

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE					<i>Form Approved</i> OMB No. 0704-0188	
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.						
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 04/20/2017		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis			3. DATES COVERED (From - To) SEP 2016 - APR 2017	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Building Partner Capacity: More Than Just Shooting, Moving, and Communicating				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A		
				5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A		
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A		
6. AUTHOR(S) Cooley, Brandon, E., Major, USMC				5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A		
				5e. TASK NUMBER N/A		
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068					8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)					10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
					11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.						
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES						
14. ABSTRACT The Marine Corps has shown proficiency in building partner capacity, but has, in most cases restricted its focus to infantry-centric activities. Partner nation militaries need to develop across more capabilities that support and sustain their main security force missions. The Marine Corps, therefore, should expand its security cooperation activities to encompass all warfighting functions when training partner nation militaries. TSC teams may not be formed correctly in order to build capacity through and across all warfighting functions. TSC teams should, however, be multi-functional and not cover just infantry related skills since there are many tasks that need to be complete prior to accomplishing infantry missions.						
15. SUBJECT TERMS Building Partner Capacity; Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group; MCSCG; Security Cooperation Engagement Plan; SCEP; Security Cooperation; TSC; SPMAGTF-SC; Multi-functional; assessments						
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 51	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON USMC Command and Staff College	
a. REPORT Unclass	b. ABSTRACT Unclass	c. THIS PAGE Unclass			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)	

*United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Building Partner Capacity:

More Than Just Shooting, Moving, and Communicating

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Major Brandon E. Cooley


AY 16-17

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Douglas E. Streusand

Approved: 

Date: 20 April 2017

Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. James Joyner

Approved: 

Date: 20 APR 2017

Executive Summary

Title: Building Partner Capacity: More Than Just Shooting, Moving, and Communicating

Author: Major Brandon E. Cooley, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The Marine Corps has shown proficiency in building partner capacity, but has, in most cases restricted its focus to infantry-centric activities. Partner nation militaries need to develop across more capabilities that support and sustain their main security force missions. The Marine Corps, therefore, should expand its security cooperation activities to encompass all warfighting functions when training partner nation militaries.

Discussion: Building capacity should not be limited to one area or warfighting function; however, the current view for the Marine Corps revolves around building capacity primarily through infantry-centric training. The Marine Corps fights across warfighting functions in order to maximize its efficiency, while being supported heavily by components within these warfighting functions. If the Marine Corps trains a partner military only on engaging the enemy, with limited training in the areas that support and sustain security operations, then its partners will continue to lack the ability to sustain themselves. The Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG) serves as the lead agency for the Marine Corps to support the Marine Corps's worldwide theater security cooperation efforts. The group coordinates, manages, executes, and evaluates security cooperation programs and activities to include planning, security cooperation-related education and training, and advisory support, as required, to the tactical units conducting theater security cooperation through mil-to-mil engagements. MCSCG's aim is to ensure unity of effort in building partner capacity in order to facilitate Marine Corps support to Geographic Combatant Commanders' (GCC) objectives, but it cannot make a partner military better, or build its capacity alone and rely on tactical unit assessments based off the engagement plans. MCSCG conducts the first assessments of partner militaries with the MARFOR and country team planners' prioritized training events in accordance with partner nation military established security missions; however, these assessments are broad in nature and require feedback from the engagement teams in order to improve the engagement plans that cover a three to five-year period. From the first assessment, the MARFOR gives the assessment and engagement plan to the tactical unit assigned to conduct the security cooperation mission. These tactical units, or Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) teams, may not be formed correctly to cover training across all warfighting functions, and they typically train and assess to the engagement plan, and do not assess areas outside of what the engagement plan identifies. These TSC teams should assess everything, especially if it will make their partner team better at conducting their security mission, and provide maximum capacity building. TSC teams should build capacity through and across all warfighting functions, and training should not cover just infantry related skills since there are many tasks that need to be complete prior to accomplishing infantry missions.

Conclusion: It is in the best interest of the United States to have strong and capable partners, and the Marine Corps seeks to maintain a key role in building partner capacity for years to come. Building partner capacity is most effective when the capacity built meets the interest of both the US and its partners. This step in the right direction will keep the Marine Corps as the partner of choice and ensure TSC teams are truly building partner capacity writ large.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

Illustrations

	Page
Figure 1. Security Cooperation Guidance.....	7
Figure 2. MCSCG CLATT Composition and Tasks	10
Figure 3. Security Cooperation Planning Execution Process	12
Figure 4. The “Sweet Spot”.....	13
Figure 5. El Salvador BIM SCEP Concept.....	25
Figure 6. Force Allocation Process – Global Force Management	32
Figure 7. USMC Sourcing Process – Global Force Management	33

Table of Contents

	Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	<u>ii</u>
DISCLAIMER	<u>iii</u>
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....	<u>iv</u>
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	<u>v</u>
PREFACE	<u>vi</u>
INTRODUCTION	<u>1</u>
BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY: WHAT IT IS AND ENCOMPASSES	<u>5</u>
BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY: AN ACTIVITY OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.....	<u>7</u>
MARINE CORPS SECURITY COOPERATION GROUP MISSION AND ROLE IN BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY.....	<u>10</u>
PROBLEM FRAMING: MCSCG CANNOT DO IT ALL	<u>14</u>
PROBLEM: BUIDLING PARTNER CAPACITY BASED SOLELY UPON INFANTRY-CENTRIC CAPABILITIES	<u>17</u>
PROBLEM: SECURITY COOPERATION TEAMS DO NOT ENCOMPASS MARINES FROM ACROSS WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS	<u>20</u>
SOLUTION: BUILDING PARTNER CAPCITY ACROSS ALL WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS	<u>23</u>
SOLUTION: SCEPS AND ASSESSMENTS THAT BETTER DEFINE CAPABILITIES AND CAPACITY OF THE PARTNER NATION	<u>26</u>
CONCLUSION.....	<u>28</u>
APPENDIX: MARINE CORPS ROLE AND SOURCING FOR BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY	<u>30</u>
NOTES.....	<u>35</u>
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	<u>39</u>

Preface

I chose this topic because of my experience as the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Southern Command (SPMAGTF-SC) Operations Officer and Ground Combat Element Officer-in-Charge (OIC) in Central America from May – November 2015. While serving concurrently in these billets, I directly planned and oversaw all operations within the MAGTF. I managed Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) teams operating in Belize, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. I learned what works, and what does not when it comes to building partner capacity in this region. I have planned two SPMAGTF-SC deployments to Central America, the one I served with in 2015, and the follow-on SPMAGTF-SC in 2016.

8th Engineer Support Battalion (ESB) served as the Command Element (CE) for SPMAGTF-SC 2015. The selection of an engineer unit as the CE headquarters, and the Ground Combat Element (GCE) was an alternate sourcing solution for the TSC mission in Central America. Typically, SPMAGTFs have infantry units as the CE, and only infantry Marines in the GCE. SPMAGTF-SC 2015 was very different though, as its GCE consisted of non-infantry Marines with military occupational specialties (MOS) usually found in the logistics combat element (LCE). Each team did have one infantry Platoon Sergeant, but the Marines on the TSC teams for SPMAGTF-SC 2015 consisted of logisticians, combat engineers, supply, disbursers, motor transport operators, heavy equipment mechanics, heavy equipment operators, water purification technicians, generator mechanics, communications, intelligence, military police, and bulk fuel specialists. This deployment gave a unique opportunity to an engineer unit that ultimately allowed the TSC teams to gain a different perspective on building partner capacity, and find ways to improve the training for the partner nation militaries. SPMAGTF-SC's TSC teams were multi-

functional and consisted of Marines from across all warfighting functions, and did exactly what this paper is suggesting for future TSC missions Marine Corps wide.

My research included reviewing several national strategic documents, joint and service publications, Theater Strategy Plans, lessons learned/reviewed, and RAND studies; however, Marine Corps documents only discuss the Marine Corps's role in TSC. My research also includes my notes from the USMC Security Cooperation Planners Course, my deployment, and planning experience in support of building partner capacity for two SPMAGTFs.

I would like to acknowledge the stewardship of Major General David Coffman, USMC; Brigadier General Eric Smith, USMC; Colonel Ivan Monclova, USMC; LtCol John F. Vazquez, USMC and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Janczyk, USA. My appreciation to the awesome Marines of SPMAGTF-SC 2015, primarily the S-3 Operations Section, aka "The Lion's Den," consisting of Captain Matthew Angel (S-3A) and Staff Sergeant Jeremy Kinsey (S-3 Chief), as well as my TSC Team OICs for their ability to think outside of the box. My gratitude to the Leadership Communications Skills Center team (Linda, Andrea, and Stase) who assisted me in getting my thoughts on paper properly. Special thanks to Dr. Douglas E. Streusand for serving as a great mentor and encouraging his students to be bold in their writing and research skills. Finally, I want to thank my patient wife, Gianni, and our three children, Cristian, Noah, and Gabriel, for their continued love and support.

