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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

Leading Change: Transformation of the Marine Corps Manpower Officer

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Executive Summary

Title: Leading Change: Transformation of the Marine Corps Manpower Officer

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Thesis: Establishing relevance, utility, and opportunity for the Marine Corps' Manpower 0102 Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) requires change to be led. Kotter's "8 steps for change" serves as a model for Marine Corps leaders to address today's MOS and manpower challenges. Understanding the inner workings and evolution of the MOS and its current condition indicates that leading organizational change is necessary for creating a professional cadre of officers who will deliver manpower to the warfighters and sustain and increase operational tempo across a wide range of military operations.

Discussion: Policies and procedures put in place over the last two decades transformed the Department of Defense's human resource administrative support mechanisms through the consolidation of structure and technological advancements. The lack of adjustment to MOS training, MOS development, insufficient billets to accommodate manpower officers at the service-level and void doctrine perpetuates the misemployment of manpower Marines, proving how the inefficiencies of professional development in the past and today are threatening unit readiness across the Corps in the future. The Army's Human Resource transformation initiative produced many long-term successes over the past two decades. Conversely while the Marine Corps manpower community at large has adjusted to support strategic and operational demand, the 0102 MOS remains the "quasi-administrator" who is seemingly disregarded as a warfighting necessity and therefore, continually seeking improvement of its current state. Ultimately, the ability to lead organizational change within occupation lies at the heart of the issue and the charge for the future.

Conclusion: Kotter's model for organizational change, when applied to present day 0102 MOS transformation, will highlight common pitfalls and construct a solid foundation for application of change to an occupational specialty where the "Marines are the Mission."

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INTRODUCTION

Upon assignment as Deputy Commandant of Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC M&RA) in December 2015, Lieutenant General Mark Brilakis identified a fundamental gap in Marine Corps Manpower management when he realized that there were no Colonels with a manpower officer (01 field) background serving at the single service-level manpower organization.¹ M&RA is the Marine Corps human resource/manpower advocate and support, so one might assume that a senior Manpower Officer would serve under his charge under the current construct of other Marine Corps departments. Each division under M&RA is inextricably linked to the operating force G-1 division and S-1 section, who by a set of orders are required to ensure that the human resource processes function effectively and efficiently. Understanding that the strategic vision of M&RA ultimately serves as the vector and vision of the manpower community, General Brilakis dedicated advocacy to leading a change and better the 0102 Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) in the future.²

In a video produced in July 2016 for a 0102 MOS operational planning team, General Brilakis expressed concern as to whether “the Marine Corps is getting full value from the 0102 community.”³ He asked whether the Marine Corps “missed something in respect to the MOS,” querying the reason behind the evolution of administration and consolidation of personnel services.⁴ Further, he expressed that the current system for training and educating Manpower Officers does not effectively prepare one to perform and advance in such a billet nor do the assignments equip 0102s to conduct service level support.⁵ The compilation of issues described by General Brilakis suggests that the 0102 MOS has “come to a fork in the road” where a holistic approach may require significant changes to redefine the importance and relevance of the role in warfighting for commanders and Marines across the Marine-Air-Ground-Task-Force (MAGTF).⁶

Due to a lack of general officers and a limited number of Colonels in the MOS, he charged the operational planning team, made up of more readily available company and field grade 0102s, to be innovative and provide input on how they could revamp the manpower model and achieve better utility for the service.


Ultimately, the OPT members drafted short and long term courses of action to develop the 0102 Manpower Officer based on three main areas: uniformed advocacy, training and education, and standardization.⁷ According to numerous briefs buried within the files at M&RA, the same problematic topics have been addressed in numerous venues as problem areas for decades. This study will utilize the outcomes of the OPT as lines of effort and a framework for implementing change based off its recommendations. Seeing that, historically, the Marine Corps has haphazardly implemented change for the 0102 MOS, a review of the inner workings and evolution of the MOS and its current condition is also necessary to understanding the holistic challenges. Therefore, it is in the intent of this paper to identify the indicators for leading organizational change in the Manpower Officer MOS to ensure the creation of a professional cadre who will deliver manpower support to the warfighter across the range of military operations.

