

**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.  
**PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 05-01-2017	<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Master's Thesis	<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> Sep 2016 -Apr 2017
--	--	---

<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Unresolved Dilemma of Georgia's security architecture	<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b> N/A
	<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b> N/A
	<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b> N/A

<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Davitadze, Lasha, Lieutenant Colonel, Georgian Armed Forces	<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b> N/A
	<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b> N/A
	<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b> N/A

<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068	<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b> N/A
--	--

<b>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>	<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b> N/A
	<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b> N/A

**12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**  
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.

**13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

**14. ABSTRACT**  
The Georgian government claims to establish and maintain a foreign policy that removes Georgia from the Russian sphere of influence. Therefore, Tbilisi aims to create a security system that guarantees the further development of Georgian statehood. However, the more Georgia seeks to emphasize its desire to join NATO, the greater is the pressure from Moscow on Tbilisi. Thus, from the security perspective, Georgia is vulnerable more than ever before. In addition, there is no consensus among NATO members on potential membership of Georgia in the alliance. In fact, Georgia is knocking on a closed door. The question arises whether or not NATO membership can guarantee the security of the small of Georgia.

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> UU	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 37	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b> USMC Command and Staff College
<b>a. REPORT</b> Unclass	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> Unclass	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> Unclass			<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)</b> (708) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

United States Marine Corps  
Command and Staff College  
Marine Corps University  
2076 South Street  
Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

---

---

TITLE

UNRESOLVED DILEMMA OF GEORGIA'S SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Lasha Davitadze, Georgian Armed Forces

AY 16-17

---

---

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member:

Approved:

Date:

*[Signature]* Anne Louise Antonoff  
*[Signature]*  
5/4/17

Oral Defense Committee Member:

Approved:

Date:

*[Signature]* Benjamin Jensen  
*[Signature]*  
3/4/17

## DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE, THE GEORGIAN ARMED FORCES, OR ANY OTHER US OR GEORGIAN GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

*Table of Contents*

DISCLAIMER .....	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	iii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	vi
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE.....	vii
I. INTRODUCTION .....	1
II. OPTIONS OF ALIGNMENT .....	5
III. DISAGREEMENT WITH NATO ABOUT GEORGIA’S ATLANTIC INTEGRATION .....	10
IV. PROBABILITY OF THE PRAGMATIC CHANGE IN THE GEORGIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY .....	13
V. “IDENTITY” VS “REALPOLITIK” .....	21
VI. THE ADVANTAGES OF STABILIZED RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW .....	24
VII. ALTERNATIVE TO NATO.....	27
VIII. CONCLUSION .....	31
CITATIONS AND FOOTNOTES .....	36
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	39

## Executive Summary

**Title:** Unresolved Dilemma of Georgia's Security Architecture.

**Author:** Lt.Col. Lasha Davitadze

**Thesis:** In order to establish an efficient security architecture, Georgia should pursue a strategy of limited alignment and create a new security structure based on a *Realpolitik* approach. The lack of clear consensus within NATO about Georgia's Atlantic integration and increased security threats from the Russian Federation caused by Georgia's potential membership in NATO are the main barriers hampering Georgia's path towards the Atlantic integration. At the same time, the pragmatic change in the Georgian foreign and security policy could result in stabilized relations with Russia and the benefits associated with that. Also, the creation of a regional collective security system could be considered as an additional option to ensure Georgia has an effective security system.

**Discussion:** As a small state in an unstable environment, bordering the Russian Federation, the Republic of Georgia faces significant external security challenges. From the moment of declaration of independence until now, Georgia has been struggling to solve its problems of ensuring national security and guaranteeing territorial integrity. The Georgian government claims to establish and maintain a foreign policy that removes Georgia from the Russian sphere of influence. Therefore, Tbilisi aims to create a security system that guarantees the further development of Georgian statehood and the security of its citizens. Georgia's desire to establish a secure and stable environment is based on the perception that only a western alignment can guarantee its future independence and prosperity. Therefore, Georgia views membership in NATO as a crucial factor to its national security.

However, the enlargement of NATO has always been an irritation for Moscow. The more Georgia seeks to emphasize its desire to join NATO and accordingly present itself as a part of Euro-Atlantic security architecture, rather than a "post-Soviet" state, the greater is the pressure and perceived threat from Moscow regarding the security and stability in Georgia. From the security perspective, Georgia is vulnerable more than ever before. In addition to that, there is no consensus among NATO members on potential membership of Georgia in the alliance. In fact, Georgia is knocking on a closed door and it is still ambiguous whether Georgia will ever get collective defense guarantees from NATO. For this reason, the question arises whether or not NATO membership can guarantee the security of the small state of Georgia.

In addition, potential membership in the alliance is not feasible for Georgia's security architecture. Even if the ruling political elite in Tbilisi still believes that NATO membership might become a reality in the near future, a pragmatic analysis of the August war in 2008 should correct any misunderstanding about how realistic the prospect of NATO integration is. In fact, a pragmatic approach and a realistic view of the current situation explicitly reveal the ineffectiveness of Georgia's choice to gain security through the membership in NATO.

**Conclusion:** Thus, for the stable and secure development of the country, the government in Tbilisi should make dispassionate judgments regarding the security policy. In particular, the Georgian government needs to adjust its security policy to a more realistic approach. Considering the fact that there is no sign of any upcoming successes regarding the NATO-Georgian relationship, this relation has obviously exhausted its potential. The earlier Tbilisi will announce that membership in NATO is not a priority anymore, the greater is the chance to reach an agreement with Moscow regarding the dilemma of ensuring Georgia with an effective security architecture. Hence, in order to establish an efficient security system, Georgia must pursue a strategy of limited alignment and create a new security structure based on the *Realpolitik* approach.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to recognize the efforts of the people who enabled this paper. First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere thanks to Dr. Anne Louise Antonoff, Professor of Military History at the Marine Corps University, my mentor through this process. Her mentorship and advices were crucial in producing this paper and I thank her for all the efforts spent on her mentorship.

I also would like to express my recognition to Dr. Benjamin M. Jensen, Professor of International Relations at the Marine Corps University. I want to thank him for his recommendations and additional guidance regarding my paper.

Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my family for their love and support. Their understanding, patience, encouragement, and friendship were the source of my inspiration during this process.

**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

**FORM APPROVED - - - OMB NO. 0704-0188**

PUBLIC REPORTING BURDEN FOR THIS COLLECTION OF INFORMATION IS ESTIMATED TO AVERAGE 1 HOUR PER RESPONSE, INCLUDING THE TIME FOR REVIEWING INSTRUCTIONS, SEARCHING EXISTING DATA SOURCES, GATHERING AND MAINTAINING THE DATA NEEDED, AND COMPLETING AND REVIEWING THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION. SEND COMMENTS REGARDING THIS BURDEN ESTIMATE OR ANY OTHER ASPECT OF THIS COLLECTION OF INFORMATION, INCLUDING SUGGESTIONS FOR REDUCING THIS BURDEN, TO WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES, DIRECTORATE FOR INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND REPORTS, 1215 JEFFERSON DAVIS HIGHWAY, SUITE 1204, ARLINGTON, VA 22202-4302, AND TO THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (0704-0188) WASHINGTON, DC 20503

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (LEAVE BLANK)	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED <b>STUDENT RESEARCH PAPER</b>
----------------------------------	----------------	---

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Unresolved Dilemma of Georgia's security architecture</b>	5. FUNDING NUMBERS <b>N/A</b>
---	----------------------------------

6. AUTHOR(S) <b>Lt.Col. Lasha Davitadze</b>	
--	--

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>USMC COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 2076 SOUTH STREET, MCCDC, QUANTICO, VA 22134-5068</b>	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER <b>NONE</b>
---	---

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>SAME AS #7.</b>	10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER: <b>NONE</b>
---	--

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES <b>NONE</b>
--

12A. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>NO RESTRICTIONS</b>	12B. DISTRIBUTION CODE <b>N/A</b>
--	--------------------------------------

**ABSTRACT (MAXIMUM 200 WORDS)**  
 As a small state, the Republic of Georgia faces significant external security challenges. Georgia has been struggling to ensure its national security. The Georgian government claims to establish and maintain a foreign policy that removes Georgia from the Russian sphere of influence. Therefore, Tbilisi aims to create a security system that guarantees the further development of Georgian statehood. However, the enlargement of NATO has always been an irritation for Moscow. The more Georgia seeks to emphasize its desire to join NATO, the greater is the pressure from Moscow on Tbilisi. Thus, from the security perspective, Georgia is vulnerable more than ever before. In addition, there is no consensus among NATO members on potential membership of Georgia in the alliance. In fact, Georgia is knocking on a closed door and it is still ambiguous whether Georgia will ever get collective defense guarantees from NATO. For this reason, the question arises whether or not NATO membership can guarantee the security of the small state of Georgia.

14. SUBJECT TERMS (KEY WORDS ON WHICH TO PERFORM SEARCH) <b>Georgia's security architecture, Georgia, Georgia's Atlantic integration, Georgia's future, Security, Limited alignment, Security policy, Alternative to NATO, Change in Georgia's security policy.</b>	15. NUMBER OF PAGES:
	16. PRICE CODE: <b>N/A</b>

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT <b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE: <b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT <b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
--	--	--	----------------------------

“It is the strong will of the citizens of Georgia to establish a democratic order, economic freedom, a social state governed by the rule of law, to ensure universal human rights and freedoms and to strengthen the state independence and peaceful co-existence with other nations...”