INTRODUCTION

Security Cooperation is the best method of avoiding direct, large-scale US intervention into any region around the globe. Security Cooperation is neither new in US history nor is it new to the United States Marine Corps. In fact, many generations of Marines have engaged international partners, in peacetime and wartime, in order to build partner capacity and “prevent situations from advancing or degrading to a point where they can threaten [US] national security interests.”¹ Although international partner military engagements and capacity building is not new, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have focused attention to this topic and given building partner capacity a new strategic rationale due to direct military intervention, and military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contact, between US forces and partner nation forces that aim to limit and deter war.

Multiple programs and activities fall under the heading of Security Cooperation. These activities share the same core concepts of building partner capacity, gaining access to, and building relationships with countries and regions that possess or align themselves to similar security interests as the United States. Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, defines security cooperation as “all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military and security capabilities for internal and external defense for multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to the host nation.”² In building partner capacity, “engagement” is the operative term. The Marine Corps has shown proficiency in building partner capacity, but has, in most cases restricted its focus to infantry-centric activities. Partner

nation militaries need to develop across more capabilities that support and sustain their main security force missions. The Marine Corps, therefore, should expand its security cooperation activities to encompass all warfighting functions when training partner nation militaries.

The Marine Corps itself is infantry-centric; every Marine is a Rifleman, which is most likely a key reason as to why security cooperation events are primarily infantry related. Many people in the Marine Corps have heard the phrase, “if you ain’t infantry, then you’re support.” This statement is true because everything that takes place within the Marine Corps focuses on the warfighter, or the “grunt,” better known as the infantry Marine; however, combat service support is the key enabler that allows the warfighter to do his or her job effectively. Combat service support is a primary activity under the logistics warfighting function that provides services and supplies for movement or maintenance of the force.

To ensure proper support is in place, the Marine Corps fights across six warfighting functions: maneuver, intelligence, logistics, fires, force protection, and command and control. These warfighting functions “are a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united in a common purpose that commanders utilize to accomplish missions and training objectives.”³ Commanders apply combat power through these warfighting functions using leadership and information. They use the warfighting functions to allow them to exercise command and help them and their staffs exercise overall control of the force. According to the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, Marine forces obtain maximum impact by harmonizing the warfighting functions to accomplish the desired objective within the shortest time possible and with minimum casualties. Furthermore, the warfighting functions encompass all military activities in a particular battlespace, so proper integration of the warfighting functions ensures an integrated plan and helps achieve unity of effort.⁴

The warfighting functions apply equally across the range of military operations, to include Phase 0 in which the US conducts security cooperation in order to build partner capacity prior to decisive operations. They are the building blocks for all types of operations, including prolonged, amphibious, distributed, information, and counter insurgency.⁵ If the Marine Corps uses warfighting functions to achieve maximum efficiency, why do partner nation militaries not understand this concept and show their lack of support capability in many areas that support maneuver, and the basic infantry skills? This exact inadequate support capability was observed during training events with SPMAGTF-SC 2015, as well as studied through after action reports suggesting the same. Moreover, why does the Marine Corps not stress the need for building capacity across these functions?

In the words of then Brigadier General David Coffman, Commander of United States Marine Forces South, from 2013-2015, “Theater Security Cooperation and building partner capacity is our primary mission. Remember, we are not trying to make these individuals Marines, but we want to put a Marine Corps brand on everything we do while making our partners better, thus allowing them to accomplish their mission more effectively.”⁶ Proper employment and integration of the warfighting functions creates maximum efficiency with minimal casualties across the range of military operations and allow a commander to exercise best control over his force. With that said, the Marine Corps should be building partner capacity across these same warfighting functions to allow a commander best control of the force. This would allow the Marine Corps to put its brand on the training given to partner nation militaries. Most of the militaries that the Marine Corps partners with, possess comparable functions or systems designed to support and sustain, command and control, gather intelligence, and protect the force just as the Marine Corps does. This training is neither a stretch nor an attempt to make partner nation militaries just

like the Marine Corps. It would make the partner nation military more effective in its capabilities and accomplishing its mission.

The Marine Corps and its partners would be best served if training and assessments covered all warfighting functions, and not just maneuver and the infantry-centric skills associated with it. One unit, MCSCG, first assesses partner nation militaries, but they may not catch or assess everything related to a partner nation military's mission sets on their first evaluation, especially since their assessments are conducted over a one to two-week period, and not through daily engagements. Security Cooperation teams need to be well-rounded and promote all warfighting functions in order to build partner capacity and ensure the partners are not only capable of conducting infantry tactics but are capable of supporting, commanding, controlling, protecting, and sustaining themselves as well.

To understand the Marine Corps's role in building partner capacity, and how and why the Marine Corps conducts this mission, one must first understand what building partner capacity is, and that building partner capacity is nested within the US National Strategy. All services build partner capacity in their own way, but the Marine Corps receives specific missions through a lengthy process that may not get to the root of the problem that this paper discusses. The Marine Corps attempts to accomplish its building partner capacity missions through single unit sourcing solutions by assigning one tactical unit to a particular mission. A single unit sourcing solution limits the ability of a unit to properly assess and train its partners in order to achieve the best success in building partner capacity. If all TSC teams were multi-functional, and capable of training and assessing partner militaries across all warfighting functions, then capacity of partner militaries would increase.

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY: WHAT IT IS AND ENCOMPASSES

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review defined the term building partner capacity. Since then it has become a catch phrase for a wide array of programs.⁷ In this document, building partner capacity refers to, “targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense and its partners.”⁸ Building partner capacity also looks to enable partner nations to contribute to coalition operations and advance US national security interests.⁹ There is no standard definition of building partner capacity, and the RAND study *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances*, suggests that building partner capacity is a “term of art” rather than a capability or specific program.¹⁰

The United States has a long history of working with partner nation militaries and governments, and building their capacity to face internal threats. Although the term “building partner capacity” dates back to the early 2000s, the US military engaged in building partner capacity long before the term came into use, and this the concept of building partner capacity is understood and applicable throughout the spectrum of security cooperation activities. Building partner capacity through security cooperation activities attempts to promote long-term regional stability while promoting specific US security interests.¹¹ Security cooperation is the means by which the DOD encourages and enables partner nations to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. According to *Foreign Internal Defense*, Joint Publication 3-22, *The Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF), which is a classified document, outlines the strategic objectives in which goals and activities for specific regions, and lays out the overarching framework for many building partner capacity activities.¹²

DOD efforts to build partner capacity include a broad range of security cooperation activities and programs designed to build upon the defense capacity of foreign partners and allies of

the United States, and, ultimately, to have positive, tangible effects on US national security. Activities in which the DOD engages towards these ends include, but are not limited to training, mentoring, advising, equipping, exercising, educating, and planning with foreign security forces.¹³ Through these activities, DOD conducts training at three levels: individual, collective, and staff training in order to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, leader, and collective levels.¹⁴ Individual training consists of US forces training partner nations on military occupational skills (MOS) appropriate to their organization and equipment. This level of training teaches partners to shoot their weapons for instance, and move through a tactical environment, or even instruct officers and leaders on principles of leadership. Collective training consists of US forces training partner militaries on tasks that apply to a whole unit that performs the same type of missions, i.e. infantry, logistics, communication, etc., thus teaching the unit to fight and conduct operations as a unit. This may also involve tactical mission planning and execution. Staff training consists of US forces training partner militaries in staff development and troop leading procedures through military decision making at any unit level, typically platoon and above. The United States Marine Corps trains partner militaries across all levels of training. Its ability to do so meets Marine Corps Security Cooperation Mission Essential Tasks 4 and 10, which include Marine Corps Tasks 1.17.3 *Train Partner Nation Forces* and 5.5.5.1 *Conduct/Support Theater Security Cooperation Activities* from the Navy and Marine Corps Order 3500.59B, *Security Cooperation Training and Readiness Manual*.¹⁵

This research paper defines “building partner capacity” as the actions taken by the United States Marine Corps during day-to-day engagements with partner militaries that focus on training, advising, and assisting at the tactical level. These security cooperation activities concentrate on missions of deterrence, security, and stability at Phase 0 of the range of military operations.

Furthermore, building partner capacity in this scope allows the Marine Corps to work closely with its partners and assist them with the development of their own capabilities and capacity. This development serves both the partner nation and the US well, as it typically addresses US national and/or shared security interests with the partner nation.