PROBLEM: A WHEEL WITH NO SPOKES

General Brialakis's operation planning team identified the areas of concern for the MOS as inadequate training, career development, and diminished competitiveness for promotion and command, lack of uniformed advocacy and lack of formalized/updated doctrine.⁸ The attendees suggested that when small improvement projects surface, they slowly fade away leaving little to no change to the MOS and its support mechanisms; a potential indicator of a lack of true advocacy and proponentcy. Advocacy and proponentcy assignments are designated to "provide

subject matter expertise, insights and coordinated recommendations to the Commandant in order to inform Marine Corps force development and other relevant decisions” as portrayed in figure 1.⁹ While DC, M&RA serves as the advocate for Manpower Personnel Policy, Planning and Administration (Active Component, Reserve Component, and Civilian), the functional area of Manpower does not have a designated proponent. The advocate will typically identify a community of interest when a proponent is not clearly established in a single vested Marine Corps organizational or functional area official. This method establishes stakeholders whose inputs inform the advocate and represent requirements and interests within HQMC processes.

Figure 1. Advocates & Proponents in the Marine Requirements Oversight Council



M&RA documents produced over the last two decades reveal that the 0102 MOS continues to fall short on providing adequate training and education, producing adequate doctrine, and failing to manage the MOS career assignments and development.¹¹ Furthermore, surveys conducted in 2001 and 2016 by advocacy board members reveal that the 0102 MOS

failed to adapt with the evolution of Marine Corps administrative initiatives leaving Manpower Officers with a lack of identity.¹² The ambiguous apparatus which links manpower functions from the Manpower Officer to the MAGTF and service-level serves as the root cause for the issues that lead to requests for uniformed advocacy. The short-term success of the few bottom-up initiatives to improve manpower support and the 0102 MOS resultantly vary, some more measurable than others.

INSPECTIONS AND BLEAK RESULTS

The Marine Corps' measure of effectiveness for the 0102 MOS and their G-1 and S-1 staff performance takes place through the conduct and inspection of administrative and collateral duty / assigned functions. Inspections cover a broad spectrum within the four designated functions of administration such as general, operational, manpower, and personnel responsibilities.¹³ The Inspector General (IG) Inspection, Marine Corps Administrative Analysis Team (MCAAT) Inspection, and the MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) assessments reveal that tactical and operational unit Manpower Officers are failing to provide their Commanders and the unit satisfactory support.

The IG has the responsibility to inspect, assist, and assess the quality of the Marine Corps and examine avenues for evolution.¹⁴ One-third of the CORE functional areas assessed during the Marine Corps IG inspection at the battalion and regimental level is assigned to the S-1 section, supervised by a single 0102.¹⁵ Reports reveal that in the last 36 months, half of the administrative areas inspected resulted in negative findings and numerous non-mission capable assessments.¹⁶ None of the administrative checklists/functional areas are primary duties for the Manpower Officer serving in the S-1 section such as is the case with a Safety Officer and the SACO. In addition, a Manpower Officer is not formally trained to all the functional areas that

they very often responsible for under this routine readiness inspection program whose mission is to serve as “the eyes and ears of the Commandant.”¹⁷

Like the IG, MCAAT is eyes and ears of M&RA through the Director of Manpower Information Systems Division (MI). MCAAT inspects the same S-1 sections on areas in coordination with the installation personnel administration center. When MCAAT analyzes the effectiveness of internal audit procedures, regulatory compliance, systems management, internal controls, command administrative operations, and the timely and accurate performance of pay and entitlement transactions in the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS), travel systems, and other associated systems results are routinely less than favorable. Statistics of administrative inspections from the fiscal year 2014 MCAAT inspections reveal an average score of 79.9% in mission rating, indicating “non-mission capable” evaluation results.¹⁸ While some of the areas overlap with IG functional areas, Manpower Officers have limited training opportunities to learn how to manage such programs and curriculum at the entry level training venue does not train on the application of any of the systems to manage such functions.