Preamble to the Constitution of Georgia

## **I. Introduction**

As a small state in an unstable environment, bordering the Russian Federation, the Republic of Georgia faces significant external security challenges. Although Georgia declared its independence in 1991, the country is still considered to be a sphere of influence of Russia. From the moment of declaration of independence until now, Georgia has been struggling to solve its problems of ensuring national security and guaranteeing territorial integrity. Furthermore, due to the aggressive Russian policy towards Georgia, the tension between the two countries is very high, and as a result, Russia occupies 20% of Georgian land.

In order to mitigate the risk of being a victim of its aggressive neighbor, and to obtain stability in the country, the Georgian government claims to establish and to maintain a foreign policy that removes Georgia from the Russian sphere of influence. Tbilisi aims to create a security system that guarantees the further development of Georgian statehood and the security of its citizens. Consequently, the foreign policy should encourage the development of Georgia as a prosperous, democratic state with western values and more importantly, under the protection of the Atlantic security umbrella, as it is stated in the National Security Concept (NSC) of Georgia.<sup>1</sup> Hence, the integration into the Euro-Atlantic community was declared as a key priority for the Georgian security architecture.

In fact, Georgia’s desire to establish a secure and stable environment is based on the perception that only a western alignment can guarantee its future independence and prosperity.

Furthermore, the national strategic narrative identifies Georgia as a European state and accordingly part of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, Georgia views membership in NATO as a crucial factor to its national security. In other words, achieving membership in NATO has been central for Georgia's foreign and security policy-makers. In order to affirm its desire and the ability to be not only a security consumer but also a security provider country as well, Georgian Armed Forces are successfully engaged in numerous NATO-led military operations. In principle, Georgia's desire to join NATO and its contribution to the security of the North Atlantic area has brought some accomplishment. The statement issued at the Bucharest summit in 2008 to the effect that Georgia "will become a member of the alliance in the future" significantly emphasized Georgia's progress towards membership.

Tbilisi made its first attempts to establish political and military ties with NATO in 1992 by becoming a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.<sup>3</sup> In addition, Georgia became involved in a NATO-led Partnership for Peace (PFP) program in 1994.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the Georgian government was obliged to maintain a balance between Russia and the West. Considerable efforts were undertaken by Tbilisi not to irritate Russia, who had an enormous influence on separatist governments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, Russia's ability to manipulate with the conflict zones and trigger the escalation of frozen conflicts was taken into account in Tbilisi.

The period after the Rose Revolution, with Mikheil Saakashvili becoming the president of the state, seems to have been a clear watershed in Georgian politics. The newly elected government in Tbilisi disregarded the possible irritation of Moscow and announced a stark reinforcement of the efforts towards NATO membership. Tbilisi has made serious strides and it became more obvious that Georgia will strengthen its security ties with the West. As a result, in

2004 the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) was established between NATO and Georgia, which allowed the Alliance to provide more assistance regarding Georgia's integration in NATO in military, economic, and political spheres.<sup>5</sup>

However, the enlargement of NATO has always been an irritation for Moscow since the end of the Cold War. Especially the extension of NATO towards Russia's southern border and in its sphere of influence has brought the alliance into competition with Moscow. Moreover, Georgia's membership in NATO will be perceived as a threat to Russian national security. In fact, Russia's military intervention in Georgia in 2008 and its aftermath have revealed the limits of NATO's willingness and influence to engage with the states within Russia's area of influence. The decision made at Newport in 2014 not to grant Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP) clearly illustrated that NATO's relations with the Russian Federation have a higher priority and that the alliance is not willing to undertake any risk regarding its relations with Russia due to the question of Georgia's membership in NATO. In addition, the crisis in Ukraine has strongly revealed the limits of NATO and western institutions to influence events within the zone of interest of the Russian Federation, as well as the lack of unity within these organizations regarding relations with Moscow.

Georgia's potential membership in NATO is the main cause of the perceived threat from Russia. Furthermore, such an attitude plays into the hands of the leadership in Moscow and encourages them to continue coercive politics towards its neighbors. Consequently, the more Georgia seeks to emphasize its desire to join NATO and accordingly present itself as a part of Euro-Atlantic security architecture, rather than a "post-Soviet" state, the greater is the pressure and perceived threat from Moscow regarding the security and stability of Georgia. In this regard, it is not easy to find the right solution to ensure Georgia's security and stability. Tbilisi has

chosen the way of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and has met with an aggressive response from Russia. From the security perspective, Georgia is vulnerable more than ever before. In addition to that, there is no consensus among NATO members on potential membership of Georgia in the alliance. For this reason, the question arises whether or not NATO membership can guarantee the security of the small state of Georgia.

In fact, a pragmatic approach to, and realistic view of, the current situation explicitly reveals the ineffectiveness of Georgia's choice to gain security through the membership in NATO. The efforts of the Georgian government to become a NATO member will not only worsen the security environment of the state, but also will disclose different positions of the various NATO members on potential obligations in the sphere of security. Accordingly, potential membership in the alliance is not a feasible security architecture for the republic of Georgia. In order to establish an efficient security architecture, Georgia should pursue a strategy of limited alignment and create a new security structure based on a *Realpolitik* approach. The lack of clear consensus within NATO about Georgia's Atlantic integration and increased security threats from the Russian Federation caused by Georgia's potential membership in NATO are the main barriers hampering Georgia's path towards the Atlantic integration. At the same time, the pragmatic change in the Georgian foreign and security policy could result in the stabilized relations with Russia and the benefits associated with that. Furthermore, the creation of a regional collective security system could be considered as an additional option to ensure Georgia with an effective security system. In fact, all these are strong motives for the Georgian security and foreign policy-makers to review the desire of joining NATO as a means of an effective security architecture and seek alternate options to procure stability in the country.

## II. Options of alignment

One of the main attributes of a small state is its vulnerability.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, a small state can anytime become the victim of the aggression of the great power. In this regard, small is a relative term. As Neumann argues, the basic way in which size has been studied in international relations is in terms of capabilities.<sup>7</sup> According to Kevlihan a state can be small in terms of military, economic, and political power when compared to other more powerful states.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, Shodhganga claims that the course of international politics is determined by those states which possess superior military and economic capability. Thus, small states are treated as inconsequential actors in the realm of international politics.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, Shodhganga notes that a large body of small states must adjust their foreign policies to the external environment in order to overcome their presumable security challenges.<sup>10</sup>

Additionally, the current international system leaves small states less room for choice in the decision-making process. So, it is a conventional wisdom that, small states are more likely to bandwagon with threatening great powers rather than to balance against them.<sup>11</sup> An American theorist Stephen Walt, sets out two principle strategies that small states can adopt – balancing and bandwagoning. According to his principles, balancing takes place when a state aligns with other states to balance against a stronger power; bandwagoning occurs when states join an alliance with the stronger power.<sup>12</sup> Thus, balancing and bandwagoning are the tools available to a smaller state in order to respond to security threats. In addition, Elman points out that small states are more likely to bandwagon with an aggressive great power rather than balance against it.<sup>13</sup>

In contrast to Elman's point, John D. Ciorciari points out three options on how small states tend to align with the great powers in pursuit of their security interests. In his book, *The*

*Limits of Alignment*, he argues that in international relations theory, states have only three basic options: balance against the great power, bandwagon with it, or remain as neutral as possible, which means to implement a limited alignment approach.<sup>14</sup> Corciari claims that limited alignments are likely to become the norm. Moreover, small states should implement a flexible security policy and adjust their positions to the regional concerns. As he puts it, small states should “play a different game, seeking maximum great-power commitment to their security interests while trying to minimize the price of obtaining that support.”<sup>15</sup> In fact, according to this approach, states seek the greatest benefit for the smallest risk.

Ciorciari emphasizes the importance of determination of the magnitude of the risks and rewards that governments of small states are willing to take in order to pursue various alignment strategies.<sup>16</sup> Optimizing risks and rewards is the essence of small states’ alignment choices. In order to determine the suitability of each form of alignment for the Republic of Georgia, it is fair to examine those choices with respect to the risks and rewards of each option and to provide adequate analysis of the best possible alignment strategy.