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY: AN ACTIVITY OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

Security Cooperation and building partner capacity fit into the US national strategy as defined in several national, strategic level documents. Key documents that affect security cooperation and building partner capacity are as follows: The National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and any Presidential Policy Directives as well. Security cooperation and building partner capacity permeates US strategy and foreign policy. Figure 1 below illustrates the linkages between national-level documents and regional level documents crossing between the DOD and Department of State (DOS) that ultimately lead to a security cooperation engagement plan (SCEP) based off of the GCC's Theater Campaign Plan and service component plan, in this case the United States Marine Corps Force (MARFOR).¹⁶




Figure 1: Security Cooperation Guidance
Source: Security Cooperation Planners Course, MCSCG

The National Security Strategy outlines the President's vision for providing enduring security for the American people. The 2015 National Security Strategy states:

We will focus on building the capacity of others to prevent the causes and consequences of conflict to include countering extreme and dangerous ideologies... and build the capacity of our partners to join with us in meeting security challenge. US forces will continue to defend the homeland, conduct global counterterrorism operations, assure allies, and deter aggression through forward presence and engagement while deepening security cooperation around the globe.¹⁷

The National Defense Strategy flows from the National Security Strategy and explains the Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF) vision for the DOD's role in protecting the US and its interests. The 2012 National Defense Strategy expands on building partner capacity and promotes the US as the "partner of choice":

We will expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners... and ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests. Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. Across the globe, we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations including those in Africa and Latin America – whose interests and viewpoints are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity. Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.¹⁸

The National Military Strategy issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), is a deliverable to the SECDEF that outlines strategic aims of the armed forces. Developed from the guidance of the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy provides a guide for military activities to define military objectives. The 2015 National Military Strategy encompasses this same vision and promotes the expansion of these efforts by stating:

As we look to the future, the U.S. military and its allies and partners will continue to protect and promote shared interests. We will preserve our alliances, expand partnerships, maintain a global stabilizing presence, and conduct training, exercises, security cooperation activities, and military-to-military engagement. Such activities increase the capabilities and capacity of partners, thereby enhancing our collective ability to deter aggression

and defeat extremists. Additionally, we are working to strengthen institutions across Africa, aimed at fostering stability, building peacekeeping capacity, and countering transregional extremism. And the U.S. military is supporting interagency efforts with Latin American and Caribbean states to promote regional stability and counter transnational criminal organizations. Combined training and exercises increase the readiness of our allies and partners while enhancing the interoperability and responsiveness of U.S. forces.¹⁹

The Quadrennial Defense Review is a Congress mandated DOD review of strategy, programs, and resources. In 2006, the Quadrennial Defense Review stated that joint ground forces “possess the ability to train, mentor, and advise foreign security forces and conduct counterinsurgency campaigns.”²⁰ Therefore, all conventional forces are capable of training, equipping, advising local forces, while deploying and engaging with partners, and supporting stability operations. The claim that all conventional forces could train, equip, and advise partner militaries made quite an impact, since special operations forces primarily owned this role prior to 2006, but now it is incumbent upon all services’ conventional forces to be able to carry out this task.²¹ The 2014 QDR explains how building security globally not only assures allies and partners and builds their capacity, but also helps protect the homeland by deterring conflict and increasing stability. Furthermore, it outlines the DOD’s three pillars. *Protect the homeland*, to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and to support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters. *Build security globally*, in order to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and partners, and cooperate with others to address common security challenges. *Project power and win decisively*, to defeat aggression, disrupt and destroy terrorist networks, and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.²² All three of these pillars encompass building partner capacity through security cooperation activities that address common security challenges.

MARINE CORPS SECURITY COOPERATION GROUP MISSION AND ROLE IN BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

Established in 2011, MCSCG serves as a unique command that consolidates all facets of security cooperation to include advisor skills, training and assessment expertise, and security assistance program management.²³ MCSCG serves as the Marine Corps's subject matter expert for the training and coordination of tactical units assigned building partner capacity and security cooperation missions. MCSCG's structure and organization includes a headquarters staff, instructor group, and regionally aligned coordination, liaison, assessment, and training teams (CLATTs) as seen in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2: CLATT Composition and Tasks
Source: Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group Command Brief

The mission of MCSCG is “Execute and enable Security Cooperation programs, training, planning, and lines of operation in coordination with operating forces and MAGTF(s) IOT ensure unity of effort in support of USMC and Regional MARFOR objectives.”²⁴ The specified tasks of MCSCG are: plan and execute Marine Corps security cooperation and training and education; conduct foreign security force capabilities based assessments (CBA); conduct engagements and activities with partner nation; provide security cooperation planning and execution

support; provide in-country coordination and liaison support for security cooperation activities; support development and review of Service, Joint, and intergovernmental security cooperation doctrine, policies, authorities and initiatives; and maintain a security cooperation information repository.²⁵

The chief product that MCSCG produces in support of security cooperation and building partner capacity is a Security Cooperation Engagement Plan (SCEP). The SCEP is a three to five-year plan that synchronizes security cooperation engagements in order to build prioritized foreign security force (FSF) capabilities and capacity and to apply Marine Corps resources effectively and efficiently.²⁶ Furthermore, the SCEP assists a MARFOR and an embassy's Security Cooperation Office (SCO) to build FSF capability and capacity to accomplish the desired security role. SCEPs attempt to provide solutions to prioritized gaps identified in the assessment report through detailed event-level data. The SCEP not only aids a unit when engaging with a partner military, but also justifies requirements and expenditure of resources in regards to DOD budget, demonstrates DOD intent to interagency partners, and to partner nations, and serves as a roadmap for how to get from current to desired capabilities and capacities.²⁷ Although a SCEP is the primary tool utilized for mil-to-mil engagements, and consist of indentified and planned training events, TSC teams must always assume that they have to improvise and adapt to partner militaries training shortfalls. Improvisation is a hallmark of Marines. It allows Marines to thrive in adverse conditions, and should be a part of building partner capacity as well.

The Security Cooperation Planning and Execution Process (SCPEP) links ends, ways, and means as seen in Figure 3 below. MCSCG uses a modified version of the Marine Corps' Expeditionary Force Development System to assess a FSF capability to support Regional MARFOR objectives, identify capability gaps, and develop a long-term plan to close or mitigate

capability gaps.²⁸ The SCPEP has five phases: Problem Analysis, Needs Analysis, Solutions Analysis, Implementation, and Execution.




Figure 3: Security Cooperation Planning Execution Process
Source: Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group SCPEP Fundamentals Brief

During Problem Analysis, the country team working at the embassy requests MARFOR planners to evaluate a FSF based off the FSF’s advertised missions, vision, and capabilities in order to determine if the FSF is ready for a desired security role (DSR) or further security cooperation engagement by producing a Security Cooperation Operational Assessment Report (SCOAR). Based on the outcome of the SCOAR, MARFOR planners, country team personnel, and the MCSCG CLATT determine the Desired Security Role (DSR) for the FSF, and identify capabilities required to fulfill the DSR. The development of the DSR is through a common objective analysis of MARFOR (DOD), country team (DOS), and partner nation objectives as seen in Figure 4 below.²⁹ This analysis helps find what MCSCG refers to as the sweet spot in which the DSR is the sweet spot, and represents common interests and objectives of all parties.




Figure 4: The “Sweet Spot”

Source: Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group SCPEP Fundamentals Brief

Based off the SCOAR, the FSF-CBA serves as the Needs Analysis phase of the planning process. It is a tailored analysis of a FSF’s capability and willingness to assume the DSR. Extensive research, interviews with key stakeholders, and on-site evaluation of the FSF allows for the conduct and development of the DSR.³⁰

The FSF-CBA report feedback and direction from the MARFOR creates the Solutions Analysis. Analysis of capability gaps develops a comprehensive, resource-informed SCEP. The SCEP covers a three to five-year period that supports resource requests such as Program Objective Memorandum (POM), Global Force Management (GFM), and other planning time horizons, thus identifying money and personnel requirements for three to five years. The SCEP takes into account the MARFOR’s intended method of engagement, and lays out a plan for capability development to achieve the DSR.³¹ The plan utilizes all available tools and resources to achieve its objectives: mobile training teams (MTTs), subject matter expert exchanges (SMEEs), US resident military education and training, senior leader visits, exercises, and deployment schedules in which units deploy in support of a theater campaign plan and conduct security cooperation missions.

During the Implementation Phase, the MARFOR and country team take the lead, obtain the required resources, and conduct appropriate stakeholder coordination. This phase follows GCC business rules, i.e. funding/budget impacts and legal reviews, to get approval for training events.³² The key to this stage is ensuring security cooperation executors provide detailed post event/exercise/engagement assessments. These assessments allow a country team to identify gaps and requirements needing solutions, and the assessments will update the annual country team plan for training.