Lastly, MSTP is the single organization in the Corps charged with training the MAGTF. Aside from the garrison functions of administration and manpower management, this is a critical venue for the assessment of the combat readiness for the MAGTF G-1. Manpower Officers inevitably flop through a demonstrated lack of involvement in the process, lack of staff coordination, and lack of interface with other warfighting functions in the planning process.¹⁹ The MSTP provides training in MAGTF operations across the range of military operations within an operational environment, facilitates a planning practical application and a final exercise, and improves the warfighting skills of senior commanders and their staffs through an after actions review.²⁰ With the removal of structure for the 0102 on the MSTP staff post Desert

Shield/Desert Storm, G-1s have routinely missed opportunities for training and observation on their operational readiness standards.²¹ The G-1 has a legitimate role to provide a casualty estimate, manage a combat replacement program, execute personnel functions of Marine Corps competency, and provide input to the Marine Corps planning process as outlined in the MOS training and readiness manual.²² Without integration into the MSTP, Manpower Officers ultimately fail to improve the G-1 as a critical warfighting support function.

Seeing that many units are rated as non-mission capable and no mechanism exists to train and mentor the higher level administrative staffs as a part of warfighting, one should not be surprised with the apparent deficiency. The failure to meet assessment measures and inability to train to readiness standards are indicators that the 0102 MOS and its relevance in our Marine Corps needs to be refocused and changed.

TALENT AND MANPOWER MANAGEMENT

From an organizational standpoint, the CMC has concerns over the gaps in current billet grade and MOS assignments within units across the Marine Corps as they negatively impact the Corps' personnel and overall readiness.²³ Currently the Marine Corps has ten billets for Colonel with 01 background and only three of them are being filled due to the lack of representation in the O6 ranks and lack of talent management within the field.²⁴ A number of proposals during the OPT were centered on the MOS' minimal opportunities for command as a primary staff officer and lack of a career progression path that would allow a Manpower Officers to remain competitive enough with contemporaries for grooming to serve as the service-level Manpower Officer like the DC, M&RA. In addition, training, and education opportunities for the vast majority of Manpower Officers to create talent required to work at the operational and service-

To prevent future occurrences, the Personnel Administration School (PAS) Commander has attempted to build curriculum for the existing Manpower Officer Course (MOC) to instruct career level Manpower Officers on the processes of assignments and manpower management within the Corps.²⁶ However, due to lack of resident expertise and no virtual training environment, the course continues to be a series of guest lectures offering limited time to critically think and practice true manpower assessment. Of the fifteen tasks outlined within the training and readiness manual for the MOC, only three courses have been developed within the PAS curriculum. Many Manpower Officers do not get the opportunity to attend the MOC because it is a ten-day unit-funded course which is not mandatory.²⁷

Critical to the success of any occupational field is the development of training and education that produces a MAGTF Manpower Officer at the field grade level who understands the manpower management processes, systems, and its relation to the different pillars of manpower throughout M&RA. Ensuring continued career development of the 0102 MOS requires change necessary to train Manpower Officers in performing manpower management and executing policy that fulfills the need of the warfighter while linking to and accounting for policy of the service-level staff.

DOCTRINE AND POLICY

Underdeveloped doctrine and outdated publications for the Marine Corps administrative apparatus has severed the linkage between the warfighter and the strategic vision of M&RA and the Marine Corps regarding the Manpower Officer. The Marine Corps Administrative Procedures (MCAP) Order identifies the function and organization of administration, but has not been revised for thirteen years and is inadequate for guiding to Manpower Officers in today's Marine Corps because it does not take into account the changes that have occurred over the last

decade.²⁸ Further, the MCAP outlines the manpower function of administration as a small portion of the G-1/S-1 responsibilities.

In order to assist the MAGTF G-1 and S-1 in their operational and planning responsibilities, a planner might easily attempt to reference doctrine for planning. MSTP Pamphlet 1.0, the *MAGTF G-1*, was the gap for doctrine to identify associated operational tasks, but the pamphlet was cancelled in 2015 because it failed to be updated.²⁹ The purpose of the MSTP pamphlet was to supplement information provided in the MAGTF Command and Control and Marine Corps Planning Process warfighting publications. This serves as a guide for G-1 and S-1 detailed responsibilities and includes formats to guide the planning process. The MSTP pamphlet was utilized for MAGTF staffs as guides to facilitate drawing out planning factors and considerations during operational planning, but it's lack of currency and modernization leaves planners assuming away manpower capability.

