation, the forces deployed in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve are currently conducting over 38 exercises in conjunction with allied militaries from all over Europe.⁵¹ These exercises include a strong CAM component, but also include wide area security tasks that reinforce the scalability and flexibility of the Army's conventional forces. In order to participate in 38 virtually concurrent exercises, the BCTs in Europe must operate in a disaggregated fashion. This involves the deployment of small, task-organized elements operating around Eastern Europe with the express purpose of working in conjunction with local security forces to build partner capacity and enduring relationships. In an emergency, war or otherwise, the separated forces quickly reconsolidate and conduct large-scale combat operations as required. This scalability gives senior leaders in the United States flexible options for projecting force and pursuing strategic goals, but only a well-trained and balanced force makes this possible. By not focusing on the entire spectrum of conflict, the conventional forces of the United States Army becomes a force with limited utility beyond traditional war, while its SO elements suffer reduced effectiveness through attenuation brought on by a merciless operational tempo

Conclusions

The OE in which the US Army operates remains marked by its complexity and the possibility of conflicts that extend across the range of military operations. In the future, the United States will have to answer calls for assistance and training from friendly nations, nebulous gray zone conflicts, low-level insurgencies, and the threat of traditional war in Europe and the Korean peninsula. The United States Army's ability to respond to these challenges by providing flexible and balanced options to policy makers will be the cornerstone of its future existence.

One of the core challenges to the Army's ability to provide the required flexibility and balanced force is fiscal austerity. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review makes it clear that the United States has transitioned from a wartime footing to one of watchful stability.⁵² With this transition, the US must make changes to its organization, personnel, and operational requirements. As administrations change, policy makers, uniformed and civilian, will make decisions based on threats and economic realities that will have dramatic impact on the US Army's ability to fight and win the nation's wars. Despite the inevitability of constant change, one thing must remain clear: the US Army has the responsibility to face challenges and threats across the spectrum of conflict regardless of desire or preparation.

As the military looks at the growing threat of Russian military power, thoughts are inevitably turning toward the Army's comfort zone, where the organization feels it excels, and that is traditional war. It is true that the Army has lost some of its proficiency in regards to linear, large-scale conflicts. Fifteen years of focus on wide area security and stability have eroded the organization's competency at maneuver and combined arms tactics. "Today, a major in the Army knows nothing but fighting terrorists and guerrillas, because he came into the Army after 9/11. But as we get into the higher-end threats, our skills have atrophied over 15 years," the Army's Chief of Staff, GEN Milley stated in a recent article.⁵³ This is hardly an inspirational quote, but one that is all too familiar to leaders in the Army. The struggle to balance requirements with fiscal reality has been the major peacetime focus of the Army since the conclusion of the American Revolution. The decision to reduce the size of the Army after World War One and the subsequent unpreparedness for the Second World War, followed by similar decisions before the Korean conflict, have reinforced the Army's fears of the traditional post-war environment. History provides precedent, however precedent does not equal predestination.

As the Army continues to recover from the longest war in its history, it must avoid the temptation to subscribe wholly to the past and continue to make informed decisions about the future.

At the conclusion of its 2006 war in Lebanon, the Israeli government initiated a commission seeking answers to Israel's admittedly sub-par performance against Hezbollah. Released in 2008, the Winograd Commission's final report listed a number of flaws in Israel's preparation and execution during the conflict.⁵⁴ While outside the scope of this paper, one important conclusion has bearing for the US Army. Before the outbreak of the war in Lebanon, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) concluded that future conflicts with Hezbollah would follow a decidedly non-traditional course.⁵⁵ The decision to focus on counterinsurgency tactics left the IDF ill-prepared to deal with a conflict that resembled a traditional war more than an insurgency. The Israelis learned that the decision to focus on irregular warfare or WAS to the exclusion of combined arms maneuver was a mistake. Focusing on one facet of warfare is not the key to maintaining relative advantage, being prepared for all forms of war, at all times, is.