To begin with, the first option is to balance against the great power. While balancing, according to Ciorciari, “countries align to pool their capabilities against a common adversary when they cannot stand safely on their own.”<sup>17</sup> Balancing mostly occurs when various small states have a common adversary and when an individual state is not in a condition to eliminate the threat on its own. Small or weak states are likely to be abandoned by the bigger and stronger allies because they are less important in terms of capabilities. Therefore, the biggest risk of a small state is the possibility to be abandoned for the sake of the interests of bigger states in the alliance. For instance, Ciorciari argues that the more dependent a small state becomes on the

alliance, the more vulnerable it will be if its stronger ally decides to leave it alone with the threats.<sup>18</sup>

In addition, balancing against a great power is dangerous for a small state because the latter runs the risk of provoking the larger state and, moreover, making an influential enemy. Ciorciari points out an explicit example of the ineffectiveness of the tight alignment. He underscores the challenges that the Georgian government faced in August 2008. In principle, the Bush administration had provided sufficient support for Georgia to claim the membership in NATO and as a result provoked Russia.<sup>19</sup> Ultimately, NATO's failure to prevent the Russian invasion of the Republic of Georgia clearly illustrates the ineffectiveness of the balancing approach. Furthermore, the famous quote of Lord Palmerston, the former prime minister of the United Kingdom, to the effect that "there are no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests," explicitly indicates that tight alignments are not reliable.<sup>20</sup>

The second option of the alignment strategy is to bandwagon with a great power. The principal risk of bandwagoning is the danger of reducing the state's autonomy and becoming a satellite state of a great power. Even though to bandwagon with a great power might provide meaningful aid in the development of a small state, on the other hand, it can make a country too dependent on such aid. As emphasized in Ciorciari's book the more tightly a small state aligns, and the more dependent it becomes on a great power, the more constrained it will be in formulating independent policies."<sup>21</sup> Hence, a small state runs a risk of diminished autonomy while pursuing the bandwagoning approach in its foreign and security policy.

Moreover, states that have obtained their independence from colonial power are less likely to seek alignments that will run the risk of undercutting their freedom again.<sup>22</sup> In the case of the Republic of Georgia, public opinion and the history of the hostile foreign policy of

Moscow towards Tbilisi will not allow the policymakers to undertake the same mistake again and to bandwagon with the Russian Federation. In addition, due to the imperial legacy, the Georgian population will resist if the government will try to bandwagon with Russia, which will definitely result in a political backlash in Tbilisi. Thus, it is fair to assume that the population of Georgia will not accept the bandwagoning approach with Russia, and therefore, it is not a suitable alignment strategy for the country.

The third and the ideal option for a small state on how to align with the great powers in pursuit of its security interests is a limited alignment approach. Indeed, Ciorciari calls it “The Middle Path,” and claims that, in this case, small states do not declare strict alliances. Moreover, they attempt to steer through the balancing and bandwagoning options and use the dispute with the great power as a source of leverage.<sup>23</sup> In other words, when a state pursues a limited alignment, it maneuvers between a rigid alignment and a true nonalignment. Limited alignment is nothing but keeping all the options open to achieve the best possible balance between risks and rewards. Ciorciari emphasizes this point by stating that small states normally prefer limited alignments, because they believe flexibility in foreign and security policy will provide the best ratio of risks and rewards under condition of the strategic uncertainty.<sup>24</sup>

Limited alignment is thus an intermediate option, ensuring adequate benefits for a small state at an acceptable price. In contrast, the high risks and variable rewards of either a balancing or a bandwagoning approach are likely to lead a small state to prefer a limited alignment strategy. From a pragmatic viewpoint, it should come as no surprise that the Republic of Georgia should be no exception and should pursue a limited alignment strategy as the only means to ensure the security of the state and its citizens. Furthermore, it is crucial for Georgia not to be aligned too tightly with NATO and the West in order not to provoke Moscow. At the same time,

it is essential to remain flexible and be involved in numerous security cooperations with as many great powers as possible.

In short, a small state like Georgia in a hostile environment and under conditions of strategic uncertainty should pursue a strategy of limited alignment in order to procure the peace and stability in the country. Moreover, it is more likely that the limited alignment will provide Tbilisi with the leverage that tight alliance usually does not. Limited alignment seems to be a more preferred strategy for Georgia, especially when a threatening power is geographically proximate and when alternative allies are unavailable.

One can well argue that, whether the state implements the limited alignment, balancing, or bandwagoning approach of foreign policy, all are part of a complex strategic bargaining process. In principle, bargaining is the process among at least two actors of arriving at a mutual agreement. According to Sechser, coercion is a process of strategic bargaining, typical of great powers. Coercive bargaining includes economic sanctions, cyber warfare, and other forms of political and economic punishment.<sup>25</sup> In order to be successful in the process of strategic bargaining and especially in the competitive setting of coercive diplomacy, a small state should not only consider its own objectives but also foresee the reaction of proximate great power. In particular, it is imperative for a small state to conduct successful bargaining with the great power as a means of conflict mitigation.

Different models of bargaining have long been used to resolve conflicts among the parties. As it is outlined in Fisher's and Ury's book, *Getting To Yes*, disagreement between the parties appears to be a conflict of positions, and the two sides naturally tend to bargain over positions which often reach an impasse. That being said, bargaining over interests rather than positions might lead to an outcome that could be satisfactory for both parties. In fact, interests

define the problem.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, Reiter uses the bargaining model to argue that if two states in dispute know the outcome of a possible war, they should, in general, prefer to reach an agreement that would reflect a likely postwar settlement, rather than to fight, reach that same settlement, and also suffer the costs of war.<sup>27</sup> It is fair to assume that the bargaining model, which focuses on interests rather than on positions, is a more pragmatic and realistic approach of conflict mitigation. Once the probable outcomes of a war are clearly understood, the parties to the dispute should prefer to reach a bargain without fighting rather than fight and then reach the same bargain. While the theory of the limited alignment as well as the tenets of strategic bargaining set great conditions for Tbilisi to conduct such a foreign and security policy, it would be wise to examine those in the practice.

### **III. Disagreement within NATO about Georgia's Atlantic integration**

To understand why Georgia is unlikely to win if it fights, one must first consider the improbability of help from larger allies. First of all, it must be highlighted that there is a lack of clear consensus within NATO about Georgia's Atlantic integration. After the demolition of the Soviet Union, a weak Russia became accustomed to NATO enlargement closer to its borders. However, with the presidency of Vladimir Putin, Russia became increasingly assertive. Moreover, Russia is focused on building gradually its international position and power again.<sup>28</sup> Consequently, pursuing further expansion of NATO closer to Russia's borders could compromise current NATO-Russia relations. In addition, the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the Russian Federation underscores Russia's persistent opposition to any future enlargement of NATO to Russian borders and in particular in the Caucasus region.<sup>29</sup> Hence, it can be stated that Russia will not tolerate a NATO member in its southern border and accordingly, potential

membership of Georgia could have significant implications for NATO's relationships with Moscow. As a result, it could be inferred that enlargement has brought the alliance into competition and in some cases confrontation with Moscow.

Since accession to membership in NATO is subject to the consensus of all member countries, Georgia is in a difficult situation. The question of Georgia's membership revealed the fundamental differences within the alliance about its enlargement and priorities. Especially the armed conflict with Russia in 2008 revealed that NATO's relations with Moscow remain a priority. Moreover, it does not appear that the NATO allies are willing to provide a meaningful promise of collective defense, which raises doubts about the further NATO expansion to Georgia.<sup>30</sup> Although at the Bucharest summit in April 2008 the members agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO, an exact timeline was not set for such an occasion.<sup>31</sup> The result of the summit undoubtedly showed that several members of NATO avoided irritating Moscow and because of that refused to give the MAP to Georgia and Ukraine. Hence, it can be inferred that there is no consensus within the NATO to include Georgia in its security system. In addition, NATO's decision repeatedly to deny Georgia the MAP at the 2014 Newport summit clearly illustrates the limits of NATO's influence and willingness to engage with states within Russia's "zone of privileged interest."<sup>32</sup>

Another reason for disagreement within the NATO about Georgia's membership in the alliance is the unresolved conflicts in Georgia. Unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia serve as an additional argument for some European leaders to deny Georgia's quest for the NATO membership. Due to the current status quo regarding frozen conflicts in Georgia, the membership of NATO may become a reason of friction or even armed conflict between the Russian Federation and the alliance. According to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the

parties will be responsible for stepping in for Georgia in the case of armed conflict with Russia and provide collective defense.<sup>33</sup> In fact, such an attempt undertaken by the alliance could have major implications for its relationships with Moscow, as well as for wider European security. Taken together, the Article 5 obligation and the perceived threat from Russia raises a question for several NATO members as to whether or not Georgia's admission in the alliance is worth a potential conflict with Moscow.

Moreover, unresolved conflicts in Georgia serves as a good argument for countries with strong economic and energy interests in Russia, like France and Germany, to oppose Georgia's membership in the alliance in the near future.<sup>34</sup> In 2008 on NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, the German chancellor, Angela Merkel said that offering membership to a divided Georgia could destabilize the new government there.<sup>35</sup> In addition, France opposes letting Georgia into NATO by stating that "France will not give its green light to the entry of Ukraine and Georgia."<sup>36</sup> Build on these statements France and Germany believe that since Georgia is not stable enough to receive MAP, it would be an unnecessary offense to Moscow and moreover, could upset the balance of power between Europe and Russia.

Although NATO theoretically maintains its commitment that Georgia will become a member of the alliance in the near future, there is a stark contrast within the alliance about supporting Georgia's accession bid. There is no consensus within NATO regarding whether Georgia should even be offered a MAP, which works to Russia's advantage. Moscow is well aware of the division that exists within NATO regarding the relationships with Russia and aims to exploit these to achieve its own objectives. Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, warned in February 2015 that if NATO continues to support Georgia's bid to NATO membership, then Moscow will take "measures to prevent any adverse impact" on the situation in South

Caucasus.<sup>37</sup> The fact that no clear decision about the perspectives of Georgia's NATO membership has yet been taken clearly demonstrates Russia's ability to influence the decision-making process within the alliance.