Lastly, a draft of a Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 1-12, *Marine Corps Administration*, surfaced in the community on numerous occasions since 2012, but it has also yet to be signed and published. The publication is the only document that outlines the art and science of administration as it relates to warfighting which is the very reason for the Marine Corps' existence.

“As a science, administration applies known policies or conducts process management techniques to streamline procedures. It applies measurable actions regarding efficiency, resources, and strength. The results of administration can be both observable and measurable, with quantitative outcomes. As an art, administration requires an intuitive ability to grasp the essence of a unique tactical, operational, or strategic situation and applies a creative ability to devise qualitative sustainment through planning, policy, and execution. Many contributions of administration affect sustainment by ensuring the readiness and availability of personnel. Additionally, administration enhances the commander's ability to enforce good order and discipline and increase morale.”³⁰

Codifying the manpower functions of administration through an operational lens forces Manpower Officers, staffs, and commanders to connect routine administrative functions to mission accomplishment.

To avoid common pitfalls, leaders can also not assume that the occupational framework will flow once drastic changes are implemented. Recommended changes from 2001 and 2016 reveal that the people who work in the MOS have been discussing the same “problem areas” for almost two decades. Therefore, admiration of the problem from the top (the level of advocacy) when communication and potential solutions emerge from the bottom-up indicates a lack of change management within the MOS and organization; an issue that seems to perpetuate history and foreshadow the future, but ear marks the necessity for change.

EVOLUTION OF THE MANPOWER OFFICER: HOW DID WE GET HERE?

The 0102 MOS has undergone numerous changes throughout its history. Many of the resulting unsuccessful initiatives and lessons observed can be directly associated with the common mistakes found in other organizations seeking to undergo change. Prior to 1977, the MOS designator was 0180 with a billet description of Adjutant, originally designated for restricted officers until the Corps later transformed it into an unrestricted officer MOS to relieve critical shortfalls. The Warrant and Limited Duty Officers possessing the 0180 primary MOS were retained until separation creating overages in the MOS, creating room for manpower to fill 0170 Personnel Officer shortages.³¹ Failure to observe the two MOS’s as separate billets at the reporting unit level disregarded the specific training, career progression and intended assignments accompanying this primary staff MOS in its infancy. In turn, this observation failure provided the obstacle that blocked the ability to see the vision for the MOS in the future.

In December 1980, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) approved The Basic School's suggestion to assign female and male officers, uniquely qualified through education and/or previous experience, to assignments where they "best fit" in accordance with the Corps' MOS distribution plan.³² There was an understanding that by doing this, combined with lateral moves from combat arms could assist in better distributing talent when assigning Marines to and/or obtaining the 0180 MOS when requested. However, this effort by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower now failed to create a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition at the lower levels of the organization to ensure quality spread of talent of assignment beyond entry level training.³³

In June 1987, a memo prepared by General Paul X. Kelly credited to Colonel James W. Marsh, Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, for bringing the Corps Manpower programs "light years" forward, further directing that no combat arms officer be given the 0180 MOS.³⁴ Because these changes neglected to anchor within the shared norms of the Corps, uncoordinated decisions were made regarding the MOS and efforts to evolve or change were removed. He stated that having 0180 as a career MOS "continuously haunts me ---and I simply cannot take what I believe to be strong potential for adverse impacts on Marine officers to my grave!"³⁵ Following the publishing of this memo, the message was released to cancel the assignment of the 0180 MOS as a primary MOS to Second Lieutenants because it was believed that administrative support is best served by a mixture of experienced combat arms and service support officers with proper training in procedures of administration.³⁶ Days later the same message was cancelled by recommendation of Lieutenant General Cheatham, Deputy Chief of Staff of Manpower, because he believed that it was a serious mistake. The long-term success and survival of these proposals

required a group Manpower professionals capable of initiating and sustaining the plan for the occupational specialty through and beyond its maturity.

