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Operation CHROMITE was a brazen move. The amphibious counter-stroke was brilliant in design, but how are such feats sustained? The North Koreans were unable to regain any initiative after the successful landing and breakout of Brigadier General Walker. However, the Marine Corps and its logistics capability passes untested in academic writing. The USMC logistics animal is capable, but when does it merge with Army? Why does it merge with Army? Does it need to or can the Marines keep their logistics power after securing the beach? This paper will dive deeply into the logistics supporting the landing at Inchon and draw conclusions for the future of Marine logistics.

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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Bullets, Beans, and Bandages at High Tide: What the Marine Corps Can Learn from the Logistics at Inchon, 1950

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: Bullets, Beans, and Bandages at High Tide: What the Marine Corps Can Learn from the Logistics at Inchon, 1950.

Author: Major Jason M. Garza, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The Marine Corps has just enough logistics support to "seize and secure advanced naval bases," and to push combat service support (CSS) the last tactical mile; however, during Operation CHROMITE, X Corps pulled logistics capability away from the Marine Corps.

Discussion: From 25 June 1950 through 27 July 1953, the United States was locked in mortal combat with North Korea with the aim to restore South Korea's sovereignty. The intention was bold, as was the commander, Douglas MacArthur. The fighting in South Korea was amateur at its best. From the time President Truman authorized, with UN support, MacArthur to land forces and aid the South Koreans, the forces were in big trouble. MacArthur employed the 24th Division immediately into Pusan port and engaged the enemy by Chinmanpo. These forces were soft and according to the London Times, and New York Times, weak and weary from occupation duty in Japan. Therefore, two more divisions were flooded into Pusan only to meet stiff resistance from the NKPA. The US and UN forces were handedly pushed from the battlefield, only to establish a defensive perimeter by Pusan Port. General Walker, Commander of the 8th Army, gave all the forces a sobering speech that we will not fall back any further and this will not be a Dunkirk, or Bataan. MacArthur landed the 1st Marine Division, and 7th Infantry Division deep into the enemy rear — a daring amphibious counterstroke on 15 September 1950 to save the UN forces. This envelopment from the sea not only severed the NKPA forces, but allowed Brigadier General Walker to break out of Pusan perimeter, link up with X Corps and push the enemy back into North Korea. This paper will dive deeply into the logistics supporting that operation.

Conclusion: Operation CHROMITE was a brazen move. The amphibious counterstroke was brilliant in design, but how are such feats sustained? The North Koreans were unable to regain any initiative after the successful landing and breakout of Brigadier General Walker. However, the Marine Corps and its logistics capability passes untested in academic writing. The USMC logistics animal is capable, but when does it merge with Army? Why does it merge with Army? Does it need to or can the Marines keep their logistics power after the beach?

DISCLAIMER

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Preface

No essay, paper, or book is written alone. Therefore, upfront, I want to thank Dr. William Gordon for his guidance, and tutelage during this paper. Also, I would also like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Owen "Nuts" Nucci, USMC, for challenging me, my ideas, and my conclusions. I also want to thank Colonel Jeffrey Jarosz, USMC, for giving me the inspiration to deep dive the Inchon campaign. The time spent reading, and developing the professional military education (PME) discussions for the officers of Combat Logistics Regiment-1 gave me a passion to review primary source documents about the landing of the 1st Marine Division at Inchon, Korea. Last but not least, I want to thank the brilliant ladies at the Learning Communication Skills Center without whom my writing would not be worth reading.

The body of knowledge in following pages represents that passion. Consequently, there is no in depth discussion about the successes, failures, and trappings of supplying a bold plan like Operation CHROMITE. There are; however, a few books written about the Korean War, the Pusan breakout, the landing at Inchon, and the Chosin Reservoir. Inasmuch, my readings allowed me to understand every aspect of the ebb and flow the maneuver forces conducted, but not how that movement was sustained. In my opinion that is a gross oversight. I was optimistic about discovering the calculus of supply and transport, but also disturbed there were few studies about logistics. Martin Van Creveld wrote *Supplying War*, Donald Engels covered the *Logistics of the Macedonian Army* and Kenneth Privratsky wrote *Logistics of the Falklands War*; these books provided me a basis of presentation and investigation. My study dives into the difficulties of supplying Operation CHROMITE, and dares to postulate about the future of Marine logistics.

Sincerely,
Major Jason M. Garza, United States Marine Corps

"The line between disorder and order lies in logistics."

-Sun Tzu

Introduction

Operation CHROMITE was General Douglas MacArthur's brilliant amphibious counterstroke to land his X Corps, the First Marine Division, followed by the 7th Infantry Division, deep into the Korean peninsula behind the formidable North Korean People's Army (NKPA) *In Min Gun*.[1] The landing at Inchon served two purposes, one, to sever the logistics and supply capability of the *In Min Gun*, and, two, to break out the US 8th Army, retake Seoul, and push the *In Min Gun* back across the 38th parallel.[2]

The landing at Inchon curried no favor with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Omar Bradley, the newly formed Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS), or President Harry Truman; in fact, General MacArthur fought not only his higher headquarters, but also the seemingly insurmountable approach lanes, tides, and geographical constraints of Inchon as well.[3] Marine Corps logistics units have enough logistics capability to "seize and secure advanced naval bases,"[4] and to push combat service support (CSS) the last tactical mile; however, during Operation CHROMITE, X Corps pulled logistics capability away from the Marine Corps proving the immutable law of sustaining the MAGTF: it cannot be done alone.

The Marine Corps cannot go it alone, and who are these Marines who provide the crucial element of logistics? Who are the Marines that plan the logistics system to win battles? What can the Marine Corps learn from Inchon and can it make a better logistician? Lastly, can the

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[1] David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 293.
[2] Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*, rev., and ex., ed., (New York: Free Press, 1991), 478.
[3] Ibid, 479.
[4] Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Marine Operating Concept* (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, September, 2016), 12.

marriage of logistics and engineering training usher the Marine Corps into 2025 and beyond?

"My logisticians are a humourless lot...they know if my campaign fails, they are the first I will slay."