Overall, whether Georgia will ever get collective defense guarantees from NATO is still ambiguous. In fact, Georgia is knocking on a closed door, which contributes to increased disillusionment with NATO among the Georgian population. The lack of clear consensus within NATO about Georgia's Atlantic integration, the "Russian factor" in the NATO decision-making process, the perceived threat from Russia towards wider European security, and the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are central arguments for some alliance members to deny Georgia's quest for NATO membership.

#### **IV. Probability of the pragmatic change in the Georgian foreign and security policy**

Besides the motives from NATO's perspective against Georgia's Atlantic integration, the potential membership in the alliance is not feasible from Georgia's standpoint as well, due to the increased security threats from Russian Federation towards Georgia caused by membership in the alliance. In addition to the improbability of NATO support, a powerful reason why Georgia cannot fight without losing pertains to the likely turn of events, even if Georgia were to obtain MAP status and become a member of the alliance in the near future. Such a course of action will not guarantee the security and stability of the country. On the contrary, potential membership of NATO will contribute to increased security threats from the Russian Federation towards Georgia. The more steps Georgia takes to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures, the greater are the pressure and the increased security threats from Moscow.

Georgia's quest to ensure its stability and security via the NATO membership is precisely the reason of Moscow's coercive politics towards Georgia. Russia will not tolerate the expansion of western involvement within its "sphere of influence" to ensure that it remains the predominant power in the South Caucasus region.<sup>38</sup> Thus, it can be emphasized that Atlantic integration will increase security threats arising from Moscow by placing Georgia as a target for the Russian military, by a potential complication of relationships with the separatist governments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and by the augmented risk of repetitive Russian military intervention in Georgia. NATO membership will thus place Georgia as a target for the Russian military.

From the security perspective, therefore, Georgia is vulnerable more than ever before. The possible appearance of NATO's military bases and large troop contingents in direct proximity of Russia's Southern border will undoubtedly transfer Georgia into the high-priority target list of Russian military power. Even if NATO were to rise to the defense of Georgia, it will in fact not be able to deter Russian pressure. In fact, if war were to break out, Georgia would bear the brunt of the conflict. Subsequently, Georgian foreign and security policy-makers should critically analyze whether or not striving for NATO membership could guarantee Georgia's security.

Moscow opposes NATO's expansion towards its borders because it weakens Russia's position in its "near abroad." Consequently, Georgia's membership in the alliance will promote the perception in Moscow of being encircled by the western powers. Therefore, Georgia may become a primary planning objective and accordingly a target for Russian military units. For instance, according to a statement by former Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov, while Georgia has the sovereign right to join the NATO, Russia is doing everything in its power to

protect its borders from the potential enemy that Georgia would become should it join.<sup>39</sup> Thus, striving for a membership in an alliance that is not willing to accept Georgia as a member country in the near future and therefore risking to become the enemy for the Russian Federation is not a proportional risk for Tbilisi which worth it to take.

From the Russian point of view, NATO enlargement towards the east was an outcome of temporary Russian weaknesses and frustration caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union.<sup>40</sup> But contemporary Russia endeavors to restore its reputation as a great power. Consequently, those earlier conditions resulted in an increasingly assertive Russian foreign policy. The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, expressed concerns about NATO's expansion in the former Soviet space, in particular in Georgia. He explicitly outlined that the appearance of a powerful military bloc at the Russian Southern border will be considered as a direct threat to the national security of his country.<sup>41</sup>

To be a potential target of the Russian military is not the only threat that NATO membership "offers" to Georgia. Potential complication regarding the relationships with the separatist governments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is another possible consequence that Tbilisi needs to take into account on its path towards the Atlantic integration. It should come as no surprise that Moscow will use its influence on separatist governments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to leverage the political situation and create a sense of instability in order to isolate Georgia from NATO. Tbilisi's aspiration to join the alliance could cause potential complications regarding the relations with the separatist regimes which will notably hamper the process of restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia. Furthermore, Russia is a key player in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian issues and has enormous influence on separatist governments. Accordingly, Moscow will use its influence to manipulate with the potential escalation of the

situation in conflict zones in order to create a sense of instability in the region and therefore hinder the process of Georgia's Atlantic integration.

The status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia present a major challenge for Tbilisi regarding the territorial integrity of the country. Even though both Abkhazia and South Ossetia are within the internationally recognized borders of Georgia, the central government lacks control of these regions. The deterioration of Tbilisi's relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia began with the fall of the Soviet Union. The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to aspirations for independence not only in Tbilisi, but also in two regions of Georgia, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well. In fact, aspirations for independence among these two regions led to a war in South Ossetia and later in Abkhazia and resulted in losing control of the central government of Georgia (Figure 1). This situation was exploited by Russia in a manner that was devastating for Georgia. In other words, backing separatist regimes and having *de facto* governments under control, Moscow successfully utilizes its capability to manipulate Georgia's success towards NATO membership.

**Figure 1: Conflict zones in the Republic of Georgia<sup>42</sup>**



It can be stated that every time Georgia takes a step forward regarding NATO membership, Russia exercises its influence on the separatist governments in order to create a sense of instability. Russia's military intervention in Georgia in 2008 is the best example to illustrate Moscow's power to create a legitimate reason to "punish" Georgia for its Atlantic aspirations by using separatist regimes. Moreover, Russia's military intervention occurred straight after the declaration at the 2008 Bucharest summit that Georgia "will become a member of the alliance in the near future."<sup>43</sup> It can be inferred that this declaration triggered Moscow's reaction to manipulate the conflict zones in Georgia in order to send a strong signal to the west that Russia will not tolerate an alliance at its Southern border. Hence, unresolved separatist conflicts are the strongest leverage for Moscow to block the expansion of NATO. Looking globally, separatist regimes will remain as a tool in Moscow's coercive politics towards Tbilisi and will activate it every time Georgia will make a move towards the Atlantic integration.

In addition, to strengthen its ties to both separatist regions the Russian government carried out programs, such as the distribution of Russian passports to thousands of ethnic Abkhaz and South Ossetians residing in the conflict zones.<sup>44</sup> In this regard, Moscow created a sense of legitimacy in the case of repeated intervention to act for the sake of the security of its own citizens. Moreover, the Russian Duma adopted the resolution recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Hence Moscow's military presence has a legitimate foundation now, which is augmented by bilateral agreements with both separatist regimes.<sup>45</sup> Consequently, Russia no longer depends on Georgia's approval to justify its military presence in these regions. Moreover, it could be concluded that the establishment of a military presence in those regions was one of the main reasons behind the decision to recognize their independence.

Since Russia is the occupying power, Tbilisi sees it as the major adversary, while the separatist regimes are seen as Russia's proxy regimes rather than independent political players.<sup>46</sup> In this regard, the likelihood that Moscow will use its proxy regimes to create a sense of instability in the region and consequently hinder Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration is very high. Frozen separatist conflict is one of the strongest leverages maintaining Russia's influence in the post-Soviet Countries.<sup>47</sup> Above all, Georgian security and foreign policy makers should bear in mind that territorial disputes can appear as a critical hesitation in the nearest future. Furthermore, Georgia's Atlantic aspiration irritates Moscow and accordingly creates more tension regarding the relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia rather than reducing it. Thus, Russia's harsh attitude towards the territorial integrity of a sovereign state arises fears in Tbilisi that frozen conflicts could anytime turn into a bloody war.

Indeed, the potential membership in NATO will augment the risk of repetitive Russian military intervention in the republic of Georgia. As stated in the Strategic Defense Review (SDR) of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) of Georgia, Tbilisi's persistence in pursuing its goal of Euro-Atlantic integration is not acceptable to Russia and will present an increased risk of future threats.<sup>48</sup> The full-scale military aggression committed by the Russian Federation against Georgia in August 2008 made it clear that Moscow is ready to openly oppose norms and principles of international law for the sake of its own interests. Moreover, according to the Threat Assessment Document (SAD) of the Georgian government, the ultimate goal of the military intervention of 2008 was not the occupation of Georgian territories, but the punishment of the pro-Western government in Tbilisi for its Atlantic aspirations.<sup>49</sup> From this standpoint, it must be expected that Moscow will continue its coercive politics towards Tbilisi so long as the Georgian government remains faithful to the Atlantic aspirations.

According to Ghia Nodia, a Georgian political scientist, the aggressor did not pay any political price for bullying a small country in its neighborhood, and therefore there is a danger of a repetition of such a behavior in the future.<sup>50</sup> Besides, it is rational to conclude that the Russian government will take active measures to achieve political regime change in Tbilisi and accordingly change the political course of the country in case Georgia achieves tangible success regarding the NATO membership. Furthermore, the passive reaction from the West to the events in Georgia in 2008 and later on in Ukraine will tempt Moscow to maintain a hostile attitude towards Georgia in the future as well. Moreover, Moscow will not hesitate to use force in order to coerce Tbilisi to abandon its desire to join the NATO. Hence, the risk of repetition of a large-scale military aggression against Georgia is still very high and will remain so until the government in Tbilisi uses a pragmatic approach in order to analyze current security challenges around the country and reconsider its aspiration to join the NATO as the only means to ensure the security of the country.