For this reason, the memorandum for the CMC stated that the policy was “a controversial issue...filled with emotion and misperception” and all it did was intensify a problem because it could not be completely implemented.³⁷ General Cheatham further believed that this policy was not in keeping with all of the positive changes that had occurred in the administrative field up to this point in time and that administrative problems would inevitably result in a decrease in combat readiness due to administrative inadequacies. Shortly after General Kelly (CMC) was briefed, the All-Marine Message (ALMAR) was suspended in August 1987, confirmation that change would continue to take place within the Marine Corps administrative occupational field.³⁸

As the Marine Corps worked through periods of reduced manning during the 1990s, the 0180 MOS appeared strong because of overages at the field grade level. Leading into the 21st century, a serious need for Captains and below existed across numerous operational units and new problem areas were arising and identified by Manpower’s Planning and Policy Division in the MOS Status of Force assessment leading into Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.³⁹ The problem areas outlined consisted of inefficient MOS training, inadequate doctrine, and lack of career progression, which lead to severe retention issues.⁴⁰

Shortly following, the Marine Corps created consolidated personnel administration centers to account for a reduction of manpower and resources available to operational units. This shortage led to ultimately the civilianizing of more than 1,370 administrative positions to assist in building up combat arms MOSs and subsequently removing the administrative personnel out of the operational unit S-1s.⁴¹ Additionally and at the same juncture in time, the “Marine-on-

Line” administrative system began to turn a few administrative functions over to the individual Marine further marginalizing the relevance of the MOS.

In October 2013, a request to change the MOS from the 0180, Adjutant to 0102, Manpower Officer was approved.⁴² The G-1 Administrative Advocacy board generated the request to bring MOS numbering into alignment with other common MOSs for unrestricted officers, as well as update the description with the MOS’s relevance and contribution to the warfighter but contained no substantive change. The Manpower Officer description established that one will “plan, coordinate and/or supervise the functions of manpower.”⁴³ The change was released via message, tables of organization were updated with new name changes, and Manpower Officers and commanders were left with a transformation that lacked vision and resources to properly implement. Technology and organizational changes pushed in absence of updated doctrine, training, education, MOS occupational field policy and change management, and leadership ultimately left the Manpower Officer to serve as a “wheel with no spokes.”

MODELING AND FORM FOR OUTLINING LEADING CHANGE

John P. Kotter’s 2012 revised work, *Leading Change*, emphasizes the linkage between leadership and management and provides a framework for producing lasting change within an organization.⁴⁴ He outlines the eight most common mistakes that often lead businesses to ineffectively transform and offers an eight-step process for leading and producing successful change within any organization depicted in figure 2.


Mistakes and elements of Kotter’s model are allowing too much complacency, failing to create a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition, underestimating the power of vision, under communicating the vision by a factor of ten, permitting obstacles to block the new vision, failing to create short-term wins, declaring victory too soon, and neglecting to anchor changes firmly in the corporate culture.⁴⁵ He further details consequences of these mistakes in new strategies not implemented well, acquisitions don’t achieve expected synergies, reengineering takes too long and costs too much, downsizing doesn’t get costs under control and quality programs don’t deliver hoped for results.⁴⁶

In addition to Kotter’s model, this research utilizes the Army’s 21st century Transformation of

Human Resources as a case study and basis for applying the model to the military organization.

This study concludes by determining the degree to which Kotter’s 2012 model for Leading Change could be applied to the Marine Corps’ 0102 transformation initiative. The combination of Kotter with the case study provides an outlook for leading and managing change within the current Marine Corps Manpower organization to ensure that Manpower leaders achieve the desired utility and opportunity in the Marine Corps.

Figure 2. Kotter’s Eight Step Model



ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE MODEL: KOTTER'S EIGHT STEPS

Kotter's eight-stage process of creating major change is a top-led model internationally recognized for assisting organizations to achieve successful transformations. Most important, Kotter emphasizes that the key lies in understanding why organizations resist needed change, what exactly is the multi-stage process that can overcome destruction inertia, and most of all, how the leadership is required to drive that process in a socially healthy way requiring more than good management. Kotter, therefore, proposes eight steps required to lead change. While Kotter's model provides a methodical approach for transformation within an organization, he emphasizes the importance of leadership within the transformation effort.