-Alexander the Great

Logistics Theory

Clausewitz on Supply

Arguably, there are no two thinkers who did more to define, and codify the nature, theory, and principles of war than did the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz, and the Swiss writer Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini. However, their ability to illuminate the problems surrounding providing logistics leaves every serious student of war found wanting. This is by no means a diatribe about what Clausewitz and Jomini may have missed when writing about war, but to contextualize logistics within the fluid and nonlinear environment of war.

Therefore, it is important to note that Clausewitz reached many of his conclusions while serving in all facets of the Prussian Army during a time of great crisis in the 1800s.[5] Europe in late 18th and early 19th century was plunged into chaos when Napoleon attempted to conquer the known world. Interestingly enough, Clausewitz actively served in combat roles from as early as twelve years old.[6] Furthermore, he served in combat and staff positions during the Prussian campaign against the invasion of Napoleon's *Grande Armée* in the early 19th century.[7]

Clausewitz watched, helplessly, as his countrymen and army did little to stop this juggernaut from France and suffered defeat after humiliating defeat. Adding insult to injury, Clausewitz was captured by the French in 1807 and spent many some months in prison.[8] It was there, in prison, humiliated and angry, that Clausewitz developed his understanding about the

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[5] Donald Stoker, *Clausewitz: His Life and Work* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 14.
[6] Ibid, 12.
[7] Ibid, 175.
[8] Ibid, 68.

theory, and the nature of war. Clausewitz would then spend the next twenty-five years revising his theories, and understanding of war culminating with his wife, Marine von Clausewitz, publishing the collection of his theories.[9]

Clausewitz's tome of erudition was titled *On War* and serves the keystone deeply embedded in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1 *Warfighting*, MCDP 4 *Logistics*, MCDP 5 *Planning*, and MCDP 6 *Command and Control*. Clausewitz, ever the strategic thinker, describes logistics as the one that most directly affects the fighting.[10] He also states that an "interaction therefore will be most frequent between strategy and matter of supply, and nothing is more common than to find considerations of supply affecting the strategic lines of a campaign and a war."[11] However, Clausewitz only skims the surface of the in-depth analysis one would expect from a strategic thinker because he was concerned with a theory of war and not just a characteristic of war. Inasmuch, Clausewitz was very much preoccupied about the *why* of war, and not necessarily the *how*; thereby, setting him apart from other thinkers in his age. On the other hand, Clausewitz does offer tactical advice to the commander in Book Six, and Seven discussing the defense, and attack respectively. As a result, he devotes chapters fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen of Book Five of *On War* to Maintenance and Supply, Base of Operations, and Lines of Communication respectively. These chapters give the deepest insight about logistics from Clausewitz's perspective.

Clausewitz begins to unravel the difficulties of supporting a modern army in Book Five, and links everything back to his theory of war. There are a few modern concepts derived from Book Five, despite the fact that Clausewitz could only ponder "modern" as a reference to a 19th

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[9] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed., and trans. by Michael Howard, and Peter Paret (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984), 1.
[10] Ibid, 131.
[11] Ibid, 131.

century army. Clausewitz was only able to observe an army moving by foot or by horse, which, strangely enough has not changed much since 1832. The boots worn by warriors are better designed, trucks can carry more and move farther than horses, and the aeroplane makes the Pegasus less of a legendary being and more of a modern replacement for carts. Clausewitz begins to describe the system of supply to support an army far from its industrial base and emanating from depots.[12] Furthermore, the supply system is designed to keep the soldier ready at all times. The whole focus of the supply system is described in very impassioned terms. In fact, it is quite visceral as Clausewitz is not concerned with soldiers marching under heavy load for many miles without a crust of bread.[13] Hardship is merely a fact of war, but not one needed to derive the nature and theory of war. The supply system; however, is produced at the enterprise level from home station or procured locally by the army through nefarious or dubious means.[14] This is fascinating because Clausewitz describes how unsuitable Napoleon's logistics concept is and how it would not survive the times. Taking from the locals is something associated with guerrillas or partisans and not of a professional army nowadays. However, Napoleon sent his generals forward to forage, procure, steal, or loot provisions for the army.[15] Clausewitz showed disdain for the looting, and stealing aspects of rapidly moving French forces.

Clausewitz's thoughts about supply are pedestrian in nature, but give way to the logistics problem at hand for a modern 20th century military and that is supply depots. Stealing from the locals may have its merits, but not as a reliable concept in the 20th century. However, the establishing of depots and the positioning stocks is exactly how modern armies will support themselves and plan campaigns. Armies use lines of communications linking hubs of supplies

[12] Ibid, 331.
[13] Ibid, 330.
[14] Ibid, 332.
[15] Ibid, 335.

along protected, and established routes to maneuver forces in order to sustain momentum and this has progressed far from the interior lines of the Napoleonic Age or even in Mölke's era. The mental gymnastics to extend this concept of basing from eighty miles to eight thousand miles is not difficult and neither is the medium upon which those supplies will travel.

Clausewitz did; however, address supply as a component of war that requires attention.[16] He was determined to derive the nature of war, but not let common factors of all war derail his nonlinear discussion. This logic is present in Book Two of *On War* which was titled "On the Theory of War".[17] Clausewitz will go on to elaborate why supply, maintenance, and medical services will not assist with a theory of war. However, all logisticians and engineers must provide sustainment in a nonlinear environment, rife with danger, and do so with linear capabilities. According to Clausewitz, using supply as a system to describe the theory war is not practical.[18] Therefore, supply, logistics, and maintenance are always present on the battlefield and present very real challenges to an army. Logistics and matters of supply will always occupy the commander's genius, but does not represent the totality of war.

Also, Clausewitz could neither foresee the advent of the airplane nor the floating depots used to sustain combat forces in hostile a country, but the concept of a depot holds true. Clausewitz, like the Chinese military theorist, Sun Tzu, dismisses the bean counters maxim of logistics drives operations when he pondered "whether war governs the supply system or is governed by it."[19] Clausewitz is undoubtedly correct when he states the supply system will change, adapt, and morph, to achieve established ends vice being the established ends.[20] Feeding

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[16] Ibid, 135.
[17] Ibid, 133.
[18] Ibid, 135.
[19] Ibid, 337.
[20] Ibid, 338.

troops, fixing weapons, and feeding horses, or trucks is not the aim of an army at war—the army is there to win, and defeat the enemy. The maintenance and supply of troops is but merely part of the fog and friction that pulls an army away from committing all its resources and assets against a belligerent. According to Clausewitz, describing the theory of war in terms of supply is as "relevant to combat as the craft of the swordsmith to the art of fencing."[21] In conclusion, Clausewitz understood the need to develop a highly fluid system of hub-and-spoke depots to supply forces in war. Arguably, the chapters devoted to reducing supply and logistics to a necessary evil instead reveal the need for someone on the staff to design and implement a nonlinear method to sustain the warfighter.