As an aftermath of the Russian military aggression of 2008, 20 % of the country's territory is occupied. The provocative actions of the Russian military units in the occupied zones towards Georgian citizens create an additional source of tension. In fact, such a local tension could easily escalate into large-scale military operations. Various acts of provocations from the Russian military units have one goal, namely, to create a sense of instability and therefore weaken NATO's attitude towards Georgia's membership in the alliance. In short, with the aim of preventing Georgia's membership in the alliance, it is more than likely that Moscow will take aggressive measures by destroying Georgia's territorial integrity and consequently destabilizing the Georgian state.

In sum, there is a clear lack of consensus within NATO about Georgia's membership in the alliance. The possibility of complicating relations with the Kremlin and moreover to apply Article 5 of the NATO Charter against Russia eliminates the likelihood for Georgia to join the alliance under the current circumstances. In other words, the potential membership of Georgia in the alliance could have significant implications for Brussels regarding the relationships with Moscow. For instance, it is a frequently repeated dictum that it was due to the August 2008 war that Georgia lost its NATO prospects.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, due to the perceived threat from Russia, Europe is not ready to include Georgia under its security umbrella.

Next, it is rational to conclude that potential membership in the alliance will lead to the increased security threats from Russia towards the republic of Georgia. The NSS of the Russian Federation stress Kremlin's persistent opposition to any future enlargement of NATO to its borders and in such a case this will be perceived as a direct security threat to Russia.<sup>52</sup> Consequently, membership in NATO can make Georgia a possible target in the Russian military planning. Moreover, unresolved separatist conflicts in Georgia are the major trump card in Moscow's hands in order to block the expansion of NATO towards its Southern border. The Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is another apparent evidence that Moscow would retaliate against Georgian membership in NATO by never permitting Tbilisi to peacefully regain authority over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.<sup>53</sup> The Russian military intervention in Georgia in 2008 is the best illustration of Moscow's aggressive intentions and, moreover, there are no guarantees that such a scenario will not take place again in the near future.

Thus, despite the pressure from Moscow, Georgian foreign policy has been steady in the pursuit of the Euro-Atlantic integration. In order to demonstrate its commitment to the membership, Georgia is actively involved to ensure security side by side with the alliance

partners in NATO led-military operations. For instance, Georgia sends more troops per capita in Afghanistan than any other NATO member country, including the USA.<sup>54</sup> However, the more steps Georgia takes towards integration, the greater is the pressure brought from Moscow. In addition, Georgians were disappointed by the western reaction to the war in 2008. No informed person expected military involvement from the west, but Georgian population hoped for much stronger political steps to stop the aggressor. Therefore, a considerable part of Georgian society was pushed to think that it is time to reconsider Georgia's pro-western course as a failed security and foreign policy strategy.<sup>55</sup> As Tina Khidasheli, Georgian Minister of Defense, argued in late September 2015, disillusionment with NATO is occurring in Georgia. At every NATO summit, an affirmative, Open Door Policy regarding Georgia failed to be implemented and the door remained shut.<sup>56</sup> Under this circumstance, it seems wise for Tbilisi to reconsider its Atlantic aspirations as the only means to ensure the security of the country.

## V. “Identity” VS “Realpolitik”

Georgia's foreign and security policies are identity-driven and less motivated by realist paradigms such as national interests or *Realpolitik*. The national strategic narrative identifies Georgia as an ancient European state and accordingly an ancient part of western civilization.<sup>57</sup> According to Karina Korostelina, social identity is a feeling of belonging to a particular group and affects our social perceptions and behavior.<sup>58</sup> It should therefore come as no surprise that Georgia has sought membership in the main Western security institution based on its identity. The popular phrase “I am Georgian and therefore I am European,” stated by Zurab Zhvania, Prime Minister of Georgia in 2004-2005, is one such an example.<sup>59</sup> Based on that assumption, the Georgian elite gradually has created the image of the West as a savior. Today, as well,

Georgia is looking for a new patron, which could help the country in terms of providing tangible security guarantees.<sup>60</sup> Thus, there is a perception in Tbilisi that the West should help due to a common identity and in particular, support its membership in the alliance in order to ensure security and stability in Georgia. In fact, however, Tbilisi has already used all possible leverage in relations with NATO based on its identity. In such a situation, it is crucial for Tbilisi to abandon the identity approach in its security policy and switch over to a more pragmatic way such as national interests or *Realpolitik*.

Georgia's membership in NATO is not realistic, especially given the Russo-Georgian war and the remaining territorial disputes. Even if the ruling political elite in Tbilisi still believes that NATO membership might become a reality in the near future, pragmatic analysis of the origins and implications of the August war should correct any misunderstanding about how realistic the prospect of NATO integration is. Thus, for the stable and secure development of the country, dispassionate judgments must be made in Tbilisi regarding Georgia's security policy. In particular, it needs to be adjusted to a more realistic approach such as *Realpolitik*. Considering the fact that there is no sign of any upcoming successes regarding NATO-Georgian relations, it could be concluded that this relation has obviously exhausted its potential. Thus, Tbilisi needs to realize that its aspiration for Atlantic integration is no longer suitable for Georgia. In other words, Tbilisi needs to consider to address another alternative course in the foreign and security policy to ensure Georgia's security.

Based on analysis of the current circumstances, the concept of *Realpolitik* in Georgian security policy could appear as a solution. As John Bew argues, the concept of *Realpolitik*, is an attempt to resolve a political puzzle on how to build a stable and secure environment around the nation-state in an unsteady, rapidly changing, and violent environment.<sup>61</sup> Based on this approach,

the Georgian government needs to identify the entities struggling for supremacy in the region and accordingly achieve some equilibrium and balance between these entities so that they do not hinder the development of the nation-state.<sup>62</sup> Thus, the logic of *Realpolitik* could be applied to the conduct of Georgian foreign and security policy. In particular, *Realpolitik* requires finding an equilibrium between the West and the Russian Federation in such a way that Tbilisi can profit from it and will be able to establish a secure and stable environment in the country.

As outlined in Henry Kissinger's book, *Diplomacy*, sovereignty is not a right but a reflection of power. In this spirit, the law of the strongest is the determining factor in politics. Furthermore, according to the concept of *Realpolitik*, a small state ought to adjust its actions in accordance with the changing circumstances.<sup>63</sup> In this regard, the cornerstone of *Realpolitik* is the alignment of the interests of external powers with the needs of the small state for security. In addition, adaptivity is a crucial factor in the foreign and security policy of a small state in order to survive and ensure peace and stability in the complex security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. As has already been noted, a limited alignment strategy could appear as a solution. Tbilisi should consider using tenets of the concept of *Realpolitik* combined with the limited alignment strategy in order to arrange its security policy in accordance with the current political reality.

To summarize, Georgia cannot afford to set up its security strategy based on promises and aspirations. NATO's decision to delay the question of Georgia's membership in the alliance for an indefinite period of time gives rise to an essential need for Tbilisi to reshape its security strategy. Furthermore, there is no leverage at Tbilisi's disposal to force Moscow to reconsider its stance regarding Georgia's membership in the alliance. The Georgian government therefore has no other choice rather than to pursue a strategy of limited alignment and create a new security structure based on a *Realpolitik* approach. The earlier Tbilisi will announce that membership in

NATO is not the major means of guaranteeing the security of the state anymore, the greater is the chance to reach a bargain with Moscow regarding the dilemma of ensuring Georgia with an effective security architecture. Furthermore, such an action will open a window of opportunities to normalize relations with Russia. In fact, stabilized relations with the Kremlin may result in the reduced threat to the national security of Georgia, as well as, potential support regarding the resolution of separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and presumably, will have a positive impact on the economic conditions of the country.

## **VI. The advantages of stabilized relations with Moscow**

The pursuit of stabilized relations with Moscow, to be facilitated by signaling a move away from commitment to NATO, will have several advantages. First and foremost, it is rational to assume that stabilized relations with Moscow will facilitate to the reduced threat to Georgia's national security. In other words, pursuing a strategy of limited alignment and creating a new security structure based on a *Realpolitik* approach will reduce the perceived threat in Moscow to be encircled by the West and in return, it will reduce the probability of open conflict breaking out again on the Georgian soil. Pursuing progress in the security related issues through constructive bilateral, Russo-Georgian relations will give a hand to both parties. Normalization of Russo-Georgian relations will positively affect each country's security environment and the security environment in the entire Caucasus region as well.

Secondly, successful Russo-Georgian dialogue could also make it possible to gain potential support from Moscow regarding the resolution of separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Abkhazian and South Ossetian issues cannot be resolved without Kremlin's

involvement. There is little doubt that Russia is the leading player regarding the resolution of conflicts in Georgia. The National Security Concept (NSC) of Georgia states that ending the occupation of Georgia's territories and restoring Georgian sovereignty over the whole territory of the country is the most important priority of the country's national security policy.<sup>64</sup> Therefore, it is rational to infer that government in Tbilisi should do everything in its power to foster good neighborly relations with Russia. Such an attitude could awake a willingness in Kremlin to contribute to the rapid restoration of Georgia's territorial sovereignty. By implementing such a foreign policy, it is crucial for the Georgian government to articulate that a strong, sovereign and, more importantly, friendly Georgia is in Moscow's interests as well.