ARMY ADJUTANT GENERAL CASE STUDY

The values discussed above, while not an Army framework for planning, were verified when the Army Adjutant General branch underwent its transformation at the beginning of the 21st century. The personnel transformation was a line of operation in the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan with Army Adjutant General, Lieutenant General Vollrath, spearheading the mechanisms for change.⁴⁷ His initial warning order to leaders and members of the Adjutant General's Corps was bold. He told them that "Change is hard, and the normal human reaction is to deny it. But, if change scares you, you need to get out of here."⁴⁸ He further conveyed the importance of change with the emergence of new threats and technology within the Army organization. The initiative would leverage automation and web technologies revolutionizing human resource activities.⁴⁹

The Army's transformation efforts first began with a basic revision to the term "personnel administration" in its mission replacing it with "human resources management"

(HRM), more broadly known and familiar to the civilian sector. The concept of HRM ensured that the Army included all aspects of the management of human capital within the organization instead of traditional personnel functions such as paperwork. HRM was accepted by the Army leadership and, over time, has been integrated into policy and doctrine, modern updates to what formerly was described as the functions of personnel management and personnel administration. The Human Resources Officer must now advise on and make informed decisions regarding force structure requirements, recruiting and retention programs, as well as well-being program and unit and individual personnel readiness.²⁴ This resulted in organizational change from the headquarters level all the way down to the operational units, effectively resulting in change surrounding the worth of the personnel and career management within the organization.

Vollrath handed off his initiatives to Lieutenant General Timothy J. Maude who led the furthering of efforts in a strategic human resource management community that ultimately created the capability to provide a “lifecycle personnel support across the entire spectrum of operations.” Supported by an integrated database that coordinated and collected readily available, personnel information for all HR managers in all organizations was accessible and better supports commanders and soldiers individually and collectively.²³ He ensured that alongside technological transformation that probable operational scenarios were captured within Army doctrine with the publication of FM 1-0, *Human Resources Support* in February 2007. This updated doctrine outlined all HR related functions and how it fits into the Army’s operational concept spanning the spectrum of conflict.

The Army now had a common understanding and reference for HR support that worked for the Army: encompassing management concepts of personnel information and readiness;

replacement, casualty, and postal operations; personnel accounting and strength reporting; mobilization and demobilization; and other essential personnel services.

The Army also created a new, lighter type of HR support to increase operational versatility and responsiveness by restructuring personnel assets to sustain the brigade fighting forces; devoid of having theater-level organizations oversee their unit level functions. The new structure also enabled HR officers to excel in key positions of command and staff while retaining their competitiveness for promotion and selection to resident schools. Organizational change efforts converted personnel organizations (ie. Personnel Detachments, Personnel Services Battalion, Personnel Groups geographically located) from providing direct support to becoming a more organic, operational G-1 in concept.²⁴ The Army HR transformation beginning with Vollrath's vision, serves as a modern military example where many factors shaped success once senior leaders committed to making a change for the good of its most precious asset.

ARMY HR TRANSFORMATION AND KOTTER'S MODEL

So how, per Kotter's model did the U.S. Army manage to lead change? In stage one, establishing a sense of urgency, Lieutenant General Volrath gave his initial warning order establishing the sense of urgency and revealing the intent that others should recognize the need for change and its importance to the Army as a fighting organization. In stage two, creating the guiding coalition, Human Resources Command (HRC) reformed in 2003 by merging the personnel assets of U.S. Total Army Personnel Command and the United States Army Reserve Personnel Command along with establishing HRC as a *field operating* agency of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, G-1, a single organization concept encouraging the human resource professionals to work as a team.²⁵ By HRC becoming the G-1's functional proponent for military personnel management and personnel systems and the Center of

Excellence, enough power could also be assembled to lead future change efforts in developing a team with common goals.

In stage three, developing a vision and strategy, the consolidation of human resources personnel within the HRC facilitated a common mission and vision to direct the drivers of change. The G-1 proponent provided a support mechanism within the same location to help direct the change efforts as directed by General Maude.

Communicating the change vision, stage four, was accomplished through the dissemination of the vision through many different avenues such as in the updating of Army field manuals and pamphlets creating an overt and covert common operational picture within the HR enterprise and the Army.