Jomini on Logistics

Baron Antione-Henri de Jomini, coincidently, appears on the scene exactly at the same time as Carl von Clausewitz, but presents the character of war as more linear.[22] Furthermore, Jomini prescriptively and scientifically describes war and dares to write and publish *The Art of War* in direct contrast to Clausewitz. Jomini's work, the *Art of War* is a narrow, prescriptive evaluation of how to wage a Napoleonic war. Some thoughts transcend merely commenting about the character of 19th century warfare, and those passages seem lifted straight from Clausewitz. Notwithstanding, Jomini was in Napoleon's *Grande Armée* during his European conquest and observed the Great Captain at work.[23]

Jomini; however, was neither baptized in the crucible of war as early as Clausewitz, nor was Jomini given any direct command of troops in battle. Jomini joined the profession of arms

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[21] Ibid, 133.
[22] Ibid, 516.
[23] Baron De Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. by G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, 2008), 194.

after being consumed by the French Revolution in 1798 and there was nothing substantial about that service and he went about his previous ambition of banking.[24] Jomini later joins the French Army again in 1804 and is given various staff positions of little importance, but he is able to write and think about war and warfare.[25] He did, to note, attain the rank of Brigadier General and served on Marshall Ney's staff for a time being.[26] Jomini was characterized as arrogant, sloppy, and ambitious by those who even remembered him. Interestingly enough, Jomini was opposite of Clausewitz at French river crossing of Beresina during their retreat from Moscow.[27] Shots were not traded between the two at that battle; however, the shots were traded between the two in their respective writing.[28]

Inasmuch, Baron De Jomini, ever the tactician, describes logistics as "the practical art of moving, and supplying armies."[29] Consequently, Jomini lists five other branches of war as: statesmanship, strategy, grand tactics, engineering, and minor tactics.[30] Jomini places the idea, and responsibility of moving armies, on the Chief of Staff because of its importance to the battle. Also, Jomini lists logistics as one of the six branches of war, but does not define, give structure, provide illustrations, or quantify what *is* logistics. Jomini stumbles around in the dark grasping at applications or examples or logistics, but relegates logistics to the mystical, or in his own words merely "the science of detail."[31] In the *Art of War* there are attempts to step away from establishing rules or steps for the reader about logistics; however, it's not a big step and Jomini falls back on a prescriptive list of what he understands as logistics.

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[24] Book.
[25] Book.
[26] Book.
[27] Book.
[28] John R. Elting, "Jomini: Napoleon's Disciple?" *Military Affairs*, 17-26.
[29] Jomini, 194.
[30] Ibid, 195.
[31] Ibid, 194.

Jomini is a product of the 19th century Enlightenment movement and his writing reflects that reductionist approach. Everyone affected by the Enlightenment attempted to apply math, order, rules, and steps to everything up to and including war. The deceptive title of Jomini's work *Art of War* belies this mathematical zeitgeist. Jomini lays out lists to adhere to, but not a way of thinking as contrasted with Clausewitz's Romantic and philosophical approach war. Therefore, Jomini's discussions given to administration and engineering are not explored in the same depth as say his discussion of strategy, or grand tactics. Jomini does; however, describe mobilizing, and embarking formations as critical to development of the battle.[32] Furthermore, he does describe logistics as more than just the lodging of troops, directions to the marches of columns, camps and supply depots.[33] He starts to unravel the necessity of logistics when waging war far from home shores and the tyranny of distance, but loses his relevance thereafter. As an example, Jomini has sixteen point about marches, convoys, cantonments, and depots of which on their own are interesting, but not as inspiring or illuminating as Jomini believes.[34] All in all, the creative art of employing the hard science of calculation ties Jomini's chapter on logistics to the modern-day logistician to a fault.

Marine Corps Doctrine, 1950

The acme of military writings for the US Marine Corps describe the application of violence based on the works of Clausewitz and Jomini and were codified in 1997. Inasmuch, MCDP 4 *Logistics* describe logistics as "the art and science of planning and executing the movement and supply of forces."[35] However, the incredibly fluid, nonlinear, and creative

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[32] Ibid, 198.
[33] Ibid, 195.
[34] Ibid, 201
[35] Headquarters US Marine Corps, *MCDP-4 Logistics*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, February

MCDP 4 was not in print in 1950, but lived on within the hearts of the Marines. Also, the documents that governed logistics were contained in the Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 2-15 *Small Wars Manual* and USF 63 *Amphibious Instructions: Landing Forces* into the 1950s. MCDP 4 *Logistics* and other documents for the modern warrior will be discussed later in the paper.

The Marine Corps of the 1940's perfected, refined and captured the complexity of amphibious operations during World War II in the USF 63. Also, the Marines captured the complexity of supplying and waging what Clausewitz refers to as a People's War in the FMFRP 2-15. Stated in the *Small Wars Manual*, "logistics is that branch of the military art which embrace the details of transportation and supplies."[36] The *Small Wars Manual*, originally published in 1940 as NAVMC 2890, contains the lessons learned and prescribes how to sustain the force in a sustained operation against a belligerent people. Chapter III breaks down logistics into supply and transportation and gives detailed considerations for the logistician. Furthermore, each of the sections drill into best practices about procuring supplies, establishing supply depots, and the distribution of ammunition, food and water. Interestingly enough, there is no diagram about establishing a system sustain the warfighter. That is left entirely up the logistician to discover what is available in the theater, who is providing it, how to get it and, lastly, how to move to it. The art and science of getting bullets, beans and bandages about the battlespace is the crux of the problem and *The Small Wars Manual* describes that in a very Jominian way.

Also, the *Amphibious Instructions: Landing Forces*, describe the "how" of getting a force ashore against an entrenched enemy and sustaining that effort. Marines and sailors of WWII

21, 1997), 3.