It is not easy to find the right solution regarding the resolution of conflicts in Georgia. However, in the case of Russia's consent towards the Kremlin's proxy governments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it could be possible for Tbilisi to restart a direct dialogue with the governments of these *de facto* regimes. Hence, Moscow's positive involvement is absolutely key in order to resolve conflicts with the separatist regimes peacefully. As emphasized in the National Military Strategy (NMS) of the MOD of Georgia, the main national and security policy objective of Georgia is to end these conflicts and allow the peaceful restoration of its territorial integrity.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, Tbilisi's willingness to grant the broadest autonomy to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in the case of reintegration, could serve as an additional stimulus for *de facto* regimes in order to follow to "the Law of the Strong."<sup>66</sup> Thus, de-escalation of separatist conflicts and the improved relations with Moscow could result in augmented social and economic ties between Russia and Georgia.

Lastly, stabilized relations between Moscow and Tbilisi could have a positive impact on the economic conditions of the Republic of Georgia. Economic development is one of the most

vital priority for Georgia today. Consequently, to be back on the Russian market and to increase the flow of Russian tourists in Georgia could boost the economic growth of the country.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, the gradual improvement of the relations could make the resumption of railway communication between Russia and Georgia via Abkhazia achievable. The practical implementation of this plan could give rise to a wave of positive changes in Russia-Georgian relations. Moreover, the revival of the rail and other communication systems could trigger positive economic and political processes in the entire South Caucasus region.<sup>68</sup> In fact, it can be concluded that normalized relations with Moscow will foster the economic growth of Georgia as well as of the entire region.

Thus, for the stable and secure development of Georgia, it is critically important to regulate relations with Moscow. However, the normalization of relations does not take place in a vacuum. Moreover, the process is related to patterns of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) power. In principle, it could be expected that the implementation of a strategy of limited alignment will result in the normalization of these relations, which in return will have positive effects on the both country's security environments. In the short run, it will diminish the probability of open conflict breaking out again and in the long run, it could result in decreased threats to Georgia's national security. Next, normalized relations with Russia could possibly awake the willingness in the Kremlin to contribute to the resolution of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Finally, stabilized relations could result in improvements of the economic conditions of the Republic of Georgia.

It is important to note that while these new approaches in Georgia's foreign policy may raise eyebrows in some western capitals, at the same time such a pragmatic foreign and security policy could be perceived as a strength in its immediate neighborhood.<sup>69</sup> Presumably, Georgia's

western partners and supporters may even assess this policy as a sign of greater maturity. Having the ability to stand on its own, on the one hand, will make Tbilisi less dependent on Western patronage and, on the other hand, will facilitate willingness in Moscow to acknowledge Georgia as an equal and sovereign state.

## **VII. Alternative to NATO**

Creation of a regional collective security system can be considered as an alternative to NATO, one that could become an imperative pillar of the Georgian security architecture and of regional stability. In fact, Ciorciari emphasizes this point by stating that another important benefit of limited alignment is the opportunity for a small state to develop a meaningful security cooperation with more than one great power partner.<sup>70</sup> Indeed, there is an objective need on both sides of the Caucasus Range for creating such a form of regional engagement. Prospects in this sphere include cooperation between Russia and Georgia in order to achieve a long-lasting stability in the region. Moreover, it is imperative for Tbilisi to collaborate with its neighborhood to facilitate the transformation of South Caucasus into a peaceful and safe region. Georgia also needs to maintain its ties and cooperations with the international community in multilateral and bilateral formats for the sake of strengthening its position in the region.

There are several advantages to such cooperation with Moscow. First, it is of interest to note that cooperation between Tbilisi and Moscow is crucial in ensuring the regional security. According to Zurab Bezhanishvili, the Georgian political scientist, the tension between these two countries have an excessively painful impact on the security environment in the Trans-Caucasus Region. Moreover, he claims that despite the potential for open military conflict, a partnership

may emerge between these countries.<sup>71</sup> In addition, it is explicitly outlined in the NSC of Georgia that the creation of a peaceful and cooperative environment in the Caucasus Region would pay positive dividends for the security of Georgia.<sup>72</sup> Hence, mutual interests lie in the opportunity to collaborate on the security issues in the Caucasus in order to achieve a joint goal of guaranteeing peace and stability in the region.

Establishing a peaceful and cooperative environment in the North Caucasus Region of the Russian Federation is of particular importance to Georgia. Tbilisi needs to realize the importance of deepening relations with the people of the North Caucasus in order to contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of trust and stability. Moreover, this kind of active engagement will prevent the region of destabilizing and accordingly becoming a breeding ground for international terrorist organizations. SDR of MOD of Georgia notes that the country faces a potential threat from international terrorism. Regional conflicts create an environment conducive for international terrorism and organized crime that support illegal activities such as the transportation of drugs, arms, weapons of mass destruction and human trafficking.<sup>73</sup> Given this conclusion, it would be pragmatic for Moscow and Tbilisi as well to start the cooperation to strengthen mutual security which in turn will also constitute the climate of trust between two countries. Thus, in order to ensure stability in the entire Trans-Caucasus region, it is vital for Tbilisi to cooperate with its neighbors.

Secondly, it is in Georgia's national interests to pursue an active neighborhood policy to enhance regional and own security. In principle, Tbilisi traditionally has enjoyed good neighborly relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The establishment of a common approach to the region's future development is essential. Despite existing obstacles between Azerbaijan and Armenia, there is potential for cooperation among the three South Caucasus countries in

developing joint measures to improve the security environment in the region. As outlined in the NSC of Georgia, the conflicts in the Caucasus negatively affect the security of the whole Trans-Caucasus region.<sup>74</sup> Therefore, it is of interest to all countries in the Trans-Caucasus Region to collaborate with each other regarding the security guarantees.

The implementation of large-scale economic projects will further contribute to the development of the region. Moreover, such projects will not only have an economic value, but also will strengthen the security environment in the region through better cooperation, trust-building, and long-term business relationships. Indeed, the economic variable of the DIME is likely to play a significant positive role in ensuring a stable and secure environment in the region. For instance, the three most important regional energy projects the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline are economically important. They also increase the level of stability in the entire region.<sup>75</sup>

Thus, Georgia needs to aspire to cooperate with neighbor countries in trade, transportation, economy, security and other fields in order to facilitate establishing a peaceful environment in the entire trans-Caucasus region. Besides the partnership with neighbors, preserving the strategic agreements between Tbilisi and Western countries is an additional tool to ensure the security of Georgia.

Finally, every effort must be taken that Georgia maintains its ties and cooperations with the international community for the sake of strengthening its position in the region. Moreover, Georgia needs to continue to deepen its strategic partnerships in bilateral and multilateral formats with the partner nations. As a matter of fact, maintaining the security cooperation with the west and at the same time cooperate with Russia on regional issues is the essence of the limited alignment strategy. In particular, Tbilisi needs to focus on maintaining the current good relations

with the west in all elements of DIME as the means of ensuring the successful implementation of the limited alignment policy.

Strengthening foreign political ties must remain a priority for Georgia. It must be highlighted that Georgia and US cooperation is absolutely crucial. According to SDR of MOD of Georgia, the US-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership continues to provide the foundation for security assistance and cooperation, support of independence and territorial integrity and strengthening democracy and stability in the country.<sup>76</sup> In short, Georgia and US cooperation and generally Tbilisi's strategic partnerships with West in bilateral and multilateral formats contribute significantly to pursue the limited alignment strategy and accordingly, enhance Georgia's national security.

Georgia must continue to deepen its strategic partnership with the US. Support from the United States is absolutely vital in terms of gradually building and maintaining the elements of national power. Moreover, partnership with Washington will serve as a major pillar in implementing a limited alignment strategy and creating an environment of strategic uncertainty. In addition, government in Tbilisi should do everything in its power to convince Washington that a strong, sovereign, and stable Georgia can play significant role in ensuring peace and stability in the region and perhaps become a mediator between two powers. In order to maintain the support of the US and the West, Georgia should continue to contribute strengthening regional and international security by participating in multinational military operations all around the globe.

Fulfillment of the state's international obligations is an important responsibility. Georgia must continue to be actively engaged in international peace support and stability operations as well as other multinational activities in order to contribute to the global security and stability. In fact, the NMS of Georgia clearly underlines the importance of deepening this cooperation

through participation in foreign security assistance programs, foreign military training, courses and international exercises as well as other forms of defense diplomacy.<sup>77</sup> So, it can be concluded that fulfillment of international obligations and participation in international and multinational military operations by the Georgian Armed Forces (GAF) strengthens international security, as well as contributing considerably to the successful execution of the limited alignment strategy of the Republic of Georgia.

Hence, the creation of a regional collective security system seems to be the alternative option in ensuring the security of the Republic of Georgia. In principle, cooperation between Moscow and Tbilisi is critical in order to ensure peace and stability in the Caucasus Region. In addition, the establishment of a common approach regarding the regional security and effective cooperation with the neighbor countries will increase the prospects of ensuring peace and stability in the entire region. Lastly, for the sake of Georgia's national security, Tbilisi needs to focus on the further development and preservation of its ties and strategic partnership with NATO and in bilateral and multinational formats with the partner nations. In particular, the importance of the US-Georgian cooperation is absolutely crucial to enhance Tbilisi's ability to implement a limited alignment strategy in its foreign and security policy and to preserve stability in the country.