Fortuitously, the answer to the question of how to balance the Army in order to meet the varied threats of the current operating environment already exists. As the Army began the post-Iraq recovery process, it developed the concept of Unified Land Operations and the subordinate core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security to meet future challenges. The concept of CAM/WAS allows for the creation of a flexible force that is better prepared to face challenges wherever, and under whatever guise they may appear. Reinforced by realistic training at the nation's combat training centers and the experiences gained through global deployments, the conventional forces of the United States have the ability to effectively contribute to national defense without committing to an approach that weights

one style of war over another. It is a fundamental obligation of the Army to be prepared for a conflict of any nature, and in order to avoid fighting a war it is ill prepared for, the Army must prepare for every kind.

APPENDIX: LIST OF ACRONYMS

BCT: brigade combat team

CAM: combined arms maneuver

COIN: counterinsurgency

CTC: Combat Training Center

FID: foreign internal defense

GEN: General

IADS: Integrated Air Defense System

IDF: Israeli Defense Forces

ISIL: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

MET: Mission Essential Task

METL: Mission Essential Task List

MISO: military information support operations

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEO: non-combatant evacuation operation

OE: operating environment

ROMO: range of military operations

SO: special operations

SOF: Special Operations Forces

TRADOC: Training and Doctrine Command (US Army)

ULO: Unified Land Operations

WAS: wide area security

¹ Andrew O'Reilly, "Military Brass sound alarm about 'insidious decline' in readiness," *Fox News*, February 09, 2017, <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/02/09/military-brass-sound-alarm-about-insidious-decline-in-readiness.html>; John Cooper, "The U.S. Military is in Really Bad Shape," *The National Interest*, February 14, 2017, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-military-really-bad-shape-19446>; Michaels E. O'Hanlon, "The state if U.S. military readiness," *The Brookings Institute*, August 15, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/08/15/the-state-of-u-s-military-readiness/>.

² Headquarters Department of the Army, *Train to Win in a Complex World*, FM 7-0, (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 5, 2016), 1-1

³ Richard Sisk, “Most Army Brigades, Navy Planes Aren’t Combat Ready: Leaders,” *Military.com*, February 07, 2017, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/02/07/most-army-brigades-navy-planes-combat-ready-leaders.html>; Jen Judson, “US Army Chief Sounds Alarm: Military at ‘High Risk’,” *Defensenews*, April 07, 2016, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/army/2016/04/07/army-chief-sounds-alarm-military-high-risk/82763640/>. While beyond the scope of this paper, the author believes in the tendency of human beings to fall back on what is familiar or successful in the past during times of uncertainty. This is certainly true of the military where past competence and clearly defined threats contribute to the impression that times were simpler.

⁴ US Department of Defense, *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC, March 4, 2014), 6

⁵ Kris Osborn, “The U.S. Army’s Biggest Fear: Getting Crushed in a Devastating Land War to Russia or China,” *National Interest*, January 05, 2017, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-armys-biggest-fear-getting-crushed-devastating-land-18950/>; Josh Smith, “Outgoing sergeant major of the Army calls for return to basics,” *Stripes*, December 10, 2014, <https://www.stripes.com/news/outgoing-sergeant-major-of-the-army-calls-for-return-to-basics-1.318406#.WM8xpRiZOt8>; Michelle Tan, “Back to basics: Army dials up traditional soldiering once again,” July 05, 2016, <https://www.armytimes.com/story/military/2016/07/05/back-basics-army-dials-up-traditional-soldiering-once-again/86005952/>

⁶ Mark Milley, “Statement of GEN Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff United States Army Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate,” (speech, Washington, DC, April 07, 2016), 4, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Murphy-Milley_04-07-16.pdf

⁷ *Ibid*, 4

⁸ All war is the use of violence to achieve a political end state. This is the same for a conventional army such as the German Wehrmacht as it is for Mao’ Peoples Liberation Army. The division of war into categories is a conflation of ways and ends. The adjectives like conventional and irregular describe the tactics, techniques, and procedures used in the conduct of war, not the nature of war itself.