In stage five, empowering broad-based action was accomplished by aligning structure to the vision. The Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) concept enables commanders to possess their own HR capability to ensure modular forces with HR skill and structure to meet current and projected challenges.²⁶ Keeping in line with the fundamentals outlined in FM 1-0, the PSDR concept empowers HR functional experts to ensure the tools, programs, policies, and systems are in place to support manning, personnel readiness, and the well-being of soldiers with a shared sense of purpose.²⁶ In addition, the Army expects officers at the brigade and below level to gain joint training and education earlier in their careers which empowers HR officers to achieve the vision.

Whereas in stage six, generating short-term wins was accomplished through branding, the name change, and merging of the branch leadership, accountability, and accessibility which allowed for better personnel support to the organization and the individual soldier.

In stage seven, consolidating gains and producing more change, the solidification of the process of assignment for human resource managers allowed Officers to increase competitiveness for promotion outside of command opportunity. This induced confidence into stage eight, anchoring new approaches in the culture, where HRC created a new way of doing business that was focused on the soldier and across the service, imbedded itself within military culture. Ultimately, the structural changes to human resource managers within the Army gave way to the sharing of ideas and new practices centrally under one command vice competition for position.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In today's strategic environment, vast technological development and information challenges the modernization of Marine Corps execute the missions and adaptation requires mechanisms that pace with the tempo of the evolution of the future. From automated records to integrated joint manpower systems, many revolutionary ideas are changing the way the Marine Corps Manpower operates in the 21st century. The Marine Corps Operating Concept suggests that it is a "start-point for change, not the end-point." In response to these changes, leaders throughout the Corps continue to turn to innovators at all ranks to share their ideas. However due to recent change management failures to address important elements of the transformation and the role of the 0102 MOS, the forecast changes in the specialty are bleak. It will take bold leadership to undo the latency of the recent past and take concrete steps to readdress steps to transform manpower at the pace of warfighting.

First, the DC, M&RA must create a sense of urgency through accountability within the current occupational field manager and proponent level managers should be tasked to produce a plan to regenerate a current MAGTF Manpower Officer doctrine, revamp 0102 MOS curriculum

and training standards, while overseeing future assignments and effectively managing talent. Though these efforts may require a great deal of coordination in a highly complex system, the effort and time spent in the process will be worth the rewards of the future. Not establishing a sense of urgency will further result in the expenditure of time where admiring the problem results in not a single change initiative. Continual discussions on the same issues and/or symptoms of a root problem, “kicks the can,” and induces further complacency, an environment where change will only occur as a result of crisis.

Next, the charter for MOS advocacy should form around key 0102 MOS leaders who drive change at the headquarters level with support and solution forming from the operational level. General Brilakis stated that he is the “0102 MOS advocate” and “not the MOS manager.” Therefore, power to lead change needs to start with creating the guiding coalition, one that spans the ranks and levels of the organization. This should be well led and by a “hand selected” officer, charged with keeping the processes to evolve in check while minding the Marine Corps’ big picture. What may prove difficult, is creating a sense of trust since an active advocacy charter has not been in play for years. Ultimately, the 0102 MOS needs to have “buy-in” and solid lines of communication to ensure that the vision is well-known and mechanisms for feedback exist to prevent a stagnation in the MOS. If systems are properly in place, like the Training and Readiness Manual and educational curriculum reviews, and are well led, they will be able maintain pace with current modernization initiatives and foresee and avoid the obstacles that prohibit relevance of manpower for the warfighter.

Reinvigorating the process to change, update and foresee the 0102 MOS relevance in full spectrum operations requires new approaches supported by the organizational leadership and bought into by operational level cadres. “Bottom up” approaches to improve the Marine Corps

Manpower Officer must be comprehensively received and assessed. Comprehensive approaches in organizational Marine Corps change must incorporate new manpower initiatives that a lasting effect while achieving short-term wins. As each step is realized, the Manpower Officer MOS will not only create a professional cadre to improve delivery of manpower support across the full range of military operations, but ensure the viability, resiliency and effectiveness of today's ultimate warfighter, the United States Marine.

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³ *OPT Report on Findings in the Case of 0102 Manpower Officer Career Progression and Education Development*, August 24, 2016, Manpower Information Quality Assurance and Advocacy Archives, M&RA, Quantico, VA.

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⁷ ALMAR 144/87

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