## **VIII. Conclusion**

In conclusion, Georgian government claims to establish a foreign policy that removes the country from the Russian sphere of influence. Therefore, the Republic of Georgia has chosen the way of joining the NATO as the means of ensuring its national security. However, the

enlargement of NATO has always been an irritation for Moscow, especially the extension of NATO towards Russia's southern border and in its "sphere of influence." Consequently, Georgia's potential membership in the alliance will promote the perception in Moscow of being encircled by the western powers, which could lead to an aggressive response from Russia.

From the security perspective, Georgia is vulnerable more than ever before. The possible membership in the alliance will worsen the security problems of the state. In particular, NATO membership will place Georgia as a target for the Russian military. Subsequently, foreign and security policy-makers in Tbilisi should critically analyze whether or not striving for NATO membership could guarantee Georgia's security. Furthermore, the pragmatic approach and the realistic view of the current situation explicitly reveal the ineffectiveness of Georgia's choice to gain security through the membership in NATO. Accordingly, potential membership in the alliance is not a feasible security architecture for the republic of Georgia. In order to establish an efficient security architecture, Georgia should pursue a strategy of limited alignment and create a new security structure based on *Realpolitik* approach.

In addition, it is imperative for a small state to conduct successful bargaining with the great power as a means of conflict mitigation. In fact, interests define the problem. In this spirit, bargaining over interests rather than positions might lead to an outcome that could be satisfactory for both Tbilisi and Moscow as well. Furthermore, the bargaining model, which focuses on interests rather than on positions, is a more pragmatic and realistic approach for Tbilisi to find a common ground with Moscow and as a result facilitate the conflict mitigation.

There is a lack of clear consensus within NATO about Georgia's Atlantic integration. The question of Georgia's membership has revealed the fundamental differences within the alliance about its enlargement and priorities. Moreover, potential membership of Georgia could

have significant implications for NATO's relationships with Moscow. Furthermore, unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia serve as an additional argument for some European leaders to deny Georgia's quest for the NATO membership. Hence, it can be inferred that there is no willingness among all members of the alliance to include Georgia in its security system.

In this regard, it can be stated that Georgia is knocking on a closed door. In fact, Tbilisi has already used all its leverage in relations with NATO based on its European identity. So, in such a situation, it is crucial for Tbilisi to abandon the identity approach in its security policy and switch over to a more realistic way such as national interests or *Realpolitik*. In other words, the *Realpolitik* approach could facilitate in finding an equilibrium between West and the Russian Federation in such a way that Tbilisi can profit from it and will be able to establish a secure and stable environment in the country.

Furthermore, Tbilisi cannot afford to set up its security strategy based on promises and aspirations. NATO's decision to delay the question of Georgia's membership in the alliance for an indefinite period of time arises an essential need for Tbilisi to reshape its security strategy. Moreover, there is no leverage at Tbilisi's disposal to force Moscow to reconsider its stance regarding Georgia's membership in the alliance. The Georgian government has no other choice rather than to pursue a strategy of limited alignment. The earlier Tbilisi will announce that membership in NATO is not the major means of guaranteeing the security of the state anymore, the greater is the chance to reach a bargain with Moscow regarding the dilemma of ensuring Georgia with an effective security architecture.

In addition, a small state like Georgia in a hostile environment and under the condition of the strategic uncertainty should pursue a strategy of limited alignment in order to procure the peace and stability in the country. Moreover, it is more likely that the limited alignment will

provide Tbilisi with the leverage that tight alliance usually do not. As a matter of fact, limited alignment seems to be a more preferred strategy for Georgia, especially when a threatening power is geographically proximate and when alternative allies are unavailable.

In light of this analysis, it is critically important for Georgia to regulate relations with Moscow. It will diminish the probability of open conflict breaking out again, as well as resulting in decreased threats to Georgia's national security in the long run. Additionally, it is important to note that normalized relations with Russia could awake the willingness in Kremlin to contribute to the resolution of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Furthermore, stabilized relations with Russia could result in improvements in the economic conditions of the Republic of Georgia.

Under these circumstances, it is rational to conclude that the creation of a regional collective security system seems to be the alternate option in ensuring the security of the Republic of Georgia. In fact, cooperation between Moscow and Tbilisi is vital to ensure stability in the Caucasus Region. Furthermore, successful cooperation with the neighbor countries will increase the possibility to ensure the security of the entire region. Lastly, and most importantly, Tbilisi needs to retain the strategic partnership in bilateral and multinational formats with the Western partners. To be more specific, the importance of the Georgian-US cooperation is absolutely crucial to enhancing Tbilisi's ability to implement a limited alignment strategy in its foreign and security policy and to preserve stability in the country.

In short, the Georgian government must do everything in its power to ensure the security of the country. The fact that NATO has delayed the question of Georgia's membership in the alliance for an indefinite period of time leaves no other choice to the government in Tbilisi to reshape its security strategy. Based on the analysis of the current circumstances and the available alignment strategies, the Georgian government should conduct a rational *Realpolitik* in order to

ensure the security of the country, while preserving independence and freedom of its citizens. As Benjamin Franklin has declared "those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."<sup>78</sup>



- 
- <sup>28</sup> Cerny Radek, "Russia and the Future Expansion of NATO" (master's thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2011), 2, <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA553117>
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid, 8.
- <sup>30</sup> Travis L. Bounds and Ryan C. Hendrickson, "Georgioan Membership in NATO: Policy Implications of the Bucharest Summit," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 22, no. 1 (January-March 2009): 30, <https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/>.
- <sup>31</sup> Paul Gallis, "Enlargement Issues at NATO's Bucharest Summit," *Congressional Research Service* (2008): 21, <https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/>.
- <sup>32</sup> Tracey German, "Heading West? Georgia's Euro-Atlantic Path," *Journal of International Affairs* 91, no. 3 (Mai 2015): 602, <https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.
- <sup>33</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *The North Atlantic Treaty* (Washington, DC: 1949), 7, <https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/>.
- <sup>34</sup> Cerny Radek, "Russia and the Future Expansion of NATO" (master's thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2011), 13, <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA553117>
- <sup>35</sup> Steven Erlancer, "NATO Allies Oppose Bush on Georgia and Ukraine," *The New York Times*, last modified April 3, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/world/europe/03nato.html>
- <sup>36</sup> Brent Jines, "France Opposes Georgia, Ukraine as NATO Members," *USA Today*, last modified Mai 14, 2008, [https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-04-01-france-nato\\_N.htm](https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-04-01-france-nato_N.htm)
- <sup>37</sup> Tracey German, "Heading West? Georgia's Euro-Atlantic Path," *Journal of International Affairs* 91, no. 3 (Mai 2015): 612, <https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid, 604.
- <sup>39</sup> Kakha Jibladze, "Russia's Opposition to Georgia's Quest for NATO Membership," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 5, no. 1 (2007): 45, <https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.
- <sup>40</sup> Cerny Radek, "Russia and the Future Expansion of NATO" (master's thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2011), 12, <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA553117>
- <sup>41</sup> Nakia J. Summers, "Georgia's Quest for NATO Membership: Challenges and Prospects" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 10, <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA536297>
- <sup>42</sup> Euractiv, Post-Soviet "frozen conflicts," last modified April 28, 2016, <http://www.euractiv.com/section/armenia/linksdossier/post-soviet-frozen-conflicts/>
- <sup>43</sup> Tracey German, "Heading West? Georgia's Euro-Atlantic Path," *Journal of International Affairs* 91, no. 3 (Mai 2015): 602, <https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.
- <sup>44</sup> Kakha Jibladze, "Russia's Opposition to Georgia's Quest for NATO Membership," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 5, no. 1 (2007): 46, <https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.
- <sup>45</sup> Ghia Nodia, "The August 2008 War: Main Consequences for Georgia and its Conflicts," *Nationalities Papers* 40, no. 5 (September 2012): 728, <https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid, 728.
- <sup>47</sup> Tomas Janeliunas and Laura Kirvelyte, "Development of Georgia's Security Strategy: Tough Road Towards NATO," *Journal of International Affairs*, (September-October 2008): 142, <https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/>.
- <sup>48</sup> Ministry of Defense of Georgia: *Strategic Defence Review* (Tbilisi: Ministry of Defense, 2013), 12, <https://mod.gov.ge/assets/up-modul/uploads/pdf/SDR-ENG.pdf>
- <sup>49</sup> Ministry of Defense of Georgia: *Threat Assessment Document for 2010-2013* (Tbilisi: Ministry of Defense, 2010), 2, <https://mod.gov.ge/assets/up-modul/uploads/pdf/TAD-ENG.pdf>
- <sup>50</sup> Ghia Nodia, "The August 2008 War: Main Consequences for Georgia and its Conflicts," *Nationalities Papers* 40, no. 5 (September 2012): 724, <https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid, 733.
- <sup>52</sup> Cerny Radek, "Russia and the Future Expansion of NATO" (master's thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2011), 8, <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA553117>
- <sup>53</sup> Jim Nichol, "Georgia and NATO Enlargement: Issues and Implications," *Congressional Research Service* (March 2006): 6, <https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/>.
- <sup>54</sup> Donnacha O Beachain and Frederik Coene, "Go West: Georgia's European Identity and its Role in Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Objectives," *Nationalities Papers* 42, no. 6 (November 2014): 934, <https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.
- <sup>55</sup> Ghia Nodia, "The August 2008 War: Main Consequences for Georgia and its Conflicts," *Nationalities Papers* 40, no. 5 (September 2012): 732, <https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.