⁹ Thomas R. Mockaitis, “The COIN Conundrum: The Future of Counterinsurgency and U.S. Landpower,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2016), xii. This monograph addresses the complexity of the current OE and force structures. The author advocates for irregular warfare to remain in the special operations community with augmentation if the situation becomes too large for JSOC to handle alone.

¹⁰ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States*, I-5

¹¹ *Ibid*, I-6

¹² Dick Couch, *Chosen Soldier: The Making of a Special Forces Warrior* (New York: Crown Publishing, 2007), 31. In the opening chapter of the book, Mr. Couch discusses the history of Army Special Forces with an emphasis on the post World War 2 development of the organization. The knowledge that nuclear war would destroy the combatants led to the belief that small-scale wars would pre-dominate with an increased need for small units capable of fighting them without adding to the risk of escalation. In many respects, this prediction has proven true. Although the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq were conventional in nature, Vietnam and Iraq had a very strong irregular warfare component as well.

¹³ Philip Kapusta, “The Gray Zone”, *Special Warfare*, October – December 2015, 18; Thomas R. Mockaitis, “The COIN Conundrum.” In each of these articles, the author’s declare for specialization that seems to draw a distinct line between the nature of war and the nature of the forces used to fight war. Like the range of military operations, the conventional and special operations forces of the US military are part of the same whole: they represent the applicability of violence on a sliding scale.

¹⁴ Headquarters Department of the Army, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 31, 2014), 10

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 11 - 12

¹⁶ Headquarters Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014*, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2014), 5. The Army’s Strategic Planning Guidance does not, by any stretch of the imagination disregard the idea of counterinsurgency. The issue is the burning threats of today, will cause us to forget about other potential threats eventually leaving us vulnerable to exploitation by an observant adversary. The Israelis suffered from this before the 2006 war in Lebanon.

¹⁷ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, (Washington, DC: The White House, July 1994), 1. In his first NSS, President Clinton discusses both the fall of communism and the threats that loom largest in the eyes of the United States. In the introduction and first page, President Clinton’s staff states that “The threat of a war among great powers and the specter of nuclear annihilation have receded dramatically” and then continues on to identify the threats of terrorism, WND proliferation, and illicit drug trafficking as preeminent in the near term.

¹⁸ Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Guard Should Specialize in Coin: War College Study,” *Breaking Defense*, May 06, 2016, <http://breakingdefense.com/2016/05/guard-should-specialize-in-coin-war-college-study/>

¹⁹ Steven Pifer, “Pay Attention, America: Russia is Upgrading its Military,” *The Brookings Institute*, February 5, 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/pay-attention-america-russia-is-upgrading-its-military/>. In this Op-Ed piece Mr. Pifer describes the modernization program Russia has embarked on covering its conventional and nuclear forces. In recent months economic sanctions and decreased oil revenue have limited the Russian Federation’s ability to continue, however the Russians did improve their technology thereby narrowing the previously yawning gap; Paul McCleary, “Pentagon: Chinese Military Modernization Enters New Phase,” *Foreign Policy*, May 13, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/13/pentagon-chinese-military-modernization-enters-new-phase/>

²⁰ Simon Shuster, “Why Russia is Rebuilding its Nuclear Arsenal,” *Time*, April 4, 2016, <http://time.com/4280169/russia-nuclear-security-summit/>. The debate over whether this is rhetoric continues however, the threat of Russian rearmament cannot be taken lightly in view of history and recent events.

²¹ Geoffrey Till, “Future Conditional: naval power sits at center of Russian strategy,” *Jane’s Navy International* 121, no. 6 (August 2016): <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1806003507?accountid=14746>. This article pertains to the Russian Navy specifically, however the same foreign policy concept applies to the ground forces as well. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation’s military operations have focused on areas that border the federation i.e. Chechnya, Georgia, and the Ukraine to

name a few. Russia's actions in Syria were the first time the Russian Federation conducted large-scale military operations outside its immediate borders during the post-Soviet era.