During the Execution Phase, the tactical unit conducting engagements and mil-to-mil operations receive orders and directions. The unit monitors, assesses, examines, reports on FSF progress, and makes necessary adjustments to the SCEP as required. Throughout the entire process, thorough analysis of theater requirements ensures the DSR remains consistent with national, theater, and country level objectives. If there are any changes in a FSF's capability to support MARFOR objectives during the execution of the SCEP, an assessment team conducts a Security Cooperation in Progress Review (SCIPR) to determine the need for changes to the SCEP based off changes to the DSR or measures of performance (SCEP Execution).³³

PROBLEM FRAMING: MCSCG CANNOT DO IT ALL

Understanding who and what MCSCG is and what they do in relation to security cooperation and building partner capacity illustrates the commitment that the Marine Corps has divested into this mission. However, MCSCG can only do so much and identify only so many gaps and solutions. LtCol John Vazquez serves as the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) for the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) CLATT sections for MCSCG. When interviewing him in regards to MCSCG,

his answers gave some insight into the issues that prevent assessments of partner nation security forces across all warfighting functions, which ultimately decreases the capacity that the US is building with partner nations.

The current structure of the CLATTs is eight Marines; however, by the time the phased growth of the command is complete, the CLATTs will rate ten to twelve Marines. At full strength, CLATTs will consist of one LtCol OIC / Foreign Affairs Officer (FAO), one Major Assistant OIC any MOS, two Majors (FAO), four Captains any MOS, and two Gunnery Sergeants any MOS.³⁴ When CLATTs deploy to conduct assessments of partner nation militaries, they typically, as much as possible, are functionally built around warfighting functions.³⁵ However, MCSCG attempts to externally obtain Marines from other commands in order to provide a subject matter expert to all assessment teams, but subject matter experts from all warfighting functions are not always available. CLATTs used to rate certain MOSs; however, to make the personnel management easier on the monitors, MCSCG dropped most of the MOS requirements, except for the FAO billets.³⁶ For most work in the USSOUTHCOM and United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) AORs, a graduate of The Basic School (TBS) or School of Infantry (SOI) or Marine Combat Training (MCT) graduate will suffice.

The dropping of specific MOS requirements for CLATTs limits the warfighting functions that CLATTs can assess. A TBS, SOI, or MCT graduate will have been in the fleet for at least three to four years (typically) prior to being able to receive orders to MCSCG. A Marine headed to MCSCG following their first enlistment is not a SME in their MOS. These Marines receive extensive training once at MCSCG, through a robust Security Cooperation Development Program, which includes the Marine Advisor Course, Security Cooperation Planners Course, the

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management Action Officer Course, language training, and an abundance of on the job training (OJT).³⁷

Needless to say, manpower issues have caused MCSCG to lose valuable personnel and some teams have operated below their desired structure and without appropriate personnel. This does not undercut the TSC mission, but an inadequate CLATT without representation from all warfighting functions, undercuts the preliminary assessments conducted. Furthermore, most of the training received by the CLATT members is beneficial, but the OJT is most likely the best investment for a Marine who is assessing a partner nation military. This OJT however, does not ensure that Marines conducting assessments will be looking at the whole picture, and identifying all the gaps across the warfighting functions. Regardless of the training the CLATT Marines receive, experience and expertise of the warfighting functions will aid a CLATT in identifying the supporting functions that support a partner nation's security missions. CLATTs will not identify all gaps, but attempt to as much as possible, and the CLATTs assessment give a starting point to the actual TSC teams assigned the mission of training the partner nation.

When a TSC team deploys and trains partner nation militaries, it must train to the SCEP produced by MCSCG since the SCEP details the approved training events, but the TSC team should identify and assess other gaps not listed on the SCEP. TSC teams should look assess the partner military in all functions, especially those pertaining to the partner military's security mission. TSC teams should train their partner militaries in areas that support infantry skills training events to ensure the desired security mission receives maximum support and sustainment across all warfighting functions, just as the infantry receives support and sustainment within the Marine Corps. Areas that support infantry training include logistics, force protection, command and control, and represent other warfighting functions besides maneuver. If MCSCG and the MARFOR

provide a set list, a SCEP, of training requirements to a TSC team, the TSC team is apt, if not determined, to stick to that list. Both T. X. Hammes's account of advising, assisting, and training missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the author's personal experience indicates that Marines have rarely been willing to deviate from training lists or schedules even when they have had clear, legal authority to do so.³⁸ Utilizing a SCEP for conducting training events is crucial; however, if the TSC team does not properly assess and address gaps in supporting functions and report them properly, partner nation capacity decreases.³⁹

PROBLEM: BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY BASED SOLELY UPON INFANTRY-CENTRIC CAPABILITIES

When looking through MARFOR campaign plans, it is evident to see a number of exercises aimed at building partner capacity within all GCCs; however, what is not evident is the capacity building that takes place beyond security through the teaching of infantry skills and tactics revolved around shooting, moving, and communicating. For instance, several United States European Command (USEUCOM) exercises involve and train forces on maritime interdiction, mine warfare, anti-mine warfare, and live-fire and maneuver training exercises.⁴⁰ In USAFRICOM, several exercises involve and train forces on combined arms maneuver with live fire.⁴¹ In USSOUTHCOM, several exercises involve and train forces on maritime interdiction and counterdrug/terrorism interdiction through live fire training events.⁴² By no means does this list of exercises suggest this is all that these commands accomplish, but what it does suggest is a focus on infantry related skills, with little to no training in the support functions required to accomplish the training events.

Mil-to-mil engagements, other than exercises, have the same focus on infantry related skills. The last SCEP for El Salvador lists capability sets, an engagement plan for mil-to-mil engagements, objectives for training, and milestones for each engagement. The El Salvador military unit assessed, the Batallón de Infantería de Marina (BIM), had gaps in its capacity to conduct mission planning, small boat operations, and small unit operations. When looking at these gaps in coordination with planned engagements, there are four engagements planned in a particular year for a TSC team to train the BIM, in order to meet certain milestones. A few of the milestones are proficiency of combat orders, military leadership, water survival, small craft familiarization, land navigation, logistics I, squad fire and maneuver, and crew served weapons.⁴³ At the end of the engagement periods, the BIM was supposed to be able to accomplish a myriad of tasks related to infantry/maneuver mission; however, there was no mention of being able to provide the support to its force for these missions. Furthermore, the SCEP lists logistics I as a milestone, but the SCEP does not identify a logistics II, or follow-on logistics course, thus limiting the training in this crucial area.

Herein lies an issue. The SCEP lists *Logistics I* as a task during the second engagement period, but there was no follow-on logistics course, and there is not a mention of this in the skill phase objectives for later engagements. Once again, all skill phase objectives were maneuver/infantry-centric to include writing a basic order, demonstrating basic light infantry skills, conducting squad movement, demonstrating plans for raids, attacks, and patrols, demonstrating basic command and control capabilities, and conducting company level operations.⁴⁴ It does mention demonstrating proficiency with operational planning; however, it does not mention what this

means, and SPMAGTF-SC 2015 found this to be an issue since the BIM had a difficult time supporting themselves through logistics functions, and other warfighting functions besides maneuver.⁴⁵

The SCEP from Senegal for the Compagnies Fusilier Marin Commandos (COFUMACO) lists the unit's two lines of operation (LOO): unit development and small craft/light infantry core skills.⁴⁶ In both of these LOOs, the focus of development is upon the unit, as well as its professional development, light infantry operations, mission planning, and small craft support and sustainment. The development and understanding logistical requirements training event, listed as *Capability Set #4* in the SCEP, provides training for support and sustainment operations, but the COFUMACO trains on logistics last.⁴⁷ Without logistical support, and the ability to plan for logistics, infantry operations are impossible since no mission will survive without support and sustainment.

A SCEP developed for the Belize Defence Force (BDF) and Belize Coast Guard (BCG), it identifies capability gaps in infantry patrolling, mission planning, unit support functions, and limited Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) inter-agency planning.⁴⁸ Furthermore, it lists other gaps such as logistics, sustainment, and maintenance, but suggests their placement into overall mission planning. Placement into overall mission planning could easily cause an oversight if not viewed properly since logistics and other support functions planning takes place throughout all steps of planning and at all levels. Moreover, if a TSC team consists of only combat arms or infantry Marines, it may not possess adequate knowledge to train on logistics support, maintenance, or sustainment procedures, during a specific engagement period. If this is the case, another engagement will be required at a later, unidentified date, and will take time to plan.

This will leave a crucial gap in a partner nation militaries' capacity and ability to support themselves.

There is clear and valid evidence available that suggests partner nation militaries have issues in other areas besides maneuver; however, these areas seem glossed over when it comes to overall training and building partner capacity across all warfighting functions. Training conducted on support and sustainment operations at the end of a training cycle, or engagement period, is a bad idea. Support and sustainment training embedded early in a training cycle allows planning for support requirements to be at the forefront of everyone's mind, as they move into other training areas. By embedding support and sustainment training events early, it allows partner to see the relevance of what may be required to support their infantry training and operations. If the only time a partner nation military can fully support itself across all warfighting functions is when the Marines are with them, then the Marine Corps has done a disservice to its partners.