- <sup>56</sup> Eugene Kogan, “Georgian Expectations vs Reality,” *Military Technology* 40, no. 5 (May 2016): 1, <https://web-a-ebSCOhost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.
- <sup>57</sup> Tracey German, “Heading West? Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic Path,” *Journal of International Affairs* 91, no. 3 (May 2015): 602, <https://web-a-ebSCOhost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.
- <sup>58</sup> Karina V. Korostelina, *Social Identity and Conflict: Structures, Dynamics, and Implications* (New York: Free Press, 2007), 15.
- <sup>59</sup> Nakia J. Summers, “Georgia’s Quest for NATO Membership: Challenges and Prospects” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 13, <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA536297>
- <sup>60</sup> Donnacha O Beachain and Frederik Coene, “Go West: Georgia’s European Identity and its Role in Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Objectives,” *Nationalities Papers* 42, no. 6 (November 2014): 933, <https://web-a-ebSCOhost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.
- <sup>61</sup> John Bew, *Realpolitik: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 17.
- <sup>62</sup> *Ibid*, 17.
- <sup>63</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1994), 137.
- <sup>64</sup> Ministry of Defense of Georgia: *National Security Concept of Georgia* (Tbilisi: Ministry of Defense, 2016), 11, <https://mod.gov.ge/assets/up-modul/uploads/pdf/NSC-ENG.pdf>
- <sup>65</sup> Ministry of Defense of Georgia: *National Military Strategy* (Tbilisi: Ministry of Defense, 2014), 3, <https://mod.gov.ge/assets/up-modul/uploads/pdf/NMS-ENG.pdf>
- <sup>66</sup> John Bew, *Realpolitik: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 32.
- <sup>67</sup> Nikolai Silaev and Andrei Sushentsov, “Russia’s View of Its Relations with Georgia after the 2012 Elections: Implications for Regional Stability,” *Connections* 14, no. 1 (2014): 65, <https://web-a-ebSCOhost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.
- <sup>68</sup> *Ibid*, 74.
- <sup>69</sup> Ghia Nodia, “The August 2008 War: Main Consequences for Georgia and its Conflicts,” *Nationalities Papers* 40, no. 5 (September 2012): 734, <https://web-a-ebSCOhost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.
- <sup>70</sup> John D. Ciorciari, *The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975* (Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 22.
- <sup>71</sup> Zurab Bezhanishvili, “Between Conflict and Partnership,” *Russian Politics and Law* 47, no. 3 (May-June 2009): 19, <https://web-a-ebSCOhost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/>.
- <sup>72</sup> Ministry of Defense of Georgia: *National Security Concept of Georgia* (Tbilisi: Ministry of Defense, 2016), 3, <https://mod.gov.ge/assets/up-modul/uploads/pdf/NSC-ENG.pdf>
- <sup>73</sup> Ministry of Defense of Georgia: *Strategic Defence Review* (Tbilisi: Ministry of Defense, 2013), 7, <https://mod.gov.ge/assets/up-modul/uploads/pdf/SDR-ENG.pdf>
- <sup>74</sup> Ministry of Defense of Georgia: *National Security Concept of Georgia* (Tbilisi: Ministry of Defense, 2016), 9, <https://mod.gov.ge/assets/up-modul/uploads/pdf/NSC-ENG.pdf>
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid*, 18.
- <sup>76</sup> Ministry of Defense of Georgia: *Strategic Defence Review* (Tbilisi: Ministry of Defense, 2013), 15, <https://mod.gov.ge/assets/up-modul/uploads/pdf/SDR-ENG.pdf>
- <sup>77</sup> Ministry of Defense of Georgia: *National Military Strategy* (Tbilisi: Ministry of Defense, 2014), 10, <https://mod.gov.ge/assets/up-modul/uploads/pdf/NMS-ENG.pdf>
- <sup>78</sup> “Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.” Benjamin Franklin, Historical Review of Pennsylvania, 1759 <http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/1381.html>

## Bibliography

---

Bew, John. *Realpolitik: A History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Bezhanishvili, Zurab. "Between Conflict and Partnership." *Russian Politics and Law* 47, no. 3 (May-June 2009): 19-35

<https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/>.

Bounds, Travis L. and Ryan C. Hendrickson. "Georgian Membership in NATO: Policy Implications of the Bucharest Summit." *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 22, no. 1 (January-March 2009): 20-30

<https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/>

Ciorciari D. John. *The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975*. Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2010.

Elman, Miriam Fendius. "The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in its Backyard." *Journal of political Science* 25, no. 2 (April 1995): 171-217.

<https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>

Fisher, Roger and William Ury. *Getting To Yes*. Edited by Bruce Patton. New York: Penguin Group Inc, 2011

Gallis, Paul. "Enlargement Issues at NATO's Bucharest Summit." *Congressional Research Service* (2008):

<https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/>.

German Tracey. "Heading West? Georgia's Euro-Atlantic Path." *Journal of International Affairs* 91, no. 3 (May 2015): 601-614.

<https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.

Gvalia, Siroky, Lebanidze and Iashvili Zurab. "Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States." *Journal of International Relations* 22, no. 1 (January-March 2013): 98-131.

<https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.

Janeliunas, Tomas, and Kirvelyte Laura. "Development of Georgia's Security Strategy: Tough Road Towards NATO." *Journal of International Affairs*, (September-October 2008): 133-157.

<https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/>.

---

Jibladze, Kakha. "Russia's Opposition to Georgia's Quest for NATO Membership." *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 5, no. 1 (2007): 45-51  
<https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.

Kevlihan Rob. "Small States in the International System: What Theories of International Relations Have to Say." *Journal of International Affairs*, (2015):  
[http://www.academia.edu/7485155/Small\\_states\\_in\\_the\\_International\\_System\\_What\\_theories\\_of\\_international\\_relations\\_have\\_to\\_say](http://www.academia.edu/7485155/Small_states_in_the_International_System_What_theories_of_international_relations_have_to_say)

Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1994.

Kogan, Eugene. "Georgian Expectations vs Reality." *Military Technology* 40, no. 5 (May 2016): 4-4.  
<https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.

Korostelina, Karina V. *Social Identity and Conflict: Structures, Dynamics, and Implications*. New York: Free Press, 2007.

Ministry of Defense of Georgia: *National Military Strategy*. Tbilisi: Ministry of Defense, 2014.  
<https://mod.gov.ge/assets/up-modul/uploads/pdf/NMS-ENG.pdf>

Ministry of Defense of Georgia: *National Security Concept of Georgia*. Tbilisi: Ministry of Defense, 2016.  
<https://mod.gov.ge/assets/up-modul/uploads/pdf/NSC-ENG.pdf>

Ministry of Defense of Georgia: *Strategic Defence Revi*. Tbilisi: Ministry of Defense, 2013.  
<https://mod.gov.ge/assets/up-modul/uploads/pdf/SDR-ENG.pdf>

Ministry of Defense of Georgia: *Threat Assessment Document for 2010-2013*. Tbilisi: Ministry of Defense, 2010.  
<https://mod.gov.ge/assets/up-modul/uploads/pdf/TAD-ENG.pdf>

Neumann, B. Iver, and Gstohl Sieglinde. "Lilliputians in Gulliver's World? Small States in International Relations." *Journal of International Affairs*, (2004):  
[https://www.google.com/#q=Lilliputians+in+Gulliver's+World?+Small+States+in+International+Relations&\\*>](https://www.google.com/#q=Lilliputians+in+Gulliver's+World?+Small+States+in+International+Relations&*>)

---

Nichol, Jim. "Georgia and NATO Enlargement: Issues and Implications." *Congressional Research Service* (March 2006):  
<https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/>

Nodia, Ghia. "The August 2008 War: Main Consequences for Georgia and its Conflicts." *Nationalities Papers* 40, no. 5 (September 2012): 721-738  
<https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *The North Atlantic Treaty*. Washington, DC: 1949.  
<https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/>.

O Beachain, Donnacha, and Frederik Coene. "Go West: Georgia's European Identity and its Role in Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Objectives." *Nationalities Papers* 42, no. 6 (November 2014): 923-941.  
<https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>

Patnaik Sivananda. "Small States in International Politics: A Case Study of Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka." Doctor's thesis, the Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda Vadodra, 2014.  
<http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/>

Radek, Cerny. "Russia and the Future Expansion of NATO." Master's thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2011.  
<http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA553117>

Reiter, Dan. "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War." *Perspectives on Politics* 1 (2003):  
[http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic248058.files/March%2020readings/Reiter\\_Exploring\\_the\\_Bargaining\\_Model.pdf](http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic248058.files/March%2020readings/Reiter_Exploring_the_Bargaining_Model.pdf)

Sechser, S. Todd. "A Bargaining Theory of Coercion." *Journal of International Relations* (2015):  
<http://faculty.virginia.edu/tsechser/Sechser-Bargaining-Theory-of-Coercion.pdf>

Silaev, Nikolai, and Andrei Sushentsov. "Russia's View of Its Relations with Georgia after the 2012 Elections: Implications for Regional Stability." *Connections* 14, no. 1 (2014): 65-86  
<https://web-a-ebshost-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/>.

---

Summers, Nakia J. "Georgia's Quest for NATO Membership: Challenges and Prospects."  
Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010.  
<http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA536297>