²² Maren Leed, "Square Pegs, Round Holes, and Gray Zone Conflicts," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* no. 2, (summer/fall 2015): 139, <http://search.proquest.com/>

²³ James Marson and Thomas Grove, "Russia Builds Up Army Near Ukraine Border," *The Wall Street Journal*, August 19, 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-builds-up-army-near-ukraine-border-1471537008>

²⁴ The US continues to maintain one Stryker brigade combat team and infantry brigade combat team in Germany and Italy respectively. This is down from an entire corps stationed in Germany throughout the Cold War. In response to Russia, the US has announced that a second armored brigade combat team will deploy in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve. As escalation continues, the potential of violence increases correspondingly. The ability to dispatch trained forces that conduct both security cooperation while maintaining the capability to fight a traditional conflict, resides solely within the conventional forces. Michelle Tan, "Back to Back Rotations to Europe Could Stress the Army's armored BCTs," *The Army Times*, February 11, 2016,

<https://www.armytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2016/02/11/back--back-rotations-europe-could-stress-armys-armored-bcts/80243786/>

²⁵ Anthony H. Cordesman, "Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2016: A Comparative Analysis," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, December 5, 2016, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/161208_Chinese_Strategy_Military_Modernization_2016.pdf

²⁶ *Ibid*, 44

²⁷ *Ibid*, 225 - 230

²⁸ Dr. Richard Weitz, "Colloquium Brief: U.S. Army War College 25th Annual Strategy Conference Carlisle, Pennsylvania, April 8-10, 2014 — Balancing the Joint Force to Meet Future Security Challenges," *Strategic Studies Institute*, November 15, 2016,

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/USAWC-25th-Annual-CB/2016/11/15>;

R. Reed Anderson et al., "Strategic Landpower And A Resurgent Russia: An Operational Approach To Deterrence," *Strategic Studies Institute*, May 2016,

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1324>

²⁹ Headquarters Department of the Army, *Doctrine Primer*, ADP 1-01 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, September 2, 2014), v

³⁰ Headquarters Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, ADP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 10, 2011), 5

³¹ *Ibid*, 1

³² *Ibid*, 6

³³ *Ibid*

³⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 81

³⁵ United States Forces Korea, "CFC Announces Start of Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 2016," news release, March 06, 2016, <http://www.usfk.mil/Media/Press-Releases/Article/686836/cfc-announces-start-of-key-resolve-and-foal-eagle-2016/>

³⁶ Colin Gray, "Irregular Enemies And The Essence Of Strategy: Can The American Way Of War Adapt?," *The Strategic Studies Institute*, (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006), 17. Despite this monographs age, Dr. Gray makes valid points regarding the United States and its approach to war, particularly irregular warfare. Dr. Gray makes a strong

case that the US military excels in traditional war, but struggles in fighting irregular wars despite a plethora of experience in combatting insurgencies. In his opinion, it is the United States' outlook and approach to war that creates challenges. The development of CAM and WAS as the two components of a unifying framework (ULO) addresses this disparity in outlook ensuring that balance between traditional and irregular war is achievable.

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ Headquarters Department of the Army, *Train to Win in a Complex World*, FM 7-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 5, 2016), 1-1

³⁹ US Department of the Army, *Train to Win in a Complex World*, 1-8

⁴⁰ The METL and related METs may be found at the US Army's Army Training Network CAC-enabled website <https://atn.army.mil>. This website provides all of the tasks Army units train on and covers both core competencies in addition to individual tasks.