PROBLEM: SECURITY COOPERATION TEAMS DO NOT ENCOMPASS MARINES FROM ACROSS WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS

Infantry and combat arms related MOSs, i.e. artillery, combat engineer, tanker, etc. are ideal for training infantry skills; however, focus upon other warfighting functions should take place more than just through one or two week-long exercises each quarter. This is the current trend as seen with USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM conducting one or two, two-week long logistics training courses in 2016. A partner military will learn very little about logistics planning during a two-week training event, but this will not make a partner nation military proficient in this area. All warfighting functions should be concentrated on more than during a two-week period, and should tie in with the infantry training. Logistics planning enables a force to sustain and

move itself, something many countries have a hard time doing without direct assistance. This is the same for Command and Control, and the rest of the warfighting functions. Many of the exercises throughout the AORs train command and control, but typically only during the duration of the exercise, as seen during USSOUTHCOM's exercise *TRADEWINDS 2015*. The command and control training lasted ten days. The command and control training culminated with a final operation lasting only one day.⁴⁹ Following *TRADEWINDS*, Belize went back to understaffing its Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). The JIOC had one Marine officer inside of it for a period of six months who assisted the one or two-man Belize Defence Force staff, and train them on command and control in order to assist with future missions. This Marine was a Combat Engineer, who understood planning, and command and control and enforced this throughout the deployment. He did not need to be an infantry Marine to teach this and assisted training in other warfighting functions to include logistics, force protection, intelligence, and fires.

SPMAGTF-SC 2015 had TSC teams composed primarily of non-infantry/non-combat arms military occupational specialties (MOS). The make-up of the TSC teams allowed them to identify gaps outside of infantry training because many of these Marines' MOSs depended upon support and sustainment training to ensure they could be competent within their MOS in any other environment. Each team possessed one infantry Marine, a 0369/Infantry Platoon Sergeant holding the rank of Staff Sergeant or Gunnery Sergeant. That Platoon Sergeant oversaw all infantry related training, and assisted in identifying support and sustainment gaps as well, but the Marines who were supply, engineers, utilities, bulk fuel, etc. from the Marine Logistics Group (MLG) could identify many more gaps in support across all warfighting functions. The infantry Platoon Sergeant had a knowledge base of everything required for infantry training, but was able

to work directly with Marine logisticians on his team and work through problems with the partner nation militaries as well. This combination of one infantry Platoon Sergeant with a team of non-infantry Marines worked well because all Marines are Riflemen, therefore the team could train its partners in infantry skills, and in other warfighting functions that support the infantry training.

Many TSC teams, except for SPMAGTF-SC 2015 TSC teams, consist primarily of infantry units from the ground combat element (GCE) of a SPMAGTF. The SPMAGTF also consists of a logistics combat element (LCE) which supports the entire SPMAGTF. The GCE looks to the LCE typically for support of items such as ammunition, targets, and supplies for training events, but it does not look to them to identify logistical or support gaps of a partner nation's military. The GCE and LCE working together to identify gaps should be common practice, in which the LCE not only supports the GCE, but also supports the capacity building of the partner nation. Within SPMAGTF-SC 2015, this was the case, because the GCE actually consisted of logistics Marines.

Unless Marines with non-infantry MOSs serve alongside infantry Marines on TSC teams, those teams are unlikely to observe deficiencies outside of infantry-related concerns. Assessments of training engagements go back to the MARFOR and cover specific mission sets; however, if the assessment follows only established missions, it does not report on shortfalls outside of the specific mission set. Take the El Salvador BIM for instance. On the BIM SCEP it states, "conduct small unit mission planning" at the platoon level. The BIM accomplished this event, and the assessment reported that the BIM could write an order, and plan small boat maneuvers according to their SCEP capability sets and milestones.⁵⁰ The assessment, however, did not cover gaps in the support requirements, or other warfighting functions that support this specific training

event. Small unit mission planning in this case was not successful, but the report may say it was successful because the BIM produced an operations order, and planned for boat maneuvers. This inadequate reporting skews the overall assessment. The BIM accomplished their mission of conducting small unit mission planning; however, they missed several support requirements actually needed for this type of planning. They overlooked boat motor maintenance readiness, transportation, and fuel requirements for the boats themselves, something that a Marine engineer who operates bridge erection boats and combat rubber raid crafts recognizes immediately. In this case, a Marine from the LCE with specific boat qualifications should transfer to the TSC team, or been assigned to the TSC team in the beginning based of SCEP planning.⁵¹

MCSCG relies upon assessments from the TSC teams conducting the training on a deployment; however, MCSCG not receiving the assessments is currently a gap according to LtCol Vazquez.⁵² There does not seem to be a clearly identified routing process for assessments from the TSC teams to the MARFOR, and back to MCSCG. MCSCG, who conducted the first assessment on a partner nation military, requires feedback to update their training plans that will allow them to train and prepare Marines better, that come through the Basic Advisor Course. A new assessment model is currently under development to make it easier for units conducting training to assess their partner militaries.⁵³ The new assessment model will not be as restrictive to mission sets, and differ from the current after action report model that the Marine Corps currently uses. These assessments are the only formal way for MCSCG to learn of the needs of partner militaries. The MARFORs must ensure that comprehensive assessments reach MCSCG since they serve as the Marine Corps's security cooperation executive agency.

SOLUTION: BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY ACROSS ALL WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS

Building partner capacity across all warfighting functions is relevant for the Marine Corps, which operates as a MAGTF that is adaptable to any situation. The Marine Corps would not operate well without all parts of the MAGTF, and it never advocates breaking apart the MAGTF. The Marine Corps should look at partner nation militaries in the same light. They too require support elements to enhance their fighting and security capability, and this should not be broken apart. SCEPs should identify all warfighting functions and their gaps, thus allowing capacity building across all functions. Partner nations may not have what they call warfighting functions, but country teams understand the purpose and fundamental principle of warfighting functions.⁵⁴ It is easy to sell this idea to a country team, and the partner nation military when key leaders can identify areas that are supposed to support their maneuver, but are greatly lacking in their ability to do so. The other warfighting functions: command and control, intelligence, logistics, fires, and force protection, support maneuver and the warfighting abilities of any unit, American or otherwise. Some warfighting functions may be more difficult to train to, such as intelligence, because there are certain legalities and authorities that govern what intelligence training Marines are able to give to partner nation militaries. All training conducted must be within legal and practical constraints, and a request for the training and approval may be required from the partner nation, and the US country team.⁵⁵

Many of the FSFs in the Northern tier of Central America have infantry-centric missions based around tactics and maneuver, as seen in Figure 5 below.⁵⁶ These missions are best suited for multi-functional TSC teams since the mission sets identified require more support than what the capability sets state. It is necessary to build teams around all warfighting functions that can

accomplish multiple missions, train across several areas and functions, and evaluate and assess the entire partner nation military through all roles of its assigned missions.⁵⁷ If a TSC team is not multi-functional, other training engagements will need to be scheduled to train in areas that could not be trained to during a specific engagement due to lack of knowledge or skills sets within a particular team.




Figure 5: El Salvador BIM SCEP Concept

Source: Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group El Salvador SCEP

MCSCG assessment teams do not always include Marines from all warfighting functions, but TSC teams can and should. Special Operations units have operated with multi-functional training teams for years. Special operations units use small teams of specialized individuals who have cross-trained in several areas so that they can train and operate independently of larger conventional forces. In response to the 2006 QDR's mandate that general-purpose forces accept TSC missions, those units should have borrowed this approach from the Special Operations community that allow a team to remain flexible, and have the capability to train across all functions within their own units.⁵⁸

The RAND Study, *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances*, contends that building of sustainment capabilities correlates with long-term effectiveness of partner forces.⁵⁹ It suggests that sustainment considerations are highly correlated with long-term effectiveness in twenty-nine cases studied.⁶⁰ Whether building sustainment capacity involves building separate logistics capability or establishing a funding stream to expand on an already existing capability, evidence suggests that effective capacity building involves sustainment. The best way to build this capacity is to train the sustainment providers with a partner nation military so they can sustain their own force.