[36] Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*, FMFRP 12-15 (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, December 22, 1990), SWM 3-1.

learned the hard during the battles of Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Guadalcanal and Saipan to name a few. The Marines understand where the resupply was coming from and did not limit themselves to two dimensions, but capitalized on three dimensions with the use of aircraft. Also, the manual describes the creation of specific forces to establish and run the beach because that is foothold. Everything is funneled through the beach until airfields are established. The lessons learned and contained in these manuals assists the logistician, but still leaves a lot in their creative hands.

In conclusion, nature and theory of logistics comes quite nicely to one point: people. The logistician is subject all the same forces as the infantryman. The logistician must battle weather, fatigue, friction, and fear. Furthermore, the logistics system applied to operations can slow, speed, or change the options a commander can employ. Clausewitz, Jomini, and the compilers of Marine Corps and Navy doctrine recognize the potential of logistics and worked to provide a path for logisticians to follow. However, it is apparent that a Marine or a team of Marines must sit, understand the environment, understand the problem and apply hard calculus to solve that wicked problem. Lastly, that plan must be just as fluid and responsive to the force and provide the commander with a lethal option to unleash if necessary.

"Mars must be fed. Toady his tools of war demand huge quantities of fuel and ammunition."

- John A. Lynn

A Prelude to War

The strategic landscape after the Victory over Japan (VJ), and the Victory in Europe (VE) was tense, but optimistic.[37] The United States had harnessed the power of the atom, weaponized

[37] Millett, 452.

that power, and employed that power against a belligerent — the Empire of Japan — twice.[38] The economies of the great super powers: England, Germany, France, and the Soviet Union were in utter ruins. World War II cost the Allies and the Axis powers a terrible deal more than initially understood. Generations of men were lost with the Soviet Union losing twenty-one percent of their population, and France, Britain and Germany each losing about sixteen percent. Therefore, the United States was thrown into the leading role as the World's superpower.

The initial goals of the Truman administration were to establish a robust economy based on free, and unencumbered trade; a strong, but affordable economy; contain the spread of Communism, and to incorporate nuclear power into the national strategy.[39] Furthermore, the Koreans were struggling to establish a united Korea. The Koreans, for too long, were the subject of Japanese occupation and harassment and wanted sovereignty. Difficulties arose when the Soviets influenced the northern half of Korea while US forces occupied the southern half.[40] The United Nations wanted and supported free and democratic elections, but Syngman Rhee of South Korea and Kim Il-Sung of North Korea could not come to an understanding to unite the country. Neither was willing to accept the other's political philosophy; therefore, Korea, entered into the 1950s in a classic stalemate between Democracy and Communism or Good versus Evil.[41]

Truman's Vision in The Nuclear Age

The 1950s were tense because the United States had developed a doomsday machine—the nuclear bomb—in 1945. At the time, General Douglas MacArthur was unaware Oppenheimer and his band of scientists had harnessed nuclear power, had weaponized that

[38] Ibid, 446.
[39] Ibid, 447.
[40] T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History*, (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2004), 29.
[41] Ibid, 30.

power, and had created two atomic bombs — *Little Boy* and *Fat Man*. Consequently, in 1945, after MacArthur liberated the Philippines, Okinawa, and Peleliu he turned his staff to planning Operation DOWNFALL or the more commonly known as the invasion of Japan.[42] Moreover, General MacArthur focused on Operation OLYMPIC, and CORONET.[43] Operation OLYMPIC was destined to be the first amphibious operation to land US forces on the Japanese island of Kyushu, signaling the beginning of the annihilation of her army.[44]

However, MacArthur was never afforded the opportunity to invade Japan because on 6 August 1945 Colonel Paul Tibbets piloted the *Enola Gay* from Tinian with an atomic weapon code named: *Little Boy*. Her destination: Hiroshima, Japan. The destructive power unleashed on Japan leveled the entire city of Hiroshima. People were vaporized, buildings vanished, and life was never the same in the military seaport after *Little Boy* was dropped. On the other hand, Emperor Hirohito, and his staff would not accept President Truman's demand of unconditional surrender. Hirohito, and the zealots within his staff were adamant about resisting till their last breath. Conversely, the staff, and the Emperor were working through diplomatic channels to deliver alternative surrender terms to President Truman via the British. President Truman, however, would only accept an unconditional surrender from the Empire of Japan.[45]

Therefore, on 9 August 1945, Major Charles W. Sweeney piloted *Bockscar*, and left Tinian with an atomic weapon code named: *Fat Man*. Her destination: Nagasaki, Japan. The devastation was, again, incredible; however, the effects were somewhat stunted. Major Sweeney did not deploy the weapon directly over Nagasaki, and instead deployed the weapon two miles

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[42] John Ray Skates, *The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb*, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 5.
[43] Ibid, 4.
[44] Ibid, 6.
[45] Bill O'Reilly and Martin Dugard, *Killing the Rising Sun*: How America Vanquished World War II Japan, (NY: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2016), 133.

away from the city center. The devastation was comparable to Hiroshima despite the fact Major Sweeney overshot the target.[46] The devastation was complete and exceeded the expectations of even the scientists in Los Alamos. Deep in the recesses of every air power theorists resonated the end of wanton slaughter. Now, with a single bomb, could a war end before it really began. The next war would be nuclear and it would be one sided.

A new dawn appeared in the White House. Germany was defeated. Japan was defeated. Now, President Truman could put the awful business of war behind him after having lived through war as a captain in an army artillery unit in WWI and then again as the Commander in Chief of US Armed Forces during WWII.[47] No more wars and the President had the perfect doomsday device to ensure the peace; however, the President now was concerned for the spreading bloom of Communism oozing from the Soviet Union.[48] In order for President Truman to focus on the internal strength of the United States he would have to cut monies from somewhere. The military was not as necessary anymore, but the US Constitution did demand there will always be a military.[49] The U.S. Constitution; however, did not stipulate how big the Army and Navy should be. Therefore, the military was slashed from a war time high of twelve million fighting men and women down to 2 million.[50] However, there was a conflict brewing, just to the west of Japan, between North and South Korea unbeknownst to the Truman Administration.[51] The Communist North Korea wanted to force, at gunpoint, the Democratic South Korea into unification ostensibly confirming Truman's fears of a new war of Communism