⁴¹ Hal Brands, "Paradoxes of the Gray Zone," *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, February 05, 2016, <http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/>. In this article, the author defines gray zone conflicts as "...best understood as activity that is coercive and aggressive in nature, but that is deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of conventional military conflict and open interstate war. Gray zone approaches are mostly the province of revisionist powers—those actors that seek to modify some aspect of the existing international environment—and the goal is to reap gains, whether territorial or otherwise, that are normally associated with victory in war. Yet gray zone approaches are meant to achieve those gains without escalating to overt warfare, without crossing established red-lines, and thus without exposing the practitioner to the penalties and risks that such escalation might bring". This type of conflict, typified by Russia's activities in the Ukraine and Crimea, demonstrates the weave of traditional and irregular warfare elements that necessitate a force that is capable of rapidly adjusting its posture in regards to the ROMO.

⁴² Colin Gray, "Irregular Enemies And The Essence Of Strategy: Can The American Way Of War Adapt?," 18. Colin Gray states the following "I must emphasize, yet again, that it is only the character of the strategic challenge that is distinctive, not its nature." This quote serves to reinforce the understanding that war's nature is unchanging, it involves the achievement of a political objective, it is the means that differ. Antulio Echevarria III expounds on this comment in his book *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 76 where he contends that categories of war, whether traditional or irregular are essentially false because they share the same nature. The building of artificial categories and different forces to fight within those categories is arbitrary and denies the fundamental nature of war. Scale is what matters, not type, and within this context, traditional forces have the means to fight wars all along the scale.

⁴³ Headquarters Department of the Army, *Special Operations*, ADP 3-05 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, August 31 2012), 16

⁴⁴ Headquarters Department of the Army, *Special Operations*, ADRP 3-05 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, August 31 2012), 124

⁴⁵ Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve, "Iraqi Mosul Offensive Resumes," news release. December 29, 2016,

<http://www.inherentresolve.mil/News/Article/1039360/iraqi-mosul-offensive-resumes/>

⁴⁶ Thomas Gibbons-Neff, "How U.S. and Western troops will help in the battle for Mosul," *The Washington Post*, October 17, 2016,

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/10/17/how-u-s-and-western->

troops-will-help-in-the-battle-for-mosul/?utm_term=.862e288d8715; US Department of the Army, *Special Operations*, 99. Current Army doctrine considers SOF and conventional force integration as necessary in order to support the strategic goals of the United States. This concept is enshrined in Army doctrine and across the Army, however individuals outside the organization may not fully realize how effective the SOF/conventional partnership can be under the right circumstances.

⁴⁷ Julia Zorthian and Heather Jones, “Boots on the Ground,” *Time Magazine*, October 16, 2015, <http://time.com/4075458/afghanistan-drawdown-obama-troops/>. This article, although dated, identifies US forces in over 150 countries. These deployments range from one and two man special operations teams to National Guard units conducting two-week annual training in Africa. The US military remains deployed globally, but is not engaged in a major, traditional conflict anywhere. If the trend in interstate violence continues on its downward journey, traditional war would become even more rare, thus strengthening the argument for a balanced force able to respond to contingencies of any sort.

⁴⁸ Davis Institute of National Security and Foreign Policy, *2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Assessing America’s ability to Provide for the Common Defense* (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2016), 185. While admittedly a partisan study, the 2016 index does make a strong case for North Korea’s ability to engage in a surprise attack on South Korea and US bases within the nation. With the exception of recent increases in Russian troop strength in Kaliningrad and western border regions, no major adversary of the United States maintains a robust conventional force poised within striking distance of US forces.

⁴⁹ Headquarters US Army Europe, “Operation Atlantic Resolve,” news release, February 19, 2017, <http://www.eur.army.mil/atlanticrosolve/>

⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵¹ United States Department of Defense, “America’s Commitment to European Security Operation Atlantic Resolve,” 19 February, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0514_Atlantic-Resolve

⁵² US Department of Defense, *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*, 12

⁵³ Helene Cooper, “Long Emphasis on Terror May Hurt U.S. in Conventional War, Army Chief Says,” *The New York Times*, May 15, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/16/world/africa/army-milley-africa-terrorism-land-war.html?_r=0

⁵⁴ Winograd Commission, “The Winograd Commission Final Report,” *The Council on Foreign Relations*, January 30, 2008, <http://www.cfr.org/israel/winograd-commission-final-report/p15385>