SOLUTION: SCEPS AND ASSESSMENTS THAT BETTER DEFINE CAPABILITIES AND CAPACITY OF THE PARTNER NATION

SCEPS are the starting point for training a partner nation military security forces. The SCEP is a great tool, but makes the process easy and dilutes the real issues if a team only goes by what the SCEP says. The SCEPs based around partner nation established missions allow for some deviation; however, TSC teams must ensure if they deviate from the SCEP, that the training has received proper authorization and approval through appropriate channels as necessary.⁶¹ As shown in Figure 5, the missions are vague and do not go into much detail; therefore, it is paramount for the TSC teams to utilize ingenuity and think about all of the requirements that support each one of the missions listed. TSC teams with individuals possessing ingenuity, adaptability, courage, and persistence, highlight the entire training effort with FSFs.⁶²

It is highly important for training teams to give detailed information about the training, and honest assessments and feedback on the partner nation's ability to conduct their missions. After Action Reports (AARs) can be a burden. Completion of AARs happens in the first half of a

deployment, and at the end of a deployment, and takes time away from operations. However, if done correctly, writing an AAR is simple, if a compilation of notes taken throughout the deployment feed the AAR. These notes should represent issues, good or bad, that have arisen, and need more training or sustainment for the partner military to be proficient in their jobs. AARs should assess all areas, to include TSC outside of infantry related mil-to-mil training. AARs should to assess operations conducted between Marines and partner military personnel to include construction missions or intelligence gathering missions that represent functional areas of a partner's military outside of the infantry.

Assessments following TSC missions go straight to the relevant MARFOR. MARFORs should send assessments to MCSCG as well since they evaluate the Marine Corps' security cooperation programs and activities to include assessments, and offer advisory support.⁶³ Furthermore, the SCEPs belong to the MARFORs once completed by MCSCG; however, SCEPs are a three to five-year plan, and require constant tracking. Regional MARFOR desk officers should remain cognizant of all engagements taking place in their region, and know what training is taking place between a TSC team and a partner military unit. Desk officers who communicate and check up on training events, serve the TSC teams the best, and can serve as a good source of counsel while offering sage guidance to a TSC team OIC. MARFORs can assume that all things are going well, through daily situation reports, until a large problem occurs that requires the MARFOR's attention, and desk officer engagement can mitigate problems.

As seen previously in Figure 5, which is the SCEP concept for the El Salvador BIM, USSOUTHCOM, MARFORSOUTH, and the US Embassy in El Salvador all have a stake in what training takes place between the Marine Corps and the BIM. These FSF country missions

are already established; however, the MARFOR planners use this information to identify the priorities and objectives for each mission. The MARFOR's priorities and objectives, consider the equities of the country team and the partner nation. In the case of SPMAGTF-SC 2015, the four TSC teams gave honest and direct feedback on issues and concerns outside of the FSF established missions, due to the TSC team makeup. The country team found the feedback enlightening since it went into more depth than previous assessments conducted on the same FSFs.

CONCLUSION

*"Our partners in Central America constantly fight for their lives against the gangs and drug cartels, it's sad and messy, and we owe them the best we have to offer every day."*⁶⁴

-BGen Eric Smith, Commander, MARFORSOUTH, August 2015

The Marine Corps provides a unique contribution to the DOD's security cooperation activities. The Marine Corps claims to be "the partner of choice for foreign security forces," and they embrace their claim with pride.⁶⁵ The Marine Corps feels this way because of their relatively small size being similar to that of the militaries they train and advise, as well as a positive legacy of working with international partners that is known world-wide.⁶⁶ A positive legacy does exist, but if the Marine Corps does not expand its focus of building partner capacity across all warfighting functions, it may very well sell its partners short, and lose the ability to claim that they are truly the partner of choice.

To remain the partner of choice, the Marine Corps must continue to invest in MCSCG and ensure that it remains manned, trained, and equipped accordingly in order to meet its mission of ensuring the unity of effort in building partner capacity that facilitates the Marine Corps' support to GCC objectives. The US Army has a seventh warfighting function entitled *Engagement*, and maybe it is time for the Marine Corps to follow suit, not to be like the Army, but to ensure

the engagements are properly focused and receive the amount of attention they require. MCSCG has the motto of “victory through partnership.” Victory is more satisfying if delivered in full. The Marine Corps owes this to their partners and the citizens of the US whose security interests are also a part of building partner capacity.

It is in the best interest of the United States to have strong and capable partners, and the Marine Corps seeks to maintain a key role in building partner capacity for years to come. Building partner capacity is most effective when the capacity built meets the needs of both the US and its partners. Furthermore, if the US focuses on efficiency by forming multi-functional security cooperation teams that encompass Marines from all warfighting functions, it will maximize the effectiveness of a partner nation military while minimizing costs for continued security cooperation. One agency for the Marine Corps cannot build capacity, and assess partner nation militaries, but they facilitate the ability for TSC teams to do so by conducting initial assessments for execution. It is incumbent that the TSC teams conducting the training to foreign security forces properly train foreign security forces across all warfighting functions and truly build partner capacity. Concurrently, TSC teams must assess across all warfighting functions, and provide viable solutions and attainable recommendations to rectify capability gaps across all warfighting functions. This step in the right direction will keep the Marine Corps as the partner of choice, and ensure TSC teams are truly building partner capacity writ large.

APPENDIX: MARINE CORPS ROLE AND SOURCING FOR BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

The Marine Corps' 2012 Security Cooperation report titled *Forward Deployed and Forward Engaged: The Marine Corps Approach to 21st Century Security Cooperation* illustrates the importance of security cooperation to the Marine Corps. In this document it states, "The Marine Corps commitment to security cooperation is steadfast, rooted in the need to limit US involvement in conflict while being postured to respond when necessary, strengthened by our legacy of working with foreign militaries, and enabled by an institutional investment in training and educating Marines who are not only fighters, but also trainers, mentors, and advisors."⁶⁷ In the *United States Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan 2012-2020*, General Amos, the 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps, tasked regional component commands to "provide support to partner nations, regional governments, and international organizations through theater security cooperation activities in support of combatant commander's theater campaign plans."⁶⁸ In the 2016 *Marine Corps Operating Concept* (MOC), the 37th and current Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert Neller laid out critical tasks in relation to building partner capacity. These specified tasks of building partner capacity include promoting interoperability; emphasizing task-organized, general-purpose forces for security cooperation; improving regional understanding, developing a total force (reserve and active forces) approach to supporting and sourcing steady-state operations, security cooperation activities, and contingency response mission.⁶⁹ The Marine Corps's component role in GCC planning must represent MARFOR component interests, while representing the Marine Corps's service goals, interests, capability, and capacity in order to shape GCC's tasks to the MARFOR that ensure GCC understanding of component building partner capacity/security cooperation efforts and results.

As of January 2017, there were roughly 1,300 Marines participating in theater security cooperation missions and building partner capacity throughout the globe, primarily in Europe, Africa, and Central America. Those Marines were part of one of several units that the Marine Corps utilizes to conduct security cooperation to include Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force - USAFRICOM (SPMAGTF-AF), SPMAGTF - USSOUTHCOM (SPMAGTF-SC), Black Sea Rotational Force (BSRF), and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU).⁷⁰

The process of selection by which Marine Corps units receive specific security cooperation missions is quite complex. Planning often occurs well-ahead of time in order to ensure ample time for planning to include pre-deployment site surveys, composite of the force, pre-deployment training and certification, and finally the deployment itself. The assignment process looks at several considerations: capability required to train partner forces, availability of Marine forces, availability of funding, requirement priority, and risk to source certain units. Of the five listed considerations, the final consideration, risk to source, is the most crucial. It looks at the impacts to specific units in the following areas: Service Title 10 man, train, and equip responsibilities; impact on Marine Corps ability to meet force/capability requirements mandated by the National Defense and Military Strategies; impact on supporting GCC's ability to conduct full range of military operations within the assigned AOR; and impact to supported GCC's ability to execute Operations Plans (OPLANs), Contingency Plans (CONPLANs), or Theater Campaign Plan (TCP).⁷¹




Figure 6: Force Allocation Process – Global Force Management
Source: Security Cooperation Planners Course, MCSCG

Before the Marine Corps receives a specific mission, many other steps take place in the force allocation process (see Figure 6 above).⁷² All force allocation begins with the GCC's submission of a request for forces (RFF) to the CJCS. The CJCS apportions forces to GCCs based on SecDef's contingency planning guidance in regards to *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF), OPLANs, CONPLANs, and TCPs. Once GCC requirements receive validation, and joint force coordination takes place, the service components receive them for sourcing review and coordination. The service components recommend their sourcing solution/recommendation back to CJCS, and validation of sourcing receives endorsement. This endorsement feeds the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). Once published, all service chiefs and GCC's receive the updates to the GFMAP.

Upon completion of the GFMAP, each service's headquarters receives an updated copy. The command that allocates forces for the Marine Corps is Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM). MARFORCOM executes Marine Corps force generation actions across the active and reserve components in provisioning of joint capable Marine Corps forces, and directs deployment planning and execution of service-retained operating forces in support of Combatant Commander (CCDR) and service requirements.⁷³ For security cooperation missions,

MARFORCOM attempts to utilize forces with appropriate training and experience and meet the Commandant's intent of a "single, supportable, sourcing recommendation/solution."⁷⁴

MARFORCOM looks to attain a unified Marine Corps response that meets the Commandant's intent for sourcing by looking at the capability, capacity, and availability of units.