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[46] O'Reilly, 135.
[47] Millett, 446.
[48] Millett, 447.
[49] U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8.
[50] Joseph C. Goulden, *Korea: The Untold Story of the War* (New York: Times Books, 1982), 24.
[51] Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea 1945-1950: A House Burning*, (Lawrence KS: University of Kansas Press, 2005.), 189

versus Democracy early in the spring of 1950.[52]

Post-World War II Japan

Also, on 9 August 1945, the Soviet Union broke their alliance with Japan, and invaded Manchuria with the sixteen Soviet Armies swarming around the Japanese from three fronts. The atomic bombs leveling two cities, President Truman announcing to the world that the US harnessed atomic energy, and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was finally enough to bring the Empire of Japan to her knees. Emperor Hirohito, on 15 August, 1945, made an unprecedented radio address to the people of Japan ostensibly ending the war with America, and accepting all the terms of the surrender. Inasmuch, on 2 September 1945 the government of Japan formally surrendered to the US government on the deck of the *USS Missouri*. General MacArthur was appointed as the Far East Commander (FEC) immediately following the surrender of Japan, and stationed the 8th Army in Japan to oversee the terms of the surrender, and the rebuilding of Japan.

General MacArthur was deep into overseeing the rebuild of Japan as the debate raged on in the US Capitol about North Korea's sabre rattling. In that small corner of the world, General MacArthur was at the helm, for four years now, overseeing the rebuilding of Japan in the nuclear age. MacArthur's absence from the development of nuclear weapons still stings a bit because in 1945 he was unaware of the Los Alamos project headed by J. Robert Oppenheimer's group hidden away deep in the New Mexico desert. President Truman, and the JCS were entirely focused on the growing Russian threat to western Europe.[53] Combat power and logistics was focused on the 82nd and 101st Divisions positioned to check perceived Russian ambitions.

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[52] Millett, 190.
[53] Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*, 445.

This was all happening as General Douglas MacArthur stood next to a defeated Emperor Hirohito for a photo shoot in on September 29, 1947 as reported by the *New York Times*. The picture serves two purposes: one is to put on full public display the difference in stature between General MacArthur, and Hirohito, and two, to continue the daily public shaming of the once God King of Japan. General MacArthur forced Emperor Hirohito, the manifest deity, to drive over to his Far Eastern Command (FEC) building, the *Dai Ichi* building, every day as a means to show the Japanese public that the Emperor is subordinate to the Far East Commander.[54] Furthermore, the physical differences between the two men are visceral, and intentional. Emperor Hirohito is immaculately dressed with a top hat and tails; however, MacArthur is dressed in working khakis, without ribbons, and the only decorations displayed are the five-stars on his collar. On another note, General MacArthur at six-foot-four towers over the smaller, five-foot-two Emperor Hirohito. The disparity is intentional because MacArthur wanted Japan, and more importantly the Japanese people to know they were defeated.[55] Lastly, General MacArthur was largely focused on commanding all far east forces, and out of touch with the aspirations of the Truman administration. MacArthur did what could with four divisions all manned and equipped to 60% their normal strength, an Air Force that fared no better and the shell of the once great 7th Fleet with one carrier and a small compliment to destroyers and cruisers.[56]

Armed Forces in 1950

Times were easy in Japan from 1945-1950 for US occupying forces. General MacArthur was basking in the glory of defeating an incredibly resilient, and determined enemy.

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[54] Stephen R. Taaffe, MacArthur's *Korean War Generals*, (Lawrence KS: University of Kansas Press, 2016), 15.
[55] Douglas A. MacArthur, *Reminiscences: General of the Army* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 203.
[56] Millett, 477.

Furthermore, MacArthur was able to drive Japanese away from the hatred, and violence so prevalent in Japan from the early 1900s. The easy occupation duties, and second tier logistics support eroded the 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, and 1st Cavalry Division. The soldiers began to grow complacent, standards diminished, and discipline eroded.[57] Soldiers rotated in, and out of the divisions, but the threat of another war seemed to slip further and further from everyone's minds. Training exercises to keep the men sharp were mere shells of their former selves, and the tactics, techniques, and procedures did not match reality of the next war. For instance, North Korean communist forces now employed the Soviet made T-34 tank. Arguably, the T-34 was the most effective mass produced tank of the times sporting 40-millimeter armor and an 85-millimeter main gun.[58] However, the anti-tank rockets in Japan employed by the 8th Army were of World War II vintage. They were the 2.36 inch rockets, and would merely bounce off the T-34 like shooting a BB gun at a freight train. Furthermore, the US had developed a more powerful rocket that was 3.5 inches, but those rockets were earmarked and shipped to western Europe first or held in US. The 8th Army was not ready for any war, let alone a tank war in any way, shape or form.

Also, the Marine Corps was struggling as well within Harry Truman's *Pax Romana*.

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[57] Taaffe, 17.

[58] Joseph C. Goulden, Korean *War: The Untold Story of the War*, (New York: Times Books, 1982), 42.

Inasmuch, the Marine Corps was absolutely gutted after the surrender of the Japanese. The Corps saw herself cut from a wartime stance of 474,000 Marines to 74,000 Marines by 1950.[59] The Corps was marginalized, and subject of the ire from President Truman, General Omar Bradley, the CJCS, and the rest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Clifton B. Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps, was ridiculed by the President Truman when he, publicly declared, that the Marines are just the police force of the Navy and they will stay that way as long as he is President. Also, President Truman declared that the Marines have a propaganda machine that rivals Stalin. President Truman, however, apologized to the Commandant for his comments because of pressure from Congressman and Veteran Marines. Furthermore, the Marine Corps was not alone in her struggle with the JCS, and the President.

The Navy was also cut to the proverbial bone. Secretary Johnson cut the Navy's amphibious ships from 362 in 1945 to 91 by 1950. Also, 510 landing craft are scrapped, and only one was built to replace them between 1945 and 1950. General Bradley, and Secretary Johnson's cuts to the Navy, and Marine Corps almost guaranteed that large-scale, amphibious operations will never occur again. Not because the prediction was correct, but because the US would not have the means, the experience, or the will to land a highly-trained force against entrenched defenders on a hostile shore in a nuclear age.