⁵⁵ Gordon C. Griffin, “Israel Versus Hezbollah 2006 An Assessment of Israeli Strategy” (research paper, Air War College, 2008), 32, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/2008_griffin.pdf

Bibliography

Anderson, R. Reed, Patrick J. Ellis, Antonio M. Paz, Kyle A. Reed, Lendy “Alamo” Renegar, and John T. Vaughan. “Strategic Landpower And A Resurgent Russia: An Operational Approach To Deterrence.” *Strategic Studies Institute*. Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies

Institute. May 2016,

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1324>

Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Cordesman, Anthony H. "Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2016: A Comparative Analysis." *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. December 5, 2016. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/161208_Chinese_Strategy_Military_Modernization_2016.pdf

Couch, Dick. *Chosen Soldier: The Making of a Special Forces Warrior*. New York: Crown Publishing, 2007.

Davis Institute of National Security and Foreign Policy. *2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Assessing America's ability to Provide for the Common Defense*. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2016.

Echevarria, Antulio III. *Clausewitz and Contemporary War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Gray, Colin. "Irregular Enemies And The Essence Of Strategy: Can The American Way Of War Adapt?," *The Strategic Studies Institute*. Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006.

Griffin, Gordon C. "Israel Versus Hezbollah 2006 An Assessment of Israeli Strategy." Research paper, Air War College, 2008. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/2008_griffin.pdf

Headquarters Department of the Army. *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014*. Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2014.

Headquarters Department of the Army. *Doctrine Primer*. ADP 1-01. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, September 2, 2014.

Headquarters Department of the Army. *Special Operations*. ADP 3-05. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, August 31 2012.

Headquarters Department of the Army. *Special Operations*. ADRP 3-05. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, August 31 2012.

Headquarters Department of the Army. *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World*. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1. Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 31, 2014.

Headquarters Department of the Army. *Train to Win in a Complex World*. FM 7-0. Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 5, 2016.

Headquarters Department of the Army. *Unified Land Operations*. ADP 3-0. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 10, 2011.

Kapusta, Philip. "The Gray Zone." *Special Warfare*, October – December 2015: 18

Leed, Maren "Square Pegs, Round Holes, and Gray Zone Conflicts." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* no. 2, (summer/fall 2015): 139. <http://search.proquest.com/>.

Milley, Mark, "Statement of GEN Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff United States Army Before the Committee on Armed Services." Speech. United States Senate. Washington, DC, April 07, 2016.

Mockaitis, Thomas R. "The COIN Conundrum: The Future of Counterinsurgency and U.S. Landpower," *Strategic Studies Institute*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2016.

Shuster, Simon. "Why Russia is Rebuilding its Nuclear Arsenal." *Time*, April 4, 2016. <http://time.com/4280169/russia-nuclear-security-summit/>.

Till, Geoffrey. "Future Conditional: naval power sits at center of Russian strategy." *Jane's Navy International* 121, no. 6. August 2016. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1806003507?accountid=14746>.

US Department of Defense. *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*. Washington, DC, March 4, 2014.

US Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States*. JP 1. Washington DC: United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013.

Weitz, Richard. "Colloquium Brief: U.S. Army War College 25th Annual Strategy Conference Carlisle, Pennsylvania, April 8-10, 2014 — Balancing the Joint Force to Meet Future Security Challenges." *Strategic Studies Institute*. November 15, 2016. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/USAWC-25th-Annual-CB/2016/11/15>;

The White House. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. Washington DC: The White House, July 1994.

Winograd Commission. "The Winograd Commission Final Report." *The Council on Foreign Relations*, January 30, 2008. <http://www.cfr.org/israel/winograd-commission-final-report/p15385>

Zorthian, Julia and Heather Jones. "Boots on the Ground," *Time Magazine*, October 16, 2015.
<http://time.com/4075458/afghanistan-drawdown-obama-troops/>.