MARFORCOM conducts an analysis in determining supportability and sustainability in coordination with force deployment and dwell rations. Most of the work to source units for missions takes place at a quarterly conference called the Force Synchronization Conference, as outlined in Figure 7 below.⁷⁵ The Force Synchronization Conference serves as the coordinated venue for force sourcing solutions. Representatives from all major subordinate commands have their fair say into what missions they may want, and what missions they do not want to support or cannot support.




Figure 7: USMC Sourcing Process – Global Force Management
Source: Security Cooperation Planners Course, Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group

Some units get the missions they want; others do not. Issues and influences brought to the table at the Force Synchronization Conference may cause contentious debate. Some influences may be

a personal preference of a MARFOR, other known or anticipated requirements, funding, reserve component activation authority, and force availability. Many commands want the most prominent missions associated with overseas deployments; however, not all units get this opportunity. In addition, the right unit may not receive the mission, but that particular unit may fit the commander's intent of the Commandant to have a single sourcing solution.⁷⁶ Once MARFORCOM identifies an appropriate unit for a specific mission, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) validates and approves the unit sourced. HQMC routes this to the CJCS for DOD validation and approval, and addition into the GFMAP. Once added to the GFMAP, DOD publishes orders. GCCs receive this information and route their orders to the assigned major subordinate commands, which in turn identify their internal sourcing solution.

NOTES

-
- ¹ Harry R. Yarger, *Building Partner Capacity*, Joint Special Operations University (MacDill Air Force Base, February 2015) 81. https://www.socom.mil/JSOU/JSOUPublications/JSOU15-1_Yarger_BPC_FINAL.pdf.
- ² US Department of Defense, *Joint operations Across the Range of Military Operations*, JP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011) V-10. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf.
- ³ Headquarters US Army, *Unified Land Operations*, ADRP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Army, May 16, 2012) 3-2. https://smamedia.army.mil/Institution/ALC/SSD_II/Module_IV/W308_Analyze_Terrain_FOUO/sco/docs/adrp3_0.pdf.
- ⁴ Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, MCWP 5-1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, August 24, 2010) B-1. <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/MCWP%205-1.pdf>.
- ⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶ Author's notes from SPMAGTF-SC Final Planning Conference, deployment confirmation brief, USSOUTHCOM, Miami, FL, April 30, 2015.
- ⁷ Kathleen J. McInnis, and Nathan J. Lucas. *What is "Building Partner Capacity?" Issues for Congress*, CRS Report for Congress R44313 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 18, 2015), 1, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf>.
- ⁸ US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, (Washington, DC, March 4, 2014). http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.
- ⁹ Kathleen J. McInnis, and Nathan J. Lucas, *What is "Building Partner Capacity?" Issues for Congress*, CRS Report for Congress R44313 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 18, 2015), 5, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf>.
- ¹⁰ Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, Stephanie Young, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Joe Hogler, and Christine Leah, *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013) 8. <http://www.rand.org>.
- ¹¹ US Department of Defense, *Foreign Internal Defense*, JP 3-22 (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 11, 2010) I-10. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_22.pdf.
- ¹² Ibid, I-10.
- ¹³ Kathleen J. McInnis, and Nathan J. Lucas. *What is "Building Partner Capacity?" Issues for Congress*, CRS Report for Congress R44313 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 18, 2015), 1, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf>.
- ¹⁴ Headquarters US Army, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, FM 3-22 (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Army, January, 2013). <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-22.pdf>.
- ¹⁵ Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Security Cooperation Training and Readiness Manual*, NAVMC 3500.59B (Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, October 14, 2014) 2-2. <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/NAVMC%203500.59B.pdf>.
- ¹⁶ Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, *Security Cooperation Planning*, PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course (Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2015).
- ¹⁷ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, DC, February, 2015) 7-9, 27. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.
- ¹⁸ US Department of Defense, *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC, January, 2012) 3. http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.

-
- ¹⁹ US Department of Defense. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015* (Washington, DC, June, 2015) 9. http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.
- ²⁰ Headquarters US Army, *Security Force Assistance*, FM 3-07.1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Army, May 1, 2009) 1-2. <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/FM3071.pdf>.
- ²¹ Ibid, 1-3.
- ²² US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC, March 4, 2014) V. http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.
- ²³ Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group website, <http://www.mcscg.marines.mil/>.
- ²⁴ Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, *Command Brief*, PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course (Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Jul, 2016) 4.
- ²⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁶ Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, *Security Cooperation Planning II*, PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course (Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2015) 4.
- ²⁷ Ibid, 5.
- ²⁸ Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, *Security Cooperation Planning and Execution Process Fundamentals*, PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course (Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2016) 1.
- ²⁹ Ibid, 1.
- ³⁰ Ibid, 1.
- ³¹ Ibid, 1.
- ³² Ibid, 2.
- ³³ Ibid, 2.
- ³⁴ LtCol John Vazquez, United States Marine Corps, Officer-in-Charge of the NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM Coordination Liaison Assessment and Training Section at the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, email interview with author, 23 January 2017.
- ³⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ T. X. Hammes, "Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq," in *Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War* (Washington, DC: Center for Complex Operations, January, 2015) 323-335. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/lessons-encountered/lessons-encountered_Ch4.pdf.
- ³⁹ Ibid, 334.
- ⁴⁰ US Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa, *Campaign Plan 2016-2020: Theater Crisis and Contingency Response Forces in Readiness* (HQ US Marine Forces Europe and Africa, Stuttgart, Germany, June 2016) 38.
- ⁴¹ US Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa, *Campaign Plan 2016-2020: Theater Crisis and Contingency Response Forces in Readiness* (HQ US Marine Forces Europe and Africa, Stuttgart, Germany, June 2016) 39.
- ⁴² US Marine Corps Forces South, *Campaign Plan 2014-2019: Theater Crisis and Contingency Response Forces in Readiness* (HQ US Marine Forces South, Miami, Florida, June 2014) 4.
- ⁴³ Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, *Security Cooperation Engagement Plan for El Sal-*

vador's Batallón de Infantería de Marina, PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course (Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2014) 10-12.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 6-7.

⁴⁵ Author's notes from SPMAGTF-SC deployment, while serving as the Operation Officer and GCE OIC who received Situation Reports in regards to this type of information daily.

⁴⁶ Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, *Security Cooperation Engagement Plan for Compagnies Fusilier Marin Commandos (COFUMACO)*, PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course (Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2015) 4-5.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 10-12.

⁴⁸ Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, *Security Cooperation Engagement Plan for Belize Defence Force (BDF) and Belize Coast Guard (BCG)*, PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course (Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2015) 2.

⁴⁹ Author's notes and experience building the C2 training for TRADEWINDS 2015.

⁵⁰ Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, *Security Cooperation Engagement Plan for El Salvador's Batallón de Infantería de Marina*, PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course (Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2014) 10-12.

⁵¹ Author's notes from MARFORSOUTH Security Cooperation Team 15.1 after action/turnover notes

⁵² LtCol John Vazquez, United States Marine Corps, Officer-in-Charge of the NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM Coordination Liaison Assessment and Training Section at the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, email interview with author, 23 January 2017.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Author's notes from SPMAGTF-SC 2015 deployment.

⁵⁵ US Department of Defense, *Section 1206 Global Train-and-Equip Authority*, Instruction 5111.19, July 26, 2011, 3, <https://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/511119p.pdf>.

⁵⁶ Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, *Security Cooperation Engagement Plan for El Salvador's Batallón de Infantería de Marina*, PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course (Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2014) 10-12.

⁵⁷ Yarger, *Building Partner Capacity*, 82.

⁵⁸ Headquarters US Army, *Security Force Assistance*, FM 3-07.1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Army, May 1, 2009) 1-3. <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/FM3071.pdf>.

⁵⁹ Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, Stephanie Young, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Joe Hogler, and Christine Leah, *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013). <http://www.rand.org>.

⁶⁰ Ibid, xx.

⁶¹ US Department of Defense, *Section 1206 Global Train-and-Equip Authority*, Instruction 5111.19, July 26, 2011, 3, <https://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/511119p.pdf>.

⁶² T. X. Hammes, "Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq," in *Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War* (Washington, DC: Center for Complex Operations, January, 2015) 323-335. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/lessons-encountered/lessons-encountered_Ch4.pdf.

⁶³ Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Forward Deployed and Forward Engaged: The Marine Corps Approach to 21st Century Security Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 2013) 11.

⁶⁴ Author's notes from conversation with BGen Smith.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 9.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 2.

⁶⁷ Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Service Campaign Plan 2014-2022*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 2014.

<https://marinecorpsconceptsandprograms.com/sites/default/files/files/United%20States%20Marine%20Corps%20Service%20Campaign%20Plan%202014-2022.pdf>.

⁶⁸ Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Forward Deployed and Forward Engaged: The Marine Corps Approach to 21st Century Security Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 2013) 1.

<http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/138/Docs/PL/PLU/2012%20USMC%20Security%20Cooperation%20Narrative.pdf>.