General Omar Bradley was an ardent critic of the Marine Corps. Bradley openly belittled the Marines when he testified before Congress. Bradley, as the Chairman, was explaining the future of warfare now that the power of the atom was recently harnessed, weaponized, and delivered successfully to a distant target. Bradley was supporting the shifting the funds go to the US Air Force to build the B-36 Peacemaker Strategic Bomber. Warfare, as the Chairman saw it,

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[59] Gordon L. Rottman, *Inch'on 1950: The Last Great Amphibious Assault* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2006), 10.

was in the air with nuclear bombs. Omar Bradley declared that amphibious operations are a relic of the past and will never happen in the future of warfare. Senior Marine officers could only sit stoically as the CJCS described the Marines as not necessary for the defense of the US. Sadly, President Truman agreed, and directed the Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson, take an axe to the size, and scope of the Marine Corps. Secretary Johnson was swift with his axe and cleaved the Marine into pieces.

Be that as it may, the 74,000 Marines, were split between the 1st and 2nd Marine Division and focused intently on training and discipline, despite the downsizing. General O.P. Smith drove a fanatical training schedule as the Commanding General (CG) of 1st Marine Division to ensure the Marines were ready to deploy, and win the nation's battles—any battle. In particular, the Marines of the 1st Marine Division spent weeks in the field, plying their trade, and improving upon lessons learned from war in the Pacific. The logistics units supported the infantry Marines in the field, and honed their skills in the killing arts. What good are bullets, beans, and bandages when the units carrying the supplies cannot get to or from the front lines? Marine Logistics units trained to support the infantry units from the sea, across a contested beach, over targeted lines of communications, and all alone. Marines do not guard other Marines, and that *ethos* was trained at every opportunity in Twenty-nine Palms and Camp Pendleton.

The Summer of 1950 was also a turbulent time in Korea as well. The military advisors from the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) lifted off earlier in 1948, and were now back in Japan as part of the 8th Army. The Republic of Korea's (ROK) 100,000-man Army was, supposedly, trained well, and was prepared to defend her borders if necessary.[60] The ROK Army

[60] Gordon L. Rottman, *Inch'on 1950: The Last Great Amphibious Assault* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2006), 8.

was limited to 100,000 soldiers because an army that size is not overtly threatening, but would prevent the North Koreans from taking over South Korea by force. The ROK's six divisions were ready; at least from the US perspective. However, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) used the time between 1945-1950 to build a highly disciplined, well trained, well equipped, and motivated army of ten infantry divisions, an armored brigade, and the support units of 224,000 soldiers and 150 T-34 tanks.[61] The NKPA end was to unite, by force, the Korean peninsula under a Communist regime. The Soviet military advisors to the NKPA did little to alter the course of Kim Il-Sung's ambitions and give the speech by U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson.[62] The Soviets believed the Americans would allow the NKPA to resolve the centuries old desire for Korea to unite, albeit under a Communist regime.[63]

North Korean Aggression

Invasion of South Korea

However, everything changed on 25 June 1950 when eight divisions of the NKPA swarmed over the 38th parallel into South Korea.[64] The effect was shocking, and caused an incredible stir amongst the FEC Headquarters, and Washington DC. President Truman acted swiftly, and with the United Nations (UN) issued a security resolution ostensibly declaring war on North Korea.[65] General MacArthur was given permission to support the ROK Army, and push the invading NKPA back across the 38th parallel.[66] However, the time needed to move troops from the 24th ID from Kobe, Japan to Pusan, South Korea would take time. Time that MacArthur believed he had based on the ability of the ROK Army's resistance. This was not the

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[61] Ibid, 8.
[62] Millett, 476.
[63] Millett, 476.
[64] Millett, 475.
[65] Fehrenbach, 56.
[66] Ibid, 57.

case. Seoul, the South Korean capital fell within three days, and by the end of the eighth day the NKPA controlled the two major roads leading south, the rail lines, and the port's facilities at Inchon, Wonsan, and Kunsan.[67]

MacArthur's first act was to speed the deployment of Task Force Smith to Korea, and get them directly into the fight.[68] TF Smith was the lead echelon of the 1/24th Infantry Battalion expedited into the theater. They landed at the port of Pusan, and received their orders from Major General Dean, commander of the 24th Infantry Division (24th ID).[69] They were to proceed to Taejon, tie in with ROK forces, and spoil the NKPA advance. All intelligence reports indicated that the NKPA would stop their advance once they realized there was a US infantry battalion on the battlefield.

Consequently, the NKPA did not stop their advance once the vanguard ran into TF Smith. Instead, the vanguard destroyed TF Smith—easily. The unit was not equipped to deal with T-34 tanks. The 2.36 inch rockets were ineffective and useless. The 75mm recoilless rifles did not damage the tanks; in fact, the recoilless rifles betrayed US positions making the T-34 gunner's job much easier. TF Smith scattered within hours of first contact with the enemy. The result: weapons, and ammunition left in fighting positions, sick, and wounded captured, and a battalion scurrying for the nearest friendly lines. It took as long as fourteen days for some of the soldiers to make it back to friendly lines. TF Smith did little to stop the NKPA advance; in fact, the NPA advance was only halted for seven hours.[70]

Pusan Perimeter

[67] Rottman, 9.
[68] Ibid, 9.
[69] Fehrenbach, 65
[70] Fehrenbach, 71.

This caused the FEC headquarters, and MacArthur to advance, and expedite the 24th ID, and 25th Infantry Division (25th ID) into Korea. Both divisions flowed into the port of Pusan quickly, and efficiently. However, the logistical success of the 8th Army were short lived. The 24th ID, the 25th ID, met the enemy, and were defeated in detail.[71] The divisions fell back, gave ground, and conducted a retreat in every engagement with the NKPA.[72] The situation was dire. Lieutenant General Walker, commander of the 8th Army requested reinforcements, and asked for more bombing of the NKPA lines of communications (LOC) by the Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF).[73] However, all was met with few tangible results. The NKPA was intent on driving the UN, and US forces into the sea and creating a possible American Dunkirk.[74] General MacArthur realized that in order to complete the task of restoring South Korea's sovereignty, he will need to break out General Walker's 8th Army from the Pusan perimeter.