⁶⁹ Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Operating Concept* (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, September 2016) 12-18. <https://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Marine-Corps-Operating-Concept-MOC-long-version-media.pdf>.

⁷⁰ Marine Corps Current Operations Brief 1 December 2016.

⁷¹ Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, *Global Force Management and USMC Force Sourcing Process*, PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course (Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2016) 17.

⁷² Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, *Global Force Management and USMC Force Sourcing Process*, PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course (Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2016) 11.

⁷³ Marine Forces Command mission Statement, <http://www.marforcom.marines.mil/>.

⁷⁴ Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, *Global Force Management and USMC Force Sourcing Process*, PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course (Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2016) 26.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Author's notes from past Force Synchronization Conferences.

Bibliography

- Allison, Darren G. "SPMAGTF of the Future: Creating a Permanent Regionally based Special Purpose MAGTF-Security Cooperation Headquarters." Master's thesis, Marine Corps University, 2013. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA601557>.
- Center for Naval Analysis. *Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces in Africa: Development, Performance, and Challenges*. November 2014. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/>.
- Gordon, Thomas J., LtCol and Marshall Hand Capt. "The Black Sea Rotational Force." *Marine Corps Gazette*, 95, no. 2 (Feb 2011): 59-63. <http://search.proquest.com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/865650604?accountid=14746>.
- Grafton, Jeffrey S., ed. *The Management of Security Cooperation*. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 2013.
- Hammes, T. X. "Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq," in *Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War*. Washington, DC: Center for Complex Operations, January, 2105. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/lessons-encountered/lessons-encountered_Ch4.pdf.
- Hansen, John and Michael Hartmayer. "Security Cooperation in Support of Theater Strategy." *Military Review*, Jan-Feb, 2013.
- Headquarters US Army. *Army Support to Security Cooperation*. FM 3-22. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Army, January, 2013. <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-22.pdf>.
- Headquarters US Army. *Security Force Assistance*. FM 3-07.1. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Army, May 1, 2009. <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/FM3071.pdf>.
- Headquarters US Army. *Unified Land Operations*. ADRP 3-0. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Army, May 16, 2012. https://smamedia.army.mil/Institution/ALC/SSD_II/Module_IV/W308_Analyze_Terrain_FOUO/sco/docs/adrp3_0.pdf.
- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *36th Commandant's Planning Guidance, Innovate, Adapt, Win*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, January 23, 2015. http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/2015CPG_Color.pdf.
- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *37th Commandant's FRAGO 01/2016: Advance to Contact*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, January 19, 2016. <http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC%20FRAGO%2001%2019JAN16.pdf>.

- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Forward Deployed and Forward Engaged: The Marine Corps Approach to 21st Century Security Cooperation*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 2013. <http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/138/Docs/PL/PLU/2012%20USMC%20Security%20Cooperation%20Narrative.pdf>.
- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Operating Concept*. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, September 2016. <https://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Marine-Corps-Operating-Concept-MOC-long-version-media.pdf>.
- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Operations*. MCDP 1-0. Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, August 9, 2011. <https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/signpubs/d10.pdf>.
- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Planning Process*. MCWP 5-1. Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, August 24, 2010. <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/MCWP%205-1.pdf>.
- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Security Cooperation*. MCO 5710.6C. Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, June 24, 2014. <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/MCO%205710.6C.pdf>.
- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Security Cooperation*. MCIP 3-33.03. Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, July 21, 2015. <https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/signpubs/d10.pdf>.
- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Security Cooperation Training and Readiness Manual*. NAVMC 3500.59B. Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, October 14, 2014. <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/NAVMC%203500.59B.pdf>.
- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Service Campaign Plan 2014-2022*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 2014. <https://marinecorpsconceptsandprograms.com/sites/default/files/files/United%20States%20Marine%20Corps%20Service%20Campaign%20Plan%202014-2022.pdf>.
- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Small Wars Manual*. FMFRP 12-15. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 1990. <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/FMFRP%201215%20%20Small%20Wars%20Manual.pdf>.
- Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Warfighting*. MCDP 1. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1997. <https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/signpubs/mcdp1.pdf>.
- Kinner, Scott. "A 'Custom-Built' Corps." *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 140, no. 11 (Nov 2014, 2014): 18-23. <http://search.proquest.com/lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/1625807177?accountid=14746>.

- Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group. *Campaign and Supporting Plans*. PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course. Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2015.
- Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group. *Command Brief*. PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course. Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Jul, 2016.
- Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group. *Global Force Management and USMC Force Sourcing Process*. PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course. Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2016.
- Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group. *National Level Planning Documents*. PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course. Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2015.
- Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group. *Security Cooperation Engagement Plan for Belize Defence Force (BDF) and Belize Coast Guard (BCG)*. PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course. Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2015.
- Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group. *Security Cooperation Engagement Plan for Compagnies Fusilier Marin Commandos (COFUMACO)*. PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course. Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2015.
- Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group. *Security Cooperation Engagement Plan for El Salvador's Batallón de Infantería de Marina*. PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course. Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2014.
- Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group. *Security Cooperation Planning*. PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course. Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2015.
- Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group. *Security Cooperation Planning II*. PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course. Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2015.
- Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group. *Security Cooperation Programs and Authorities – Title 10 and 22 USC*. PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course. Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2015.
- Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group. *Security Cooperation Organization - Country team*. PowerPoint Presentation, Security Cooperation Planners Course. Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Ft. Story, VA, Mar, 2015.

- Moroney, Jennifer D. P., David E. Thaler, and Joe Hogler. *Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013. <http://www.rand.org>.
- Paul, Christopher, Brain Gordon, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Lisa Saum-Manning, Beth Grill, Colin P. Clarke, Heather Peterson. *A Building Partner Capacity Assessment Framework*. RAND Report for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2015. <http://www.rand.org>.
- Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, Stephanie Young, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Joe Hogler, and Christine Leah. *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013. <http://www.rand.org>.
- Paul, Christopher, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Beth Grill, Colin P. Clarke, Lisa Saum-Manning, Heather Peterson, and Brain Gordon. *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity in Challenging Contexts?* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015. <http://www.rand.org>.
- Rand, D. H. and S. Tankel. *Security Cooperation & Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment*. Center for New American Security. Washington, DC: August 2015. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280741895_Security_Cooperation_and_Assistance_Rethinking_the_Return_on_Investment.
- The White House. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC, February, 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.
- The White House. *Security Sector Assistance*. Presidential Policy Directive-23. Washington, DC, April 5, 2013. <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/index.html>.
- US Department of Defense. *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. JP 1. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013. https://cdet.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/orgs/MCUCSCWFAY15-16/Joint%20and%20Marine%20Corps%20Operations%20%285100%29/5102%20Joint%20Force%20Theory%2C%20Foundations%20and%20Development/Required%20Reading/JP%201_2013.pdf.
- US Department of Defense. *Foreign Internal Defense*. JP 3-22. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 11, 2010. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_22.pdf.
- US Department of Defense. *Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations*. JP 3-0. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf.

- US Department of Defense. *Section 1206 Global Train-and-Equip Authority*. Instruction 5111.19, July 26, 2011. <https://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/511119p.pdf>.
- US Department of Defense. *Stability*. JP 3-07. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 3, 2016. http://dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf.
- US Department of Defense. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015*. Washington, DC, June, 2015. http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.
- US Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*. Washington, DC, March 4, 2014. http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.
- US Department of Defense. *Security Force Assistance Lexicon Framework*. Washington, DC, November 1, 2012. http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2012_SFA_Lexicon_Framework.pdf.
- US Department of Defense. *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*. Washington, DC, January, 2012. http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.
- US Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa. *Campaign Plan 2015-2018: Theater Crisis Response Forces in Readiness*. HQ US Marine Forces Europe and Africa, Stuttgart, Germany, March 17, 2015.
- US Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa. *Campaign Plan 2016-2020: Theater Crisis and Contingency Response Forces in Readiness*. HQ US Marine Forces Europe and Africa, Stuttgart, Germany, June 2016.
- US Marine Corps Forces South. *Campaign Plan 2014-2019: Theater Crisis and Contingency Response Forces in Readiness*. HQ US Marine Forces South, Miami, Florida, June 2014.
- US Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. *Special Purpose Marine Air - Ground Task Force-Crisis Response-Central Command Campaign Plan 2014-2015*. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 2015. https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/index.cfm?disp=servefile.cfm&file-Type=CDR&ID=32265&repositoryDirectory=MCCLL_REPORTS.
- US Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. *Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-South Predeployment Training Program After Action Report*. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, August 5, 2015. <https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/index.cfm?disp=servefile.cfm&fileType=CDR&ID=32074&repositoryDirectory=AARS>.
- Yarger, Harry R. *Building Partner Capacity*. Joint Special Operations University, MacDill Air

Force Base, February 2015. https://www.socom.mil/JSOU/JSOUPublications/JSOU15-1_Yarger_BPC_FINAL.pdf.