The only way to do that effectively, and quickly was to land a force behind the NKPA, sever the logistics LOCs, and retake Seoul.[75] General MacArthur envisioned landing the 1st CAV at Inchon around the middle of August called Operation BLUE HEARTS.[76] Operation BLUE HEARTS was cancelled before serious planning was conducted because of Lieutenant General Walker's deteriorating position. General Walker; however, received the 1st CAV in time to slow the advance of the NKPA, but was not able to stabilize the defense and transition from a fighting retreat into a breakout and pursuit of the NKPA.[77] On the other hand, senior officers from the 1st Marine Division were in Japan at the end of June, early July to train army

[71] Max Hastings, *The Korean War*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 98.
[72] Fehrenbach, 108.
[73] Ibid, 108.
[74] Goulden, 165.
[75] Fehrenbach, 162.
[76] Ibid, 162.
[77] Ibid, 171.

units in the art of amphibious landings.[78] General Lemuel Shepherd Commander of Fleet Marine Force (FMF), Pacific and Col Krulak informed MacArthur that a Marine Division, with its own air support, and support capability is on hand, and ready for action. MacArthur was not ready to abandon his amphibious assault just yet and the Marines presented a superb option. The only way, now, to get General Walker back on the offensive was to land the Marines at Inchon.

Fire Brigade

Therefore, on 10 August 1950 General MacArthur asks the JCS for the 1st Marine Division with attached air wing to land, at a place to be decided, behind the NKPA. Thereby, breaking the NKPA advance, breaking out Walker, and restoring South Korea's sovereignty. Initially, the JCS balked at the idea of mobilizing the Marines. However, the JCS does capitulate, and authorizes the activation of the 1st Marine Division with attached air wing. The planners of the division pull out every stop, and mobilize the 1st Provisional Marine Rifle Brigade as the vanguard for the 1st Marine Division. The Brigade was based around the 1st Marine Regiment, and Marine Air Group 33. The Brigade steamed over to Japan on any and all available shipping, and did so in under two weeks. The Marines accumulated the weapons, ammunition, rations, parts, vehicles, and equipment in near record speed. Furthermore, the Marine Corps was able to get that Brigade into the fight at Pusan.

Table 1.1
Organization 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)[79]

	Officers	Enlisted	Total
Brigade Headquarters Provisional	25	107	132
Det, 1st Signal Battalion	16	186	202
Co A, 1st Motor Transport Battalion (Rein)	8	107	113
Co B, 1st Medical Battalion (Rein)	5	90	95
Co A, 1st Shore Party Battalion (Rein)	10	170	180
Co A, 1st Engineer Battalion (Rein)	6	200	206

[78] Millett, 478.

[79] T. X. Hammes, *Forgotten Warriors: The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, the Corps Ethos, and The Korean War*, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 105.

Det, 1st Ordnance Battalion	4	115	119
Co A, 1st Tank Battalion	8	165	173
1st Battalion, 11th Marines (Rein)	37	455	492
4.2" Mortar Co, 1st Weapons Battalion	4	124	128
75mm Recoilless Gun Co, 1st Weapons Battalion	4	81	85
5th Marines, 1st Marine Division	113	2,068	2181
Det, 1st Service Battalion, 1stMARDIV	9	156	165
Det, 1st Combat Service Group, FMF	4	100	104
1st Amphibious Truck Platoon, FMF	1	73	74
1st Amphibious Tractor Co, FMF	9	235	244
1st Platoon, 1st Reconnaissance Co, 1st Marine Division	2	35	37
1st MP Traffic Platoon, MP Co, 1st Marine Division	2	35	37

The fire brigade, as it was nicknamed, was plugged directly into the Pusan perimeter. The Brigade utilized organic trucks, and engineering equipment to establish a defensive perimeter. The fighting was bloody, fierce and constant. The Fire Brigade speed around the perimeter fighting back every NKPA break in the 50-mile long Pusan Perimeter. The logisticians plugged directly into the army supply system and kept the Fire Brigade supplied as best it could. The only contention between Army and Marine logisticians centered around the amount of artillery rounds consumed. The Marines used artillery to cover their maneuver in keeping with their doctrine; however, this caused the army heartache because it was difficult to keep pace with the rate of fire. Japan was a far distance and ships were hard to come by in Korea. The logistics units, task organized by Brigadier General Craig, were commanded by Captains and Lieutenants despite the fact that the other major subordinate commands were led by Lieutenant Colonels or Majors.[80] These Marines had to adapt their units to support the brigade and be prepared to pull support from Army units currently engaged on the Pusan perimeter

Operation CHROMITE

Planning for Inchon

[80] Hammes, 107.

BLUEHEARTS was never really forgotten by MacArthur. The General had to prevent the NKPA from destroying the 8th Army. Inchon, was it and he was sure of it. The JCS already provided the 1st Marine Division and the lead element was doing a fantastic job along the Pusan perimeter. However, MacArthur was constantly second-guessed by the JCS. The JCS just did not fully agree with landing at Inchon and wanted to change MacArthur's mind. So much so, that on August 23, 1950 the JCS flew to Japan to speak with General MacArthur. MacArthur entertained the Generals and Admirals and listened to the dozen or so planners layout why Inchon is destine to fail. They referred to the amphibious Bible—USF 6—and rattled off the problems. Inchon had the worst tides in the world. The ebb and flow of the ocean was thirty-two feet leaving a brief opening to land the forces and support the assault. Also, because the tides were so drastic, the speed of the current was eight knots. The landing craft's approach will be slow and susceptible to fire from the shore and Wolmi-Do. Furthermore, Wolmi-Do stands

like a guardian in the harbor capable of hiding a force that can pound the fleet even before making the approach to Inchon. If that was not enough reason, it was typhoon season in Korea and the harbor would suffer from those weather effects. Also, the port of Inchon at low tide was at best a muddy lagoon ringed by a ten-foot sea wall. All of which will be disastrous to any

Photo # NH 96876 Marines landing at Inchon, 15 September 1950

landing force. Lastly, Inchon harbor would be the easiest harbor to mine. The planners and the JCS were sure that MacArthur understood the safe gamble is to land at Kunsan to the south.

MacArthur sat in stoic fashion and then delivered a passionate speech about how Inchon will work. Every reason listed is exactly why the 1st Marine Division should land at Inchon. The NKPA will never expect a force to land there. The NKPA are putting their efforts into

driving the 8th Army into the sea. They have overextended their supply lines and are; therefore, susceptible to and envelopment much like the British General Wolfe landed below the cliffs of Quebec and defeated the Marquis de Montcalm in 1759. Montcalm, much like the NKPA are certain of the geographic obstacles and will not expect a force that deep to their rear. Landing anywhere else is operational suicide and will only result in more deaths. At the end of the speech the Admiral Struble stood and said that the Navy will get your force to Inchon. Shortly thereafter, the JCS approved the plan for landing one Corps and two Divisions in Inchon set for the middle of September.

Land the Landing Force and Support

General O.P. Smith and the 1st Marine Division was on its way to Korea. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was already in the Pusan perimeter and would join the Division just before Operation CHROMITE was scheduled to commence. General Walker was reluctant to give up the Brigade, but capitulated under the direction of MacArthur on September 13, 1950. The Brigade embarked on landing craft the same day and steamed into formation. The 1st Marine Division Headquarters had little time to plan and was passing orders with little feedback from subordinate commanders. There was little time to allow the back and forth normally associated with the planning process. Inchon was separated into three beaches, Red, Green and Blue beaches. Wolmi-Do or Green Beach, was assaulted by 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment and taken with little fanfare at precisely 0630 on September 15, 1950. The invasion fleet could do little, but wait until high tide occurred at 1900 to land the rest of the division. The rest of the Division landed, took about two hundred casualties securing the Port of Inchon. 1st Combat Service Group with the 1st Shore Party Battalion, the 1st Engineer Battalion, the 7th Pioneer

Battalion, 1st Motor Transport Battalion and 1st Medical Battalion provided all the logistical maneuver and support to the Division, however, all the logistics forces reported directly to the X Corps Commander.[81] The Corps has to establish the port, flow forces ashore and establish an effective distribution network to support the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division.[82] This remained in effect until X Corps secured Seoul on the September 22, 1950. The engineers remained at the port and focused on improving all the roads leading from the port to Seoul.[83] The Marine logisticians remained flexible, fluid and aggressive in a dynamic environment and offloaded thousands of Marines and soldiers, tons of ammunition, dry goods, fuel, water, ammunition and retrograded wounded or dead through the beach. There were no real collapses or failures to the support system engineered by the logisticians of the Division. The plan was helter-skelter at best and required the Marines to plug into all the services for support. They did so under the tutelage of seasoned Battalion Commanders, Company Commanders, SNCOs and NCOs. The Marines and sailors assigned to the logistics units moved 450 vehicles, 350,000 rations, 315, 000 gallons of fuel, 1,260 tons of ammunition, 10, 000 troops across a narrow beach choked by mud flats and accessible only by LSTs twice a day.[84] Also, the 2d Engineer Brigade assisted by the 7th Motor Transportation Battalion repaired the Inchon-Seoul rail line 25 days ahead of schedule. A feat accomplished with professionalism and dedication.

[81] Lynn Montross, and Nicholas A. Canzona, *US Marine Operations in Korea: 1950-1953*. 5 vols., (Austin, TX: R.J. Speights, 1992), 129.
[82] Ibid, 130.
[83] Ibid, 131.
[84] Ibid, 129.

Photo # 80-G-420027 LSTs unloading at Inchon, 15 September 1950

New Logistician 2025

Operation CHROMITE was a smashing success. Moreover, the support was difficult, but not insurmountable. Marines in the rifle companies designated a Marine to link with the Battalion to get much needed bullets, beans and bandages. The Battalion, Regiment and Division staff were accustomed to have a logistician apply art and science to ensure the success of a battle. A new breed of logistician appeared on the beaches of Inchon. A logistician familiar with the difficult terrain of supporting a force from the shore, but one that had to navigate a system of support with many moving pieces and legs. These moving pieces were held by other services requiring the logistician to be inquisitive and a quick study. Today's doctrine MCWP 4-

1 *Logistics Operations*, MCWP 4-12 *Operational-Level Logistics* and MCWP 4-11 *Tactical-Level Logistics* establish many brilliant options for logisticians at all levels of war. However, creating an effective logistics system is still just a fluid and elusive today as it was when Clausewitz and Jomini wrote about it in 19th century. Logistics Operations of the future will need a new breed of logistician for future wars beyond 2025. A merger of the Logistics MOS and Engineering MOS at the Officer level will allow combat service support units to plan, fight, and win the Marine Corps next battles. A sharp and inquisitive mind capable of distilling flaws or weaknesses within the system. One that can flow easily between transportation, general engineering, maintenance, supply, health services and services. This merger happens in theory today, but the Marine Corps should combine the entry level Logistics Officer School and Engineer Officer School into one. The Marine Corps would benefit with have a Marine Officer dedicated to engineering and logistics capable of commanding a truck platoon, landing support platoons, utilities platoon, combat engineering platoon, transportation company or engineer company. An engineer conversant in four facets of logistics will be much more effective when reaching Major and sits as the Battalion or Regiment Operations Officer and beyond as a Battalion, Regiment or Group commander. The landing at Inchon was supported by Marines who were initiated in the unknown. Marines who worked tirelessly in the muddy banks of the Inchon harbor to move bullets, beans and bandages to the front. The future fight will be in the same austere, unknown, fluid and nonlinear environment against an elusive and determined enemy. The future fight will require a quick thinking, determined, and hands-on Marine inquisitive enough to study the military arts and creative enough to adapt a system to support it.[85]

[85] Williamson Murray, *America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue*, (Stanford, CA: Hoover University Press, 2017), 147.

The education of the logistician is more often than not a proverbial baptism by fire, the remedy is to combine to two most significant parts of logistics: calculus and creativity.

Glossary

1st Cavalry Division	1st CAV
1st Marine Division	1st MARDIV
1st Provincial Marine Brigade	1st PMBde
1st Marine Regiment	1st MAR
5th Marine Regiment	5th MAR
7th Marine Regiment	7th MAR
24th Infantry Division	24th ID
25th Infantry Division	25th ID
7th Infantry Division	7th ID
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	CJCS
FEC	Far East Command
Joint Chiefs of Staff	JCS
Marine Air Ground Task Force	MAGTF
North Korean People's Army	NKPA (*In Min Gun*)
ROK	Republic of Korea (South Korea)
Truck Company	Truck Co
UN	United Nations

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